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PREFACE.
The following pages have been prepared with' a view to present
in a shape for practical use, the general rules:which must govern
the action of all authorities acting in matters of taxation. Had a
similar task been previously undertaken, the writer would gladly
have been spared the labor; but Mr. Blackwell's Treatise on Tax
Titles covers the ground only in part, and Judge Dillon, though
he has done valuable service in the same direction, has not, in his
work on Municipal Corporations, deemed it advisable to go beyond
what seemed necessary to a legitimate and perspicuous presenta
tion of that subject. Other writers have had occasion to discuss
only particular topics in the law of taxation, leaving a compre
hensive examination of the general subject to be still entered upon.
The decisions in this country on the subject of taxation have
become so numerous, that it would be impossible to give abstracts
of them all, within any reasonable compass. The author has
thought it preferable, instead of attempting a digest of them, to
group the references about the controlling principles. The tax
systems of the several states are so dissimilar, that a mere digest of
. the cases is exceedingly liable to mislead, by giving, as a general
rule of law, what is only a conclusion from a local law or custom.
There are, or should be, general principles underlying all the cases;
and an understanding of these will enable one to make use of
decisions under the various tax systems, without confusion.
The subject of taxation seems to invite some consideration of
questions of political economy; but these have been passed by
after bare mention, as not being necessarily involved in a discus
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sion of the legal points. They present considerations for the legis
lature in framing^tax laws; hut courts and ministerial officers must
enforce tax laws as they are, whether based on sound or unsound
principles of political economy.
The preparation of any treatise on .taxation necessarily involves
the presentation xjf dispiifeHp^mlsy^n^.-the expression of opinions
upon tisnl. TJhia has" been done. in the following pages. It has
not been the purpos"& Tjoto^vrH';; fo-.Vtfke any positions which it was
not believed Hie "authorities- .woujd justify; and if this has been
done in any instance, £heV£ eierenees which are made to authorities. . '. .
will doubtless enable the reader to detect the error. Possibly it
may be thought, that on some points, too much importance has
been attached to those fundamental principles which restrict the
power to tax. But when one considers how vast is this power,
how readily it yields to passion, excitement, prejudice or private
schemes, and to what incompetent hands its execution is usually
committed, it seems unreasonable to treat as unimportant, any
stretch of power — even the slightest —whether it be on the part
of the legislature which orders the tax, or of any of the officers
who undertake to give effect to the order. Especially is this so,
when it is understood how little restraint there can be on the igno
rant action of assessors, acting with jurisdiction, and how very
seldom an effectual remedy can be administered where fraud or
corruption exists. And as the benefits of republican government
have been reached through the efforts of the people to establish
and maintain the legitimate restraints upon the power to tax, it
seems unwise in a high degree, to slight or disregard any of the
checks which the law has provided, whether those which are
entrusted to the hands of the judiciary, or those which are the
lawful right of the people themselves, who are to bear the burden
of the particular tax.
Thomas M. Cooley.
University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, January, 1876.
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LAW OP TAXATION.
CHAPTER I.
TAXES, THEIR NATURE AND KINDS.
Definition. Taxes are defined as being the enforced propor
tional contribution of persons and property, levied by the author
ity of the state for the support of the government, and for all
public needs.1
They are the property of the citizen, demanded and received by
the government to be disposed of to enable it to carry into effect
its mandates, and to discharge its manifold functions.2 The jus-
1Opinions of Judges, 58 Me., 591. " The public revenues are a portion
which each subject gives of his property in order to secure and enjoy the re
mainder." Montesq. Spirit of the Laws, b. 13, ch. 1. " What are taxes but the
revenue collected from the people for objects in which they are interested ;
the contributions of the people for things useful and conducive to their wel
fare." Agnew, J., in Hilbish v. Catherman, 64 Penn. St., 154, 159. Blackwell,
in his Treatise on Tax Titles, p. 1, defines taxes as " burdens or charges im
posed by the legislative power of a state upon persons or property, to raise
money for public purposes." Substantially the same definition is given by
Field, Ch. J., in Perry v.Washburn, 20 Cal., 318, 350. And see Hanson v. Ver-
non, 27 Iowa, 28, 47, per Dillon, J.; Matter of Mayor, etc., of New York, 11
Johns., 77, 80; Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind., 62; Loan Association v. Topeka,
20 Wall., 655, 664, per Miller, J.; Philadelphia Association, etc., v. Wood, 39
Penn. St., 73, 82, per Lmorie, Ch. J.; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479, 489, per
Wagner, J. ; Exchange Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3 Ohio State, 1, 10, per
Bartley, Ch. J. ; Judd v. Driver, 1 Kan., 455, 462, per Kingman, J. In People
e. McCreery, 34 Cal., 432, 456, it is said a tax is " a charge levied by the sov
ereign power upon its subjects. It is not a charge upon its own property,
ner upon property over which it has no dominion." Per Rhodes, J.
»Opinions of Judges, 58 Me., 591 ; Davison v. Ramsay County, 18 Minn.,
482. " Tax legislation means the making of laws that are to furnish the
measure of every man's duty in support of the public burdens, and the means
of enforcing it." Philadelphia Association, etc. v., Wood, 39 Penn. St., 73, 82.
per Loarie, Ch. J.
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tification of the demand is to be found in the reciprocal duties of
protection and support between the state and its citizens, and the
exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction of the state over the per
sons and property within its territory. The citizen and the prop
erty owner owes to the government the duty to pay taxes, that
the government may be enabled to perform its functions, and he
is supposed to receive his proper and full compensation in the
protection which the government affords to his life, liberty and
property, and in the increase to the value of his possessions by
the use to which the money contributed is applied.1 ,
Taxes differ from subsidies, in being regular and orderly' and
they differ from the forced contributions, loans and benevolences
of arbitrary and tyrannical periods, in that they are levied by au
thority of law, and by some rule of proportion which is intended
to insure uniformity of contribution, and a just apportionment of
the burdens of government. In an exercise of the power to tax,
the purpose always is
,
that a common burden shall be sustained
by common contributions, regulated by some fixed general rule,
and apportioned by the law according to some uniform ratio of
equality.8 While therefore the power is great and imperative, it is
not arbitrary ; it rests upon fixed principles of justice, which have
for their object the protection of the tax payer against exceptional
and invidious exactions,4 and it is to have effect through estab-
1 People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419, 422, per Buggies, J. ; McKeen e. Dela
ware Division Canal Company, 49 Penn. St.. 524, per Agnew, J.
s Jacob's Law Die., " Tax ;" Bouvier's Law Die, " Tax ;" Tyson v. School
Directors, 51 Penn. St., 9. Tribute is often used as synonymous with tax, but
the more ordinary meaning is, an exaction demanded by a conqueror, or by
some external authority whose power is too great to be resisted ; an exaction
from "strangers" rather than from the "children." Matthew 17: 26. Law
less and arbitrary exactions are sometimes called tribute when made by the
constituted government; as in the remonstrances of the Spanish Cortes to
their sovereign against such demands. Hallam's Middle Ages, ch. IV.
8 Robertson, Ch. J., in Sutton's Heirs e. Louisville, 5 Dana, 28, 31 ; Dixm, Ch.
J., in Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock Co., 9 Wis., 410, 421 ; Christianey, J.,
in Woodbridge e. Detroit, 8 Mich., 274,301; Grim v. School District, 57 Penn.
St., 433.
4 " Whenever the property of a citizen shall be taken from him by the sover
eign will, and appropriated without his consent, to the benefit of the public,
the exaction should not be considered as a tax unless similar contributions
be made uy that public itself, or shall be exacted rather by the same public
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lished rules, operating impartially. The equity of a particular
exaction cannot support it
,
unless it is made in accordance with
law.1 Neither can the apparent injustice of a particular tax de
feat it
,
when it is demanded under general rules, which the wis
dom of the legislature has prescribed for the general good.2
To some taxes a particular designation is applied by which
they are commonly known and distinguished from other taxes.
Thus, the word duty has a meaning nearly synonymous with tax,
but in ordinary use it means an indirect tax, imposed on the
importation, exportation or consumption of good3. As thus
employed it has a broader meaning than custom, which is a duty
imposed on imports or exports.
The term impost also signifies any tax, tribute or duty, but
it is seldom applied to any but the indirect taxes. An excise duty
is an inland impost, levied upon articles of manufacture or sale,
and also upon licenses to pursue certain trades or to deal in
certain commodities. The term toll, in its application to the law
of taxation, is nearly obsolete. It was formerly applied to duties
on imports and exports, but tolls as now understood are confined
almost exclusively to charges for permission to pass over a bridge,
road or ferry owned by the party imposing them.8
The taxing power an incident to sovereignty. The power
o
f taxation is an incident of sovereignty, and is coextensive
with that of which it is an incident. All subjects, therefore, over
will from such constituent members of the same community generally as
own the same kind of property." Robertson, Ch. J., in Lexington «. McQuil
lan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513, 517.
1 However equitable it may be, a tax is void unless legally assessed. Joy-
ner v. School District, 3 Cush., 567, 572. As when it is demanded contrary to
agreement with the state, but to pay debts for which the state is liable for the
party taxed. Northern Missouri R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall., 46.
» It is no objection to a tax that the party required to pay it derives no ben-
cfit from the particular burden : e. g., a tax for school purposes levied upon a
manufacturing corporation. But in truth benefits always flow from the ap
propriation of public moneys to such purposes, which corporations in com
mon with natural persons receive in the additional security to their property
and profits. See Amesbury Nail Factory Co. v. Weed, 17 Mass., 52.
• See State v. Haight, 30 N. J., 447, 448. This case holds that railroad farai
are not tolls.
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which the sovereign power of the state extends are, in its discre
tion, legitimate subjects of taxation; and this may be carried to
any extent to which the government may choose to carry it.1 In
its very nature it acknowledges no limits, and the only security
against abuse must be found in the responsibility of the legislature
which imposes the tax to the constituency who are to pay it
The judiciary can afford no redress against oppressive taxation, so
long as the legislature, in imposing it
,
shall keep within the limits
of legislative authority.2 Even a wrongful government, if it main-
1 Marshall, Ch. J., in McCulloch e. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, 428, 429 ; Provi
dence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet., 514, 563; Charles River Bridge e. Warren
Bridge, 11 Pet., 420; Nathan e. Louisiana, 8 How., 73; Howell v. State, 3 GUI,
14; Atkins e. Hinman, 2 Gilm., 437, 449; Cheaney e. Hooser, 9 B. Honr., 330,
339; Perkins e. Milford, 59 Me., 315; People e. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419; Tall-
man v. Butler County, 12 Iowa, 531 ; Davenport v. Railroad Co., 16 Iowa, 348 ;
State v. Bell, 1 Phil., N. C, 76, 85; Pullen e. Commissioners of Wake County,
66 N. C, 361 ; Bridge Proprietors v. State, 21 N. J., 384, 386; S. C. on appeal,
22 N. J., 593 ; People v. Lawrence, 41 N. Y., 137, 141 ; Matter of Van Antwerp,
56 N. Y., 261; People e. Coleman, 4 Cel., 46; Taylor e. Palmer, 31 Cal., 240;
State v. Commercial Bank, 7 Ohio, 125; Hanna v. Allen County, 8 Blackf., 352.
"Power to tax is granted for the benefit of the whole people, and none have
any right to complain if the power is fairly exercised and the proceeds prop
erly applied to discharge the obligations tor which the taxes were imposed.
Such a power resides in the state government as part of itself, and needs not
to be reserved when property of any description is granted to individuals or
corporate bodies." Clifford, J., in North Missouri Railroad Co. v. Maguire,
20 Wall., 46, 60: "The declaration * * * that, ' no man's property shall be
taken or applied to public use without the consent of his representatives, and
without just compensation being made,' concedes no new right to the state,
but only regulates its exercise. This is aright inseparably connected with
sovereign power with or without its recognition by the constitution." M«Clure,
J., in Extension of Hancock Street, 18 Penn. St., 26, 30: see Bank of Pennsyl
vania e. Commonwealth, 19 Penn. St., 144. " By all the well settled and
acknowledged principles relating to the power of sovereign states, they have
the power to tax all persons or property within their jurisdiction." Poland,
J., in Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt., 152, 161; Blue Jacket e. Johnson County, 3 Kans.,
299 ; Hagar e. Supervisors of Yolo, 47 Cal., 222 ; Coite v. Society for Savings, 32
Conn., 173.
* " The judicial cannot prescribe to the legislative department of the govern
ment limitations upon the exercise of its acknowledged powers. The power to
tax may be exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of the
legislature is not to the courts but to the people by whom its members are
elected. So, if a particular tax bear heavily upon a corporation or class of
cor, orations, it cannot, for that reason only, be declared contrary to the con
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tains order, receives the obedience of the people, and exhibits a
capability of supporting itself by force of arms, may lay taxes,
though if overthrown before a levy is collected, the whole pro
ceedings must fall to the ground with the authority that insti
tuted them.1
Classification of taxes. Taxes are said to be
Direct, under which designation would be included those which
are assessed upon the property, person, business, income, etc., of
those who are to pay them ; and
Indirect, or those which are levied on commodities before they
reach the consumer, and are paid by those upon whom they ulti
mately fall, not as taxes, but as part of the market price of the
commodity. Under the second head may be classed the duties
upon imports, and the excise and stamp duties levied upon manu
factures.8 The individual states have always derived their prin
cipal revenue from direct taxes, and the federal government from
those which are indirect,8 but the power of each to levy taxes of
stitution." Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 548, per Chase, Ch. J. See Car-
roll v. Perry, 4 McLean, 25 ; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet., 449, 466 ; Lane County
v. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71, 77; Coite v. Society for Savings, 32 Conn., 173; Kirby
v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 238 ; Pittsburgh, etc., Railroad Co. v. Commonwealth, 66
Penn. St., 73; Hanna «. Allen County, 8 Blackf., 352; State v. Newark, 26 N.
J., 519; Tallman v. Butler County, 12 Iowa, 531 ; State «. Stephens, 4 Texas, 137,
139 ; Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev., 283, 306 ; Young v. Hall, 9 Nev., 212, 224 ; Williams
v. Cammack, 27 Miss., 209, 219. " The sovereign right to lay and collect taxes
grows out of the paramount necessities of government; an urgent necessity
which admits no property in the citizen whilst it remains unsatisfled." iVYsixtf,
J., in Parham v. Justices of Decatur, 9 Geo., 341, 352.
1 So held of a government set up in an attempted revolution which failed.
O'Byrne e. Savannah, 41 Geo., 331.
*Wayland's Pol. Econ., b. 4
,
ch. 2
,
g 1
.
See also 1 Kent's Com., 254 ; Story on
Const., § 950-957; 1 Montesq. Spirit of the Laws, b. 13, ch. 7
; Tucker's Pol.
Econ., ch. 14; Rogers' Pol. Econ., ch. 22. The term "direct taxes" is em
ployed in a peculiar sense in the federal constitution in the provision requiring
such taxes to be apportioned according to representation, and they are, per
haps, limited to capitation and land taxes. Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall.,
171; Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall., 433 ; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8
Wall., 533, 544.
8 One chief reason for resorting to indirect taxes is that this method enables
the government, in the language of Turgor, " to pluck the goose without mak.
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both descriptions is only restrained by certain principles of gov
ernment, and by constitutional provisions which will hereafter be
referred to.
Maxims of policy. "Writers on political economy lay down
certain principles which should govern the imposition of taxes, but
these are guides rather to the legislature than to the courts. The
author of the " Wealth of Nations," in particular, has enumerated
certain maxims, the substance of which may be stated as follows :
1. That the subjects of every state ought to contribute to the sup
port of the government as nearly as possible in proportion to the
revenue which they respectively enjoy under its protection. 2.
The tax which each is to pay ought, as respects the time and man
ner of payment, and the sum to be paid, to be certain and not
arbitrary. 3. It ought to be levied at the time and in the manner
in which it is most likely to be convenient to the contributor to
pay it ; and 4. It ought to be so contrived as both to take out
ing it cry out," since those who pay do not perceive, or at least do not refiect,
that a part of what they pay as price is really paid as a tax. Montesquein
says :
" There are two states in Europe where the imposts arc very heavy
upon liquors; in one the hrewer alone pays the duty, in the other it is
levied indiscriminately upon all the consumers; in the first, nobody feels
the rigor of the impost, in the second, it is looked upon as a grievance. In
the former, the subject is sensible only of the liberty he has of not pay
ing, in the latter, he feels only the necessity that compels him to pay."
Spirit of the Laws, b. 13, ch. 7. The merchants and others who were the
customers of Jewish money lenders in lawless times arc supposed to have
delighted in the plunder of the usurers, though they themselves were com
pelled to make it, good in the additional interest demanded of them to com.
pensate for the risks to which the lenders were exposed. Hallam's Middle
Ages, ch. 8, pt. 2.
Indirect taxation may be as just as any other, provided it is justly laid.
To make it just, it must reach everything of the class on which it is levied.
If it reaches a part only, it must generally be unjust, because, while increas
ing the price of that portion which is taxed, it enables the producers of or
dealers in that portion which is not taxed, to demand a similar price, and
thus operates as a bounty to one class of the community at the expense of
other classes. This is a perpetual difficulty attending the imposition of
duties on imports, when the laws are not strictly enforced ; the smuggler
either undersells the honest dealer, or, if he sells at the same price, adds the
an ount of the duties to his own profits, and to that extent has an advantage
in the market.
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and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible
over and above what it brings into the public treasury.1
1The following are the maxims in Mr. Smith's words:
" I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of the
government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities;
that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the
protection of the state. The expense of government to the individuals of a
great nation is like the expense of management to the joint tenants of a great
estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective in
terests in the estate. In the observation or neglect of this maxim consists
what is called the equality or inequality of taxation. Every tax, it must be
observed once for all, which falls finally upon one only of the three sorts of
revenue above mentioned [rent, profit, wages], is necessarily unequal, in so
far as it does not affect the other two. In the following examination of differ
ent taxes, I shall seldom take much further notice of this sort of inequality,
but shall, in most cases, confine my observations to that inequality which is
occasioned by a particular tax falling unequally upon that particular sort of
private revenue which is affected by it.
" II. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and
not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to
he paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor and to every other
person. Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more or
less in the power of the tax gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon
any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of such aggravation, some
present or perquisite to himself. The uncertainty of taxation encourages the
insolence and favors the corruption of an order of men who are naturalty un
popular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt. The certainty of
what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great im
portance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe,
from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small
degree of uncertainty.
" III. Every tax ought to be levied at the time or in the manner in which it
is most likely to be convenient to the contributor to pay it. A tax upon the
rent of lands or of houses, payable at the same term at which such rents are
usually paid, is levied at the time when it is most likely to be convenient for
the contributor to pay, or when he is most likely to have the wherewithal to
pay. Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles of luxury, are all
finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very conveni
ent for him. He pays them by little and little, as he has occasion to buy the
goods. As he is at liberty, too, either to buy or not to buy, as he pleases, it
must be his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable inconvenience from
such taxes.
"IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep
out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it
brings into the public treasury of the state. A tax may either take out or
keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the
s [CH. LLAW OV TAXATION.
Of these maxims, the wisdom of which has secured for them
universal acceptance,1 the second embodies a rule of absolute
right from which the authorities are not at liberty to depart ; the
first and third address themselves to the legislature which frames
the revenue laws; the fourth also appeals to the legislative wis
dom, and is perhaps less observed than either of the others, es
pecially in those states which have never burdened themselves
with heavy debts or been tempted into wild and extravagant ex
penditures. In such states a tendency has been apparent to heavy
accumulations of money in the state treasury ; accumulations not
only unjust to the people whom they deprive of the use of the
money taken from them for considerable periods, but especially
impolitic, as they tempt those having the custody of them to a
use of them in loans— possibly in speculations — which, when
not strictly within the law, is always demoralizing and often leads
to defalcations. The maxim which is alluded to would justify
public treasury in the four following ways : First. The levying of it may
require a great number of officers, whose salaries may eat up the greater part
of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose another addi
tional tax upon the people. Secondly. It may obstruct the industry of the
people, and discourage them from applying to certain brandies of business
which might give maintenance and employment to great multitudes. While
it obliges the people to pay, it may thus diminish, or perhaps destroy, some
of the funds which might enable them more easily to do so. Thirdly. By
the forfeitures and other penalties which those unfortunate individuals incur
who attempt unsuccessfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and
thereby put an end to the benefit which community might have received from
the employment of their capital. An injudicious tax offers a great tempta
tion to smuggling; but the penalties of smuggling must arise in proportion to
the temptation. The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice,
first creates the temptation and then punishes those who yield to it ; and it
commonly enhances the punishment too in proportion to the very circum
stance which ought certainly to alleviate it; the temptation to commit the
crime. Fourthly. By subjecting the people to the frequent visits and the
odious examination of the tax gatherers, it may expose them to much no-
necessary trouble, vexation and oppression; and though vexation is not,
strictly speaking, expense, it is certainly equivalent to the expense at which
every man would be willing to redeem himself from it. It is in some one or
other of these four different ways that taxes are frequently so much more bur
densome to the people than they are beneficial to the sovereign." "Wealth of
Nations, b. 4, ch. 2.
1See Mill's Pol. Econ., b. 5, ch. 2, § 2 ; Tucker's Pol. Econ., ch. 14 ; Rogers'
Pol. Econ., ch. 21.
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any state in having its treasury in condition at all times to meet
all possible calls upon it
,
but it would condemn emphatically any
exactions from the people in advance of any needs of the govern
ment1
All these maxims assume that the taxation is laid for the pur
pose of obtaining a revenue. Within the definitions given, the
burden would not be taxation, if revenue were not the purpose.
But in laying taxes other considerations not only are but ought
to be kept in view ; the question being always not exclusively
how a certain sum of money can be collected for public expendi
ture, but how, when, and upon what subjects it is wise and politic
to lay the necessary tax under the existing circumstances, having
regard not merely to the replenishing of the public treasury, but to
the general benefit and welfare of the political society, and taking
notice, therefore, of the manner in which the laying and collection
1 Provision is made by law in some states that the moneys in the treasury
may be deposited in banks at a low specified interest. The rate is so low as
to constitute a temptation to bankers to obtain it
,
and the fact that the office
of state treasurer is generally regarded as a prize beyond what the salary
would make it
,
is strong presumptive evidence that that officer expects to
make some profit to himself, either by obtaining a bonus from the favored
bank that receives the deposits, or by making loans at a higher rate than he
would be expected to account for to the state. That such loans are regarded
as impolitic is evidenced by the fact that under the statutes of a number of
the states, they would constitute criminal embezzlement; but that they are
frequently made is commonly believed. Yet it is within the observation of
all who have watched the course of public affairs, that legislation has some-
times been so shaped as to increase the already impolitic accumulations in
state treasuries, and tax payers have been hastened up in making their pay
ments by the imposition of heavy penalties for delay, when even the or
dinary interest exacted from the tax payer would have accorded better with
state policy than collecting the money in advance of state needs, in order that
it might be deposited in banks at a rate still lower. The impolicy of such
legislation has been intensified in some cases by provisions for which it is diffi
cult to account; so unjust are they, and of such doubtful validity. Allusion is
here made to laws imposing a penalty, payable to the state, on Ihose who shall
redeem their lands from a tax purchase made by an individual ; as if the state
had an interest in preventing any citizen who, by poverty or other cause,
had failed to pay his taxes in season, from saving his estate by a later pay
ment. That these heavy penalties have sometimes prevented redemptions
which otherwise would have been made — especially in the case of special
taxes, like those for building school houses or constructing drains — is not to
be doubted.
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of the tax will affect the several interests in the state. And upon
this it may be observed that :
1. In the laying of taxes, one purpose had in view may be to
encourage one branch of industry or trade, though at the expense
of another ; as where a tax is laid upon certain fabrics received
from abroad by the exchanges of commerce for the sake of encour
aging the domestic producer of similar articles, on whose industry
the tax operates as a bounty.1 Such a burden, however, may be
so heavy that the market will not warrant its being paid, and in
such case, instead of producing revenue it merely prohibits import
ation. But a law which, under the name of taxation, has for its
purpose only to embarrass and perhaps to destroy a certain branch
of commerce, if enacted by a state, would look to the general po
lice power for its justification, and if enacted by the general gov
ernment would seem more properly to derive its force from the
authority conferred upon the government to regulate commerce
and the intercourse with foreign countries, than to an authority
conferred for revenue purposes, which such a law would not aim
or tend to subserve.2
1Tucker's Pol. Econ., ch. 14. Mr. Justice Story in his Treatise on the Consti
tution, § 965, asserts very broadly the power to tax for other purposes than for
revenue. He says : " The absolute power to levy taxes includes the power in
every form in which it may be used, and for every purpose to which the legis
lature may choose to apply it. This results from the very nature of such an
unrestricted power. A fortiori, it might be applied by congress to purposes
for which nations have been accustomed to apply it. Now, nothing is more
clear from the history of commercial nations, than the fact that the taxing
power is often, very often, applied for other purposes than revenue. It is often
applied as a regulation of commerce. It is often applied as a virtual prohi
bition upon the importation of particular articles, for the encouragement and
protection of domestic products and industry; for the support of agriculture,
commerce and manufactures (Hamilton's Reports on Manufactures in 1791) ;
for retaliation upon foreign monopolies and injurious restrictions (See Mr.
Jefferson's Report on Commercial Restrictions, in 1793 ; 5 Marshall's Life of
Washington, ch. 7, pp. 482 to 487; 1 Wait's State Papers, 422, 434); for mere
purposes of state policy and domestic economy; sometimes to banish a nox-
ious article of consumption ; sometimes as a bounty upon an infant manufac
ture, or agricultural product; sometimes as a suppression of particular em
ployments; sometimes as a prerogative power to destroy competition and se
cure a monopoly to the government. (See Smith's Wealth of Nations, b. 5,
ch.2, art. 4.)"
s Chief Justice Marshall says in McCullough v. Maryland, that " the power
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2. They may be intended to discourage trades and occupations
which may be useful and important when carried on by a few per
sons under stringent regulations, but exceedingly mischievous
when thrown open to the general public and engaged in by many
persons. An example is the heavy tax imposed in some states
and in some localities of other states on those who engage in the
manufacture or sale of intoxicating drinks. Two purposes are
generally had in view in imposing such a tax : to limit the busi
ness to a few persons, in order to more efficient and perfect regu
lation, and also to produce a revenue. As no one will pay the
tax who does not expect to be reimbursed the expense from the
profits of sales, it is obvious that the heavier the tax the fewer can
afford to pay it
,
and it may be made so heavy that no one can
afford to pay it
,
and then it becomes prohibitory. A tax laid for
the double purpose of regulation and revenue must be grounded
in both the police and the taxing power ; but the grant of a pow
er to tax would not authorize the imposition of a burden in its
nature and purpose prohibitory.1
to tax involves the power to destroy." And again, " if the right to tax exists,
it is a right which in its nature acknowledges no limits. It may be carried
to any extent within the jurisdiction of the state or corporation which imposes
it
, which the will of such state or corporation may prescribe." Weston «.
Charleston, 2 Pet., 449. The learned Chief Justice in these cases was arguing
against the existence of the power; and the idea he expresses so forcibly is that
the power to tax is so vast, and rests upon reasons which at times are so im
perative that it may be exercised again and again, as the exigencies of the
state may demand, until the property taxed is exhausted or the privilege taxed
can no longer be exercised. This statement has abundant illustrations in his
tory, of people absolutely impoverished by taxation, and even, in individual
cases, sold into slavery because they could not meet the demands of the state
upon them. It may justly be questioned, whether this strong statement, which
was put forth as a defense against an injurious tax, will fairly justify an affirm
ative exercise of power that has not revenue in view, but is only called a tax
in order that it may be employed as an instrument of destruction. In other
words, whether the unavoidable incident to the exercise of a power to demand
and collect revenue, can lawfully be the inducement to the exercise of the
power when revenue is not contemplated or sought.
1 So held in Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala., 461. The early case of State e. Doon,
R M. Charl., 1, affirmed the right to levy a tax of $1,000 on faro tables for the
purpose of prohibition, though the payment of the tax would not legalize the
use of the tables.
12 [CH. I .LXW OF TAXATION.
Taxes in kind. Taxes are generally demanded in money,
and any tax law will be understood to require money when a
different intent is not expressed.1 But if the condition of any
state, in the judgment of its legislature, shall require the collec
tion of taxes in kind— that is to say, by the delivery to the proper
officers of a certain proportion of products — or in gold or silver
bullion, or in anything different from the legal tender currency
of the country, the right to make the requirement is unquestion
able, being in conflict with no principle of government, and with
no provision of the federal constitution. Instances of taxes in
kind occurred in the colonial period,2 and statutes requiring state
taxes to be paid in gold and silver, to the exclusion of legal tender
treasury notes, have been fully sustained in several of the states.8
Labor is sometimes required as a tax, but such requirement has
usually been confined to the labor needed to keep the highways
in repair, and it is a peculiar tax, to some extent at least in the
nature of a police regulation ; and the ordinary tax regulations do
not embrace a burden of this nature, except as it may be ex
pressly named.4
1Amenia v. Stanford, 6 Johns., 92 ; Bryan v. Sundberg, 5 Tex., 418 ; Judd v.
Driver, 1 Kan., 455.
s Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71 ; Williams's Case, 3 Bland Ch., 186, 255 ;
2 Rives' Life of Madison, 146. An early tax by the French government in
Canada was of a certain proportion of all the beaver skins and moose hides.
Parkman's Old Regime, 302.
8Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal., 318, 350; State Treasurer «. Wright, 28 11l.,
512 ; Trenholm «. Charleston, 3 S. Car. (N. S.), 347, 349 ; Whittaker e. Haley, 2
Oregon, 128; Lane County e. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71. It has been decided that
a state cannot compel state script to be received in payment of county, school
and district taxes; it not being money, and the creditors of the municipali
ties not being compellable to receive it in payment. Wells v. Cole, 27 Ark.,
603.
4 In Sawyer v. Alton, 3 Scam., 127, 130, a provision of the constitution that
" the mode of levying a tax shall be by valuation, so that every person shall
pay a tax in proportion to the value of the property he or she has in his or
her possession," was held not to prevent the levy of a poll tax payable in
labor. In Town of Pleasant v. Kost, 29 1ll., 490, 494, a highway assessment
on property, payable in labor, was held not to be in the proper sense a tax.
And see Fox v. Rockford, 38 11l., 451; State v. Halifax, 4 Dev., 345. In Over-
seers of Amenia v. Overseers of Stanford, 6 Johns., 92, 93, where the ques
tion was whether one who had worked out a highway poll tax had gained a
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Taxes not debts. Taxes are not debts in the ordinary sense
of that term, and their collection will in general depend on the
remedies which are given by statute for their enforcement
Where no remedy is specially provided, a remedy by suit may
fairly be implied, but when one is given which does not embrace
an action at law, a tax cannot in general be recovered in a com
mon law action as a debt.1 Taxes are not demands against which
a setoff is admissible,2 their assessment does not constitute a tech
nical judgment, nor are they "contracts between party and party,
either express or implied ; but they are the positive acts of the
settlement under a statute which made the settlement depend on the payment
of a tax, it is said, "Taxes, in the popular and ordinary sense of the term
(and in that sense laws are generally to be read), mean pecuniary contribu
tions; and when the word paid is added by way of defining it
,
the sense be
comes more clear and certain." It was therefore held that a settlement was
not gained by working out a highway assessment. And see Starkesboro v.
Heinesburgh, 13 Vt., 215. An assessment of four dollars or two days' work on
each male resident over 21 and under 60, was held to be a poll tax, and as
such forbidden by the constitution of Nevada. Hassett v. Walls, 9 Nev., 387.
1 Ruddock v. Gordon, Quincy's Rep., 58 ; Andover Turnpike v. Gould, 6
Mass., 39, 44; Pierce v. Boston, 3 Met., 520; Crapo v. Stetson, 8 id., 393; Ap-
pleton v. Hopkins, 5 Gray, 530; Dunlap e. Gallatin County, 15 11l., 7
;
Dennis
v. Maynard, id., 477; Cumden v. Allen, 26 N. J., 398; "Webster v. Seymour, 8
Vt, 135, 140; Shaw v. Pickett, 26 id., 482; Packard v. Tisdale, 50 Me., 376;
Carondelet «. Picott, 38 Mo., 125: Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal., 318; Richards
v. Stogsdell, 21 Ind., 74; McCall v. Lorrimer, 4 Watts, 351; Miller v. Hale, 26
Penn. St., 432 ; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71, 80. Compare Duraut e. Su
pervisors, 26 Wend., 66. In Baltimore v. Howard, 6 H. & J., 383-394, it is
said by Buchanan, Ch. J., that if an act authorizes a tax but gives no remedy
for its collection, assumpsit will lie for its recovery. Other cases recognize
the right to maintain an action for taxes, and treat the statute remedy as cu
mulative merely. See Dugan v. Baltimore, 1 Gill & J., 499; in which the
court say the imposition and assessment of .the tax "created the legal obliga
tion to pay on which the law raised an assumpsit," notwithstanding the stat
ute gave a special remedy. And see State v. Steamship Co., 13 La. An., 497. It
'
has been decided in Vermont that if a tax be duly assessed against a feme
sole who afterwards marries, the. husband's property, including the personal
property acquired by the marriage, is not liable to be distrained for the satis
faction of the tax. Sumner v. Pinney, 31 "Vt., 717. Taxes do not draw inter
est as contracts, but only when it is expressly given. Haskell v. Bartlett, 31
Cal., 281 ; Himmelman v. Oliver, 34 id., 246.
»Trenholm e. Charleston, 3 S. Car. (N. S.), 394; McCracken v. Elden, 34
Penn. St., 239; Pierce v. Boston, 3 Met., 520; Johnson v. Howard, 41 Vt, 122;
Himmelman e. Spanagel, 39 Cal., 389.
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government through its various agents, binding upon the inhabi
tants, and to the making and enforcing of which their personal
consent individually is not required." 1 And the law abolishing
imprisonment for debt has no application to taxes, the remedy for
the collection of which may include an arrest if the legislature
shall so provide.2 The repeal of a tax law before the tax is col
lected puts an end to the tax itself, where no rights are reserved in
the repealing act, and nothing in the act indicates a contrary intent8
Taxation and protection reciprocal. The protection of
the government being the consideration for which taxes are de
manded, all parties who receive or are entitled to that protec
tion, may be called upon to render the equivalent.4 The protec
tion may be either to the rights of person, or to rights in property,
and taxes may consequently be imposed when either person or
property is within the jurisdiction. But a personal tax cannot be
assessed against a nonresident,' neither can the property of a non-
1Pierce v. Boston, 3 Met., 520, per Shaw, Ch. J. ; Perry e. "Washburn, 20
Cal., 318; Webster v. Seymour, 8 Vt., 135, 140; Johnson v. Howard, 41 Vt, 122.
»Appleton v. Hopkins, 5 Gray, 530 ; Harris v. Wood, 6 T. B. Monr., 641.
•Howe v. Starkweather, 17 Mass., 240; Fenelon's Petiti 1n, 7 Penn. St., 173;
Augusta v. North, 57 Me., 392; Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 71 N. C, 400;
Abbott v. Britton, 23 La. An., 511; McQuilkin v. Doe, 8 Blackf., 581; Mount
e. State, 6 id., 25 ; Ross v. Lare, 3 S. & M., 695. In Warren R. R. Co. v. Bel-
videre, 35 N. J., 584, it was decided that the tax might still be collected.
4The right to tax an individual results from the general protection afforded
to himself and his property. Vattel, b. 1, ch. 20. See Eggleston v. Charleston,
1 S. Car. Const. Rep., 45 ; Bank of U. S. v. State, 12 S. & M., 456; De Pauw v.
New Albany, 22 Ind., 204.
One who is not taxed is just as much entitled to the protection of govern
ment as one who is. Every resident of the state, and every owner of property
therein is liable to taxation, and it is this liability that entitles him to protec
tion, and not the fact that he is actually taxed. Some persons are never taxed,
because they do not come within any of the rules which the state has pre
scribed for the apportionment of its burdens. But the state prescribes these
rules in the discretion of its legislature; and it prescribes them in contempla
tion of its obligation to give impartial protection to all persons. If one in
his person, business or property comes within these rules, he must pay the
tax; if he does not, he is guilty of no neglect of duty, and chargeable with no
fault for not paying one. Youngblood e. Sexton, Sup. Ct. Mich., Oct. Term, 1875.
5Dow v. Sudbury, 5 Met., 73 ; Herriman v. Stowers, 43 Me., 497 ; People v. Su
pervisors of Chenango, 11 N. Y., 563; St. Paul e. Merritt, 7 Minn., 258.
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resident be taxed unless it has an actual situs within the state, so
as to be under the protection of its laws.1 The mere right of a
foreign creditor, to receive from his debtor within the state the
payment of his demand, cannot be subjected to taxation within
the state. " It is a right that is personal to the creditor where he
resides, and the residence or place of business of his debtor is im
material. The power of taxation, however vast in its character,
and searching in its extent, is necessarily limited to subjects within
the jurisdiction of the state. These subjects are persons, property
and business. Whatever form taxation may assume, whether as
duties, imposts, excises or licenses, it must relate to one of these
subjects. It is not possible to conceive of any other, though as
applied to them, the taxation may be exercised in a great variety
of ways. It may touch property in every shape, in its natural
condition, in its manufactured form, and in its various transmuta
tions. And the amount of the taxation may be determined by
the value of the property, or its use, or its capacity, or its produc
tiveness. It may touch business in the almost infinite forms in
which it is conducted, in professions, in commerce, in manufac
tures, and in transportation. Unless restrained by provisions of
the federal constitution, the power of the state as to the mode, form
and extent of taxation is unlimited, where the subjects to which it
applies are within her jurisdiction."2 These are conceded or ad
judged principles, and have ceased to be the subject of discussion
or argument Corporations, it is also conceded, may be taxed
like natural persons on their property and business. But debts
owing to foreign creditors by either corporations or individuals,
are not the subject of taxation. The creditor cannot be taxed,
because he is not within the jurisdiction, and the debts cannot be
taxed in the debtors' hands, through any fiction of the law which
is to treat them as being, for this purpose, the property of the
debtors. They are not property of the debtors in any sense ; they
are the obligations of the debtors, and only possess value in the
1That personalty may be taxed where it is, though the owner is a nonresi
dent; see ch. IJI. Personal allegiance has no necessary connection with the
right of taxation. An alien may be taxed as well as a citizen. See Wither-
spoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall., 210.
* State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall., 300, 319. See Oliver v. Wash-
ington Mills, 11 Allen, 265.
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hands of the creditors. With them they are property,
" but to
call them property in the hands of the debtors is simply to misuse
terms."1 Shares in a corporation are also the shares of the stock
holder wherever he may have his domicile, and if taxed to him
as his personal estate, can only be so taxed by the jurisdiction to
which his person is subject, whether the corporation be foreign or
domestic*
If it were practicable to do so, the taxes levied by any govern
ment ought to be apportioned among the people according to the
benefit which each receives from the protection the government
affords him ; but this is manifestly impossible. The value of life
and liberty, and of the social and family rights and privileges can
not be measured by any pecuniary standard ;8 and by the general
consent of civilized nations, income or the sources of income are
almost universally made the basis upon which the ordinary taxes
1Case of State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall., 300, 319, 320, per Field,
J., overruling several Pennsylvania cases. See also Hayne v. Deliesseline,
3 McCord,374; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268.
»Great Barrington v. County Commissioners, 16 Pick., 572 ; Newark City Bank
e. The Assessor, 30 N. J., 13; State v. Branin, 23 N. J., 484; State v. Bentley,
23 id., 532; Whitsell v. Northampton County, 49 Peun. St., 526; post ch. III.
This statement must, however, be subject to the qualification that a foreign
corporation must always accept the privilege of transacting business in a state,
on such terms as the state may see fit to exact.
«Mr. Thorold Rogers says, in his Treatise on Political Economy, that if tax
ation were determined by the comparative protection accorded to individuals,
women and children should pay a higher rate than strong and healthy adults,
since they have more need of assistance; and, if the law be effectual, get
more. And this, he shows, was in fact the theory of medieval (feudal) finance.
"The lord protected his vassal, the vassal assisted his lord by his service or
by his purse. But minors under the English military tenures, and women
under some forms of the military assize, were in the hands of guardians, who
were enabled to take the rents or profits of their estates, without account, dur
ing legal incapacity. The reason given was that there was no reciprocity of
service in these cases, and the plea might be justified, because, in an age of
violence, weakness taxes the energies of defense more than it excites the senti
ment of pity. A more generous and less utilitarian theory has gradually pre
vailed. It is held that for practical purposes, and under the conditions of or
ganized society, the strongest is too much indebted to the security which a
wise and just government gives, to allow any such comparison between his
condition and the condition of the weakest, as shall tend to lay a heavier im
post on the latter." Ch. 21. See also Mill, Pol. Econ., b. v. ch. 2, § 3.
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are estimated. This is upon the assumption, never wholly true in
point of fact, but sufficiently near the truth for the practical oper
ations of government, that the benefit received from the govern
ment is in proportion to the property held, or the revenue enjoyed
under its protection j1 and though this can never be arrived at with
accuracy, through the operation of any general rule, and would
not be wholly just if it could be, experience has given us no bet
ter standard, and it is applied in a great variety of forms, and with
more or less approximation to justice and equality. But, as before
stated, other considerations are always admissible ; what is aimed
at is
,
not taxes strictly just, but such taxes as will best subserve
the general welfare of the political society.2
1 " The idea of property consists in an established expectation, in the persua
sion of being able to draw such or such an advantage from the thing possessed,
according to the nature of the case. Now this expectation, this persuasion,
can only be the work of the law. I cannot count upon the enjoyment of that
which I regard as mine, except through the promise of the law which guaran
ties it to me. It is law alone which permits me to forget my natural weak
ness. It is only through the protection of the law that I am able to inclose a
field, and to give myself up to its cultivation with the sure though distant
hope of harvest." * * " Property and law are born together and die to
gether. Before laws were made there was no property ; take away laws and
property ceases." Bentham, Theory of Legislation. Works, Edinb. ed., vol.
I, p. 308. And speaking of the right to property, he justly adds: "It is that
right which has vanquished the natural aversion to labor ; which has given
to man the empire of the -earth ; which has brought to an end the migra
tory life of nations ; which has produced the love of country and a regard
for posterity." See Wayland, Pol. Econ., b. 4
, ch. 3, § 1 ; Rogers' Pol. Econ.,
ch. 21.
• An early Maryland law recited that, " fines, duties or taxes may properly
and justly be imposed or laid with a political view for the good government
and benefit of the community." Upon this Chancellor Bland comments as
follows: "A citizen may have a fine imposed upon him as a punishment for
his misdemeanor or crime ; a duty may be imposed as a means of insuring
good conduct, and in aid of the police, as in the form of a duty for a license to
keep a tavern, to retail spirituous liquors, to keep a billiard table, etc. ; a treble
tax may be imposed with a political view, as upon non-jurors during a war,
etc." Williams's Case, 3 Bland Ch., 186, 257. In the same case the learned
Chancellor refers to statutes of the colony which taxed bachelors as such.
This was not because they had more to be protected by the government than
other persons, but probably from a variety of reasons, one of the most influ
ential being that presumptively, they were better able to ty^r the burdens of
government, than men with families dependent upon the'j, or unmarried fe
males whose income would commonly be less.
2
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The taxes governments have been accustomed to lay.
In modem times, governments have been accustomed to levy a
great variety of taxes ; sometimes relying upon a single kind for
all the needs of the state, and sometimes levying a number of dif
ferent kinds with a view to distribute the burden more equally or
more to the general acceptance. None of these can invariably
operate justly, but all have advantages that may make one desir
able under one set of circumstances, and another the best when
circumstances have changed. Those which have been most com
mon will be briefly referred to.
Capilation Taxes. These are not a common resort in modern
times,1 and only in a few cases could they be either just or poli
tic. As they regard only the person, they must be shared equally
by all, except under governments where privileged orders are
recognized, and where they might be graded according to the or
ders to which the several persons taxed belong. If the tax is
graded by property, it is obviously something besides a capitation
tax.
Land Taxes. These may be measured by the production, by
the rent, or by the value. The first method has seldom been re
sorted to in eulightened periods.2 To some extent it would op
erate as a discouragement to industry ; and, while it might not be
burdensome to the cultivators of very productive estates, it might
preclude poor lands, whose production would barely pay for cul
tivation, from being cultivated at all ; in other words, would be
equal to the whole rental value. A tax, measured by rents, will
usually come nearer to being a tax on the actual revenue of the
land proprietor ; and this standard is more common. A variety
of land taxes, under different names, has been levied in Eng-
1The taxes assessed by this name have not always been taxes levied on per
sons, but sometimes taxes exacted from districts or provinces, and measured
by the «apita. Such were the capitation taxes levied under the Roman Em
pire, in apportioning which among individuals, one might represent several
«apita, according to his wealth in land, while others escaped the tax entirely.
Gibbon's Decline and Fall, ch. 17.
»It was made use of under the Roman Empire. Gibbon's Decline and Fall,
ch. i7. It has been occasionally employed in recent times. Tithes for the
support of the Established Church in England were so measured.
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land, merging at last in a general land tax, measured by rent, and
apportioned to the municipal divisions. As, however, this tax is
based upon valuations made in the fourth year of William and
Mary (1692), it is extremely unequal, and perhaps only continues
to be acquiesced in because a very small portion only of the whole
revenue is raised by it.1 In this country, land taxes are com
monly laid by value. This is subject to some objections. In
order to insure equality, it is necessary, in a new and rapidly im
proving country, that there should be frequent valuations, and
this requires a great official force, and involves heavy expense.
The apportionment of this expense among towns or other small
divisions of territory, the people of which are allowed to choose
jhe officers, reconciles them to the burden, and, in many of the
states, a new valuation is made annually.2 An objection, theo
retically more serious, is
,
that a tax by assessed value is often
(where the land is poor and unproductive, or where it is wild and
uncultivated) a tax which i
s paid from capital instead of from
revenue. A tax to be thus paid cannot long continue, and is sel
dom to be purposely laid ; but, in particular instances, almost
any tax will be such. And in this country, where a considerable
portion of the community invest in lands with a view to profit
from the rise in value, unproductive and uncultivated lands can
not be exempted from taxation because of the hardships of indi
vidual cases, without exempting a large portion of the wealth of
the state now legitimately invested where it is insuring large
profits to the owner.
Taxes on Houses. These, except where the houses are treated
as appurtenances to the lands, have been measured by rents, and
1 1 Bl. Com., 307; 1 Broom & Hadley's Com., 368, 372.
* In the light of the experience we have of the American system, it is inter
esting to note what is said by Adam Smith: "A land tax assessed accord-
ding to a general survey and valuation, how equal soever it may be at first,
must, in the course of a very moderate period of time, become unequal. To
prevent its becoming so would require the continual and painful attention of
government to all the variations in the state and produce of every different
farm in the country," * * "an attention so unsuitable to the nature of
government, that it is not likely to be of long continuance, and which, if it is
continued, will probably, in the long run, occasion much more trouble and
vexation than it can possibly bring relief to the contributors." Wealth ci
Nations, b. v, ch. 2, pt. 2.
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sometimes by hearths and windows. A hearth tax was obnoxious,
because, among other reasons, it involved inquisitorial visits of
officers to inspect rooms; and both hearth and window taxes
tended to limit among the poor the use of these conveniences, so
important not only to comfort, but to health. Both are now
abolished in England.
Taxes on Income. These may be on all incomes, or on all with
such exemption as will enable the tax payer in a frugal manner to
support himself and his family. The latter is the course usually
adopted, and in some cases incomes in excess of the exemption have
been taxed a larger percentage as they increased in amount The
reasons which favor this discrimination would also justify a heavier
proportionate tax on the thrifty classes in other cases ; and the prin
ciple once admitted there is no reason but its own discretion why
the legislature should stop short of imposing the whole burden of
government on the few who exhibit most energy, enterprise and
thrift Such a discrimination is a penalty on the possession of these
qualities. But any income tax is also objectionable, because it is
inquisitorial, and because it teaches the people evasion and
fraud. No means at the command of the government has ever
enabled it to arrive with anything like accuracy at the incomes of
its citizens, and they resist its inquisitions in all practical modes,
not only because they desire to avoid as far as possible the public
burdens which they are certain are not to be equally imposed, but
also because they are not willing that their private affairs and the
measure of their prosperity should be exposed to the public.1 The
taxes imposed on incomes by the United States during and im
mediately following the late war were escaped by a large propor
tion of those who should have paid them, and the assessors' re
turns were a wholly inadequate indication of the annual private
revenue of the country. In the United States, also, such a tax is
unequal because those holding lands for the rise in value escape
it altogether — at least until they sell, though their actual increase
in wealth may be great and sure.
Taxes on Employments. A tax on the privilege of carrying on
1Gibbon refers to torture employed under the Empire to ascertain the prof
its of employments. See Decline and Fall, ch. 17. Its employment upon the
Jews in England is a familiar fact in history.
eh. l] 21TAXES, THEIR NATURE AND KINDS.
a business or employment will commonly be imposed in the form
of an excise tax on the license to pursue the employment ; and
this may be a specific sum, or a sum whose amount is regu
lated by the business done or income or profits earned. Some
times small license fees are required, mainly for the purpose of
regulation, but in other cases substantial taxes are demanded be
cause the persons upon whom they are laid would otherwise
escape taxation in the main, if not entirely. Instances of hawk
ers, peddlers, auctioneers, etc. will readily occur to the mind.
The form of a license, though not a necessary, is a convenient
form for such a tax to assume, because it then becomes a condi
tion to entering upon the business or employment, and is collected
without difficulty. But it is equally competent to impose and
collect the tax by the usual methods.1
Taxes on the Carriage of Property. There are various methods
of imposing these ; as by licensing the business, by taxing the
vehicles employed, by tonnage duties, etc. As to tonnage duties,
the powers of the states are restricted as is elsewhere shown.
Taxes on the Wages of Labor. These, in a country where wages
are only sufficient to supply the absolute needs of life, would neces
sarily fall on the employer ; but when the accumulations o£ labor
are relied upon for a competency and even for wealth, the burden
might be more felt by the laborer. Iu modern times such taxes
have been unusual.
Taxes on Servants, Horses, Bogs, Carriages, etc. These are in
tended as taxes on luxury and ostentation, and can seldom prove
1In Ould v. Richmond, 23 Grat., 464, 468, a city tax on lawyers was con
tested for the reason, among others, that the persons taxed held a Uceme from
the state to practice law, and the municipal tax went to nullify it. Anderson,
J., says : "Whilst a lawyer's license authorizes him to practice law in any
court of the commonwealth, and it is not in the power of any municipality to
deprive him of that right, or to take away his license, it is a civil right and
privilege to which are attached valuable immunities and pecuniary advant
ages, and is a fair subject of taxation by the state, or by a municipal corpora
tion where he resides and enjoys the privilege. It is a vested civil right ; yet
it is as properly a subject of taxation as property to which a man has a vested
right. I cannot perceive that there would not be as much reason for saying
that a man's property is not taxable, because he has a vested right to it
,
as for
saying that a lawyer's license is not taxable because he has a vested right to
it." And see Youngblood v. Sexton, Mich. Sup. Ct., Oct. 1875.
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burdensome. Each person assesses himself in determining how"
many he will employ or own. The same may be said of taxes on
plate and articles of display, when taxed directly.
Taxes on Vie Interest of Money. These are objectionable for the
same reasons that apply to income taxes. They lead to the same
evasions, and to some others which it is impossible to check or
circumvent They are seldom levied eo nomine.
Taxes on Dividends are more easily collected and do not usually
involve inquisitorial proceedings. Dividends come from corpora
tions whose proceedings are usually semi-public, and while the
privacy of individuals is not invaded, neither are the demands of
the government liable to serious evasions. This is a common
method of raising revenue.
Taxes on Legacies and Inheritances.1 These are laid in diminu
tion of a new capital which now comes to the hands of parties on
the death of former owners ; and in theory they should not be
burdensome. In fact, however, except when they are upon gifts
by will to others than the immediate family, or are on collateral
inheritances, they are likely to be felt severely. The property
held by the head of the family, is usually, for all purposes of
supplying comforts and enjoyments, the property of all the fam
ily ; and a tax upon their succession to it on his death, comes in a
time of unusual necessary disbursements to increase the embar
rassments and burdens which accompany the loss of their main
reliance and support. Sometimes these taxes are levied on testa
mentary gifts and collateral successions only.
Taxes on Sales, Bills of Exchange, etc These when laid on the
instruments by means of which business is transacted, and im
posed in the form of stamp duties, have the high recommendation
1In Eyre v. Jacobs, 14 Grat., 422, a tax on collateral inheritances was ob
jected to as opposed to the requirement that taxation of property should be
uniform. But the tax was sustained as not being a tax on property, but on
the privilege of succeeding to the inheritance. The tax is spoken of in the
case by Lee, J., as one of great antiquity, imposed upon the Romans as early
as the days of the Emperor Augustus, and often in early times by nations of
Europe, as well as in modern times. See also Williams's Case, 3 Bland. Ch.,
186, 259. A similar objection to such a tax in Tyson v. State, 28 Md., 577, was
also overruled.
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that the cost of collection is but a small percentage of the sum
realized, and few evasions of payment are practicable. They
are besides paid in small sums, as business transactions take
place from time to time, and are therefore not much felt
Indeed oh many accounts they are the least objectionable taxes
that can be levied ; and the repeal of the most of those which
were levied by federal authority in this country is probably due
to the strong interest in favor of taxation calculated to aid par
ticular branches of trade.
Taxes on Newspapers. These would be likely to be imposed in
the form of stamp taxes. The objections are very obvious, and
were thought to be conclusive in this country even when the need
of revenue was the greatest
Taxes on Legal Process. These are usually imposed with a
view to adjusting, on an equitable basis, as between suitors and
the public, the expenses of the administration of justice. They
may be imposed as stamp fees on process, fees for permission to
enter a suit, etc.1
Taxes on Consumable Luxuries. Articles like spirituous and
malt liquors, tobacco, etc., are generally subjected to heavy taxa
tion as constituting mere luxuries, so that however severe may be
1There arc express constitutional provisions for such taxation in Georgia,
Nebraska, Nevada and Wisconsin. That they may be laid without any such
express authority, see Harrison v. Willis, 7 Heiskell, 35. The right is easier
defended than the policy, as the tax, if heavy, may in some cases be equiva
lent to a denial of justice. The heaviest taxes of this description have been
those indirectly imposed. in the form of fees to judicial officers. For several
centuries such fees in England constituted the principal compensation of the
judges: the regular salaries even of those of the highest courts being insig
nificant. Adam Smith found an advantage in this, for he says it happened
that each of the superior courts of Westminster " endeavored by superior dis
patch and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could. The
present admirable constitution of the courts of England was perhaps origi-
nally in a great measure formed by this emulation, which anciently took place
between their respective judges, each judge endeavoring to give in his own
court the speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit for
every sort of injustice." Wealth of Nations, b. v, ch. 1, pt 2. These in-
significant salaries continued until the 17th century. At times in this coun
try an idea has prevailed that the courts should be made self-supporting; and
in the case of the justices' courts this is now the general rule, at least as re
gards their civil jurisdiction.
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the tax, it will never, of necessity, prove burdensome to the needy
classes. The taxes are laid in various forms ; on the importation,
the manufacture, and the sale. In the United States the inclina
tion of late has been to make the tax on spirituous liquors as
heavy as can be collected; but experience demonstrates that a
point may be reached where any accession to the tax, by increas
ing the temptations to fraud and evasion, will tend to lessen the
amount collected. Indeed the same may be said of all taxes ;
the higher they are, the more numerous will be the frauds, perju
ries, betrayals of official trust, and evasions of public duty ; and
when they reach a point where the chances of profit by clandes
tine manufacture or importation are in excess of the chances of
loss by detection, added to the tax, the revenue will be certain to
fall off very rapidly even though consumption is not diminished.
It has recently been proved by the experience of the federal ex
cise laws that a tax of fifty cent3 a gallon on spirits may be more
productive than one of four times that amount Great Britain at
one time had a similar experience with taxes on tea.
Taxes on Exports. These, if the articles exported are a neces
sity to foreign countries, tend to transfer to such countries a part
of the burden of supporting our own government. If not a
necessity, they diminish exportation and production. In either
case they will usually be impolitic ; in the latter, almost certainly,
and in the former by inviting retaliatory legislation by the coun
tries affected. In this country the states cannot levy export du
ties, without the consent of congress, except for the purposes of
inspection,1 and congress is also prohibited to lay any tax or duty
on articles exported from any state.2
Taxes on Imports. These have generally been the chief reliance
of the federal government for its revenue. They have been laid
on almost every conceivable article of use, taste or ornament, and
upon almost every possible theory and principle. Some tariff
laws have perhaps been framed with a view to the just distribu
tion of the burden, and for revenue purposes only ; others, while
having revenue mainly in view, have laid heavier duties on arti-
1Const U. S., art I, § x.
«Const. U. S., art. I, § ix.
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cles which would come in competition with home manufactures,
while others, in some of their duties, have discarded the idea of
revenue entirely, and looked solely to protection. We have thus
had revenue tariffs, protective tariffs, and revenue tariffs with in
cidental protection. All have discriminated more or less against
articles of mere luxury, but articles of prime necessity have, under
some, been taxed very heavily, on the supposition tbat the burden
imposed would be more than made up to those who shared it
,
by
the incidental advantages they would receive from the building
up of manufactures at home. Whether the result has answered
expectation is a question foreign to the purpose of the present work.
Taxes on Corporate Franchises. These have been a source of large
revenue in some states, while others have only placed corporations
on the same footing with individuals, and taxed them on their
property, or imposed some specific tax intended as an equivalent
for a property tax. A tax on a corporate franchise may or may not
be just or politic. If the business is one of which corporations have
a monopoly, a tax on their franchises, however heavy, would not
be burdensome, because the result would only be to add to the
cost of whatever the corporations supplied to the public, so that
the tax would really be paid by the community at large. If on
the other hand, the business is one open to free competition be
tween corporations and individuals, and in respect to which cor
porations would enjoy no especial privileges or advantages, a tax
upon the privilege of conducting the business under a corporate
organization would be wholly unreasonable and unjust, because
it would give individuals and partnerships an advantage in the
competition ; and their competition, keeping down prices, would
prevent corporations from indirectly collecting any portion of the
tax from the public, and leave them to bear the whole burden of
a demand which, under such circumstances, must prove ruinous.
While, therefore, a tax on the corporate franchises of banks of
is3ue, which are not subject to competition, might be entirely just,
one on the corporate organization of a trading company, with
which every individual might compete, would usually be wholly
unjust, and if continued, must result in the abandonment of a
business which, under such circumstances, would be carried on at
a ruinous disadvantage.
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Taxes on the Value of Property. These have been the main reli
ance of the states. A common method of raising revenue has
been to levy annual taxes on the value of all the real and personal
property of the inhabitants, with limited exceptions, and irrespect
ive of the income which, by means of the property, is or may be
realized. This seems at first view to be just, and in the belief
that it is just, it has been steadfastly adhered to notwithstanding
the many and very serious difficulties attending it These diffi
culties pertain, for the most part, to the taxation of personal prop
erty, which is subject to the following very important objections:
1. It cannot be assessed without inquisitorial process of some
kind, instituted for the purpose of ascertaining that which is
not open to public inspection, and which the individual, except
under the compulsion of such process, would not consent to dis
close.1 Few persons will voluntarily make a complete exhibit of
1The reader will find valuable information on this score in the accounts
which the current histories of England give of taxation in that country under
the house of Plantagenet. A very interesting account of taxation under Ed-
ward I is found in Audrey's National and Domestic History of England, b. 6,
ch. 18. The assessment and valuation of articles was so minute and particular
as to give us no small insight into the domestic life of that day, and into the
extent of the comforts and conveniences enjoyed by different classes of so.
ciety. Lingard, in his History of England, b. 4, ch. 2, has the following which
relates to taxation under Edward III :
"The most ancient method of raising a supply was by a talliage on movable
property, varying, according to circumstances, from a fiftieth to a seventh, and
descending from the highest classes down to the villeins; and it is interest
ing to observe how rapidly the art of taxation improved in every succeeding
reign.
" Under John, each individual was permitted to swear to the value of his
own property, and the bailiffs of prelates, earls and barons swore in the
place of their lords. The oaths were received by the itinerant justices who,
for that purpose, proceeded regularly from hundred to hundred ; and, accord-
ing to the returns of the justices, the tax in its due proportion was levied by
the sheriffs.
" By Henry III, every man was compelled to swear, not only to the amount
of his own movables, but to that of the movables belonging to his two next
neighbors; and, if the accuracy of his statement was disputed, the truth was
inquired into by a jury of twelve good men of the county. The commission
ers were not the justices, but four knights appointed by the justices; and
they were instructed to inquire into the value of every species of personalty,
with the exception of church ornaments, books, horses, arms, gold, silver,
jewels, furniture, the contents of the cellar and larder, and hay and forage for
private use.
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their affairs to the public, and still fewer, perhaps, have their
affairs in such shape that public officers can make an inventory
of their personal possessions, including property in the hands of
others or at a distance, and debts owing to them, without the as
sistance of the owners in preparing it Statutes have recognized
this difficulty, and provided for a list to be presented by the tax
payer under oath, or allowed the assessor to tax every person ac
cording to his own judgment, leaving the person taxed to reduce
the amount by his own oath if he shall see fit, and be able to do
so. This is objectionable, not only as taking away a desirable
privacy in business and family concerns, but also as holding out
a strong temptation to false swearing in matters where a false
oath would be difficult if not impossible of detection.1
" Under the Edwards, the commissioners were appointed immediately by
the crown. They called before them the principal inhabitants of each town
ship, and bound four, six or more of them, by oath, to inquire into the value
of the movables possessed by each householder on the day mentioned in the
act, which was generally the feast of St. Michael. By movables, they were to
understand not only corn, cattle and merchandise, but money, fuel, furniture
and wearing apparel ; and, if any such articles had been sold, removed or de
stroyed since the day specified, they were yet to include them within the
amount. The exceptions allowed were few. The knights and esquires did
not return their armor, horses or equipments, their plate of gold, silver or
brass, their clothes or jewels, or those which belonged to their wives; and
persons of inferior rank were exempted from payment for one suit of clothes
for the husband and another for the wife, one bed, one ring, a clasp of gold or
silver, a silk sash or girdle for daily use, and a cup of silver or porcelain. It
is evident that, in these inquiries, as the temptation was great, so also were
the means of concealment. But the ingenuity of the commissioners kept
pace with the artfulness of the defaulters. Each year new regulations were
issued from the exchequer, and, sometimes within a short period, the amount
of tax from the same township was nearly doubled. This growing evil occa
sioned numerous remonstrances. The people complained that the collectors
entered their houses and searched every apartment; that they defrauded the
king, and that they received bribes to spare some, while at the same time,
through pique and resentment, they aggrieved others."
1This difficulty has always existed. Latimer, in his sermon at Stamford, in
the time of Henry VIII, inveighs against it in this language: "When the
parliament, the high court of this realm, is gathered together, and there it is
determined that every man shall pay a fifteenth part of his goods to the king
then commissioners come forth, and he that in sight of men, in his cattle, corn ,
sheep and other goods, is worth an hundred marks or an hundred pound, will
set himself at ten pound; he will be worth to the king but after ten pound.
Tell me, now, whether this be theft or no »"
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2. The assessment of personalty holds out constant and very
powerful temptations to defraud the state by concealing the
knowledge of every thing which the tax payer believes cannot
easily be discovered. This is so well understood that it is
scarcely expected that citizens will voluntarily state what they
possess, or that officers will make much if any effort to discover.
Indeed, the assessment of personal property reaches so small a pro
portion of the amount really protected by government, that it
might almost be said that laws for the purpose remain on the
statute books rather as incentives to evasion and fraud in the
dealings of the citizen with the state than as a means of realizing
a revenue for public purposes.
3. Such taxes are usually unjust in their discrimination be
tween residents and nonresidents who enjoy the same protection
of the laws. This will be manifest from an illustration : If money
is loaned at ten per centum, and the tax upon credits is one per
centum of the capital, the resident capitalist may count upon an
income of nine per centum upon his investments. But the non
resident who could not be taxed in the state upon his loans
which are made there and protected and enforced by its laws,
would, upon the like investment, count upon ten per centum;
and this difference would not only be a serious discrimination
against the citizen, but it would, and does, encourage further
evasions and frauds, and particularly the loaning of moneys in
the names of nonresidents in order to escape taxation. It also
presents an inducement to citizens, whose investments do not
require personal attention, to take up their residence abroad ; any
saving of the tax being equivalent to an addition of that amount
to their incomes.
4. Taxation of personalty leads to duplicate taxation in various
ways. Other taxes besides those by valuation reach such prop
erty, being laid in the shape of duties, excise and license fees,
etc. ; and, moreover, when property is moved from one jurisdic
tion into another, where the time fixed for assessment is different,
it may for that reason be twice assessed for a tax on valuation for
the same period of time.
5. Such taxation requires a large addition to the force of
revenue officers which otherwise would be sufficient, and it ren
ders necessary more frequent assessments than would be requisite
CH. I.
]
29TAXES, THEIR NATURE AND KINDS.
were taxation confined to that property, or those subjects which
are more permanent in characteristics and ownership. To make
it just, it is generally thought necessary that the tax payer's
debts should be deducted : and this complicates the difficulty of
ascertaining what his estate is
,
and leaves every man, in effect, to
make his own assessment, or subjects him to the arbitrary and
capricious action of the assessors.1 These are objections which
every one feels and appreciates ; others, which are more obscure,
need not be mentioned. A tax on land is not open to these
objections. Whenever the law seeks to tax land and personalty
with equality, the general result is
,
that land pays much the
greater proportion of the tax, because this can all be reached, and
all be taxed; no inquisitorial proceedings are required to dis
cover it
,
and no frauds or evasions can conceal it from view.
These and other reasons have led some political economists to
advocate the omission of personalty from the customary taxation
by value, and the raising of the ordinary state revenue by a tax laid
exclusively on land and a few other subjects which, like land, are
open to constant public observation and inspection, and in respect
to which neither would harsh sifting processes be required, nor eva
sions be practicable, nor frauds invited. Such a tax, it is claimed,
while nominally falling upon a few, would in fact be diffused
through the whole community, and collected from all by being
added to the price of what is produced and distributed by the
classes taxed, just as we have found that a tax upon any com
mon article of consumption is paid in the end by the consumer,
and is no more burdensome to the dealer who nominally pays
it than it is to any other member of the community of consumers.
Adam Smith declared, that " no tax can ever reduce for any con
siderable time the rate of profit in any particular trade, which
must always keep its level with other trades in its neighbor-
1 Many statutes leave the assessors to estimate the personal estate, but allow
the tax payer to reduce an excessive valuation by a statement under oath.
Under the almost universal custom of valuing property at from one-fourth to
one-thiTd its estimated value, this privilege to the tax payer becomes of no
avail. A man having an estate of $30,000, may be taxed upon that sum, and
be without redress, because he cannot make oath that he is not worth so
much, when if the general valuation is at one-third only, he should be taxed
on but $10,000.
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hood."1 And, indeed, in this country, during and after the great
civil war of 1861-5, it was generally found that a heavy tax
upon any particular article of consumption gave the business that
produced it a new and vigorous impulse of prosperity.2
Taxes on Amusements. These constitute a very considerable
source of income to the cities and villages of the country, and
sometimes to the state itself. When the amusements are of a
public nature, like theatrical and other exhibitions and shows,
concerts, games of skill or chance, publicly performed, whether
for profit or otherwise, races, etc., they seem to be as proper sub
jects of taxation as property or ordinary business. In fact such a
tax is in the nature of a tax on luxuries, and therefore as unob
jectionable as a tax can well be. The limit to the right to tax
amusements, if any exists, has never been judicially pointed out,
but when the public are invited to share them, the right must be
clear. On the other hand it would seem that strictly private and
family amusements ought to be considered wholly exempt, except
possibly when they involve such expense as to be beyond the en
joyment of the people generally, and for that reason to be properly
taxable as luxuries.
The foregoing by no means embraces all the subjects of taxa
tion ; some others will be referred to as we proceed, but the enu
meration here made may be sufficient for our present purposes.
Even marriages have sometimes been taxed ; though as a rule the
1Wealth of Nations, b. v, ch. 11, p. 11, art. 4.
*Mr. David A. Wells has treated this general subject with ability in many
publications. A pamphlet embodying the remarks of Mr. Isaac Sherman be
fore the N. Y. Assembly committee of Ways and Means, October, 1874, is ex.
ceedingly instructive and valuable. It is highly probable that if personalty
were wholly exempted from taxation by value, the burden of state taxes would
be no more unequal than now, and that the general tone of public morality,
on the score of taxation, escaping the schooling in evasions which is now had,
would be higher. In our enumeration of taxes, we have not included charges
for postage. These, though called taxes abroad, are in this country looked
upon rather as reasonable charges for a branch of transportation which the
government undertakes. They are not burdens upon the people, because they
regularly fall below the cost.
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fees imposed in the case of marriages have been only such as
were supposed sufficient to cover the cost of proper regulations.1
1 In the British internal revenue law in force near the close of the great
wars with Bonaparte, marriage licenses were taxed ten shillings if ordinary
and five pounds if special. The marriage certificate was also taxed five shil
lings. That law was very carefully prepared, with a view to producing as
much revenue as possible without serious hardships. The discriminations
against luxuries were properly very considerable. Thus, the keeper of one
pleasure horse was taxed 21. 17«. 6d., but for two he was charged I)/. 4«., and
for every additional horse 61.more or thereabouts. One carriage with four
wheels was taxed 121., and two 262. For one male servant the tax was 21. 8«.,
for ten it was 621. No tax was charged on incomes less than 502. ; from that
to 1502. a gradually increasing tax was imposed, and incomes above 1502.paid
ten per cent. Occupations and legal instruments were specially taxed ; the
taxes on indentures of apprenticeship ranged from 15*. up to 502., and articles
of clerkship in the office of an attorney or solicitor in the higher courts were
taxed 1202. The window tax was 6«. 6(2.on a house with six windows and 342.
10s. on one with fifty.
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CIIAPTER II.
THE NATURE OF THE POWER TO TAX.
In the creation of three distinct departments of the govern
ment, and the apportionment of power between them, the au
thority to tax necessarily falls to the legislative. This is manifest
from the slightest consideration of what taxation is. It is the
making of rules and regulations under which the necessary reve
nues for all the needs of government are to be apportioned among
the people and collected from them. While the principles of the
British constitution remained unsettled and in dispute, the au
thority to lay and collect taxes was claimed for the executive, but
only as a branch of the supreme authority, which was his by di
vine right, to rule at discretion.1 When this arrogant claim was
repudiated and abandoned, it became one of the most inflexible
principles of government that the executive could levy no taxes
whatsoever except in the execution of laws that had been made
for his observance. Indeed, the principle goes farther than this.
It is, that taxes arc a grant of the people who are taxed, and the
grant must be made by the immediate representatives of the peo
ple. All revenue laws in Great Britain must, therefore, originate
with the popular house of parliament ; a body very tenacious of
its privileges, and disposed to class as revenue laws whatever will,
even indirectly, bring revenue to the state.8 Following this pre-
1 "This power," said the attorney general in Hampden's Case, " is innate
in the person of an absolute king, and in the person of the kings of England.
All magistracy, it is of nature ; aud obedience and subjection, it is of nature.
Th is power is not any way derived from the people, but reserved unto the
king when positive laws first began. For the king of England, he is an
absolute monarch; nothing can be given to an absolute prince but what is in
herent in his person. He can do no wrong. He is the sole judge, and we
ought not to question him. Where the law trusts, we ought not to distrust."
Hal lam's Const. Hist., ch. 7
;
3 State Trials, 826; Broom's Const. L., 306, and
notes.
a4 Inst., 29; 1 Dl. Com., 169; Vattel, b. 1, ch. 20, g 241. The house of lords
is not permitted to amend money bills, and the commons deny the power
even to reject them. See resolutions of 5th and 6th July, 1860.
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cedent, the federal constitution requires all bills for raising reve
nue to originate in the house of representatives,1 and there are
corresponding provisions in the constitutions of nearly one half
the states.2 While such provisions are of little or no importance
in this country, where the members of both branches of the legis
lature are equally responsible to the people, the requirement that
executive officers shall confine themselves strictly to executive
duties, is one of the most valuable principles of the government
Indeed, the division of the powers of government is the most im
portant of the checks and balances by means of which the bene
fits of orderly government are secured and perpetuated ; and the
least encroachment by one department on the powers of the other
is usurpation, for which the law is supposed to provide the ade
quate remedy. Executive and ministerial officers enforce the
tax laws ; but, in doing so, they must keep strictly within the
authority those laws confer, and they cannot add to or vary, in
the slightest degree, any tax lawfully levied.8 They neither have,
nor can have any " roving commission to levy and collect taxes
from the people without authority of law but [they] can only
do so in the manner prescribed by the law, which should be the
governing rule for their conduct in levying taxes * * in
all cases."4 So inf1exible is this rule, that even the legislature
itself, as will be more fully shown hereafter, cannot clothe them
with its own authority for this purpose.5 Where the people have
located the power, there it must remain and be exercised.
The power not judicial. It is still more manifest that the
power to tax is not judicial.
" It is the province of the judicial
1During the second session of the forty-first congress, there was much dis
cussion as to what constituted a bill for raising revenue, but nothing was
settled.
• In the constitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Vermont.
« State v. Bentley, 23 N. J., 532 ; State v. Flavell, 24 id., 370.
4Barlow v. The Ordinary, 47 Geo., 639, 642, per Warner, Ch. J.
'See the next chapter. The legislature cannot confer upon a state board a
discretionary authority to add to the amount which the statute authorizes
to be collected by state tax. Houghton v. Austin, 47 Cal., 646.
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power to decide private disputes between or concerning persons,
but of legislative power to regulate public concerns, and to make
laws for the benefit and welfare of the state." 1 "The legislative
makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the
laws." 2 The legislature must therefore determine all questions
of state necessity, discretion or policy involved in ordering a tax
and in apportioning it ; must make all the necessary rules and reg
ulations which are to be observed in order to produce the desired
returns, and must decide upon the agencies by means of which
collections shall be made. " The judicial tribunals of the state
have no concern with the policy of legislation. That is a matter
resting altogether in the discretion of another coordinate branch
of the government The judicial power cannot legitimately ques
tion the policy or refuse to sanction the provisions of any law not
inconsistent with the fundamental law of the state." 8 And it is
as incompetent for the legislature to confer the power to tax upon
the judiciary as upon the executive.4 If the legislature shall
1Richardxm, Ch. J., in Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H., 199, 204.
*Marshall, Ch. J., in Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat., 1, 46. See Green-
ough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. St., 489, 494; Bates v. Kimball, 2 Chip., 77;
Newland v. Marsh, 19 11l., 376, 382; Beebe v. State, 6 Ind., 501, 515; Jones e
Perry, 10 Yerg., 59, 69 ; People v. Supervisors of New York, 16 N . Y., 424, 432
3Redfield, Ch. J., in Powers in re., 25 Vt., 261, 265.
4Hardenburg v. Kidd, 10 Cal., 402. " The court of sessions under the con
stitution can only exercise powers of a judicial character. The legislature
is incompetent to confer upon the court any other powers. The assessment
of taxes is not a judicial act; it partakes of no element of a judicial charac
ter. It is a legislative act; it requires the exercise of legislative power,
which for certain governmental purposes in the county may be devolved upon
a board of supervisors, but cannot be delegated to any branch of the judicial
department." Field, J., p. 403. In Heine v. Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall,.
655, 661, a bill in equity was filed to compel the respondent to levy a tax for
the payment of overdue corporation bonds. The bill was dismissed. Miller, J.,
says, "The power we are here asked to exercise is the very delicate one of
taxation. This power belongs in this country to the legislative sovereignty,
state or national. In the case before us the national sovereignty has nothing
to do with it. The power must be derived from the legislature of the state.
So far as the present case is concerned, the state has delegated the power to
the levee commissioners. If that body has ceased to exist, the remedy is in
the legislature, either to assess the tax by special statute, or to vest the power
in some other tribunal. It certainly is not vested, as in the exercise of an origi.
nal jurisdiction, in any federal court. It is unreasonable to suppose that the
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abuse its powers and transcend its legislative functions by the enact
ment of that which is called a tax law, but which is not such in
fact, then indeed the abuse may be arrested by the judicial arm ; 1
but the interference does not proceed on the idea of any authority
of the judiciary over the subject of taxation. The judiciary in
terposes on the application of any party whose rights are threat
ened by an unlawful exercise of authority ; and it is immaterial
with whom or what department the unlawful action originates, or
by what name it is designated. But so long as the legislation is
not colorable merely, but is confined to the enactment of what
is in its nature strictly a tax law, and so long as none of the con
stitutional rights of the citizen are violated in the directions pre
scribed for enforcing the tax, the legislation is of supreme author
ity. Taxes may be and often, are oppressive to the persons and
corporations taxed ; they may appear to the judicial mind unjust
and even unnecessary, but this can constitute no reason for judi
cial interference.2
legislature would ever select a federal court for that purpose. It is not only
not one of the inherent powers of the court to levy and collect taxes, hut it is
an invasion by the judiciary of the federal government of the legislative
functions of the state government. It is a most extraordinary request; and a
compliance with it would involve consequences no less out of the way of ju
dicial procedure, the end of which no wisdom can foresee."
1Maltby v. Reading etc. R. R. Co., 52 Penn. St., 140, 145. See Gault's Appeal,
33 id., 94; N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. v. Sabin, 26 id., 242; Wharton v. School
Directors, 42 id., 358; Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C, 244; Pullen v. County
Commissioners, 66 id., 361; McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316,
428; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet., 514, 563; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8
Wall., 533, 548; Heine v. Levee Commissioners, 19 id., 655; People e. Brook
lyn, 4 N. Y., 419; Weber v. Reinhard, 73 Penn. St., 370; Sharpless v. Mayor
of Philadelphia, 21 id., 147; Bank of Pennsylvania v. The Commonwealth, 19
id., 144; Perkins v. Milford, 59 Me., 315, 318, per Appkton, Ch. J. ; DePauw e.
New Albany, 22 Ind., 204 ; Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev., 283 ; Waters «. State, 1
Gill, 302; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss., 652, 751; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 4th
ed., ch. 1 and cases cited. " The courts have no more power to assess, or com-
mand the assessment of taxes than the legislature has to adjudge or command
the adjudication of lawsuits." Reese, J., in Justices of Cannon County e.Ho-
denpyle, 7 Humph., 145, 147. The case was one of an application for man-
damn* to compel the county court to levy a tax to pay county debts. And see
Delaware R R. Tax, 18 Wall., 206.
* » See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 548, per Cl>ase, Ch. J. ; Weston v.
Charleston, 2 Pet., 449, 466, per Mar3Jutll, Ch. J.; Delaware Railroad Tax, 18
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Tax legislation may be colorable merely, either because the
purpose for which the tax is demanded is not a public purpose, or
because of the absence of some other essential element in taxation.
When that is the case, the judiciary is the efficient check, and it
must protect individuals and protect the public against what,
in such a case, would be an attempt at lawless exactions.1
In some of the states the county courts or county justices are
empowered to make the county levies. But these, although exer
cising inferior judicial functions, are really administrative boards,
possessing an authority corresponding to that which is exercised
in other states by county commissioners or boards of supervisors.
Their action in ordering taxes is quasi legislative, and governed
by the same rules as other legislative action.
In some states, also, tax proceedings are reviewed and con
firmed by the courts before any sales of property are ordered or
demands conclusively fixed against individuals. But this again
is not legislative. Such a review is supposed to be favorable to
the taxpayer, as it gives him an opportunity to take the opinion
of the court upon the legality of the demand made upon him,
without waiting until the collector comes and seizes his person or
his property. The proceeding is the institution of a suit on be
half of the state against each individual tax-payer or item of
property taxed, and it calls upon the court to apply the law to
the issues which such a suit presents. Of the judicial nature of
such a review no question could well be raised.
Law of the land. There is a constitutional guaranty which
has come to us from Magna Charta, which declares that no person
Wall., 206; Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss., 209; State v. Bell, 1 Phil. (JT. C),
76, 85; Bridge Proprietors v. State, 21 N. J., 384, 386; S. C on appeal, 22 id.,
693 ; Dailey e. Swope, 47 Miss., 367.
1Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Pcnn. St.. 9; Covington e. Southgate, 15 B.
Monr., 491, 498; Tide Water Co. e. Costar, 18 N. J. Eq., 518; Hammett v.
Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St., 146; S. C, 3 Am. Rep., 615; Sedgw. Stat. & Const.
Law, 414. On this clear principle, that the power to tax was legislative and
not judicial, and that the valuation of property for the purposes of taxation
was an incident to the taxing power, it was held in Auditor of State e. Atchi-
son, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Kan., 500, that the supreme court could not be made
an appellate tribunal to review the valuations of railroad property made by
the board of county clerks.
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shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by the judg
ment of his peers or the law of the land. The alternative pro
visions of this guaranty have sometimes been supposed to mean
the same thing, and the guaranty itself to entitle every person to
have any demand made upon him submitted to the determination
of a jury of the vicinage. Such a construction applied in tax
cases would work a thorough and radical change in the principles
on which taxation is now supposed to rest It would cripple the
legislative power, and subject the action of the department whose
function it is to make laws on its own views of the questions of
public interest and public policy which the laws involve, to a re
view and possible reversal at the hands of a jury. It would not
so much strengthen the judicial department as it would weaken
the legislative ; for the courts themselves, though juries sit with
and as a part of them, are compelled to recognize a large degree
of independence in the action of these assistants. Such inde
pendence is often useful, and never can be seriously detrimental
when a verdict determines a single controversy only ; but to make
juries the assessors of the claims of the state upon individuals,
could only introduce anarchy ; one jury reaching one conclusion
regarding the public needs and the justice of its demands, an>l
another another, until the state would be without general rule,
and must fall to pieces from the incurable inefficiency of its gov
ernment. Such a construction of a clause agreed upon as an im
portant provision in a charter of government can never have been
intended.1
It has long been settled that while one is to be protected in his
1This is now agreed on all hands. See Cruikshanks v. Charleston, 1 Mc-
Cord, 360; State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 487, 497 ; Harper v. The Commissioners,
23 Geo., 566 ; State v. Frazier, 48 id., 137. In Harris v. Wood, 6 T. B. Monr., 641,
it is remarked that taxes are recoverable not only without a jury, but without
a judge, and the assessment of ministerial officers has been made to operate
as an execution on the citizen, and the collector could distrain, and any public
collector could be subjected to judgment on motion for the amount. "This
process is not founded on a judgment; it issues without a judgment, and it is
for this very reason that it is adopted. The state cannot wait the tedious pro
cess of getting a judgment. If she were compelled to do this, her honor
might be compromitted, and the rights of her citizens jeoparded. Hence
she clothes her collecting agents with the power to issue process at once
which will at once command her means." Per Nisbet, J., in Doe v. Deavors, 11
Geo., 79, 86.
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interests by the " the law of the land," he is entitled to " the judg
ment of his peers" on\y in those cases in which it has immemori-
ally existed, or in which it has been expressly given by law. The
clause recited from Magna Charta does not imply the necessity
for judicial action in every case in which the property of the citi
zen may be taken for the public use. On the contrary, a legisla
tive act for that purpose, when clearly within the limits of legis
lative authority, is of itself the law of the land. And an act for
levying taxes and providing the means of enforcement is
,
as we
have seen, within the unquestioned and unquestionable power of
the legislature.1 It is therefore the law of the land, not merely
1 This subject was much considered in Weimer e. Bunbury, 30 Mich., 202,
212. The following is an extract from the opinion :
"There are, unquestionably, cases in which expressions have been used im
plying the necessity for a common law trial before, in any instance, a man
can be deprived of his property ; but they will be found on investigation to be
cases calling for no such sweeping statement. If any court has ever decided
that judicial proceedings are of constitutional necessity in appropriating prop"
erty under the power of taxation, the case has not been brought to our atten
tion, and has been overlooked in our investigations. This would be most ex
traordinary if the necessity existed; for tax systems similar to our own have
prevailed ever since our government was founded ; and it cannot be said that
tax laws are usually so popular as to disarm every person of any legal objec
tions which he might suppose available to relieve him of their burdens. On
the contrary, no laws are contested more vigorously, and with none are people
more critical in looking after defects and infirmities. It may be safely assert
ed, without fear of contradiction, that if the collection of the revenue could
only be made through legal proceedings, the true principle would not have
been left to so late a discovery, but the wheels of government would long ago
have been blocked by litigious parties until an entirely new system could be
substituted. And it need hardly be said that any new system in which courts
should be made the administrators of the revenue would necessarily be so
cumbrous, and so subject to impediments and delays, as to make a constitu
tional provision requiring it a great public inconvenience.
"There is nothing technical, or, we think obscure, in the requirement that
process which divests property shall be due process of law. The constitution
makes no attempt to define such process, but assumes that custom and law
have already settled what it is. Even in judicial proceedings we do not as
certain from the constitution what is lawful process, but we test their action
by principles which were before the constitution, and the benefit of which we
assume that the constitution was intended to perpetuate. If there existed,
before that instrument was adopted, well known administrative proceedings
which, having their origin in a legislative conviction of their necessity, had
been sanctioned by long and general acceptance, we are no more at liberty to
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in so far as it lays down a general rule to be observed, but in all
the proceedings and all the process which it points out or provides
for in order to give the rule full operation. As has been well
said, " the mode of levying as well as the right of imposing taxes
is completely and exclusively within the legislative power, which,
it is to be presumed, will always be exercised with an equal regard
to the security of the public and individual rights and conveni
ence. The existence of government depending on the prompt
and regular collection of revenue must, as an object of primary
importance, be insured in such a way as the wisdom of the legis
lature may prescribe. There is a tacit condition annexed to the
ownership of property that it shall contribute to the public rev
enue in such mode and proportion as the legislative will shall
direct ; and if the officers entrusted with the execution of the laws
transcend their powers to the injury of an individual, the common
law entitles him to redress. But to pursue every delinquent liable
to pay taxes through the forms of process and a jury trial would
materially impede, if not wholly obstruct, the collection of the
revenue."1 There is no room for the supposition that in a matter
of this public importance, where promptness in collection is always
desirable, and often imperative, dilatory proceedings of this na
ture were within the contemplation of the people when consent-
infer an intent in the people to prohibit them by implication from any general
language, than we should be to infer an intent to abridge the judicial author
ity by the use of similar words. The truth is, the bills of rights in the Ameri
can constitutions have not been drafted for the introduction of new law, but
to secure old principles against abrogation or violation. They are conserva
tory instruments rather than reformatory; and they assume that the existing
principles of the common law are ample for the protection of individual
rights, when once incorporated in the fundamental law, and thus secured
against violation.
" We are, therefore, of necessity driven to an examination of the previous
condition of things, if we would understand the meaning of due process of
law, as the constitution employs the term. Nothing previously in use, re
garded as necessary in government and sanctioned by usage, can be looked
upon as condemned by it. Administrative process of the customary sort is
as much due process of law as judicial process. We should meet a great
many unexpected and very serious embarrassments in government if this were
otherwise."
1Taylor, Ch. J., in Cowles «. Brittain, 2 Hawks, 204, 207 ; Crockett, J., in
Hagare. Supervisors of Yolo, 47 Cal., 222, 233.
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ing to any general provision of the constitution.1 It is safer, and,
as we believe, more correct, to say that our constitutions have
been framed and agreed upon in view of an immemorial practice
and rule of government under which the whole subject has been
entrusted to the legislative department ; and they are to be under
stood and construed in the light of that practice wherever the
people have not expressly undertaken to change it.2
1See Cowles v. Brittain, 2 Hawks, 204, 207; State v. Allen, 2 McCord, 55, 60,
per Nott,J.\ Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich., 251; High e. Shoemaker, 22 Cal., 363;
Harper e. The Commissioners, 23 Geo., 566; Tift v. Griffin, 5 id., 185, 191.
sMr. Blackwcll, in hisTreatise on Tax Titles, p. 26, insists that the constitutional
provision we have referred to, renders judicial proceedings requisite iu every
case hefore an individual can be deprived of his property under the revenue
laws. He concedes, however, that it does not require such proceedings in
the ordinary understanding of the term. " The power to levy a tax," he says,
" properly belongs to the legislative power. The collection of it involves the
exercise of judicial and exceutive functions. The legislature levy the tax,
direct that a demand shall be made upon the owner of the land for the tax
charged against it, and if payment is refused, authorize the collector to seize
the body or goods of the delinquent; and in case satisfaction is not had in the
one or the other of these modes, power is conferred upon the collector to sell
and convey the laud itself. Now, before the power to sell the land can exist
under the law, the fact of the levy and nonpayment of the tax, the demand,
and return of no goods, or that the body cannot be found, must exist. These
facts must be ascertained to exist before the power of sale attaches. Whether
the power to decide the question of delinquency is vested by law in the regu
larly constituted judicial tribunals, or in those specially instituted for that
purpose, or in the collector himself, can make no kind of difference; it is the
exercise of judicial power, and the officer who sells performs an executive
function; so that in point of fact, the legislative, judicial and executive
departments of the government, all aid in the execution of the taxing power.
The legislature declare what facts shall constitute a cause of forfeiture ; the
judiciary ascertain the facts, apply the rule of law prescribed, and pronounce
a judgment of condemnation." But in this there is surely some confusion of
terms. Where the statute requires no intervention of the ordinary judicial
tribunals in the assessment and collection of taxes, there is commonly in the
proceedings very little that is even quasi judicial. An assessment by values
certainly is so, and the law generally is framed on that theory, and gives
parties assessed an opportunity to be heard. But under most of our laws the
subsequent proceedings are purely ministerial. What is there in the nature
of judicial action when a county officer, looking over the lists in his office,
draws off the description of lands not there credited with payment of taxes,
and proceeds to advertise and sell them ? If this is a " decision of the ques
tion of delinquency," and is judicial, any act of any officer which is to be
perfoimed as a step iu regular proceedings is judicial also. The sheriff as
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CHAPTER III.
LIMITATIONS UPON THE TAXING POWER.
Vast as is the power of the government to levy taxes upon its
citizens, there are nevertheless limitations upon it of a very dis
tinct and positive character, which inhere in the very nature of the
power itself. Some of these limitations are commonly declared
in the written constitutions, but the declaration is rather from
abundant caution than from any necessity, as the limitations are
equally imperative whether thus declared or not1 In some case3
the courts in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction may and
do enforce the restrictions ; in others it is beyond their power to
much exercises judicial power, when he sells property on the assumption
that a judgment has not been paid to himself or to some other person author,
ized to receive payment, as does the officer who performs the function of
determining what land shall be sold for taxes. In either case there is nothing
which resembles judicial proceedings; no hearing of parties; no judgment by
the officer; not even any discretion allowed him for the exercise of judg
ment It would seem, that if we can get around a requirement of judicial
action so easily as this, by calling something judicial that can only be made
so by annihilating all distinctions, we may also avoid any other constitutional
requirement, by calling whatever is done the equivalent of that which has
been required. This may be easy, but it is not safe. Any requirement of
judicial action is something of more substance than is here supposed. As to
this safeguard of " the law of the land " in tax proceedings, neither the prac
tice of governments nor the decisions of courts warrant us in saying that it
includes a judicial finding of delinquency before a sale can be made. It
means, beyond any question, regular and orderly proceedings, under the
general law, by the proper department of government ; and means nothing
more.
1 " Taxation is bounded in its exercise by its own nature, essential charac
teristics and purpose." Agnew, J., in Matter of Washington St., 69Penn. St.,
352, 363. "In our time a French writer has recorded that after attending a
debate in our House of Commons, he observed to an English statesman that
he had heard no assertion of the general principles of constitutional freedom.
The answer was, ' we take that for granted.' " Knight's England, vol. 3, p.
417. It is observable in the state constitutions that while they enter with con
siderable minuteness into declarations of individual right, many of the most
important principles of government are usually not declared at all, but simply
taken for granted.
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do so. "Whether this may be done in any given case will depend
upon whether the question which the case presents is or is not ju
dicial.
The public good. Taxes are only to be imposed for the pub
lic good. But what persons or property the public good will re
quire to be taxed, and when the tax shall be laid, and to what
extent the burden shall be imposed, are obviously not judicial
questions, but questions which address themselves to the judg
ment and discretion of the legislative department They must be
determined by the legislature, whose conclusion respecting them
must be final.1
Public purposes. It is the first requisite of lawful taxation
that the purpose for which it is laid shall be a public purpose.
The decision to lay a tax for a given purpose involves a legisla
tive conclusion that the purpose is one for which a tax may be
laid ; in other words, is a public purpose. But the determina
tion of the legislature on this question is not, like its decision on
ordinary questions of public policy, conclusive either on the other
departments of the government, or on the people. The question,
what is and what is not a public purpose, is one of law ; and
though unquestionably the legislature has large discretion in
selecting the object for which taxes shall be laid, its decision is
not final. In any case in which the legislature shall have clearly
exceeded its authority in this regard, and levied a tax for a pur
pose not public, it is competent for any one who in person or
property is affected by the tax, to appeal to the courts for protec
tion. This subject will receive a more full consideration further
on.2
Territorial limitations. It has already been seen that per
sons and property not within the territorial limits of a state cannot
be taxed by it.8 In such a case the state affords no protection,
1Ante, ch. II.
'Post, ch. IV.
'Ante, p. 14. The lands of an Indian tribe are j»ot taxable. The "N. T.
Indiar.s, 5 Wall., 761. Nor the Indians themselves when not citizens. State v.
Ross, 7 Yerg., 84.
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and there is nothing for which taxation can be an equivalent1
But where a person is resident within a state, his personal prop
erty in contemplation of law accompanies him, and he may
be required to pay taxes upon it wherever it is situate,2 while the
real estate of a nonresident is always taxable where it is.8 It is
competent also for any state to provide that tangible psrsonal
property situate within it may be taxed there irrespective of the
residence of the owner ; and sometimes state laws provide for
such taxation.4 The case of corporations is in some respects pe-
1Where the shares in a corporation are taxable to shareholders, it is not
competent to tax the corporation itself on the shares of nonresident sharehold
ers. State «. Thomas, 26 N. J., 181.
• Inhabitants of Great Barrington e. County Com'rs, 16 Pick., 572; State v.
Branin, 23 N. J., 484; State e. Bentlcy, id., 532; Newark City Bank v. Tho
Assessors, 38 id., 13; Nashua Savings Bank v. Nashua, 46 N. H., 389;
Bemis e. Boston, 14 Allen, 366; Commonwealth v. Hays, 8 B. Monr., 1, 2; Wil-
key e. Pekin, 1911l., 160; Rieman e. Shepard, 27 Ind., 288; Johnson v. Oregon
City, 2 Oreg., 327; Same e. Same, 3 id., 13; Griffith v. Carter, 8 Kan.,
565 ; Blood v. Sayre, 17 Vt , 609. But not in a state where it is merely passing
through. Hays v. Steamship Co., 17 How., 596; Hoyt e. Commissioners of
Taxes, 23 N. Y., 224; Parker Mills v. Commissioners of Taxes, 23 id., 242;
State v. Engle, 34 N. J., 425; Chauvenet e. Commissioners, 3 Md., 259; Hooper
e. Baltimore, 12 id., 464; Whitsell v. Northampton Co., 49 Penn. St., 526;
McKeen v. Same, id., 519; Union Bank e. State, 9 Yerg., 490; Conley v. Che-
die, 7 Nev., 336. A mortgage must be taxed to the owner where he lives, not
where the land mortgaged is. Latrobe v. Baltimore, 19Md., 13. Investments
by residents of the state in bonds and stocks of foreign corporations may bo
taxed within the state. Worthington v. Sebastian, 25 Ohio St., 1. It is com
petent to provide by law for taxing shares in corporations at the place where
the business is carried on. Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, 19 Wall.,
490.
»Witherspoon e. Duncan, 4 Wall., 210; Turner v. Burlington, 16 Mass., 208;
Jones v. Columbus, 25 Geo., 610.
* Hood's Estate, 21 Penn. St., 106, 114; Maltby e. Reading R. R. Co., 52 id.,
140; State v. Falkinburge, 15 N. J., 320; Wilson v. New York, 4 E. D.
Smith, 675; Hoyt v. Commissioners of Taxes, 23 N. Y., 224; People v. Ogdens-
burg, 48 id., 390; Howell v. State, 3 Gill, 14; Rieman v. Shepard, 27 Ind., 288;
Catline. Hull, 21 Vt, 152; Blackstone Manuf. Co. v. Blackstone, 13 Gray, 488;
Leonard v. New Bedford, 16 id, 292; Steere v. Walling, 7 R. I.
,
317; Hart-
land «. Church, 47 Me., 169; Desmond v. Machias, 48 id., 478; Mills v.
Thornton, 26 11l., 300; St. Louis ».Ferry Co., 40 Mo., 580; People v. Insur
ance Co., 29 Cal., 533 ; Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall., 139, 150. The same is
true of business carried on within a state or municipality by nonresidents. See
Corficld v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C C, 371 ; Harrison v. Vicksburg, 3 S. & M., 581 ;
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culiar. They may be taxed for their franchise, and they may al
so be taxed as persons where their business is carried on.1 And
as no state is under obligation to permit a foreign corporation to
carry on business, or exercise franchises within its territory, the
permission to do so may be granted under such restrictions, or
allowed on such conditions regarding taxation as the state may
think proper or prudent to impose.2
Taxation and representation. There is a maxim in our
government that the representatives of the people must impose
the taxes the people are to pay. The form it sometimes takes is
,
"taxation and representation go together." The maxim is famil
iar in English law, where it became established as the result of a
long, and at times bloody, controversy between the representatives
of the people on one side, and the crown on the other. Tho
meaning there was the same that had been contended for in other
countries ; that the imposition of taxes was essentially a legisla
tive power, and the sovereign could levy none except as they
were granted by the representatives of the realm.8 In America
Worth v. Fayetteville, 1 Winst.,70; State v. City Council of Charleston, 2
Speers, 623; Padelford v. The Mayor of Savannah, 14 Geo., 438; Pearce v. Au
gusta, 37 id., 597; Shriver v. Pittsburg, 66 Penn. St., 446. Compare Bennett
v. Birmingham, 31 id., 15.
1 People v. Utica Ins. Co., 15 Johns., 358, 382, per Thompson, J. ; Ontario
Bank e. Bunnell, 10 Wend., 186. If it is made a provision in the charter of a
corporation that its shares shall be taxed at the domicile of the owner " their
taxability at such locality is annexed as an incident to the shares, and it does
not matter where the domicile of the owner may be. The tax may then bo
enforced through the corporation, by requiring it to withhold the amount
from the dividends payable thereon." Field, J., in Minot v. Railroad Co., 18
Wall., 206, 230.
»Ducat v. Chicago, 4811l., 172; Fireman's Benevolent Association v.
Lounsbery, 21 id., 511; Fire Department of Milwaukee v. Helfenstein, 1C
Wis., 136 ; People v. Imlay, 20 Barb., 68 ; opinion of Taney, Ch. J., in Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet., 519 ; Cincinnati Mutual Health Assurance Co. v. Ros
enthal, 55 11l., 85; Fire Department v. Noble, 3E. D. Smith, 440; Same v.
Wright, id., 453; Degroot v. Van Duzer, 20 Wend., 390; Commonwealth v.
Melton, 12 B. Monr., 212, 218 ; Tatem e. Wright, 23 N. J., 429 ; Paul e. Virginia,
8 Wall., 168; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 id., 566; Ducat e.
Chicago, 10 id., 410.
8 See Clermont's note to Fortescue's De Laudimus, p. 28 ; also Bates' Case,
2 State Trials, 371 ; S
. C, Broom's Const. Law, 247 ; Hampden's Case, 3 State
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the corresponding contest assumed a different phase, and the max
im took on a different meaning as a rallying cry in the contest for
independence. The American colonies insisted upon the right of
the colonial legislatures to vote the local taxes; disputing any
such right in the parliament of Great Britain, -which was a body
in which the colonists had and could have no representatives.
That body, it was claimed, could legitimately exercise over them
the authority only of an imperial legislature to regulate external
concerns, and those of the empire at large, leaving internal con
cerns to the control of their own representatives. What the
maxim really meant was, that the local legislature must make the
local laws ; it was violated in the particular of taxes, and conse
quently brought that subject prominently to notice, though the
principle itself was general. The same principle has sometimes
been appealed to as if it meant that no person could be taxed un
less in the body which voted the tax he was represented by some
one in whose selection he had a voice; but it never had any such '
meaning, and never could have, without excluding from taxation
a very large proportion of all the property of the state. If the
privilege of voting for representatives in the government were the
only or even the principal benefit received from government, there
might be the highest reason in exempting the nonvoting infant or
alien from taxation ; but this privilege to any particular individu
al, as compared with the protection of life, liberty and property, is
really insignificant And so long as all persons cannot participate
in government, the limits of exclusion and admission must always
be determined on considerations of general public policy. It is
not doubted that, so far as can be prudently and safely permitted,
all who are to pay taxes should be allowed a voice in raising
them ; if for no other reason, because those they vote they will
more willingly and cheerfully pay.1 But the maxim that taxa-
Trials, 825 ; S. C, Broom's Const. Law, 306, and note, 370. Similar but lesa
successfui contests for the same principle in France and Spain are narrated
by Mr. Hallam and other writers.
1The aim of all the contests from which have sprung the liberties of Eng
land and America has been to establish and defend the principle of self taxa
tion, as that which must constitute the main security against oppression. Mr.
Burke insists upon this in his speech on Conciliation of America. And see
Works of Madison III, 105. The sense of the oppression of any burden is
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tion and representation go together is only true when understood
in a territorial sense which embraces the state at large ; every per
son in the state being represented in its legislative body, and that
body determining the taxation not only for the state at large, but
also, within certain limits, for each division and municipality of
the state.1 The local right is subordinate to this general authority.
greatly increased if they who are to bear it, are to do so, not voluntarily but
at the command of others. Locke expresses this idea when, in his Treatise on
Civil Government, he says, of a burden imposed as compared to one volun
tarily assumed, that " it may be all one to the purse, but it worketh diversely
to the courage." This is well illustrated in English history; for heavy taxation
dates from the time when the right of the commons to grant the taxes became
finally settled. But the chief importance in the right of those who pay taxes
to vote them, consists in this: that in monarchical countries it constitutes the
only substantial and continuous check upon tyranny, and in any country the
only security against robbery under the forms of law. As the Spanish Cortes
said in one of their remonstrances, " there remains no other privilege or lib
erty which can be profitable to subjects if this be taken away." Hallam's
Middle Ages, ch. IV. The idea is well expressed by Lawrence, J., in Harward
v. Drainage Co., 51 11l., 130. See also Gage v. Graham, 57 id., 144; People e.
Hurlburt, 24 Mich., 44. It is very justly laid down that a tax law is to be so
construed as to harmonize with the principle that the people are not to be
taxed except with their own consent or that of officers truly representing them.
Keasy v. Bricker, 60 Penn. St., 9
. In Indiana it has been decided that where
the boundaries of a township have been extended after it has voted aid to a
work of internal improvement, the territory brought in cannot be subjected to
the tax so voted. Alvis v. Whitney, 43 Ind., 83.
1 In Steward v. Jefferson, 3 Harr., 335, 336, Mr. James A. Bayard, of counsel,
objected to a school district tax, voted by the inhabitants of the district, claim
ing that it was void. " A citizen of the state who does not reside in the district
may, by Ihc act, be taxed without having the right to vote, and when he can de
rive no benefit from it; as he can neither send his own children nor other
children. This violates the first principle of republican government, that, as to
citizens, taxation goes with and is dependent on representation." But the court
affirmed the tax without discussion. That the property of persons who have
not the right to vote is taxable, see Wheeler e. Wall, 6 Allen, 558; Smith v.
Macon, 20 Ark., 17. In State v. Ross, 7 Yerg., 74, 77, Catron, Ch. J., has some
thing to say about the tyranny of taxation without representation, but the
case did not call for it. In Marr v. Enloe, 1 Yerg., 452, where the power to
authorize a county court to levy taxes for county purposes was denied, stress
was laid on the fact that the members of the court were not elected by the
people. Upon the general right of the people to tax themselves through their
representatives, sec Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heis., 682; Sanborn e. Rice Co., 9 Minn.,
273; People v. Hurlburt, 24 Mich., 44; People v. Chicago, 51 11l., 58; People
e. Batcheller, 53 N. Y., 128; State v. Lefflngwell, 54 Mo., 458. It has often
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To what extent the federal government may rightfully levy
taxes in districts not represented in the federal legislature, is per
haps not entirely clear. In the District of Columbia, which by
the national constitution was set apart for federal purposes and
placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of congress, the power is
unlimited, and whoever becomes a resident of the district must
do so with the understanding that he can participate in the gov-
been decided that a state may compel a municipality to tax itself for police
purposes. See Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Penn. St., 73 ; People v. Meha-
ney, 13 Mich., 481. And for highways and other like purposes of general
concern. See Harrison Justices v. Holland, 3 Grat, 247. But these subjects
will be elsewhere considered. Tax laws are undoubtedly to be construed, if
possible, so as not to impose taxes without the consent of the people taxed, oi
their immediate representatives: so held of a tax for military bounty pur
poses. Keasy v. Bricker, 60 Penn. St., 9 : and see Lexington v. McQuillan's
Heirs, 9 Dana, 513, 517; Madison Co. v. The People, 58 11l., 456, 463; Hamp
shire v. Franklin, 16 Mass., 75, 83; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr.,330; Maltus
e. Shields, 2 Met. (Ky.), 553. And we shall endeavor to show further on, that,
in some cases, this assent is necessary.
That a stranger, coming into a town, becomes liable to a license tax as an
" inhabitant and member of the corporation," see Plymouth v. Pettijohn, 4
Dev., 391 ; Whitfield «. Longest, 6 Ired., 268. " It is just that it should be so ;
for, as the defendant has, in the security of his property, the benefit of the
night watch and of the other police establishments, he ought to contribute
reasonably towards their expenses." Per Rvffin, Ch. J., in Wilmington «.
Roby, 8 Ired., 250, 254 ; and see Edenton v. Copeheart, 71 N. C, 156. In Pal-
mouth v. Watson, 5 Bush, 660, 661, Hardin, J., in discussing an act of the
legislature which empowered the town of Falmouth to impose a license tax
not exceeding $100 on the sale, by retail, of all spirituous, vinous or malt
liquors in said town, or within one mile thereof, said : " It is insisted for the ap
pellee that the power, which this enactment purports to confer on the trustees
of the town, to exact a license fee for the privilege of keeping a tavern or
vending ardent spirits outside of, although near, the town limits, is within the
interdiction of the fourteenth section of article 13 of the state constitution,
viz.: 'Nor shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use with
out the consent of his representatives, and without just compensation being
previously made to him.' Had the exercise of the power complained of been
the imposition of an ordinary tax merely on the property of the appellee, situ-
ated within the corporate limits of the town, for municipal purposes, we
should not doubt the correctness of the objection ; or even if the exaction of
the sum in controversy, in consideration of a trade license, had been made for
local revenue purposes alone, though not in the usual form of taxation, we
should regard it within the constitutional prohibition; for the legislature
could not delegate to the corporation the right to either license for compensa
tion or tax a privilege to be enjoyed beyond its limits, except a police regula
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ernment only to the extent that congress may permit.1 There
can be no doubt also of the right of the federal government to
levy stamp taxes and imposts of every description, by laws which
shall have uniform operation throughout all the states and terri
tories within the jurisdiction of the general government But
taxes for territorial purposes, corresponding to the taxes which are
levied by the states for state purposes, it is theoretically at least
the right of the people of the territory, when organized with a
local legislature, to levy and expend for themselves. It is not to
be supposed that the right will be denied by the general govern
ment, and if it should be, and the local taxes be imposed and
expended by the direct interposition of congressional authority,
it is not too much to say that such action would be inconsistent
with the maxim of government now under consideration, whether
valid in law or not2
The power not to be delegated. The power to impose taxes,
like any other branch of the legislative authority, must be exer
cised by the legislature itself, and cannot be delegated to ministe-
tion having reference to the comfort, safety or welfare of society within its
local jurisdiction. Cooley's Const. Lim., 577. But, in our opinion, the exac
tion of a fee of $100 for the privilege of vending ardent spirits in such prox
imity to the town as to render its exercise liable to affect the good order or
peace of the local community, did not infringe any constitutional right of the
appellee. The privilege granted to him was one which public policy requires
should be subjected to such legal restraints and regulations as will, as far as
practicable, prevent its abuse to the detriment of society. The legislature,
having the general power to do this, properly delegated that power to the local
government of the community immediately interested. The authority so
conferred on the trustees does not appear to have been abused by an excessive
or unreasonable exaction, and the rights of the appellee were certainly not in-
vaded by a compulsory one." A city ordinance, taxing wagons used in the
city for pay, cannot apply to wagons owned by those residing outside who
employ them in hauling into and out of the city. If it could, it would be
taking property for private use — for the use of that particular community of
which the owner formed no part. St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo., 122.
1Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat., 317, 324. See also Kendall v. United
States, 12 Pet., 524.
»Upon the subject of territorial powers of taxation, the following cases are
instructive: Miners' Bank v. Iowa, 12 How., 1 ; Vincennes University v. Indi
ana, 14 id., 268; Williams e. Bank of Michigan, 7 Wend., 539; Swan e.Wil
liams, 2 Mich., 427.
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rial officers, or even to another department of the government1
This is a principle which pervades our whole political system,
and when properly understood, admits of no exception. The
1Dillon Mun. Corp., §§ 60, 567, 618, and notes; Cooler's Const. Lim., 117,
205, and cases cited ; Thompson v. Schermerhorn, 6 N. Y., 92 ; St. Louis v.
Clemens, 52 Mo., 133; Hyde v. Joyes, 4 Bush, 464; People v. Clark, 47 Cal.,
456. Each of these was a case in which a municipal corporation undertook
to delegate to an administrative officer the power to determine the plan and
extent of a municipal improvement for which a tax was ordered; and it was
held there was no power to do so. Subsequent acts of affirmance by a city
council could not vitalize such action. Hyde e. Joyes, supra. And see Ran
dolph e. Gawley, 47 Cal., 458; Mercer County Court v. Navigation Co., 8
Bush, 300, 307. But it is no delegation of the taxing power to refer to the
city engineer and a committee of the council to determine when repairs in a
street improvement are needed, and how much of the old improvement can
be used in making them. Covington v. Boyle, 6 Bush, 204. The following
cases may also be referred to: Bellinger t>.Gray, 51 N. Y., 610, decides that
the duties imposed by the tax laws upon boards of supervisors, of examining
the assessment rolls and equalizing the valuation of the real estates in the dif
ferent towns and wards, and of estimating and putting down in the assessment
rolls the respective sums to be paid as taxes, are quasi judicial, and cannot be
delegated, but must be performed by the boards as such ; after they have deter
mined what changes are to be made, the mere act of changing is clerical, but
the rolls must be completed before the warrants required to be issued are an-
nexed thereto. In Scofield e. Lansing, 17Mich., 437, it appeared that the city
charter required the common council (as a condition precedent to raising a tax)
to declare by an entry on their minutes, what portion of the expense of an im
provement should be assessed to the owners of premises benefited thereby,
and specifying the amount to be assessed. Held, that this duty could not be
delegated to commissioners to perform, as the determination of those facts
was vital to the levy. The following cases are also in point here: Under
the act for the establishment of common schools, the inhabitants of the school
district, at their regular meeting, must vote a precise and definite sum as a tax
on the inhabitants of the district for building a school house. They cannot at
their meeting delegate to the trustees a discretionary power as to the aggre
gate amount of tax to be collected. Robinson v. Dodge, 18 Johns., 351 ; Trum.
bull v. White, 5 Hill, 46. A city cannot delegate to its ministerial officers
the power to tax, though they may be authorized, under general regula
tions, to issue licenses when the taxes are paid. See East St. Louis v. Wehr-
ung, 46 11l., 392. The following cases have discussed to some extent what
constitutes a delegation of the power to tax: State v. Sickle, 24 N. J., 125;
Menser v. Risdon, 36 Cal., 239 ; Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y.,591 ; Mclnery v.
Reed, 23 Iowa, 410 ; Ould v. Richmond, 23 Grat., 464, 471 ; Foss v. Chicago, 56
11l., 354; Warren v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich., 24; Johnson v. Saunderson, 34
Vt., 94- The subject was largely considered in Houghton e. Austin, 47 Cal.,
646.
4
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people create a legislative department for the exercise of the
legislative power, and they vest it with no authority to relieve
itself of the responsibility by a substitution of other agencies.
But it is never assumed by the people that the legislature can
take such supervision of all the infinite variety of interests in the
state, and of all local as well as general affairs, as to be able to
determine in every instance precisely what is needed in matters
of taxation, and precisely what purposes shall at any time, under
the particular circumstances, be provided for. There is a dif
ference between making the law and giving effect to the law ; the
one is legislation and the other administration. We conceive
that the legislature must, in every instance, prescribe the rule
under which taxation may be laid ; it must originate the authority
under which, after due proceedings, the tax gatherer demands the
contribution ; but it need not prescribe all the details of action,
or even fix with precision the sum to be raised or all the par
ticulars of its expenditure. If the rule is prescribed which, in
its administration, works out the result, that is sufficient ; but to
refer the making of the rule to another authority, would be in
excess of legislative power. An illustration or two may possibly
sufficiently explain the principle. The legislature, with the ut
most propriety, may provide for a court of claims or a state board
of audit, whose adjudications against the state shall be final upon
it ; and may direct that the amounts awarded shall go into the gen
eral levy for the year. Here is a rule to be properly worked out by
a proper agency. A like provision for the adjustment of claims
against counties, cities and townships may also be made. A fund
for contingent expenses may be put at the disposal of the execu
tive or of other state officers, to be used for public purposes not
previously enumerated in detail by the legislature. But to leave
to a court of claims or any state officer or board the power to
determine whether a tax should be laid for the current year, or
at what rate, or upon what property, or how it should be col
lected, and whether lands should be sold or forfeited for its satis
faction ; all this prescribes no rule, and originates no authority ;
it merely attempts to empower some other tribunal to prescribe a
rule and set in motion the tax machinery. And this is clearly
incompetent. The legislature must make the law, but it may
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prescribe its own regulations regarding the ministerial agents that
are to execute it
One clearly denned exception to the general rule exists in the
case of municipal corporations in the levy and collection of local
taxes. Immemorial custom which tacitly or expressly has been
incorporated in the state constitutions, has made them a part of
the general machinery of state government, and in their case
the state does little beyond prescribing rules of limitation, within
which, for local purposes, the power to tax is left to them with
authority subordinate to that of the state to make rules for its
regulation and execution.1
"Caldwell e. Justices, 4 Jones Eq., 323; Taylor v. Newbern, 2 id., 141;
Thompson e. Floyd, 2 Jones Law, 313; Wingate e. Sluder, 6 id., 552; Com-
missioners v. Patterson, 8 id., 182; Wilmington v. Roby, 8 Ired., 250; Steward
v. Jefferson, 3 Harr., 335; Lockhart v. Harrington, 1 Hawkes, 408; Cheaney v.
Hooser, 9 B. Monr., 330 ; Slack e. Railroad Co., 13 id., 1, 9 ; Battle v. Mobile,
9 Ala., 234; Stein v. Mobile, 24 id., 591; Osborn v. Mobile, 44 id., 493; Harri
son v. Vicksburg, 3 S. & M., 581; Smith v. Aberdeen, 25 Miss., 458; Hope e.
Deaderick, 8 Humph., 1; Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Cold., 382; Bull v. Read, 13
Grat, 78; Case of County Levy, 5 Call, 139; People «. Kelsey, 34 Cal., 470;
Washington v. State, 13 Ark., 752; State v. Noyes, 10 Fost, 279, 292; Burgess
v. Pue, 2 Gill, 11; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 id., 383; Kinney v. Zimpleman,
36 Texas, 554, able opinion by Walker, J.; St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo.. 559;
St. Louis «. Savings Bank, 49 id., 574; People v. Hurlburt, 24 Mich., 44, 108;
Butler's Appeal. 73 Penn. St., 448; Cooley's Const. Lim., 191 and cases cited.
For an early case denying the power of the legislature to delegate to county
boards the power to tax, see Marr v. Enloe, 1 Yerg., 452. In the subsequent
case of Hope v. Deaderick, 8 Humph., 1, the right to empower local bodies
to levy local taxes was fully sustained. In Arbegust e. Louisville, 2 Bush,
271, 275, 276, William), J., speaking of an extension of city boundaries which
was complained of as permitting unjust local taxation of suburban property,
says: " Whatever may be said of the intrinsic justice of such measures, there
is no power in the courts to control this, when the taxing power is conferred
in good faith, to uphold local government, and give police regulations to the
population, and not merely to embrace taxable property for revenue purposes in
order to lighten the burdens of others." See also Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush,
37. In the colony of Massachusetts, the right to raise money by taxation of
the interests of the proprietors of a town seems to have been conferred on the
proprietors as a corporation, and they enforced the tax by sale of such inter-
ests, but they did not sell interests set off in severalty. Bott v. Perley, 11
Mass., 169. The case of Anderson v. The Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind., 199, is
one difficult to be reconciled with the general principle asserted in the text,
that the power to tax cannot be delegated. The Kerns Draining Co. was a
corporation formed under a general statute of that state, which permitted as-
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The power affected by contracts. There are cases in
which state legislatures have pledged the state in a more or less
formal manner, that on some particular subject of taxation the
state should refrain, either wholly or for some definite period, from
levying any taxes whatever, or should levy them only to a certain
extent Whether such a pledge could bind the state has been
made the subject of controversy. The general rule is that one
legislative body cannot by its own action narrow tbe scope of the
legislative power, but with the same amplitude that it comes to
sociations voluntarily to incorporate themselves for the purpose of the con
struction of levees and drains, and authorized them when incorporated to take
property for the purpose of such levees and drains, and to tax those who were
benefited for the expenses. Anderson, being thus taxed for benefits accruing
from a drain, resisted payment, but a judgment against him was supported.
Perkins, J., does not allude to the question of the power of the legislature to
make such a delegation of authority, but confines his attention to the question
whether the purpose is a public purpose. If the drain is constructed to pro
mote the public health, he assumes the purpose to be public ; and as the record
does not show the contrary, he assumes that to have been the object and af
firms the judgment. With great respect for that eminent judge, if such a pow
er to tax can be given by general law to any persons who will organize to take
it
, we do not see why the levying and collecting of the whole revenue of the
state may not be farmed out after the manner of arbitral rulers in former pe
riods. In Harward v. St. Clair and Monroe Levee and Drainage Co., 51 11l.,
130, 135, the supreme court of 11linois deny the right of the legislature to con
fer upon a private corporation the power to tax. While basing the denial inthe
main on a clause of the constitution which, in conferring the power to tax on
municipal corporate authorities, they understand was intended to exclude its
exercise locally by any other authorities, it is justly said by Lawrence, J.,
" The power of taxation is, of all the powers of government, the one most
liable to abuse, even when exercised by the direct representatives of the peo
ple; and if committed to persons who may exercise it over others without ref
erence to their consent, the certainty of its abuse would be simply a question
of time. No person or class of persons could be safely entrusted with irre
sponsible power over the property of others ; and such a power is essentially
despotic in its nature, and violative of all just principles of government It
matters not that, as in the present instance, it is to be professedly exercised for
public uses, by expending for the public benefit the tax collected. If it be a
tax, as in the present instance, to which the persons who are to pay it have
never given their consent, and imposed by persons acting under no responsi
bility of official position, and clothed with no authority of any kind by those
whom they propose to tax, it is, to the extent of such tax, misgovernment of
the same character as our forefathers thought just cause of revolution." The
case of Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Met. (Ky.), 350, is equally em
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one body, it must pass to the successor.1 Pledges, thereiore, or
stipulations by one legislature regarding the future levy of taxes,
though they may under some circumstances charge the conscience
of the members or their successors, are not limitations on legisla
tive power, but may be observed or disregarded as it shall be
thought the public necessity or policy may require. An excep
tion, however, is held to exist in case of an agreement by a state,
entered into for a consideration, to refrain from exercising this
power ; that provision of the federal constitution which forbids
the state passing laws which impair the obligation of contracts,
applying as well to contracts by the state itself as to those between
individuals. And therefore, where a state exchanged lands with
an Indian tribe, and stipulated by legislative act that those con
veyed to the Indians should not thereafter be subject to any tax,
this stipulation was held to be binding as a contract, and availa
ble on behalf of those who subsequently by legislative permission
became purchasers from the Indians.2 A number of cases, for
phatic against the right to delegate any such power of local taxation. The
Drainage Co. Case in 11 La. An., 338, was one in which it is not surprising that
the court could not all agree in the conclusion. In that case the legislation
permitted a private corporation to drain the low lands near New Orleans at
the expense of the proprietors, though the assessment upon the proprietors
was made not by the corporation but by assessors. The court at first held
this assessment unconstitutional, but a change of two members taking place
in its composition, it was then sustained as only an ordinary case of assess
ment on a basis of benefits. Of course the state cannot confer upon a muni-
cipality a power to tax which she does not herself possess: e. g., to tax the
agencies of the federal government. O'Donnell v. Bailey, 24 Miss., 386. In
some of the state constitutions, however, there are express limitations on the
power of the state to tax which do not in terms apply to municipalities.
1Cooley's Const. Lim., 125-127, 280-284.
•New Jersey e. Wilson, 7 Cranch., 164. Compare Armstrong e. Athens Co.,
16 Pet., 281. In Home of Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall., 430, an act which, for
the purpose of encouraging the establishment of a charitable institution, de
clared that its property should be exempt from taxation, was held to be a
contract. So an exemption from taxation, for ten years, of lands which had
been donated to the state for reclamation, was held not subject to repeal as to
all lands sold. MeGee v. Math is, 4 Wall., 143. So where a bonus was paid for
a corporate charter, the state agreeing not to impose any further tax upon the
corporators during the existence of their charter under the act. it was held
that a tax on the stockholders by reason of their shares was in violation of
this agreement. Gordon v. The Appeal Tax Court, 3 How., 133 ; followed in
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which this has been the precedent, are referred to in the note, but
it is conceded in all of them that there must be a consideration to
the state for the relinquishment, or the elements of a contract will
be wanting. An exemption, from motives of state policy merely,
may be withdrawn at any time when the like motives incline the
legislature in the opposite direction;1 and in any case the inten
tion of the state to bind itself by an exemption, must be clear, as
all presumptions are against it.2
Wendover «. Lexington, 15 B. Monr., 258, 264. An act exempting the stock of
a railroad company and its real estate from taxation for 36 years was sustained
as a contract, in Toinlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall., 460; as was a perpetual ex
emption in Humphreys v. Pegues, 16 Wall., 244: see also Pacific R. R. v.
Maguire, 20 Wall., 36. That a license tax cannot be imposed on a franchise
which a corporation has acquired by a surrender of valuable rights, was de
cided in Lucas v. Lottery Commissioners, 11 G. & J., 490. That the franchise
to set up a lottery is not a contract, see Moore v. State, 48 Miss., 147 : but
see also Broadbent v. Tuscaloosa, etc., Association, 45 Ala., 170.
1Christ's Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How., 300 ; East Saginaw Salt Manuf.
Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich., 259; S. C in error, 13 Wall., 373. In the first
of these cases was considered a legislative act which provided that " the real
property, including ground rents, now belonging, and payable to Christ's
Church Hospital, in the city of Philadelphia, so long as the same shall con
tinue to belong to the said hospital, shall be and remain free from taxes."
Held, that the exemption so given was a mere privilege, bene placitum, and
might be revoked at the pleasure of the sovereign authority. And the privi
lege being recalled by a subsequent act, the property of the hospital became
taxable like any other. In the second case a legislative act had provided that
companies and corporations formed, or that might be formed, for the boring
for and manufacturing salt In the state of Michigan, should be entitled to
certain benefits conferred by the act, one of which was that " all property, real
and personal, used for the purpose mentioned, shall be exempt from taxation
for any purpose." This was considered a mere bounty law, dependent for its
continuance upon the dictates of public policy, and the voluntary good faith
of the legislature. In Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall., 430, the ex
emption, which was held irrepealable, was contained in the charter of the cor
poration. It was objected that no consideration for the exemption was shown,
but it was replied by the court that none was necessary beyond the benefits to
the community, which it is to be assumed were anticipated from the corpora
tion. On the general subject, see Hagar v. Supervisors of Yolo, 47 Cal., 222;
Ramsey v. Hoeger, Sup. Ct. 11l. (1874), 6 Chicago Legal News, 318.
' " The right to levy and collect taxes is a necessary incident of every govern
ment, essential to its very existence, and is never presumed to have been sur
rendered or abandoned except by clear words, and for what is deemed, at the
time, by the law-making power, an adequate consideration. The surrender
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It having been authoritatively determined that the charter of a
private corporation is a contract between the commonwealth and
the corporators, it follows that whatever stipulations it contains
regarding taxation of the corporate franchises or property are ir-
repealable.1 An exception to this sweeping statement exists
cannot be extended by implication; and if one tax is expressed, it caunot be
presumed to extend to others. No power to tax need be reserved ; it exists
and remains unless expressly yielded." Jones, etc., Manuf. Co. v. Common
wealth, 69 Penn. St., 81, 137. See also Commonwealth v. Bird, 12 Mass., 443 ;
Dale v. Governor, 3 Stew., 387 ; Brainard e. Colchester, 31 Conn., 407, 410 ;
Easton Bank v. Commonwealth, 10 Penn. St., 442, 450; Herrick v. Randolph,
13 Vt, 525, 531 ; People v. Roper, 35 N. Y., 629 ; People v. Commissioners of
Taxes, 47 id., 501; Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush, 667; S. C, 3 Am. Rep., 309;
Nor. Mo. R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 49 Mo., 490; S. C, 8 Am. Rep., 141 ; Pacific R.
R.Co. v. Cass Co., 53 Mo., 17 ;Wendover v. Lexington, 15 B. Monr., 258, 262 ; Bal
timore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Marshall Co., 3 W. Va., 319; Stein v. Mobile, 17
Ala., 234 ; S. C, 24 id., 591; State v. Bank of Smyrna, 2 Hous., 99; Erie R. R.
Co. e. Commonwealth, 66 Penn. St., 84; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510,
513 ; Armstrong v. Athens Co., 16 Pet., 281 ; Lord e. Litchfield, 36 Conn., 116 ;
S. C, 4 Am. Rep., 41 ; Bridge Proprietors v. State, 21 N. J., 384, 386; S. C on
appeal, 22 id., 593; Bangor v. Stetson, 56 Me., 274; Portland, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Saco, 60 id., 196, 198; People v. Lawrence, 41 N. Y., 137; Academy of Fine
Arts v. Philadelphia, 22 Penn. St., 496; Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 29 id., 226;
Macon v. Central R. R. and Banking Co., 50 Geo., 620 ; Smith v. Macon, 20
Ark., 17; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet., 514,563; Philadelphia, etc.,
R. R. Co. v. Maryland, 10 How., 376, 393; Minot v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R.
Co., 18 Wall., 206 ; Nor. Mo. R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 id., 46 ; Erie Railway v.
Pennsylvania, 21 id., 497. Naming a rate of taxation, but not expressly limit-
ing it
,
does not preclude its being raised. State v. Parker, 32 N. J., 426 : com
pare Louisville R. R. Co. v. Louisville, 4 Bush, 478; Erie R. R. Co. v. Common
wealth, 66 Penn. St., 84 ; St. Louis e. Boatmen's Ins. and Trust Co., 47 Mo., 150.
'.While it were better for the interest of the community that this power
should on no occasion be surrendered, this court has always held that the
legislature of a state, unrestrained by constitutional limitation, has full con
trol over the subject, and can make a contract with the corporation to exempt
its property from taxation, either in perpetuity or for a limited period of time.
If, however, on any fair construction of the legislation, there is a reasonable
doubt whether the contract is made out, this doubt must be solved in favor of
the state. In other words, the language used must be of such a character as,
fairly interpreted, leaves no room for controversy." Bailey v. Pacific R. R.
Co., 7 Chicago Legal News, 266 (Sup. Ct. U. S., per Davis, J.).
1Piqua Bank e. Knoop, 16 How., 369; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 id., 331, 339;
Home of the Friendless e. Rouse, 8 Wall , 430; Washington University v.
Rouse, id., 439; Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co. e. Reid, 13 id., 264; Humphreys
e. Pegues, 16 id., 244; 11linois Central R. R. Co. v. McLean Co., 17 11l., 291
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where, by the charter, the right of amendment or repeal is ex
pressly reserved, as well as where, by the constitution of the
state, all charters are granted subject to that right Where such
is the provision of the constitution, it is a limitation upon the
powers of the legislature, of which every person must take no
tice, and there is no room for the implication of a contract in re
straint of the taxing power.1 Municipal charters are not contracts,
but are granted for public purposes, and amended or repealed at
the discretion of the legislature.8
Exemption of agencies of government. No state can im
pose taxes on persons, property, or other subjects of taxation,
which are not within its jurisdiction. This is selfevident, but it
has peculiar application in this country under the federal consti
tution, which apportions the sovereign authority between the state
and the nation, and gives to each over certain subjects an exclu
sive jurisdiction. Whatever pertains to this exclusive jurisdic
tion is excluded from the taxing power of the other as much as if
it were beyond its territorial limits. The rules upon this subject,
as they have been laid down by the authorities, appear to be the
following:
1. Every person within a state owing temporary or permanent
allegiance to it ; all property of every description within the state
and entitled to the protection of its laws; every private fran
chise, privilege, business or occupation, is subject to be taxed by
the state, in return for the benefits received and anticipated from
state government and protection. But they are also on precisely
the same grounds subject to be taxed by the federal government,
whenever its necessities or policy shall be thought to require it8
1State v. Miller, 30 N. J., 368: Same v. Same, 31 id., 521; State v. Newark,
35 id., 157, 162; Iron CityB'k v. Pittsburgh, 37 Penn. St., 340; Commonwealth
v. Fayette Co. R. R. Co., 55 id., 452; Union Improvement Co. v. Common-
wealth, 69 id., 140; West Wisconsin R. R. Co. e. Supervisors of Trempealeau,
35 Wis., 257; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall., 454; Trask v. Maguirc, 18 id.,
391.
s Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat., 518, 629, per SIar*hall, Ch. J.;
Dillon on Mun. Corp., §§ 49, and 8, 9, 10; Coolcy's Const. Lim., 276; Story on
Const., 4th ed., ch. XXXIV, and cases cited.
8It is said in Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71, that with the exception
of the restrictions expressly imposed by the constitution of the United States,
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2. It is the theory of our system of government that the state
and the nation alike are to exercise their powers respectively in
as full and ample a manner as the proper departments of govern
ment shall determine to be needful and just, and as might be
done by any other sovereignty whatsoever. This theory by
necessary implication excludes wholly any interference by either
the state or the nation with an independent exercise by the other
of its constitutional powers. If it were otherwise, neither govern
ment would be supreme within what has been set apart for its
exclusive sphere, but on the other hand, would be liable at any
time to be crippled, embarrassed, and perhaps wholly obstructed
in it3 operations at the will or caprice of those who for the time
being wielded the authority of the other. And that an exercise
of the power to tax might have that effect is manifest from a con
sideration of the nature of the power. Any " power which in its
nature acknowledges no limits," 1 and which, even in a lawful and
legitimate exercise may be carried to the extent of an absolute
appropriation of the property or destruction of the franchise or
privilege upon which it is exerted,8 must be incapable of being
admitted within its sovereignty by another, with due regard to a
safe and independent exercise of its own authority. If this be so,
then under the constitution of the United States which contem
plates an independent exercise by state and nation severally of their
constitutional powers, it must follow as a necessary and inevitable
conclusion, —
3. That the means or agencies provided or selected by the fed
eral government as necessary or convenient to the exercise of its
functions cannot be subjected to the taxing power of the states.
the state power of taxation in respect to property, business and persons within
its limits remains entire. There is nothing in the constitution which contem
plates authorizing any direct abridgment of this power by the national legis
lature.
1Per Marshall, Ch. J., in Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet., 449, 466 ; Lane
County v. Orcg m, 7 Wall., 71 ; Bank of Commerce e. New York, 2 Black,
620; Carroll v. Peny, 4 McLean, 25 ; Cheaney «. Hooser, 9 B. Monr., 330, 339 ;
Veazie Bank «. Fenno. 8 Wall., 533, 548; State v. Bell, 1 Phil. (N. C), 85.
Compare Berney v. Tax Collector, 2 Bailey, 654.
8McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, 431, per Marshall, Ch. J. ; "Veazie
Bank e. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 548, per Chase, Ch. J.
58 [CH. IILLAW OF TAXATION.
The states cannot tax a bank chartered by congress as the fiscal
agent of the government,1 they cannot tax the loans of the Uni
ted States contracted under the power conferred upon the govern
ment to borrow money ,s nor the revenue stamps issued by the
United States,8 nor the salary or emoluments of federal officers.4
It also follows,—
4. That the federal government is also without power to tax
the corresponding means or agencies of the states, or the salaries
of state officers ; the state in the exercise of its functions being
entitled to the same immunity from congressional interference
that the nation is from that of the state.5 And a state municipal
corporation, being only a portion of its sovereign power, created
as a convenient if not a necessary part of the machinery of state
1McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, 368 ; Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 9 id., 738. Property occupied for the United States, but not owned by
it
,
was held taxable to the owner in Speed e. St. Louis County Court, 42 Mo.,
382. And the fact that the government has an interest in real estate does not
preclude the taxation of other interests to the owners. State e. Moore, 12
Cal., 56.
»Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet, 449; Bank of Commerce e. New York, 2
Black, 620 ; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall., 200 ; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 id., 573 ;
People v. The Commissioners, 4 id., 244; Bradley v. People, id., 459; The
Banks v. The Mayor, 7 id., 16; Bank v. Supervisors, id., 26. Compare State v.
Jackson, 33 N. J., 450; Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manuf. Co., 12 Allen,
298; Commonwealth v. Provident Inst., id., 312; Coite v. Society for Savings,
32 Conn., 173. A tax on the franchise of a corporation whose capital is in part
invested in United States securities, is not a tax on such securities. Society
for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall., 594 ; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, id.,
611 ; Hamilton County v. Massachusetts, id., 632. A city cannot tax state
bonds unless specially authorized. Augusta e. Dunbar, 50 Geo., 387.
* Palfrey v. Boston, 101 Mass., 329. Or its treasury notes. Montgomery
County v. Elston, 32 Ind., 27.
* Dobbin v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet., 435. In Melcher «.
Boston, 9 Met., 73, a clerk in a post office was held taxable by the state on his
income.
*Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall., 418, 427, per Clifford, J.; The Collector e.
Day, 11 id., 113; Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 id., 5
;
Friedman e. Siegel, 10
Blatch., S27; Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind., 276, 279; State v. Garton, 32 id., 1; Fi-
field v. Close, 15 Mich., 505; Union Bank v. Hill, 3 Cold., 325; Smith v. Short,
40 Ala., 385 ; Jones e. Keep's Estate, 19 Wis., 369; Sayles v. Davis, 22 id., 225 ;
Moore Quirk, 105 Mass., 49; S. C, 7 Am. Rep., 499; Cooley's Const. Lim.,
484, and cases cited. A railroad wholly owned by a state and operated by it,
not taxable under the U. S. revenue laws. Georgia v. Atkins, 1 Abb., U. S., 22.
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government, is as much exempt from the taxation of the federal
government, in all its revenues and property, as the state itself.1
5. A tax upon persons may possibly, in some cases, tend to
embarrass the operations of either national or state government,
in which case it would be void unless imposed by the govern
ment which was liable to be inconvenienced by it. And, on this
ground, it has been held, that a state tax of a certain sum on
every person leaving the state by public conveyance was invalid ;
the tendency being to embarrass the functions of the national
government, by obstructing the travel of citizens and officers of
the United States in the business of the government and the
transportation of armies and munitions of war.2
6. It is customary for the federal government, in receiving a
new state to the union, to require from it— and probably without
1United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall., 322. A state may tax its own mu
nicipal organizations, or their «orporate property, if it shall see tit, but there
is always a presumption against the intention to do so. Compare Wayland
e. County Commissioners, 4 Gray, 500, with Stein v. Mobile, 24 Ala., 591 ;
State v. Gaffney, 34 N. J., 133 ; Directors of Poor v. School Directors, 42
Penn. St, 21, 25 ; and Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv., 295. The grant in
general terms to a city of the power to tax will not authorize the city to tax
rtate or county property. Piper r1.Singer, 4 S. & R., 354; Kashville v. Bank
of Tennessee, 1 Swan, 269. See People v. McCreery, 34 Cal., 432, 456 ; People
v. Doe, 36 Cal., 220; People e. Austin, 47 Cal., 323. It has been held in Mas
sachusetts that lands of a county used for county purposes are exemptfrom all
taxation, whether imposed for general purposes or for local improvements.
Worcester County v. Worcester, 116 Mass., 193.
8Crandall e. Nevada, 6 Wall., 35. The like principle was recognized in
State v. Jackson, 33 N. J., 450, where a bounty voted to relieve a town from
a draft was held invalid, as tending to defeat the legislation of congress on
the subject. That case was decided by a divided court, and the decision is
opposed to the current of authority. In State Treasurer v. Philadelphia, etc.,
R. R. Co., 4 Houston, 158, a law which imposed a state tax on railroad com
panies of ten cents on every passenger carried within the state, excepting
soldiers and sailors of the United States, was held to be not a tax upon the
business of the carrier, measured by the number of persons carried, but a tax
upon the persons carried, to be collected by the carrier for the state, and, con
sequently, so far as it operated upon persons entering into, departing from, or
passing through the state, was, in effect, a regulation of commerce between
the states, and, consequently, within the decision in Crandall v. Nevada. The
case is reasoned by Chancellor Bates with his accustomed ability, but it will
be seen from the statement of the case, that some of the objections to the Ne
vada act could not be made to this.
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necessity,1 — a stipulation that the public domain, lying within its
limits, shall not be taxed by the state. The disability remains
effective until the United States has made sale, or other dis
position, of the lands, but it then terminates, notwithstanding the
title may not have passed by the actual execution and delivery of
patent of conveyance ; the land being actually severed from the
public domain by the sale itself.2 But this principle will not
apply in any case until the right to a patent is complete, and the
equitable title fully vested in the party without anything more
to be paid or any act to be done, going to the foundation of the
right.8 Nor will it apply where, as one of the conditions of the
grant, the lands not sold by the grantee within a time named
are to be open to preemption and settlement like any portion of
the public domain.4
7. Eailroads owned and controlled by private corporations are
in a certain sense public conveniences and agencies, but they con
stitute no branch or part of the government, and are not properly
governmental agencies, even though the government may employ
them for the transportation of its troops, its mails, etc., or for
other purposes. The corporations owning them are consequently
entitled to claim no exemption based on any implication that they
are essential to the operations of the government5 And the same
1See Blue Jacket e. Johnson County, 3 Kansas, 299. A possessory interest
in the public lauds for mining purposes may be taxed as being a species of
property. People v. Shearer, 30 Cal., 645; People v. Cohen, 31 Cal., 210.
8Carrol v. Perry, 4 McLean, 25 ; Witherspoon e. Duncan, 21 Ark., 240 ; S. C,
4 Wall., 210; Puget Sound Agricultural Co. v. Pierce County, 1 Wash. Ter.
Rep., 180 ; Carrol v. Safford, 3 How.; 441 ; Astrom e. Hammond, 3 McLean,
107; People v. Shearer, 30 Cal., 645; Hull e. Dowling, 18 Cal., 619; Iowa
Homestead Co. v. Webster County, 21 Iowa, 221 ; McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall.,
23. See U. P. R. R. Co. e. McShane, 18 Int. Rev. Rec., 68.
8Railway Company v. Prescott, 16Wall., 603, in which case one of the con-
ditions of the grant was, that the cost of the government surveys, selections,
etc., should be prepaid by the grantee before the lands should be conveyed.
* Railway Company v. Prescott, 16Wall., 603. Compare this with Tucker v.
Ferguson in the same court, 7 Chicago Legal News, 78 (1875).
'Thompson v. Pacific R. R., 9 Wall., 579. Compare People v. Central Pa
cific R. R. Co., 43 Cal., 398 ; Huntington v. Same, 2 Sawyer, 503 ; Inhabitants of
Worcester e. Western R. R. Corp., 4 Met., 564, 568; Boston & Me; R. R. e.
Cambridge, 8 Cush., 237. In the case of the Union Pacific R. R. Company,
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is true of any other private corporation, notwithstanding the fact
that the government may find it convenient to make use of the
corporation for its purposes, just as a private individual might be
employed for the same or any other purpose if the government
had need of his services.1
Taxes on commerce. The federal constitution provides'
that no state shall, without consent of congress, lay any imposts
or duties on imports or exports, except what may be neces
sary for executing its inspection laws. Under this provision
a state law imposing a stamp duty on bills of lading of gold and
silver to be carried out of the state has been held invalid as consti
tuting a tax on exports.8 But the provision has no application to
articles transported merely from one state into another.4 The
same clause of the constitution forbids the states without the con
sent of congress to lay any "duty of tonnage." The precise
meaning of this phraseology has been the subject of some contro
versy. Vessels are taxable as property, and possibly the tax may
be measured by the capacity, when they are -taxed only as prop-
chartered by congress, and in which the government has important interests
with some power of control, the states have no power to tax. U. P. R. R. Co.
p. Peniston, 18Wall., 5. A state bank chartered for the benefit of the state, and
with the faith and credit of the state pledged for its support, is not subject to
taxation by a municipal corporation. Nashville v. Bank of Tennessee, 1 Swan,
269.
1The national banking law permits the banks organized under it to be
taxed, only limiting taxation to a particular mode, and prohibiting its being in
excess of that of state banks. The permission thus given to tax removes
any implied exemption that might otherwise exist. See Union Nat. Bank v.
Chicago, 3 Bissell, 82. The right of congress to inhibit the taxation of na
tional banks except as it shall provide, is assumed in many cases. See Flint
e. Boston, 99 Mass., 141. The right to tax a railroad company is not affected
by the fact of its property being mortgaged to the United States. Thompson
e. Pacific R. R. Co., 9 Wall., 579.
•Art. 1, §10, par. 2.
J Almy v. California, 24 How., 169. See what is said of this case by Mr.
Justice Miller in Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall., 123, 137. A stamp tax on
foreign bills of exchange was sustained in Ex parte Martin, 7 Nev., 140.
*Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall., 123. It was held in Jackson Iron Co. v. Au
ditor General, Mich. Sup. Ct, 1875, that a tax on iron ores of one and a half
cents a ton if taken out of the state for smelting, while if reduced within the
state they were exempt, was a tax on commerce and therefore void.
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erty and not as vehicles of commerce j1 but any such distinction
must be somewhat questionable. It has been often held that a
tax on vessels at a certain sum " per ton
" was forbidden.2 And it
seems that a tax of a certain sum upon every vessel arriving in
port is to be regarded as a duty of tonnage, though demanded
irrespective of the vessel"s capacity.8 The federal constitution also
provides that congress shall have power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states and with the
Indian tribes.4 The constitution, and the laws made in pursu
ance thereof being supreme over the several states, the power of
regulation cannot be interfered with, limited or restrained by any
exercise of state authority. When therefore it is held that a
power to tax is
,
at the discretion of the authority which wields it
,
a power which may be carried to the extent of an annihilation of
that which it taxes, and therefore may defeat and nullify any
authority which may elsewhere exist for the purpose of protection
and preservation, it follows as a corollary that the several states
cannot tax the commerce which is regulated under the supremacy
of congress.5
But a tax on property that may be the subject of commerce
under congressional regulation, is not a tax on commerce. Neither
is a tax on property that has been the subject of such commerce,
where it is taxed only as property, and in common with all other
property within the state.6 An importer of foreign goods, in his
1 Lott e. Mobile Trade Co., 43 Ala., 578. See Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens,
6 Wall., 31 ; State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 id., 204.
8 Sheffield v. Parsons, 3 Stew. & Port., 302 ; Harbor Master v. Railroad Co.,
3 Strob., 59* ; State v. Charleston, 4 Rich., 286 ; Lott v. Morgan, 41 Ala., 246 ;
Johnson v. Drummond, 20 Grat., 419. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1,
186; Hays v. Steamship Co., 17 How., 596; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 id.,
227 ; Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall., 31. The point is authoritatively
determined in Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 id., 577.
' Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall., 31. It is not, however, incompe-
tent for a state to authorize a city to collect a wharfage charge on all vessels
touching at its wharves. Marshall v. Vicksburg, 15 Wall , 146.
4 Art. 1, § 8
, par. 3
. In Foster v. County Commissioners, 7 Minn., 140, it
was decided that a state tax upon a licensed trader within an Indian reserva
tion would be in conflict with this provision of the constitution.
» McCulloch v. Maryland, 4Wheat., 316, 425, per Mar3hall, Ch. J.
« Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat., 419, 437 : Waring v. The Mayor, 8 Wall.,
110; Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 id., 475, 479.
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capacity as such, is not the subject of state taxation, and cannot
be required to pay a license fee as importer ;t and his sales are ex
empt from state taxation, because he purchases, by the payment of
the duty, a right to dispose of the merchandise as well as to bring
it into the country ; and the tax, if it were admissible, would inter
cept the import, as an import, in the way to become incorporated
with the general mass of property, and would deny it the privi
lege of becoming so incorporated until it should have contributed
to the revenue of the state.2 But when the importer has sold the
imported package, or has otherwise mixed the goods with the gen
eral property of the state by breaking up the package, a state tax
which then finds the articles already incorporated with the mass of
property by the act of the importer, is not a tax upon commerce.8
A tax upon freight taken up within a state and carried out of
i.
t, or taken up out of a state and brought within it
,
is held to be
a tax upon the commerce between states, even though no distinc
tion is made between freight carried wholly within the state, and
that brought into or carried through or out of it4 The same has
been held of a tax upon the use of locomotives and cars employed
on a railroad which runs from one state into another. As prop
erty, locomotives may be taxed, but not their use as vehicles of
commerce between states.5 A tax upon the masters of vessels
engaged in foreign commerce, of a certain sum on account of
every passenger brought from a foreign country into the state, is
a tax upon commerce.6 On the other hand, a tax on exchange and
1 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat., 419, 437. And see Low «. Austin, 13
Wall., 29.
»Waring e. Mayor, 8 Wall., 110, 152, per Clifford, J., citing Brown e. Mary-
land, 12 Wheat., 419, 448, and Almy v. California, 24 How., 169, 173. See State
e. Allmond, 2 Houston, 612; Hinson v. Lott, 40 Ala., 123; S. C in error,
8 Wall., 148.
8 Brown v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 419, 437; Waring e. Mayor, 8 Wall., 110.
Articles imported may be taxed after they have passed from the hands of the
importer, even though they remain in the original packages. Waring v. The
Mayor, 8 Wall., 110. See Low v. Austin, 13 Wall., 29; Kenney v. Harwell,
42 Gn., 416.
1 Case of State Freight Tax, 15 Wall., 232. See also Erie Railway Co. v.
State, 31 N. J., 531.
»Minot v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Abb. U. S., 323 ; S. C, 18Wall., 206.
«Passenger Cases, 7 How., 283.
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money brokers,1 a tax on legacies to aliens,2 a tax on the gross
receipts of a railway company,8 have been held not to be taxes
on commerce, and consequently not an interference with the con
stitutional powers of congress.
Taxes in abridgment of the privileges and immuni
ties of citizens. The federal constitution provides that the
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several states.4 Among these privi
leges and immunities is that of being exempt in other states from
higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the citizens of such
other states.8 Under this provision, while it is entirely admissi
ble to levy taxes upon the business or property of nonresident
traders within the state,6 it is not competent to require them to
take out a license and to pay therefor a sum greater than that de
manded of residents.7 Different methods of procedure may be
expedient in order to secure uniformity of taxation as between
residents and nonresidents, and these are not objectionable if uni
formity is the purpose, and they have a tendency to secure it8
Corporations are not citizens within the meaning of the clause of
1Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How., 73.
»Mager v. Grima, 8 How., 490.
'Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall., 284, 289.
4Art. 4, § 2, par. 1.
•Corfield e. Coryell, 4 Wash. C C, 371,380, per Washington, J, ; Wiley v.
Parmer, 14 Ala., 627; Scott v. Watkins, 22 Ark., 556, 564; Oliver v. Washing
ton Mills, 11 Allen, 2C8.
«Duer v. Small, 4 Blatch., 263; Commonwealth e. Milton, 12 B. Monr., 212,
218.
'Ward e. Maryland, 12 Wall., 418; State v. North, 27 Mo., 464; Crow v.
State, 14 id., 237. In State v. Welton, 55 Mo., 288, a tax was sustained
which was levied on those dealing in articles "not the growth, produce or
manufacture of the state." The court held it not to be within the rule of
Ward e. Maryland, and not to be a tax on the produce of other states, but
only on the business. The same decision was made in State v. Hodgdon, 41
Vt., 139.
sTo provide a different method for assessing the lands of nonresidents for
taxation from that provided for residents — e. g., to assess the latter on lists
handed in by themselves, and the former on an appraisement by residents in
the vicinity— does not infringe on the privileges and immunities of nonresi
dents. Redd v. St, Francis Co., 17 Ark., 416.
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the constitution here considered, and it is no violation of the
privileges and immunities of citizens of other states to require a
corporation, of which they are stockholders, to submit to such
taxation as the state shall see fit to impose as a condition of do
ing business thsrein.1
Taxes which impair the obligation of contracts. No
state can pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.8 It
has never been held incompetent, under this provision, to tax, as
personal property, contracts for the payment of money, or which
have a money value; and the right to do so may be assumed.8
But these, it seems, can only be considered as the property of the
owner where he has his domicile, and, consequently, are only
taxable there. To tax in one state contracts owned in another, is
held to impair their obligation, and, consequently, to be inad
missible, even though they are made and payable in the state im
posing the tax, and are secured by mortgage in that state.4
1Tatem v. Wright, 23 N. J., 429, and other cases cited, ante, p. 43.
»Const, of U. 8., art. 1, § 10, par. 1.
8See Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt., 152.
* State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15Wall., 300. The act of the legislature
which came under consideration in this case required the treasurer to retain
five per cent, of the interest payable to its creditors, and pay it into the treas
ury of the commonwealth. Field, J., says : " The power of taxation, however
vast in its character and searching in its extent, is necessarily limited to sub
jects within the jurisdiction of the state. These subjects are persons, prop
erty and business. Whatever form taxation may assume, whether as duties,
imposts, excises or licenses, it must relate to one of these subjects. It is not
possible to conceive of any other, though as applied to them, the taxation may
be exercised in a great variety of ways. It may touch property in every
shape; in its natural condition, in its manufactured form, and in its various
transmutations. And the amount of taxation may be determined by the value
of the property , or its use, or its capacity, or its productiveness. Itmay touch
business in the almost infinite forms in which it is conducted, in professions,
in commerce, in manufactures, and in transportations. Unless restrained by
provisions of the federal constitution, the power of the state as to the mode,
form and extent of taxation is unlimited, where the subjects to which it ap
plies are within her jurisdiction.
" Corporations may be taxed like natural persons, upon their property and
business. But debts owing by corporations are not property of the debtors in
any sense; they are obligations of the debtors, and only possess value in the
hands of the creditors. With them they are property, and in their hands they
may be taxed. To call debts property of the debtors is simply to misuse terms.
5
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Other restraints on the power of taxation. It is cus
tomary for the people in framing constitutions for the states to im
pose other restrictions on the power of taxation, some of which we
shall take occasion to consider hereafter. With the exception of
those already mentioned, and such as may thus be expressly im
posed- the power is limited in extent only by the will of the
government itself. No limitations or restrictions upon the exer
cise of this essential attribute of government can be raised by
implication ; but the intention to limit or abridge it must be ex
pressed in clear and unambiguous language.1
All the property there can be, in the nature of things, in debts of corporations,
belongs to the creditors to whom they are payable, and follows their domicile,
wherever that may be. Their debts can have no locality separate from the
parties to whom they are due. This principle might be stated in many dif
ferent ways and supported by citations from numerous adjudications, but no
number of authorities and no forms of expression could add anything to its
obvious truth, which is recognized upon its simple statement.
"The bonds issued by the railroad company in this case arc undoubtedly
property, but property in the hands of the holders, not property of the oblig
ors. So far as they are held by nonresidents of the state, they are property
beyond the jurisdiction of the state. The law which requires the treasurer of
the compauy to retain five per cent, of the interest due to the nonresident bond
holder, is not, therefore, a legitimate exercise of the taxing power. It is a law
which interferes between the company and the bondholder, and under the pre
tense of levying a tax, commands the company to withhold a portion of the
stipulated interest and pay it over to the state. It is a law which thus impairs
the obligation of the contract between the parties. The obligations of a con
tract depend upon its terms and the means which the law in existence at the
time affords for its enforcement. A law which alters the terms of a contract
by imposing new conditions or dispensing with those expressed, is a law
which impairs its obligations; for, as stated on another occasion, such a law
relieves the parties from the moral duty of performing the original stipula
tions of the contract, and it prevents their legal enforcement." See also
Railroad Co. e. Jackson, 7 Wall., 262; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen,
268. Compare Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt., 152. In Commonwealth e. Hamilton
Manufacturing Co., 12 Allen, 298, it was decided that the fact that a part of Its
stockholders are residents of another state would not exempt a corporation
from the payment in full of an excise tax measured by the market value of its
stock. It was held by the supreme court of South Carolina in Jenkins v. Charles
ton, 7 Ch. Leg. News, 78 (1874), that the stocks of the state or its municipali
ties might be taxed within the state, though owned by nonresidents; and that
the case was not within the case of State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, supra.
1Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71, per Chase, J.; State v. Parker, 32 N.
J., 426, 435, per Depue, J.; Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat., 422, 426, per Lee, J
Ante, p. 54.
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CHAPTER IV.
THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID.
The general rule. All definitions of taxation imply that it
is to be imposed only for public purposes.1 and whatever differ
ence of opinion may exist regarding the admissibility of taxation
in particular cases, the fundamental requirement, that the purpose
shall be public, will be conceded on all sides. Nor will any ques
tion be made, that the right and tfie duty to determine in the first
instance what are and what are not public purposes, is devolved
upon the legislative department It falls there of necessity, be
cause the taxing power is a branch of the legislative, and the
legislature cannot lie under the necessity of requiring the opinion
or the consent of another department of the government before
it will be at liberty to exercise one of its acknowledged powers.
The independence of the legislature is an axiom in government ;
and to be independent, it must act in its own good time, on its
own judgment, influenced by its own reasons, restrained only as the
people may have seen fit to restrain the grant of legislative power
in making', it The legislature must, consequently, determine for
itself in every instance, whether a particular purpose is or is not
one which so far concerns the public as to render taxation admis
sible.
But it is also generally admitted, that the legislative determi
nation on this subject is not absolutely conclusive. It may be
sufficiently so to put the administrative machinery of the state in
1This is as true under one form of government as under another. In Sidney's
Treatise '- On Government," where he has occasion to refer to the doctrine
of courtiers, that the revenue voted to the king is to be spent as he thinks conve
nient instead of being devoted strictly to publ ic purposes, he very truly remarks,
that this " is no less than to cast it into a pit of which no man ever knew the
bottom. That which is given one day is squandered away the next; the people
is always oppressed with impositions to foment the vices of the court; these
daily increasing, they grow insatiable ; and the miserable nations are com
pelled to hard labor in order to satiate those lusts that tend to their own
ruin." Ch. 3, § 6.
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motion, but when the exaction is made of an individual, and the
power of the state is made use of to compel submission, he has
always the right to invoke the protection of the law. And an
appeal to the law for protection of personal property must neces
sarily render the question, which lies at the foundation of the
demand, a judicial question, upon which the courts cannot re
fuse to pass judgment. It has been forcibty, and yet very truly
said, that an unlimited power in the legislature to make any and
every thing lawful which it might see fit to call taxation, would,
when plainly stated, be an unlimited power to plunder the cit
izen.1 In asserting the right, in any particular case, the legisla
ture merely asserts its jurisdiction to act ; but questions of juris
diction are not usually concluded by a decision in its favor made
by the party claiming it; they remain open, and may be dis
puted anywhere. This is as true of courts as it is of the legislature ;
jurisdiction comes from the law, and is not obtained by any tri
bunal through a simple assertion that it exists. When, therefore,
the question of the validity of taxation becomes judicial, if it
shall appear that the exaction is made for a purpose not public,
the right of the individual to protection is clear. Such an exac
tion is not within the competency of the legislative power, and
the attempt to enforce it
,
however honestly made, could only be
an attempt to take property from its possessor under an authority
which the law of the land does not recognize. " The theory of
our governments, state and national," it has been truly said, " is
opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The
executive, the legislative and the judicial branches of these
governments are all of limited and defined powers. There are limi
tations on such power which grow out of the essential nature of
all free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights,
without which the social compact could not exist, and which are
respected by all governments entitled to the name. * * Of
all the powers conferred upon government, that of taxation is
1 Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Penn. St., 9 ; Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St.,
352; S. C., 8 Am. Rep., 255; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417, 421; Freeland v.
Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 575 ; Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me., 375, 379 ; Allen v. Jay,
60 Me., 124, 139 ; S. C, 11 Am. Rep., 185 ; People v. Township Board of Salem,
20 Mich., 452, 459 ; S. C, 4 Am. Rep., 400;; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82, 92;
Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28.
' "
.
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most liable to abuse. Given a purpose or object for which tax
ation may be' [awfully used, and the extent of its exercise is in
its very nature unlimited. It is true that express limitation on
the amount of tax to be levied or the things to be taxed may be
imposed by constitution or statute, but in most instances for
which taxes are levied, as the support of government, the prose
cution of war, the national defense, any limitation is unsafe. The
entire resources of the people should, in some instances, be at the
disposal of the government The power to tax is
,
therefore, the
strongest, the mo3t pervading of all the powers of government,
reaching directly or indirectly to all classes of the people. * *
This power can as readily be employed against one class of indi
viduals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class and
give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other, if there is no
implied limitation of the uses for which the power may be exer
cised. To lay with one hand the power of the government on
the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it on
favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up pri
vate fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under
the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation.
It is a decree under legislative forms." 1
Presumption in favor of legislation. It is not inconsistent
with this doctrine that in every instance the highest consideration
should be paid to the determination of the legislature that a tax
should be laid. It is not lightly to be assumed that its members
have come to the examination of the subject with any other than
public motives, or that they have failed to give it due investiga
tion or reflection. The presumption on the other hand must
always be that they have considered it with honesty and fair pur
pose, and that their action is the result of their deliberate judg
ment And with all these presumptions tending to support the
legislative action, it would seem but reasonable and proper that
the courts should support it when not clearly satisfied that an
1 Miller, J., in Loan Association e. Topeka, 20 Wall., 655, 663. And see
Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 575 ; Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me., 375, 379 ;
Allen v. Jay, 60 Me., 124; S. C, 11 Am. Rep., 185; Gove v. Epping, 41 N. H.,
539; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H., 9; Curtis e. Whipple, 24 Wis., 350;
People «. Flagg, 46 N. Y., 401 ; Tyler e. Beacher, 44 Vt, 648, 651.
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error has been committed. This is the general rule in constitu
tional law when the validity of legislation is involved,1 and it is
applicable with peculiar force to the case of a legislative decision
upon the purpose for which a tax may be laid.
For in the first place, there is no such thing as drawing a clear
line of distinction between purposes of a public and those of a
private nature.2 The question is embarrassing to legislatures, and
is equally embarrassing to the courts. All attempts to lay down
general rules whereby the difficulties may be solved have seemed,
when new and peculiar cases arose, to add only to the embarrass
ment instead of furnishing the means of extrication from it
Money for a particular purpose may be raised by tax, it is said in
one case, if there be the least possibility that it will be promotive
in any degree of the public welfare.8 " A tax law," it is said in
another case, " must be considered valid unless it be for a purpose
in which the community taxed has no interest ; when it is appar
ent that the burden is imposed for the benefit of others, and
where it would be so pronounced at first blush."4 And still
1Story on Const, § 1482, and notes; Sedg. on Const- and Stat. L., 414;
Cooley, Const. Lim., 182, and numerous cases cited in notes.
*General Purposes of Taxation. These are enumerated by Adam Smith, as
follows:' 1. The defense of the commonwealth. This includes the expenses
of forts, arsenals, ships of war, a standing army and its equipment, the arm
ing and disciplining of the militia, military roads and means of transporta
tion of troops, etc. 2. The administration of justice. 3. The expense of pub
lic works and public institutions, of which he enumerates — (a.) Public works
and institutions for facilitating the commerce of the society — (b ) Institutions
for the education of youth — (c.) Institutions for the instruction of people of
all ages. 4. The expense of supporting the dignity of the sovereign.
Dr. Wayland enumerates more perfectly the purposes for which the public
funds are most commonly expended, as follows: 1. The expenses for the sup.
port of civil government, including in these the compensation of judicial,
legislative and executive officers. 2. Expenses for the purposes of education,
classified by him as common education and scientific education. 3. Expenses
for maintaining religious worship, which, however, he considers inadmis
sible. 4. Expenses for the improvement of coasts and harbors, and whatever
is necessary for the security of external commerce, and for roads, canals, etc.
5. Expenses of pauperism. 6. The expenses of war.
•Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn., 118, 128, per Butler, J.
4Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Penn. St., 147, 174, following, Cheaney v.
Hoiser, 9 B. Monr., 330, 345. And see Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango,
13 N. Y., 143, 149.
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another presents the same idea in language but little different :
" To justify the court in arresting the proceedings and in declar
ing the tax void, the absence of all possible public interest in the
purpose for which the funds are raised must be clear and palpable ;
so clear and palpable as to be perceptible by every mind at first
blush." 1 These are very strong and sweeping assertions, but they
are supported by many others equally emphatic and comprehen
sive, which are .to be met with in the adjudications of courts.2
The very emphasis, however, with which the principle is declared
renders it peculiarly liable to mislead, unless it is examined in
the light of the adjudicated cases in which it has been applied,
generally with explanations, and often with necessary qualifica
tions.8
Grade of the government which taxes. In considering the
legality of the purpose of any particular tax, a question of first
importance must always concern the grade of the government
which assumes to levy it The " public " that is concerned in
a legal sense in any matter of government, is the public the par
ticular government has been provided for; and the "public pur
pose
" for which that government may tax is one which concerns
its own people, and not some other people having a government
of its own, for whose wants taxes are laid. There may, therefore,
be a public purpose as regards the federal union, which would
not be such as a basis for state taxation, and there may be a pub
lic purpose which would uphold state taxation, but not the taxa
tion which its municipalities would be at liberty to vote and col
lect The purpose must in every instance pertain to the sover
eignty with which the tax originates ; it must be something with-
1Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis., 624, 652, per Dixon, Ch. J. And see
Speer v. School Directors, 50 Penn. St., 150.
* " The exercise of the taxing power must become wanton and unjust — be
so grossly perverted as to lose the character of a legislative function — before
the judiciary will feel themselves entitled to interpose on constitutional
grounds. To arrest the legislation of a free people, especially in reference to
burdens self-imposed for the common good, is to restrain the popular sover
eignty, and should have clear warrant in the letter of the fundamental law."
Schenley r. Alleghany City, 25 Penn. St., 128, 130, per Woodward, J.
•This is forcibly put by Dixon, Ch. J., in Whiting v. Sheboygan etc. R. R.
Co., 25 Wis., 167, 180.
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in its jurisdiction so as to justify its making provision for it The
rule is applicable to all the subordinate municipalities ; they are
clothed with powers to accomplish certain objects, and for those
objects they may tax, but not for others, however interesting or
important, which are the proper concern of any other government
or jurisdiction. State expenses are not to be provided for by fed
eral taxation, nor federal expenses by state taxation, because in
neither case would the taxation be levied by the government
upon whose public the burden of the expenses properly rests. To
provide for such expenses would consequently not be a purpose
in which the people taxed would in a legal sense be concerned.
This is the general rule ; some apparent exceptions there unques
tionably are, where the nation and the state have common inter
ests and a common duty, such as may require the action of both,
and would justify the levy of a tax by either or both to accom
plish the one object. An illustration would be the case of a tax
for the common defense against the public enemies, which might
be levied by each, because the purpose would iu a strict sense be
public as to both.
The grade of the government is also important for another rea
son. A municipal government is one of delegated and limited
powers, whose authority is generally to receive a somewhat strict
construction, and which must find the purposes for which it may
tax clearly confided to its charge by the state. It is not suffi
cient that a purpose may seem to belong properly to its jurisdic
tion, or that the court may believe it ought to have had author
ity over it ; but it must be seen that the authority has been con
ferred in fact It is otherwise with the state, which has all the
power of taxation not withheld from exercise in the making
of the state and federal constitutions, and in support of whose
action consequently the most liberal intendments are to be made.
It is otherwise with the federal union also ; for though its powers
are not general like those of the state, but are limited and de
fined by the federal constitution, yet as they concern the most
important matters of government, and relate to subjects not of
domestic concern merely but of international intercourse, and to
other matters which sometimes call for broad and comprehensive
views, and make a policy of liberal expenditures wise and states
manlike, it would be neither reasonable nor prudent to subject its
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action in the matter of taxation to critical rules. That which it
decides to be an object of public expenditure must generally be
so accepted, and error in its action must be corrected by discus
sion and through public opinion and the elections.
General expenses of government. Every government must
provide for its general expenses by taxation ; and in these are to
be included the cost of making provision for those public needs
or conveniences for which, by express law or by general usage, it
devolves upon the government to make provision. As regards
the federal government, a general outline of these is to be found
in the federal constitution. That government is charged with the
common defense of the union, and for that defense it may raise
and support armies, create and maintain a navy, build forts and
arsenals, construct military roads, etc. It has a like power over
the general subject of post offices and post roads, and over other
subjects enumerated in the federal constitution and subjected to its
authority. It may contract debts, and it must provide for their
payment For all these purposes it may levy taxes, and its power
in so doing to select the subjects of taxation and to determine the
rate and the methods is as full and complete as can exist in any
sovereignty whatsoever, with the exceptions which are prescribed
by the constitution itself.
These exceptions are the following :
1. That duties, imposts and excises must be uniform through
out the United States.1
2. A capitation or other direct tax must be laid in proportion
to the federal census or enumeration, according to which the rep
resentation of the states in the popular branch of congress is de
termined.8
3. No tax or duty can be laid on articles exported from any state.8
To these express restrictions is to be added the following,
which is always implied :
1Const of U. S., art. I, § 8, par. 1 ; Veazie Bank e. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 541,
per Ckase, Ch. J.
»Const, of U. S., art. 1, § 9, par. 4; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 541,
per Chase, Ch. J.
»Const of U. S., art I, § 9, par. 5. A tonnage duty laid on foreign vefsels is
not a tax on exports. Aguirre e. Maxwell, 3 Blatch., 140.
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4. No tax can be laid on a state, or its agencies of government,
nor any which can tend to impair the sovereign powers of the
states, or impede the exercise of their essential functions.1
Some taxes levied by the federal government are directly cal
culated and intended to benefit private individuals. For an illus
tration, it gives bounty land or pensions to those who have per
formed military or naval services for the country, notwithstand
ing it has made no promise, and is consequently under neither a
legal nor a moral obligation to do so. But the primary object in
all such bounties is not the private but the public interest. To
show gratitude for meritorious public services in the army and
navy by liberal provision for those who have performed them, is
not only proper in itself, but it may reasonably be expected to
have a powerful influence in inciting others to self-denying, faith
ful and courageous services in the future, when the government,
which is so ready to be generous as well as just, shall have need
of their assistance. The same may be said of a like recognition
of valuable public services rendered by other persons : the ques
tion in every case is not one of power, but of prudence and public
policy.
Imposts laid on any other consideration than the production of
revenue have been often objected to as being only colorably taxa
tion, and therefore not warranted by the taxing power. But
where the impost produces revenue, it is a tax, and it cannot be
invalid merely because, if laid in some other way or at some other
rate, the revenue would have been greater.2 Nor can the motives
'Ante, pp. 56-59, and cases cited.
•"No doubt all taxation should be general and, as far as practicable, equal.
Legislation either to benefit or burden particular classes under the idea that
it is for the good of the state at large, infringes upon the natural and guaran
tied right of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, subject to fair
aud equal contributions to the just and necessary expenses of government in
the exercise of its proper and legitimate functions. A government which
assumes the office of controlling and directing the lawful industry of the citi
zens into the channels which it may choose to deem best, assumes what does
not legitimately belong to it Some states in modern times, in undertaking to
find work for the people, have discovered that it was a sure way to make work
for themselves. But we cannot sit in judgment upon the wisdom or expedi.
ency of laws. An act of the legislature must clearly transcend the limits of
the power confided to that department of government, or more properly
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which have influenced the selection of objects for taxation, or de
termined the rate, be inquired into for the purpose of invalidating
it : proper motives in the legislature are always conclusively pre
sumed.1 If therefore it should be conceded that a tariff of duties
discriminating between articles of merchandise in order to protect
or encourage particular branches of home industry, was unwise,
impolitic, or contrary to the spirit of the federal constitution, it
could not for that reason be treated as invalid. Of public policy
in matters of federal taxation the congress must judge, and the
spirit of the constitution is supposed to address itself to the legis
lature rather than to the courts. Every tax must discriminate,
and only the authority that imposes it can determine how and in
what directions. The motives that influence the members of a
legislative body raise questions between them and their constitu
ents alone.2 Indeed it is only when a burden is imposed which it is
impossible to bear; one which is laid not for the purpose of pro
ducing revenue, but in order to accomplish some ulterior object
which the general government lacks the power otherwise to accom
plish, that a case is presented which really can be said to be fairly
debatable on the score of power. Such a burden, it may be said,
comes under no definition of the word
" tax " which is recognized
in public law. It demands no contributions for the service of the
state ; it adds and is expected to add nothing to the public rev
enue. It annihilates that upon which it is levied, and it differs
from confiscation only in this, that confiscation seizes something
of value, and appropriates it to the needs of the government, thus
making it useful, while this seizes it for the purpose of destruc
tion only. But even in such cases, it is held that the presumption
speaking, it must violate some prohibition, either express or necessarily im
plied, either of the federal or state constitution, before it can be pronounced
by the judicial department to be unconstitutional and void." Sharm>ood. J., in
Durach's Appeal, 62 Penn. St., 491, 495. As to the general right of congress
to tax, see United States v. McKinley, 4 Brewster, 246.
>Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120, 154 ; People e. Draper, 15 N. Y., 532, 545,
555 ; Sunbury & Erie R. R. Co. v. Cooper, 33 Penn. St., 278 ; Wright v. Defrees,
8 Ind., 298, 302; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md., 376; Newman, ex parte, 9 Cal.,
502 ; Lyon v. Morris, 15 Geo., 480 ; McCardle, ex parte, 7 Wall., 506, 514 ; John
son v. Higgins, 3 Met., Ky., 566; Flint etc., Plank Road Co. v. Woodhull, 25
Mich., 99, 103; State v. Hays, 49 Mo., 604, 607; State v. Fagan, 22 La. An., 545.
»See Story on Const., § 1677; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 548.
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that correct motives have controlled the legislative action must
preclude the judiciary from inquiring into the purpose of the legis
lation.1
Public purposes in general. For the most part the term
public purposes is employed in the same sense in the law of taxa
tion and in the law of eminent domain. But both in the legisla
tion of the country and in the judicial decisions some differences
have been recognized, and, as we think, with good reason. An
appropriation under the right of eminent domain is only a forced
sale which one is compelled to make for the public good. As
the consideration paid on such sale is pecuniary, and is supposed
to be equal to the full value of what is taken, no injustice results
to him whose property is appropriated. On the other hand, no
pecuniary consideration is paid when money is demanded under
the power of taxation ; and if the money is taken in order to be
appropriated to private purposes, the benefits which the tax payer
might be presumed to receive from its being used for the needs of
the government, to enable it to protect and defend him with its
other citizens, are not realized. In such a case the supposed con
sideration to the individual for taking his property wholly fails.
A more liberal construction of public purposes is consequently
admissible in the law of eminent domain, where an error in the
direction of too great liberality could not be seriously detrimental,
than in the law of taxation where a like error would result in the
most serious injustice.
There are provisions in a number of the state constitutions un
der which one needing a private way across the land of another
may have the way established against the will of the owner, by
making out his necessity to the satisfaction of a proper public
officer, or of a jury, and by paying such damages as shall be as
sessed against him. This is an extension of the law of eminent
domain,2 but it has its foundation in public policy, and the appro-
1Veazie Bank e. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 548. That the right to tax may be car
ried to the extent of destruction is strongly protested against in Berney a.
Tax Collector, 2 Bailey, 654, 672, per Harper, J.
* In a few cases it has been held that private roads might be laid out by
compulsory proceedings without any such constitutional permission. Har-
vey v. Thomas, 10 Watts, 63 ; Case of Pccopson Road, 16 Penn. St., 15 ; Sher
man e. Buick, 32 Cal., 241.
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priation is supposed to accomplish a public purpose in bringing
into use a parcel of real property which otherwise would be or
might be practically inaccessible. A proposition to make such a
private way at the public expense by means of an exercise of the
power of taxation would, by general consent, be pronounced
wholly inadmissible, as being a proposition to appropriate the
public revenues to a private purpose. The difference in the two
cases is felt and appreciated the moment they are stated, and the
wisdom of recognizing it in legislation has also been very gener
ally felt. There are also some cases in which, without the aid of
constitutional provisions, it has been held that private property
may be appropriated under the law of eminent domain, in order
to enable private parties to establish and carry on their business
enterprises, notwithstanding it would be incompetent to aid the
same enterprises by payments from the public treasury. An
illustration is the case of lands appropriated for the purpose of
creating a reservoir for water, by means of which a water power
may be made available in private hands for manufacturing pur
poses. The right to make the appropriation has been sustained,
on the ground that, within the meaning of the law of eminent
domain, land is taken for the public use whenever its taking is for
the general public advantage, and that the establishment of power
for manufacturing purposes is an object of such great public in
terest — especially where manufacturing is one of the great indus
trial pursuits of the commonwealth — as fully to justify the de
claring it a public use and to authorize for the purpose the ap
propriation of private property by individuals or corporations.1
1Hazen v. Essex Company, 12 Cush., 475, 477, per Shaw, Ch. J. ; Great Falls
Manuf. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N. H., 458, per Perley, Ch. J. The following cases
are to the same effect: Fiske v. Framingham Manuf. Co., 12 Pick., 67; Bos
ton & Roxbury Mill Corporation v. Newman, 12 id., 467; Hardmg v. Grod-
lett, 3 Yerg., 41. The courts of Wisconsin have sustained such laws. New-
comb v. Smith, 1 Chand., 71; Thein v. Vcegtlander, 3 Wis., 461, 465; Pratt v.
Brown, id., 603. But with some hesitation of late ; see Fisher e. Horicon Co.,
10 id., 351; Curtis v. Whipple, 24 id., 350; note of Judge Redfield to Allen
e. Inhabitants of Jay, 12 Am. Law Reg., 493; S. C, 60 Me., 124; also 11 Am.
Rep., 185. They have also been sustained in other states: Olmstead v.
Camp, 33 Conn., 532; Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me., 317; Miller v. Troost,
14 Minn., 365; Vcnard v. Cross, 8 Kan., 248; Harding v. Funk, id., 315; Bur
gess v. Clark, 13 Ired., 109; M'Afee's Heirs v. Kennedy, 1 Lit., 92; Smith e.
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On the other hand, the right to exercise the power of taxation
in aid of the manufacturing enterprises of private persons or cor
porations has seldom been asserted, and whenever asserted has
been most emphatically denied. The views of the learned Chief
Justice of Maine on this subject have been so clearly and point
edly stated, in response to an inquiry b}' the executive — whether
the legislature has authority, under the constitution, to pass laws
enabling towns, by gifts of money or loans of bonds, to assist in
dividuals or corporations to establish or carry on manufactures —
that it is deemed advisable to present the material portions of his
negative reply in the note.1
Connelly, 1 T. B. Monr., 58; Shackelford e. Coffey, 4 J. J. Marsh., 40;
Crenshaw e. Slate River Co., 6 Rand., 245 ; Ash «. Cummings, 50 N. H.,
591.
1" The line of demarkation may not always be clear and distinct and well
defined between what is for public and governmental and what for private
purposes — between the general legislation for the whole people and the spe
cial for the individual. But the questions proposed leave no doubt as to the
special phase of legislation to which they refer. They are obviously limited
by and embrace what is special and private, excluding by their very terms
whatever may or can, by the most enlarged and liberal construction, be re
garded as relating to municipal, governmental or public objects of any de
scription whatsoever." * * * " Individuals and corporations embark in
manufactures for the purpose of personal and corporate gain. Their pur
poses and objects are precisely the same as those of the farmer, the mechanic
or the day laborer. They engage in the selected branch of manufactures for
the purpose and with the hope and expectation not of loss but of profit. By
the very assumption of the interrogatories, they are engaged in private and
corporate undertakings for private and corporate emolument. All municipal,
police, educational, public or governmental purpose, whether of peace or of
war, is excluded from our consideration by the manifest purpose of the in
quiry." * * * " The inquiry is whether the legislature can authorize a
town, by a majority or any other vote, to give away the property of an unwil
ling minority to an individual or manufacturing corporation whom or which
such majority may select as donees. The question relates only to manufac
tures; but if the right of confiscating the private property of an individual
for the purpose of giving it away to one branch of industry can be conferred
upon towns, one does not easily see where or what bounds can be imposed or
limitations made. The general benefit to the community resulting from every
description of well directed labor is of the same character, whatever may be
the branch of industry upon which it may be expended. All useful laborers,
no matter what the field of labor, serve the state by increasing the aggregate
of its products — its wealth. There is nothing of a public nature any more
entitling the manufacturer to public gifts, than the sailor, the mechanic, the
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An equally pointed denial of the right is met with in the opin
ion of an eminent federal judge, in a recent case, in which a town,
under an authority which the legislature had attempted to confer,
had voted its bonds in aid of a private manufacture.1 The like
doctrine was afterwards affirmed in the federal supreme court
After consideration of the general nature of the power to tax, the
court declare it to be "beyond cavil that there can be no lawful
tax "which is not laid for a public purpose. It may not be easy
to draw the line, in all cases, so as to decide what is a public pur
pose in this sense, and what is not. It is undoubtedly the duty
of the legislature, which imposes or authorizes municipalities to
impose a tax, to see that it is not to be used for purposes of a
private interest instead of a public use ; and the courts can only
be justified in interposing when a violation of this principle is
clear and the reason for interference cogent And in deciding
whether, in a given case, the object for which the taxes are as
sessed falls upon the one side or the other of this line, they must
be governed mainly by the course and usage of the government,
the objects for which taxes have been customarily and by long
course of legislation levied, what objects or purposes have been
considered necessary to the support and for the proper use of the
government, whether state or municipal. Whatever lawfully
pertains to this, and is sanctioned by time and the acquiescence
of the people, may well be held to belong to the public use, and
proper for the maintenance of good government ; though this may
not be the only criterion of rightful taxation.
" But in the case before us, in which the towns are authorized
to contribute aid, by way of taxation, to any class of manufac
tures, there is no difficulty in holding that this is not such a pub
lic purpose as we have been considering. If it be said that a
benefit results to the local public of a town by establishing manu-
lumberman or the farmer. Our government is based upon equality of rights.
All honest employments are honorable. The state cannot rightfully discrim
inate among occupations, for a discrimination in favor of one branch of in
dustry is a discrimination adverse to all other branches. The state is equally
to protect all, giving no undue advantage or special or exclusive preference
to any." Opinions of Judges, 58 Me., 590.
1Commercial National Bank e. Iola, 2 Dillon, 353. See National Bank of
Cleveland e. Iola, 9 Kan., 689; Opinions of Judges, 58 Me., 590, 596.
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factures, tlie same may be said of any otber business or pursuit
whicb employs capital or labor. The merchant, the mechanic,
the innkeeper, the banker, the builder, the steamboat owner are
equally promoters of the public good, and equally deserving the
aid of the citizens by forced contributions. No line can be drawn
in favor of the manufacturer which would not open the coffers of
the public treasury to the importunities of two-thirds the business
men of the city or towa"1
Further authorities in support of the position that there is a
distinction in the meaning of public use, as employed in the law of
eminent domain and of taxation, would seem unnecessary. Cus
tom must have great influence in determining the proper limit of
either power ; but it is manifest that the adjudications recognize
certain incidental benefits to the public as constituting such a
public interest as will justify an exercise of the eminent domain
which, in the case of the power of taxation, are not admitted as
constituting any basis whatever for its employment Few cases
have undertaken to point out the distinction,2 but the courts have
acted upon it in many cases.
1Per Miller, J., in Loan Association e. Topeka, 20 Wall., 655, 664. See also
Allen e. Jay, 60 Me., 124; S. C, 11 Am. Rep., 185. Taxation in aid of private
enterprises is properly characterized by Di«kenson, J., in Opinions of Judges,
58 Me., 590-603, as taxation "to load the tables of the few with bounty that
the many may partake of the crumbs that fall therefrom."
5See, however, Whiting v. Sheboygan etc. R. R. Co., 25 Wis., 167, 190, per
Dixon, Ch. J. In Teople v. Town Board of Salem, 20 Mich., 4r12,477, the fol
lowing remarks are made in response to the argument in favor of the right to
tax, drawn from the admitted right of eminent domain for the purpose in
question : " Reasoning by analogy, from one of the sovereign powers of gov
ernment to another, is exceedingly liable to deceive and mislead. An object
may bo public in one sense and for one purpose, when, in a general sense,
and for other purposes, it would be idle and misleading to employ the
same term. All governmental powers exist for public purposes, but they are
not necessarily to be exercised under the same conditions of public interest.
The sovereign police power which the state possesses is to be exercised only
for the general public welfare, but it reaches to every person, to every kind of
business, to every species of property within the commonwealth. The con
duct of every individual and the use of all property and of all rights is regu
lated by it, to any extent found necessary for the preservation of the public
order, and also for the protection of the private rights of one individual
against encroachments by others. The sovereign power of taxation is em
ployed in a great many cases where the power of eminent domain might be
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An enumeration of the purposes which are recognized as justi
fying taxation is not needful, and is scarcely practicable. The
most of them pass unchallenged. To preserve the public order;
to provide for the enforcement of civil rights and the punishment
made more immediately efficient and available if constitutional principles
would suffer it to be resorted to; but each of these powers has its own pecu
liar and appropriate sphere, and the object which is public for the demands
of one is not necessarily of a character to permit the exercise of another. * *
* * "If we examine the subject critically, we shall find that the most im
portant consideration in the case of eminent domain, is the necessity of ac
complishing some public good which is otherwise impracticable; and we
shall also find that the law does not so much regard the means as the need.
The power is much nearer akin to that of the public police than to that of
taxation ; it goes but a step further, and that step is in the same direction.
" Every man has an abstract right to the exclusive use of his own property
for his own enjoyment, in such manner as he shall choose; but if he should
choose to create a nuisance upon it
,
or do anything which would preclude a
reasonable enjoyment of adjacent property, the law would interfere to impose
restraints. He is said to own hia private lot to the center of the earth, but he
would not be allowed to excavate it indefinitely, lest his neighbor's lot should
disappear in the excavation. The abstract right to make use of his own prop-
erty in his own way is compelled to yield to the general comfort and protec
tion of the community, and to a proper regard to relative rights in others.
The situation of his property may even be such that he is compelled to dis
pose of it
,
because the law will not suffer his regular business to be carried
on upon it. A needful and lawful species of manufacture may so injuriously
affect the health and comfort of the vicinity that it cannot be tolerated in a
densely settled neighborhood, and, therefore, the owner of a lot in that neigh
borhood will not be allowed to engage in that manufacture upon it
,
even
though it be his regular and legitimate business. The butcher, in the vicinity
of whose premises a village has grown up, finds himself compelled to re
move his business elsewhere, because his right to make use of his lot as a
place for the slaughter of cattle has become inconsistent with the superior
right of community to the enjoyment of pure air and the accompanying
blessings and comforts. The owner of a lot within the fire limits of a city
may be compelled to part with the property, because he is unable to erect a
brick or stone structure upon it
,
and the local regulations will not permit one
of wood.
"Eminent domain only recognizes and enforces the superior right of the
community against the selfishness of individuals in a similar way. Every
branch of needful industry has a right to exist, and community has a right to
demand that it be permitted to exist; and if
,
for that purpose, a peculiar lo
cality, already in possession of an individual, is essential, the owner's right to
undisturbed occupancy must yield to the superior interest of the public. A
railroad cannot go around the farm of every unwilling person, and the busi
ness of transporting persons and property for long distances by rail, which
6
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of crime ; to make compensation to public officers and to others
who perform services for the public ; to protect public property ;
to erect and keep in repair the necessary public buildings ; to pay
the expenses of legislation and of administering the laws ; all these
are purposes which, in a consideration of the law of taxation, call
has been found so essential to the general enjoyment and welfare, could never
have existed if it were in the power of any unwilling person to stop the road
at his boundary, or to demand unreasonable terms as a condition of passing
him. The law interferes in these cases and regulates the relative rights of the
owner and of the community with as strict regard to justice and equity as the
circumstances will permit. It does not deprive the owner of his property,
but it compels him to dispose of so much of it as is essential on equitable
terms. While, therefore, eminent domain establishes no industry, it so regu
lates the relative rights of all that no individual shall have it in his power to
preclude its establishment. * *
* * "But when we examine the power of taxation with a view to ascer
tain the purposes for which burdens may be imposed upon the public, we
perceive at once that necessity is not the governing consideration, and that
in many cases it has little or nothing to do with the question presented.
Certain objects must of necessity be provided for under this power, but in re
gard to innumerable other objects for which the state imposes taxes upon its
citizens, the question is always one of mere policy, and if the taxes are im
posed, it is not because it is absolutely necessary that those objects should be
accomplished, but because on the whole it is deemed best by the public au
thorities that they should be. On the other hand, certain things of absolute
necessity to civilized society the state is precluded, either by express consti
tutional provisions, or by necessary implication, from providing for at all;
and they are left wholly to the fostering care of private enterprise, or private
liberality. We concede, for instance, that religion is essential, and that with
out it we should degenerate to barbarism and brutality; yet we prohibit the
state from burdening the citizen with its support, and we content ourselves
with recognizing and protecting its observance on secular grounds. Certain
professions and occupations in life are also essential, but we have no author
ity to employ the public moneys to induce persons to enter them. The neces
sity may be pressing, and to supply it may be, in a certain sense, to accom
plish a " public purpose ; " but it is not a purpose for which the power of tax
ation may be employed. The public necessity for an educated and skillful
physician in «ome particular locality may be great and pressing, yet if the
people should be taxed to hire one to locate there, the common voice would ex
claim that the public moneys were being devoted to a private purpose. The
opening of a new street in a city or village may be of trifling public import
ance as compared with the location within ic of some new business or manu
facture ; but while the right to pay out the public funds for the one would be
unquestionable, the other by common consent is classified as a private inter
est, which the public can aid as individuals if they see fit, while they are not
permitted to employ the machinery of the government to that end. Indeed,
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for no comment, as each and all are absolutely indispensable in
orderly government All these may therefore be passed by while
attention is directed to cases not so clear, the determination of
which will sufficiently indicate the bounds which usage in repre
sentative government has prescribed as the proper limit to a lawful
expenditure of the public moneys.
Religious instruction. This to individuals is an object of the
very highest moment, and formerly it was thought to be the duty
of government to provide for it The more enlightened opinion
of the present day refeps it exclusively to the voluntary action of
the people.1 It is expressly forbidden by many of the state con-
the opening of a new street in the outskirts of a city is generally much more a
matter of private interest than of public concern; so much so that the owner
of the land voluntarily throws it open to the public without compensation;
yet even in a case where the public authorities did not regard the street as of
sufficient importance to induce their taking the necessary action to secure it
,
it
would not be doubted that the moment they should consent to accept it as a
gift, the street would at once become a public object and purpose, upon which
the public funds might be expended with no more restraints upon the action
of the authorities in that particular, than if it were the most prominent and
essential thoroughfare of the city.
" By common consent also a large portion of the most urgent needs of soci
ety is relegated exclusively to the law of demand and supply. It is this in its
natural operation, and without the interference of government, that gives us the
proper proportion of tillers of the soil, artisans, manufacturers, merchants and
professional men, and that determines when and where they shall give to so
ciety the benefit of their particular services. However great the need in the
direction of any particular calling, the interference of the government is not
tolerated because, though it might be supplying a public want, it is consid.
ered as invading the domain that belongs exclusively to private inclination
and enterprise. We perceive, therefore, that the term
" public purpose," as
employed to denote the objects for which taxes may be levied, has no relation
to the urgency of the public need, or to the extent of the public benefit which
is to follow. It is, on the other hand, merely a term of classification, to dis
tinguish the objects for which, according to settled usage, the government is to pro
vide, from tlwse which by the like wage, are left toprivaie in«lination, interest or
liberality.
"It creates a broad and manifest distinction — one in regard to which there
need be neither doubt nor difficulty — between public works and private en
terprises, between the public conveniences which it is the business of govern
ment to provide and those which private interest and competition will supply
whenever the demand is sufficient."
1 Cooley, Const. Lim., ch. 13 and cases referred to in the notes. Dr. Way-
land justly observes that " The only ground on which taxes for the support of
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stitutions that public moneys shall be appropriated to religious
worship. It is true that in selecting the objects of taxation, build
ings and other property made use of for that purpose are gener
ally exempted from the lists. This is done without discrimina
tion between sects, and is generally defended upon the ground
that public worship is a public benefit which may properly be
encouraged in this indirect way. The discrimination is opposed by
some persons, but whether or not it is proper or politic, it cannot
be declared unwarranted by the general principles of government.
As already observed the question what taxes shall be levied and
upon what classes of persons or property is always one of public
policy which the legislature must solve. But another view is not
entirely without plausibility. Whoever contributes to the sup
port of churches, also contributes to pay the taxes, if any, which
are imposed upon them. But as most persons who pay taxes at
all do, in some form, and with some regard to their ability, con
tribute to the support of churches, it is of little importance to the
general public whether taxes are levied on church property or not,
as whatever is collected from such property, while it goes to di
minish what will be collected from individual property, will at
the same time increase to the same extent what the individuals
pay for the support of religious instruction, so that the burden in
the one case will be substantially the same as in the other. We
do not say that this view is strictly correct, but it is perhaps
safe to say that the inequality occasioned by the exemption of
church property from taxation is not so great as without reflection
one would be likely to suppose.
Secular instruction. It may be safely declared that to
bring a sound education within the reach of all the inhabitants
religion can be defended is that its existence is necessary for the support of
civil government, and that it can be sustained in no other manner than by
compulsion. The first assertion we grant to be true ; the second we utterly
deny. Hence we do not believe that any taxation for this purpose is neces-
sary. AH that religious societies have a right to ask of the civil government
is, the same privileges for transacting their own affairs which societies of
every other sort possess. This they have a right to demand, not because they
are religious societies, but because the exercise of religion is an innocent
mode of pursuing happiness. If these bo not granted, religious men are op
pressed, and the country where such oppression prevails, let it call itself what
it may, is not free." Wayland, Pol. Econ., b. 4, ch. 3, § 2.
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has been a prime object of American government from the very
first It was declared by colonial legislation, and has been reit
erated in constitutional provisions, to the present day. It has
been regarded as an imperative duty of the government; and
when question has been made concerning it
,
the question has re
lated not to the existence of the duty, but to its extent. But the
question of extent is one of public policy, and addresses itself to
the legislature and the people, not to the courts.1 And the ten
dency on the part of the people has been steadily in the direction
of taking upon themselves larger burdens in order to provide
more spacious, elegant and convenient houses of instruction, and
to place within the reach of all a more generous and useful edu
cation. And this is usually done by the direct action of the pub
lic ; the state or its municipalities constructing and owning the
edifices, and supporting the schools, academies, colleges and uni
versities.
1 See the very interesting case of Cushing v. Inhabitants of Newburyport,
10 Met., 508. Also Stuart e. Kalamazoo, 30 Mich., 69. That a tax for the
support of free schools is within a general grant of the power to tax for
"municipal purposes," see Horton v. School Commissioners, 43 Ala., 598.
Dr. Wayland, in speaking of the liberality of construction in determining the
purposes of taxation, says: "It must not, of course, always be expected that
the product created by consumption (in public expenditure) will be a visible,
tangible, material substance. Thus we see no physical, tangible product as
the result of taxes for the support of civil government. But we receive the
benefit in security of person, property and reputation; or in that condition
of society which, though it be incapable of being weighed and measured, is
absolutely essential both in individual happiness and individual accumula
tion. The same may be said in substance concerning the taxes paid for gen
eral education. Here, whether the tax payer receives his remuneration in in
struction given to his own children or not, he yet receives it in the improve
ment of the intellectual and social character of his neighbors, by which his
property is rendered more secure, the labor for which he pays is better per
formed, and the demand for whatever he produces is more universal and more
constant. The same may be said of the public expenditure by which the
moral and social character of a community is elevated, the taste of a nation
refined, and an impulse given to efforts for the benefit of man. "With this
view, no one could oppose the expense incurred in bestowing upon public
edifices elegance, or even, in some cases, magnificence of structure, in the
public celebration of remarkable eras, and in the rewards bestowed upon
those who have by their discoveries enlarged the boundaries of human
knowledge, or by their inventions signally improved the useful arts." Pol.
Econ., pt 4, ch. 9, § 1
.
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In some states a practice has prevailed, while making liberal
provision for instruction in public schools, to also give assistance
to institutions owned and controlled by private corporations or
by religious bodies or denominations. The legal right to do this
has received but little attention. In one case in Massachusetts,
under a constitutional provision which required moneys raised for
public schools to be applied to those only which were under the
order and superintendence of the public authorities, it was denied
that the legislature could lawfully authorize a town to take mon
eys which had been raised for the public schools and appropriate
them in support of a school founded by a charitable bequest,
under which the order and superintendence of the school was
vested in trustees who, though a majority were to be chosen by
the inhabitants of the town, were yet limited to the members of
certain religious societies.1 And in Wisconsin the authority of
the legislature to empower a town to tax its citizens in aid of the
erection of buildings for an educational institution to be owned
and controlled by a private corporation was denied on general
principles. " It strikes us," say the court, " at the first blush, that
this is not the levy and collection of money for public purposes,
as clearly as if the institute were not an incorporated body, but a
mere association of private individuals resolved upon the estab
lishment of a like institution. If it were such an institution,
or a grammar or classical school, or a seminary built up and
established by individual enterprise, as by persons engaged in
the profession of teaching, or by others, and owned and con
trolled by those contributing towards it
,
and the emoluments
belonging to them, we apprehend that no one would contend
that the people [of the town] might be taxed for the purpose of
donating the moneys to it The fact that it is an institution in
corporated by act of the legislature does not change its character
in this respect. It is but a most frivolous pretext for giving to a
corporation, where there is no certain and definite personal respon
sibility, money exacted from the tax payers, which a just and
honorable man engaged in the same business would hesitate to
receive though paid without opposition, and to enforce the pay
ment of which, against the will of the tax payers, he would never
1 Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass., 94.
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think of resorting to coercive measures, provided the same were
lawful. It can no more be supported by taxation than if it were
unincorporated, or a private school or seminary of the kind above
supposed." 1
It has been decided to be competent for the legislature to au
thorize a town to tax itself in aid of the erection of buildings for
a state educational institution to be constructed within it2 In
that case the purpose, as regards the state at large, was clearly
public, but the locality was allowed to assume a special burden
on the ground of special and peculiar benefits. A case in New
York perhaps goes further, inasmuch as it sustains the authority
of the legislature to require a village to render such assistance.3
While it is perhaps entirely proper to regard the incidental benefits
to the locality as constituting a just basis for an exceptional tax
upon it
,
no such ruling would be admissible where the build
ing itself was not to be one owned and controlled by the public,
and where consequently the sole ground for any taxation would
be the incidental benefits to flow from a private undertaking.
This has been so clearly shown in a case from which we have
already quoted, that we copy from the opinion instead of attempt
ing any statement of the general doctrine in our own language :
" That is not the kind of public benefit and interest which
will authorize a resort to the power of taxation. Such benefits
accrue to the people of all communities from the exercise in their
midst of any useful trade or employment, and the argument, pur
sued to its logical result, would prove that compulsory payment
or taxation might be made use of for the purpose of building up
and sustaining every such trade or employment, though carried
on by private persons for private ends, or the purposes of mere
individual gain and emolument That there exists in the state no
power to tax for such purposes, is a proposition too plain to ad
mit of a controversy. Such a power would be obviously incom-
1 Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis., 350, 353, per Dixon, Ch. J.
»Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen, 500. See also Marks v. Trustees of Parduo
University, 37 Ind., 155; Burr v. Carbondale, Sup. Ct 11l., 1874, 6 Chicago
Legal News, 350.
8 Gordon v. Corncs, 47 N. Y., 608. In that case, however, there was to be a
grammar school in the state building, free to the children of the village.
Compare State v. Ha',en, 22 Wis., 660.
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patible with the genius and institutions of a free people ; and the
practice of all liberal governments, as well as all judicial author
ity, is against it
. If we turn to the cases where taxation has been
sustained as in pursuance of the power, we shall find in every one
of them that there was some direct advantage accruing to the
public from the outlay, either by its being the owner or part own
er of the property or thing to be created or obtained with the
money, or the party immediately interested in and benefited by the
works to be performed, the same being matters of public concern ;
or because the proceeds of the tax were to be expended in defray
ing the legitimate expenses of government, and in promoting the
peace, good order and welfare of society. Any direct public ben
efit or interest of this nature, no matter how slight, as distin
guished from those public benefits or interests incidentally arising
from the employment or business of private individuals or cor
porations, will undoubtedly sustain a tax. In thus endeavoring
to define how the public must be beneficially interested in order
to justify the raising of money by taxation in cases like the pres
ent, we of course do not intend to include all purposes for which
money may be so raised. Taxes may be levied and collected for
charitable purposes, but these constitute a peculiar ground for the
exercise of the power which does not exist here.
" So claims founded in equity and justice in the largest sense,
and in gratitude, will support a tax ; such claims, however, and
we think all others where taxation is proper, except claims found
ed in charity, may be referred to the general principle above spo
ken of, of public interest in, or benefits received b
y the transaction
out of which the claims arose." 1
Public charity. The support of paupers and the giving of
assistance to those who by reason of age, infirmity or disability,
are likely to become such, is by the practice and the common
consent of civilized countries a public purpose. The laws not
only exempt from taxation the limited means of such persons, but
they go further, and provide public funds with which to furnish
them retreats where they can be supplied with the necessaries, and
to a reasonable extent, with the comforts of life. Hospitals are
also provided where dependent classes can receive medical aid
1 Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis., 350, 354, per Dixon, Ch. J.
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and assistance, and asylums where the deaf, the dumb and the
blind may be supported and taught, and where the insane may be
kept from doing or receiving harm, and can have such careful and
scientific treatment, with a view to their restoration, as they would
not be likely to receive elsewhere. He would be a bold man who
in these days should question the public right to make provision
for these benevolent objects. And this provision might not only
be made by the establishment of institutions for the purpose, but
private institutions might undoubtedly be aided with public funds
in consideration of services to be rendered to the public and ex
penses to be incurred by them in assisting and relieving the same
necessitous and dependent classes.1 The buildings and property
of charitable bodies may also, with the utmost propriety and jus
tice, be exempted from taxation, as by implication public build
ings for the same purpose are exempted2
Private business enterprises. However important it may
1But it is not competent to levy taxes to be paid over to individuals or asso
ciations simply because they are charitable. So held in a case where the
legislature had required the agencies of foreign insurance companies to pay
over two per centum of their receipts to an association for the relief of dis.
abled firemen. " If the legislature may command such a contribution as this,
we are unable to see why they may not command every citizen to contribute,
not only to this association, but to every charitable association; and indeed,
to every man who spends his money and means in a charitable way. There
are associations for all sorts of charity —why may not the legislature require
us to contribute to them all, if they may require this class of people to con
tribute to this one? We cannot answer this question." Lowrie, Ch. J., in
Philadelphia Association etc. v. Wood, 39 Penn. St., 73, 82.
» In Directors of the Poor v. School Directors, 42 Penn. St., 21, 25, in which
it was claimed that a public poor house was taxable for school purposes under
general words in the statute, Lowrie, Ch. J., uses the following vigorous lan
guage :
" Tax the poor house to support the schools ? Why this would be to
take the poor taxes to support the schools ; and the people must be taxed to
pay the officers who perform such foolish service. If we require the town
ships, counties, towns, cities and state, and the road, school and poor author
ities to tax each other, we shall furnish fees enough for several hundred
officers engaged in transferring from one public body to another the taxes
which it has collected for its public purposes. These poor taxes must be col
lected to support the schools and roads, and s«hool taxes to support the poor
and so on all around. Surely it is not too much to say that this is absurd. Th»
public is never subject to tax laws, and no portion of it can be without express
statute. No exemption law is needed for any public property held as such."
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be to the community that individual citizens should prosper in
their industrial enterprises, it is not the business of government to
aid them with its means. Enlightened states leave every man to
depend for his success and prosperity in business on his own ex
ertions, in the belief that by doing so his own industry will be
more certainly enlisted, and his prosperity and happiness more
likely to be secured. It may therefore be safely asserted that
taxation for the purpose of raising money from the public to be
given or even loaned to private parties, in order that they may
use it in their individual business enterprises, is not recognized as
for a public use. In contemplation of law it would be taking the
common property of the whole community and handing it over to
private parties for their private gain, and consequently unlawful.
Any incidental benefits to the public that might flow from it
could not support it as legitimate taxation.1
1Allen e. Jay, 60 Me., 124; S. C, 11 Am. Rep., 185. See a valuable note to
this case by Judge Redfleld, 12 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 493. In it reference is
made to the recent case of Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass., 454, as follows:
" The foregoing opinion and the still more recent decision of the supreme
judicial court of Massachusetts, in the case of Lowell v. The City of Boston,
seems to justify the expectation that some limits will hereafter be placed to
the power of interested parties through the legislature to carry forward private
enterpriset by means of taxation. The case of Boston grew out of an act of
the legislature, at a special session called largely for that purpose, by which
the city was authorized to issue bonds not exceeding $20,000,000, at five per cent,
interest when payable in gold, or six per cent- if payable in currency ; the
avails of these bonds to be loaned to the owners of land upon which build
ings were destroyed by the great fire of November last. Commissioners were
appointed to manage the loan, and were required to take a first mortgage upon
the land at less than three-fourths its value, as security for the money advanced,
at seven per cent, interest. Here there was a case where there could be no
reasonable danger of loss, and a high probability of some gain to the city by
means of the larger rate of interest paid by the borrowers than that paid by
the city. There could be no fair question either that such a proceeding would
afford great accommodation to the property owners on the burnt district,
and that it would greatly conduce to the speedy restoration of that portion of
the city, and thus naturally to the increase of the wealth and business pros
perity of the city, and to some extent, to the greater convenience, accommo
dation and prosperity of the inhabitants of the city generally. And still the
court, unanimously, so far as we learn, came to the conclusion that the statute
was void, and perpetually enjoined all proceedings under it." A town can
not raise money by tax to distribute among its citizens according to cumbers.
Hooper e. Emery, 14 Me., 375, 379. Towns cannot raise mone}-.'>for the pur-
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Moral obligations. There are some eases in which taxation
has been allowed for the benefit of private persons on considera
tions not of charity so much as of justice. Any exercise of the
powers of government is liable to cause injury to particular indi
viduals. When the injury is merely incidental, these individuals
have no legal claim to indemnification. Nevertheless, it seems
eminently proper and just, in some exceptional cases, to recognize
a moral obligation resting on the public to share with the persons
injured the damage sustained ; and this can only be done by means
of taxation. All governments are accustomed to recognize and
pay equitable claims of this nature under some circumstances;
claims, for instance, for the destruction of private property in war,
and sometimes for incidental injuries occasioned by the construc
tion of a public work, or for loss in performing a contract to con
struct it.1
In these cases the legislature is not confined in making compen
sation within the strict limits of common law remedies, but it may
recognize moral or equitable obligations, such as a just man would
be likely to recognize in his own affairs, whether by law required
to do so or not The principle is clear, but it has sometimes been
employed with considerable severity against municipal corpora
tions in compelling them to recognize claims which appeared to
the legislature more just than to those who were required to pay
them.2
pose of abating a particular class of taxes
— e. g., poll taxes upon its male in
habitants — and consequently cannot appropriate public moneys for that pur
pose. Cooley v. Granville, 10 Cusb., 56.
1See Friend e. Gilbert, 108 Mass., 408. This principle was carried very far
in Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y., 116.
It has been decided that a municipal corporation has power to defend and
indemnify its officers where they have incurred liability in the bona fide dis
charge or attempt to discharge their duty. See cases cited in next note.
In Briggs v. Whipple, 7 Vt., 15, 20, William*, Ch. J., sa3's: "Towns must
always indemnity the collector against any damage he may sustain, where a
recovery is had against him on account of the want of power to lay the tax, or
any Illegality in granting the same." This is certainly the statement of a
sound principle in morals, but it is not clear that the collector would have
a
legal remedy against the town in case of its failure to indemnify.
• It was held (without discussion) in Wilkinson e. Cheatham, 43 Geo., 258,
that in providing for the removal of a county seat the legislature had power
to cause commissioners to be appointed to assess the damages suffered by
in-
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Amusements and celebrations. To furnish amusements to
its citizens is not one of the functions of government But to
provide public parks or other grounds which shall be open to
the public use and occupation for healthful recreation and enjoy-
dividuals in consequence, and to levy a county tax to pay the same. This was
certainly going a great way. On much stronger grounds officers who have
been subjected to liability in performing or in the attempt to perform public
duty, have been held justly entitled to indemnity from the public funds. Nel
son «. Milford, 7 Pick., 18, 23; Hadsell v. Hancock, 3 Gray, 526; Fuller v.
Groton, U id, 340; Baker v. Windham, 13 Me., 74; Pike e. Middleton, 12
N.H., 278; Briggs «. Whipple, 6 Vt, 95; Sherman v. Carr, 8 R. I.
,
431; Ban
croft v. Lynnfield, 18 Pick., 566, 568. It was held in Beals v. Supervisors of
Amador, 35 Cal., 624, that the legislature, having apportioned the debts of a
county on dividing it, might subsequently require the payment of interest
upon it; this being only just. Also that the power was not affected by the
circumstance that a debt by assignment had become the property of an indi
vidual, who would reap the benefit of the legislation.
In Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal., 343, 349, Field, J., speaking of a case in which
a city had been required to issue its bonds for equitable demands upon it
,
for
which no legal remedy existed, says: " The question presented is not one of
power in the legislature to impose upon the corporation the paymeut of claims
for which no consideration has been paid, but of power to provide for claims,
meritorious in their character, for which an equivalent has been received, and
from the payment of which the corporation could only escape on strict tech
nical grounds. That the legislature can provide for the payment of claims,
invalid in the forum of the law, but equitable and just in themselves, would
seem unquestionable. It may become, for example, of the highest import
ance to a municipal corporation, that counsel should be employed to defend
its rights of property assailed by different parties, but its charter may not
confer authority to employ the counsel or to meet his charges. Professional
services, rendered under such circumstances, would not constitute a legal
charge upon the corporation, but that it would be competent for the legisla
ture to authorize the payment of the charge, and the imposition of a tax for
that purpose, no one will deny. Or, take a still stronger case: a city has
issued, in pursuance of law, its bonds, the annual interest is maturing, and the
sources of revenue on which it relied to pay the same have failed, and it has
no power to borrow the money within the requisite time, but individuals pos
sessing the means come forward and, at the request of its authorities, advance
the necessary money to protect the honor and good faith of the city. A claim
for reimbursement would not, under the circumstances, in face of positive
prohibitions of the charter to raise money except in a particular way, be valid
and binding, but that the legislature could authorize its payment, and the
raising of the means by taxation without trenching on any constitutional
restrictions, is clear."
In Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 13 N. Y., 143, 149, Dcnio, J., says:
" The legislature is not confined in its appropriation of the public moneys, or
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ment is not only proper but highly commendable, and in large
towns may almost be said to be absolutely necessary.1 The great
public parks of the world are great public blessings, in which the
poor participate with the rich, and from which they, perhaps,
derive the larger share of positive benefit How far a state or a
town should go in making these attractive, the legislative wisdom
must provide, and it will be likely to err but seldom in the
direction of liberality so long as careful provision is made for an
honest expenditure of public funds.2
Government sometimes provides for the celebration of important
events or eras. Cities or towns have no authority to do this, at
least without express legislative permission. Such are the de
cisions in cases where public money has been voted to celebrate
the declaration of independence, or the closing military success
in the revolutionary war.8 It is not very clear that the power
could be conferred upon them if the legislature were disposed to
do so.
ot the sums to be raised by taxation in favor of individuals, to cases in which a
legal demand exists against the state. It can thus recognize claims founded in
equity and justice in the largest sense of these terms, or in gratitude or charity
Independently of express constitutional restrictions, it can make appropria
tions of money whenever the public well-being requires, or will be promoted
by it
,
and it is the judge of what is for the public good. It can moreover,
under the power to levy taxes, apportion the public burdens among all the
tax paying citizens of the state, or among those of a particular section or po
litical division. It is well settled that the authority to raise money by the
exercise of the taxing power is not in conflict with the constitutional provis
ion protecting private property from seizure. The two principles coexist in
the constitution, and it is not difficult to distinguish between them."
1 In Attorney General v. Burrell, 31 Mich., 25, a town was held to have au
thority under its general power to purchase and hold land for town purposes,
to buy and hold a public square.
» " It is difficult to name a limit beyond which taxes will not be borne without
impatience, when they appear to be called for by necessity and faithfully
applied. * * But the sting of taxation is wastefulness." Hallam's Mid
dle Ages, ch. 1
,
pt. 2
.
8Hodges v. Buffalo, 2 Denio, 110; Tash v. Adams, 10 Cush., 252; New Lon
don v. Brainard, 22 Conn., 552 ; Gerry v. Stonuham, 1 Allen, 319 ; Hood v. Lynn,
id., 103, 107; Dillon's Mun. Corp., § 110.
In the case last cited, the following remarks are made by BigeUnc, Ch. J.,
regarding the force of usage in the construction of town powers: "It was
urged by the counsel for the respondents, that the appropriation in the present
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Highways and roads. One of the most important functions
of government is the making provision for public roads for the
use of the people. The variety of these is great, and the modes
of construction and operation are different. No question is made
of the competency of the legislature to levy taxes for the com
mon highway, the improved turnpike and macadamized road,
the planked or paved street, the canal, the tramway-or the rail
way. Any or all of them may be constructed by the state, or,
under state authority, by the municipal subdivisions of the state
within whose limits they may be needed.1 They may be sup
ported and kept in repair by taxation of the state or of proper
districts, or private corporations may be invested with the fran
chise of constructing them and taking tolls for their use. Upon
these points, also, no question arises. The differences of opinion
case might be justified and sustained on the ground of usage. But the answer
to this argument is twofold. In the first place, there is no evidence in the
case of the existence of any such usage or custom in the towns or cities of
this commonwealth. It is not even alleged in the answer of the respondents.
Certainly, the court cannot take judicial cognizance of it. But even if such
usage was alleged and proved, it would not alter the case. An unlawful
expenditure of the money of a town cannot be rendered valid by usage, how
ever long continued. Abuses of power and violations of rights derive no
sanction from time or custom. A casual or occasional exercise of the power
by one or a few towns will not constitute a usage. It must not only be gen
eral, [reasonable and of long continuance, but, what is more important, it
must also be a custom necessary to the exercise of some corporate power, or
the enjoyment of some corporate right, or which contributes essentially to the
necessities and conveniences of the inhabitants. The usage relied on in the
present case, if established, would not satisfy either of these last named requi-
sities, which are necessary to give it validity. It is said by this court, in a
recent case, that there arc many things in the management of town affairs,
which are done without objection and pass by general consent, which cannot,
when objection is made and they are brought to the test of judicial investiga
tion, be supported as strictly legal. Sikes v. Hatfield, 13 Gray, 353. The
present case is an illustration of the truth of this remark."
1In Philadelphia e. Field, 58 Penn., 320, it was held competent for the legis
lature to provide for the construction of a free bridge over the Schuylkill,
opposite one of the streets of Philadelphia, and to require the expense to be
borne by taxation of the city. The cases of Thomas v. Lcland, 24 Wend., 65;
Norwich v. County Commissioners, 13 Pick., 60; Hingham, etc., Corporation
e. Norfolk County, 6 Allen, 353, and Board of Wardens v. Philadelphia, 42
Penn. St., 209, were cited with approval. Some of these will be referred to
hereafter.
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which are met with, regarding taxation for public conveniencies
of this nature, have principally arisen in those cases in which
the legislature has permitted or required the municipal corpora
tions or subdivisions of the state to become stockholders in pri
vate corporations organized for the purpose of constructing them,
or to make loans or donations to such corporations in order to
assist them in their enterprises. On the one hand, it has been
insisted, that the state cannot subject itself and its property, as a
corporator- to the risks of a business conducted and managed in
part, perhaps mainly, by individuals for their own benefit ; and
that if it can do so in one business, because of benefits that may
flow to ihe public in consequence of their being supplied with
convenient facilities for travel and transportation, there is no
reason in the nature of things why it may not do so in any other
case where benefits to the public might reasonably be anticipated
in consequence of their being' furnished any other valuable con
veniences or facilities. The public, it has also been claimed,
could not be taxed in aid of such private corporations, because
the benefits anticipated from them would be purely incidental,
not differing in their nature from those which might flow from
the establishment of a mill for the manufacture of bread stuffs,
or from any other manufactory of a useful kind, or from any use
ful and necessary private business ; and, consequently, could not,
on the principles already stated and universally recognized as
sound, constitute any basis for taxation. On the other hand, the
argument has been, that corporations for the construction of turn
pikes, canals, railroads, etc., had a duplicate nature, and were both
public and private ; that the taking of property for them was
universally recognized as being for a public use ; that the ways
they constructed or proposed to construct were quasi public high
ways on which the public at large were entitled to equal and
impartial accommodations, and that for all these reasons there was
a public interest in their construction which constituted them
public purposes within the meaning of the law of taxation, and
rendered the question of public assistance to them a question
purely of policy and not at all one of power.
The question concerns first, the power of the state, and, sec
ond, the power of the municipal bodies. So far as the state at
large is concerned, a large preponderance of decisions is in sup
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port of the authority to aid these corporations by an exercise of
the power to tax, and this by taking stock in such corporations,
or by making to them loans or donations.1 As to the municipal
bodies, it is conceded that they have no such power unless it is
specially conferred by the legislature ; the general authority to
construct streets, roads and bridges not comprehending such a
case.8 It is also conceded that any special authority must be
strictly pursued, or the action of the municipality under it will
be invalid. But when the legislature has thought proper to
confer the power, and care has been observed to keep strictly
within it
,
in the municipal action, the same cases already referred
to sustain the action as standing on the same ground, and as be
ing supported by the same reasons which would support the like
action when taken by the state itself.8
1 " Improvement of coasts and harbors, and all that is necessary for the se
curity of external commerce, must be done by the public. Internal improve
ments, such as roads, canals, railroads, etc., may, in general, be safely left to
individual enterprise. If they would be a profitable investment of capital,
individuals will be willing to undertake them. If they would be an unprofit
able investment, both parties had better let them alone. The only case in
which a government should assume such works is that in which their mag
nitude is too great to be intrusted to private corporations. Whenever they
are undertaken, the principles on which the expenditure should be made are
the same as those which govern the expenditure of individuals." Wayland's
Pol. Econ., b. 4, ch. 3, § 2
.
• Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.), 171 ; Stokes v. Scott County, 10 Iowa, 166,
173; State v. Wapello County, 13 id., 388; La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind., 38. A
considerable number of cases in which proceedings of municipal bodies in
aid of railroads have been held to vary from the special authority, and conse
quently invalid, recognize and proceed upon this principle.
• Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Monr., 526 ; M'Clenachan v. Curwen, 3 Yeates, 363 ;
Commonwealth v. Mc Williams, 11 Pa. St., 61 ; Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120 ;
Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend., 65, and cases collected in Cooley's Const. Lim.,
119, note. In Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall., 655, 660, from which lib
eral extracts have already been made, Mr. Justice Miller gives the following
condensed statement of the arguments for and against municipal aid to rail
roads: "The subject of the aid voted to railroads by counties and towns
has been brought to the attention of the courts of almost every state in the
Union. It has been thoroughly discussed in those courts. It is quite true
that a preponderance of authority is to be found in favor of the proposition
that the legislatures of the states, unless restricted by some special provision
of their constitutions, may confer upon these municipal bodies the right
to take stock in corporations created to build railroads, and to lend their
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It has been decided that an assessment for making and opening
a road where no road has in fact been laid out, and where, con
sequently, the land is the subject of private ownership, and no
highway would exist when the money was expended, would be
illegal and void.1 It has also been held that a city has no authority
credit to such corporations. Also, to levy the necessary taxes on the inhabi
tants, and on property within their limits subject to general taxation, to en
able them to pay the debts incurred. But very few of these courts have
decided this without a division among the judges of which they were com
posed, while others have decided against the power altogether.
" In all these cases, however, the decision has turned upon the question,
whether taxation, by which this aid was afforded to the building of railroads,
was for a public purpose. Those who came to the conclusion that it was,
held the laws for that purpose valid. Those who could not reach that con
clusion held them void. In all the controversy, this has been the turning
point of the judgments of the courts. And it is safe to say that no court has
held debts created in aid of railroad companies, by counties or towns, valid on
any other ground than that the purpose for which the taxes were levied was
a public use, a purpose or object which it was the right and the duty of state
governments to assist by money raised from the people by taxation. The ar
gument in opposition to this power has been, that railroads built by corpora
tions organized mainly for purposes of gain — the roads which they built be
ing under their control and not that of the state— were private and not public
roads, and the tax assessed on the people went to swell the profits of individu
als and not to the good of the state or the benefit of the public, except in a
remote and collateral way. On the other hand, it was said that roads, canals,
bridges, navigable streams, and all other highways had, in all times, been
matter of public concern. That such channels of travel and of the carrying
business had always been established, improved and regulated by the state,
and that the railroad had not lost this character because constructed by indi
vidual enterprise aggregated into a corporation.
" We are not prepared to say that the latter view of it is not the true one,
especially as there are other characteristics of a public nature conferred on
these corporations, such as the power to obtain right of way, their subjection
to the laws which govern common carriers, and the like, which seem to justify
the proposition. Of the disastrous consequences which have followed its
recognition by the courts, and which were predicted when it was first estab
lished, there can be no doubt."
1Philbrook v. Kennebeck, 17 Me., 196 ; and see People v. Supervisors of
Saginaw, 26 Mich., 22. The same reasons would render void all subscriptions
to internal improvements which are made without any precautions to secure
the construction of the works, and which contemplate the payment of the
money or the delivery of the securities subscribed in reliance only on the
good faith and business prudence of the corporators. In some cases, large
sums thus subscribed and paid have been wholly misappropriated.
7
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to assess on abutters upon a street the expense of a bridge over a
mill race running through the center of the street, and owned by
private parties. The duty of the owners of the race to restore
the street which they occupied to a passable condition, could not
thus be transferred to the public, or to any portion of the public.1
Municipal water and gas works. The propriety and neces
sity of provision by taxation for a supply of water for the extin
guishment of fires, and for the general use of the inhabitants of
large towns, is not disputed. Costly expenditures are sometimes
made in the construction of public works for these purposes, and
large sums are in some instances paid to corporations or individ
uals who furnish or contribute to furnish the public supply.2
1People v. Rochester, 54 N. Y., 507.
»Mayor of New York v. Eailey, 2 Denio, 433 ; West e. Bancroft, 32 Vt., 367 ;
Rome v. Cabot, 28 Ga., 50; Wells v. Atlanta, 43 id., 67; Dillon's Mun. Corp.,
§§ 97, 371, note, 438, note. In Van Sicklen «. Burlington, 27 Vt., 70, 75, in
which it was held competent for a town in its corporate capacity to vote
money forprocuring apparatus for the extinguishment of fires, and to aid fire
companies formed for the purpose, the following remarks are made by ltham,
J.: " There is no doubt that towns or municipal corporations, as well as pri
vate corporations, are limited to the exercise of such powers as are expressly
given them ; that is
,
the inhabitants of a town cannot by a vote impose a tax,
or appropriate their funds, for objects entirely foreign to their political or mu
nicipal duties — such as to build a county jail, 10 Vt., 506; to repel the public
enemies of the country, 13 Mass., 272 ; or to build a county road, 11 Pick., 396.
But when the object is within their duty and jurisdiction as a municipal cor
poration, they may exercise such powers as will enable them fully to discharge
the duties devolving upon them. Our statute on this subject is nearly a tran
script of that of Massachusetts. In that state it is provided by statute, that
'towns may vote money as they shall Judge necessary for the support of the
ministry, schools, the poor, and other necessary charges arising within the
same town.' On the question whether this latter and general clause is limited
to the objects previously specified, Ch. J. Stow, in the case of Willard v. New-
buryport, 13 Pick., 230, observed, ' that it seems very clear that this statement
was not intended to be an enumeration of objects and purposes for which
towns may raise money, but the expression of a few prominent objects by
way of instance, and a general reference to others, under the term of other
necessary charges.' On the same construction, the general words in our act,
that money may be voted ' for the prosecution and defense of their common
rights and interests, and for all other necessary and incidental charges,'
must not be limited to the objects specially mentioned in that act, but will
be extended to other matters that fall within their rights and duties. It has
always been found difficult to define the limits within which towns may act,
or give any definite rules by which we may ascertain when their votes will.
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Cities may also be authorized to construct gas works in order to
furnish their citizens with light, as well as to supply the corporate
needs,1 or they may be empowered to contract for the corporate
wants with private corporations or persons.8 The more common
objects for which towns and cities customarily levy taxes we pass
over as not requiring enumeration.8
Military bounties. The general government having author
ity to declare war and conduct warlike operations, no question
be deemed illegal. Ch. J. Shaw observed, ' that perhaps no better approxi
mation to an exact description can be made, than to say that it embraces that
large class of miscellaneous subjects affecting the accommodation and «onve
nience of the inhabitants, which have been placed under the municipal ju
risdiction of towns by statute or usage.' "
1See Western Saving Fund Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St., 175 ; Same e.
Same, id., 1-85.
* See Wilson v. La Porte, 33 Ind., 258.
*A tax to repair a meeting house, and to pay the sexton for ringing the bell,
Is prima facie not a town purpose, but it may be shown by the vote to levy it
to be such, by showing that it is to be done as compensation for the use of the
meeting house for town purposes. Woodbury v. Hamilton, 6 Pick., 101. A
town may appropriate money for the repair of a fire engine used by the town
but owned by individuals. Allen v. Taunton, 19 id., 485. And for the re
pair and regulation of clocks used for the benefit of the citizens of the town
generally. Willard v. Newburyport, 12 id., 227.
To what extent municipal corporations may be legally justified by their
general grant of power in levying taxes to defray the expense of procuring
legislation for their benefit, has in some cases been made a question. The
bounds of such authority, must, it is conceived, be very much restricted.
Probably no case which comes within the principle of the early Rhode Island
tax to raise for Mr. Roger Williams £100, to remunerate him for obtaining
the colonial charter (Arnold's Rhode Island, vol. 1 p. 205) would be ques-
tioned. Some attention to the interests of a local community at the state cap
ital is frequently essential, and no reason is apparent why the expense may
not be considered a proper municipal charge. See Bachelder v. Epping, 8
Fost., 354. Compare Frankfort v.Winterport, 54 Me., 250. But lobby services
are services a municipality has no right to employ and no power to pay. The
practice is immoral and corrupting, and will not be tolerated in the law. The
subject is fully and satisfactorily considered and discussed by Chapman, J.,
in Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152, who in denying the right of a town to pay
for lobby services in procuring its charter, cites with approval the cases of
Pingrey v. Washburn, 1 Aiken, 264; Gulick v. Ward, 10 N. J., 87; Wood v.
McCann, 6 Dana, 366; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S., 315 ; Harris v. Roof,
10 Barb., 489; Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y., 289; Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick.,
478. And see Hatzfield v. Golden, 7 Watts, 18?.
100 [CH. IV.LAW OF TAXATION.
can exist of its right to levy taxes in order to pay bounties for
military services performed or promised. The several states may
with as little question do the same. But it is no part of the
duty of a township, city or county, as such, to raise men or
money for warlike operations ; and under the general grant of
municipal powers, they are without authority to impose upou
their people any burden by way of taxation for any such pur
pose.1 No reason is perceived, however, which should preclude
them, under the proper legislative sanction, from devoting their
funds to this purpose to any extent that may be necessary to ena
ble them to secure a voluntary performance of any duty which
may rest upon their inhabitants to contribute their proportion to
the public defense. And so are the authorities. The several
municipal divisions of the state, under proper enabling legisla
tion, may promise and pay bounties to those who will volunteer
to fill any call made upon their people for their proportionate
contribution to the public armies in time of actual or threatened
hostilities.2 They may also pay bounties to those who have vol
untarily entered the public service from or as representing their lo-
1Stetson e. Kempton, 13 Mass., 272; Gove e. Epping, 41 N. H., 539, 545;
Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 id., 9; Baldwine. North Brandford, 32 Conn., 47;
Webster v. Harwinton, id., 131; Covere. Baytown, 12 Minn., 124; Petersburg
e. Noss, 52 Penn. St., 448; Meeke. Bayard, 53 id., 217; Fiske e. Hazzard, 7R
I., 438; People v. Supervisors of Columbia, 43 N. Y., 130; Alley v. Edge
combe, 53 Me., 446; Wahlschlager e. Liberty, 23 Wis., 362; Wilson v. Buck-
man, 13 Minn., 441 ; Dillon on Mun. Corp., K)3. Furnishing a uniform for a
voluntary military company is not within the compass of " town charges."
Claflin v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502.
s Speer e. School Directors, 50 Pa. St., 150, 159 ; Waldo v. Portland, 33 Conn.,
363; Bartholomew v. Harwinton, id., 408; Fowler e. Danvers, 8 Allen, 80;
Lowell e. Oliver, id., 247; Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St., 38; Opinions of Judges,
52 Me., 590, 595 ; Washington County v. Berwick, 56 Pa. St., 466. Where the
municipality has taken action for the payment of such bounties in advance
of legislative authority, it may be conferred retrospectively. . Booth e. Wood-
bury, 32 Conn., 118; Crowell e. Hopkinton, 45 N. H., 9; Shackford e. New.
ington, 46 id., 415; Ahl v. Gleini, 52 Pa. St., 432; Weister v. Hade, id., 474;
Grim v. School District, 57 id., 433 ; Coffman v. Keightly, 24 Ind., 509 ; Board
of Commissioners e. Bearss, 25 id , 110; Comer v. Folsom, 13 Minn., 219 ; State
v. Demorest, 32 N. J., 528 ; Taylor e. Thompson, 42 11l., 9 ; Barbour e. Cam
den, 51 Me., 608; Hart v. Holden, 55 id., 572; Burnham v. Chelsea, 43 Vt., 69;
Butler v. Putuey, id., 481 ; Lowell v Oliver, 8 Allen, 247.
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cality in advance of any such promise.1 And they may raise mon
eys by tax in order to refund to individuals any sums advanced
by them to relieve the municipality from a draft, or to fill its
assigned quota of a call, on an understanding, based upon infor
mal corporate action, that the sums should be refunded when
legislation could be had permitting it,2 and perhaps also where the
advancements were made without any such informal action.8 But
they cannot be empowered to refund to individuals sums which
such individuals may have paid in order to procure substitutes
in military service, for themselves as individuals, in an impend
ing draft Sucli payments being made by the parties in their
own interest, the repayment of them by the public could be noth
ing else than an appropriation of public moneys to a private
purpose.4
The public health. It is not doubted that the preservation
of the public health is a public purpose of prime importance.
Sanitary regulations are indispensable in large towns, but they
may be made for every locality. The right to provide for drain
ing low lands for the purpose is well settled,6 and the right to
protect low lands from overflow may also be justified on the same
reasons.
1Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis., 624, 952. See also Freeland v. Hastings,
10 Allen, 570; Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St., 38; State v. Richland, 20 id.. 362;
Veazie v. China, 50 Me., 518 ; Kunkle e. Franklin, 13 Minn., 127.
»Weister v. Hade, 52 Pa. St., 474. See People v. Sullivan, 43 111.,412, 413;
Johnson v. Campbell, 49 id., 316 ; Susquehanna Depot v. Barry, 61 Pa. St., 317.
Compare Gregg v. Jamison, 55 id., 468.
«Kelley e. Marshall, 69 Pa. St., 319 ; Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 585.
See Hilbish v. Catherman, 64 Pa. St., 154; Micheltree e. Sweezey, 70 id., 278;
Cass D.Dillon, 16 Ohio St., 38; Statee. Harris, 17 id., 608; Perkins v. Milford,
59 Me., 315.
4Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570; Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Penn. St.,
9. See also Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H., 9 ; Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540 ;
Pease v. Chicago, 21 11I., 500, 508; Ferguson v. Landram, 5 Bush, 230; Estey v.
Westminster, 97 Mass., 324; Usher v. Colchester, 33 Conn., 567; Kelley v. Mar-
shall, 69 Pa. St, 319; Perkins v. Milford, 59 Me., 315; Thompson e. Pittston
59 id., 545 ; Cover v. Baytown, 12 Minn., 124.
»Woodruff e. Fisher, 17 Barb., 224; Hartwell v. Armstrong, 19 id., 166;
Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind., 199, 202; Draining Company Case,
11 La. An., 338; Sessions v. Crunkilton, 20 Ohio, N. S.,347, 349.
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Protection against calamities. Under the head of calami
ties again3t which the government should or might make provision
for protection, may be mentioned fires, the overflow of the coun
try by great freshets, the washing away of the shores of the sea, or
the banks of rivers in populous districts, destruction of persons or
property by wild beasts, and the like. If the danger is sufficiently
great and extensive to make the threatened calamity a matter of
general concern, the purpose is public ; if not, it will not justify
taxation.
Payment of the public debt. For whatever purposes taxes
may be laid, government may contract debts. The converse of
this is equally true, that for whatever purposes debts may be con
tracted, taxes may be laid. It follows that the payment of the
public debt is always a public purpose, not only because of the
importance of meeting the public engagements, but also because
the debts themselves were contracted for public purposes. But
an unlawful debt is no debt at all. If it has been contracted in
violation of law or of the constitution, and for any other than a
public purpose, it cannot be a public purpose to make provision
for its payment. The purpose must be determined by the consid
eration for the debt, and not by the fact that public officials have
unwarrantably assumed to contract it.1
Exclusiveness of public interest. The purposes to be ac
complished by taxation need aot be exclusively public in order
to warrant an exercise of the power. There are sometimes cases
in which the public have equally with private parties an interest,
and in which, therefore, an apportionment of the burden between
the public and such individuals might be appropriata In such
cases the public interest may properly invoke legislative action
for the levy of a tax ; and the legislative determination as to the
just proportion to be borne by the public must be conclusive, so
far at least as the public are concerned.2 Cases in illustration
might be suggested of a building for the common use of the pub
lic authorities and of private parties, and of a way for the use of
the public, but in which individuals have such a peculiar and
1See Nougues v. Douglass, 7 Cal., 65, 75.
»See Eddy v. Wilson. 43 Vt., 362. Compare Greenbanks e. Boutwell, 43 id.,
207.
CII. IV.] THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID. 103
t
special interest that the public authorities may decline to do more
than to share with such parties the expense of the way. Taxa
tion in these cases has relation to the public interest only, and
the fact of private interest in the same object is an incidental cir
cumstance of no legal importance.
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CHAPTER V.
THE PURPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO THE DISTRICT TAXED.
The general rule. It has been seen that it is essential in tax
ation that the purpose for which contributions are demanded from
the people shall be public in its nature. It is also equally es
sential that this shall be a purpose, one which in an especial man
ner pertains to the district within which it is proposed that the
contribution shall be collected. The general idea has been ex
pressed in the preceding chapter, butthe subject seems to require
a more particular consideration.
If a single township were to be required to levy upon its inhab
itants and collect and pay over to the state whatever moneys were
necessary to pay the salaries of the several state officers, it would
be apparent " at first blush," that the enactment was not one
which, either in its purpose or tendency, was calculated to make
the taxpayers of that township contribute only their several pro
portions to the public purpose for which the tax was to be levied.
If, on the other hand, for the purpose of purchasing and orna
menting a city park or any other improvement of mere local con
venience, a tax should be imposed upon the whole state, it would
be equally manifest that equality and justice were not the pur
pose of the imposition, but that, if carried into effect, the people
of the state not residing in the city would be compelled to con
tribute to a purpose in which, in a legal sense, they had no inter
est whatever.1 The cases supposed are extreme cases, but the
principle which would govern them is universal, and the occasions
1" If the legislature should arbitrarily designate a certain class of persons on
whom to impose a tax either for general purposes or for a local object of a
public nature, without any reference to any rule of proportion whatever, hav
ing no regard to the share of public charges which each ought to pay relative
ly to that borne by all others, or to any supposed peculiar benefit or profit
which would accrue to those made subject to the tax which would not enure
to others, so that in effect the burden would fall on those who had been se
lected only for the reason that they might be made subject to the tax, we cannot
doubt that the imposition of it would be an unlawful exercise of power, not war
ranted by the constitution, against the exercise of which a person aggrieved,
might sue for protection." Bigelow, Ch. J., in Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen, 223, 1
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for its application are not infrequent. Briefly stated, the principle
is this : The burden of a tax must be made to rest upon the
state at large, or upon any particular district of the state, accord
ing as the purpose for which it is levied is of general concern to
the whole state, or, on the other hand, pertains only to the partic
ular district A state purpose must be accomplished by state
taxation, a county purpose by county taxation, or a public pur
pose for any inferior district by taxation of such district This
is not only just, but it is essential. To any extent that one man
is compelled to pay in order to relieve others of a public burden
properly resting upon them, his property is taken for private pur
poses, as plainly and as palpably as it would be if appropriated to
the payment of the debts or the discharge of obligations, which
the person thus relieved by his payments might owe to private
parties.1
" By taxation," it is said in a leading case, " is meant a
certain mode of raising revenue for a public purpose in which the
community that pays it has an interest. An act of the legislature
authorizing contributions to be levied for a mere private pur
pose, or for a purpose which, though it be public, is one in which
the people from whom they are exacted have no interest, would
not be a law, but a sentence commanding the periodical payment
of certain sums by one portion or class of people to another."»
237. The following remarks are made by Sharswood, J., in Hammctt v. Phil
adelphia, 65 Penn. St., 146, 151: "There is no case to be found in this
state, nor, as I believe after a thorough research, in any other, with limitations
in the constitution or without them, in which it has been held that the legis
lature, by virtue merely of its general powers, can levy or authorize a munici
pality to levy a local tax for general purposes. * * *
" It may be shown logically, and that without difficulty, that such a doctrine
lands us in this absurd proposition : that the whole expenses of government,
general and local, may be laid upon the shoulders of one man if one could be
found able to bear such a burden. A. conclusion so monstrous shows that the
premises must be wrong. Such a measure would not be taxation but confisca
tion."
1Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513; Howell e. Bristol, 8 Bush,
493, 497; Wells e. Weston, 22 Mo., 384; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510;
State e. Haben, 22 Wis., 660; Madison County v. People, 58 11l., 456; Bright
v. McCullough, 27 Ind., 223; Knowlton e. Rock County, 9 Wis., 410; Hale e.
Kenosha, 29 id., 599; Sleight v. People, Sup. Ct. 11l., 1875; 7 Chicago Legal
News, 292.
'Black, Ch. J., in Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St., 147, 174: " It is of
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This very forcible statement of the general doctrine has met with
universal acceptance and approval, because it is as sound in mor
als as it is in law. " To tax occupations outside of the city," it is
said in another case, "for the benefit of those living in the city, is
in effect taking the property of the citizen for private use ; that is
,
for the use of a particular community of which the outside citizen
forms no part. Whether it be called a tax, or the appropriation
of property, the result is precisely the same." 1
Instances of violation of the rule. The cases in which so
plain a rule is likely to be disregarded will naturally be those in
which doubt might exist whether the circumstances were such as
to warrant its application. Cases of highways afford some illus
tration. In the northern and western states, the cost of these is
usually borne by the towns, and it is not surprising to find a gen
eral impression prevailing in some quarters, that the towns must
always bear it But there is probably no state that does not pro
vide for highways of more general importance than the ordinary
town ways ; highways that are very properly called and treated
as state or county roads, and which are made and kept in repair
by an expenditure of state or county moneys. In such a case,
the state or the county is the proper taxing district, and the town
cannot tax itself for the purposes of the road, except as a part of
the larger district to which it belongs.2
the essence of all taxation, that it should compel the discharge of the burden
liy those upon whom it rests; and if the state should attempt to compel any
single county by taxation to pay the salaries of the state officers, or the ex
penses of the legislature, no one would for a moment doubt that while the act
was arbitrary, unjust and tyrannical, it was also unconstitutional." Ryer-
son v. Utley, 16 Mich., 269, 276. See Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St., 352; S.
C 8 Am. Rep., 255; Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513,516, per
Robertson, Ch. J.; Weber v. Reinhard, 73 Pa. St., 370, 373, per Sliarswood,
J. ; Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn., 273.
1 Adams, J., in St Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo., 122 ; S. C. 11 Am. Rep., 440.
Contrast with this the case of Falmouth v. Watson, 5 Bush, 661; in which It
cense fees imposed by a town on those selling intoxicating drinks outside
its limits but near it
,
were sustained as being imposed, partly at least, for po
lice purposes. See also Langhorne v. Robinson, 20 Grat, 661.
»People e. Supervisors of Dutchess, 1 Hill, 50. In this case, the board of
supervisors undertook to require two towns to raise town taxes for a bridge,
which, under the law, was a charge upon the county. Parsons v. Goshen, 11
Pick., 396. This differs from the last in that here the town voluntarily as-
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A case equally plain would be that of a single locality assum
ing to tax itself, or the state assuming to compel it to tax, for the
construction of a state work, or the erection of a state public
building. The right to impose an exceptional portion of the bur
den on the locality where such a work is to be constructed or
building erected, on the ground that it receives special and pecu
liar benefits therefrom, will be considered elsewhere. It is not of
that we speak in this place ; but of the right of a town to assume,
or of the state to compel it to assume, as a town charge, the bur
den of that which unquestionably should rest upon the state, and
which in a legal sense concerns the state alone. It is manifest
there can be no such right so long as taxation is laid on general
rules, and not at the arbitrary caprice of legislative bodies.1
More difficult cases arise where the principle of assessments by
benefits is resorted to for improvements which commonly are con
structed by an expenditure of the ordinary taxes. In no part of
the law of taxation has the practice of our state governments left
the discretion of the legislature more entirely unfettered than in
laying and apportioning such assessments, and the case must be
sumed to tax itself for the construction of a road, the expense of which was
by law to be borne by the county. In neither of these cases was any question
at issue regarding the power of the legislature to impose an exceptional por
tion of the expense upon towns specially benefited. The legislature made
the burden wholly a county charge, aDd the county in the one case and the
town in the other, assumed to set aside the legislation and substitute a rule of
Its own.
1See Ryerson e. Utley, 16 Mich., 269 ; State v. Haben, 22 Wis., 660. This
latter case will be referred to more at length hereafter. It is supported by the
case of Livingston County v. Wieder, recently decided by the supreme court
of Illinois, and to be found in 64 11l., 427. In Bergen e. Clarkson, 6
N. J., 352, the case was this : A city was partly in the two counties of Mid
dlesex and Somerset. A city tax was voted to purchase of Middlesex county
an interest in the court house for the purpose of accommodating the corpora
tion with public buildings. Kinsey, Ch. J. : " The money thus raised and
thus appropriated was not applied to the exigencies of the city ; it was raised
for a purpose which had no legal existence, and appropriated as a mere gift to
the county. The effect therefore was to compel the inhabitants of the corpor
ation residing on the Somerset side of the city, who had to build and maintain
a court house of their own, to assist in defraying the expenses of the public
buildings of another county." The tax was consequently illegal. The case
of S1eight v. People, Sup. Co. 11l., 1875, 7 Chi. Leg. News, 292, presented a
similar question, and was decided the same way.
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most extraordinary and clearly exceptional to warrant any court
in declaring that the discretion has been abused, and the legisla
tive authority exceeded. In Pennsylvania, it has been decided
that a case of clear abuse existed in an act imposing u special as
sessment upon the premises fronting on a county road, and others
lying within a certain distance therefrom, for the purpose of con
structing the road on a very costly plan, not, as the court found,
for the local, but for the general public benefit The act, conse
quently, was adjudged void.1 It must be conceded that this
legislative application of the law of special assessment was of very
questionable propriety, and the conclusion of the court was doubt
less just, notwithstanding it leaves us in great doubt touching the
exact bounds of the legislative discretionary authority in this
regard.2
Taxing districts in general. The cases which have been
instanced show that the nature of the object to be accomplished
will, in many cases, determine the district within which the tax
must be*levied and collected. But, in other cases, there may be
questions of fact to be examined and considerations of equity to
be weighed before the proper bounds of a taxing district can be
fixed upon. When a local improvement is to be made or a local
work constructed for the general public good, the general theory
of taxation would seem to require that the cost should be col
lected from the state at large, or, in other words, from -the whole
public for whose benefit it is to be made. But, as has already
been remarked of the common roads, it is not the custom of the
country to provide for these improvements by general taxation.
Instead of apportioning the cost of each through the state at
1In re Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St., 352 ; S. C, 8 Am. Rep., 255. The
case of People v. Springwell8, 25 Mich., 1E3, in its main facts bears some re
semblance to the foregoing. The legislature proposed to assess upon a town
ship the expense of a costly road, 'which was to be constructed by state agents
under state authority, and taken out of the control of the local officers. The
act was adjudged invalid on the ground that by the constitution the state was
forbidden to engage in internal improvements, and the towns were given con
trol of these local works, and of the expenditure of their moneys therefor.
8People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y., 401, may usefully be compared with the case of
Washington Avenue. It was a case of compulsory town taxation for a like
expensive road. See also People v. Supervisors of Richmond, 20 N. Y., 252 ;
Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm., 405.
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large, it has been found more satisfactory and more consistent
with the general system of local government, that the works
themselves should be apportioned for construction among the
divisions of the state in which they respectively are to be con
structed, and that each division should be left to bear the cost of
that which falls within it The advantages of this system ara
obvious. Presumptively the cost of these works is apportioned
through the state as equally and justly in this mode as by
spreading the cost of all among the whole people. Moreover,
when each community is thus taxed for those works only which
are constructed in the immediate vicinity, and the importance of
which its members may be supposed to feel and appreciate, it is
reasonable to expect that they will bear the cost more willingly
and cheerfully than they would their proportion of a work at a
distance, of the necessity of which they could know nothing
except by report, and the ccnstruction of which they might
attribute to local and personal considerations. These are not the
only reasons for leaving highways and other public works of a
similar nature to be constructed by the local divisions of the state
only. Such a course has been found conducive to economy in
expenditure, because the community upon whom the whole cost
falls have the opportunity, and will be certain to have the dis
position, to watch with reasonable jealousy in order to see that
nothing is wasted and nothing is plundered. At the same time,
as all local improvements tend to confer special and peculiar
benefits upon the local community beyond what are received by
the state at large, the people thus immediately and specially bene
fited may generally be relied upon to make liberal appropriations
for the public works which are to add to the comforts, con
veniences, and, perhaps, the adornment of their neighborhood,
because the very moneys they thus vote appear to return to them
in the increased value which the expenditure confers upon their
estates. It is found to be a wise apportionment of the cost of
public highways which leaves each separate division of the state,
either town or county, to defray that which is to be expended
within its limits.
There is a class of public works, however, which by general
consent are not regarded as being general in their nature, though
the use thereof may be open to the general public. As an illus
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tration may be taken the case of the pavement of a city street.
The street itself is a public highway, but the necessity for a
heavy expenditure in paving arises from causes that are purely
local. Moreover, in large cities, the pavement becomes absolutely
essential, and must be made by the owners of adjoining property,
if not provided for by the public. The ability to make prpfit-
able use of their property depends upon it
,
and they might, per
haps, be safely left to provide for it at their own expense, if all
property was improved and occupied ; and if
,
when individual
action was relied upon, there was any method of insuring uni
formity of action in the time, manner and expense of improving
the streets. The necessity, however, for public supervision and
direction is manifestly imperative, and the necessity for making
the improvement a local burden is almost equally imperative,
since it is not to be supposed that the state at large would under
stand and appreciate the absolute need of an improvement which
was specially important to a few persons only.
Considered as a city work, the expense of paving a street may
be levied upon the whole city, or a system of apportionment may
be resorted to, analogous to that which is adopted in the con
struction and working of highways in general ; that is to say, the
cost of any such work may be assessed upon that part of the city
which receives peculiar benefits from it. The latter method
would require either a division of the city into taxing districts
for the several local improvements within it
,
or the creation of a
special taxing district for each improvement, setting apart for the
purpose that portion of the city which was believed to receive
the special benefits. These special taxing districts are most com
mon, and they are either fixed after an examination of the
circumstances of each particular case with a view to ascertaining
how far the special benefits extend, and what property shares in
them, or they are determined by some general rule which, though
it may not be strictly just in any particular case, will, in the
main, it is supposed, apportion all such expenses with reasonable
equality and fairness.
Establishment of districts. When the nature of the case
does not conclusively fix it
,
the power to determine what shall be
the taxing district for any particular burden is purely a legislative
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power, and not to be interfered -with or controlled, except as it
may be limited or restrained by constitutional provisions. Kefer-
ence to the cases cited in the margin will show that this is a prin
ciple which the courts assert with great unanimity and clearness.1
" The judicial tribunals," it has justly been said, " cannot interfere
with the legislative discretion, however onerous it may be."' And
when it was objected that a certain construction of a statute would
throw upon one locality the expense of constructing a road for
state purposes, "the conclusive answer" was declared to be " that
the state may impose such a burden where, in the wisdom of the
legislature, it is considered that it ought to rest." 8 The right to
1People e. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419, 425 ; Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm., 405, 416,
per Caton, J. ; Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Penn. St., 320 ; Langhorne v. Robinson,
20 Grat., 661; Conwcll v. Connersville, 8 Ind., 358; Malchus v. Highlands, 4
Bash, 547; Challis v. Parker, 11 Kansas, 394; Hingham, etc., Turnpike v.
Norfolk County, 6 Allen, 353 and cases cited. In Howell v. Buffalo, 37 N. Y.,
267, 273, Parker, J., speaking of the legislative power over special assessments,
says: "The legislature was not bound to apportion the tax among the taxable
persons within the city, but might, according to its own view of justice and
right, apportion the whole tax among a part of such persons. It saw fit to
apportion the tax upon the owners of the lands which had been benefited by
the improvement, in proportion to the amount of such benefit. As it is im
possible, under the doctrine adverted to, to say that it had not the constitutional
power so to do, so it can scarcely be contended that, in so doing, it violated
any principle of justice or right." Where lands constituting one parcel are sit
uate in two townships or counties, they may under general legislation be made
taxable in the one in which the owner or occupant has his domicile. Saun
ders v. Springstein, 4 Wend., 429; Hairstou v. Stinson, 13 Ired., 479; Ellis *1.
Hall, 19 Penn. St., 292. But this mode of assessment cannot be claimed as a
right by the owner. And assessment of the separate parts in the counties,
etc., in which they lie, is not bad as to either for want of jurisdiction. Patton
v. Long, 68 Penn. St., 260.
tRcmney, J., Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. S., 126, 138. The same judge
in Hill e. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. S., 243, 245, after speaking of former decisions
in the same state says: "It was there shown * * that the right to
tax for such a purpose necessarily included the power to determine the
extent, and upon what property the tax should be levied ; and that its im
position upon the property particularly and specially benefited by the improve-
nient, was but a lawful exercise of tho discretion with which the legislative
body was invested, in apportioning the tax." "We see," he says further on,
" no reason to doubt the correctness of these conclusions." See also what is
said by Rapallo, J., in Gordon e. Cornes, 47 N. Y., 608, 611. Also Allen v.
Drew, 44 Vt., 174, 187; Alcorn v. Hamcr, 38 Miss., 6j2, 761.
*Jo7ui8on, Ch. J., in People v. Supervis rs of Richmond, 20 N. Y., 252, 255,
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do this where the constitution has interposed no obstacles is de
clared to be not now open to controversy, if indeed it ever was.1
The legislature judges finally and conclusively upon all questions
of policy, as it may also upon all questions of fact which are
involved in the determination of a taxing district.4
And having the authority to determine what shall be the tax
ing districts, the legislature must also be left to its own methods
of reaching the conclusion. Most cases will be settled by general
See to the same effect, Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm., 405. The case was one in
which the legislature had required the levy of a special tax upon the taxable
property of a single precinct for the purpose of repairing and maintaining a
bridge over the Rock river at that place. The court declared the act valid,
and that it was always in the power of the legislature to determine the district
in w hich a tax shall be levied. See also Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St., 326 ;
Waterville e. Kennebeck Co., 59 Me., 80.
1People e. Lawrence, 41 N. Y., 137, 141, per Mason, J. That the legislature
may establish taxing districts independent of county or township, or bounda
ries of political subdivisions, see Malchus v. Highlands, 4 Bush, 547; Shelby
Co. v. Railroad Co., 5 Bush, 225; Shawv. Dennis, 5 Gilm., 405, 416; People
v. Hawes, 34 Barb., 69. See also the next page.
8Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y., 123, 133. This was a very peculiar case of
a special taxing district for a local improvement. Grover, J., states it thus:
" An examination of the case shows that, at the time of the passage of the act,
the Long Island Railroad Company had the right of way in a tunnel con
structed in Atlantic street, Brooklyn, for a railroad operated by steam, and
were operating their road thereon ; that the legislature deemed ii expedient to
close the tunnel, grade the street, lay a track upon the surface to be operated
by horse power, etc., and to authorize the making of a contract with the rail
road company for doing the work and effecting the changes for a sum not
exceeding $125,000. To carry into effect this design, the act in question was
passed, authorizing the commissioners, whose appointment was provided for
in the act, to make the contract, and to make an assessment for the. payment
of the contract price, together with the incidental expenses, upon the lands
and premises situate in the district specified in the act. This local assessment
for those purposes, it is apparent, was based upon the ground that the territory
subjected thereto would be benefited by the work and change in question.
Whether so benefited or not, and whether the assessment of the expense
should for this, or any other reason, be made upon the district, the legislature
was the exclusive judge." See also Hoyt e. East Saginaw, 19 Mich., 39, 43.
In Kansas it is held that where several streets are to be improved, it is compe
tent to make one district of them all, and apportion the expense by frontage
along them all. Parker v. Challis, 9 Kansas, 155; Challis v. Parker, 11 id.,
394. As to the assessment of railroad property in the same state, see po3t, j>.
114, note.
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law ; but taxes for extraordinary purposes may require special
legislation, or at least may justify it In such cases it may be
proper to enter upon such inquiries into the facts as cannot well
be made directly by the legislative body of the state, whose du
ties are too multitudinous to admit of special investigations on a
bearing of evidence or on personal examination by its members.
Under such circumstances it may be proper and convenient to
refer the whole subject to the local authorities ; and this in the
case of local works or improvements is the course usually adopted.
The state does not determine whether a city shall be improved
and a tax levied therefor, but, by provision in the city charter, or
by special legislation, it refers the whole subject to the city com
mon council, under such directions, regulations and instructions
as it may be thought proper or prudent to give or impose. The
state does not apportion the counties and towns into school dis
tricts, and order the construction of district school houses; but
by general law submits the subject to the people specially con
cerned. This is the general course, and it has been found to be
the satisfactory, and therefore the wise course. And if an appor
tionment is to be made on the basis of benefits to property, the
local authorities may be and usually are empowered to refer the
assessment of benefits to officers or commissioners chosen for the
purpose, whose report, when under the provisions of the law it
shall become final, will settle the limits of the special taxing dis
trict These are only methods of giving effect to the legislative
authority over this subject.1
DiTersity of districts. Taxing districts may be as numerous
as the purposes for which taxes are levied. The district for a
single highway may not be the same as that for the school house
located upon it. It is not essential that the political districts of
the state shall be the same as the taxing districts,2 but special
districts may be established for special purposes, wholly ignoring
1Peoplee. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419, 430; Lexington e. McQuillan's Heirs, 9
Dana, 413 ; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich., 560 ; Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen, 223 ;
Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y , 116 ; Hingham, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Norfolk
County, 6 Allen, 353 ; Salem Turnpike, etc., Co. v. Essex County, 100 Mass.,288;
Appeal of Powers, 29 Mich., 504.
»People v. Central R. R. Co., 43 Cal., 398, in which it was decided to he
competent to divide a county into revenue districts. Malchus v. Highlands,
8
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the political divisions. A school district may be created of terri
tory taken from two or more townships or counties, and the bene
fits of a highway, a levee or a drain may be so peculiar that jus
tice would require the cost to be levied* either upon part of a
township or county, or upon parts of several such subdivisions of
the state.1 The political divisions of the state are necessarily
regarded in taxation only where the tax itself is for a purpose spe
cially pertaining to one of them in its political capacity, so that, as
already stated, the nature of the tax will determine the district
Overlying districts. Even when the purpose for which a tax
is demanded pertains to the state at large, or to one of its divi
sions, so that a general levy throughout the state or such division
is essential, there may be peculiar reasons why a part of the gen
eral public who are concerned in the purpose should bear a pro
portion of the burden greater than that which should be borne by
the others. A pertinent illustration might perhaps be the case of
a tax for the construction of a state capitol. It would be clear,
we should say, that such a tax should be spread over the state at
large, because the purpose is a state purpose, and every individual
4 Bush, 547 ; S. C, 2 'Withrow's Corp. Cos., 361, in which an act was sustained
which created a special district near Newport, with authority to grade and
pave or macadamize with rock or gravel, any public road passing through or
into the same, on a favorable vote of two-thirds the owners of real estate, by
or through which any such road may pass. See also County Judge v. Shelby
R. R. Co., 5 Bush, 225. A strong illustration of legislative power in estab
lishing districts is afforded when several streets are put into one district for
.the purposes of improvement, and the cost of improving all is assessed
throughout the district; as in Challis v. Parker, 11 Kans., 394.
1County Judge e. Shelby R. R. Co., 5 Bush, 225. See also People e. Draper,
15 1ST.Y., 532 ; Buffalo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Supervisors of Erie, 48 id., 93 ; Litch
field e. McComber, 42 Barb., 288, 299 ; Sangamon, etc., R. R. Co. v. Jacksonville,
14 11l., 163; Bakewcll e. Police Jury, 20 La. An., 334 ; Malchus n Highlands,
4 Bush, 547; Norwich e. County Commissioners, 13 Pick., 60; Brighton v.
Wilkinson, 2 Allen, 27; Attorney Gen'l v. Cambridge, 16 Gray, 215; Salem
Turnpike, etc., Co. v. Essex County, 100 Mass., 282. In Kansas a statute for an
assessment of railroad property as a whole, and an apportionment to the dif
ferent counties and townships, was sustained in Missouri River, etc., Co. e
Morris, 7 Kans., 210; Same v. Blake, 9 id., 489; Smith v. Lea- enworth Co.,
9 id., 296. Several states assess railroad property in a similar manner. In
Kentucky, railroads can only be taxed as an entirety and by the state. ADple-
'gate v. Ernst, 3 Bush, 648.
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in the state is directly interested in its accomplishment But it is
also apparent that the people and the property at the place where
the structure is proposed to be constructed would receive special
and probably very great benefits in consequence of the construc
tion, beyond what they would receive in common with all others.
The fact is often recognized in the voluntary contributions which
are made by the people to secure the location and construction of
state buildings at the place where they reside or own property ;
and the question then arises whether these peculiar benefits may
not constitute a basis for special taxation. To make them such,
it would be necessary there should be two taxing districts : the
one embracing the whole state, and the other embracing only the
district which, in the opinion of the legislature, was so peculiarly
benefited as to justify an exceptional burden upon its people and
property. In such a case the people within the minor district,
which is also embraced within the larger district, would contribute
twice to the same burden ; but this, though apparently a violation
of the principles of taxation, is not so in fact, if the establishment
of the minor district has only equality and justice in view, and if
each taxpayer, though twice called upon, is by the twp assess
ments only required to pay what, as between himself and the rest
of the state, has been found to be his just proportion of a burden
which, though general in its 'nature, distributes its benefits une
qually.
This doctrine has been applied in Pennsylvania to the case of
a county town, which, in addition to its proportion of the county
levy, was specially assessed for the expense of constructing a
court house and jail. " The advantages of a county town," it
was said, "are too well appreciated, not to make every village use
all its exertions to have a court house provided for its benefit and
convenience, and as its inhabitants profited by, not only the dis
bursement of the tax among them, but a permanent increase of
their business and an appreciation of their property, they were
morally bound to contribute in proportion."1 In the state of New
York it has also been applied to a state work of public improve
ment, — a canal — which conferred or was likely to confer local
1
Gib3OTh Cb. J., in Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 258, 861.
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benefits on a locality specially taxed.1 It has also been applied
to the case of a building erected for the accommodation of a state
educational institution. In one case where a local tax was pro
vided for to meet a portion of the cost of erecting at that place a
building for the state agricultural college, the principles which
underlie such cases were so clearly stated that a quotation from
the opinion will be more satisfactory than any synopsis that might
be attempted, or any restatement in our own language.
" It may at first sight seem," it was said, " as if the establishment
of a college and its endowment and support by the common
wealth for the education of all persons within the state, who
might wish to receive instruction in certain branches of science or
art, would stand on the same footing as the public schools, and that
money raised for such an object ought to be apportioned and dis
tributed in such manner as to bear on all persons and property
equally, without resort to local taxation, which would operate
partially, and in a certain sense disproportionately. We are not
prepared to say that this proposition is in all respects incorrect
We doubt very much whether it would be competent for the
legislature to impose the whole burden of supporting such an in
stitution upon any particular municipality, section or district of
the state. But we are clear in the opinion that there may exist
a state of facts which would render it just and expedient, and
strictly within the exercise of constitutional authority, for the
legislature to enact that a portion of such a public burden should
be borne by persons and estates situated within certain limits, and
to authorize a special assessment on them for that purpose. If
the establishment of a public institution of general utility or
necessity in a particular locality would be productive of direct
and appreciable benefit to persons or estates in the vicinity, either
by increasing the value of property there situated, or by the op
portunities which it would afford to those residing in the neigh
borhood to enjoy certain common advantages and privileges, with
greater facility and at less cost than others having an equal right
to participate in them, but who reside or own estates more remote
ly situated, or in distant parts of the state, we can see no reason
1Thomas e. Leland, 24 Wend., OS. See also Harbor Commissioners e. State,
45 Ala., 399.
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why these special advantages or benefits should not be taken into
consideration, in determining the mode in which the public bur
den of defraying the cost of the institution should be apportioned
and distributed. While perfect equality in the raising of money
for public charges is inattainable, it would certainly approximate
more nearly to an equitable apportionment of them, to provide
that such portion of the expenditure for a public object as will
inure directly to the benefit or profit of a certain town or dis
trict, should be borne by the estates situated and persons resident
therein, leaving only that sum to be treated as a public charge,
and to constitute a general assessment on all persons and property
in the commonwealth, which may reasonably be supposed to be
expended for the equal and common benefit of all. Such dis
tribution of a public burden would be reasonable, because it
would tend to equality ; and it would be proportional, because it
would be borne in proportion to the benefits which each would
receive." 1
A like principle is sometimes applied to the construction and
improvement of the streets. These, as has been said, constitute
highways for the accommodation of the general public, but are
calculated, by their improvement, to increase largely the value of
all property fronting on, or lying in the immediate vicinity of
them. Should the legislature determine that the cost of a street
improvement should be borne in part by the whole city, and in
part by an assessment made on the basis of benefits within a dis
trict to which the improvement was exceptionally valuable, we
know of no valid objection that could be in terposed. Whether
the city shall bear the whole expense, the adjacent prop
erty the whole, or, on the other hand, the expense be appor
tioned between two districts, one of which includes the whole
city, and the other the adjacent property only, must be deter-
1Bigehne, Ch. J., in Merrick e. Amherst, 12 Allen, 498, 504. See to the same
effect, Marks e. Pardue University, 37 Ind., 155; Gordon e. Cornes, 47 N. Y.,
608, 614. Every such special assessment must of course have express legisla
tive authority. It could not be made under the general power conferred upon
a municipality to levy taxes for corporate purposes. This was affirmed and
explained in Livingston County v. Weider, 64 11l., 427. See also Burr v.
Carbondale, Sup. Ct. 11l., 1875, 6 Chicago Legal News, 360. Also Chap.
XX.
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mined by the legislature on a consideration of all the equities
bearing on the case.1 Other local city improvements may un
doubtedly be provided for in the same way.
The legislature has sometimes applied the same doctrine to the
case of general city taxation ; constituting two districts, the one,
consisting of the whole city, to be assessed equally, and the other
consisting of the more compact portions of the city, which, because
receiving a larger share of the benefits of city government, in the
protection afforded by the police and fire departments and the
like, was required to pay a greater proportionate share of the ex
pense of such government. It is not perceived that such a case
differs in principle from the other cases of overlying districts
which have been mentioned. Nevertheless, in one case, the power
of the legislature to discriminate in city taxation between what
may be designated the out property, and that in the parts com
pactly built, has been denied, on the ground that the city consti
tuted the taxing district for city purposes, and such a discrimina
tion would give distinct rules of taxation within the same district,
to the number of which there could be no limit except the legis
lative discretion ; a doctrine wholly inconsistent, it was said, with
the constitutional idea of taxation.2 This conclusion seems to us
to impose restraints on the constitutional power of the legislature
to establish taxing districts, which can hardly be justified in reason,
or by the decisions in analogous cases. Legislation, such as was
condemned in the case, has not been uncommon in other states,
and in some cases, has passed the test of judicial scrutiny.8 Such
1 See Municipality e. White, 9 La. An., 446; Municipality v. Dunn, 10 Id.,
57 ; Chicago v. Larned, 34 11l., 203 ; Ottawa v. Spencer, 40 id., 211 ; Patton v.
Springfield, 99 Mass., 627 ; S. C, 2 Withrow's Corp. Cas., 484.
■Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County, 9 Wis., 410, 421. Compare Zanes-
vllle v. Richards, 5 Ohio, N. S., 589.
8See Serrill v. Philadelphia, 38 Penn. St., 355, 358. In that case it appeared that
the legislature had provided that land within the city of Philadelphia, which
the assessors should mark "rural," should be taxed only two-thirds, and a
part of it only one-half, what others were taxed for city purposes, they being
released from the rest " because," as Woodward, J., says, " rural owners derived
no benefit from lighting, paving and cleaning streets," etc. The act was en
forced without question as to its validity. And see Gillette «. Hartford, 31
Conn., 351. The cases of Henderson v. Lambert, 8 Bush, 607; Benoist e. St
Louis, 19 Mo., 179, and Lee v. Thomas, 49 id., 112, are all directly opposed to
the case in Wisconsin.
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legislation is sustained on the ground that it is only an equitable
apportionment of the burdens of municipal government between
those who receive a part of its benefits only, and those who par
ticipate in them all.1
A different case has been presented in some other states. City
boundaries having been extended so as to embrace the lands of
parties who insisted that their premises were agricultural lands
merely, and would receive no benefit from the city government,
such parties sought the protection of the courts, and prayed for
injunction to restrain the imposition upon them of any tax in ex
cess of what they would have been chargeable with had the bounda
ries not been extended to embrace them. It is to be observed of
such cases that the legislature which has full and exclusive
authority to determine the proper bounds of the municipal divis
ions of the state, and also to establish the taxing districts, had
proceeded to do so, and in fixing the city boundaries without any
provision for a discrimination in the taxation of property within
them, had determined that no such discrimination should or ought
to be made. The whole subject was one committed exclusively
to the judgment and discretion of the legislature, whose members
would make inquiry into the facts in their own way, and act upon
their own reasons. No question could be made of the complete
jurisdiction over the case, and if the action was unfair, and led to
unequal and unjust consequences, it seems difficult to suggest any
ground upon which it could be successfully assailed that would
not warrant a judicial review of legislative action in every case in
which parties complain of injustice and inequality. Neverthe
less the courts have considered themselves warranted in inquiring
into the facts, in order to determine whether the extension of mu
nicipal boundaries was fairly warranted, and having in some cases
reached the conclusion that it was not, and that the extension was
made for the purpose of subjecting to taxation adjacent property
that would not receive the benefits of municipal government, and
1In Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn., 351, 357, Butler, J., delivering the opinion
of the court, assumes as probable that the persons within the city limits whose
lands have been brought In by an extension of city lines, had been so brought
in on the application of the old corporation and against their own desire, and
that the discrimination in taxation in their favor was only a just protection
against inequality and unfairness.
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was not in fact urban property, they have undertaken to protect
the owners of property thus unfairly brought in, against the un
equal taxation to which the legislation would expose them. In
doing this they have not assumed to nullify the legislative action
in extending the municipal limits, but they have undertaken to
modify and relieve against its consequences, and to do this upon
the express ground that the motive which has influenced the legis
lation was not legitimate.1
Some of these decisions are made by very able judges, whose
opinions are always entitled to the highest respect, but it seems
difficult to harmonize them with the conceded principles govern
ing the law of taxation. For, 1. They do not question legislation
as being in excess of legislative authority, as might be done where
taxes are voted for a purpose not public ; but they leave the
legislation to stand, and only interfere to qualify its effect, on the
ground that it has been adopted on improper grounds and will
operate unequally ; 2. This is done on an inquiry into the facts,
and a substitution of the judicial conclusion for the legislative
on a subject not at all judicial ; a subject, too— the proper limits
of city extension — upon which persons are certain to differ
widely, and where an inquiry into the facts after the judicial
method of an examination of witnesses is usually much less sat
isfactory than that personal knowledge and investigation which
legislators are supposed to possess or to make.2
1Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr., 330 ; Covington v. Southgate, 15 id., 491 ;
Sharp's Ex'r v. Donavan, 17 id., 223; Arbegust v. Louisville, 2 Bush, 271;
Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 id., 86; Fulton v.
Davenport, 17 id., 404; Buell v. Ball, 20 id., 282; Deeds v. Sanborn, 26 id., 419:
Deiman v. Fort Madison, 30 id., 542; Bradshaw e. Omaha, 1 Neb., 16. The
point is thus stated in a recent case in Kentucky: " As in ordinary cases of
taxation, in which the reciprocal benefits are deemed commensurable, so the
subjection of lands included in the town extension to the burden of a munici
pal tax is not considered an unlawful appropriation of private property to
public use, unless the legitimate object of improving the town shall have been
palpably perverted to the unauthorized purpose only of lessening the burden
of taxation on the inhabitants, who will not be otherwise benefited by the ex-
tension." Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush, 37, 40, per Robertson, J.
•As to correcting the injustice of legislative action by the judiciary in
matters of taxation, reference may be had to what is said by Gibson, Ch. J., in
Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 258, 261.
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Extra territorial taxation. Those cases in which it has
been held incompetent for a state or municipality to levy taxes
on persons or property not within its limits, have generally indi
cated the want of jurisdiction over the subject of the tax as the
ground of invalidity. But such a burden would be inadmissible,
also, for the further reason that, as to any property or person out
side the district in which the tax was levied, the want of legal
interest in the tax would preclude its being subjected to the bur
den. A state can no more subject to its power a single person or
a single article of property whose residence or legal situs is in
another state, than it can subject all the citizens or all the prop
erty of such other state to its power. The accidental circum
stance that it may happen to have the means of reaching one and
not the rest can make no difference ; there must be an interest in
the subject matter of the tax ; there must be between the state
and the tax payer a reciprocity of duty and obligation ; and these
in contemplation of law would be wholly wanting in the case
supposed.1 This is the general rule; whether it is subject to
exceptions may be a question^ In Missouri it has been held to
be incompetent for the legislature to empower a city to tax for
city purposes the land outside the city but adjacent to it
,
and
therefore receiving, possibly, some of the benefits of the city
1 State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall, 300. Compare Jenkins v.
Charleston, Sup. Ct, So. Car., 7 Chicago Legal News, 78. Where a town had
for more than twenty years exercised jurisdiction over part of another with
its acquiescence, a tax levied within this part by such first mentioned town
was nevertheless held void. Ham v. Sawyer, 38 Me., 37, 39. And see Hugh-
ey's Lessee v. Horrell, 2 Ohio, 231. But where an act sets off one town from
another, it may provide that taxes to pay existing liabilities shall be assessed
and collected in both by the existing officers as if the act had not been passed.
Winslow v. Morrill, 47 Me., 411. Towns cannot even by agreement establish
the rule that each may tax lands of its residents lying in the other ; there
being no statute permitting it. Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass., 547. In some
states it is provided by law that, where occupied lands lie partly in two town-
ships, they may be taxed together in that in which is the mansion house, or in
which the principal portion is situate. See Bausman v. Lancaster, 50 Penn.
St., 208; Judkins v. Reed, 48 Me., 386; State v. Hay, 31 N. J., 275; State v.
Hoffman, 30 id., 346; Statee. Metz, 29 id., 122; Saunders v. Springstein, 4
Wend., 429. Assessments upon personalty as depending upon the residence
of the owners will be considered in another chapter.
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government and expenditures.1 The contrary has been held in
Virginia, where land for half a mile outside the corporate limits was
made taxable to pay the interest of a debt contracted in aid of in
ternal improvements.2 And in Indiana an objection to similar
legislation was put aside with very little consideration,8 less, one
would suppose, than its importance deserved. It is certainly diffi
cult to understand how the taxation of a district can be defended
whose people have no voice in voting it
,
in selecting the purposes,
or in expending it. A city has sometimes been allowed to exact a
license fee of those engaging in the sale of intoxicating drinks
near its limits, but in such a case regulation is the principal ob
ject, and the city is the party chiefly concerned.4
1 Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo., 384, 386, approved in St. Charles e. Nolle, 51 id.,
122. And see Wilkey v. Pekin, 19 11l., 160.
»Langhorne v. Robinson, 20 Grat., 661. In this case the city of Lynchburg
was authorized to levy a tax " upon the lands, property and persons of all
persons within the town proper and corporation, and for half a mile round
about and beyond its present tax paying limits," for the purposes of aid to a
railroad corporation. The act was sustained in reliance upon New York
cases, and the broad assertion is made by the judge delivering the opinion,
after referring to the undoubted right of the state to delegate the power of
taxation to municipal authorities, "On principle I can imagine no reason
why the power might not as well be delegated to any other persons in the
discretion of the legislature." If we understand this opinion literally, it
would sustain the legislature in a delegation to the city authorities of Lynch-
burg, or of any other favored town, of any indefinite power of taxation for
any public purpose whatever, and upon any portion of the state ; the town
authorities in doing so, acting for and with the authority of the representatives
of the people chosen to the legislature. But doubtless this was not intended.
It is evident that the particular tax involved in that case was thought by the
court to be just; had it been otherwise, perhaps the principle involved
would have received further consideration.
8 Conwell v. Connersville, 8 Ind., 358, 362. Davison, J., says : " The appel
lant, in his brief, propounds this inquiry: 'Can the appellees tax property
lying outside of the corporate limits, and within two hundred yards?' No
argument or authority is adduced in relation to the point involved in the in
terrogatory. Hence, we are inclined to answer briefly that the act of 1849
invests the president and trustees with full power to tax property within two
hundred yards of the corporate line. And we do not advise that that act is
in conflict with the constitution."
4 Falmouth e. Watson, 5 Bush, 660. A town cannot give its ordinance such
extra territorial effect without express authority by statute. Strauss v. Pon
tine, 40 11l., 301.
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To give locality to a purpose in respect to which a public ex
penditure is to be made, it is obviously not essential that the
expenditure should be within the district, nor that a public work
created by means thereof should have its situs within the district.
The district interest must be the true test whether an object is or
is not a proper object of district taxation ; and if the benefits
are had by the district, the interest is manifest. The case of city
waterworks located outside its limits is an illustration.1
1Godd in?>. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120, 155, per Tucker, President; Denton v.
Jnckson, 2 Johns. Ch., 317, 336. But in general, specific authority would be
required to enable a municipality to expend money outside its territorial lim
its for a purpose which presumptively is not local. Thus, a town under its
general authority to vote taxes for township purposes cannot raise money to
build or repair a bridge outside. Concord v. Boscawen, 17 N. H., 465. Com
pare North Hempstead v. Hempstead, Hopk. Ch., 288; Riley v. Rochester, 9
N. Y., 64. A city may be authorized to purchase and improve a public park
outside its limits. M'Callie v. Chattanooga, 3 Head, 317.
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CHAPTER VI.
EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION.
Requirement of equality. There is no imperative require
ment that taxation shall be equal. If there were, the operations of
government must come to a stop, from the absolute impossibility
of fulfilling it The most casual attention to the nature and op
eration of taxes -will put this beyond question. No single tax
can be apportioned so as to be exactly just, and any combination
of taxes is likely in individual cases to increase instead of dimin
ishing the inequality. Theoretically, tax laws should be framed
with a view to apportioning the burdens of government so that each
person enjoying government protection shall be required to con
tribute so much as is his reasonable proportion, and no more.
The tax law that comes nearest to accomplishing this is
,
in the
ory, the most perfect. But to accomplish this it may not be re
quisite to require the tax-gatherer to call upon every individual,
and collect from him in person this reasonable proportion. It
may possibly be found that the most equal and just tax can be
collected from the fewest persons.1 A tax on an article of prime
necessity, which few produce, but all use, may be collected of the
producers alone without their feeling the burden beyond what
others would feel it
,
because the tax in the natural course of bu
siness would be added to the price of the commodity, and would
be collected by the producers from the whole community of con
sumers. Such a tax would be generally distributed, and would
be wanting in equality only because of the fact that articles of
prime necessity are not consumed by different members of the
community in proportion to their means or income, and there
fore the poorer classes would pay more than their just proportion.
To collect all the revenues of government by a tax on bread-
stuffs exclusively, would consequently be to compel unequal con-
1 Smith, Wealth of Nations, b. 5, ch. 2, pt. 2, art 4. State taxes on property
fc« valuation ar° collected from very few oersons, five to eight per cent of the
whole poputation.
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tributions to the support of the government, by means of the
necessities of the poor. A tax on an article which is purely one
of luxury would probably be more equal, and certainly less un
just, and would be diffused with some proportion to income ; every
man would tax himself, and would abstain or indulge as he felt
the disposition and ability to pay. To collect the whole revenue
of the state from an article of luxury like spirituous liquors,
might be as little liable to objection as any other method if it
were practicable, but to attempt the collection of all from one ar
ticle would require a tax so heavy as to be difficult of enforce
ment, and which would probably defeat the purpose of the law
by diminishing the consumption as the price increased. We
have already seen that other kinds of taxes are open to serious
objections on the score of equality and justice. A tax on prop
erty by valuation, which seems perhaps most fair of all, is subject,
as has been shown, to difficulties which preclude its being laid,
apportioned or collected with absolute justice. The objections
need not be repeated here.
It being thus manifest that there are serious and often insur
mountable difficulties in the way of equal taxation, it remains to
be seen what is the rule of law where in the particular case the
inequality can be pointed out and demonstrated. On this sub
ject, certain points have already been covered. The legislature
must decide when and how and for what public purposes a tax
shall be levied, and must select the subjects of taxation. This is
legislative, and the legislative conclusion in the premises must be
accepted as proper and final. It follows that a tax cannot be at
tacked on averment and proof that some other tax for the same
purpose would have been more just and more equal. An excise
tax on one kind of business only is not illegal for the discrimina
tion ; it is always to be conclusively presumed that the legisla
ture found good and controlling reasons impelling the action it
has taken, and that, in view of all the circumstances which were
known to its members, the tax which has been provided for is
reasonable.1
Very strong language has been used by the courts in some
1See De Camp v. Eveland, 19 Barb., 81 ; Nor. Ind. R. R. Co. e. Connelly, 10
Ohio, N. S., 159, 166; People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419; Lusher e. Scites, 4 W.
Va., 11.
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cases, and it may be useful to collect some of the expressions.
The act in Pennsylvania by which the legislature allowed the
county borough to levy a tax for the erection of a court-house
and jail for the use of the county, was thought by some of its citi
zens to be void because unequal. The court thought otherwise.
"As regards taxation," say the court, '; there is no limitation of it.
Equality of contribution is not enjoined in the bill of rights,
and probably because it was known to be impracticable. Pre
vious to the convention of 1838, we had double taxation of tracts
of unseated lands lying foul of each other ; of lands and mort
gages of them ; of grounds and rents issuing out of them ; of bank
charters and bank dividends under them, and perhaps of some
other things. On the other hand, it was known that other de
scriptions of property had not been taxed at all. Since then, the
exigencies of the state have brought to light many new sources
of revenue, and more would have been discovered had more been
wanted. No one imagined, however, that the inequality had
made the previous taxation unconstitutional.
" If equality were practicable, in what branch of the govern
ment would power to enforce it reside ? Not in the judiciary,
unless it were competent to set aside a law free from collision
with the constitution, because it seemed unjust It could inter
pose only by overstepping the limits of its sphere, by arrogating
to itself a power beyond its province ; by producing intestine dis
cord, and by setting an example which other organs of govern
ment might not be slow to follow. It is its peculiar duty to keep
the first lines of the constitution clear, and not to stretch its pow
er in order to correct legislative or executive abuses. Every
branch of the government, the judiciary included, does injustice
for which there is no remedy, because everything human is im
perfect. The sum of the matter is
,
that the taxing power must
be left to that part of the government which is to exercise it.
" But what if this power were so managed as to lay the public
burthens on particular classes in ease of the rest ? It is illogical
to argue from an extreme case ; or from the abuse of a power to
a negation of it. Every authority, however indispensable, maybe
abused ; and if it might not, it would be powerless for good." 1
1 Gibson, Ch. J., in Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 258, 260. "Equality of taxation,
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" Perfect equality in the assessment of taxes," it is said in an
other case, " is unattainable. Approximation to it is all that can be
had. Under any system of taxation, however wisely and carefully
framed, a disproportionate share of the public burdens will be
thrown on certain kinds of property, because they are visible and
tangible, while others are of a nature to elude vigilance. It is
only where statutes are passed which impose taxes on false and
unjust principles, or operate to produce gross inequality, so that
they cannot be deemed in any just sense proportional in their
effect on those who are to bear the public charges, that courts
can interpose and arrest the course of legislation by declaring such
enactments void." 1
" Perfectly equal taxation," it has again been said, " will re
main an unattainable good as long as laws and government and
man are imperfect." * " There is no provision in the constitution
as a maxim of taxation, means equality of sacrifice. It means apportioning the
contributions of each person towards the expenses of government, so that he
shall feel neither more nor less inconvenience from his share of the payment
than every other person experiences from his. This standard, like other
standards of perfection, cannot be completely realized." Mill., Pol. Econ.,
b. 5, ch., 2, § 2. There is a very elaborate examination of this general subject
in Williams's Case, 3 Bland. Ch., 186, 220.
: Bigelow, Ch. J., in Commonwealth v. Savings Bank, 5 Allen, 428, 436.
See Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247; Ould v Richmond, 23 Grat., 464, 473;
Howell v. Bristol, 8 Bush, 493. " Equality can never be but approximation."
Redfleld, J., in Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt., 174, 186.
* Sharaxvood, J., in Grim v. School District, 57 Penn. St., 433, 437. Compare
Durach's Appeal, 62 Penn. St., 491 ; People v. Worthington, 21 11l., 171 ; Com
monwealth e. N. E. Slate & Tile Co., 13 Allen, 391 ; Youngblood v. Sexton,
Sup. Ct. Mich., October term, 1875. In Coburn v. Richardson, 16 Mass., 213,
215, a tax on the lands of a nonresident for parish purposes was assailed.
Parker, Ch. J. "Numerous are the inconveniences and great is the injustice
which may flow from this statute. But it is for the legislature alone to determine
whether these are or are not counterbalanced by any great public good which
may be expected to be produced by it." In Conner e. Fulsom, 13 Minn., 219,
222, in which a town bounty tax was contested, on the ground that it benefited
in part another town, as in fact it did, Wilson, Ch. J., holds this language.
'" It is generally true that a city, town or county, in expending money for the
advancement of its own local interests, either directly or indirectly benefits
some other subdivision of the state. If it builds a road or bridge, or aids in
building a railroad, or in making any other public improvement, from which
benefit to itself is expected to accrue, frequently some other subdivision of
the state is directly and equally benefited ; but it has not been considered that
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that taxation shall be equal. Sound policy requires that it
should be, so far as possible. But perfect equality is not possi
ble. Indeed, if this was necessary there could be no taxation
except such as would include every person and every thing ;
which would be manifestly impracticable and unjust." 1 These are
strong expressions, but they do not go beyond the demands of
stiict accuracy.
But are there not cases which on their face are manifestly so
unequal and unjust as to furnish conclusive evidence that equal
ity has not been sought for but avoided; that oppression, not jus
tice was desired, and confiscation, not taxation intended ? Such
cases it surely is possible to conceive, and if such has never been
the intent of legislation, it is certain that it has sometimes been
the result
It has already been stated that inequality does not necessarily
follow the restricting of a tax to a few subjects only, or to a single
subject A license tax cannot be deemed unequal because reach
ing one occupation only, if it is to reach all who follow that Let
it reach all of a class, either of persons or things, it matters not
whether those included in it be one or many, or whether they re
side in any particular locality or are scattered all over the state.
It would be only when individuals of the class were singled out
this would be a legal objection to an appropriation or tax for such improvement.
If our constitution required absolute or perfect equality in taxation, such
objection would perhaps have to be admitted. But perfect equality is not re
quired, nor is it possible. All taxes ' should be as nearly equal as may be,'
in the language of the constitution. If the taxes imposed are distributed on
just principles applicable alike to all for whose benefit the appropriation is
made or intended, substantial equality is attained, and no constitutional right
invaded." Compare People v. Whyler, 41 Cal., 351, 354, per lihodes, J.
1Sharawood, J., in Weber v. Reinhardt, 73 Penn. St., 370, 373. See Opinions
of Judges, 58 Me. , 590 ; Loan Association v. Topeka, 20Wall., 655, per MiUer, J.
" It was justly remarked by Judge Ellsworth in Savings Bank e. New Lon
don, 20 Conn., 117, and again in Carrington v. Farmington, 21 id., 65, 72; that
taxes are at best arbitrary and unequal. Studied discriminations are made in
all tax laws in favor of or against particular persons or subjects, or trades, or
business, or institutions. The character of this kind of legislation, as ar
bitrary, partial, cumulative and capricious, is well exemplified in the re
cent acts of congress. From the nature of the case there can be no uniform
rule of making the assessments." MeCurdy, J., in Coite v. Society for Savings,
32 Conn., 173, 184.
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for exemption, that the inequality would be manifest1 To tax
all loans of money would be equal, and would enable all to adjust
their rates of interest accordingly ; but to tax all except those
made by A., B. and C, or all but those of the inhabitants of a
single city, would be unequal, and would create an invidious and
unjust distinction in favor of the excepted persons, which would
give them the advantage of higher net rates. The one would be
taxation ; the other would be lawless exaction. This, as a general
principle, is undoubted.2
1Durach's Appeal, 62 Penn. St., 491, 494; Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark., 289;
State v. Parker, 32 N. J., 426, 435, per Depue, J. ; Youngblood v. Sexton, Sup.
Ct. Mich., Oct. Term, 1875. In the Franklin Insurance Co. v. State, 5 W. Va.,
349, a tax of three per cent- on the preminms of insurance companies was held
void; the constitution requiring taxation to be equal and uniform, and this
tax law applying to no other class of subjects or corporations, or to individu
als. The tax seems to have been regarded as a tax on property. Surely the
requirement of uniformity cannot make it essential that all persons or subjects
shall be taxed, nor that all corporations shall be taxed alike. Does it mean
any more than that any particular tax shall be laid equally and uniformly
upon the persons or subjects within the class taxed ? Would not a tax of one
per cent- on the net earnings of all railroad companies be equal and uniform ?
And if this is inadmissible, how can there beany equalization of taxation, as
between, for instance, the insurance company and the saloon keeper, unless
everything is brought to the standard of a property tax, in which case thoso
who ought to pay most would sometimes pay least? To determine whether a
tax on insurance companies alone would be unequal or unjust, it would be
necessary to look to the result. The tax, we must suppose, would go to in
crease the preminms, and if the community generally insured, the taX would
be generally distributed through the community, and would be paid in pro
portion to the protection received. See Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13 Grat.,
767; Carter e. Dow, 16 Wis., 298. In State e. Charleston, 12 Rich., 702, 732,
Dunkin, Chancellor, says : " Essential characteristics of any system of taxation,
properly so called, are certainty, equality, universality. All the persons or
property within a state, district, city or other fraction of territory having a
local sovereignty for the purpose of taxation, should, as a general rule, consti
tute the basis for taxation." Like language is made use of by Tu«k, J., in
O'Neal ,e.Bridge Co., 18 Md., 1, 23, and it is quite true and just where taxation
by values is what the law provides for; but it has but limited application to
the taxation of business in any form. That the legislature cannot designate
one class of persons because of their race as special objects of taxation, see
Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal., 534.
•A remarkable case of invidious exemption occurs in the legislation of
Arkansas for 1871. A statute purporting to be passed in the interest of immi
gration and manufactures, exempts every species of manufacture and min-
9
"~
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Exemptions. There are some cases in which it has been cus
tomary for the legislature to make certain exemptions, either of
persons or property, from the general rule which it has prescribed
on the subject of taxation. Some of these, such as the exemp
tions of household furniture, tools of trade, etc., and the limited
personal property which very poor persons may be possessed of,
are to be looked upon rather as being in the nature of limitations
of the general rule, than as exceptions from it; the taxation is
only of all that is possessed over and beyond what has been left
out as absolutely needful to the owner's support.1 The same may
be said of some kinds of property, such as church property, school
property, burying grounds and the like, which are by many per
sons looked upon as fit objects for the public contributions.
Implied exemptions. Some things are always presumptively
exempted from the operation of general tax laws, because it is
reasonable to suppose they were not within the intent of the
legislature in adopting them. A state may, if the legislature see
ing — the capital employed therein, the property used therefor, and the pro.
ductions while in the ownership and possession of the original manufacturer
or miner — from all taxation for a period of five years. Had the act stopped
here, a question might possibly be made whether the exemption was unjust.
It might be contended that releasing the manufacturer from taxation while
leaving competition open would be likely to reduce prices in proportion as
the cost of production was diminished by the exemption. But the legisla
tion referred to went on to provide that no corporation or individual should
"have the benefit of the act whose productions should not average $900 per
month. In other words, it exempted all the large manufacturers, but left the
smaller ones not only taxed as before, but compellable also to share with the
Test of the community in making up to the state what would be lost by not
taxing the others. If anything»could add to the injustice of an exemption of
a portion only of those engaged in a particular business, it would be that the
discrimination was made against the very class that the policy of the law
is thought to favor; namely, the men of small means.
It was decided in Nashville v. Althorp, 5 Cold., 554, that where a merchant's
privilege is taxed, discriminations can not be made: e. g., between those
living within and those without a city. Compare Robinson v. Charleston, 2
'Rich., 317.
"'I do not well perceive what definition can well be given to the words
' taxable property,' unless they be made to mean all property not exempted by
law from taxation." Harper, Ch. J., in City Council v. St. Philip's Church, 1Mc-
Mul. Eq., 139, 144. See Martin v. Charleston, 13 Rich. Eq., 50, 52; Levy o.
Smith, 4 Fla., 154.
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fit, tax all the property owned by its municipal divisions; but to
do so, would render necessary new taxes to meet the demand of
this tax, and thus the public would be taxing itself in order to
raise money to pay over to itself, and no one would be benefited
but the officers employed. It is always to be assumed that the
general language of statutes is made use of with reference to
taxable subjects, and the property of municipalities is not in any
proper sense taxable. It is, therefore, by clear implication ex
cluded.1 It is not, like government agencies, excluded from the
power of tax laws, but it is beyond the grasp of their intent.
1 People v. Salomon, 51 11l., 37; Directors of the Poor v. School Directors,
42 Penn. St., 21, 25 (case of poor house); State v. Gaffney, 34 N. J., 133 (case
of city water works and land acquired therefor). And soe People e. Doe,
36 Cal., 220; People v. Austin, 47 Cal., 353; Gibson v. Howe, 37 Iowa, 168;
Trustees of Industrial University «. Champaign County, Sup. Ct. 11l., 1875,
7 Chicago Legal News, 160 (case of property conveyed to trustees in trust for
a state educational institution). In Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duvall,
295, 296, the following language is made use of by Boberteon, J., the question
being whether property belonging to the city of Louisville was taxable for
state purposes: "A general law concerning persons may include artificial as
well as natural persons, and every corporation is a legal person. Even the
United States and every separate state, and every county in each state, are
quasi corporations, and each of all such corporations is in law a person.
And, consequently, a tax on the real estate of all persons would, without
qualification or exception, literally include that of every corporation, muni
cipal as well as private. But in this respect there is an obvious and essential
distinction between municipal and private corporations. A private corpora
tion, like a bank or railroad or turnpike, is, in technical language, altogether
personal. But a municipal corporation, like a state, a county or the city of
Louisville, is much more than a person. While nominally a person, it is
vitally a political power, and each in its prescribed sphere is imperium in
imperio. All are constituent demands of one total sovereignty. The city of
Louisville, to the extent of the jurisdiction delegated to it by its charter, is but
an_ effluence from the sovereignty of Kentucky; governs for Kentucky, and
its authorized legislation and local administration of law are legislation and
administration by Kentucky through the agency of that municipality. The
tax law of Kentucky constructively applies to persons only, and not at all to
political bodies exercising in different degrees the sovereignty of the state.
Were this not true, then the statute literally embracing all persons, and the
state being in one sense a person, her capital and penitentiary, and other
public property, would, like the estate of a natural person, be subject to
assessment for taxation; and so too would the court houses and jails and
poor houses of all the counties of the state. But neither a state nor a county
has ever been considered a person contemplated by any tax law ever enacted.
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Express exemptions. Before referring to the express exemp
tions from general taxation, which it has been customary to
make, it may be well to refer to certain constitutional provisions
which have been adopted in different states with a view to secure
uniformity in taxation. The provisions are various, and a refer
ence to such as have come under judicial consideration will suffice
for our purpose.
Arkansas. The constitution provided that " all property shall
be taxed according to its value ; the manner of ascertaining which
to be as the general assembly shall direct, making the same equal
and uniform throughout the state." Where the legislature, by a
city charter, undertook to exempt the property of the inhabitants
from taxation for the construction of roads in the county of which
the city formed a part, this was held invalid as a violation of the
rule of uniformity which the constitution had established.1
California. The constitution requires that
" taxation shall be
equal and uniform," and that "all property in the state shall be
taxed in proportion to its value." Under this the following rul
ings have been made : L That " all property in the state " was to
be understood as intending all private property only, and that it
did not include the public property belonging to the United
And does not the only real reason for their constructive exclusion equally
except the municipal property of Louisville, used for the convenience and
facility of its local governments* We think so, and without elaborate argu
ment we so adjudge." It was, nevertheless, held that such property as
the corporation might own, not for canning on its municipal government,
but only for the convenience or profit of its citizens, individually or collec
tively, and which, therefore, it would own and use as a private corporation,
would be subject to taxation under such genera) words of the statute as would
embrace the like property owned by a private corporation. This private side to
a public corporation has often been recognized in other than tax cases. Bailey
e. New York, 3 Hili, 531; 2 Denib, 433; Lloyd « New York, 5 N. Y., 369;
Storrs e. Utica, 17 id., 104; Western Fund Savings Society ». Philadelphia,
31 Penn. St., 175 ; Commissioners e. Duckett, 20 Md., 468; Detroit e. Corey,
9 Mich., 165; post, ch. XXI.
That the general power conferred upon a municipal corporation to tax, will
not authorize the taxation of state or county property, see Nashville v. Bank
of Tennessee, 1 Swan, 269 ; Piper «. Singer, 4 S. & R., 354.
1Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark., 289.. For other cases construing the constitu
tional provision, see Washington v. State, 13 Ark., 752; McGhee e. Mathis, 21
id., 40.
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States or the state and its municipalities.1 2. That exemptions of
private property would be inconsistent with the requirement of
equality and uniformity, and consequently were forbidden.2
3. That special assessments for local improvements need not be
levied by value,8 but that whatever basis was adopted, exemp
tions of property falling within the class assessed were forbidden.4
4. That the requirement of uniformity in the taxation of proper
ty was not violated by a tax on business graduated by sales.5
5. That authority to a board of supervisors to remit a tax or a
part of a tax in a specified district, would be inconsistent with
the requirement of uniformity, and consequently invalid.8 6. That
a state revenue law is not void for want of uniformity, because
of the regulations of different counties as regards enforcing col
lection of delinquent taxes being different7
Georgia. A provision that taxation on property shall be ad
valorem only, will preclude the taxation of cattle by the head.8
But the constitutional requirement of uniformity is not violated
by taxes on business.9
Illinois. The constitution prescribed that the " general assembly
shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every person
and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or
her property." Also that "the corporate authorities of counties,
townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages may be
1People v. McCreery, 34 Cal., 432. As to what is " equal and uniform " in
taxation, see People v. Whyler, 41 Cal., 351, 355, per Rhodes, Ch. J.
»Peoplee. McCreery, 34 Cal., 432; People v. Whartenby, 38 id., 461; Peo-
pie v. Eddy, 43 id., 331 ; S. C, 13 Am. Rep., 143 ; Lick v. Austin, 43 Cal., 590.
•Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal., 76; Blanding v. Burr, 13 id., 343; Emery v.
San Francisco Gas Co., 28 id., 345 ; Walsh e. Mathews, 29 id., 123 ; Crosby v.
Lyon, 37 id., 242.
4People v. S. F. & A. R. R. Co., 35 Cal., 606.
sSacramento v. Crocker, 16 Cal., 119.
•Wilson v. Supervisors of Sutter, 47 Cal., 91. (Case of a levee tax.)
7People v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 43 Cal., 398. As to equality in taxa
tion, see further, Beals v. Almador Co., 35 Cal., 624; Chambers v. Satterlce,
40 id., 497.
•Livingston e. Albany, 41 Geo., 21.
•Burch e. Savannah, 42 Geo., 596; Bohler v. Schneider, 49 id., 195; Home
Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 50 id., 530.
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vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate pur
poses, such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property
within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same." As to
these provisions it has been decided that they " were manifestly
inserted in the fundamental law for the purpose of insuring
equality in the levy and collection of the taxes to support the gov
ernment, whether levied for state, county or municipal purposes.
The design was to impose an equal proportion of these burthens
upon all persons within the limits of the district or body imposing
them. Under these provisions the legislature has no power to ex
empt or release a person or community of persons from their pro
portionate share of these burthens. Not having such power them
selves, they are unable to delegate such power to these inferior
bodies." 1 These provisions preclude discrimination in favor of
or against any classes of property or persons whatsoever ; 2 they re
quire the taxation of loans or any other credits, these being prop
erty as much as lands or chattels in possession ; 8 they do not ad-
1Walker, J., in Hunsakcr v. Wright, 30 11l., 146, 148. See Trustees e. Mc-
Connell, 12 id., 138; O'Kane v. Treat, 25 id., 557, 561; Madison County e.
People, 58 id., 456 ; Dunham v. Chicago, 55 id., 357.
* Primm e. Belleville, 5911l., 142; discrimination in favor of improvements
and of personalty ; Bureau County v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 44 id., 220 ;
Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Boone County, 44 id., 240; discrimination against
railroad property.
8Trustees v. McConnell, 12 11I., 138. In People v. Worthington, 21 id., 171,
173, Colon, Ch. J., states the rule strongly and clearly : " The constitution
means as it declares, that each shall pay a tax in proportion to the property
which he has, whether that property consists of farms or mortgages; of visi
ble substances or choses in action. It is not to be denied that this rule of
taxation must in some, nay In many instances, operate unequally and even
oppressively ; and such may be the case of the defendant here. He sells a
piece of land and gives a deed, and takes a note and a mortgage to secure the
purchase money. He is- taxed for the amount due on the mortgage, and the
purchaser is taxed for the land, and if the purchaser neglects to pay these
taxes, then the seller must do it himself or lose his security. This is a
hardship no douLt, but like many other hardships which befall mankind, it
results from the failure of another to perform his duty, and must be provided
against by grea'cr caution in selecting a purchaser, or in seeking satisfaction
of him for the taxej paid on the land. It may be true in one sense to say
that it is double taxation to tax the horse which is sold and also the note which
is given for the purchase money; and so is it to tax the note which is given
for one hundred dollars borrowed money, and also the money which is bor
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mit of residents in one part of a road district being exempted from
taxes for the roads in another part ; 1 nor of one class of counties
being taxed a higher rate for state purposes than another class
which happens to be more largely indebted for local purposes ; '
rowed; and so we might go on throughout the whole system of human trans
actions which involves a credit for things tangible which are within the state
and subject to taxation ; and even so it is if they are beyond the state, for the
presumption is that they are taxed wherever they may be. Whatever rights,
credits or choscs in action which may be taxed, are so much over and above
the money and other physical objects within the state, and are in the same
sense double taxation ; for those very credits must ultimately be paid with
those physical objects if they are ever paid. * * Although we might think
that the provisions of the constitution on the subject of taxation are unjust
and unequal, or even arbitrary and oppressive, neither the legislature nor the
courts can, for any such reason, disregard them."
1O'Kane v. Treat, 25 11l., 557. The exemption was of residents within a
municipal corporation from being taxed for roads beyond its limits butwithin
the same road district. Compare Pleasant v. Kost, 29 11l., 490, 494 ; Madison
County v. People, 58 id., 456.
3Ramsey Hoeger, Sup. Ct. 11l., 1874; 6 Chicago Legal News, 318. The
case was one of an attempt, indirectly, to saddle upon the state the local in
debtedness incurred in the aid of railroads.
One important question under the provisions of the constitution of 11linois
regarding taxation must be considered as still open. The constitution of 1870
declares that "the general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be need
ful by levying a tax by valuation so that every person and corporation shall pay
a tax in proportion to his, her or its property, * * * but the general assembly
shall have power to tax * * * persons or corporations owning or using
franchises and privileges in such manner as it shall from time to time direct
by general law, uniform as to the class upon which it operates." In as
sumed execution of this authority, the legislature of 1873 passed an act provid
ing as follows : "The capital stock of all companies, now or hereafter cre
ated under the laws of this state shall be so valued by the state board of
equalization as to ascertain and determine respectively the fair cash value of
such capital stock, including the franchise, over and above the assessed value
of the tangible property of such company or association. Said board shall
adopt such rules and principles 'or ascertaining the fair cash value of such cap
ital stock as to it may seem equitable and just, and such rules and principles,
when so adopted, if not inconsistent with this act, shall be as binding and of
the same effect as if contained in this act, subject, however, to such changes,
alterations or amendments as may be found from time to time to be necessary
by said board ; provided, that in all cases where the tangible property or capi
tal stock of any such company or association is assessed under this act, the
shares of capital stock of any such company or association shall not be as
sessed in this state." Under this law the state board of equalization adopted
the following resolution:
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but they do not preclude taxes being laid on other subjects than
property by some other ptandard than that of value, and conse-
" Resolved, That for the purposes of ascertaining the fair cash value of the
capital stock including the franchises of all companies and associations, now
or hereafter created under the laws of this state, or for the assessment of the
same, or so much thereof as may be found to be in excess of the assessed or
equalized value of the tangible property of such companies and associations,
respectively, we, the state board of equalization, hereby adopt the following
rules and principles, viz:
" 1. The market or fair cosh value of shares of capital stock, and the market
or fair cash value of the debt, excluding indebtedness for current expen
ses, shall be combined or added together, and the aggregate amount so ascer
tained shall be taken and held to be the fair cash value of the capital stock, in
cluding the franchises, respectively, of such companies and associations.
"2. From the aggregate amount, ascertained as aforesaid, there shall be
deducted the aggregate amount of the equalized or assessed valuation of all the
tangible property, respectively, of such companies and associations; such
equalized or assessed valuation being taken in each case, as the same may be
determined by the equalization or assessment of property by the board, and
the amount remaining in each case, if any, shall be taken and held to be the
amount and fair cash value of the capital stock, including the franchise, which
this board is required by law to assess, respectively, against companies and
corporations now or hereafter created under the laws of this state."
The supreme court of the state sustained this assessment, not, however, pass"
mg upon the question of its fairness or justice, which they expressly disclaimed
the right to do, but conceding to the state board of equalization the right to arrive
at the valuation by any such rules as they should devise, which seemed to them
calculated to reaeh the proper result. As the assessment made under these
rules would be of the whole value of the franchise as if no indebtedness exis
ted, there would manifestly be in the case what would be equivalent to double
taxation ; but as in valuing individual property under the luws of 11linois,
debts are not deducted, this was no more than would exist in other cases,
and the court attach importance to this fact as bearing upon the competency
of the board to establish such rules. It is to be observed, however, that the
law provided for assessing " the fair cash value of such capital stock includ-
ing the franchise." A franchise may have a distinct value by itself irrespect
ive of any debts that may be owing by the corporation or person possessing
it
,
as a farm may have irrespective of the mortgage upon it; but there is cer
tainly some difficulty in understanding how the capital stock of a corporation
can be valued without taking into account its indebtedness, or how, if the
corporation owes so much that its capital stock is absolutely worth nothing,
and could be sold for nothing, it could have for any legal purpose a "fair
cash value " given it by taking as the measure of its value that which ren
ders it valueless. It may be that if, by enforcing the debt, the capital stock
should become the property of the creditors, it would then have a value equal
to the previous value of the debt; but this would be by the substitution of
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quently, -taxes on polls are not unconstitutional.1 Neither do
they take from the legislature the power to commute for taxes, re
ceiving instead what they shall regard as an equivalent.2
Indiana. The constitution provides that " the general assem
bly shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of assess
ment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and
personal, excepting such only for municipal, educational, literary,
scientific, religious or charitable purposes as may be specially ex
empted by law." It also provides that "the general assembly
shall not pass local or special laws" "for the assessment and col
lection of taxes for state, county, township or road purposes."
Of these provisions it has been said, they " do not prohibit local
taxation for objects in themselves local. They require a general,
uniform levy for state purposes, but they do not forbid local tax
ation under general laws. Nor do we think they prohibit indirect
taxation by way of licenses upon particular pursuits, etc. Such
indirect taxation may be made effectual as a police regulation.
The taxing, which is a part of the legislative power of the state,
is supreme, except where limitations are imposed. Indirect taxa
tion, by way of tariffs, etc., has ever been regarded a legitimate
exercise of the taxing power, and we do not think a provision in
the constitution requiring the general levy of direct taxes for
state purposes to be upon a uniform assessment, implies a pro
hibition of all other taxation. Such, at all events, is not the
conventional force of its language."8
one thing of value for another. Before that time, certainly, the debt is no part
of the capital stock. In these remarks no question is made of the correctness
of the decision of the supreme court, which is certainly able and plausible.
The opinion is given in full in 6 Chicago Legal News, 319. The federal
circuit court for the same circuit held the assessment void, and it is believed
the question is now in the United States Supreme Court.
1Sawyer v. Alton, 3 Scam., 127. This case arose under an earlier constitu
tion, but the provisions were substantially the same.
»11linois Central R. R. Co. v. McLean County, 17 11l., 291, where an ad va
lorem tax was commuted for a percentage of gross receipts. And see State
Bank v. People, 4 Scam., 303; Hunsaker v. Wright, 30 11l., 146.
1Perkins, J., in Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind., 199, citing La Fay.
ette v. Jenncrs, 10 id., 70, 75; The Bank v. New Albany, 11 id., 139; Walk.
Am. Law, 3d ed., p. 122; Aurora v. West., 9 Ind., 74. To the same effect is
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Nor do these provisions require the rate of assessment to he
equal for all purposes throughout the state, but only to be equal
and uniform throughout the district for which the tax is levied.1
Nor do they preclude the legislature making exemptions,2 but
they do preclude the levy of a specific tax on one species of
property for any public purpose ; for example, a specific tax by
the acre on real estate for highway purposes.8
Ioiva. The constitution provides that " the property of all cor
porations for pecuniary profit, now existing or hereafter created,
shall be subject to taxation the same as that of individuals."
This provision would preclude exemptions of corporate property
from taxation, and consequently would require the court, in any
doubtful case, to construe a revenue law as not intending such an
exemption.4
Louisiana. A provision that "taxation shall be equal and uni
form throughout the state" will not preclude the legislature au
thorizing the taxation of callings, trades and professions. The
taxation will be equal and uniform if all persons in the same
calling, trade or profession within the taxing district are taxed
alike.5 But it would preclude a discrimination as between those
carrying on the same business,6 and it would preclude a specific
Bright e. McCullough, 27 Ind., 223, in which the authorities are reviewed by
Elliott, J.
1Adamson e. Auditor of Warren County, 9 Ind., 174; Conwell e. O'Brien, 11
id., 419 ; Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Auditor of Warren County, 14 id., 331 ;
Bright v. McCulloch, 27 id., 223.
»Bank of the State v. New Albany, 11 Ind., 139. See Bank of Conners-
villc v. State, 16 id., 105 ; King e. Madison, 17 id., 48.
»Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind., 223.
4Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster County, 21 Iowa, 221. If we understand
correctly the case of Dubuque, etc., R. R. Co. v. Webster County, 21 id., 235,
the provision above quoted would not prevent a taxation of corporations on
their gross re«eipts in lieu of taxation on property.
5Municipality v. Dubois, 10 La. An., 56 ; New. Orleans v. The Bank, id., 735 ;
New Orleans v. Staiger, 11 id., 68; New Orlfcans v. South Bank, id., 41 ; New
Orleans v. Turpin, 13 id., 56; Merriam e. New Orleans, 14 id., 318; State v.
Volkman, 20 id., 585; Hodgson v. New Orleans, 21 id., 301. The doctrine ap
plied to the case of license fees for theatrical and other exhibitions. Charity
Hospital v. Stickney, 2 id., 550 ; Municipality v. Duncan, id., 182.
•New Orleans v. Home Ins. Co., 23 La. An. 449.
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tax on any species of property, the value of which is not uni
form, as, for example, a specific tax on cotton by the pound.1
Maryland. The constitution ordains that "the county com
missioners shall exercise such powers and duties only as the legis
lature may from time to time prescribe ; but such powers and du
ties, and the tenure of office shall be uniform throughout the
state." Where the legislature made provision by law for the
levy of a tax, by the county commissioners of a single county,
for the support of public schools therein, the objection to this
legislation, that it gave powers to and 'imposed duties on the com
missioners of that county which were peculiar and exceptional,
was held not to be well taken. It was not the purpose of the
constitution that all local regulations should be the same in all
parts of the state, or that every locality should levy taxes for the
same objects and no others, or that the county commissioners
should exercise their uniform powers on precisely the same sub
jects. And this legislation was not to be regarded as giving ex
ceptional authority, but as requiring a special exercise, in one
county, of the uniform power to tax which the commissioners
possessed in all the counties.2
TBims v. Jackson, 22 La. An., 440. See Livingston v. Albany, 41 Geo., 21,
for the same principle. Also, State e. Endom, 23 La. An., 663, in which it
was decided that a specific tax on drays, wagons, carriages, etc., in proportion
to the number of animals drawing them, was forbidden as not being a uni
form tax on the business which was taxed. A law which should make no dis
crimination in the taxation of business, we should say would in some cases,
produce the grossest injustice and inequality; and it may be seriously ques
tioned whether the requirement of uniformity in the taxation of business
could be understood as forbidding the classification of those engaged in the
business; for example, underwriters, by the business done or preminms re
ceived ; merchants, by the capital invested or sales made, etc. ; and the appor
tionment of taxes accordingly.
»Bowie, Ch. J., in Commissioners of Public Schools v. Commissioners of
Allegany County, 20 Md., 449, 457, 458. As the decision is of very general
application, we copy from it:
" It is said, there is no law conferring on the commissioners of the counties
generally, power to make provision for public schools, and therefore the act
of Allegany county is special, local, unequal, contrary to the letter and spirit
of the constitution, which designed that all parts of the state should be sub-
ject to the same taxation for the same objects.
"When the organic law imposed this feature of uniformity upon county
commissioners and other county officers, it cannot be supposed it was designed
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Massachusetts. The constitutional provision that the legislature
shall only impose proportional and reasonable taxes is not violated
by permitting a town in which a state agricultural college is
located, to levy a tax to pay an exceptional portion of the cost of
erecting buildings for such college.1
Michigan. The provision that " the legislature shall provide
a uniform rule of taxation, except on property paying specific
taxes, and taxes shall be levied on such property as shall be pre-
to ignore the varieties of situation and condition of the people of the several
counties, and the different institutions established among them. The levy
courts for which the county commissioners were substituted, had exer
cised, from the organization of the state government, the power of levying
taxes for every local purpose which the peculiar wants of each county might
require, under the sanction of general or special acts of legislation.
" The legislation of the state exhibits various systems of internal regulation
in respect to roads, schools, paupers and criminal trials, in the several coun
ties, all of which ultimately involve the exercise of the power of taxation.
Some of these systems, since the adoption of the new constitution, have been
codified as part of the public local law of the state. If the position assumed
in this case be correct, the laws requiring provision for the support of the
poor, repairs of county roads, or the support of paupers, which are not uni
form throughout the state, and require the levying of taxes for such purposes,
are ipso fa«to void, because not within the powers legitimately granted by
the constitution.
" Uniformity of power does not necessarily imply identity of purpose or ob
ject. The difference between power and object is, that the one is an attribute,
faculty or means; the other an end or fact to be accomplished. Power is
general, object is special. As in mechanics, the motive power may be applied
to an almost infinite variety of uses; so in politics, the power of taxation,
which is the great motor of government, may be exercised for the promotion of
every object of society, among the chief and noblest of which is
,
the diffusion
of knowledge and- the education of the people.
"The 'power to levy all needful taxes, and to pay and discharge all claims
on or against the county which have been expressly or impliedly authorized
by law ' (conferred by art. 28, § 3
,
Code of Maryland), conveys authority and
imposes the duty of providing for any local object sanctioned by the legisla
ture. * * In this instance, the commissioners of the county are not
left to inference as to their duty and obligation to exercise the power of
taxation, but are expressly enjoined to exert it for the most salutary pub
lic purposes. The power here called into requisition is uniformly vested
in the commissioners of all the counties in the state, as is indicated in the
public general laws. Its application to various specific objects is shown by
the public local laws."
1 Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen, 498.
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scribed by law ;" also that " all assessments hereafter authorized
shall be on property at its cash value," do not preclude a taxation
of business as such, although the property employed in the busi
ness is also taxed.1
Minnesota. The constitution provides that "all property on
which taxes are to be levied shall have a cash valuation, and be
equalized and uniform throughout the state." It is not compe
tent where equality and uniformity are required to impose a tax
exclusively upon one subdivision of the state to pay a claim or
indebtedness which is not peculiarly the debt of such subdivision,
or to raise money for any purpose not peculiarly beneficial to such
subdivision.2
Missouri. A constitutional requirement that taxation shall be
uniform, and shall be levied on property in proportion to its value,
is not violated by the taxation of income and salaries. The pur
pose of it is to make the burdens of government rest on all prop
erty alike; to forbid favoritism and prevent inequality. Outside
of this constitutional restriction, the legislature must be the sole
judge of the propriety of taxation, and define the sources of rev
enue as the exigencies of the occasion may require.8
1Walcott v. People, 17 Mich., 68 ; Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 26 id., 325.
* Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn., 273. That the provision would preclude penal-
ties for failure to list property for taxation, see McCormick v. Fitch, 14 id., 252.
8Glascow v. Rouse, 43 Mo., 479, 489. There is a summary of the doctrine of
the courts in this case by Wagner, J., which is deserving of being copied at
length :
" That taxes should be uniform, and levied in proportion to the value of the
property to be taxed, is so manifestly just that it commends itself to universal
assent But, notwithstanding the constitutional provision, there are some
kinds of taxes that are not usually assessed according to the value of property,
and some which could not be thus assessed ; and there is perhaps not a state
in the Union, though many of them have in substance the same constitutional
provision, which does not levy other taxes than those imposed on property.
" Every burden which the state imposes upon its citizens with a view to
revenue, to carry on the operations of the state government, or for the support
ofmunicipal corporations, is a branch of the power of taxation, whether im
posed under the name of a tax or some other designation. The license fees
which are sometimes required of those who pursue particular employments
are, when imposed for revenue, taxes. Lawyers and physicians may be com
pelled to pay a license for practicing their professions, for the purpose of rev
enue ; and although not levied on property, it is still a tax. Stamp duties are
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Ohio. The constitution provides that " laws shall be passed
taxing by a uniform rule all moneys, credits, investments in
bonds, stocks, joint stock companies or otherwise ; and also all
real and personal property according to its true value in money ;
taxes. It is customary to require that corporations shall pay a certain sum
annually, in proportion to their capital stock paid in, or by some other stand
ard, which is generally fixed for mere convenience. It therefore seems plain
that the constitutional requirement that ' taxation upon property shall be in
proportion to its value,' does not include every species of taxation ; nor, in
deed, would it be possible to place such an interpretation upon it without
doing the grossest injustice.
'-A very large proportion of revenue is derived from other sources than a
direct levy on property, and the doctrine contended for would release the
former and throw the whole burden upon the latter. In cases of municipal
corporations, a different construction has always prevailed. Assessments for
the opening, making, improving, or repairing streets, the draining of swamps,
the throwing up of levees, and the like local works, have been usually made
upon property with some reference to benefits which it was supposed the
property would receive.
" The requirement that property should be taxed in proportion to its value,
applies as much to these local assessments as any other species of taxes. The
local authorities have only such power as is delegated to them by the state,
and the state can confer no power against the prohibitions of the constitution.
"There are three general classes of direct taxes: capitation, having effect
solely upon persons; ad valorem, having effect solely upon property; and in-
come, having a mixed effect upon persons and property.
" The argument of the plaintiff's counsel proceeds on the hypothesis that
every species of tax comes within the constitutional prohibition. This is a
mistake. The whole practice of the state has been different, and it has never
been challenged, nor could it be, on legal principles. The statutes provide
for a poll tax, which is in violation of the ad valorem rule, and is unequal, yet it
is clearly within the constitution. A license is imposed upon shows, peddlers',
auctioneers, dram shops and billiard tables, all of which taxes are in violation
of the ad valorem principle, but not therefore unconstitutional. The taxes im
posed are uniform as to the particular classes, but not in proportion to the
taxes assessed on other property.
"The constitution enjoins a uniform rule as to the imposition of taxes od
all property, but does not abridge the power of the legislature to provide fot
a revenue from other sources. It was intended to make the burdens of gov
ernment rest on all property alike — to forbid favoritism and prevent inequal
ity. Outside of the constitutional restriction, the legislature must be the solo
judge of the propriety of taxation, and define the sources of revenue as the
exigency of the occasion may require. The income tax was uniform and
equal as to the classes upon which it operated ; it did not come within the
meaning of the term ' property,' as used and designated in the constitution,
and I think it was not in confl ict with any provision of that instrument."
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but burying grounds, public school houses, houses used exclu
sively for public worship, institutions of purely public charity,
public property used exclusively for any public purpose, and per
sonal property to an amount not exceeding in value two hundred
dollars for each individual, may, by general laws, be exempted
from taxation," etc. This provision renders it imperative that all
the property of which exemption is not permitted by it shall be
taxed, and precludes any other exemptions than those indicated,
as well when the tax is for a municipal purpose as when it is
levied for a state purpose.1
It also precludes the debts of the tax payer being deducted
from the value of his property ; this being inconsistent with the
requirement that all property shall be taxed.2 But it does not
preclude the taxation of business, as such, the licensing of stores,
etc.8
Tennessee. A constitutional provision that "all property shall
be taxed according to its value," and that " no one species of
property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed
1Zanesville v. Richards, 5 Ohio, X. S., 589. See Hill e. Higdon, 5 id.,
243, 246. Inthe case first cited Ranney, Ch. J., says: " Before the adop
tion of the present constitution, the whole matter of taxation was commit
ted to the discretion of the general assembly. It might be levied upon such
property and in such proportion, as the body saw tit. The right to make ex
ceptions and exemptions, was unquestionable. But this discretion no longer
exists. The public burdens are made to rest upon the property of the state,
and whenever money is to be raised by taxation, the positive injunction is,
that' laws shall be passed, taxing by an uniform rule, all moneys, credits, in
vestments in bonds, stocks, joint stock companies, or otherwise; and also
all real and personal property, according to its true value in money.' With
out express authority of law, no tax, either for state, county, township or cor
poration purposes can be levied, and we see no reason to doubt that this sec
tion of the constitution is equally applicable to, and furnishes the governing
principle for, all laws authorizing taxes t« be levied for either purpose. The
great object of the provision was to secure equality and uniformity in the im
position of these public burdens. The convention was very well aware that
much the largest part would be required to answer the purposes of these n
local subdivisions; and equally well that it could only be levied as the gen
eral assembly should provide."
* Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3 Ohio, N. S., 1. Obligations for the pay
ment of money are to be taxed by value, and if of no value, are not taxable.
Id.
» Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio, N. S., 534.
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higher than any species of property of equal value," has no
reference to the taxation of privileges, and such taxation is in
the discretion of the legislature. It is therefore competent to
authorize a town to levy license taxes on the various occupations
carried on therein.1
Virginia. The requirement that taxation shall be equal and
uniform does not preclude the state from authorizing a county to
levy a tax on a county office,2 nor does it require the license taxes
on privileges or occupations to be equal or uniform.8 On this
last point the decision in West Virginia is to the contrary.*
Wisconsin. The constitutional provision that "the rule of tax
ation shall be uniform" extends to taxation by cities, towns and
counties, as well as that levied by the state.8 It does not pre
clude license taxes under the police power.6 And the state hav
ing for a long period been in the practice of collecting speci6c
taxes from corporations in lieu of the taxes on property levied gen
erally, it was decided against the opinion of the judges, that
such specific taxes were not in violation of the constitutional re
quirement of uniformity.7
The general right to make exemptions. It remains to see
"what is the rule regarding exemptions, where none is prescribed
by the state constitution.
1Adams v. Somerville, 2 Head, 363 ; State v. Crawford, 2 id., 460.
* Gilkerson v. Frederick Justices, 13 Grat., 577. See also Gordon's Execu
tors e. Baltimore, 5Gill, 231. Compare Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. e. Hille-
gas, 18 N. J., 11 ; Same e. Commissioner of Appeals, 18 id., 71, and Gardner
e. State, 21 id., 557, in which a provision in a charter that the corporation
should pay a certain tax, "and no other tax or impost shall be levied or as
sessed " upon it, was held to apply to county and town taxes as well as those
imposed for state purposes.
8 Slaughter e. Commonwealth, 13 Grat., 767.
* Franklin Ins. Co. v. State, 5 W. Va., 349. This case is referred to, ante, p
129.
* Knowlton e. Supervisors of Rock Co., 9 Wis., 410; Hale e. Kenosha, 29
id., 599 ; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510.
•Carter e. Dow, 16 Wis., 298 (dog license); Tenney e. Lenz, id., 566; Fire
Department e. Helfenstein, id., 136.
' Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis., 454, overruling Attorney General v.
Plankroad Co., 11 id., 35.
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The exemptions commonly made by express statute are based
upon reasons so forcible tbat they have seldom been contested.
"We refer now to the exemptions of tools of trade ; of the limited
personal property of very poor persons ; the property of corpora
tions or associations devoted exclusively to the work of public
charity, or in other directions where what they accomplish ope
rates in the relief of public burdens, and the like. Exemptions of
the property of .re1igious societies, and of persons or corporations
engaged in instruction, have not passed unchallenged on the score
of right and policy ; but the power to make them is unquestioned.
And upon the general subject of exemptions, the following rules
are deduced from the authorities :
1. The general right to make exemptions is involved in the
right to apportion taxes, and must be understood to exist wher
ever it is not forbidden.1 The right is supposed to be exercised
on reasons of state policy, and presumptively such exemptions
contribute to the general public benefit.8
2. Exemptions thus granted on considerations of public policy,
may be recalled whenever the legislative view of public policy
shall have changed. To the individuals, corporations or associa
tions benefited by them, they are to be regarded as favors or
privileges merely, to continue during the pleasure of the sover
eignty, and there can be no breach of faith — certainly no want
of power — in terminating them at anytime. Cases illustrative
of this principl e are cited on a previous page.8
1Butler's Appeal, 73 Penn. St., 448. See People v. Colman, 4 Cal., 46 ; State
«. North, 27 Mo, 464; Hill e. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. S., 243; State v. Parker, 8$
N. J., 312; Indianapolis v. Sturdevant, 24 Ind., 391.
* The homestead is sometimes exempted, and when it is
, if it is taxed with
the tract of which it forms a part, the sale of the whole for taxes is void.
Penne. Clemans, 19 Iowa, 372, 374; Stewart v. Corbin, 25 id., 144. An ex.
emption from taxation of all property employed in manufactures, was assumed
to be valid in Gardiner C & W. Factory Co. v. Gardiner, 5 Greenl., 133. New
York once had a statute which exempted from taxation the buildings, ma
chinery and manufactured articles in the hands of the manufacturer of every
cotton, woolen or linen manufactory within the state. See Columbian Manf.
Co. «. Vanderpool, 4 Cow., 556. Such exemptions are much less questionable
and much less pernicious than would be an exemption of the property of a
portion only of those engaged in a particular manufacture, leaving those with
whom they would compete to pay taxes.
J Ante, p. 54. See in addition to cases there cited, Hospital v. Philadelphia,
10
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3. The intention to exempt must in any case be expressed in
clear and unambiguous terms ; taxation is the rule, exemption is
the exception.1
4. All exemptions are to be strictly construed. They embrace
only what is within their terms. This general rule has many
24 Penn. St., 229 ; Commonwealth e. Fayette, etc., R. R. Co., 55 id., 452 ;
Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H., 138 ; St. Joseph e. Railroad Co., 39 Mo., 476 ; State
v. Dulle, 48 id., 282; Tomlinson «. Jessup, 15 Wall., 454. When officers have
power by law to make exemptions in special cases, if they refuse to make one,
the party concerned is without remedy unless an appeal is given by law.
Clinton School District's Appeal, 56 Penn. St., 315. Such a power is only
admissible where an examination into facts is essential in order to determine
whether the case is within the general rule of exemption which is prescribed
by law. A general power to exempt property from taxation cannot be con
ferred by the legislature even upon a municipal corporation. Brewer Brick
Co. e. Brewer, recently decided by the supreme court of Maine.
1See ante, pp. 52-56, and" cases cited in the notes. " Taxation is an act of sov
ereignty to be performed, so far as it conveniently can be, with justice and
equality to all. Exemptions, no matter how meritorious, are of grace, and
must be strictly construed." This was said in a case where the court felt
compelled to hold that a married woman was subject to a tax for the raising
of bounty moneys, though her husband was actually in the military service.
Crawford v. Burrell, 53 Penn. St., 219, 220. See also Lord Colchester Kcwney,
Law R., 1 Exch., 368; Piatt e. Rice, 10 Watts, 352; Providence Bank v. Bil
lings, 4 Pet., 514; Minot v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., or The Delaware Rail
road Tax, 18 Wall., 206; Trask v. Maguire, id., 391; Gsrdon e. Baltimore, 5
Gill, 231; Howell v. Maryland, 3 id., 14; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md., 376;
Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co. v. Shacklett, 30 Mo., 550; Washington University e.
Rouse, 42 id., 308; Pacific R. R. Co. v. Cass County, 53 id., 17; Stewarte. Da
vis, 3 Murphy, 244; State e. Town Council, 12 Rich. Law, 339; Anderson v.
State, 23 Miss., 459; B. & O. R. R. Co. e. Marshall County, 3W. Va., 319;
Samee. Wheeling, id., 372; State v. Bank of Smyrna, 2 Houston, 99; Muni
cipality v. Railroad Co., 10 Rob. (La.), 187 ; Louis. Canal Co. v. Commonwealth,
7 B. Monr., 160 ; St. Peters Church v. Scott County, 12 Minn., 395 ; Portland, S.
& P. R. R. Co. x. City of Saco, 60 Me., 196; State v. Parker, 32 N. J., 426;
Hart v. Plum, 14 Cal., 148; People v. Whyler, 41 id., 351; Biscoe v. Coulter,
18 Ark., 423 ; Harvard College v. Boston, 104 Mass., 470, 475 ; Orr v. Baker, 4
Ind., 86; City of Indianapolis v. McLean, 8 id., 328; City of Madison v.
Fitch, 18 id., 33; Methodist Church «. Ellis, 38 id.^3; Washburn College«
Shawnee County. 8 Kans., 344; "Vail v. Beach, 10 id., 214; St. Mary's College
e. Crowl, 10 id., 442 ; Miami County v. Brackenridge, 12 id., 114; No. Mo. R.
R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall., 46. A general law on the subject of taxation,
manifestly intended as a revision of all laws on the subject, operates to repeal
the previous exemptions which it does not in terms renew. Columbian Manf.
Co. e. Vanderpool, 4 Cow., 556; Fox's Adm'rs v. Commonwealth, 16 Crat., 1.
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illustrations, one of the most striking of which is found in the
case of exemption of church and school property. The general
exemption of such property from taxation, it is held, will not
exempt them from special assessment for local improvements,
such as the paving and repair of the streets on which they stand,
and the like. In the leading case, the words of the exemption
were, that no church or place of public worship " should be taxed
by any law of this state." Upon this the court remarked : "The
word taxes means burdens, charges or impositions, put or set upon
persons or property for public uses ; and this is the definition
which Lord Coke gives of the word talliage, 2 Inst., 232 ; and
Lord Holt in Carth., 438, gives the same definition in substance
of the word tax. The legislature intended by that exemption to
relieve religious and literary institutions from these public bur
dens, and the same exemption was extended to the real estate
of any minister not exceeding in value fifteen hundred dollars.
But to pay for the opening of a street in the ratio of the benefit
or advantage derived from it is no burden. It is no talliage or
tax within the meaning of the exemption, and has no claim upon
the public benevolence. Why should not the real estate of a
minister as well as of other persons pay for such an improvement
in proportion as it is benefited ? There is no inconvenience or
hardship in it, and the maxim of law, that qui sentit commodum
debet sentire onvs, is perfectly consistent with the interests of
science and religion." 1 And yet these assessments are a legal exer-
1 Matter of Mayor, etc., of New York, 11 Johns., 77; Bleeckere. Ballou, 3
Wend., 263 ; Chegaray t. Jenkins, 3 Sandf., 409 ; People v. Roper, 35 N. Y., 629 ;
Buffalo City Cemetery v. Buffalo, 46 id., 506; Northern Liberties v. St. Johns
Church, 13 Penn. St., 104; Crawford v. Burrell, 53 id., 219, 220; Second Uni-
versalist Society e. Providence, 6 R. I.
,
235; Matter of College St., 8 id., 474;
Patterson v. Society, etc., 24 N. J., 385; State v. Robertson, id., 504; State
v. Newark, 27 id., 185 ; State v. Mills, 34 id., 177 ; State v. Newark, 35 id., 157 ;
S. C, 10 Am. Rep., 223; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush, 508;
S. C, 8 Am. Rep., 480; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 383, 396; Baltimore
e. Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517; LeFevre v. Detroit, 2 Mich., 586; Kendrick e.
Farquar, 8 Ohio, 189, 197; Armstrong v. Treasurer of Athens County, 10 id.,
235; Cincinnati College v. State, 19 id., 110; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H.,
138 ; Seymour v. Hartford, 21 Conn., 481 ; Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co.,
36 id., 255; First Presbyterian Church v. Fort Wayne, 36 Ind., 338; B.C,
10 Am. Rep., 35; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind., 329; Trustees of Church v. Ellis,
38 id., 3 ; Bank of Republic e. Hamilton, 21 11l., 53 ; Canal Trustees v. Chi
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cise of the taxing power, and can only be justified on that
cago, 12 id., 403; Chicago e. Colby, 20 id., 614; McBride v. Chicago, 22 id.,
574; Peoria v. Kidder, 26 id., 351; Pteasant v. Kost, 29 id., 490, 494; Paine v.
Spratlcy, 5 Knns., 525; Orange & Alexandria R. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 17
Gratt., 176; Crowley v. Copeley, 2 La. An.,' 329; La Payette v. Orphan Asylum,
4 id., 1; Rooney v. Brown, 21 id., 51; St. Louis Public Schools v. St. Louis,
26 Mo., 468; Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 id., 155; S. C, 11 Am.
Rep., 412 ; Lockwood e. St. Louis, 24 ,Mo., 20 (sewer tax) ; Emery v. Gas Co.,
28 Cal. 315; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 id., 240; Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis., 599;
Seamen's Friend Society e. Boston, 116 Mass., 181 ; Agricultural Society v.
Worcester, id., 189. The real estate belonging to the board of public schools
of the city of St. Louis, is liable to be assessed under and by virtue of the
ordinances of the city of St. Louis, for the construction of sewers, paving of
sidewalks, opening of streets, etc. St. Louis Public Schools v. City of St . Louis,
26 Mo., 468.
Seme of the exemptions in these cases seem very strong and comprehensive,
but they were generally applied only to the customary taxes. The following
instances may be given : In Baltimore v. Cemetery Company, an exemption
from " any tax or public imposition whatever " was held to apply only to
"taxes or impositions levied or imposed for the purpose of revenue," and not
to relieve the cemetery from " such charges as are inseparably incident to
its location in regard to other property;" e. g., an assessment for paving the
street in front. In Buffalo City Cemetery v. Buffalo, 46 N. Y., 506, where the
cemetery was by law exempt from "all public taxes, rates and assessments,"
it was held not exempt from a paving assessment Folger, J., says: "We
think that the current of authorities in this and some of the sister states runs
to this result: that public taxes, rates and assessments, are those which arc
levied and taken out of the property of the person assessed, for some public
or general use or purpose, in which he has no direct, immediate and peculiar
interest; being exactions from him towards the expense of carrying on the
government, either directly and, in general, that of the whole commonwealth,
or more mediately and particularly through the intervention of municipal
corporations; and that those charges and impositions which are laid directly
upon the property in a circumscribed locality, to effect some work of local
convenience, which in its result is of peculiar advantage and importance to
the property, especially assessed for the expense of it
,
are not public but are
local and private so far as this statute is concerned." In Patterson v. Society,
etc., 24 N. J., 385, the exemption was from " taxes, charges and impositions ; "
but it was held not to extend to an assessment for grading and paving a street.
In State v. Newark, 27 N. J., 185, the exemption was from " charges and im
positions," and the same ruling was had. In Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R.
R. Co., 36 Coun., 255, the railroad company paid a tax which, by its charter,
was to be " in lieu of all other taxes;" but the company was, nevertheless,
held liable to a street assessment.
These cases show that the general inclination has been to confine the appli
cation of all such general language to the taxes imposed for ordinary revenue.
But in Massachusetts it has been held that an assessment for altering a street
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ground.1 It is sometimes a matter of great nicety to determine
how far a general or even a qualified exemption from taxation
extends, in the case of a corporation which employs its means or
some portion thereof in the purchase of property not required for
is a civil imposition within the meaning of a college charter exempting the
college property from " all civil impositions, taxes and rates." Harvard Col
lege v. Boston, 104 Mass., 470.
1People e. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419 ; Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76 ; Patterson e.
Society, etc., 24 N. J., 385 ; State e. Fuller, 34 id., 227 ; State e. Newark, 35 id.,
168, 171; Weeks e. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 242; Motz e. Detroit, 18 Mich., 495;
Baltimore v. Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517; Glascow v. Rouse, 43 Mo., 479,489;
McComb v. Bell, 2 Minn., 295; Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 Penn. St., 69;
Walsh e. Mathews, 29 Cal., 123 ; Chambers e. Satterlee, 40 id., 497 ; Yeatman
v. Crandall, 11 La. An., 220; Matter of Opening of Streets, 20 id., 497; Reeves
e. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, N. S., 333; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kans.,
186.
An exemption from " all taxes and assessment3" held to exempt from assess
ments for benefits, as well as from general taxes. State v. Newark, 36 N. J.,
478; S. C, 13 Am. Rep., 464. Compare Patterson v. Society, etc., 24 N. J., 385 ;
Oswald v. Gilfert, 11 Johns., 443; Codman v. Johnson, 104 Mass., 491. The
following cases of exemptions maybe specially mentioned: An exemption
from a state tax will not preclude the levy of a tax by a city. Martin v.
Charleston, 13 Rich. Eq., 50. An exemption of charitable societies from tax
ation, held to embrace the case of a masonic grand lodge, which for fifty
years had not been taxed, this neglect to tax being regarded as having fixed
the construction of the exemption. State v. Addison, 2 S. Car., N. S., 499. An
exemption of universities, colleges, academies and school houses, held not
to extend to an academy of fine arts, " as none can claim an exemption unless
the exemption be so clearly expressed in the statute as to admit of no other
construction." Academy of Fine Arts v. Philadelphia, 22 Penn. St., 496. The
exemption from taxation of the property of soldiers in actual service will not
exempt from a tax actually imposed before the soldier enlisted. Tobin v.
Morgan, 70 id., 229. An exemption of "all houses of religious worship and
the pews and furniture within the same," will exempt only that part of a
building occupied for religious worship, and if other portions are leased for
business purposes, they are taxable. Proprietors v. Lowell, 1 Met., 538. An
exemption of such real estate of literary and scientific institutions "as shall
be actually occupied by them, or by the officers of such institutions for the
purposes for which they were incorporated," held not to extend to a house
built on the real estate of Harvard College and leased by the corporation to
one of the professors for a dwelling; the occupation of a lessee not being
such an occupation as was intended by the statute. Pierce v. Cambridge, 2
Cush., 611. The same exemption held applicable to a farm and the farming
stock owned by an educational institution, and by it worked solely to raise
produce and do team work for a boarding house kept to supply students with
board at cost. Wesleyan Academy v. Wilbraham, 99 Mass., 599. Compare
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the purposes for which its corporate privileges were conferred,
though capable, perhaps, of being made useful and profitable as
an aid in its corporate business. The question is
,
in each instance,
whether such property, in the manner in which it has been in-
State v. Ross, 24 N. J., 44)7. Under an exemption of school buildings, a build
ing occupied in part for a school and in part for other purposes is not exempt.
Wyman e. St. Louis, 17 Mo., 335. An exemption of every school house and
every building erected for the use of a college, incorporated academy or other
seminary of learning, held not to embrace a building used and occupied for
a private boarding school. Chegaray e. New York, 13 N. Y., 220. To the same
effect is State v. Ross, 24 N. J., 497. See a peculiar case, Mass. General H'os-
pital e. Somervillc, 101 Mass., 319. Bequests to colleges, etc., held to be taxa
ble under the general statute taxing bequests, though after being received they
would be exempt under a general provision exempting the property of such
institutions. Barringer v. Cowan, 2 Jones' Eq., 436. Exemption from "taxa
tion of every kind " does not exempt from an assessment for street improve
ments. Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo., 155. Compare Dunleith,
etc., Bridge Co. v. Dubuque, 32 la., 427 ; Brightman v. Kirner, 22 Wis., 54.
Exemption of the stock of a railway company from taxation held to include
all property necessary and proper for the purpose of laying, building and
sustaining the road. Ordinary of Bibb County e. Central R. R. Co., 40 Geo.,
646. Where the shares of stock in a corporation were exempt from taxation,
the property of the corporation was held to bt exempt also. Baltimore e. B.
& O. R. R. Co., 6 Gill, 288. See State e. Brmin, 23 N. J., 484. A specific
state tax on a railroad company held to preclude taxation of its property by
valuation. Camden & Amboy R. K. Co. v. Commissioners, 18 id., 11. And
see State v. Cook, 32 id., 338; Cook e. State, 33 id., 472; Douglass e. State, 34
id., 485. A branch road to procure gravel held liable to ordinary taxation.
State v. Hancock, 33 id., 315. Compare State v. Hancock, 35 id., 537. A provis
ion in a railroad charter was that " all machines, wagons, vehicles or carriages,
belonging to the company, with all its works and all the property which may
accrue from the same, shall be vested in the respective shareholders forever,
in proportion to their respective shares, and shall be deemed personal estate, and
exempt from any charge or tax whatever." This makes all the property of
the company, owned and used for its purposes, personal estate and exempt.
A city in which the company owns property cannot dispute this exemption
on the ground of its lessening its power to pay its debts. Richmond v. Rich
mond & Danville R. R. Co., 21 Grat., 604. General exemption of the property
of a corporation from taxation construed to include the franchi3e. Witming
ton R. R. Co. v. Reid, 13Wall., 264; Raleigh, etc., Railroad Co. v. Reid, 13 id.,
269; State v. Berry, 17 N. J., 80; Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Hillegas, 18
id., 11; Same v. Commissioners of Appeal, id., 71. An exemption of the
" stock " of a corporation is an exemption of its gross income also, it being
but an accessory to the stock. State v. Hood, 15 Rich. Law, 177.
Capital, it has been held, signifies the actual estate, whether in money or
property, which is owned by an individual or corporation. In reference to a
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vested, can be regarded as within the intent of the exemption ?
The general inclination of the courts has been to hold, that a
charter which provides for a certain tax, and " that no other tax
or impost shall be levied or assessed" upon the corporation, will
exempt from taxation all the property held by it
,
necessary to
effect the purpose of the incorporation, but not other property
held by it which, though convenient and tending to increase the
profits, is not necessary to the corporation and its business. But
this is always a question of special construction and not of
general law.1
corporation, it is the aggregate of the sum subscribed and paid in, or to be
paid in, by the shareholders, with the addition of profits on the residue, after
the deduction of losses. People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 23 IT. Y., 192, 219.
In Mechanics' etc. Bank v. Townsend, 5 Blatch., 315, capital was held not tr
include surplus earnings, though undivided.
A railroad company paid the state a specific tax under a law which pre-
Tided that it should not " be assessed with any tax on its lands, buildings or
equipments." Held not to preclude municipal taxation. Orange & Alexan
dria R. R. v. Alexandria, 17 Grat., 176. Compare this with Richmond e. Rich
mond & Danville R. R. Co., 21 id., 604, where an exemption from " any charge
or tax whatsoever " was held to cover municipal as well as state taxes. See
also Southern R. R. Co. v. Jackson, 38 Miss., 334; Neustadt v. 11linois Central
R. R. Co., 31 11l., 484; Gardner v. State, 21 N. J., 557.
Effect of consolidation of railways on a previous exemption of one of the
roads. See Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall., 460; Charleston v. Branch, id.,
470. An exemption from taxation of " property necessarily used in operating
the railroad," held to apply to an inn used exclusively by persons arriving and
departing on the railroad. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Board, etc., of Craw
ford County, 29 Wis., 116. Vot other cases of special exemption, see State
Bank v. Madison, 3 Ind., 43; Orr v. Baker, 4 id., 86; Lord v. Litchfield, 36
Conn., 116 ; State v. Haight, 35 N. J., 40. And see Rex e. Calder, 1 B. & Aid.,
263; State v. Minton, 23 N. J., 529; Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bayless, 2
Gill, 355; State v. Norwich & Worcester R. R. Co., 30 Conn., 290; Armstrong
v. Athens Co., 16 Pet., 281.
An exemption for the benefit of a religious society ceases on its making
sale of the property. New Haven v. Sheffield, 30 Conn., 160. And as to strict
construction in general, see Erie Railway v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall., 492.
1 Where a canal is exempt from taxation the toll house is not taxable.
Schuylkill Nav. Co. e. Commissioners of Berks Co., 11 Penn. St., 202.
Where a railroad is exempt, this will cover its water stations and depots, but
not warehouses, coal lots, coal shutes, machine shops, wood yards etc., which
are only necessary to the profits to be made by the company. Railroad v. Berks
County, 6 ill., 70. See Lehigh Co. v. Northampton, 8 W. & S., 331; Wayne
Co. v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 15 Penn. St., 351, 357, where the sub-
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Invidious exemptions. An exemption, to be admissible, it
would seem, ought to be either made on the basis of contract, in
which case the public is supposed to receive a full equivalent
ject is considered at length; N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. v. Sabin, 26 id., 242;
West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester Co., 30 id., 232 ; Lackawana Iron Co. v.
Luzerne Co., 42 id., 424; Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co., v. Supervisors of
Crawford, 29 Wis., 116; Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 34 id., 271 ;
Orange, etc., R. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Grat., 176, which does not allow the
implied exemptions; Vermont Cent. R. R. Co. v. Burlington, 28 Vt., 193;
Souhegan Nail, etc., Factory v. McConike, 7 N. H., 309; Gardiner v. State, 21
N. J., 557; State e. Mansfield, 23 id., 510; State v. Flavell, 24 id., 370; State
e. Bluudell, 24 id., 402; State v. Betts, 24 id., 555; State v. Newark, 25 id.,
315; State v. The Collector of Newark, 26 id., 519; State Treasurer v. Som-
ervillc & Easton Railroad Co., 28 id., 21; State v. Elizabeth, 28 id., 103; State
?. Lester, 29 id., 541; State v. Hancock, 33 id., 315; Hannibal & St. Joseph
Railroad Co. v. Shacklctt, 30 Mo., 550; State v. H. & St. Jo. R. R. Co., 37 id.,
265; Boston & Me. R. R. Co. e. Cambridge, 8 Cush., 237; Wilmington R. R.
Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall., 264, 268, per Davis, J.
An exemption to a railroad company of" all machines, wagons, vehicles or
carriages belonging to the company, witli all their works," etc., held to apply
to their real estate as well as to their rolling stock. Richmond «. Richmond
& Danville R. R. Co., 21 Grat., 604, citing Baltimore v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 6
Gill, 238. A provision that a certain tax on the capital and debts of railroad
companies should "take the place of all other taxes on railroads and horse
railroad property and franchises," held to exempt property whether used for
railroad purposes or not. Osborn v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 40 Conn., 491.
And see in general, The Tax Cases, 12 G. &. J. 117.
A general exemption of railroad property from taxation has been said to be
coextensive with the right of the railroad company to take property for its use
by condemnation, and that the limit of such right is the limit of the exemp
tion. State v. Hancock, 33 N. J., 315; Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Milwau
kee, 34 Wis., 271.
The act incorporating the 11linois Central Railroad Company provides as
follows : " The * * * stock, property and assets belonging to said com
pany shall be listed by the president, secretary, or other officer, with the audi
tor of state, and an annual tax for state purposes shall be assessed by the
auditor upon all the property and assets of every name, kind and description
belonging to said corporation. Whenever the taxes levied for state purposes
shall exceed three-fourths of one per cent, per annum, such excess shall be
deducted from the gross proceeds or income herein required to be paid by
said corporation to the state, and the said corporation is hereby exempted
from all taxation of every kind except as herein provided for." Held, that
this exemption did not apply to a wharf boat and to a steamboat used
principally in conveying the passengers and freight from the terminus
of the road to the terminus of another railroad, thus making connections. 11l
inois Central R. R. e. Irvin, Sup. Court 11l., 1875, 7 Chicago Legal News, 286.
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therefor, or it ought to be made on some ground of public
policy, such as might justify a pension or a donation of the
public funds on some general rule of which all who come
within it may have the benefit1 It is difficult to conceive
of an exemption law which selects single individuals or cor
porations, or single articles of property, and taking them out
of the class to which they belong, makes them the subject
of capricious legislative favor. Such favoritism could make
no pretense to equality ; it would lack the semblance of
legitimate tax legislation. It is certain that municipal bodies
or taxing officers have no authority to make such exemptions
unless expressly empowered by legislation ; and to make any
would render invalid the whole tax roll on which the exempted
property or person ought to have appeared. The motives of the
exemption or the beneficial purposes expected to be accomplished
by it can make no difference. No man is obliged 1to be more
generous than the law requires ; each may stand strictly on his
legal rights, and refuse to submit to any 'exaction that purposely
is made more burdensome to him than the rules of law permit2
1"A common burden should be sustained by common contributions, regulated
by some fixed general rule, and apportioned according to some uniform ratio
of equality. Thus, if a capitation or personal tax be levied it must be im
posed on all free citizens equally and alike, or if an ad valorem or specific tax
be laid on property, it must be laid equally, according to value or kind, on all
the property, or on each article of the same kind, owned by every citizen ;
and no citizen or class of citizens owning any property of the kind subject to
taxation can be exempted constitutionally on any other ground than that of
valuable and peculiar public services; for otherwise one man or set of men
might be entitled to enjoy exclusive privileges, or legal exemptions which
are substantially the same, without the only constitutional consideration of
public services." Robertson, Ch. J., Sutton's Heirs e. Louisville, 5 Dana, 28,
31.
»Per Paine, J., in Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 242, 263. The case was one
of an exemption of a block in the city of Milwaukee on which a hotel was
about to be constructed; the common council directing it to be made " in view
of the great public benefit which the construction of the hotel would be to the
city." Compare Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio, N. S., 1 ; Adams v. Bcman,
10 Kansas, 37. In Henry v. Chester, 15 Vt., 460, a tax list was held void on
two grounds: " 1. The plain and obvious requisitions of the statute in regard
to making up were disregarded, both by important and essential omissions,
and by arbitrary additions without even the color of right or legal warrant. If
this may be done and still the list be regarded as legal, so might it with equal
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The legislature is equally powerless if the constitution has pre
scribed a rule of equality which forbids exemptions.1 Such a
rule, it has been seen, is prescribed by the constitutions of some
of the states, which in terms or by necessary implication require
all private property in the state to be taxed in proportion to ite
value.2
Accidental omissions from taxation. It has been decided in
a number of cases that accidental omissions from taxation, of per
sons or property that should be taxed, occurring through the neg
ligence or default of officers to whom the execution of the taxing
propriety if the entire real estate in town were omitted or inserted -wholly at
random, without even the form of an appraisal." See State v. Branin, 23 N.
J., 484; Hersey v. Supervisors, etc., 16 Wis., 185; Crosbye. Lyon, 37 Cal.,
242; Primm v. Belleville, 59 11l., 142; Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis., 454;
Smith v. Smith, 19 id., 615; People v. McCrccry, 34 Cal., 432. Including in
the assessment persons who are not liable, and against whom a tax cannot be
enforced, does not invalidate the tax against the rest. Inglee e. Bosworth, 5
Pick.. 498. See Dillingham e. Snow., 5 Mass., 547.
An illegal exemption by the common council of one man from a sewer tax
will not authorize another to have his tax enjoined where it appears that his
payment is not increased by the exemption. Page v. St. Louis, 20 Mo., 136.
The principle is that no one is to be heard to complain of that which works
no injury to him. See Sanford v. Dick, 15 Conn., 447; Case v. Dean, 16
Mich., 12.
1In Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510, it was held that under a constitu
tional provision requiring that " the rule of taxation shall be uniform, and
taxes shall be levied upon such property as the legislature shall prescribe,"
it was not competent to provide that a tax for a special improvement should
be laid exclusively on real estate. The cases of Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10
Wis., 242; Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock Co., 9 id., 410; Lumsden v.
Cross, 10 id., 282, and Attorney General v. Plankroad Co., 11 id., 35, 42, are
referred to as having settled the construction of the constitution of the stato
which would forbid the sweeping exemption of personal property. It is to
be observed that the general law of the state at that time required the taxation
of " all property, real and personal, not expressly exempted therefrom." Com
pare Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind., 223 ; Primm e. Belleville, 59 11l., 142. In
assessing by benefits the tax will be void if it appears that exemptions are
made of property which should be taxed. Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Cill,
383, 390. Compare Page «. St. Louis, 20 Mo., 136.
s See O'Kane e. Treat, 25 11l., 557, 561 and other cases already cited. A
constitutional provision that all real property shall be subject to taxation
with certain enumerated exemptions, amounts to a prohibition of further ex
emptions. Fletcher e. Oliver, 25 Ark., 289.
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laws is intrusted, would not have the effect to vitiate the whole
tax. The reasons for this conclusion are summarized in one of
the cases as follows : " The execution of these laws is necessarily
intrusted to men, and men are fallible, liable to frequent mistakes
of fact, and errors of judgment If such errors on the part of
those who are attempting in good faith to perform their duties
should vitiate the whold tax, no tax could ever be collected.
And therefore, though they sometimes increase improperly the
burden of those paying taxes, the rule which holds the tax not
thereby avoided is absolutely essential to the continuation of the
government."1 It seems difficult to resist the force of this rea-
1Paine, J., in Weeks e. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 242, 262, where the following
cases are cited and relied upon; Speer v. Braintree, 24 Vt., 414; State v. The
Collector of Jersey City, 24 N. J., 108; Insurance Co. v. Yard, 17 Penn. St.,
331; Williams v. School District, 21 Pick., 75. See also State v. Randolph,
25 N. J., 427, 431; Smith v. Smith, 19 Wis., 615; Schofield v. Watkins, 22 11l.,
66; Dunham v. Chicago, 55 id , 357,361; People v. McCreery, 34 Cal., 432.
In Watson e. Princeton, 4 Met., 599, 602, Sliaw, Ch. J., says that the case of omis
sion, through error of judgment or mistake of law, to tax property that should
be taxed, can give no right of action to recover back any portion of the tax
paid by another. " Various other remedies may be resorted to to secure just
and legal taxation. The law is strict in requiring that the whole valuation
shall be laid before the tax paying inhabitants, in order that any omission,
mistake or irregularity may be corrected before the tax is collected. It is for
the interest of the town, and of the inhabitants generally, that each inhabitant
liable should be taxed, and to the extent of his liability; and therefore it must
be presumed to be the inclination of assessors to impose rather than omit a
tax, in case of doubt, leaving the individual aggrieved to raise the question if
he shall think tit. And the final remedy, if the inhabitants believe that their
assessors are acting upon erroneous principles, is to elect others in their
places." See also George v. School District, 6 Met., 497 ; Dean v. Gleason, 16
Wis., 1. There has been some disposition in 11linois to hold that, even in the
case of intentional omissions, the parties aggrieved should be left to their rem-
edy against the assessor, and the tax roll sustained. Schofield v. Watkins, 22
11l., 72; Merritt v. Farris, 22 id., 303, 311; Dunham v. Chicago, 55 id., 357, 361.
But see Primm e. Belleville, 59 id., 142. In Muscatine v. Railroad Co., I Dill.,
536, 542, Mr. Justice Miller, at the circuit, had occasion to consider the effect
of omitting to tax certain property which, as it was claimed, the constitution
expressly required should be taxed with all other. He said : " A statute of
Iowa exempts railroad property from all other taxes except one per cent, per
annum paid into the state treasury. The constitution of the state declares
that all taxation shall be uniform. Whether this constitutional provision (the
exact terms of which I have not attempted to state) renders the statute void,
is a question upon which the supreme court of this state has twice, as I am
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soning, and it applies to the case of a mistake of law with the
same cogency as to the case of a mistake of fact Indeed where
the omission has occurred through no purpose to evade or disre
gard official duty, the occasion which produced it seems wholly
immaterial.1
informed, been equally divided. If the question was presented to the circuit
court by way of supervisory control over the officers, who, under its com
mand, are collecting this tax, whether this railroad property should be
assessed the same as other property, I confess I do not see how it could avoid
deciding it. But, instead of nn order to assess the property, I am asked to
declare all other assessments void, because it is not assessed. This, it will be
seen, is a very different question ; and it is clear that I can only enjoin its col'
lection on the ground that it is void. The case of Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2
Black, 510, is relied on as authority for the latter proposition. In that case,
after the city of Sheboygan had issued bonds in- aid of a railroad, the legisla
ture of that state passed an act declaring that the tax to pay these bondyshould
be assessed exclusively on the real estate of the city. The constitution of
Wisconsin has a provision similar to the one referred to in the constitution of
Iowa, and the supreme court of the United States held this attempt to make a
part only of the taxable property of the city responsible for this particular
debt, was a violation of the constitution, which rendered the tax levied under
that statute void.
" In the case before us there is no attempt to render any species of property
liable to taxation for any specific debt, or class of debts, but an exemption of
the railroad from all other burdens in consideration of a definite sum, which
may be more or less than its share of such burden. Whether this exemption
be forbidden by the constitution or not, I am quite clear that it does not
render void the tax which is levied upon other property.
" The case of Gilman v. Sheboygan does not go so far as this, either in the
facts on which it is grounded, or the reasons by which the judgment was sus
tained. There is a manifest difference between an attempt to impose the en
tire burden of a debt already incurred by a municipality, upon a particular
species of property, and the attempt to exempt a species of property from all
other taxation, in consideration of a sum supposed to be its just share of the
general public burden. It is not inappropriate to look to the consequences of
holding that this failure to assess the railroads renders all other tax void. It
applies to the tax assessed for all other purposes as well as this tax. Every
nonresident holder of property in the state could apply to me and insist on an
injunction against the tax on his property. And if the state judges believe
it to be void, they would be bound on the same principle to suspend the col
lection of all taxes throughout the entire state. A proposition which leads
inevitably to such a result can not be sound. I cannot therefore grant an in
junction on this ground, whether railroad property is liable to taxation or not."
1See People e. McCreery, 34 Cal., 432, where the mistake was one of law,
but the omission was held not to be fatal.
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Invidious assessments. A tax 'when assessed by valuation
may be made unequal and oppressive by the unfairness with
which the valuation is made. The remedies for an excessive
valuation we have no purpose to consider in this place ; they be
long more properly to a subsequent part of the work. As a gen
eral rule, a tax cannot depend for its validity upon the ability to
justify it to the satisfaction of a court or jury. Value is matter
of opinion, and when the law has provided officers upon whom
the duty is imposed to make it
, it is the opinion of these officers to
which the interests of the parties are referred. The court cannot
sit in judgment upon their errors, nor substitute their own
opinions for the conclusions the officers of the law have reached.
It is possible, however, that there may be circumstances under
which the action of these officers will not be conclusive. Sup
pose it admitted, or established beyond a peradventure, that a
public officer who has been empowered by the law to apportion
certain burdens among the citizens, as in his judgment shall be
just, has been actuated by a fraudulent purpose, and instead of
attempting to carry the law into effect, has wholly disregarded its
mandate, declined to bring his judgment to bear upon the ques
tion submitted to him, and arbitrarily, with the intent and purpose
to defeat the equity at which the law aims, has determined to im
pose an excessive burden upon a particular citizen. Suppose this
to be unquestioned or unquestionable, can it be that the citizen
has no remedy against the wrong intended ?
Such a question, it would seem, could admit of but one answer.
" A discretionary power cannot excuse an officer for refusal to exer
cise his discretion. His judgment is appealed to ; not his resent
ments, his cupidity or his malice. He is the instrument of the law
to accomplish a particular end, through specified means ; and when
he purposely steps aside from his duty to inflict a wanton injury,
the confidence reposed in him has not disarmed the law of the
means of prevention. His judgment may indeed be final if he
shall exercise it
, but an arbitrary and capricious exertion of
official authority, being without law, and done to defeat the pur
pose of the law, must, like all other wrongs, be subject to the law's
correction." 1 Assessors indeed are clothed with a power which
1 Merrill v Humphrey, 24 Mich., 170. See Same Case, 11 Law Reg., N. S.,
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is quasi judicial, but fraud vitiates even the most solemn judg
ments of courts, and the action of these quasi judicial bodies can
not stand on any higher ground. It may be that all presump
tions should so far favor their action as to protect them against
personal actions at the suit of parties aggrieved, but such presump
tions cannot preclude inquiry when their action is questioned for
fraud. The policy of the law may protect the person, but it
would be defeated if legal effect should be given to such fraudu
lent levies.1
Duplicate taxation. It has been remarked on a preceding
page
8 that when personal property is taxed, duplicate taxation is
sometimes imposed. By this was meant that such property some
times, after being subjected to one levy for the support of govern
ment for the current year, is by a change of circumstances sub
jected to taxation a second time for the support of government
during the same period. Such a case would generally occur in
"onsequence of the removal of the property, after the listing in
208, with note by Judge Redfield. See also Albany, etc., It. R. Co. v. Canaan,
16 Barb., 244; Buffalo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Erie County, 48 N. Y., 93; Western
R. R. Co. v. Nolan, 48 id., 513 ; Fuller e. Gould, 20 Vt, 643, 644 ; Stearns e. Miller,
25 id., 20 ; Wilson e. Marsh, 34 id., 352 ; State v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 7
Nev., 99. That neither a state nor a municipality has aright to discrimin
ate in taxation between residents and nonresidents, see ante, p. 64; City
Council of Charleston ads. State, 2 Speers L., 719; Nashville v. Althorp, 5
Cold., 554. Compare Jones e. Columbus, 25 Geo., 610, where it was held
competent to discriminate between residents and nonresidents of a city in
the taxation of slaves employed therein. But any such discrimination must
be express^ authorized by law. Robinson e. Charleston, 2 Rich., 317.
The recent case of Adams v. Beaman, 10 Kansas, 37, should be considered
in connection with the Michigan and Wisconsin cases referred to in this and
the succeeding note.
1 See Lefferts v. Supervisors of Calumet, 21Wis., 688, where it was decided that
the collection of a tax would be restrained where the taxing officers in their
assessment had fraudulently discriminated against the complainant; Merrill e.
Humphrey, 24 Mich., 17, a similar case with the same holding; Mil
waukee Iron Co. v. Hubbard, 29 Wis., 51, approving and following the case
firs't cited. Sec also Mason v. Lancaster, 4 Bush, 406, 408. Inequality in a
legal sense is not produced by certain tax payers taking proceedings which
vacate an assessment as to them, while others, who have lost the like right by
delay, remain taxed, especially when the lands relieved are liable to reassess
ment. Matter of DeLancy, 52 N. Y., 80.
*Ante, p. 28.
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one jurisdiction, into another where the time of listing was lat
er. A system of indirect taxes, combined with a system of gen
eral taxation by value, must often have the effect to duplicate the
burden upon some species of property or upon some persons, and
the taxation of stockholders in a corporation, and also of the cor
poration itself must sometimes produce a like result. There is
also sometimes what seems to be a double taxation of the same
property to two individuals ; as where the purchaser of property
on credit is taxed on its full value, while the seller is taxed to the
same amount on the debt.1 How this would operate may be
1la California, whose constitution requires " all property " to be " taxed in
proportion to its value," it is held not competent to exempt solvent debts from
taxation to the creditor. People v. McCreery, 34 Cal., 432 ; People v. Yerke,
35 id., 677; People v. Black Diamond Co., 37 id., 54; People v. Whartenby,
38 id., 461. For a decision to the same purport in 11linois, see Trustees v. Mc-
Connell, 12 11l., 138. The fact that the debt is secured by mortgage on prop
erty which is also taxed, can make no difference. People v. Eddy, 43 Cal.,
331 ; compare Lick v. Austin, id., 590. But in Savings and Loan Society v.
Austin, 46 id., 415, the majority of the court held that a debt for money loaned,
which was secured by mortgage, could not be taxed to the creditor if the mort
gaged property was also taxed. The reasoning of the court may be thus sum
marized : If the debt is taxed, the mortgagee will take this into account in
making the loan, and it goes to increase the interest he demands. In effect,
therefore, the tax on the debt will be paid by the mortgagor. But he also pays
the tax on the property, and consequently duplicate taxation is imposed upon
him. This reasoning, if applied universally to indirect taxation, would keep
the boards very busy in correcting the inequalities of tax legislation. And
why it should be limited to the case of a loan secured by mortgage, is not very
apparent, since if all debts for property sold are taxed, it may with consider
able plausibility be argued that the seller has anticipated the tax and added it
to the price, so that the purchaser pays twice when he comes to pay the assess
ment on the property bought. But then, whether the tax does increase the in
terest demanded on the loan, must depend on circumstances. If all loans are
taxed, it may be conceded that the interest will be increased ; but if only a
part of them are taxed, those making the taxed loans may not be able to add
the tax to the interest. In a locality, for instance, in which nonresidents were
loaning money freely, a resident might be compelled to submit to a loss of the
tax in order to be able to make any loans at all. And then one who has bor
rowed money without security may be taxed on that, or on what he has bought
with it, and if the lender is taxed on the loan, why is not this also a case of
duplicate taxation ? These are suggestions merely, but they may serve to in
dicate the labyrinth of difficulties into which the courts would be thrown if
the effects of taxation were thus to be traced up for the purpose of correcting
inequalities.
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readily perceived by supposing the extreme case that all the prop
erty in a town is sold on credit, in which case, if the property is
taxed to the purchasers, and the debts to sellers, it is manifest
that the town taxes twice as much wealth as lies within its
borders.
Now, whether there is injustice in the taxation in every in
stance in which it can be shown that an individual who has been
directly taxed his due proportion is also compelled indirectly to
contribute, is a question we have no occasion to discuss. It is
sufficient for our purposes to show that the decisions are nearly,
if not quite, unanimous in holding that taxation is not invalid be
cause of any such unequal results.1 It cannot be too distinctly
borne in mind, that any possible system of tax legislation must
inevitably produce unequal and unjust results in individual in
stances ; and if inequality in result must defeat the general law,
then taxation becomes impossible, and governments must fall
back upon arbitrary exactions. But no such impracticable prin
ciple is recognized in revenue laws. While equality and justice
1It is no objection to a tax graduated by the amount of a merchant's sales,
that a part of the goods sold had been purchased of another who had paid a
tax thereon. Mayes v. Erwine, 8 Humph., 290.
The money of a depositor may be taxed to him, and the deposits of the bank,
including this, may also be taxed to the bank. Yuba Co. e. Adams, 7 Cal.,
35. And see other cases further on.
Income may be taxed though invested in real estate which is taxed the same
year. Lott v. Hubbard, 44 Ala., 593.
In«ome, as used in a statute exempttng incomes from taxation, held to mean
the creation of capital, industry and skill. Wilcox v. Middlesex County, 103
Mass., 544. Iucome means that which comes in and is received from any
business or investment of capital without reference to the outgoing expendi
tures. Profit*, on the other hand, are understood to mean the net gain of any
business or investment, taking into account both receipts and payments. In
come, as applied" to the affairs of individuals, expresses the same idea that
revenue does when applied to the affairs of government. People e. Supervis
ors of Niagara, 4 Hill, 20, affirmed 7 Hill, 504. As to difference between
" annual value " and " annnal income," see Troy Iron and Nail Factory v.
Winslow, 45 Barb., 231. There is a case in Texas in which the indirect re
sults of taxation were followed up somewhat sharply. The law subjected " all
property-, real and personal," with certain exceptions, to taxation. A planter
was taxed on his corn and cotton, but contested the tax as duplicate, because
he had already been taxed on his slaves and mules by which he produced the
corn and cotton. The objection was found by the court to be insurmount
able. State v. Jones, 5 Texas, 383.
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are constantly to be aimed at, impossibilities are not demanded.
Tax legislation must be practical.1 It is one of the reasons for
levying indirect taxes, and other taxes than those on property by
value, that they tend to diminish the inequalities that would ex
ist if a single species of taxation only were to be levied. The
legislature must judge of the general result, and when the law has
apportioned the tax, individual hardships must be regarded as
among the inconveniences which are incident to regular govern
ment. The same necessity that justifies any taxation will justify
and sustain any reasonable provisions for giving it effect The
necessity of the state and reasonable provisions for the security
of the individual must be equally considered ; the state is no more
to be deprived of its revenue, because of individual hardship, re
sulting from general rules, than is the individual to be stripped of
his property without law, because in its necessity the state finds it
more convenient to take it thus than by regular proceedings. The
incidental hardship or inconvenience must be submitted to in
either case.
These general views have often been declared by able jurists.
"Property," it is said in one case, "is liable in many cases to be
taxed twice, when it would appear difficult or unsafe to make
provision by law to prevent. Thus, stock in trade may be taxed
to the owner, while he may be indebted for it to many persons,
who may be taxed for those debts or the money loaned to pur
chase it Real estate may be taxed to a mortgagor in possession
while the mortgagee is taxed for the money secured by the mort
gage.
* * * So imperfect are all human institutions, that
perfect equality in the imposition of burdens is not to be ex
pected. These provisions for valuation are not considered to be
in conflict with the general purpose to have all property subjected
to taxation once, and only once at the same time." 2 " The power
1" There is nothing poetical about tax laws. Wherever they find property
they claim a contribution for its protection, without any special respect to the
owner or his occupation." Lowrie, Ch. J., in Finley v. Philadelphia, 32 Penn.
St., 381.
*Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 36 Me., 255, 259, per Shepley, Ch. J. See People
e. Worthington, 21 11l., 171 ; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 258 ; St. Louis Life
Ins. Co. v. Assessors, 56 Mo., 503, per Vorit, J. For cases of apparent double
taxation by a tax on business, see Savannah v. Charlton, 36 Geo., 460; Burch
11
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to tax twice," it is said in another case, "is as ample as to tax
once." 1 We make out, therefore, no conclusive case against a
e. Savannah, 42 id., 596; Sacramento e. Crocker, 16 Cal., 119; Coulson v. Har
ris, 43 Miss., 728; Woolman v. State, 2 Swan, 353. As to the impossibility of
avoiding inequalities in highway taxes, see Hingham, etc., Turnpike Co. v.
Norfolk Co., 6 Allen, 353, 359, per Bigelow, Ch. J.
In "Williams ,e. Cammack, 27 Miss., 209, 224, Handy, J., speaking of a special
levee assessment, says : "Nor is it any objection to the constitutionality of
the act that it operates injuriously upon the appellant. Every revenue bill,
and every work of public improvement must, more or less, have such an ef
fect. But they must be submitted to as the necessary action of the machinery
of government, and as individual sacrifices to the general good, in order that
the advantages of the social compact may be enjoyed. This principle rests
on the very foundations of society, and is illustrated in every day's experience ;
the citizen yielding his natural rights, even of life, liberty or property, to
the public good. But he can only claim immunity when it is secured to him
by the principles of the constitution."
In People v. Whyler, 41 Cal., 351, 355, a levee tax was objected to as not
equal, because not apportioned according to benefits. The court held that it
-was required to be apportioned by value, and Rhode*, Ch. J., says: "A tax is
equal and uniform which reaches and bears with the like burden upon all the
property within the given district, county, etc. It bears the like burden when
the valuation of each parcel is ascertained in the same mode — the mode pre
scribed by law — and when it is subject to the same rate of taxation as other
property within the district, county, etc. Absolute equality is unattainable,
and the benefits derived or to be derived from the expenditure of the tax can
not be taken into account."
1West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester County, 30 Penn. St., 232, per Porter, J.,
cited with approval in Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Penn.
St., 73, 77-8. See also Erie Railway Co. «. Commonwealth, id., 84. Congress
having levied a tax upon an article, is not thereby precluded from levying
another. U. S. v. Benson, 2 Cliff., 512. In Philadelphia Savings Fund v.
Yard, 9 Penn. St., 359, 361, in referring to the case of The Carlisle Bank, 8
Watts, 291, the following remarks are made: "The horror of double taxation,
manifested in that case, is unsuited to the times; for it ha) obtained, and must
prevail in the exigencies of the commonwealth; moreover, it is expressly rec
ognized and established by the 6th section of the act of 16th April, 1845. It
exists in the case of ground rents, where the ground itself and the reditum
issuing from it are taxed ; in a tax upon a mortgage to the whole value of the
land, and the land itself. And so, where A. borrows money on mortgage and
loans it to C on bond, and who loans a part of it to D., it is taxed in the cur
rent of each actual employment. In the complexity and involutions of busi
ness, a dollar is employed many times in a day, and in each actual employ
ment represents the property, business, or the person of him who uses it. And
in cases of this kind, it is the usufruct and not the actual or identical money,
that is taxed." In Pittsburgh, etc., R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Penn. St.
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tax, when we show that it reaches twice the same property for
the same purpose. This may have been intended, and in many
cases at least, is admissible.1
77, the following remarks are made by the same court: " It [the case in judg
ment] resulted even in double taxation, that has never been considered un
lawful in this state. On the contrary, it is of frequent occurrence. The real
and personal property of a corporation may be taxed, although it pays a tax
on the stock which purchased it. Lackawana Iron Co. «. Luzerne County, 42
Penn. St., 424, 431. See Carbon Iron Co. e. Carbon County, 39 Penn. St., 251 ;
West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester County, 30 Penn. St., 332; Philadelphia Sav
ings Fund v. Yard, 9 id., 361. The power of the legislature is as ample to tax
twice as to tax once (30 id., 332) ; and it is done daily, as all experience shows.
9 id., 361. Equality of taxation is not required by the constitution. Kirby v.
Shaw, 19 id., 258. The stock may be full taxed to the institution and also to the
stockholders (Whitsell v. Northampton County, 49 id., 526, 529) ; and the stock
holder in a corporation of another state is obliged to pay a tax to Pennsylvania
an his stock, he being a resident here, although the whole profit and stock is
subject to taxation in the state of its location." See also Toll-bridge Co. v.
Osborn, 35 Conn., 7 ; St. Louis Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 56 Mo.,
503, per Vorit, J. In Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat., 422, a tax on collateral inherit
ances was sustained against an objection that taxation of property was re
quired to be uniform. Lee, J., points out that it is not a tax on property, but
on the privilege of succeeding to the inheritance.
1The case of The Toll-bridge Co. v. Osborn, 35 Conn., 7, is a very strong one.
A corporation was chartered to build and maintain a toll-bridge, with power,
" for the purpose of carrying the resolve into effect," to purchase and hold
lands not exceeding one hundred acres. The company built the bridge, and
soon alter purchased a large quantity of mud flats adjoining the bridge, and
erected wharves upon it
,
which became of great value and were profitably
rented. An act, passed in 1847, provided that the real estate of any private
corporation, "above what was required and used for the transaction of its ap
propriate business," should be liable to be assessed and taxed to the same ex
tent as if owned by individuals. Held, that the real estate thus used by the
company for wharves, was liable to taxation under the statute.
The facts in this case were such, that tlie property was really taxed several
times. By the decision of the court, the corporation was compelled to pay a
tax upon this property ; the shareholders paid a tax upon their shares of
stock which represented this property; and the corporation also paid a tax
upon its capital stock ; and, furthermore, as a great part of the stock was
owned by a railway company, they might be taxed as shareholders, and also
upon their capital stock, of which these shares were a part, while the share
holders in the railway company might be required to pay a tax upon their
shares also.
The court held, that it mattered not, so long as the legislative intent was
clear. While it was the general policy of the law to avoid duplicate taxation,
yet, where the meaning of the statutes is clear, the court cannot pronounce
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There is a sense, however, in which duplicate taxation may be
understood—and which we think is the proper sense—which
would render it wholly inadmissible under any constitution requir
ing equality and uniformity in taxation. By duplicate taxation in
this sense is understood the requirement that one person or any one
subject of taxation shall directly contribute twice to the same burden,
while other subjects of taxation belonging to the same class are required
(,
)
contribute but once.
We do not see, for instance, how a tax on a merchant's stock
by value could be supported, when by the same authority and for
the same purpose the same stock was taxed by value as a part of
his property. This is a very different thing from one tax upon
property and another upon the business, though the latter may
indirectly reach the property ; here is no circumlocution, no ques
tion of ultimate effects ; but a tax levied twice on the same subject
only under a different name. The same may be said of a tax on
the property of a corporation and also on the capital which is in
vested in the property ; if the latter is taxed as property, this also
is duplicate taxation, and as much unequal as would be the taxa
tion of a farmer's stock by value, when on the same basis it is
taxed as a part of his general property. When, for instance, the
money paid in as capital of a manufacturing corporation has been
invested in buildings and machinery, these are what then represent
the capital, and to tax the capital as valuable property distinct from
that which then represents it would be to tax a mere shadow ; 1 it
them invalid because they admit of duplicate taxation. Compare Jones, etc.,
Manuf. Co. v. Commonwealth, 69 Penn. St., 137.
1 That the capital of a corporation is represented by the property in which
it has been invested, can hardly require the citation of authorities, but the
following may be referred to. Gordon v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 231 ; Baltimore v.
Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 6 id., 288; Tax Cases, 12 Gill and J., 117;
Rome R. R. Co. e. Rome, 14 Geo., 275 ; Augusta e. Georgia R. R., etc., Co., 26
id., 651; Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co. e. Shacklett, 30 Mo., 550; Auditor, etc., v.
New Albany, etc., R. R. Co., 11 Ind., 570; Conwell e. Connersville, 15 id., 150;
Mutual Ins. Co. e. Supervisors of Erie, 4 N. Y.,442; Salem Iron Factory v.
Danvers, 10 Mass., 515 ; Amesbury Woolen, etc., Co. v. Amesbury, 17 id., 461;
Boston, etc., Glass Co. e. Boston, 4 Met., 181 ; Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston,
9 id., 199; Bangor & Piscataqua R. R. Co. e. Harris, 21 Me., 533; Cumberland
Marine R. v. Portland, 37 Me., 444; Savings Bank e. New London, 20 Conn.,
111,117; Bridgeport v. Bishop, 33 id., 187; Toll Bridge Co. e. Osborn, 35 id.,
7 ; New Haven v. City Bank, 31 id., 100 ; Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, 5
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would be to make the shadow stand for the substance in order
that it might be taxed, when the substance itself is taxed directly
under its own proper designation. We do not speak here of a
taxation of the property and also of the franchise ; those being
two things as will be seen further on. 1
Presumption against duplicate taxation. It has very pro
perly and justly been held that a construction of the laws was
not to be adopted that would subject the same property to be twice
charged for the same tax, unless it was required by the express
words of the statute, or by necessary implication.
2 It is a funda
mental maxim in taxation that the same property shall not be
subject to a double tax payable by the same party, either directly
or indirectly ; and where it is once decided that any kind or class
of property is liable to be taxed under one provision of the statutes,
it has been held to follow as a legal conclusion, that the legislature
could not have intended the same property should be subject to
another tax, though there may be general words in the law which
would seem to imply that it may be taxed a second time. 8 This
Ired., 516; Smith e.Exeter, 37 N. H., 556; Fitchburgh R. B. Co. v. Prescott, 47
N. H., 62. For the distinction between a tax on the franchise of a corporation,
and a tax on its capital as property, see Bank of Commerce v. New York
City, 2 Black, 620 ; Van Allen e. The Assessor, 3 Wail., 573 ; Bradley v. People,
4 id., 459. The law of these cases is that where the tax is on the capital
by a valuation as property, it is invalid if the capital is invested in nontaxa
ble securities.
1When the capital stock of a corporation is required to be assessed at its
" actual value," this means above or below the par value according to the fact
Oswego Starch Factory v. Dolloway, 21 N .Y., 449.
8Salem Iron, etc., Co. v. Danvers, 10 Mass., 514 ; Amesbury Woolen, etc., Co.
e. Amesbury, 17 id., 461 ; Water Power Co. v. Boston, 9Met., 199, 202 ; Bank of
Georgia v. Savannah, Dudley, 130 ; Gordon's Executors v. Baltimore, 5Gill, 231 ;
The Tax Cases, 12 Gill and J., 117 ; Savings Bank v. New London, 20 Conn.,
Ill, 117; Toll Bridge Co. v. Osborn, 35 id., 7; Osborn v. N. Y. and N. H. R.
B. Co., 40 id., 491; Smith v. Burley, 9 N. H , 423; Savings Bank v. Ports
mouth, 52 N. H.,17.
»Savings Bank v. Nashua, 46 N. H., 389-398, citing Smith v. Burley, 9N. H.,
423 and other cases. And see Osborn v. N. Y. and N. H. R. B. Co., 40 Conn.,
491, 494. In State v. Sterling, 20 Md., 502, a law taxed savings banks a certain
percentage on all the deposits held by them on a certain day. Held to be void
because not exempting the investments in securities otherwise taxed or not
taxable at all.
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is a sound and very just rule of construction, and it has been ap
plied in many cases where, at first reading of the law, a double
taxation might seem to have been intended. 1
Application of the presumption. A few instances in which
this rule of presumption has been applied will show what taxation
has been held to be in effect duplicate taxation, and for that reason
excluded from the general language made use of in tax laws.
Under a statute in Massachusetts, shares in any incorporated
company possessing taxable property were taxable to the owners
in the towns of their residence respectively. While this was in
force, a manufacturing corporation was assessed under the gen
eral law for the taxation of property to its owners, for all its real
and personal estate in the town where its business was carried on.
It was held that this taxation of shares was by implication to be
regarded as standing in the place of a taxation of the personal
estate to the corporation itself, since, if both were taxed, it would
in effect be duplicate taxation. As to the real estate, however, the
conclusion was different. The taxes upon that had always, in
that state, been paid exclusively to the town in which it was sit
uated. In all successive valuations made in pursuance of the
laws for that purpose, each town had been charged with the value
of all the real estate within it, in the apportionment of the tax
among the several towns. It would therefore be unjust if the real
estate which was included in estimating the amount of taxes
charged on a town, by being assessed as represented by the shares
of stockholders elsewhere, should be exempted from contributing
to the discharge of such taxes. The policy of all the tax laws
had been that the land should contribute to the local taxes irre
spective of the residence of the owner, and the implication that
this was intended in the case of corporate real estate was so strong
1 Bank of Georgia e. Savannah, Dudley, 132 ; Factory Co. v. Gardiner, 5 Greenl.,
133; Glass Co. v. Boston, 4 Met, 181; Savings Bank v. Worcester, 10 Cush.,
128; American Bank «. Mumford, 4 R. I.
,
478,482; Savings Bank e. Gardiner,
4 id., 484; Smith v. Exeter, 37 N. H., 556 ; Toll Bridge Co. v. Osborn, 35 Conn.,
7; State v. Hannibal, etc., R. R. Co., 37 Mo., 265. In the case of Kimball v.
Milford just decided by the supreme court of New Hampshire (2 Am. Law
Times' Reports, 504), stock in a foreign corporation, which by its charter pays
a specific tax in lieu of all others, was held not taxable in New Hampshire,
under its statutes.
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that the counteracting presumption against an intent to impose
duplicate taxation must yield to it.1
So in Georgia it has been held under a city charter empow
ering the corporation in general terms to levy taxes on real and
personal estate, that while the city might tax the stockholders of
a bank upon their shares, this taxation would by implication ex
clude the taxation of the bank on its capital stock.2 In Pennsyl
vania it has been decided that a tax on the discount business of a
bank is in a degree a tax upon the capital of the bank. Where
therefore it was provided by its charter that the bank should not
be subject to taxation on its capital stock, for any other than state
purposes, the tax on its discount business would be inadmissible
but for the fact that the charter was granted under and subject to
a provision in the state constitution which made it at all times
subject to legislative alteration or repeal.8
So in Massachusetts it is held that a bank which pays a specific
tax on its capital stock is not taxable on collaterals deposited with
1Salem Iron Factory v. Dauvers, 10 Mass., 514. This case was followed
after some change in the statute, In Amesbury Woolen, etc., Co. v. Amesbury,
17 id., 461. And see as to the real estate, Amesbury Nail Factory Co. v. Weed,
17 id., 53; Tremont Bank v. Boston, 1 Cush., 142; Boston Water Power Co. «.
Boston, 9 Met., 199. In Middlesex R. R. Co. v. Charleston, 8 Allen, 330, where
shareholders in a street railway were taxable on their shares in the towns
where they resided, it was held not competent to tax the personal property of
the corporation used in and necessary for the prosecution of its business.
'' The value of the personal property owned by the corporation is included as
a subject of taxation in the value of the shares; as in the case of banks, insur
ance companies, manufacturing corporations and other railroads." Hoar, J.,
p. 333. Compare The Tax Cases, 12 G. & J., 117. To tax a bank on its prop
erty and also the stockholders on their shares was regarded as duplicate tax
ation, and not allowable under the Maryland laws, in Gordon's Ex'rs v. Balti
more, 5 Gill, 231, and Baltimore v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 6 Gill, 288. And see
in Rhode Island, American Bank v. Mumford, 4 R. I.
,
478 ; Providence Insti
tution v. Gardiner, 4 id., 484.
' Bank of Georgia e. Savannah, Dudley, 132. citing with approval the Massa
chusetts cases. So where a bank was exempt from any tax, except one of
twenty-five cents on every share of its stock owned by individuals, it was de
cided that stockholders were not taxable on their shares. Bank of Cape Fear
v. Edwards, 5 Ired., 516. See also Johnson e. Commonwealth, 7 Dana, 338;
State v. Tunis, 23 N. J., 546.
» Iron City Bank v. Pittsburgh, 37 Penn. St., 340.
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it as security for loans.1 So if it appear that a corporation is by
its charter exempt from taxation, the shares in the hands of the
shareholders are to be understood as exempt also.2
On the other hand a tax on the market value of the capital
stock of a corporation, over and above the value of its real and
personal property, is not duplicate taxation by reason of the tan
gible property being also taxed, but is a tax upon the franchise.8
So a tax on the deposits of savings societies has been held a tax
on the franchise and not a tax on property.* And where by
statute " no income shall be taxed which is derived from property
subject to taxation ;" a merchant may nevertheless be taxed on
his income under the general law taxing income from a profession,
trade, or employment, this income being the " net result of many
combined influences; the use of the capital invested ; the personal
labor and services ; * * the skill and ability with which they
lay in or from time to time renew their stock ; the carefulness and
good judgment with which they sell and give credit ; and the
1Waltham Bank v. Waltham, 10Met, 334 ; Tremont Bank e. Boston, 1 Cush.,
142; and see Salem Iron Factory e. Danvers, 10 Mass., 514.
»State v. Branin, 23 N. J., 484, citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 7 Dana,
342; Tax Cases, 12 G. & J., 117; Gordon's Ex'rs v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 231;
Smith v. Burley, 9 N. H., 423. See also State v. Bentley, 23 N. J., 532; State
v. Powers, 24 id., 400 ; Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, 5 Ired., 516. And com
pare Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall., 264.
8 So held in Hamilton County v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall., 632, in reliance
upon a settled course of decisions in Massachusetts. See Commonwealth v.
Hamilton Mnn'f. Co., 12 Allen, 298, 306. Shares of stock in a foreign corpora
tion may be taxed in full to resident owners, irrespective of the taxation of
its property where it is located. Dwighte. Boston, 12 Allen, 316. A state
may tax the franchise or the capital of a corporation by such rule as it may
prescribe, even though it be arbitrary. And if the corporation be a railroad
company owning a road in two states, one state may tax the corporation on a
proportional part of its stock, measured by the length of the road in that
state. Minot «. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Wall., 206.
4 Society of Savings e. Coite, 6 Wall., 594 ; Provident Institution v. Massa
chusetts, id., 611. See Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass-, 252 ; Com'th
e. Savings Bank, 5 Allen, 428; People v. Supervisors of Niagara, 4 Hill, 20;
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.e. New York, 7 id., 261 ; Bank of Utica v. Utica, 4
Paige, 399; Coite v. Society for Savings, 32 Conn., 173; Coite v. Conn. Ma.
Life Ins. Co., 36 id., 512; 11linois Mu. Ins. Co. v. Peoria, 29 11l., 180; Olivere.
Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268; Commonwealth v. Cary Improving Co., 98
Mass., 19- Attorney General v. Mining Co., 99 id., 148.
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foresight and address with which they hold themselves prepared
for the fluctuations and contingencies affecting the general com
merce and business of the country. To express it in a more sum
mary and comprehensive form, it is the creation of capital, indus
try and skill." 1 So it is competent to tax brokers upon their an
nual receipts, notwithstanding they pay a license tax for the priv
ilege of carrying on that business.2 So a tax upon the amount of
the nominal capital of a bank, without regard to loss or deprecia
tion, has been likened to "one annexed to the franchise as a roy
alty for the grant"8 A tax on the interest paid by a corporation
on its indebtedness, though collected from the corporation, is still
a tax on the creditor ; the corporation being only made use of as
a convenient means of collecting the tax.4 So a tax on the shares
of stockholders in a corporation is a different thing from a tax on
the corporation itself or its stock, and may be laid irrespective of
any taxation of the corporation when no contract relations forbid.5
So it has been held that a corporation which was required to pay
1Wilcox v. Commissioners of Middlesex, 103 Mass., 544, per Ames, J.
»Drexel v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn. St., 31. In this case the tax law was
objected to as retrospective because, in order to arrive at the proper measure of
taxation, it required a return of the receipts for the preceding year, and made
that the basis of taxation, but the court justly held there was nothing to this.
»Bank of Commerce v. New Y«rk, 2 Black, 620, 629, per Nelson, J.
*Haighte. Railroad Co., 6 Wall., 15; Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 id., 262;
United States v. Railroad Co., 17 id., 322. In the second of these cases a state
tax on the interest on bonds issued by a railroad company and secured by
mortgage on aline lying partly in another state was held to be void, on the ground
that to the exteut of the road out of the state she was " taxing property and inter
ests beyond her jurisdiction." It is to be said of this case that the plaintiff
was a nonresident, and for that reason not taxable in the state on his bonds,
under the subsequent decision of the same court State Tax on Foreign Held
Bonds, 15 Wall., 300, 323. Railroad bonds are taxable to the owners notwith
standing the company pays a tax on " the market value of their stock and
their funded and floating debt, in lieu of all other taxes on railroad property
and franchises." Bridgeport v. Bishop, 33 Conn., 187.
'Tremont Banke. Boston, 1 Cush., 142; Statee. Pet way, 2 Jones Eq., 396;
State v. Thomas, 26 N. J., 181 ; Lycoming County v. Gamble, 47 Penn. St., 106 ;
Whitsell v. Northampton County, 49 id., 526; Union Bank v. State, 9 Yerg.,
493; Oswego Starch Factory v. Dollaway, 21 N. Y., 449; People v. Bradley,
39 11l., 130, 141 ; Conwell v. Connersville, 15 Ind., 150; Van Allen v. Assessors,
3Wall., 573, 584 ; State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 id., 300, 323 ; Cumberland
Marine Railway v. Portland, 37 Me., 444.
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a bonus on its capital in lieu of a tax on dividends, might never
theless be taxed on its " net earnings or income ;" this not being the
same thing as dividends.1 So in case of a corporation which pays
a specific tax, an exemption " from any other or further tax or im
position," will not prevent any real estate it may own, and which
is not needed for corporate purposes, from being taxed. " The
power granted to a corporation to hold land is limited to the pur
poses for which the power was conferred. This is the general rule,
and governs in the construction of the exempting clause. The
tax levied may so far operate as a double tax, the property being
already taxed in the shape of capital; but if the company choose
to invest capital in property not necessary for their business, such
as the legislature did not contemplate in their grant, they cannot
complain that it is twice taxed. Double taxation is not uncon
stitutional."2
It has often been decided that a tax on the franchise of a cor
poration, and also on its capital or property, was not duplicate
taxation.8 The franchise, nevertheless, has a property value, and
as a question of construction, it may sometimes be necessary to
1 Jones, etc., ManPg Co. v. Commonwealth, 69 Penn. St., 137. That stock
divided among stockholders as profits are dividends, sec Lehigh Crane Iron
Co, v. Commonwealth, 55 Penn. St., 448; State v. Farmer's Bank, 11 Ohio, 94;
Sun Mtt. Ins. Co. v. New York, 8 N. Y., 241, 250.
s Potts, J., in State v. Newark, 25 N. J., 315, 317, citing Tatem v.Wright, 23
id., 429. See also Railroad Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall., 264, 268, per Davis, J.,
11linois Central R. R. Co. v. Irwin, Sup. Ct. 11l., 1875, 7 Chicago Legal News,
286.
8Carbon Iron Co. v. Carbon County, 39 Penn. St., 251; Lackawana Iron Co
v. Luzerne County, 42 id., 424; Tremont Bank v. Boston, 1 Cush., 142; Com
monwealth v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 12 Allen, 75 ; Commonwealth v. Hamil
ton Manf. Co., id., 298; Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Reid, 64 N. C, 226;
Mason v. Lancaster, 4 Bush, 406; Monroe Savings Bank e. Rochester, 37 N.
Y., 365; Bank of Commerce v. New York, 2 Black, 620, 629; Minot «. Rail-
road Co., 18 Wall., 206. In Commonwealth v. N. E. Slate & Tile Co., 13 Allen,
391, 393, Wells, J., says : " The fact that the defendant corparation held prop
erty which was the subject of taxation in other ways, does not render this tax
upon its franchise illegal. In the practical operation of the powers of taxa
tion, which are given in several forms, it is inevitable that double taxation
shall occur in some cases. The legislature may relieve against it by allowing
deductions if it sees fit to do so ; but the court can only apply the law as it
stands." If the capital is invested in nontaxable securities, the franchise may
still be taxed. Monroe Savings Bank v. Rochester, 37 N. Y., 365. And see
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hold that an exemption of the property of a corporation from tax
ation is an exemption of the franchise also. It has been so held
in the case of a railroad corporation whose charter provided that
" the property of said company and the shares therein shall be
exempt from any public charge or tax whatever." 1 The intent
in such a case, when reasonably apparent on the face of the legis
lation, must control. It has been held that a tax on the capital
stock measured by dividends was not a tax on dividends, and the
corporation paying it was therefore liable to a tax on net earn
ings under a statute which provides that corporations not paying
a tax on dividends shall be taxed on net earnings.* A tax on
" the capital stock actually paid in or secured to be paid in," is a
tax on the capital at its nominal amount, and is not to be in
creased or diminished by accumulations or losses.8 These cases
will perhaps illustrate sufficiently the power of the legislature to
impose taxation that in its result duplicates the burden, as well as
the force of the presumption that the legislature, in its desire to
lay all burdens of government justly, has never intended dupli
cate taxation unless plain language expressive of that intent has
been employed.
So far, the subject has been considered as the questions of
equality and justice in taxation arise on the tax laws themselves.
Of the steps necessary or proper to be taken in order to secure
equality under such laws, it will be necessary to speak further on.
Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall., 594; Provident Inst. v. Massachusetts, 6
id., 611; Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, id., 632.
1Wilmington Railroad Uo. v. Reid, 13 Wall., 264; Raleigh, etc., Railroad
Co. v. Reid, id., 269. In New Jersey where a corporation by its charter was
to pay a certain tax on its capital stock paid in, and it was declared that
" no
further or other tax or impost shall be levied or assessed upon said company,"
this was held to exempt not the franchises merely, but the property also.
State v. Berry, 17 N. J., 80; Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Commissioner of
Appeals, 18 id., 71. So it has been held that a tax on the gross income of a
corporation cannot be laid when the stock is exempt State v. Hood, 15 Rich.,
117.
»Phoenix Iron Co e. Commonwealth, 59 Penn. St., 104. A tax on capital in
vested in shipping is not duplicate taxation as applied to vessels upon which
the harbor master's fees have been paid. State v. Charleston, 4 Rich., 286.
»Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. New York, 7 Hill, 261, citing Bank of Utica
e. Utica, 4 Paige, 390; People v. Supervisors of Niagara, 4 Hill, 20. See Gor
don v. New Brunswick Bank, 6 N. J., 100 ; Rudderow v. State, 31 id., 512.
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Commuting taxes. Tax laws sometimes provide for commu
tation; that is to say. for the substitution of something else for
the tax that is levied. Thus, road taxes are sometimes levied in
labor, with permission to commute by the payment of what is
deemed an equivalent in money. Many of the special exemptions
we have referred to were in the nature of commutations ; the state
has received something as "an equivalent for the ordinary taxa
tion which was released.1 Such commutations are competent
when not forbidden by the constitution, and are supposed to pro
duce no inequality.2 But a commutation must not be invidious ;
if
,
as between individuals it selects one class for favor, and ex
cludes others, it is void.8
Diversity of taxation in different districts. Eeference has
been made to cases which recognize the right to establish different
rules of taxation in different districts, even when by the state
constitution uniformity and equality in taxation are required.
Such general rules are made in view of the universal custom to
consult the circumstances of different districts, and the wishes of
their people regarding the taxes to be levied therein as district
taxes; and all presumptions are against any purpose to set aside
that custom. Local taxes may be levied on a different system
in the different municipal districts, and for different purposes ;
1 See Gardiner e. State, 21 N. J., 557 ; Daughdrill v. Ins. Co., 31 Ala., 91.
Where a railroad company pays a tax on its annual income in lieu of a tax on
its property, the tax so paid is supposed to be a full equivalent for the prop
erty tax, and therefore there is no room for applying the rule of strict con
struction against the company, as if the substitution of one tax for the other
was a privilege. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Supervisors of Crawford, 29
Wis., 116.
» State Bank v. People, 4 Scam., 303 ; 11linois Central Railroad v. McLean
County, 17 11l., 291. It was one of the stipulations in the charter of the Bal
timore & Ohio R. R. Co., that the corporation should pay to the state one-fifth
of the passenger fares received for passage on its branch road between Wash
ington and Baltimore. A stipulation of this nature violates no provision of
the federal constitution. B. & O. R. R. Co. e. Maryland, 21 Wall., 456. The
same decision had previously been made by the state courts, and the position
affirmed that the stipulation did not violate the state constitution. Waters v.
State, 1 Gill, 302, 308.
• So held of a commutation in labor for a highway tax; the permission to
commute being extended only to male tax payers between the ages of 21 and
50. Cooper v. Ash, Sup. Ct. 11l., 1875, 7 Chi. Leg. News, 393.
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and this, not only when they are laid to supply mere local
'works and conveniences, but also when they are for purposes —
like the highways, for instance— which, though paid for locally,
are for the benefit of the whole state and the use of all its
people.1
Monopolies. It seems scarcely necessary to say, that the rule
of equality in taxation will forbid the power being employed for
the purpose of building up monopolies. That it is capable of
being so employed needs no demonstration ; and that it some
times has been so employed, especially in the arrangement of the
customs duties, is unquestionable; always, of course, under the
pretense of an apportionment of taxes for the public good. Tax
ation of business and the license taxes are peculiarly liable to
abuse in this direction,2 especially if they undertake to limit the
number to whom permits shall be granted ; and if the state can
exempt the large manufacturer from taxation while taxing his
feeble competitor, as has been done in one state at least, it may
take in this way a long stride in the direction of establishing a
monopoly. The spirit of a free constitution, if not its letter, for
bids such legislation, and sound public policy forbids it also.
One reason why taxation for private purposes is inadmissible, is
that its tendency is to the building up of monopolies at the
expense of the public who would suffer from them;8 it begins in
a pretense for the public good, and it ends in crippling the gen
eral industry while it excites the general discontent.4
1See in general, People v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 43 Cal., 398; Bright v.
McCullough, 27 Ind.. 223; Commissioners of Schools v. Alleghany County, 20
Md., 439, 457; Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen, 500.
»See Judge Nott'3 article on Monopolies in the International Review, Vol.
1, p. 370. Charles I. was able to exact large sums of money by enforcing a
royal proclamation forbidding the erection of buildings in extension of Lon
don, and granting special permits on the payment of large sums for the privi
lege. Green's England, ch. 8, sec. 5.
»See Philadelphia Association e. Wood, 39 Penn. St., 73,82, per Lowrie,
Ch. J.
4The right of a city to levy a tax for the construction of a patented pave
ment has been denied in some states, on the express ground, that the patent
was a monopoly, and there could be no competition in bidding for the con
tract to construct it. Nicholson Pavement Co. v. Fay, 35 Cal., 695; Same v.
Painter, id., 699; Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wis., 590; Burgess e. Jefferson, 21
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Permanence In legislation. It should be added, that in
order that tax laws may not be oppressive, they should not be
subject to frequent changes. Tariff .laws frequently changed
become a serious impediment to the business of the country,
from the impossibility on. the part of business men to calculate
upon the future. To all the other contingencies of business is
added this one, which is
,
perhaps, greatest of all : that the federal
legislature may so change the customs laws as to detract con
siderably from the market value of merchandise on hand, or
increase largely the cost of something employed in manufacture,
or in some other way to change greatly the outlook for any par
ticular trade. The excise laws are seldom changed without
serious injury to individuals ; and if others, perhaps, make for
tunes by the change, the possibility of such prosperity leads to
speculations in possible changes, and even to endeavors to procure
alterations for speculative purposes. Changes in other tax laws
are not so injurious, but they are always liable to be oppressive,
in individual cases, and. for this reason are not to be made except
to cure positive evils. Mere inconveniences, to which the people
have become accustomed, or even impolitic or unequal taxation
to which trade and business have adapted themselves, are usually
less harmful than considerable changes in the law with a view to
their correction. This is a consideration of policy, with which
the courts have no concern, but it seems sufficiently important to
justify mention in this connection.
La. Ad„ 143. Contra, Hobart «. Detroit, 17 Mich., 246 ; In re Eager, 46 N.
Y, 100; In re Dugro, 50 id., 513.
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CHAPTER VII.
THE APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES.
The distinction between an exercise of the eminent domain, and
one of the power to tax, consists mainly in this : that the one is
an exceptional exaction for the public benefit, while the other is
an exaction based upon the idea that it is only an equal and fair
contribution to the public wants.1 In order to make it equal and
fair, apportionment is a necessary element in all taxation.
The apportionment of a tax consists in a selection of the subjects
to be taxed, and in laying down the rule by which to measure the
contribution which each of those subjects shall make to the tax.2
Apportionment is therefore a matter of legislation. " The power
of taxing and the power of apportioning taxation are identical and
inseparable. Taxes cannot be laid without apportionment, and
the power of apportionment is
,
therefore, unlimited) unless it be
restrained as a part of the power of taxation." 8
The methods of apportionment are diverse and numerous,
but all taxes may possibly be arranged under the three heads of
specific taxes, ad valorem taxes, and taxes apportioned by special
benefits.
Specific Taxes. Under this head may be ranged those which
impose a specific sum by the head or number, or by some stand
ard of weight or measurement, and which require no assessment be
yond a listing and classification of the subjects to be taxed. Li
cense taxes and other taxes on business or occupations, stamp
taxes, taxes on franchises and privileges, are usually specific, as are
also many excise and customs taxes.
1 Blackwell on Tax Titles, 1 ; People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419 ; po3t, Ch. XX.
* " The power to tax necessarily involves the right to designate the property
on which it is to be levied ; in other words, to apportion the tax." Ranney, J.,
in Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. S., 126, 123, citing Cincinnati v. Gwynne,
10 Ohio., 192; Bonsall e. Lebanon, 19 id., 418.
» Ruggles, J., in People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419, 426-7. See Glascow «.
Rouse, 43 Mo., 479, 489.
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As regards all such taxes, the law by which they are laid is of
itself a complete apportionment Ministerial officers have nothing
to do but to list the subjects of taxation ; classify them where that is
necessary ; ascertain the number, weight, measurement, etc., and
collect the sum which the law has definitely fixed. If the taxes
are stamp or license taxes, even the listing may not be required,
but the individual who is to pay them will purchase his stamp or
his license, by voluntary payment, as he may have occasion.
Ad Valorem Taxes. A large proportion of the duties on imports
are of this description, and so, sometimes, are many of the taxes
which make up the internal revenue. The statute laying them
prescribes the rule, but requires the action of appraisers in appor
tioning them between individuals. By far the larger proportion
of all state taxation is also upon property by a valuation, and effect
can only be given to it by means of assessors, who value the prop
erty and apportion the tax by their estimate.
Taxes Apportioned by Benefits. As between districts, where an
object for which taxes are to be levied pertains to two or more,
the legislature sometimes makes the apportionment by its own
action directly, with reference to the supposed interest of each in
such object, or to the benefit each is likely to derive therefrom. It
may also provide for the apportionment by commissioners appointed
for the purpose.1 This often becomes necessary in the case of roads
and bridges lying partly in two or more districts, and also on the
division of towns, counties, etc.2
• See Salem Turnpike, etc., Corp. v. Essex County, 100 Mass., 2SS, and cases
cited. The case was one of the appropriation of a turnpike road under the
eminent domain, and an apportionment of the cost among the counties, cities
and towns which it accommodated. See also Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm., 405.
»On the division of a county or town and the setting off of territory for a new
one, the old county, unless it is otherwise provided by statute, will retain
the property and remain liable for the debts. North Hempstead v. Hempstead,
2 Wend., 109, 135; Hartford Bridge Co. v. East Hartford, 16 Conn., 149, 171 ;
Windham v. Portland, 4 Mass., 384-390; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 id., 76,85;
Medford v. Pratt, 4 Pick., 222; Montpelicr e. East Montpelier, 29 Vt., 12,20;
Milwaukee v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis., 93. It will also retain the right to proceed
in the collection of the tuxes previously voted, and they will belong to it
though collected in part from territory now set off. Devor e. McClintock, 9
W. & S., 80; Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick., 323; Harman v. New Marlborough, 9
Cush., 525; Moss v. Shear, 25 Cal., 38; Morgan County v. Hendricks County,
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Elsewhere the constitutional provisions of a number of the
states are referred to, which require state taxation of property to
be by value. The judicial decisions are also cited, which hold
that the local levies, commonly known under tbe head of assess
ments, though laid under the taxing power, are not taxes as the
term is employed in the constitutions, and consequently may be
laid by some other standard than that of value, if the legislature
shall so prescribe. The standard more often established than any
other is one which seeks to put upon each item of property a tax
proportioned to the special benefit it is to receive from the expen
diture. There are different methods of making the apportion
ment between individuals: 1. Assessors or commissioners may
be empowered to examine the district and apportion the tax ac
cording as they shall find that benefits will be received. 2. The
legislature may determine that the benefits will be in proportion
to value, area or frontage, and direct an apportionment accordingly.
In another place it is shown that either course is admissible.1
General principles of apportionment. The principles by
which the legislative apportionment of taxes is to be tested have
been so admirably stated in a Kentucky case, that we give at
length the language of the court in preference to any attempt
at stating them in our own language : " When shall a tax be
levied? To what amount? Shall it be a capitation or property
tax ? Direct or indirect ? Ad valorem or specific ? And what
classes of property are the fittest subjects of taxation ? are all
questions wisely confided by our constitution to the discretion of
the legislative department, subject to no other limitation than
that of the moral influence of public virtue or responsibility to
32 Ind., 234. See Alvis v.Whitney, 43 id., 83. But it is competent for the legis
lature to make apportionment of debts and property in such a case, or to pro
vide for its being done, and to compel the necessary taxation to do what may
be just in the premises. Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H., 524; Londonderry
v. Deny, 8 id., 320; Willimantic v. Windham, 14 Conn., 457; Hartford Bridge
Co. e. East Hartford, 16 id., 149-172; Granby e. Thurston, 23 id., 416; Mont
pelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt., 12-20: Milwaukee e. Milwaukee, 12 Wis.,
93; State v. Rice, 35 id., 178; Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Greenl., 112; Mar
shall County Court v. Calloway County Court, 2 Bush, 93; Richland County
v. Lawrence County, 12 11l., 1 ; Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Pa. St., 374.
1See Chapter XX.
12
178 [CH. TILLAW OF TAXATION.
public opinion. But in some other respects, and so far as the
power of taxation may be effectual without being thus limited, it
is in our opinion limited by some of the declared ends and prin
ciples of the fundamental laws. Among these political ends and
principles, equality, as far as practicable, and security of property
against irresponsible power, are eminently conspicuous in our
state constitution. An exact equalization of the burdens of
taxation is unattainable and Utopian. But still there are well
defined limits within which the practical equality of the consti
tution may be preserved, and which, therefore, should be deemed
impassable barriers to legislative power. Taxation may not be
universal, but ic must be general and uniform. Hence, if a capita
tion tax be laid, none of the class of persons thus taxed can
be constitutionally exempt upon any other ground than that of
public service ; and if a tax be laid on land, no appropriation
land within the limits of the state can be constitutionally ex
empted, unless the owner be entitled to such immunity on the
ground of public service. The legislature, in the plenitude of
the taxin g power, cannot have constitutional authority to exact
from one citizen, or even from one county, the entire revenue for
the whole commonwealth. Such an exaction by whatever name
the legislature might choose to call it
,
would not be a tax, but
would be, undoubtedly, the taking of private property for public
use, and which could not be done constitutionally without the
consent of the owner or owners, or without retribution of the
value in money.
" The distinction between constitutional taxation and the tak
ing of private property for public use by legislative will, may
not be definable with perfect precision. But we are clearly of
the opinion, that whenever the property of a citizen shall be
taken from him by the sovereign will, and appropriated without
his consent to the benefit of the public, the exaction should not
be considered as a tax unless similar contributions be made by
that public itself, or shall be exacted rather by the same public
will, from such constituent members of the same community gen
erally, as own the same kind of property.
" Taxation and representation go together. And representative
responsibility is one of the chief conservative principles in our
form of government When taxes are levied, therefore, they
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must be imposed on the public in whose name and for whose
benefit they are required, and to whom those who impose them
are responsible. And although there may be a discrimination in
the subjects of taxation, still persons in the same class, and
property of the same kind, must generally be subjected alike to
the same common burden. This alone is taxation according to
our notion of constitutional taxation in Kentucky. And this
idea, fortified by the spirit of our constitution, is
,
in our judg
ment, confirmed by so much of the twelfth section of the tenth
article as declares, 'Nor shall any man's property be taken or
applied to public use without the consent of his representatives,
and without just compensation being previously made to him.' "1
Apportionment presumptively just. Whatever the rule
of apportionment that is thus established by legislation, it is pre
sumptively as just and equal in the opinion of the legislature as
the circumstances would permit It is not to be questioned for im
policy, and cannot be overthrown by showing that in particular
instances it operates unjustly.2
1 Boberlson, Ch. J., in Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513, 516. See
also Youngblood v. Sexton, Sup. Ct., Mich., Oct. term, 1875.
* As to diversity in apportionment, see Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co., 14
Ind., 199; Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515; Wallace v. Shelton, 14 id.,
498. Taxation of merchants by sales is not unequal. Sacramento e. Crocker,
16 Cal., 119. That the courts can afford no relief for what is merely an un
wise apportionment, see Tallman v. Butler County, 12 Iowa, 531.
That a license tax may be apportioned in reference to the size of the town
in which the privilege is to be exercised, see State v. Soulier, 3 Heiskell,
281. A singular case of apportionment was that in Ould v. Richmond, 23
Grat., 464. The tax was a license tax on lawyers, who were classified in six
classes by the finance committee of the common council, and the tax was dif
ferent in the several classes. The tax was sustained against an objection to
its inequality. The classification seems to have had in view the value of the
privilege the license gave, the extent of the business, the income, etc.
In Berney v. The Tax Collector, 2 Bailey 654, 681, O'Niell, J., in speaking
to objections which were made to a tax on bank dividends, says : " It may
be that the tax on the dividends may operate unequally in that it is virtually
a tax on money at interest, which is not generally subjected to taxation. This
objection, however, is not addressed to the proper forum; it belongs to the
legislature, not to the judiciary, to decide on its propriety and force. The
legislature may select any property they please, to be taxed. If the tax is to
operate generally on every citizen, who may own the property declared liable
to it
,
it would be constitutional. If an act purports to exempt one class of
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Apportionment imperative. But the requirement of ap
portionment is imperative.1 And whenever the tax is a direct
levy on property, there must be a taxing district Given a tax
and a district, then the sum demanded of any one person, or laid
upon any one parcel of property, must have fixed relation to the
whole tax, as well as to that demanded of every other person or
laid upon every other piece of property. "Without this the exac
tions of money for the public are mere forced contributions, and
taxation will differ from the eminent domain only in this, that
the latter demands the property of the citizen when necessity re
quires it
,
and on making compensation, while the former exacts
it at discretion and without compensation.2
Of apportionment in general the following rules may perhaps
safely be predicated :
1
. Though the districts are established at the discretion of the
legislature, the basis of apportionment which is fixed upon must
be applied throughout the district.8 There cannot be two rules
of apportionment for the same tax in the same district ; if there
could be, there might be any number, and in effect there would
be none at all, and every man might be assessed arbitrarily.4
citizens, owning property upon which it imposes a tax in the hands of others,
it might be a discriminating tax, and unconstitutional." In Youngblood v.
Sexton, Sup. Ct, Mich., Oct. term, 1875, a tax on business was objected to
because the sum levied was uniform and did not discriminate according to
the business done ; but the court say, this is clearly within the power of the
legislature, who must determine conclusively whether this method is or is not
more just and politic than any other.
1 Henry e. Chester, 15 Vt., 460; Tide Water Co., e. Coster, 18 N.J. Eq.,
518, per Beasley, Ch. J.
» Christiancy, J., in Woodbridge e. Detroit, 8 Mich., 274, 309, following and
approving Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513. Compare State v.
Portage, 12 Wis., 562; Weeks «. Milwaukee, 10 id., 242, 258; Chicago t1.
Larned, 34 11l., 203; Creotee. Chicago, 56 id., 422; Wellere. St. Paul, 5 Minn.,
95 ; Wilson v. Supervisors of Sutter, 47 Cal., 91.
• O'Kane v. Treat, 25 11l., 557, 561 ; Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark., 289.
* Tide Water Co. e. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq., 518. In Wilson v. Supervisors of
Sutter, 47 Cal., 91, it was held incompetent to authorize the supervisors to
remit a levee tax on part of the district. And yet it would have been compe
tent originally to so bound the district as to exclude the part on which it was
proposed to remit the tax.
That the basis of the apportionment is not necessarily the same for general
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2. Though the apportionment must be general, a diversity in
the methods of collection violates no rule of right, and is as much
admissible as a diversity in police regulations. Indeed, this may,
under some circumstances, be an absolute necessity. Thus,
before the civil war had been brought to a termination, the
taxes under internal revenue laws were laid by general rules, but
special regulations were required for their enforcement in insur
rectionary districts. So a land tax might be assumed by one
state, while in another it might be necessary to have elaborate pro
visions for the sale of the property taxed.
3. It is no objection to a tax that the rule of apportionment
which has been provided for it fails in some instances, or even in
many instances, of enforcement Evasions of duty are liable to
and local taxes, even when value is the standard, is illustrated by the case of
Insurance Co. e. Baltimore, 23 Md., 296. It appears from that case that for the
purposes of an apportionment of state taxation among the municipal divisions,
the nominal capital of private coporations was assumed to be the value. But in
imposing the tax on the corporations themselves, or their members, the actual
value was ascertained. This method would be likely to lead to some' inequal
ities in the distribution of state taxation between districts, but they could not
be serious.
In this connection may be mentioned several cases in which classes of tax
able property were attempted to be relieved from the apportionment. In one
of these, the personal property was not to be taxed for the payment of a city
debt, for the reason, probably, that the purpose for which the debt was con
tracted was supposed to have benefited specially the real estate. Gilman v.
Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510.
Others were where in assessing the real estate for municipal taxes, the value
of improvements was required to be excluded. In all these cases, the discrim
ination has been held to be beyond the constitutional power of the legisla
ture. If the tax is to be assessed for a corporate purpose, it must be uniform
as to persons and property. The burden must be imposed upon all the prop
erty within the limits to be taxed. Any other rule would utterly destroy the
equality and uniformity contemplated by the constitution. If personal prop
erty or improvements may be exempted, with the same propriety and justice
the law might compel one half the real estate within this district to sustain
the whole burden. Thornton, J., in Primm v. Bellville, 59 11l., 142, 144;
Hale e. Kenosha, 29 Wis., 599. The tax in the Wisconsin case was for a
railroad debt; in the other for a sewer. In Baltimore e. Hughes, 1 G. & J.,
480, where a city council had authority to levy a tax for a public improve
ment on the district benefited thereby, it was held that if the ordinance
providing for the tax showed the improvement to be for the general benefit
of the city, and not of the particular district in which the tax was ordered,
the tax was void.
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occur under all laws ; but an evasion by one individual cannot
give another a legal right to be excused. If the law establishes
a uniform rule, its validity cannot depend upon the certainty
or uniformity of its enforcement.1
.i
. The apportionment of the tax is not to be extended to em
brace persons or property outside the district This is a matter
of jurisdiction, and if there are any exceptions to the rule they
must stand on very special and peculiar reasons.2
5
. Although exemptions may be made, as has been previously
shown, special and invidious discriminations against individuals
are illegal.8 This, so far as we know, is not disputed : and there
is plausible ground for at least a question, whether the principle
may not apply in some cases to the establishment of small dis
tricts for the construction of important public works ; districts,
the establishment of which, in view of the purpose for which the
tax is to be laid, is equivalent to the singling out of a few persons
for invidious discrimination. It has been held in one case that a
statute was void which, as to certain portions of a city street, em
powered the common ,;ouncil to cause it to be improved in a man
ner exceptionally expensive, at the cost of the abutting owners, and
against their will, when as to all the other streets of the city the
owners of the larger proportion of the frontage must petition for
such an improvement before it could be ordered.4 The statute was
looked upon as an abuse of the legislative power to apportion tax-
1 In United States v. Riley, 5 Blatcb., 204, 209, Shipman,J., speaking of the
internal revenue law, says : " The law is uniform, and thereby conforms to the
constitution. Its validity does not depend on the celerity or uniformity with
which it can be executed in some disturbed districts of the country. Tax laws,
both state and national, are required to be uniform. This is an elementary
principle of legislation, resting upon the solid foundation of justice. But it
is a novel doctrine that a law, uniform in its provisions, can be annulled by
the refusal of a portion of those on whom it is designed to operate to comply
with its provisions. If this notion were to prevail, civil commotion or foreign
invasion within a small district of the country would paralyze the govern
ment and repeal the fundamental law upon which its existence depends."
s See ante, pp. 14, 42.
8 The rule of uniformity applies to wharf and dockage charges laid on the
commerce of a city. People v. S. Fr., etc., Railroad Co., 35 Cal., 606.
* Howell e. Bristol, 8 Bush, 493, 497. Compare Covington v. Casey, 3 id.,
698; Washington Avenue, 69 Tenn. St., 352.
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es ; as perhaps it was. But the case must be very clear to warrant
the court in holding that the legislature, in acting upon a subject
within its admitted authority, has deprived itself of power by
abusing it1
1 In Arbegust v. Louisville, 2 Bush, 271, 275. Williams, J., has the following
remarks regarding the change of taxing districts by extension of city bound
aries : " When, in the judgment of the legislature, the interest of a suburban
population demands local regulations, and the peace, tranquillity and order of
the public indicates that such is necessary, we cannot doubt its constitutional
power to so enact, nor question its power to tax, for such purposes, the real as
well as the personal estate of the people, nor the large as well as the small lots
included therein ; for it is more consonant with the entire genins, equality and
justice of our constitution and laws, that each should bear the burdens of that
government which protects his person and property according to the worth
of his estate, than to discriminate against the small in favor of the large prop
erty holders. But whatever may be said of the intrinsic justice of such a
measure, there is no power in the courts to control this, when the taxing power
is conferred in good faith to uphold local government and give police regula
tions to the population, and not merely to embrace taxable property for reve
nue purposes in order to lighten the burdens of others."
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CHAPTEE VIII.
OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTERS OF TAXATION.
Necessity for official action. Taxation is an act of govern
ment Government can only perform its functions by means of
officers, and must make all its demands upon its citizens through
the medium of official action. However just it may be, that an
individual, in any condition or under any specified circumstances,
should contribute a part of his means to government revenues,
there is no lawful method of compelling him to do so, except
through the compulsion of official process. No individual as such,
or by virtue of his citizenship, can compel another to perform his
duty to the state. He must come clothed with the authority of
the state for the purpose, or, in contemplation of law, he comes as
a trespasser, whose lawless intrusion may rightfully be resisted
and repelled.
Officers, who are. An office is defined to be a public charge
or employment, and he who performs the duties of that office is
an officer.1 There are legislative, executive and judicial officers,
with duties pertaining to their respective departments of the gov
ernment, and there are also inferior officers, commonly designated
ministerial, whose duty it is to execute mandates lawfully
directed to them by superiors, whether of one department or of
another.8 The proceedings in tax cases are entrusted by the law
in part to officers who perform mere ministerial duties, and in
part are confided to those who, though not belonging to the judi
cial department, have functions which in a certain sense are judi
cial.
Officers de facto. It is sometimes found that the person who
is performing the duties of an office is not the one to whom the
1Marshall, Ch. J., United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock., 9(5, 102. Bouvier's
definition of an officer is " one who is lawfully invested with an office;" which
seems to exclude what are known as officers defa«to.
" Bouvier Die, Tit, Officers ; People e. The Governor, 29 Mich., 320.
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law, if properly followed, would have confided it. This may hap
pen from an uncertainty regarding the method by which the
officer should be chosen, a dispute of fact concerning the result of
the election which has been held, or from many other causes. If
in any such case, a person claiming to be chosen solves the doubt
in his own favor, and takes possession of the office, and if the pub
lic acquiesce in his assumption, he then performs the duties of the
office, and comes within the definition which has been given of an
officer. But while he is an officer in fact, if he is not rightfully
such, he may at any time be ousted of his position by judicial pro
ceedings, instituted in behalf of the state, at the instance of the
public prosecutor. Perhaps also the law of the state will allow
the person rightfully entitled, and who, by the wrongful posses
sion, is excluded from the office, to institute a proceeding for the
purpose on his own behalf. From what has been said, it will be
seen that there may therefore be officers dejure and officers de facto.
An officer dejure is one who not only is invested with the office, but
who has been lawfully appointed or chosen, and therefore has a
right to retain the office and receive its perquisites, and emolu
ments. An officer de facto is defined to be one who has the reputa
tion of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good
officer in point of law.1 He comes in by claim and color of right,
or he -exercises the office with such circumstances of acquiescence
on the part of the public, as at least afford a strong presumption
of right, but by reason of some defect in his title, or of some in
formality, omission or want of qualification, or by reason of the
expiration of his term of service, he is unable to maintain his pos
session, when called upon by the government to show by what
title he holds it2 It is immaterial in what the defect consists, or
whether the claim is in good faith or merely colorable. The public
acquiescence and reputation attach certain important consequences
1Parker «. Kett, 1 Ld. Raym., 658, per Holt, Ch. J.; King v. Corp. of Bed
ford Level, 6 East, 356, 368, per Ellenborough, Ch. J.; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N.
H., 113, 140; Davis e. Police Jury, 1 La. An., 288; Ray v. Murdock, 36 Miss.,
692. " An officer defacto is one who exercises the duties of an office under
color of appointment or election to that office." Storrs, J., in Plymouth v.
Painter, 17 Conn., 585, 588. To the same effect is Brown v. Lunt, 37 Me.. 423,
438; Strang ex parte, 21 Ohio, N. S., 610.
• Blackwell on Tax Titles, 92-3 ; Wilcox v. Smith, 5 Wend., 231.
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to his occupation of the office, which the interest of the state does
not permit to depend upon his own motives or the degree of plaus
ibility which attaches to his claim.1
Usurpers. It is possible also that one may attempt to per-
' la several recent cases, where persons have been performing official func
tions under assumed legislative authority which proved to be unconstitu
tional, the position has been taken, that one who acts as an officer under
legislation of this nature, could not be an officer de facto, because the legisla
tion was no law and consequently could give no color of right. It has also
been insisted, that an officer defa«to always is one who comes in by color of ap.
pointment or election by the authority having competent power to appoint or
elect; so that, if any office is elective, it matters not that the governor claims
and exercises the right to appoint, and that the appointee is enabled by public
acquiescence to act: the appointment being without authority of law, the ap
pointee is a mere usurper. The subject is very carefully considered in State
v. Carroll, 38 Conn., 449, 471 ; S. C, 9 Am. Rep., 409, where the authorities are
reviewed at length. The conclusions are summarized by Butler, Ch. J., as fol
lows : " An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful
officer, the law upon principles of policy and justice will hold valid, so far
as they involve the interests of the public and of third persons, where the
duties of the office were exercised : 1. Without a known appointment or elec
tion, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence, as were
calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his
action, supposing him to be the officer he assumed to be. 2. Under color of
a known and valid appointment or election, but where the officer has failed
to conform to some precedent requirement or condition, as to take an oath,
give a bond, or the like. 3. Under color of a known election or appointment,
void because the officer was not elegible, or because there was a want of
power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or
irregularity in its exercise; such ineligibility, want of power or defect being
unknown to the public. 4. Under color of an election or appointment by or
pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be
such." In Commonwealth e. McCombs, 56 Penn. St., 436, substantially the
same conclusion was reached. So it was also in Ex parte Strang, 21 Ohio,
N. S., 610, where the legislature, in disregard of a requirement of the consti
tution, bad made an appointment. The following cases, the most of which
are referred to in State v. Carroll, support the same views; O'Brian «. Kni-
van, Cro. Jac., 552; Harris v. Jays, Cro. Eliz.,699; Parker v. Kett, 1 Ld. Raym.,
658; Fowler v. Beebe, 9 Mass., 231 ; Taylor v. Skrlne, 3 Brev., 516; Wilcox v.
Smith, 5 Wend., 231 ; Parker e. Baker, 8 Paige, 428 ; People a. Kane, 23 Wend.,
414; People e.White, 24 id., 520; Burke v. Elliott, 4 Ired., 355; Gilliam e.
Reddick, 4 id., 368; Brown v. Lunt, 37 Me., 423, 428; State v. Bloom, 17Wis.,
521; People v. Bangs, 24 1ll., 184; Clark v. Commonwealth, 29 Penn. St., 129;
Mallette. Uncle Sam Co., 1 Nev., 188; Kimball v. Alcorn, 45 Miss., 151 ; Cocke
v. Ilalsey, 16 Pet., 71; Gibb v. Washington, 1 McAll., 430; Vaccari v. Max
well, 3 Blatch., 368..
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form the duties of an office, who is neither chosen to do so, pur
suant to law, nor is supported by the public acquiescence. Such
a person cannot acquire the reputation of being the officer he
assumes to be ; he is a mere usurper, and his acts are wholly void
for all purposes. No one is under obligation to recognize his
claim to the office, and whoever does so must take upon himself
the consequencea It is of high importance that the encourage
ment of such claims should not be allowed to bring disorder and
insecurity into public affairs.1
Questioning title of officer de facto. The case of an officer
de facto is different To deny validity to his acts would lead to
insecurity in both public and private affairs. It would compel
those having occasion to transact business with a public officer,
before they could put faith in his official acts, to go into a careful
examination of all the evidences of his title, and of the provisions
of law bearing upon them, in order to determine whether the as
sumption of official character is warranted by law, and is supported
by a compliance with the necessary formalities. " It would con
stitute every citizen a judge of official titles. He must look to
the constitution to see that the officer was eligible to an election
or appointment ; to the statute to ascertain when, where and how
the election or appointment is required to be made, and to the
poll books and archives of the state for the purpose of ascertain
ing the facts ; and then determine at his peril the mixed question
of law and fact involved in the ascertainment of official charac
ter."2 The mere statement of the case is sufficient to show that
such a requirement would in the highest degree be unjust to the
private citizen, and detrimental to public interests. But to treat
the official acts of a de facto incumbent as void would be equally
1See Plymouth e. Painter, 17 CoDn., 585, 593; Peck e. Holcombe, 3 Port,
329; Keeler v. Newborn, 1 Phil., N. C, 505; Munson v. Minor, 53 11l., 594.
In Birch v. Fisher, 13 S. & R., 208, an assessment made by persons not
shown to have been either elected or sworn, held to be by " mere intruders
who came in without color of authority." An officer who holds over in good
faith, though' without warrant of law, is not a usurper. Kreidler v. State, 24
Ohio, N. S., 22. Compare State v. McFarland, 25 La. An., 547. To support
oue's acts as those of an officer defacto, they must have been done under color
of an office whose duties have been discharged by him. Bailey v. Fisher, 38
Iowa, 229.
» Blackwell on Tax Titles, 94.
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unjust to him. "When the controversy should arise collaterally,
as commonly it must, the officer himself would not be a party to
the record, and would have no opportunity and no privilege of
meeting the issue raised, although the decision might as effectu
ally determine his right to act, as if he had been proceeded against
directly by the appropriate process of quo warranto. " This would
be judging a man unheard, contrary to the principles of natural
justice and the policy of the law." Until he is removed by pro
ceedings directly instituted for the purpose, and in which he is
permitted to be heard, " he holds the office by the sufferance of
the state, and the silence of the government is construed by the
courts as a ratification of his acts, which is equivalent to a pre
cedent authority. When the government acquiesce in the acts of
such an officer, third persons ought not to be permitted to ques
tion them."1 When, however, the officer himself attempts to
build up a right in his own favor, it is not unreasonable to require
him to defend his right, as he would be compelled to do if he
should assert title to any article of property as against the true
owner. His-suit for the legal fees may therefore be successfully
resisted, as may any attempt by him to enforce official process by
the aid of the law. These are cases in which he is a party, and is
properly called upon to demonstrate his title. Besides, if citizens
were not permitted to resist his official claims in such proceedings,
their acquiescence in them, until the state itself should be able to
bring to a conclusion the formal proceedings to try the title, would
be only an enforced acquiescence, and could not justly support a
title to an office by reputation. The most that public policy
could require in such cases would be that his de facto incumbency
should be evidence of a right prima facie in his favor, but leaving
the actual right subject to be disproved.8 And if he is sued for
1Blackwell on Tax Titles, 94 ; Bucknam «. Ruggles, 15 Mass., 180. See
People e. Lothrop, 24 Mich., 235. Proceedings of a common council in levy
ing a tax cannot be contested on the ground that by a change in the charter a
portion of the seats were vacated, if the members continued de facto to act.
Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. S., 126.
8Kent v. Atlantic Delaine Co., 8 R. I., 305, where it was held that one who
sues as collector to recover a ta:i gives sufficient prima facie evidence of his
authority if he shows he has acted as such officer in regard to that tux ; but
that this prima facie case is open to rebuttal. See also Colton v. Beardsley
36 Barb., 29; Auditors of Wayne v. Benoit, 20 Mich., 170; Pejepscott Propri.
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any act which he can only justify as an officer, he is put to the
proof that he was duly elected or appointed, and that any condi
tions precedent have been complied with.1
Validity of acts of officers de facto. On the other hand,
the public, by whose acquiescence the de facto officer has been
permitted to act, and individuals who have transacted official
business with him, have a right to rely upon the validity of that
which has been done by him, to the same extent precisely as if
the same acts had been performed in the same way by an officer de
jure. When such acts come collaterally in question, neither the
public, that has thus acquiesced, nor individual citizens, are per
mitted to question them. They are as valid, to all intents and
purposes, as if the title to the office had been unquestionable.
This is the general rule, as it has been settled on grounds of pub
lic policy from the time of the year books.2
etors e. Ransom, 14 Mass., 145. It was decided in Universal ist Society v.
Leach, 35 Vt., 108, that if an ineligible person is chosen sole prudential com.
mittee of a school district, his assessment of a tax voted by the district is
void.
1Lightly v. Clouston, 1 Taunt., 113; Riddle v. Bedford, 7 S. & R., 386,
392; Fetterman v. Hopkins, 5 Watts, 539; Pike v. Hanson, 9 N. H., 491; Col-
burn e. Ellis, 5 Mass., 427; Fowler v. Beebe, 9 id., 231, 234; Sprague v. Bai
ley, 19 Pick., 436 ; Patterson v. Miller, 2 Met., Ky., 493 ; People v. Hopson, 1
Denio, 574, 579; Greene v. Burke, 23 Wend., 488, 492; Schlencker e. Risley, 3
Scam., 483 ; Blake v. Sturtevant, 12 N. H., 567 ; Cummings v. Clark, 15 Vt.,
653; OIney v. Pearce, 1 R. I., 292; Samis v. King, 40 Conn., 298, 310; Vena-
ble v. Curd, 2 Head, 582. In First Parish in Sherbourne v. Fiske, it is said
that if parish assessors fail to take the oath of office, a tax assessed by them
would be illegal and might be recovered back. 8 Cush., 264. But a tax which
has been paid cannot be recovered back on the ground that the collector de
facto had never been legally elected and sworn. Williams t1.School District
21 Pick., 75. It is not intended to assert here that in every case in which the
state might oust an officer by quo warranto an individual could also take ad-
vantage of a defect in his title. The inquiry on behalf of the state may and
does go beyond that which individuals may institute. A prima facie right
is sufficient as against individuals, but only an indefeasible right as against
the state. As an illustration of what is meant, the case of one holding a
legal certificate of election may be taken : if a lawful election was held, the
certificate may conclude private parties, but the government would be at lib
erty to go beyond it and show that the election was accomplished by illegal
votes, or that for any other reason the prima facie case was defective. See
the discussion in Auditors of Wayne v. Benoit, 20 Mich., 176.
* " The law favors the acts of one in a reputed authority, and the inferior
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Officers de facto in tax cases. It remains to be seen wheth
er these general principles are applicable in tax cases. It has
sometimes been urged that in tax proceedings th«re was no proper
room for the application of the doctrine, which is applied in other
cases in support of action by officers de facto ; that the proceedings
are summary and for the most part ex parte; that they may de
prive the owner of his freehold by means of process which usual
ly and perhaps necessarily is somewhat arbitrary, and that he is
therefore entitled of right to have all the security, which the law
has intended he should have; in the character and standing of
of an officer duly and properly chosen for the particular duty ; in
shall never inquire if his authority is lawful." Vin. Abr., tit. " Officer," G., 3.
See Bac. Abr., "Offices and Officers," B.; People e. Collins, 7 Johns., 549,
551; Mclnstry v. Tanner, 9 id., 135; People v. Dean, 3 Wend., 438; Wil
cox v. Smith, 5 id., 231, 234; Parker v. Baker, 8 Paige, 429; People v.
Kane, 23 Wend., 414; People v. White, 24 id., 520; Fowler v. Beebe, 9 Mass.,
231; Commonwealth v. Fowler, 10 id., 290; Nason «. Dillingham, 15 id., 170;
Bucknam v. Ruggles, id., 180; Gilmore v. Holt, 4 Pick., 257; Williams e.
School District, 21 id., 75; Blackstone e. Taft, 4 Gray, 250; Burke e. Elliott, 4
Ired., 355; Gilliam v. Reddick, id., 368; Farmers & Merchants' Bank v. Ches
ter, 6 Humph., 458; Beard v. Cameron, 3 Murph., 181 ; Brush e. Cook, Brayt.,
89 ; Taylor v. Skrinc, 3 Brev., 516 ; Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn., 585 ; Doug
lass e. Wick wire, 19 id., 489; State v. Carroll, 38 id., 449; Sam is v. King,
40 id., 298; McGregor v. Balch, 14 Vt., 428; Downer e. Woodbury, 19 id.,
329; Lyon v. State Bank, 1 Stew., 442; Barret v. Reed, 2 Ohio, 409; Johnson
v. Steadman, 3 id., 94, 96; Eldred ». Sexton, 5 id., 216; Ex parte Strang, 21 Ohio,
N. S., 610; Justices of Jefferson v. Clark, 1 T. B. Monr., 82, 86; Rice e. Com
monwealth, 3 Bush, 14; Prickett«. People, 1 Gilm., 525, 529; Keyser v. Mc-
Kissam, 2 Rawle, 139; Riddle e. Bedford County, 7 S. & R., 386, 392; Baird
v. Bank of Washington, 11 id., 411; Neal v. Overseers, 5 Watts, 538; McKim
e. Somers, 1 Penrose & Watts, 297; Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Penn. St.,
436; Gregg v. Jamison, 55 id., 468; Cooper v. Moore, 4 Miss., 386; Kimball v.
Alcorn, 45 id., 145; Cabot e. Given, 45 Me., 144; Jones e. Gibson, 1 N. H.,
266 ; Moore a. Graves, 3 id., 408 ; Morse v. Calley, 5 id., 222 ; State e. Tolan,
33 N. J., 195; Leach e. Cassidy,23 Ind., 449; McCormick v. Fitch, 14 Minn.,
252 ; Auditors of Wayne County e. Benoit, 20 Mich., 176 ; Ex parte Bollman,
4 Cranch, TO; Sawyer e. Steele, 3 Wash. C C, 464; Willink v. Miles, Pet. C C,
188; Ronkendorf v. Taylor, 4 Pet., 349; Lawrence v. Sherman, 2 McLean,
488; United States v. Bathelder, 2 Gall., 15.
There is a discussion in McNutt v. Lancaster, 9 S. & M., 570, of the ques
tion whether, where the statute declared that the acts of one who should pre
sume to execute the duties of an office, before taking the official oath, should
be " absolutely void," could have any validity as those of an officer de facto.
No decision was reached.
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the official oath of such officer, when one is required by law ; in
the official bond if one is made necessary ; and indeed such secur
ity as would be afforded by a strict compliance with every pro
vision which has been made by the revenue laws for the protec
tion of taxpayers.1 The reasons are plausible, but they are not
very conclusive. Indeed if official action of officers de facto in
judicial positions can be sustained, as it often has been,2 though
not only property but also liberty may depend upon it
, it is diffi
cult to suggest any distinguishing reason to remove tax cases from
the application of the same principle. The clear and very strong
preponderance of authority is
,
that the general policy of the law
requires the acts of officers de facia to be sustained in tax cases,
under the same circumstances and on the same imperative reasons
that sustain them in others.8
Estoppel against intruders who have acted. The rule
which supports official action, may perhaps in some cases be car
ried with propriety even farther than is above stated. If one has
assumed to act as an officer under revenue laws, and has made col
lections, as such, he cannot be permitted, when the government calls
upon him for an accounting, to turn about and say that he was
1 Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H., 182; Payson e. Hall, 30 Me., 319; Coite v.
Wells, 2 Vt, 318; Isaacs v. Wiley, 12 id., 674; People v. Hastings, 29 Cal.,
449. Some of the cases which may seem to support this view are properly to
be referred to some other principle. They turn often upon the question,
whether the statute is mandatory in requiring that something should be done,
which has been omitted, or whether the person who has assumed to act as
officer held defacto the particular office to which the duty pertained ; or some
other question foreign to the precise point now under discussion.
* Lord Caere's Case, 1 Leon., 288; Margate Pier e. Hannam, 3 B. & Aid.,
266; Wilcox v. Smith, 5 Wend., 231; People e. Kane, 23 id., 414; People e.
White, 24 id., 520; Brown v. Lunt, 37 Me., 423; Taylor v. Skrines, 3 Brev.,
516; Mallettv. Uncle Sam Co., 1 Nev., 188; Clarke. Commonwealth, 29 Penu.
St, 129; Lavere. McGlachlin, 28 Wis., 364; In re Griffin, 2 Am. Law Times,
93.
3 Tucker e. Aiken, 7 N. H.,113; Smith v. Messer, 17 id., 420; Hall v. Cush-
ing, 2 Greenl., 218; Adams v. Jackson, 2 Aiken, 145; Spear v. Ditty, 8 Vt,
419; Downer v. Woodbury, 19 id., 329; Sheldon v. Coates, 10 Ohio, 278;
Washington «. Miller, 14 Iowa, 584 ; Allen v. Armstrong, 16 id., 515 ; Scott v.
Watkins, 22 Ark., 556; Twombly e.Kimbrough, 24 id., 459, 474; Ronkendorf
i. Taylor, 4 Pet., 349; Ray v. Murdock, 36 Miss., 692; Jones v. Scanland, 6
Humph., 195.
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never elected or appointed, but has acted as a mere usurper without
right, and that the proper remedy of the government was to have
resisted his intrusion, or caused his ouster. On every principle
of right and justice he is precluded from denying his official char
acter under such circumstances.1 Such a person has a right at any
time to refuse to proceed farther in official action, and he cannot
be held responsible as for a neglect of duty in such refusal ; but
it is doubtful if one under any circumstances, even though he be
a mere usurper, who has collected revenue for the government un
der claim of right, can be permitted to protect himself against an
accounting, by showing that he was an intruder without any just
pretense to the place. To the extent that he has acted, the gov
ernment may properly adopt his agency, and require him to give
to taxpayers, who have recognized his authority, the benefit of
their payments.2
1Johnston v.Wilson, 2 N. H., 202, 206; Horn v. Whittaker,6 id., 88; Sand
wich s1. Fish, 2 Gray, 298, 301; Barrington v. Austin, 8 id., 444; Wen
dell v. Fleming, id., 613; Cheshire e. Howland, 13 id., 321; Williams-
town v. Willis, 15 id., 427; Borden v. Houston, 2 Texas, 594; Billings-
ley v. State, 14 Md., 369. In Jones e. Scanland, 6 Humph., 195, it
appeared that a defaulter had been chosen sheriff. By law such a choice
was absolutely void. He nevertheless gave bond and acted in the collection
of taxes. On motion, judgment was entered on his official bond for failure
to pay over. Beete, J. : " The election of sheriff was void, and he did not there
by become sheriff dejure; but thus intruding himself into office, and assum
ing its duties, he became sheriff de facto, and those who voluntarily bound
themselves for the faithful performance of his duties cannot absolve them
selves from their obligation, by insisting that he was no sheriff. They will
be held to their undertaking, till the proper public authority has produced
his amotion from the office which he in point of fact fills."
• See United States e. Maurice, 2 Brock., 96; Bell v. Railroad Co., 4 Wall.,
598; State v. Cunningham, 8 Blackf., 339; Church e. Sterling, 16 Conn., 387;
Commonwealth e. Philadelphia, 27 Penn. St., 497; Wentworth e. Gove, 45 N.
H., 160; Trescott e. Moan, 50 Me., 347. A Sheriff who has collected taxes
without having the proper list is nevertheless liable to account. The Gov
ernor v. Montgomery, 2 Swan, 613. Cases of sale of the office of collector and
the effect thereof are found in Meredith v. Ladd, 2 N. H., 517 ; Carleton v.
Whitcher, 5 id., 196; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 id., 113; Alvord e. Collin, 20 Pick.,
418; Howard v. Pr»ctor,7 Gray, 128; Spencer v. Jones, 6 id., 502. Where the
fact of an official oath is in question it may be shown by parol that the oath
was taken, though the law requires a record. Briggs v. Murdock, 13 Pick.,
305; Pease «. Smith, 24 id., 122; Hall v. Cushing, 2 Greenl., 218; and see
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Joint official action. In some cases, under the tax laws,
official action is required to be taken by a board composed of
several persons. It may then appear that there has been an im
possibility to secure concurrence, or that, through neglect or inad
vertence, less than the whole board has acted ; and it becomes
necessary to determine whether, in any such case, the action can
be supported. The rules of law on this subject are well settled.
The law contemplates, that all the members of a board, who are
to exercise a joint public authority, shall meet to consider the
subject of their authority, and that the whole board shall have
the benefit of the judgment and advice of each of the members.
In revenue cases, especially, and in others in which the official
action may eventuate in divesting the citizen of his estate, it is to
be supposed the law intended that this joint deliberation and ac
tion should be for the benefit of the citizen also. If
,
therefore,
no such meeting is held, and no opportunity had for joint consul
tation and action, the joint authority is not well executed, even
though all acting separately may have signed such a document as
would have been sufficient, were it the result of a proper meeting.
Such action is not the action of the board, but of individuals.
It is always presumable that it might have been different had
there been a meeting and comparison of views, such as the law
contemplated. At any rate, there can be no conclusive or satis
factory evidence of what would have been the joint judgment,
when it has never been exercised ; and the members of the board
have no discretion to substitute individual action when the law
has required the action of the organized body.1 No custom of
the locality, or long continued practice can legalize the putting
aside of this rule of law. The members of the board are officers
of law, and must obey the rules that presumably for beneficial
Scott v. Watkins, 22 Ark., 566. And as to the right of a collector to contest
the validity of a tax he has collected, see People v. Brown, 55 N. Y., 180.
1 See Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend., 178, 182, per Cowen, J.; Lee e. Parry, 4
Denio, 125; Powell e. Tuttle, 3 N. Y., 396; People e. Supervisors of Chenan-
go, 11 id., 563; Fuller e. Gould, 20 Vt., 643.
If only two of a board of three qualify and act, there is no board, and the
action is void. Schenck v. Peay, 1 Dill., 267; S. C, 1 Woolw., 175. So, if
only two of the three are chosen, the two cannot act. Williamsburg v. Lord,
51 Me. 599. And see Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend., 178, 182.
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purposes, have been prescribed for them.1 But the law does not
require impossibility, and it may be found impossible for the
members to agree in joint action. In such a case, it is to be pre
sumed the intent was, that the law should not fail of execution,
but that the action of the majority should be sufficient. And,
where a majority have acted, the legal intendment in favor of the
correctness of official action, requires us to conclude that such
action is the result of due meeting and consultation, or at least of
a meeting duly called, at which all had the opportunity to attend,
and a majority did attend. It is therefore prima facie valid,
though the legal presumption in its favor may be overcome by
evidence that no such meeting was called or had.2
1In Middleton v. Berlin, 18 Conn., 189, a tax list was signed by one only of
a board of five assessors. An attempt was made to support it by showing a
usage of the towu to divide the town into districts, in each of which one of
the assessors acted separately ; but the court said " assessors are the officers
of the law, and must obey the law, and no direction of the town, or long con
tinued usage can justify a departure from the law." See People v. Supervis.
ors of Chenango, 11 N. Y., 563. In Kinney v. Doe, 8 Blackf., 350, the list was
made by the official lister, but it was not shown that two householders acted
with him as the law required, and it was held void.
8In support of the general principle, that the action of a majority is suffi
cient, see Wadham College, Cowp., 377; Grindley v. Barker, 1 B. & P., 236;
The King v. Beeston, 3 T. R., 592; Withnell e. Gartham, 6 id., 388; Cooley v.
O'Connor, 12 Wall., 391, 398; Commonwealth v. Canal Commissioners, 9
Watts, 466, 471 ; Jewett v. Alton, 7 N. II., 253 ; Babcock v. Lamb, 1 Cow., 238 ;
Rogers, ex parte, 7 id., 526 ; McCoy v. Curtice, 9 Wend., 17, 19 ; Downing e.
Rugar, 21 id., 178; Crocker v. Crane, id., 211, 218; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio,
594; Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y., 467; Caldwell e. Harrison, 11
Ala., 755; Soens e. Racine, 10 Wis., 271; Sprague v. Bailey, 19 Pick., 436;
Williams v. School District, 21 id., 75; Fire District e. County Commission
ers, 103 Mass., 142; People v. Coghill, 47 Ca1., 361; Johnson e. Goodridge, 15
Me., 29; Bangor v. Lancey, 21 id., 472; Lowe v. Weld, 52 id., 588.
This is on the ground that all are presumed to have met and consulted, a
presumption that may be overcome by proof. Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio,
594,598, per Bronson, J.; Ex parte Baltimore Turnpike Co., 5 Binn., 481;
Blackwellon Tax Titles, 111. Under the decisions which are above cited, it
is difficult to understand how a case like Howard e. Proctor, 7 Gray, 128, can
be supported. There, one who was selectman and also assessor, was chosen
collector, and it was decided that the choice was valid, though his bond was
to be approved by the selectmen, and the assessors, in certain cases, had au
thority to remove him. The decision was put on the ground that these
boards might act by majorities; but the very nature of the action was such as
to preclude one member of the board from consultation and action with the
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Official returns and certificates. It is generally held that
the returns and certificates required of an officer in the perform
ance of official duty are to be taken, in the proceeding in which
they are made, as of unquestionable verity. They are not to be
attacked, and proof entered into in a collateral proceeding, to
which the officer is not a party, to show that they are false.1
rest, or if he could act, made him interested adversely to the public. See also
Fox e. Fox, 24 Ohio (N. S.), 335. Kinyon v. Duchene, 21 Mich., 498, is contra.
Where a drainage law provided that the commissioners shall jointly view
and assess, etc., this requires the presence of all, both in viewing and assess
ing. People v. Coghill, 47 Cal., 361. Compare Palmer v. Doney, 2 Johns. Cas.,
346.
1Com. Dig. Return, G. ; Flud e. Pennington, Cro. Eliz., 872; Harrington e.
Taylor, 17 East, 378; Ilex v. Elkins, 4 Burr., 2129; Andrews v. Linton, 1 Salk.,
265 ; Wheeler v. Lampman, 14 Johns., 481, 482 ; Putnam v. Man, 3 Wend., 202 ,
Case v. Redfield, 7 id., 398 ; Boomer v. Laine, 10 id., 525 ; Baker v. McDuffle,
23 id., 289; Sperling v. Levy, 1 Daly, 95,98; McArthur v. Pease, 46 Barb.,
423; Livermore e. Bagley, 3 Mass., 487,512; Slay ton e. Chester, 4 id., 478;
Gardner v. Hosmer, 6 id., 324, 327; Bott v. Burnell, 9 id., 96; Estabrook v.
Hapgood, 10 id., 313, 314; Bott v. Burnell, 11 id., 163; Saxton v. Nimms, 14
id., 313, 320; Bean e. Parker, 17 id., 591,601; Lawrence v. Pond, id., 433;
Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick., 109,112; Whittaker v. Sumner, 7 id., 551,555;
Boynton v. Willard, 10 id., 165, 169; Erucee. Holden, 21 id., 187, 189: Pullen
«. Haynes, 11 Gray, 379; Campbell v. Webster, 15 Gray, 28; McGough v.
Wellington, 6 Allen, 505; Hathaway e. Phelps, 2 Aiken, 84; Stevens v. Brown,
3 Vt., 420; Eastman v. Curtis, 4 id., 616; Barret v. Copeland, 18 id., 67, 69;
White River Bank v. Downer, 29 id., 332; Lewis e. Blair, 1 N. H., 68; Whi
ting v. Bradley, 2 id., 79, 81 ; Sias v. Badger, 6 id., 393; Brown v. Davis, 9 id.,
76; Angier v. Ash, 26 id., 99; Clough v. Monroe, 34 id., 381; Ladd e. Wig
gins, 35 id., 421; Bolles v. Bowen, 45 id., 124; Morse v. Smith, 47 id., 474;
Phillips e. Elwell, 14 Ohio St., 240; Eastman e. Bennett, 6 Wis.. 232; Carr v.
Commercial Bank, 16 id., 50; Castner v. SymoDds, 1 Minn., 427; Tullis v.
Brawley, 3 id., 277; Folsom v. Carli, 5 id., 333; Delenger v. Higgins, 26 Mo.,
180; McDonald v. Leewright, 31 id., 29; Reeves v. Reeves, 33 id., 28; Stewart
v. Stringer, 44 id., 400; Washington, etc., Co. v. Kinnear, 1 Wash. Ter., 116;
Tillman v. Davis, 28 Ga., 494; Brown v. Way, 28 id., 531; Allender v. Riston,
2 Gill. & J., 86; Tribble v. Frame, 3 Monr., 51; Caldwells v. Harlan, 3 id.,
349, 351; McConnel v. Bowdry's Heirs, 4 id., 392; Smith v. Hornback, 3 A
K. Marsh, 378, 392,393; Small v. Hagden, 1 Litt., 16,17; Trigg v. Lewis'
Ex'rs, 3 id., 129, 132 ; Hunter v. Kirk, 4 Hawks, 277 ; Stinson v. Snow, 1 Fairf.,
263; Wilson v. Hurst's Ex'rs, 1 Pet. (U. C;, 441 ; Hawks e. Baldwin, Brayt.,
85; Welsh v. Bell, 32 Penn. St., 12; Paxon's Appeal, 49 id., 195; Hill v. Grant,
49 id., 200; Rico e. Groff, 58 id., 116; Ayres v. Duprey, 27 Texas, 593;
Angell v. Bowler, 3 R. I., 77 ; Castner v. Styer, 23 N. J., 236 ; State v. Clerk of
Bergen, 25 id., 209 ; Martin v. Barney, 20 Ala., 369 ; Crow v. Hudson, 21 id.,
SCO; Hinckley e. Buchanan, 5 Cal., 53.
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If the party is injured by a false return, he has his remedy by
action against the officer.1
In general it is believed that these rules have been held to be
applicable in tax cases.2
1Wheeler e. Lampman, 14 Johns., 481 ; Putnam e. Man, 3 Wend., 202 ; Case
v. Redfield, 7 id., 398; Baker e. McDuffle, 23 id., 289; McArthur e. Pease, 46
Barb., 423; Livermore v. Bagley, 3 Mass., 487,512; Slayton «. Chester, 4 id.,
478; Gardner v. Hosmer, 8 id., 324,327; Whitaker v. Sumner, 7 Pick., 551;
Boynton v. Willard, 10 id., 165, 169; Bruce e. Holden, 21 id., 187, 189; Pullen
e. Haynes, 11 Gray, 379; Campbell e. Webster, 15 id., 28; McGough v. Wei.
lington, 6 Allen, 505; Clough v. Monroe, 34 N. H., 381 ; Lewis v. Blair, 1 id.,
68; Siase. Badger, 6 id., 393; Angier v. Ash, 26 id., 99; Bolles v. Bowen,
45 id., 124; Tomlinson v. Long, 8 Jones L. 469; Albright v. Tapscott, 8
id., 473; McBee e. State, 1 Meigs, 122; Castner e. Symonds, 1 Minn., 427;
Folsom v. Carli, 5 id., 333; Goodal v. Stuart, 2 Hen. & Munf., 105, 112; Trigg
«. Lewis' Ex'rs, 3 Litt., 129, 132 ; Hunter «. Kirk, 4 Hawks, 277 ; Stinson v.
Snow, 1 Fairf., 263; Philips v. Ewell, 14 Ohio St., 240; McDonald e. Lee-
wright 31 Mo., 29; Stewart v. Stringer, 41 id., 400; State v. Clerk of Bergen,
25 N. J., 209; Mentz v. Hamman, 5 Whart., 150; Paxon's Appeal, 49 Penn.
St. 195 ; Eastman v. Bennett, 6 Wis., 232.
* There are cases which hold official returns of ministerial officers to be only
prima facie evidence of facts recited : Cockrell e. Smith, 1 La. An., 1 ; Waddell
e. Judson, 12 id., 13; Leverich e. Adams, 15 id., 310; Wallis v. Bourg, 16 id.,
176; Newton e. Prather, 1 Duv., 100; Fleece v. Goodrum, 1 id., 306; Kings
bury v. Buchanan, 11 Iowa, 387; Pomeroye. Parmelee, 9 id., 140, 150;
Owens e. Ranstcad, 22 11l., 161, 167 ; Rivard v. Gardner, 39 id., 125, 129 ; Gregg
e. Strange, 3 Ind., 366 ; Doe e. Attica, 7 id., 641 ; Butler v. State, 20 id., 169 ;
Tucker e. Bond, 23 Axk., 268; Ingraham e. McGraw, 3 Kans., 521.
In Lothrop v. Ide, 13 Gray, 93, a collector sued for arresting a person on a
tax warrant, relied upon his return as showing that the party had no goods on
which to levy. The plaintiff was allowed to give evidence that he offered to
turn out goods in satisfaction of the tax. On exceptions the following opin
ion was given by Dewey, J :
" The questions in the present case concern the admission and effect of the
evidence offered by the plaintiff, that prior to the actual arrest of the plaintiff
for the nonpayment of his tax, he tendered to the defendant sufficient person
al property, that might have been levied upon to satisfy the same. The ob
jection to its admission is that it contravenes the return of a sworn officer.
The officer does not in the present instance directly aver that there were not
sufficient goods of the plaintiff that might have been found to levy upon, but
merely says, ' not Snding sufficient goods upon which it may l1e levied,' he
arrested the body. There is no allegation that he made search for the goods,
or that the same might not have been found with proper diligence. Without
deciding the more general question of directly contradicting a return of a col
lector of taxes, and whether, in a suit brought against such collector for an
illegal arrest, his return is to be considered prima facie evidence merely, and
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CHAPTER IX.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF TAX LAWS.
One of the most serious of the difficulties which are encoun
tered in the administration of the revenue laws, is that' of ascer
taining the intent of the legislature in the enactment of particu
lar provisions, and in giving that intent the proper application
and effect.
Rules of construction in general. Artificial rules of con
struction have probably found more favor with the courts than
they have ever deserved. The application of them has often
times been pushed to an extreme which has defeated the plain
and manifest purpose in enacting the laws. Penal laws have
presumed to be correct until the contrary be shown, it might perhaps be suf
ficient in the present case to say that no such direct averment is made here.
" But the court are of the opinion that, in case of an action instituted against
a collector of taxes for an illegal arrest, the certificate of the collector is not
conclusive evidence in his own favor. In cases of certificates of field-drivers,
they have been treated as prima facie evidence of their doings rather than
conclusive. In the somewhat loose language, formerly used, they were said
to change the burden of proof, by which language we understand, when used
in reference to this class of cases, not a change of the technical burden of
proof upon the issue, but that they are to avail until controlled by a greater
weight of evidence overpowering them. In Pickard v. Howe, 12 Met., 207, it
was considered as prima facie evidence, and also in the case of Bruce v. Hol-
den, 21 Pick., 187. In the case of Barnard v. Graves, 13 Met., 19, it was said
that the certificate of a collector of taxes, of his doings on a levy of his war
rant, is to be deemed prima facie evidence as to all matters upon which they
are by law to make returns. We have not felt that the decision in Livermore
v. Bagley, 3 Mass., 513 should require us to come to a different result in the
present case from that stated in Barnard v. Graves.
"The evidence being admissible, we think it is such as would have war-
ranted the jury in returning a verdict for the plaintiff. The authority to ar
rest the body, which is given by Rev. Stat, ch. 8, § 11, arises only where the
collector cannot find sufficient goods upon which to levy. This provision
continues in force at all times previous to an act of arrest."
In Bowen e. Donovan, 32 Ind., 379, it was held competent to defeat a tax
sale of lands by showing that the tax-payer had personal property from which
the tax might have been collected. And see Scales v. Alvi8, 12 Ala., 617.
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been construed out of all meaning, and in remedial laws remedies
have sometimes been found which the" legislature never gave.
Something of this fate has befallen the revenue laws. In some
of the earlier cases they seem to have been regarded as things
which, like the obligations entered into with a usurer, were to be
confined to the very letter of the bond, if enforced at all ; and
every intendment was made against them and the proceedings
under them. The legislature has endeavored to remedy the evil
by going to the opposite extreme. It has passed statutes from
time to time in the supposed exercise of a control over rules of
evidence which, if literally construed and enforced, are in the na
ture of judicial decrees, determining conclusively against the per
son whose property has been seized for taxes, all such questions
of law or right as he might raise in support of his inheritance.
It is difficult to determine which is more unreasonable, the old
strictness of some of the courts against tax proceedings, or the
new strictness of some legislation against those who have the
misfortune to be confronted with a tax deed.
The intent to govern. The underlying principle of all con
struction is that which seeks the intent of the legislature in the
words employed to express it. Beyond the words we are not to
look, where the meaning is plain and intelligible.1 If the law is
plain and unambiguous, the legislature must be intended to mean
what has been plainly expressed, and nothing remains but to
give the intent effect2 When doubts arise on the meaning
1The construction of a statute is to be gathered only from the words used
where they are plain and intelligible. Therefore, where a statute providing
for the summary arrest of a defaulting collector, authorized him to be released
on giving bond after he had been committed to prison after his arrest, it was
held that a bond taken without committing him to prison was unauthorized.
Daggett v. Everett, 19 Me., 373.
•United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 399; Sturgis e. Crowninshield, 4
Wheat., 122, 202; People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 31, 35; S. C, 4 id., 384; Newell v.
People, 7 N. Y., 9, 83; McClusky e. Cromwell, 11 id., 593; People v. N. Y.
Central R. R. Co., 24 id.. 485, 492; Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md., 471;
Cantwell v. Owens, 14 id., 215 ; Case e. Wildridge, 4 Ind., 51 ; Spencer e. State,
5 id., 41, 49; Ludlow's Heirs e. Johnson, 3 Ohio, 553; Ezekiel e. Dixon, Kel
ly, 146 ; In re Murphy, 23 N. J., 180 ; State v. Blasdel, 4 Nev., 241 ; Patterson
e. Yuba, 13 Cal., 175; District Township v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262; Bidwell e.
Whittaker, 1 Mich., 479 ; Bartlett v. Morris, 9 Port, 266 ; McAdoo v. Benbow,
63 N. C, 461, 464.
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of the words, the antecedent law, the evil to be remedied, the
circumstances under which the law has been enacted, and to some
extent the contemporaneous or even the subsequent practical con
struction may be resorted to, for any light they may possibly
throw upon the meaning. And here rules of interpretation come
in which are discussed with more or less fullness in various ele
mentary treatises.1 But rules of interpretation are only in the
nature of suggestions, by means of which we may be enabled to
reach an intent which has been doubtfully expressed. If the
intent is plain without them, they are useless, and may introduce
doubts where none existed ; but if the words are capable of sev
eral constructions, they may serve to indicate, with reasonable
certainty, the one which was in the mind of the legislature.
Construction of revenue laws. In the construction of the
revenue laws,8 special consideration is of course to be had of the
purpose for which they are enacted. That purpose is to supply
the government with a revenue. But in the proceedings to ob
tain this it is also intended that no unnecessary injury shall be
inflicted upon the individual taxed. While this is secondary to
the main object — the impelling occasion of the law — it is none
the less a sacred duty. Care is taken in constitutions to insert
provisions to secure the citizen against injustice in taxation,
1See especially Blackstone's Commentaries; the Treatises of Sedgwick &
Smith; Dwarris on Statutes, with Potter's additions; Bishop on Statutory
Crimes ; Story on the Constitution ; Cooley Const. Lim., Chapter IV.
2It may be noted here, that while under the federal government the term
most usually applied to the laws by which taxes are laid and collected is
revenue laics, in a number of the states that term is seldom made use of as ap
plying to the laws of the state for the corresponding purpose. There is no
substantial difference, however, in the meaning of the two terms, tax laws and
revenue laws. In Peyton v. Bliss, 1 Woolw., 170,173, Mr. Justice Miller says:
' Any law which provides for the assessment and collection of a tax to defray
the expenses of the government is a revenue taw. Such legislation is com
monly referred to under the general term " revenue measures," and those
measures include all the laws by which the government provides means for
meeting its expenditures. I can imagine no definition of a government
revenue which would not include all the money raised by any form of taxa
tion." But an act imposing a penalty which goes to the government is not for
that reason merely a revenue law. Keveuue laws are those laws only whoso
principal object is the raising of revenue, and not those under which rev-
enue may incidentally arise. The Nashville, 4 Biss., 188.
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and all legislative action is entitled to the presumption that this
has been intended. We are therefore at liberty to suppose that
the two main objects had in view in framing the provisions of
any tax law, were first, the providing a public revenue, and second,
the securing of individuals against extortion and plunder under
the cover of the proceedings to collect the revenue. The provis
ions for these purposes are the important provisions of the law.
Other provisions may be made for subordinate purposes ; to en
courage order, regularity and promptitude in the proceedings, and
to give to the government a security against losses and frauds
beyond what might be had in the integrity of officers.
The question regarding the revenue laws has generally been,
whether or not they should be construed strictly. The general
rules of interpretation require this in the case of statutes which
may divest one of his freehold by proceedings not in the ordinary
sense judicial, and to which he is only an enforced party. It is
thought to be only reasonable to intend that the legislature, in
making provision for such proceedings, would take unusual care
to make use of terms which would plainly express its meaning,
in order that ministerial officers might not be left in doubt in the
exercise of unusual powers, and that the citizen might know ex
actly what were his duties and liabilities. A strict construction
in such cases is reasonable, because presumptively the legislature
has given in plain terms all the power it has intended should be
exercised. It has been very generally supposed that the like
Btnct construction was reasonable in the case of tax laws. Mr.
Dwarris in his Treatise on Statutes has the following remarks :
"Statutes made for the advancement of trade and commerce,
and to regulate the conduct of merchants, ought to be perfectly
clear and intelligible to persons of their description. By the use
of ambiguous clauses in laws of that sort, the legislature would
be laying a snare for the subject, and a construction which con
veys such an imputation ought never to be adopted. Judges,
therefore, where clauses are obscure, will lean against forfeitures,
leaving it to the legislature to correct the evil, if there be any.
With this view, the ship registry acts, so far as they apply to
defeat titles and to create forfeitures, are to be construed strictly,
as penal, and not liberally, as remedial laws. In like manner in
the revenue laws, where clauses inflicting pains and penalties aro
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ambiguously or obscurely worded, the interpretation is ever in
favor of the subject; 'for this plain reason,' said Healh, J., in
Hubbard v. Johnstone, ' that the legislature is ever at hand to
explain its own meaning, and to express more clearly what has
been obscurely expressed.'" The same author on another page
says :
" It is a well settled rule of law, that every charge upon
the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous lan
guage. Acts of parliament which impose a duty upon the pub
lic will be critically construed with reference to the particular
language in which they are expressed. When there is any am
biguity found, the construction must be in favor of the public ;
because it is a general rule, that when the public are to be
charged with a burden, the intention of the legislature to impose
that burden must be explicitly and distinctly shown." 1 This
statement of the general rule expresses the view which it is be
lieved has always prevailed in England.2 It is also that which
1Dwarris on Statutes, 742, 749.
s Quotations from a few cases may be here given. In Warrington v. Furbor,
8 East, 242, 245 (case of a stamp tax), Lord Ellenborough, Ch. J., says : " Where
the subject is to be charged with a duty, the cases in which it is to attach
ought to be fairly marked out, and we should give a liberal construction to
words of exception confining the operation of the duty." In Williams v. San-
gar, 10 East, 66, 69 (case of turnpike tolls), Lord Ellenborough says :
" In the
construction of these tax acts we must look at the strict words, however we
may sometimes lament the generality of the expression used in them ; but we
must construe those words according to their plain meaning with reference to
the subject matter." In Denn «. Diamond, 4 B. & C, 244 (case of an ad valorem
duty on sales), Bayley, J., says : " It is a well settled rule of law that every
charge upou the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous lan
guage." It was therefore held that a conveyance in consideration of natural
love and affection was not taxable as a " sale." In Tompkins v. Ashby, 6 B.
& C, 541, 543 (case of a stamp duty), Lord Tenterden, Ch. J., says : " Acts of
parliament imposing duties are so to be construed as not to make any instru-
ments liable to them unless manifestly within the intention of the legisla
ture." In Doe v. Snaith, 8 Bing., 147, 152 (case of a stamp duty), Tindal, Ch.
J., says: "As all stamp acts, being a burden on the subject, must be clearly
expressed, wherever they impose the burden, I should say that even if there
were doubt, we should take the smaller sum." In Wroughton v. Turtle, 11
Mees. & W., 561, 567, Park, B., says : " It is a well settled rule of law that
every charge on the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous
words." In Marquis of Chandos e. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 6
Exch., 464, 479, Pollock, C B., says: "It is a well established rule in the con
struction of revenue acts that a duty cannot be imposed on the subject except
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has been adopted in the several states.1 Like views have
been frequently expressed by the federal courts. Thus, Mr.
Justice Story in giving reasons for holding that the reve
nue act of 1841 did not intend to levy a certain permanent
duty on indigo, says : " My reasons for this conclusion are
these : In the first place, it is
,
as I conceive, a general rule in the
interpretation of all statutes, levying taxes or duties, upon sub
jects or citizens, not to extend their provisions, by implication, be
yond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their
operation so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out,
although standing upon a close analqgy. In every case, therefore
of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the
government, and in favor of the subjects or citizens, because bur
dens are not to be imposed nor presumed to be imposed, beyond
what the statutes expressly and clearly import Eevenue statutes
are in no just sense remedial laws, or laws founded upon any per
manent public policy, and therefore, are not to be liberally
construed. Hence, in the present case, if it be a matter of real
doubt, whether the intention of the act of 1841 was to levy a per
manent duty on indigo, that doubt will absolve the importer from
paying the duty, beyond the period when it would otherwise
be free." 2 Duties it is said by Mr. Justice Nelson " are never
imposed upon the citizen upon vague or doubtful interpretations." 3
by clear -words. The meaning of the legislature must be distinctly made out
from the terms of the statute." In Gurr v. Scudds, 11 Exch., 190, 192, Pollo«k,
C. B., says: "If there is any doubt as to the meaning of the stamp act, it
ought to be construed in favor of the subject, because a tax cannot be im
posed without clear and express words for that purpose."
1 " Statutes which impose restrictions upon trade or common occupations,
or which levy an excise or tax upon them, must be construed strictly." Par
ker, Ch. J., in Sewell v. Jones, 9 Pick., 412, 414. " A statute conferring au
thority to impose taxes must be construed strictly." Anderson, Ch. J., in
Moseley e. Tift, 4 Fla., 402, 403. "A strict construction of the [tax] law is
fully authorized by the nature and consequences of the proceeding." Stuart,
J., in Barnes v. Doe, 4 Ind., 132, 133, quoting Williams v. State, 6 Blackf., 36.
" It is a well settled rule that every charge under a stamp act must be imposed
by clear and unambiguous words." Hay, J., in Smith v.Waters, 25 Ind., 397,
399. See Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Ga., 23; Williamsburg v. Lord, 51 Me.,
599; Boyd v. Hood, 57 Penn. St., 98.
• United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, 373.
> Powers v. Barney, 5 Blatch., 202, 203.
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" The revenue laws," it is said in another case are not to be so
construed as to extend their meaning beyond the clear import of
the words used."1 In another case remarks are made by an able
circuit judge, which apply with great force to nearly all the feder
al revenue laws. " In construing a severe statute, declaring a
heavy forfeiture (and according to one construction claimed, for
small offenses), it is just to say, that those who arc called upon to
conduct their business affairs in view of all its provisions, ought
to be fairly apprised of its requirements, and its penalties of what
ever kind. They are bound to know the law, but law makers owe
to them the duty to make the law intelligible ; and those whose
business it is to construe or expound a law which is of doubtful or
double meaning, should not incline to the harshest possible mean
ing, when it is obvious that those to whom it is to be applied
may well have been led to trust in another, which is less severe,
but equally satisfying its terms. This is not saying that laws of
the kind in question are to be strictly construed in favor of the
subject and against the state, but only, that they should be con
strued with reasonable fairness to the citizen."2 There are some
cases, however, from which, if the expressions made use of in
the opinions are taken literally, a different rule might be de
duced. Thus it is said in one case : " A revenue law is not to be
strictly construed, but rather the contrary, so as to attain the ends
for which it was enacted."8 In other cases it is said that, " the
penalties annexed to violations of general revenue laws do not
make them penal, in the sense which requires them to be con
strued strictly."
4 And in the decision of a recent case in the United
States supreme court, a similar view seems to be taken.
" Eev-
enue statutes," it is said, "are not to be regarded as penal, and
therefore to be construed strictly. They are remedial in their char
acter and to be construed liberally, to carry out the purposes of their
enactment."'
1United States v. Watts, 1 Bond, 580, 583, per Leaviit, J.
» Woodruff, J., in United States v. Distilled Spirits, 10 Blatch., 428, 433.
• Beady, J., in United States v. Olney, 1 Abb., U. S., 275, 282. See Twenty-
eight Cases, 2 Ben., 63.
4United States e. Barrels of Spirits, 2 Abb., U. S., 305, 314, per Dillon, J.
And see United States v. Cases of Cloth, Crabbe, 356.
• United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall., 395, 406, citing Cliquot's Champagnp,
3 Wall., 114, 115.
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It seems highly probable that the word remedial has been em
ployed by the learned judge delivering the opinion in this case,
in a sense differing from that in which it is commonly used in the
law. A remedial law, as the term is generally employed, is some
thing quite different from the revenue laws. An author of ac
cepted authority expresses the ordinary understanding, when he
defines a remedial statute to be "one which supplies such defects
and abridges such superfluities of the common law as may have
been discovered1 ; such as may arise either from the imperfection
of all human laws, from change of time and circumstances, from
mistakes and unadvised determinations of unlearned (or even
learned) judges, or from any other cause whatever ; and this being
done either by enlarging the common law where it was too narrow
and circumscribed, or by restraining it where it was too lax and
luxuriant, has occasioned another subordinate division of remedial
acts into enlarging and restraining statutes. So it seems that a
remedial statute may also have its application to, and effect upon
other existing statutes, and give the party injured a remedy; and
for a more general definition, ' it is a statute giving a party a mode
of remedy for a wrong where he had none or a different one
before.'"2
Mr. Justice Blackstone speaks of statutes against frauds as
remedial, but the context shows he is speaking of statutes giv
ing parties a remedy against frauds; and he adds: "when the
statute acts upon the offender and inflicts a penalty, as the pillory
or a fine, it is then to be taken strictly, but when the statute acts
upon the offense by setting aside the fraudulent transaction,
here it is to be construed liberally."8 Another author in point
ing out the distinction between penal and remedial laws remarks
that " the remedy for breach of a remedial statute is by an action
for damages, sustained from such a breach, at the suit of the party
grieved ; that for breach of a penal statute, by an action of debt
for the penalty, or, in more concise terms, the legal distinction be
tween remedial and penal statutes is
,
that the former gives relief
1 1 BL Com., 86.
»Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 73, citing, Chitty's note to 1 Bl. Com., 86.
The definition in Bouvier's Law Dictionary is the same.
« 1 Bl. Com., 88.
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to the party grieved ; the latter imposes penalties for offenses com
mitted." 1 These considerations would seem to justify the conclu
sion that the learned judge, in applying the word remedial to tax
laws, has used it in some political or special, rather than in the
strict legal sense, and that it was not the intention of the court to
overrule the opinion of Mr. Justice Story in Wigglesworth's case.»
There may and doubtless should be a distinction taken in the
construction of those provisions of revenue laws which point out
the subjects to be taxed, and indicate the time, circumstances and
manner of assessment and collection, and those which impose pen
alties for obstructions and evasions. There is no reason for pecu
liar strictness in construing the former. Neither is there reason
for liberality. The difference in some cases is exceedingly im
portant The one method squeezes everything out of the statute
which the unyielding words do not perforce retain ; the other
reaches out by intendment, and brings within the statute what
ever can fairly be held embraced in its beneficent purpose. The
one narrows the statute as it is studied ; the other expands it
Every lawyer knows how much easier it is to find a remedy in a
statute than an offense. There must surely be a just and safe
medium between a view of the revenue laws which treats them as
harsh enactments to be circumvented and defeated if possible, and
a view under which they acquire an expansive quality in the
hands of the court, and may be made to reach out and bring
within their grasp, and under the discipline of their severe provis-
113 Pet. Abr., 297, note. And see Cummings v. Frye, Dudley, 182 ; Carey
v. Giles, 9 Geo., 253. Also the instance of remedial statutes in Potter's Dwar-
ris on Stat., 231, 245.
»The opinion in U. S. v. Hodson, 10 Wall., 395, refers to Cliquot's Cham
pagne, 4 Wall., 114, which in turn refers to Taylor v. United States, 3 How.,
193. The opinion in this last case was given by Mr. Justice Story, and the
language made use of, which consists largely in a quotation from the opinion
given in the lower court, does not express his own views so clearly as was cus
tomary with that learned judge. What is manifest in his opinion is, that the
point was not regarded as of importance in that case, the meaning of the
statute being plain ; and while the distinction pointed out by the lower court
between penal and remedial lawa is approved and shown to be in accordance
with the authorities, it is not clear that the general remarks of the judge were
intended to go further. It would have been a remarkable circumstanee if
Mr. Justice Story had overruled his own opinion, delivered so recently that, at
that time, his son (and reporter) had not issued the volume containing it.
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ions, subjects and cases, which it is only conjectured may have
been within their intent Eevenue laws are not to be construed
from the standpoint of the tax payer alone, nor of the government
alone. Construction is not to assume either that the tax payer,
who raises the legal question of his liability under the laws, is
necessarily seeking to avoid a duty to the state which protects
him, nor, on the other hand that the government, in demanding its
dues is a tyrant, who, while too powerful to be resisted, may jus
tifiably be obstructed and defeated by any subtle device or inge
nious sophism whatsoever. There is no legal presumption either
that the citizen will, if possible, evade his duties, or, on the other
hand, that the government will exact unjustly or beyond its needs.
All construction, therefore, which assumes either the one or the
other, is likely to be mischievous, and to take onesided views, not
only of the laws, but of personal and official conduct The gov
ernment in its tax legislation is not assuming a hostile position
towards the citizen, but, as we have elsewhere said, is apportion
ing for and as the agent of all, a duty among them ; and the citi
zen, it is to be presumed, will perform that duty when it is clearly
made known to him, and when the time of performance has
arrived. Unjust exactions, if such are made, must be attributed
to human imperfection, not to intent; and frauds and evasions are
to be supposed exceptional. A recent decision of the supreme
court of Connecticut lays down a rule, which, as applied to those
provisions of the revenue laws which apportion the taxes and give
ordinary remedies for their collection, seems not objectionable,
though more liberal than is recognized by the authorities gener
ally. The case was a revenue case, and the question was whether
a statute for imposing a personal tax on "persons who are resi
dents" of the taxing districts, could be applied to the personalty
belonging to the estate of a deceased person. In support of such
a construction it is said : " The greatest, and perhaps the only,
objection that can be urged against this rule is
,
that we cannot
say in strictness that the deceased or his estate is a resident of the
district. This objection assumes that the statute is to be strictly
construed. But we do not think that the doctrine of strict con
struction should apply to it. Statutes relating to taxes are not
penal statutes, nor are they in derogation of natural rights. Al
though taxes are regarded by many as burdens, and many look
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upon them even as money arbitrarily and unjustly extorted from
them by government, and hence justify themselves and quiet
their consciences in resorting to questionable means for the pur
pose of avoiding taxation, yet, in point of fact, no money paid
returns so good and valuable a consideration as money paid for
taxes laid for legitimate purposes. They are just as essential and
important as government itself ; for without them, in some form,
government could not exist. The small pittance we thus pay is
the price we pay for the preservation of all our property, and the
protection of all our rights. But there is not only a necessity for
taxation, but it is eminently just and equitable that it should be
as nearly equal as possible. Hence it is- the policy of the law to
require all property, except such as is specially exempted, to bear
its proportion of the public burdens. Not only so, but the law
manifestly contemplates that property rated in the list shall be
liable for all taxes, town and school district taxes alike. This is
evident from the provision that district taxes shall be laid on the
town list, with special provision for certain change's rendered
necessary in order to tax all the real estate situated within the
district, and none situated without, and also to assess the tax in
each instance upon the right person. In construing statutes relat
ing to taxes, therefore, we ought, where the language will permit,
so to construe them as to give effect to the obvious intention and
meaning of the legislature, rather than to defeat that intention by
a too strict adherence to the letter." 1
1Cornwall v. Todd, 38 Conn., 443, 447, per Carpenter, J. So it is said in Hub-
bard t>.Brainard, 35 id., 563, 568, by Butler, J. : "A law imposing a tax is
not to be construed strictly because it takes money or property in invitum
(although its provisions are for that reason to be strictly executed), for it is
taken as a share of a necessary public burden; nor liberally, like laws in
tended to effect directly some great public object, but fairly for the govern
ment and justly for the citizen ; so as to carry out the intention of the legisla
ture, gathered from the language used, read in connection with the general
purpose of the law, and the nature of the property on which the tax is imposed,
and the legal relation of the tax payer to it." And in Rein v. Lane, Law R.,
2 Q. B., 144, 150, Blackburn, J., says :
" We must construe the words of the
statute imposing the duty according to the intention which those words ex
press when used in such a statute for such a purpose." And in Lord Foley v.
Commissioners of Revenue, Law R., 3 Exch., 263, 268,' Kelley, C B., justly
remarks that " it is better for the subjects and the state that the ordinary rules
of construction should be applied." Prof. Parsons in his Treatise on Con-
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If tbere should be any leaning in such cases it would seem that
it should be in the direction of the presumption that every thing
is expressed in the tax laws which was intended to be expressed.
The laws are framed by the government for its own needs, and if
imperfections are found to ex"ist, the legislature, in the language
of Mr. Dwarris, " is at hand to explain its own meaning, and to
express more clearly what has been obscurely expressed." But
there can be no propriety in construing such a law either with ex
ceptional strictness amounting to hostility, or with exceptional
favor beyond that accorded to other general laws. It is as un
reasonable to sound a charge upon it as an enemy to individual
and popular rights, as it is to seek for sophistical reasons for grasp
ing and holding by its authority every subject of taxation which
the drag net of the official force has brought within its sup
posed compass. The construction, without bias or prejudice, should
seek the real intent of the law ; and if the leaning is to strictness,
it is only because it is fairly and justly presumable that the legis
lature, which was unrestrained in its authority over the subject,
has so shaped the law as, without ambiguity or doubt, to bring
within it everything it was meant should be embraced.
In the state revenue laws the penal provisions are few and by
no means severe. In the federal revenue laws, some of them
are of a severity very seldom to be met with in penal statutes, and
only to be justified by the supposed impossibility of collecting the
Tevenue without them. In illustration of what is here said, ref
erence need only be made to the case of forfeiture of property for
the mere indulgence of a fraudulent intent never carried into effect ;
a forfeiture too, which may be visited upon a purchaser who has
bought in good faith, and without suspicion of the intended
fraud.1 If such provisions are to be construed with liberality,
there is no reason why any other penal provisions whatsoever
should not be.
tracts, vol. 3, p. 287, states the proper rule very clearly and concisely: " It is
a well settled principle that every charge upon the subject must be imposed
by clear and unambiguous words. * * But it is equally certain that no in.
terpretation will be adopted which must defeat the purpose of the law, pro.
vided the language of the statute admit fairly and rationally of an interpreta
tion which sustains that purpose."
1Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 14 Wall., 44.
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Construction of local powers to tax. In the construction of
any grant of the power to tax made by the state to one of its
municipalities, the rule which is accepted by all the authorities is
,
that it should be with strictness. The reasonable presumption is
held to be, that the state has granted in clear and unmistakable
terms, all it has intended to grant at all; and whatsoever au
thority the municipal officers assume to exercise, they must be
able to show the warrant for in the words of the grant There is
no inherent power in the municipalities to levy taxes ; they can
tax only as the state in its wisdom has thought proper to permit,
and if the state has erred in the direction of strictness, the legisla
ture alone can correct the evil.1
1 See the following cases which have laid down and will serve to illustrate
this rule of strictness : Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76 ; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio,
574; Tallman v. White, 2 N.Y., 66; Manice v. id., 8 id., 120; Cruger e. Dough-
erty, 43 id., 107; Litchfield e. Vernon, 41 id., 123; Mays v. Cincinnati, lOhio,
N. S., 268 ; Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 id., 625 ; Reed v. Toledo, 18 id., 161 ; Jonas v.
Cincinnati, 18 id., 318; Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Geo., 23; Augusta e. Walton,
37 id., 620; Sanders v. Butler, 30 id., 679; Vanover v. The Justices, 27 id., 354;
Richmond e. Daniel, 14 Grat., 385 ; Orange & Alexandria R. R. Co., e. Alex
andria, 17 id., 176; Holland v. Baltimore, 11 Md., 186; Bouldin O.Baltimore, 15
id., 18; Harmony v. Osborne, 9 Ind., 458; Kyle v. Malin, 8 id., 34; Indianapo
lis v. Mansur, 15 id., 112; Carron v. Den, 26 N. J., 594; Leavenworth v. Nor
ton, 1 Kan., 432 ; Snyder v. North Lawrence, 8 id., 82 ; Shawnee County r. Car
ter, 2 id., 115; Chicago v. Chicago, etc., R.R. Co., 20 11l., 286; Drakee. Phillips,
40 id., 388; Douglass v. Placerville, 18 Cal., 643; Hewes «. Reis,40 id., 255;
Kniper v. Louisville, 7 Bush, 599; Campbell County Court v. Taylor, 8 id.,
206; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 id., 508; Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met.,
Ky., 171; Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick., 415; Nichol v. Nashville, 9 Humph.,
252; Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Penn. St., 401 ; Bennett e. Birmingham, 31 id.,
15; St. Louis«. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559; St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 id., 122; Lott v.
Ross, 38 Ala., 156; Montgomery e. State, 38 id., 162; Henry v. Chester, 15 Vt.,
460; Municipality v. Pance, 6 La. An., 515; Ashevillet>. Means, 7 Ired.,406;
Dean v. Charlton, 27 Wis., 522; Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494; Fairfield v.
Ratcliffe, 20 id., 396; Oregon Steam, etc. Co.. v. Portland, 2 Ore., 81; United
States v. Burlington, 2 Am. L.Reg., N. S., 394; Leonard v. Canton, 35 Miss.,
189 ; Dillon, Mun. Corp., § 605 ; Cooley's Const. Lim., 195.
"The power to tax is a high governmental power, but fortunately for the
people it cannot be exercised by the legislative authority without limit, and
when the legislature grants that high power to another tribunal, it can only be
exercised in strict conformity to the terms in which the power is granted, and
a departure in any material part will be fatal to the attempt to exercise it."
Peters, J. in Campbell County Court v. Taylor, 8 Bush, 206, 208. It was held in
this case that authority to the voters of a county to vote a specified tax was
14
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This rule confines the municipalities, in the levy of taxes,
strictly to the ordinary purposes for which such municipalities
are accustomed to make levies. The customary grant does not
go a step beyond this, and unusual purposes cannot be brought
within the scope of their taxing power without an express grant
which clearly indicates the special object.1 This is not only in
accordance with the general rule that construes sovereign grants
with strictness, but it is also obviously wise. The mischief of a
strict construction is easily obviated by the legislature ; but the
mischief of a liberal construction may be irremediable before it
can be reached.2 It is in accordance with this rule, that the au
thority conferred upon a county to levy a tax " for county pur
poses
" was held, in Georgia, not to warrant a tax for the con
struction of public buildings ; county purposes, as understood in
that state, being the support of the poor, public education, and
the like.8 In Maine, it was held that a general power in a town
to tax for corporate purposes would not include the right to tax
in order to make a toll bridge free.* Whatever doubt might be
not exercised by a vote of the county excluding a city therein. See for a simi
lar principle, Attorney General v. Supervisors of St. Clair, 11 Mich., 63. Au
thority to levy a tax on taxable property will not authorize a specific tax on
an insurance company (not on their capital). Augusta v. Walton, 37 Geo., 620.
It will authorize a tax on the shares in a bank without their being specially
mentioned. Frederick v. Augusta, 5 id., 561 ; Pearce v. Augusta, 37 id., 597 ;
Augusta v. National Bank, 47 id., 562. A statute authorizing a tax on divi
dends over a certain per cent, on capital, means capital actually paid in, and
not merely authorized capital. Street Railway Co. v. Philadelphia, 51 Penn.
St., 465; Philadelphia v. Ferry Railway Co., 52 id., 177. A power to tax all
personal property within a city, held not to reach shares in a railroad owned
by a resident. Richmond v. Daniel, 14 Grat., 385. An interpretation of a
statute for the assessment of a special tax which will interfere with the general
tax law, is not to be adopted unless there is the clearest language to justify it.
State v. Douglass, 33 N. J., 363.
1Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass., 272; Alley v. Edgecomb, 53 Me., 446.
*Where a city has authority to levy taxes only to a certain percentage on
the assessment, the power to levy more is not to be implied from the fact that,
by the charter, it is made the duty of the city to erect hospitals, poor houses,
etc., and more would be needed for those purposes. Leavenworth e. Norton,
1 Kansas, 432.
* Vanover v. The Justices, 27 Geo., 354. As to what are " county purposes "
in Minnesota, see McCormic v. Fitch, 14 Minn., 252.
•Bussy e. Gilmore, 3 Greenl., 191.
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raised as to this last decision, there can be none, we should sup
pose, of the correctness of those which have held that a power to
tax for necessary town charges would not warrant a tax to raise
military forces or to pay military bounties. This is clearly no
part of the corporate duty of a town, and could not be supposed
within the intent of the legislature in providing for necessary
town charges.1 Similar rulings have been made in a great variety
of cases, in which particular powere have been claimed ; but the
reader must be referred to works on the special subject of muni
cipal law, for a reference to these decisions.2
1The leading case on this point is Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass., 272, 278, in
which Parker, Ch. J., gives his idea of what constitutes town charges, as fol
lows: "The phrase ne«essary charges is indeed general; but the very gen
erality of the expression shows that it must have a reasonable limitation. For
none will suppose that, under this form of expression, every tax would be le
gal which the town should choose to sanction. The proper construction of
the terms must be that, in addition to the money to be raised for the poor,
schools, etc., towns might raise such sums as should be necessary to meet
the ordinary expenses of the year; such as the payment of such municipal
officers as they should be obliged to employ, the support and defense of such
actions as they might be parties to, and the expenses they would incur in per
forming such duties as the laws imposed, as the erection of powder houses,
providing ammunition, making and repairing highways and town roads, and
other things of a like nature: which are necessary charges, because the effect
of a legal discharge of their corporate duty. The erection of public build-
ings for the accommodation of the inhabitants, such as town houses to as
semble in, and market houses for the sale of provisions, may also be a proper
town charge, and may come within the fair meaning of the term necessary;
for these may be essential to the comfort and convenience of the citizens.
But it cannot be supposed that the building of a theater, a circus or any other
place of mere amusement, at the expense of the town, could be justified under
the term necessary town charges. Nor could the inhabitants be lawfully taxed
for the purpose of raising a statue or monument, these being matters of taste
and not of necessity, unless, in populous and wealthy towns, they should be
thought suitable ornaments to buildings or squares, the raising and main
tenance of which are within the duty and care of the governors or officers of
such towns." Bee Alley v. Edgecomb, 53 Me., 446. Compare Lisbon v. Bath,
21 N. H., 319 ; Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass., 181 ; Cruckshanks v. Charleston, 1
McCord, 360; State v. Charleston, 2 Speers, 623; Simmons e. Wilson, 66 N.
C, 336.
* Dillon on Municipal Corporations is specially referred to. Mention of the
following cases may, perhaps, be useful in this connection: A vote at a town-
ship meeting to raise "all the law will allow for school purposes," held good,
though informal. State v. Sickles, 24 N. J., 125. The authority that may
vote a tax cannot refer it to a committee or to officers with power. State v.
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Liability of power to abuse. The liability of the taxing
power to abuse is often assigned as a reason why, in particular
cases, it should be held not to have been conferred. But this is
illogical and unreasonable- "Every authority, however indispen
sable, may be abused, and if it might not, it would be powerless
for good." 1 The point is forcibly put by the supreme court of
Ohio. " It has been strongly urged that this power is peculiarly
liable to abuse. It is liable to be abused ; perhaps peculiarly so.
But so is all government, and all governmental powers. Yet gov
ernment is nevertheless a necessity among men. It is a very bad
government indeed which is not better than the inevitable anarchy
and outrage which follow the absence of all government And
the fact that a power is liable to be abused, affords no conclusive
argument against it" ' It is only a reason for caution in construc
tion, in order to be certain that the power is intended to be given,
and for holding the donee of the power to a strict execution of
the authority.
Directory and mandatory provisions. Much use is made in
the law of taxation of the words directory and mandatory, as words
of classification of the various provisions of tax laws, as regards
the imperative nature of the obligation they impose on the reve
nue officers to obey them strictly. All the provisions of a statute
not on their face merely permissory or discretionary, are intended
to be obeyed, or they would not be enacted at all ; and therefore
they come to the several officers who are to act under them, as
Sickles, supra; Robinson e. Dodge, 18 Johns., 351 ; Trumbull e.White, 5 Hill,
46 ; Mercer County Court v. Navigation Co., 8 Bush, 300. A tax, purporting
to be levied by the authorities of two districts, meeting and acting jointly, is
void. State e. Reeves, 28 N. J., 520. Authority to a county to levy a tax for
county buildings, will not authorize the issue of bonds for the purpose.
Shawnee County e. Carter, 2 Kansas, 115. The power to impose license fees
is not contained in a grant of general local legislation. Sanders v. Butler, 30
Geo., 679. A city charter, conferring power to tax in general terms, is to be
understood, in speaking of " property within the city," to mean visible prop
erty within the city, and would not include debts owing to a citizen by peo
ple residing abroad. Johnson v. Lexington, 14 B. Monr., 648. Followed in
Covington v. Powell, 2 Met. (Ky.), 226; Louisville «. Henning, 1 Bush, 381.
1Gibson, Ch. J., in Kirby e. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 258, 260.
*Brinkerhoof, J., in Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood County, 8 Ohio, N. S.,
333, 343. See Breevort v. Detroit, 24 Mich., 322, 325; Bridgeport e. Nichols,
23 Conn., 189, 203.
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commands. But the negligence of officers, their mistakes of fact
or of law, and many other causes will often prevent a strict obe
dience, and when the provisions which have been disregarded
constitute parts of an important and perhaps complicated system,
it becomes of the highest importance to ascertain the effect the
failure to obej: them sball have .on the other proceedings with
which they were associated in the law. The form the question
most commonly assumes is this: Some official act which the law
provides for, and which constitutes one step to be followed by
others in reaching a specified result, having failed to be taken,
Does the authority to proceed toward the intended result, termi
nate when that particular step has been neglected, or may the
proceeding go on to a conclusion treating the neglect as immate
rial? If the proceeding fails at that point, the requirement of
the official act which has been neglected is said to be mandatory,
but if it may still proceed, the requirement is directory only ;
that is to say, the law directs that particular act to be performed,
but does not imperatively command it as a condition precedent to
anything further.
In some cases the question assumes a different form. The mu
nicipalities, it has been seen, levy and collect taxes not only for
their own purposes, but also under state apportionment for the
state at large. The power to levy taxes is usually conferred
upon them in merely permissory terms ; terms implying a discre
tion to levy them or not at the will of the local majority or the
local board. These may sometimes raise the question whether
they are intended to confer a discretionary authority merely, or,
on the other hand, whether they were not meant to impose a duty
and put the municipality under an imperative obligation.
A solution of this question will commonly depend upon the
purpose of the tax for which authority is given. If the tax is
for purely local purposes, the permission to levy it can seldom be
regarded as anything more than an enabling statute, of which
advantage may be taken or not, at discretion ; but if it is for gen
eral purposes, the law must be regarded as imposing a duty. In
whatever terms the authority is conferred upon a county to levy
its proportion of the state tax, the levy is imperative ; and per
missory words in the statute may be construed as commands, and
a reluctant local authority may be coerced into a performance of
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the duty. The rule is the same where what is authorized is for
the purpose of meeting some legal obligation of the municipality ;
" for where a statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of
justice or the public good, the word may is the same as the word
shall," and imports a duty equally imperative.1 In most cases,
however, the question whether any particular provision of a tax
law is mandatory or not, will arise between the government and
its officers, or some one claiming under their proceedings on the
one side, and the person taxed on the other ; and the form it will
take will be, whether the person taxed is entitled to defeat any
proceeding which is being taken adversely to him, by reason of
the failure on the part of the officers to observe some direction
of the statute under which they derive their authority. If he
may, it is because the direction was mandatory, and obedience
to it a condition precedent to any further adverse proceedings.
The phraseology of the statute may sometimes settle this ques
tion very conclusively. If by the use of negative words it requires
a particular proceeding to be taken in a particular time or man
ner, and makes it void if not so done,' or gives it effect, provided
it is so done,8 or declares that, unless it is taken, subsequent pro
ceedings shall not be bad/ or prohibits its being done except at the
time the statute prescribes,5 or if any terms plainly imperative are
employed, the intent is clear, and no discretion can be permitted
in construction. It is not often, however, that these or similar
words are met with in the statutes which define official duties un
der the revenue laws, and the construction of particular provis
ions must be left for determination in such light as the obvious
purpose they were intended to accomplish may afford. And
that purpose, it would seem, ought generally to be conclusive.
1Rex v. Barlow, 2 Salk., 609. Bee Rex e. Inhab. of Derby, Skinner, 370 ;
Virginia «. The Justices, 2 Virg. Cas., 9; Justices of Clark Countye. Railroad
Co., 11 B. Monr., 143; Coy «. Lyons City, 17 Iowa, 1 ; State v. Harris, 17 Ohio,
N. S., 608; Baltimore e. Marriott, 9 Md., 160, 174; New York e. Furz, 3 Hill,
612; Minor v. Mechanics' Bank 1 Pet., 46; Mason v. Fearson, 9 How., 248,
Supervisors v. United States, 4 Wall., 435 ; Galena v. Amy, 5 id., 705.
»The King v. Hepswell, 8 B. & C, 466.
s The King v. Inhab. of St. Gregory, 2 Ad. v. El., 99.
4Stayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind., 144.
lIn re Douglass, 46 N. Y., 42.
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No one should be at liberty to plant himself upon the nonfeas
ances or misfeasances of officers, under the revenue laws, which in
no way concern himself, and make them the excuse for a failure
on his part to perform his own duty. On the other hand he
ought always to be at liberty to insist that directions which the
law has given to its officers for his benefit shall be observed.
Many eminent judges have endeavored to lay down a general rule
on this subject, by which the difficulties in tax cases may in gen
eral be solved. In one of the most recent cases in which this has
been attempted, the general doctrine is stated as follows : " There
are undoubtedly many statutory requisitions intended for the
guide of officers in the conduct of business devolved upon them,
which do not limit their power, or render its exercise in disregard
of the requisitions ineffectual. Such generally are regulations
designed to secure order, system, and dispatch in proceedings, and
by a disregard of which the rights of parties interested cannot be
injuriously affected. Provisions of this character are not usually
regarded as mandatory, unless accompanied by negative words,
importing that the act required shall not be done in any other
manner or time than that designated. But when the requisitions
prescribed are intended for the protection of the citizen, and to
prevent a sacrifice of his property, and by a disregard of which
his rights might be and generally would be injuriously affected,
they are not directory but mandatory. They must be followed,
or the acts done will be invalid. The power of the officer in all
such cases is limited by the measure and conditions prescribed
for its exercise." 1
The same rule in nearly the same terms has been laid down in
other cases,2 and it seems a sound and just rule, and may reason
ably be believed to be in accord with the legislative will in the
1Field, J , in French v. Edwards, 13 Wall., 506, 511.
»See especially Torrey v. Milbury, 21 Pick., 64, per Stow, Ch. J., approved
and followed in State v. Jersey City, 35 N. J., 381, 386; Clark v. Crane, 5 Mich.,
151, 154, per Maiming, J. ; O'Neal e. Va. & Md. Bridge Co., 18 Md., 1, per Tuck,
J. ; McDonough v. Gravier, 9 La. An., 546 ; Spear v. Ditty, 8 Vt, 419 ; Shawnee
County v. Carter, 2 Kansas, 115; Wheeler v. Chicago, 24 11l., 105, 108; Walker
v. Chapman, 22 Ala., 116; Kelly v. Craig, 5 Ired., 129; Magee v. Common
wealth, 46 Penn. St., 358. All acts required by the statute in order to make
the tax chargeable are conditions precedent and must be strictly complied
with, or the tax cannot be collected. Hewes v. Reis, 40 Cal., 255.
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cases to which it is applicable. All legislation must be supposed
to take into account the possible, if not probable mistakes and
irregularities of officers in executing the provisions of the law,
and it is hardly reasonable to infer an intent, on the part of a
legislative body, that a failure of administrative officers to comply
with any provision made for the benefit of the state exclusively,
or merely as a guide in orderly proceedings, should deprive the
state of all benefit to be derived from a compliance with other
provisions that embody the main purpose and object of the law.
Nor, on the other hand, is it to be supposed the legislature in
tended its own securities for the protection of individual rights
and property should be disregarded with impunity.1
Instances of mandatory provisions. What, then, are the
provisions of tax laws which are made for the benefit and protec
tion of the individual tax payer? In many cases this question,
as applied to particular provisions, is easily solved ; in others
there is more difficulty. That the tax payer shall be entitled to
such protection as the official responsibility of officers can give
him ; that the tax shall be voted by the competent authority and
under any conditions which the law has prescribed; that there
shall be official warrant for any compulsory proceedings;2 all
1See Corbett v. Bradley, 7 Nev., 106, 108, per Lewis, Ch. J. ; Briggs v. Georgia,
15 Vt , 61, 72, per Hubbard, J. ; Dryfuss v. Bridges, 45 Miss., 247 ; State v. Lean,
9 Wis., 279, 292. Ia Sandwich >e.Fish, 2 Gray, 293, 301, S/u>w, Ch. J., in an
swering an objection made on behalf of a defaulting collector, that certain
provisions regarding the authority to collect had not been complied with,
says: "The provisions of the statutes as to the form of warrants and tax lists,
and the place where the lists shall be deposited, are intended for the benefit of
the taxpayers. As to all other persons they are directory merely, and not con
ditions precedent. Defects in the warrant or tax list might be a good excuse
for not executing the warrant. But to say that a collector who has collected
the money without objection by the tax payers, is not liable to account there
for would be as contrary to the rules of law as to justice. He can only avail
himself of such defects as have prevented his performance of his duty."
sWhere the statute provided that a tax voted at an annual town meeting in
March should be assessed on the tax list of the May following, it was held
mandatory and the town incompetent by vote to authorize the selectmen to
assess it on the list of the previous year. Alger v. Curry, 38 Vt., 382. Where
the statute requires the tax list to be verified by an oath "made and sub
scribed," this means an oath duly certified in writing, and the absence of it is
fatal to the proceedings. "Applying to the case the rules which have gov-
erned Hie courts in passing upon this class of titles, the objection must be held
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these are manifestly conditions precedent to any lawful demand
whatever upon the citizen. They are of the highest importance,
because it is only by means of the requirement of official action in
an orderly manner and at periodical times, that he can be protected
against arbitrary and capricious action. Moreover, they go to
make up the power which the law gives to its agents over the
property and persons of the people ; and without the power to act,
all attempted action is a trespass upon individual rights.1 There
must be a voting of the tax by the proper authority ; there must
be an assessment and an apportionment. So far all is clear.2 So
fatal. The assessor acts under a special and limited authority, conferred by
the law and not by the owner of the estate. He is the mere instrument to
pass the title. The proceeding is construed strictly, and the power must be
strictly pursued in every particular. The law requires that every prerequisite
to the exercise of the power to sell the estate must precede its exercise.
The agent must pursue the power or his act will not be sustained by it. These
principles have been recognized by this court in their application to tax titles in
repeated decisions. Yenda «. Wheeler, 9 Texas, 408; Robson o Osborn, 13 id.,
298 ; Watford «. McKinna, 23 id., 36." Wheeler, Ch. J., in Davis v. Farnes, 26
id., 296, 297.
1See Chapter VIII. Where an act providing for local improvements re
quired the certificate of the commissioners of public works, as to the amount of,
expense paid or actually incurred by the city, as the basis of the assessment, it
was held that nothing could be the substitute for this. The affidavit of the
surveyor will not be received. Petition of Cameron, 50 N. Y., 502.
8" Many of the provisions of our statute regulating the imposition of taxes,
must be considered directory merely. Some arc doubtless conditions; such
as those which are intended to secure an equality of taxation or burdens
among the citizens, that is, that the citizen may know for what he is taxed,
know his valuation, and have notice of the time and place of appeal." Coul
ter, J., in Insurance Co. v. Yard, 17 Peun. St., 331, 338. In O'Neal e. Va. &
Md. Bridge Co., 18 Md., 1, 23, Tuck, J., explains the distinction between di
rectory and mandatory provisions in tax laws, and refers to Youngs v. State, 7
G. & J., 253, and other Maryland cases. Where the statute required the county
judge in case of default of a tax collector to collect and pay over, on his own
knowledge or on complaint of the treasurer, to hold a court within 20 days to
try such delinquent collector, this was held to be in point of time directory
merely, the time not being prescribed for the benefit of the collector, "but
rather to quicken the diligence of the judge, so that justice may be promptly
administered and the greater certainty of collections insured." Stickney v.
Huggins, 10 Ala., 106. A requirement that taxation shall be by value is man
datory. Life Association v. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo., 512. Where a lot
omitted from the assessment of the preceding year is to be placed upon the
roll with the valuation of the last year when it was assessed, if the lot was
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all provisions designed to give him the opportunity of a review of
the assessment, whether by the assessors themselves or on an ap
peal from their conclusions, are exclusively in his interest. Every
notice which the statute provides for to that end, whether by pub
lication or otherwise, must be given with scrupulous observance
of all its requisites. The notice cannot be shortened a single day
without rendering it ineffectual ; the presumption being that the
law has made it as short as was deemed consistent with due pro
tection.1 A published notice cannot be received as the substitute
for a notice to be personally delivered to the party concerned.8
The same rules apply to any notice required of subsequent pro
ceedings ; if required to be given within a certain time, or in any
prescribed mode,8 it must be so given. A statute declaring that
never on the roll, it cannot be put on under the provision. People v. Goff, 52 N.
Y., 434. Hall, J., in Chandler v. Spear, 22 Vt., 388, 398, says, " when the statute
under which the sale is made directs a thing to be done, or prescribes the
form, time and manner of doing anything, such thing must be done, and in
the form, time and manner prescribed, or the title is invalid; and in this re
spect the statute must strictly, if not literally, be complied with. Spear «.
Ditty, 9 Vt., 282; Bellows v. Elliott, 12 id., 569, 574; Sumner v. Sherman, 13
id., 909, 612; Carpentere. Sawyer, 17 id., 122, 124. But in determining what
is required to be done, the statute must receive a reasonable construction ; and
when no particular form or manner of doing a thing is pointed out, any mode
which effects the object with reasonable certainty is sufficient; and in judging
of these matters the court is to be governed by such rational rules of construc
tion, as direct them in other cases. Spear v. Ditty, 8 Vt., 419, 421 ; Bellows v.
Elliott, 12 id., 569, 574; Isaacs v. Shattuck, 12 id., 668."
1See cases cited in Chapter XV.
»Moulton v. Blaisdell,24 Me., 283; Lovejoy v. Lunt, 48 id., 377. And see
Lagroue v. Rains, 48 Mo., 536. Where the notice is to be given personally and
also by publication, a failure in either is fatal. Appeal of Powers, 29 Mich.,
504.
'
aThe statute required the sheriff at the next term of the county court pre
ceding a tax sale, to return a list of the lands on which taxes were unpaid,
with the names of the owners if known, and other particulars, and this was
to be read aloud, recorded in the minutes, and posted in the room. Held to be
mandatory. Kelly v. Craig, 5 Ired., 129. In Sprague v. Bailey, 19 Pick., 436, a
provision that notice of abatement to those who should pay their taxes prompt
ly, should be posted in public places, was regarded directory merely. The point
was not reasoned. All provisions regarding notice of sale and the place of
sale are mandatory. State v. Rollins, 29 Mo., 267; Rubey v. Huntsman, 32 id.,
501 ; McNair e. Jenson, 33 id., 312. A tax was assessed to the owner of the
equity of redemption and lands sold therefor. The statute then in force pro
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all resolutions, etc., involving an appropriation of money, or taxa
tion, shall be published "in all the newspapers employed by the
corporation," and not be passed until after notice has been pub
lished at least two days, is plainly intended to be imperative.1
Whatever tends to make the right to redeem more valuable to
him must be observed ; and here time may be of the very highest
importance; and at no stage of the proceedings should the requi
sites of notice be more strictly observed. These are illustrations
of mandatory requirements. Many others are noticed in other
chapters.2
Instances of directory provisions. On the other hand, the
requirement of an official bond or oath from an officer is for the
protection of the public, and not of the tax payer.8
So in general the fixing of an exact time for the doing of an
act is only directory, where it is not fixed for the purpose of
giving the party a hearing, or for any other purpose important to
him.4 So the requirement of a warrant to the town assessors re
quiring them to assess the state tax, is directory, as this becomes
Tided that no sale of real estate for taxes should affect the rights of any person
not taxable therefor, unless a written demand was first made upon said person
by the collector for the payment of said taxes. No demand in this case was
made upon the mortgagee before the sale. Held, that a repeal of this statute
did not leave him liable for the tax. Tinslar v. Davis, 12 Allen, 79.
1Petition of Douglass, 46 K. Y., 42; Petition of Smith, 52 id., 526.
»See in general, in addition to the cases already cited regarding mandatory
provisions, Hoffman e. Bell, 61 Penn. St., 444; Kniper v. Louisville, 7 Bush,
599; First Presb. Ch. e. Fort Wayne, 36 Iud., 338; Sibley e. Smith, 2 Mich.,
486; Rayner e. Lee, 20 id., 384; People v. Clark, 47 Cal., 456; Richardson v.
Heydenfeldt, 46 id., 68; Culver e. Hayden, 1 Vt., 359 ; Richardson v. Dorr,
5 id., 9; Brown «. Wright, 17 id., 97; Judevine v. Jackson, 18 id., 470; Taylor
t>.French, 19 id., 49; Langdon v. Poor, 20 id., 13; Lane«. James, 25 id., 481;
see also post, Chapter XV.
8See Hale v. Cushing, 2 Greenl., 28; Scarborough v. Parker, 53 Me. 252;
ante, Chapter VIII. In Vermont the decisions are that if the collector appointed
to collect any tax assessed on lands for roads and bridges shall fail to give the
required bond, any sale made by him is void. See Oatman v. Barney, 46 Vt.,
594, and cases cited.
*Hart v. Plum, 14 Cal., 148. As where an assessment was to be filed within
twenty days, but this was only to make it a lien. Magee v. Commonwealth,
46 Penn. St., 358.
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of no moment if they act without it.1 A provision that the true
value and the equalized value of lands shall appear in distinct
columns on the roll is directory only, as the failure to obey it in
no way affects the person taxed.2 So putting a special tax in a
column by itself on the roll when it should be put with the town
tax is equally harmless, and therefore cannot affect the proceed
ings.8 And manifestly the tax payer has nothing to do with any
accounting by the officer, or with any report or document to be
made by him for the security of the public or for the information
of superiors only, and which is not to be warrant for, or to affect
in any manner subsequent proceedings for enforcing the tax.* In
the margin many other cases are referred to in which statutory
provisions have been decided to be merely directory.8
1Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick., 418. In this case it was decided that a levy
which was excessive as to the school tax, but not excessive in the aggregate
was valid.
•Torrey v. Milbury, 21 Pick., 64. The failure of the clerk to enter the word
sold in the book opposite the description of the land as required by the statute,
does not defeat the sale. Playter e. Cockran, 37 Iowa, 258.
•Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich., 228. Compare Case v. Dean, 16 id., 12. A
statute required that a school district tax should be assessed within thirty days
after the clerk of the district should certify to the assessors the sum to be
raised. This is only directory. Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass., 230; Williams v.
School District, 21 Pick, 75; similar ruling in Gale v. Mead, 2 Denio, 160;
Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Penn. St., 224 ; Smith v. Crittenden, 16 Mich., 152 ; Harrison
Co. Commissioners v. McCarty, 27 Ind., 475. For somewhat similar provi
sions held to be mandatory, see Mix e. People, Sup. Ct., 11l., June term, 1874,
7 Chicago Legal News, 2; Cowgill e. Long, 15 11l., 202. Compare Eames v.
Johnson, 4 Allen, 382.
4 Tweed «. Metcalf, 4 Mich., 578. The clause in the tax warrant, " and you
are hereby directed to settle with the selectmen by the 20th day of Septembei
next," is merely directory, and does not limit the collector's power to that time.
Picket v. Allen, 10 Conn., 145.
8Craig v. Bradford, 3 Wheat., 594; U. S. e. Kirkpatrick, 9 id., 720; U. S. «.
Dandridge, 12 id., 64; Hale v. Cusbing, 2 Greenl., 218; Muzzy e. White, 3
id., 290; Scarborough e. Parker, 53 Me., 252; Holland e. Osgood, 8 V t.
,
276,
280; Cortisse. Corbiss, 8 id., 373,390; Allen v. Parish, 3 Ohio, 187; Fry e.
Booth. 19 Ohio, N. S., 25; Vance v. Schuyler, 1 Gilm.,160; Webster e. French,
12 11l., 302; State e. McGmly, 4 Ind., 7
;
Stayton v. Hulings, 7 id., 144; No-
land v. Busby, 28 id., 154; New Orleans v. St. Romes, 9 La. An., 573; Ed
wards e. James, 13 Texas, 52 ; Lawrence v. Speed, 2 Bibb, 401 ; Hayden v.
Dunlap, 3 id., 216; People v. Allen, 6 Wend., 486; Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 43;
Jackson e. Young, 5 Cow., 269 ; People v. Holley, 12 Wend., 481 ; Striker v.
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Retrospective taxation. The basis of an apportionment of
taxes may as lawfully be retrospective as the reverse ; that is to
say, it may as well have regard to benefits theretofore received as
to those which may be received thereafter. Where taxes are
levied for a series of years upon the same valuation of property,
they are necessarily retrospective, and one may be taxed upon
property which he has long ceased to own when the tax is levied.
But there is commonly a presumption that any new tax law was
not intended to reach back and take for its standard of apportion
ment a state of things that may no longer be in existence. " New
burdens," it is very justly said, " ought always to be prospect
ive,"1 and it is reasonable to suppose the legislature has intended
that they should be. Such a supposition is in harmony with the
general rule of law which requires the courts to " always construe
statutes as prospective and not retrospective, unless constrained
to the contrary course by the rigor of the phraseology." ' This is
Kelley, 7 Hill, 9; Gale e.Mead, 2 Denio, 160; People v. Peck, 11 Wend., 604;
Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 252; Elmendorf e. New York, 25 Wend., 693, 696;
Peoplee. Cook, 8 N. Y., 67; Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass., 230; Lowell «. Hadley,8
Met., 180; People v. Doe., IMich., 451; Parks v. Goodwin, 1 Doug., Mich., 56;
Hickey v. Hinsdale, 8 Mich., 267 ; People v. Hartwell, 12 id., 508 ; State v.
Click, 2 Ala., 25, 26; Savage v. Walsh, 26 id., 620; McKune v. Weller, 11 Cal.,
49; State v. County Commissioners, 29 Md., 516; Huey v. Van Wie, 23 Wis.,
613 ; Adams v. Seymour, 30 Conn., 402. The omission of the collector to en
ter upon his warrant the true day and year when he received it does not inval-
idate his proceedings under it. Goodwin v. Perkins, 39 Vt., 598. The right
of the commonwealth to levy a tax on the market value of the capital stock
of a corporation is not defeated by the neglect of the city assessors to make re-
turn of the corporation to the treasurer of the commonwealth as required by
statute. Commonwealth v. New England Slate & Tile Co., 13 Allen, 391.
1Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 13 Penn. St., 165. In that case it
was decided that a tax measured by dividends "from and after January 1,
1841 " would not apply to a dividend declared by the proper committee De
cember 30, 1840, but not passed upon by the directors until January 4, 1841.
8Woodward, J., in Price v. Molt, 52 Penn. St., 315, 316. And see Philadel
phia e. Ferry Railway Co., 52 id., 177; Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 11l., 223; Thames
Manuf. Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn., 550; Warren R. R. Co. v. Belvidere, 35 N. J.,
584; Clark v. Hall, 19 Mich., 356; Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 163, 166;
Cooley's Const. Lim., 370, and cases cited. A law declaring that certain de
fenses shall not be made to tax deeds until the redemption money is paid will
not apply to prior sales. Conway v. Cable, 37 11l., 82. Where taxes are levied
under a law which is repealed by a subsequent act, unless it appears clearly
that the legislature intended the repeal to work retrospectively, it will be as
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the rule not only as a construction of the grant of power, but also
as to all the incidents ; 1 though a remedial provision may well
be presumed to have been intended to reach back for the pur
poses of justice.2 And in cases where a tax is levied to meet ex
penses previously incurred, or to pay the cost of something of
which the persons to be taxed have already had the benefit, any
presumption against an intent to give the law retroactive opera
tion may be overcome by the apparent justice of such a construc
tion.
sumed that it intended the taxes to be collected according to the law in force
when they were levied. Oakland v. Whipple, 44 Cal., 303. In Allen e. Drew,
44 Vt., 174, an act was construed so as to govern the proceedings by one sub
sequently approved, the two having been pending together, and the one first
approved expressly in terms referring to the other. A statute making mort
gagees personally liable for taxes on the land after taking possession, held appli
cable to mortgages given before but under which the mortgagees took posses
sion after the statute was passed. Andrews v. Worcester, etc., Ins. Co., 5 Allen,
65.
1In Gerry v. Stoneham, 1 Allen, 819, a statute providing that where a party
was assessed more than his due and legal proportion, the tax and assessment
should be void only for the excess, and a recovery by suit should be limited
to the excess, was held not applicable to pending actions.
8When the Michigan tax laws have been revised, it has been held that
stringent provisions, therein designed to favor tax titles must be understood
to apply to cases originating under the revision. Clark v. Hall, 19 Mich.,
356 ; Smith v. Auditor General, 20 id., 398. That revision, however, contained
a section which required every person redeeming from the tax sale to pay,
not only the redemption money with heavy interest to the* purchaser, but also
a penalty of twenty-five per cent to the state. Now there was no more reason
and no more justice in the state exacting a penalty for the privilege to one
party to redeem from the tax purchase of another, than there would be for de
manding a like penalty for the privilege of redeeming from an execution sale,
or for voluntarily paying an honest debt; the exaction, if legal — which may
well be questioned —was unjust and impolitic, for it tended to bring about
the forfeiture of estates, and every state is interested that this shall not happen
to its citizens. It was, therefore, held to be a reasonable presumption, when
this provision was repealed, that the state intended the repeal to apply to past
as well as to future sales. People v. Auditor General, Sup. Ct. Mich., at
June term, 1875, not yet reported. Compare Tinslar v. Davis, 12 Allen, 79,
which was a strong case for the application of the opposite presumption. The
repeal of a tax law which makes deeds on tax sales prima facie evidence of
title, where it is done by a new tax law which contains a similar provision,
will not prevent deeds given under the repealed law being prima facte evi
dence of title; the fair presumption being that the legislature intended that
rule to be continuous. Blackwull v. Van Vleet, 30 Mich., 118.
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CHAPTER X.
CURING DEFECTS IN TAX PROCEEDINGS.
A subject intimately connected with that of the construction of
tax laws, is that of the power of the legislature by other legisla
tion to dispense with obedience to those regulations which have
been prescribed by itself for the protection of those who are taxed.
It is a subject which presents, perhaps, more intrinsic difficulties
than the other.
An act of dispensation may assume any one of several forms :
1. It may assume the form of a rule of conclusive evidence,
which should preclude a departure from the law being shown.
2. It may take the form of a mandate to officers, commanding
them to give effect to proceedings that have been taken, disregard
ing any defects.
3. It may be a special curative statute to heal defects in certain
specified proceedings which have been taken.
4. It may be a general curative statute to heal irregularities or
defects in any proceedings whatsoever previously taken.
5. It may be a general statute for future cases, which, while
marking out a course for the officers to pursue, shall at the same
time declare that irregularities shall not vitiate any proceedings
had under the statute.
6. Besides these, there may be either a special or a general law
for reassessing the tax, when the proceedings for its collection have
proved ineffectual.
Legislation coming under each of these heads is to be met with
in the statutes of the several states, and is entitled to some con
sideration.
1. Conclusive Rules of Evidence. A legislative act which should
declare a tax conveyance conclusive evidence that the title of the
former owner was divested, and was passed by the deed to the
purchaser, could only be supported under the sovereign legisla
tive power to frame and change at its will the rules of evidence.
That power is confessedly great, but it is not unlimited. It is a
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power to shape and mould, for the purposes of justice, the rules
under which parties are to make a showing of their rights, and not
a power to preclude their showing them. " The most formal con
veyance may be a fraud or a forgery ; public officers may connive
with rogues to rob the citizen of his property ; witnesses may tes
tify or officers certify falsely, and records may be collusively
manufactured for dishonest purposes ; and that legislation which
'would preclude the fraud or wrong being shown, and deprive the
party wronged of all remedy, has no justification in the principles
of natural justice or of constitutional law. A statute, therefore,
which should make a tax deed conclusive evidence of a complete
title, and preclude the owner of the original title from showing its
invalidity, would be void, because not a law regulating evidence,
but an unconstitutional confiscation of property." 1 In this con
nection, it is hardly necessary to say that no reference is had to
cases under statutes of limitation, nor to cases resting on princi
ples of equitable estoppel
2. Legislative Mandates. A mandate to officers commanding
them to give effect to invalid proceedings would be ineffectual
for reasons equally conclusive. If such an act proceeds without
an inquiry into the facts, it is a naked attempt to transfer one
man's property to another by mere legislation, and this is not an
authority which belongs to any legitimate government.2 If it
1McCrcady v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 356. And see Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich.,
329; Case e. Dean, 16 id., 12; White v. Flynn, 23 Ind., 46; Corbin v. Hill, 21
Iowa, 70; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 162; S. C, 46 id., 291; Wright v.
Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev., 341, 349; Young v. Beardsley, 11 Paige, 93; East Kings
ton e. Towle, 48 N. H., 57; S. C, 2 Am. Rep., 174; Taylor v. Miles, 5 Kaus.,
498; S. C, 7 Am. Rcp., 558; Powers e. Fuller, 30 Iowa, 476. The case of
Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis., 556, contains some very general and unqualified
language on this subject. That a deed may be made conclusive that the mero
3ale was according to law has been held in Iowa. McCrcady v. Sexton, 29
Iowa, 356 ; Ware v. Little, 35 id., 234 ; Jeffrey v. Brokaw, id., 505. Under a
provision that, before issuing a warrant for collection of a local assessment,
the assessment shall be examined and certified as correct by street commis
sioners, and the attorney and counselor of the city, which certificate shall be
conclusive evidence of regularity of the proceedings, it has been decided that
the certificate would only cover the formal proceedings. It does not deter
mine the fact that the assessment is made against the proper persons. Newell
e. Wheeler, 48 N. Y., 486.
•Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay, 252; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet., 627, 657;
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assumes to proceed upon evidence, then it is usurpation of author
ity, and for that reason void.1 The legislature must prescribe
rules, but when questions arise between parties whether rules have
been complied with, the judiciary is the appointed arbiter.
3. Special Curative Acts. A special act to cure defects in tax
proceedings may undoubtedly be passed in some cases. In the
margin a number of cases are mentioned where the power to cure
defects in legal proceedings has been distinctly affirmed, and they
are in point here.2
There are some limitations of the power, and there is some
embarrassment in considering them, because, though often al
luded to, they have never been very fully examined in the judi-
Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn. St., 256, 266; Lam-
bertson v. Hogan, 2 id., 22, 24.
1An act requiring the board of supervisors of a county to proceed to the
apportionment and assessment of drain taxes, some portion of which had
already been adjudged void, and the others palpably were so, was adjudged
void on this ground in Butler v. Supervisors of Saginaw, 26 Mich., 22. The
cases of Lewis e. Webb, 3 Greenl., 326; Lane v. Dorman, 3 Scam., 238, 242;
Campbell «. Union Bank, 6 How., Miss., 625, 661 ; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Penn.
St., 256, 256 ; Cash, appellant, 6 Mich., 193 ; MeDaniel v. Correll, 19 11l., 226 ; Den-
ny e. Mattoon, 2 Allen, 361 ; Budd v. State, 3 Humph, 483 ; Wally's Heirs e.
Kennedy, 2 Yerg., 554, and Piquet, appellant, 5 Pick., 64, are referred to as
illustrating under different circumstances the distinction between legislative
and judicial authority. See also Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Penn. St., 22 ; Green-
ough v. Greenough, 11 id., 489, 494 ; Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 id., 45 ; S. C,
8 Am. Rep., 153, 155 ; Calhoun v. McLendon, 42 Geo.. 405 ; Trustees v Bailey,
10 Fla., 238 ; People v. Frisbie, 26 Cal., 135 ; Sydnore. Palmer, 32 Wis., 406, 409.
* Kearney v. Taylor, 15 How., 494; Strauch v. Shoemaker, 1 W. & S., 166,
175 ; McCoy v. Michew, 7 id., 386 ; Williston v. Colkett, 9 Penn. St, 38 ; Mont-
gomery v. Meredith, 17 id., 42 ; Dundeu e. Snodgrass, 18 id., 151 ; Schenley e.
Commonwealth, 36 id., 29 ; State v. Union, 33 N. J., 350 ; State v. Newark,
34 N. J., 236 ; Walter v. Bacon, 8 Mass., 468, 472 ; Patterson v. Philbrook, 9
id., 151, 153; Locke e. Dane, 9 id., 360; Trustees e. McCaughey, 2 Ohio, N. S.,
152; Butler v. Toledo, 5 id., 225; Cowgill v. Long, 15 11l., 202; Mitchell e.
Deeds, 49 id., 416; Boardman v. Beckwith, 18 Iowa, 292; Allen v. Archer, 49
Me., 346; People v. Seymour, 16 Cal., 332; People v. Todd, 23 id., 181 ; Boyce
v. Sinclair, 3 Bush, 261 ; Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind., 316 ; Lucas e. Tucker,
17 id., 41 ; Musselman e. Logansport, 29 id., 533 ; Br»,voort e. Detroit, 24 Mich.,
322; Pillsbury v. Auditor General, 26 id., 245 ; Tucker v. Justices, etc., 34 Geo.,
370; Bellows v. Weeks, 41 Vt, 590. The legislature may validate a city ordi-
nance so as to save the lien of a tax levied under it. Schenley v. Common-
wealth 36 Penn. St., 29.
15
226 [CH. X.LAW OF TAXATION.
cial decisions, or even enumerated. Some of the restrictions that
should attend the exercise of the power rest in policy only, and
therefore address themselves to the legislative judgment and
sense of right, but do not constitute limitations upon legislative
power. One of these, concerns the retroactive character of such
legislation ; there being a special liability to abuse in retrospect
ive legislation. The people in some states have felt this so
strongly, that by their constitutions, retrospective laws have been
expressly forbidden ;1 but in the absence of any such express re
striction, there is nothing in the fact that curative statutes ope
rate retrospectively which can preclude their passage.2 Another
objection to such laws is
,
that they may be invidious and in
spired by favoritism, as they select for confirmation certain pro
ceedings— those of a single district, for instance— leaving all
others untouched. But the defects may be in a single district
only, and the need of legislation exclusively confined to it.
Moreover, in different districts different regulations may have
been politic originally, and if so, there can be no very conclusive
reason why they may not in effect be made by a retrospective
sanction of the regulations actually applied. Cities always have
rules of taxation differing in some particulars from those which
prevail in towns ; and, as in the case of police regulations, such
rules must be allowed to vary, because in some cases there may
be the most conclusive reasons why they should. But we should
think the very limit of such legislation would be reached, when a
particular assessment and the proceedings under it
,
in their ope
ration throughout the district, were confirmed. To discriminate
in such proceedings, and say they shall be valid as to a particular
purchaser, or against a particular person or estate taxed, would
not be legislation, because it would establish no rule. Its pur
pose would be, while leaving in force the rule which defeats the
1 Provisions of this nature will be found in the constitutions of Louisiana
New Ilampshire, Missouri, Tennessee and Texas. In North Carolina retro-
spective taxation of sales, purchases and other acts done, is forbidden.
* State v. Newark, 27 N. J., 185 ; People e. Supervisors of Ingham, 20 Mich.,
95. A statute which is but a mode of continuing or reviving a tax which
might be supposed to have expired, and is in this sense retrospective, but
which does not give a judicial construction to a former statute, is not uncon
stitutional. Stockdale v. The Insurance Co., 20 Wall., 323.
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assessment, to exempt from its operation the case of a favored
party. No department of the government possesses this author
ity. And aM special confirmations of assessments and other pro
ceedings are forbidden in some states by>the constitutional re
quirement that all laws shall be general.
One very precise limit to the power to cure these proceedings
is this : They cannot be cured when there was a lack of jurisdic
tion to take them. This is a rule applicable to every species of
legal proceedinga Curative laws may heal irregularities in ac
tion, but they cannot cure a want of authority to act at all.1
What constitutes a want of jurisdiction is the difficult question in
these cases. And in this regard the rules which apply to retro
spective and to prospective healing acts are the same.
It is certain that whatever the legislature could not have au
thorized originally it cannot confirm. The unauthorized acta of
^
individuals cannot confer upon the state a power it did not before
possess.2 Therefore no unconstitutional taxation can be confirmed,
and none that entirely wants any essential element of taxation.
Taxation without an assessment must consequently be incapable
of confirmation, because apportionment is indispensable.8 And if
1 Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen, 361 ; Nelson v. Rountree, 23 Wis., 367 ; Daniel
«. McCorrell, 19 11l., 226, 228; Richards v. Rote, 68 Penn. St., 248; Statee.
Doherty, 60 Me., 504; Griffin's Ex'r v. Cunningham, 20 Grat., 31, 109, per
Joynes, J. ; Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. v. McQuilkin, 12 Kans., 301 ; People v.
Goldtree, 44 Cal., 323; Abbott «. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 162.
» National Bank of Cleveland v. Iola, 9 Kans., 689, 696, per Dillon, J.
• The Pennsylvania statute of 1815 declared that " no inequality in the assess
ment or in the process or otherwise, shall be construed or taken to affect the
title of the purchaser, but the same shall be declared to be good and legal."
Also that only "when the owner or owners of lands sold for taxes shall have
paid the taxes dne on them previously to the sale, or within two years there
after shall have tendered the amount of the taxes and costs with twenty-five
per centum additional, and the tender has been refused, shall he or they be
entitled to recover the lands by due course of law, and that in no other case
and on no other plea shall an action be sustained." Notwithstanding this act
it was decided that if an unseated lot was put on the seated list, and then
transferred to the unseated without notice to the owner, a sale on this assess
ment would be void. Millikin v. Benedict, 8 Penn. St., 169, reviewing and ap
proving Lorimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133; and Harper v. Mechanics' Bank,
7 TV. & S., 214. In Commercial Bank v. Woodside, 14 Penn. St., 404, 409,
Bell, J., says: " It is essential to the validity of every tax sale of lands that
the subject of it should be assessed and returned, by some competent authority,
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the party has been illegally deprived of the opportunity to be
heard in opposition to the assessment, the defect is jurisdictional.1
And it is clear that a tax for an illegal purpose cannot be af
firmed ; the inability to authorize such a tax being perpetual.8
A tax discriminating against an individual could not be af
firmed ; but a merely excessive levy for lawful purposes, appor
tioned through the district, might be. It has often been decided
that, where the only defect in a tax was the want of previous
legislation, this might be supplied retrospectively.8 But a tax
as unseated, or, where it has been rated as a seated tract or lot, that it be trans
ferred to the unseated list, by the commissioners of the county, or their au
thorized agents, with notice to the owner, if that be possible. This is the
doctrine of all the cases in which the subject has been treated. They settle
indisputably, that an omission, in this particular, is uncured by the act of
1815, which applies only to irregularities in the proceeding. It is the assess
ment says Lorrimer v. McCall, 4 W., 351 ; S. C, 4 W. & Serg., 133, which
confers the power to sell in the same manner as a judgment on which an exe
cution is issued. Without this, there is no authority to divest the title of
the owner, and if a tract be returned as seated it cannot be sold for taxes. To
the same effect are the other adjudications, down to Milliken v. Benedict, 8
Barr, 169." To the same efiect is Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Penn. St., 374. That
the want of an assessment is not an irregularity capable of being thus cured,
see Steward v. Shoenfelt, 13 S. & R., 360 ; Bratton e. Mitchell, 1W. & S., 310 ;
Miller v. Hale, 26 Penn. St., 432 : McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 id., 13.
That the want of a notice required by the constitution is an incurable defect,
see Wilson « McKenna, 52 11l., 43. An assessment so defective as to be totally
void cannot be cured by legislation. People v. Holliday, 25 Cal., 300. So
with a want of valuation : People v. Savings Union, 31 id., 132. The confirma
tion by a city council of a void assessment cannot make it good. Doughty v.
Hope, 3 Denio, 594.
1See Thames Manufacturing Co. v. Lothrop, 7 Conn., 550, which however
is not an adjudication upon the point. Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 11l., 223; Bil
lings e. Detton, 15 id., 218, are decisions which support the text. If one man's
land is taxed to another and sold, the sale is void and cannot be made other
wise by legislation. Abbott e. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 162. And see Hume v.
Wainscott, 46 id., 145. If land is taxed by a city which is not within it, the
tax cannot be validated though it is afterwards brought in. Atchison, etc., R.
R. Co., v. McQuilkin, 12 Kans., 301.
• Conway v. Cable, 37 11l., 82; Hart v. Henderson, 17 Mich., 218; Dean e.
Borchsenins, 30 Wis., 235.
•In Grim e. School District, 57 Penn. St., 433, Sharmood, J., speaking of a
bounty tax, says: " It has not been pretended, and could not be, that the legis
lature had not the power antecedent to authorize it. If so, they could cure
any irregularity or want of authority in levying it by a retroactive law, even
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sale that was made after a tax' had been paid, would be void and
incapable of confirmation, the officer losing all jurisdiction to
proceed when payment has been made.1
The general rule has often been declared, that the legislature may
validate, retrospectively, the proceedings which they might have
authorized in advance. Therefore, if any directions of the stat
ute fail of observance, which are not so far of the essence of the
thing to be done that they must be provided for in any statute on
the subject, the legislature may retrospectively cure the defect
But there- are probably some exceptions to this general rule. If
the law has afforded the party an opportunity to be heard, when
it might have been dispensed with, he has a right to rely upon
this for his protection, and we should doubt the right of the
legislature to take it away by retroactive law. There are some
cases which, we think, recognize this right to a hearing which
the law has given, as constituting an exception to the general
right of the legislature to cure defects. And the reason of the
exception will apply to all cases in which notice to the party, by
publication or otherwise, has been provided for his protection.
If this can be dispensed with by a healing act, the very provision
for a notice for the party's protection becomes a trap for his de
struction.2
though thereby a right of action, which had been vested in an individual,
should be divested. It is within the principle of all the decisions of admit
ted authority." And see Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn., 118; Crowell v. Hop-
kinson, 45 N. H., 9; Lowell e. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247; Comer v. Folsom, 13
Minn., 219; State v. Demorcst, 32 N. J., 528; Barbour v. Camden, 51 Me., 608;
Board of Commissioners v. Bearss, 25 Ind., 110; Taylor v. Thompson, 42 11l.,
9; Tucker v. Justices, 34 Geo., 370.
1Reading v. Finney, 73 Penn. St., 467.
»In Miller v. Hale, 26 Penn. St., 432, in which it was decided that a sale of
unseated lands, made before the expiration of a year from the time when the
tax was due and unpaid, could not be validated by the statute curing irregu
larities, the following remarks are made by Woodward, J.: " If it be granted
that this was a regular assessment, or that its irregularities were such as the
curative provisions of the act of 1815 would remedy, it cannot be claimed
that the taxes were ' due and unpaid for the space of one year before ' the
sale — a condition on which the jurisdiction of the treasurer is expressly
limited by the first section of the act of 1815. It was said with great truth,
by Judge Huston, in McCall v. Lorimer, 4 Watts, 351, 352, that taxes cannot be
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4 and 5. Prospective Curative Laws. As already observed, a
general healing statute is subject to the same rules as a special
act for the like purpose, and requires no separate consideration.
A statute providing that in proceedings thereafter to be taken,
errors and irregularities shall not vitiate, comes also under the
same restrictions upon legislative authority,1 though possibly it
due unless they have been assessed. It is, indeed, the assessment that makes
the tax. It is the duty of all owners of unseated lands to return them for
taxation, and to pay the taxes when assessed ; but how is he to pay before they
are assessed? It is not for him to fix the valuation or the rate, but for the
county commissioners ; and, until they have performed their duty, he has no
duty to perform. But, when the assessment has been made and the tax ascer
tained, there is no authority for proceeding to sell the land until the tax shall
have remained unpaid a year. A sale short of that period is simply void.
It is like a sale where there has been no assessment, which has often been de
clared insufficient to pass the title. Nor does the curative provision of the
fourth section of the act of 1815 apply to such a sale, for that was inteuded to
remedy irregularities in proceedings where jurisdiction had attached, not to
confer jurisdiction in cases that were beyond the purview of the act. A sys
tem was provided by the legislature for enforcing the payment of taxes upon
unseated lands, but until a tract has been assessed and the tax remained due
and unpaid a year, it is not within the system nor subject to any of its
provisions. If such were not the rule of decision, titles could be divested,
without notice to the owner, whenever it suited the interest or caprice of the
county officers to expose them to sale. A law, intending to promote public
objects without a wanton sacrifice of private rights, would thus become an
instrument of intolerable mischief, and the doubts, of its constitutionality,
which, with all its checks and balances, attended its enactment and early his
tory, would grow into a conviction that would sweep it from the statute
book."
The cases of Milliken e. Benedict, 8 Penn. St., 169, and Commercial Bank
v. Woodside, 14 id., 404, turn upon a failure to give a notice which, in ad
vance, might have been dispensed with. See also Prindle v. Campbell, 9
Minn., 212; Dubuque e. Wooten, 28 Iowa, 571. But see People e. Seymour, 16
Cal., 332.
1A Minnesota tax law came under review in Prindle e. Campbell, 9 Minn.,
212. Among other things it provided, that " all the instructions and direc
tions herein given for the assessing of lands and personal property, and the
levying and collecting of taxes and assessments, shall be deemed only direc
tory, and no error or informality in the proceedings of any of the officers en
trusted with the same, not affecting the substantial justice of the tax itself,
shall vitiate, or in any wise affect the validity of the tax or assessment, or of
the title conveyed under the sale for taxes under this chapter." Held, that this
does not embrace such errors and informalities as go to the jurisdiction of the
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may go farther in some particulars, as the parties concerned would
be apprised in advance that they were not to rely upon an exact
compliance with the law, and would be under greater obligation to
watch the proceedings. It is not an objection to a curative statute
that it is passed while suits are pending, and was designed to de
feat the proceedings cured. The court must apply the statute
officers charged with the performance of the duties imposed by the chapter, or
the validity of their acts, but only such as do not substantially affect the mate
rial steps in the proceedings. Held, further, that a defective notice of sale was
not cured by the act. An assessment in which the lands of two persons were
assessed together under one aggregate assessment was in Hamilton v. Fond du
Lac, 25 Wis., 490, 495, held void, and the defect not corrected by a statute that
an assessment shall be valid, " notwithstanding any omission, defect or irregu
larity " in the proceedings. Paine J., says " it would be clearly going beyond
the scope and intent of this act to say that it made valid an assessment against
one person of a tax upon another person's lots. That is something more than
a mere omission, defect or irregularity in the proceedings."
Under the Pennsylvania statute the following irregularites held to be cured:
A failure of the assessor to sign his roll. Townsen v. Wilson, 9 Penn. St.,
270. A sale of seated land with unseated; the sale being good as to the pro
portion of the tax for which the unseated was chargeable, and the title passing
after redemption expired. Mitchell v. Bratton, 5 W. & S., 451 ; Campbell v.
Wilson, 1 Watts, 503; Harper v. McKeehan, 3 W. & S., 238; McCord v. Ber-
gautz, 7 Watts, 487 ; Dietrick v. Mason, 57 Penn. St., 40. Paying over surplus
moneys instead of giving a surplus bond. Rogers v. Johnson, 67 id., 43, citing
and relying upon Ash e. Ashton, 3 W. & S., 510, and Iddings e. Cairns, 2
Grant's Cas., 88. The statute does not cure the want of a deed. Hoffman v.
Bell, 61 Penn. St., 444. As to curing irregularities in general, see Laird v.
Heister, 24 id., 452; Cuttle v. Brockway, 24 id., 145; Heft v. Gephart, 65 id.,
510, 518; Witherspoon «. Duncan, 4 Wall., 210, 217. A Massachusetts statute
provided, that "if in the assessors' list, or their warrant and list committed to
the collector, there shall be any error in the name of any person taxed, the tax
assessed to him may, notwithstanding such error, be collected of the person
intended to be taxed ; provided he is taxable, and can be identified by the as
sessors." This applied to the case of one taxed by his surname only. Tyler
v. Hardwick, 6 Met., 470. See Sargeant v. Bean, 7 Gray, 125, where this statute
was further considered. And for cases under a law for like purpose in Ohio,
seeWelker v. Potter, 18 Ohio, N. S., 85 ; Upington v. Oviatt, 24 id., 232. The
cases under the Iowa statute go farther, we think, than any others, in sanc
tioning broad powers in the legislature to cure defects. The following are
referred to : Eldridge v. Kuehl, 27 Iowa, 160 ; McCready v. Sexton, 29 id., 356 ;
Hurley e. Rowel, 31 id., 64; Rima v. Cowan, Slid., 461; Thomas v. Stickle,
32 id., 71 ; Henderson v. Oliver, 32 id., 512; Bulkley v. Callanan, 32 id., 461 ;
Ware v. Little, 35 id., 234 ; Jeffrey v. Brokaw, 35 id., 505 ; Genther r. Puller, 36
id., 604.
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in the pending suits. 1 But such a statute cannot affect cases
already passed into judgment.2
6. Reassessments. The method of curing defects by reassess
ment of the tax is less open to abuse than any that has hitherto
been mentioned. Whether this is done by general law, which
provides for all cases in which tax proceedings prove invalid, and
authorizes the same tax to be imposed on the persons or property
that should be charged therewith, by proceedings begun de novo,
or assumes the form of a special law providing for the like reas
sessment in any particular case, it is scarcely possible that it
should cause serious injustice beyond what is incident to all tax
legislation. In the new proceedings the party concerned has all
the opportunity to watch the various steps, and to be heard in
review of them, that he has in any case, and he is precluded by
nothing that has taken place in the proceedings which proved
abortive. The assessment is for the purpose merely of enforcing
against him a duty which he was likely to evade, by reason of the
nonfeasances or misfeasances of the officers whose duty it was to
enforce it ; and as the new proceeding gives him the same oppor
tunity of being heard that is given in other cases, and is con
ducted on principles that operate generally, he has no reasonable
ground of complaint9 The only cases in which hardship is likely
1See Cowgill v. Long, 15 11l., 202; Millere. Graham, 17 Ohio, N. S., 1 ; State
v. Squiers, 26 Iowa, 340; State v. Norwood, 12 Mi, 195 ; Hepburn e. Ourts,
7 Watts, 300; Grim e. School District, 51 Penn. St., 433. Certiorari dismissed
where a defect in the assessment was cured by special act after it was sued out.
State v. Apgar, 31 N. J., 358. And see Newark v. State, 32 id., 453 ; Bristol v.
Supervisors of Ingham, 20 Mich., 95 ; Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall., 506 ; U. S. v.
Tyner, 11 id., 88.
»Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Penn. St., 22; People v. Supervisors of Saginaw,
26 Mich., 22. The legislature has no authority to reverse judgments directly
or indirectly, and a legislative act legalizing a tax roll and healing defects
therein will be so construed as not to affect an existing judgment for tresspass
against the collector for seizing and selling property to satisfy the illegal
tar. Moser e. White, 29 Mich., 59.
8A statute which, in case of an invalid or irregular tax, provides that it
may be assessed by the assessors for the time being, "to the just amount to
which, and upon the estate or to the person to whom such tax ought at first
to have been assessed," may be used to correct an error which extends to the
entire list. Goodrich v. Lunenburg, 9 Gray, 38. It justifies a reassessment to
the wife, of a tax wrongfully put to the husband and abated the preceding
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to be inflicted by such legislation, are those in which a tax is re
assessed upon an estate which has changed hands since the tax
should have been collected from it ; but a proper examination ot
the records will, in most cases, lead the purchaser to a discovery
of the liability, and enable him to provide against it1 Where
the tax itself was originally void by reason of having been levied
for an illegal purpose, it is obviously impossible to breathe vital
ity into it by new proceedings.2 If it was void because of want
of legislation justifying it
, it may be reassessed after proper legis
lation has been had.8 If it was void because of a disregard of
apportionment, or for any reason affecting a part of the list only,
it may be reassessed with the proper corrections, where correc
tions are practicable.* And here it may be observed that a judi
cial decision against the first proceedings, if based upon errors
and defects merely, and not upon the vicious nature of the tax
itself, is not a bar to a reassessment Such a decision merely
points out the error, and the reassessment may be of all others
the most proper and effectual way of correcting it5
Judicial corrections. Still another method of curing defects
may be noticed. It is that which is sometimes provided by
statutes allowing the parties concerned to have a judicial review
of the proceedings on a proper application.6 We do not refer
year. Hubbard v. Garfield, 102 Mass., 72 : and see Overing v. Foote, 43 N. Y.,
290.
1That the tax may be reassessed, notwithstanding such a change of title,
see Tallman v. Janesville, 17 Wis., 71 ; Cross v. Milwaukee, 19 id., 509. That
local assessments may be reassessed as well as general taxes, May v. Hol-
dridge, 23 id., 93; Brevoort v. Detroit, 24 Mich., 322. And as to such laws iu
general, see further, Tweed v. Metcalf, 4 id., 579, 590; State v. Newark, 34 N.
J., 236 ; In re Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y., 261. A failure to require the payment
of a tax, or the decision of the auditor general that it is not payable, or the
receipt of taxes for subsequent years, works no estoppel as against the state.
Delaware Division Canal Co. v. Commonwealth, 50 Penn. St, 399.
"Dean e. Charlton, 23 Wis., 590; Denn e. I orchsenins, 30 id., 236.
8 Mills v. Charlton, 29 Wis., 400. See In re Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y., 261.
4See Dean e. Charlton, 27 Wis., 522; Cook v. Ipswich Local Board of
Health, L. K., 6 Q
. B , 451 ; Brevoort v. Detroit, 24 Mich., 322.
• Dean v. Charlton, 23Wis., 590 : compare Butler v. Supervisors of Saginaw,
26 Mich., 22.
* For cases of this nature, see State v. Jersey City, 35 N. J., 381 ; Miller e.
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now to those cases in which proceedings are, under general laws,
referred to a court at some stage for confirmation, but to those in
which the proceedings are attacked after their conclusion, and
they are subjected to a judicial examination with a view to the
correction of any errors, if correction shall be found practicable.
Corrections Dy amendment. Of the errors that creep into
the records of tax proceedings very many are merely clerical, or
occur in consequence of a failure to put in proper form the evi
dence of transactions in themselves correct. Tax proceedings
must stand by the record; and a failure to make the proper
record may be_ as fatal as a failure to take the proceeding of
which the record should have been made.
If
,
however, the defect in a record is obviously clerical and
nothing more ; that is to say, if the record on its face sufficiently
shows that the proper steps have in fact been taken, but there is
some error on the part of the recording officer in putting the evi
dence upon the record in precise conformity to the law ; some
omission of a word, or the accidental employment of one word for
another, or any similar error which cannot mislead ; the mistake
may be overlooked, and the court, when the record becomes the
subject of judicial investigation, may by intendment supply what
is omitted, and correct what is erroneous, and then sustain the
record as though the proper corrections had been made by the re
cording officer himself.1 But corrections cannot be made by in
tendment unless the necessary facts appear, either in the record
Graham, 17 Ohio, N. S., 1. The statute in each case is quite peculiar. That
of New Jersey forbade any collateral questioning of the proceedings in the
case of certain assessments for local objects, but permitted them to be review-
ed at any time on certiorari, or other proper proceeding in the supreme or cir-
cuit court.
1Mr. Blackwell, speaking of Atkins v. Hinman, 2 Gilm., 437, 451, says:
"Where in a collateral action, amendments of the tax record were permitted
in the circuit court, the supreme court sustained them upon the ground
that they were only corrections of clerical mistakes, and could prejudice no
person's rights ; that they brought no new matter in the case, and gave no ad-
ditional efficacy to the proceedings, but simply put them in stricter conform
ity to the provisions of the statute. And it must be remembered that these
amendments were of the judgment and precept under the 11linois statute of
1839, and the anterior proceeding on the files of the court, furnished the facts
whereon the amendments were based." Blackwell on Tax Titles, 399.
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as actually made, or in the dfficial documents on file from which
the record should have been drawn up; the courts cannot imply
the existence of facts which are not recited any where in the
official proceedings.
Where the proceedings are conducted under the supervision
of a court of record, or must go before such a court for confirma
tion, the facts which do not appear of record may be supplied by
leave of the court, on a proper showing by affidavit.1 The author
ity of the court to permit such amendments, in order to make
the record correspond to the facts, is probably not different from
what it is to permit amendments in the exercise of its ordinary
jurisdiction.
If the facts to be supplied are such as affect individual cases on
the roll, and may prejudice the parties, it would seem to be a mat
ter of right that the persons to be affected should have notice of
an application to amend, and an opportunity to meet the showing.
This should certainly be so if the application is made at a stage
of the proceedings when the party, if the correction is made, will
have no opportunity subsequently to raise any questions regard
ing the propriety or justice of the amendment. As an illustration,
the case may be instanced of a judgment which is erroneous by
reason of some defect which it is desired to supply by an amend
ment; in such case clearly the party against whom the judgment
is to be validated should be allowed the privilege to contest the
truth of that which it is proposed to put upon the record, and by
which it is expected to bind him.2 And the application ought to
be a distinct proceeding for the purpose, and not be made in a suit
brought to recover lands which have been sold under the judg
ment.8 On such an application counter affidavits would be ad-
1Young v. Thompson, 14 11l., 380, 381.
» See Dunham v. Chicago, 55 11l., 357.
« In an action of ejectment, to recover possession of land by virtue of a tax
title, motion was made to amend the precept. Treat, Ch. J., says : " If such an
amendment is allowable, it should only be made upon a distinct application
to the court for that purpose. The application should have no connection
with any other case. A contrary course would introduce much confusion
and Inconvenience into judicial proceedings. A court engaged in the trial of
a case ought not to be delayed and embarassed, by a motion to amend the
record of another proceeding, which is but collaterally in question before it.
Buch an application might involve the necessity of bringing in other parties
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missible, and the court ought to insist upon a very clear showing
of the facts, before giving its sanction to the introduction of any
changes in a record not originally made under its supervision.
There is a manifest difference between such a case and the correc
tion of errors in the record of proceedings which have been taken in
the court itself, and of which the judges themselves may be pre
sumed to have some recollection.
There are undoubtedly cases in which ministerial officers may
correct errors without judicial permission ; and there are also some
cases in which it would be apparent they could have no such
power. Still other cases may be open to reasonable doubt
Where the defect consists merely in the failure to copy into a
book of records the official document which evidences some legal
transaction, the proper recording officer may correct it at any time,
by making the required record. This may be done by the officer
who should have done it in the first place, or it may be done by his
successor in office. But where the document which should go
upon record is defective, a case of more difficulty is presented.
Many cases involving the right to make amendments have been
considered in the state of New Hampshire, and it may be useful
to notice them.
In a very early case the validity of a town vote to raise money
was in question, and the court, while the cause was on trial, per
mitted the record to be" amended so as to show that the proper
vote had been had. The amendment was made by the person
who was town clerk at the time the meeting was held ; and the
case does not show that he was still in office. The authority to
make the amendment was not much considered ; the judge con
tenting himself with saying that,
" On this point we think that
great care must be taken that amendments be made only accord-
and different interests before the court" Pitkin v. Yaw, 13 11l., 251, 253. In
another case the samejudge, in speaking of a defective judgment on a delin
quent tax list, says: " It may be that the circuit court, upon a proper app.i-
catiou, will allow the record to be so amended as to show when thejudgment
was rendered. But until the record is thus perfected, no title can be asserted
under the proceedings." Young v. Thompson, 14 11l., 380, 381. Where the
certificate of publication of the collector's notice of his intended application
for judgment for taxes is deficient, it may be amended by order of the court,
upon notice being given to the opposite party, even after judgment Dunham
«. Chicago, 55 11l., 357, citing Coughran e. Gutchens, 18 11l., 390.
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ing to the fact ; but we have no doubt that a record may be
amended to conform to the truth."1
In the next case in which a like question was raised, the point
was more fully considered. It was admitted that there were de
fects in the record of town proceedings, which would be fatal to a
tax title then under consideration in a case on trial, unless they
could be cured. The defects are summed up by the court, and
the case disposed of as follows: "The return of the posting up
of the warrant for the town meeting is insufficient It does not
state when it was posted up. Nor does it show that it was posted
at a public place. It does not appear that Thirston, who was
chosen collector, took the oath of office prescribed by law. And
there are defects in the return of the collector, to which excep
tions have been taken.
" The tenants move that these proceedings may be amended.
It has been already settled that the records of towns may be
amended to conform to the truth of the fact.2 The amendment
must be made by the person who was in office at the time.3
"It seems probable that in the prior cases where amendments
have been allowed, the officers who were permitted to make them
were not in office at the time ; if they were, it must have been
under subsequent election ; and the right to have the amendment
made cannot depend upon the question whether the officer has
again been elected. The form in which such amendments are to
be made, has never yet been settled. It would be very danger
ous to sanction alterations of the books themselves, by erasures
and interlineations. And we are of opinion that they should be
made only upon evidence showing the truth of the facts, and
then by drawing out in form the amendment which the facts au
thorize. The amendment, with the order under which it is made,
may then be annexed to the books where the original is recorded,
so that the whole matter will appear ; and in furnishing copies the
original and amendment should both be furnished.
"But it is objected, on the part of the demandant, that no
1Bishop v. Cone, 3 N. H., 513, 516, per Ri«hardson, Ch. J., who cites, as au
thority, Welles v. Battelle, 11 Mass., 477, and Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick., 397.
•Citing Bishop v. Cone, 3 N. H., 513 ; Welles v. Battelle, 11 Mass., 477 ; Car
digan v. Page, 6 N. H., 182.
'Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick., 397.
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amendment ought to be made to her prejudice. That when she
purchased, these defects in the vendue title were apparent, and
that she must be presumed to have purchased with knowledge
that the title was defective.
" The general rule is that amendments of records are made with
saving of the rights of third persons acquired since the existence
of the defect Chamberlain v. Crane, 4N. E 116 ; Bowman v.
Stark, 6 id., 459.
" To apply this rule, however, to all cases of defects in sales of
lands for taxes, would, in effect, be very nearly denying a right to
amend ; as the owner of the land sold would attempt to defeat any
amendment, by conveying to some friend, who would bring a suit
in his behalf. It would, at least, be necessary to confine the ap
plication of the principle to cases where the land had been actu
ally conveyed bona fide.
"But instances might exist, when the purchaser, although he
might not have found upon the records all that was necessary to
make a formal and valid record, might have been well assured,
from what he did find, that all that was necessary had in fact been
done.
" For instance, in relation to the two first defects in the records
in this case — in the return of the warning of the meeting, and in
the record of the oath of the collector — although these records
are not sufficient in point of law, they lead the mind of any one
to the belief that what was requisite was probably done. And
in such cases, where the fact appears to be stated, but not in a
formal manner, there is no reason why he who purchases should
not be subjected to the same liability to have the amendment
made, and the record put in form, that his grantor would have
been, had he attempted to recover the land.
" There are cases where, although all that is required may not
appear of record, it may be left to the jury to presume that all
that was required was done. As in Bishop v. Cone — although
the application of the principle in that case may, perhaps, have
been questionable, on account of the transactions having been so
recent, that, if the truth would have warranted it, an amendment
might have been made. Whether that principle could be applied
against a subsequent purchaser, it is not necessary to determine.
But where what is necessary, is
,
although not formally stated, so
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far set down as to lead to a belief that a correct record might
have been made, there seems to be no reason why a purchaser,
who has access to the records, should not take it subject to a right
to have the record put in form, if the truth will warrant it
" When, on the other hand, nothing appears upon the record in
relation to any particular fact necessary to make out a title, nor
is any thing set down from which it is naturally to be inferred
that the fact existed, a subsequent bona fide purchaser ought not
to have his title defeated by supplying a record instead of amend
ing a record." 1
The subsequent cases in New Hampshire are in accord with
these, and fully sustain them in their conclusions.2 It is said that
" it has never been held that such amendments could be allowed
by any other tribunal than one of the superior courts." 8 And
yet unless some statute confers upon them the authority, it is not
1Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H., 168, 176, per Parker, Ch. J. The judge thereup
on proceeds to say that " upon these principles, if the facts will warrant it "
the various defects which he points out in detail may be amended. But he
adds, " we must first have evidence to show that these amendments may be
made with truth."
s On the trial of Bean v. Thompson, 19 N. H., 290, involving the validity of
a tax voted at a town meeting, it appearing that there was no return upon the
warrant calling the meeting, the selectmen who were in office when it was held
were permitted, on motion, to make the proper return. Woods, J., says:
" Leave is often granted to officers, whose returns of their doings, or records of
public transactions, are, by law, made evidence, to correct errors or to supply
omissions, to conform to the truth. The interest which the public have in the
correctness and fullness of the record, and the responsibility of the officer him
self for the accuracy of his own doings, are primarily a good cause for grant
ing such indulgences tending to the promotion of reasonable objects. And it
has never been deemed an objection to the amendment of a return or record,
that proceedings were pending which might be affected by it
,
except that
where rights or claims bona fide have intervened, amendments that would en
tirely defeat them have been in some instances denied." And he refers to
Gibson v. Bailey, supra, as laying down the proper rule on the subject. In
Scammon v. Scammon, 28 N. H., 419, 429, Bishop v. Cone and Gibson v.
Bailey, are again referred to with approval. In Cass v. Bellows, 31 id., 501,
they also are approved, but the proper person to make the corrections then
necessary was dead, and consequently they could not be made. See further
Prescott v. Hawkins, 12 id., 19 ; Pearce v. Richardson, 37 id., 306, 309 ; Jaquith
v. Putney, 48 id., 138.
8 Pierce v. Richardson, 37 N. H., 306, 311, per Bell, J.
240 [CH. X.LAW OF TAXATION.
very clear whence they derive it
,
nor how a township officer, or one
who has been such, can, in this collateral way, have authority con
ferred upon him to do anything which, without such authorization,
would be an illegal act.
i An early case in Massachusetts, often quoted in New Hamp
shire, involved the validity of a correction by a town clerk, of his
own motion, to cure a defect in an entry made by himself. The
amendment was sustained ; the court expressing the opinion that
the clerk might have made it at any time while he held the office,
even though under a subsequent election.1 But it is held in the
same state that the successor of the clerk can have no authority
to make corrections in records of transactions which were had
before he came into office.2
In Vermont it has been said that " the practice of amending
and altering the records, when a controversy has arisen, to meet o
particular case, or in consequence of a decision of the court, cannot
be defended."8 In a later case the right to amend, under proper
restrictions, was asserted. " While it is obvious," say the court
"some limits must be fixed to such amendments, we do not fee
prepared to say, as matter of law, that they are never allowable.
If the officer making the record were out of office, or were a party
to the suit, as in Hadley v. Chamberlin, 11 Vt, 618, and in many
other cases, it might be improper. * * But we think in gen
eral it must be regarded as the right of the clerk of a town, or
other municipal corporation, while having the custody of the
records, to make any record according to the facts. And we do
not perceive that his having been out of office and restored again,
could deprive him of that right But even the officer could not
alter or amend a record upon the testimony of third persons ordi
narily, and ought not to do it upon his own recollection, unless
in very obvious cases of omission or error, of which the present
might fairly be regarded as one probably. Such amendments
1 Welles v. Battelle, 11 Mass., 477, 481, per Parker, Ch. J.
•Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick., 397. The defect consisted in the failure to record
the adjournment of the town meeting at which the new clerk was chosen.
8 Williams, Ch. J., in Hadley v. Chamberlin, 11 Vt., 618. The amendment
was made in open court on the trial of a cause involving the sufficiency of the
record. One peculiarity of the case was that the officer making the amend
ment was a party to the suit, and made it for his own protection.
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should ordinarily be made by the original documents or min
utes." 1
It is observable of this case that the amendment, which con
sisted in the signing of the record of warning of a school district
meeting, was made by the clerk on the trial of a cause, where the
record was in question, and without the permission of the court.
From the case it appears that " the court decided that they had
no power over the clerk, and could give him no directions, but
said that in the opinion of the court the clerk had a right, if he
chose to do so, to amend the record in that particular, if such
amendment would be according to the truth ; but that the clerk
must judge for himself whether he would or should make such
amendment, and the court added that if such amendment was
made, the record, in the opinion of the court, would be admissi
ble." This remark distinguishes the case broadly from those in
New Hampshire, and leaves the responsibility of all amendments
with the officer himself.
In New York, in a case in which the affidavit of the assessors,
attached to the assessment roll, was found to be defective, the
opinion was expressed that it would be competent for the board
of supervisors, when in session for the purposes of a review of the
rolls, " to send for the assessors of any one town to come before
them, and supply omissions, and make the necessary affidavits,
where the omission occurred through accident or mistake." 2 This
opinion appears entirely reasonable ; and it would seem that the
officer who, through any carelessness or error, has executed, or
even delivered, a defective process or return, ought to be at lib
erty to correct it at any time afterwards, before any decisive action
has been taken, under the process or document amended, and
while, therefore, there is no possibility that the error can have
prejudiced any one.
Of course the amendment could not be made by one who wns
no longer in office, as under such circumstances it would not be
an official act8 Neither could it be made under circumstances
1RedjUld, Ch. J., in Mott e. Reynolds, 27 Vt., 206, 208.
•Parish v. Golden, 3.r,N. Y., 462, 465, per Morgan, J.
*Shavi, Ch. J., in Hartwell v. Littleton, 13 Pick., 229, 232. "The first ques
tion is whether the town clerk of a former year, who does not now hold that
16
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where it could operate unjustly upon the rights of parties. Thus,
it has been held in Vermont, that if a tax sale is fatally defective
by reason of the failure of the town clerk to certify in his record
that the advertisements were published as required by law, the
clerk cannot make it good by amending his record after the time
for redeeming from the sale has expired. The reason is
,
that the
owner, relying upon the record, may have omitted to redeem, in
asmuch as his land has not been legally sold.1 But until the
rights of third parties have intervened, or conclusive action has
been taken in reliance upon the records or documents, as repre
senting in their imperfect state the actual facts, it is not perceived
why a mistake once made should be crystalized and preserved
as an instrument for the destruction of all that shall follow, in
stead of being corrected, that legal proceedings may be supported
upon it The question to some extent is one of public policy ;
and while undoubtedly it is wise to hold strictly to the rule, that
records shall not be tampered with to the injury of parties con
cerned, there is no principle or reason of public policy which
should preclude the correction of errors before rights have be
come fixed, but many considerations which support it.
No amendment can make valid a tax sale that was void for
want of a proper description of the land in the assessment and
subsequent proceedings.2 And if fatal errors occur in tax con-
office, can be allowed to come in and amend the record of a former year,
made whilst he was in that office; and the court are of opinion that he can
not. It has been held in Welles v. Battelle, 11 Mass., 477, that where a clerk
continues in office several years, by repeated annual elections, he may amend
the record of a former year, notwithstanding an election has intervened, and
though he does not hold the office under the same appointment. But we
think there Is an obvious distinction in principle between the two cases. In
the latter the clerk not only knows the fact, in relation to which the amend
ment is to be made, which is a circumstance common to both, but he still
enjoys the confidence of the town, is by their vote entrusted with the custody
of their records, and is held responsible for their purity and correctness under
the sanction of his official oath, and all such other guards as the law has
thought it necessary to prescribe in the case of a clerk actually in office. The
intervening election is substantially a continuance of the clerk in the same
oflSce." And see School District e. Atherton, 12 Met., 112.
1 Judevine e. Jackson, 18 Vt., 470, approved and followed in Langdon v.
Poor, 20 id., 13. Compare Jaquith e. Putney, 48 N. H., 138.
» Roberts v. Chan Lin Pen, 23 Cal., 259.
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veyances, they can neither be amended by the officer, nor cor
rected by motion in a court of law. The proper tribunal for that
purpose is a court of equity. A court of law, where the defect
ive conveyance was in question, might order the case continued
to give opportunity for relief in equity, but could not do more.1
An officer to whom return has been made by another, has no
authority to amend such return,8 but a correction in an immate
rial point can give no one a ground of complaint8
1Annan «. Baker, 49 N. H., 161, 171, per Nesmith, J., citing Prescott v.
Hawkins, 12 Id., 19.
•Blighte. Banks, 6 T. B. Monr., 192, 206; Blight e. Atwell, 7 id., 264, 268.
See Bellows v. Weeks, 41 Vt, 590. 600; Jones v. Tiffin, 24 Iowa, 190.
' Case v. Dean, 16 Mich., 12. As to amendments permitted by statute in
Iowa, see Jones v. Tiffin, 24 Iowa, 190; Conway e. Younkin, 28 id., 298.
244 [CH. XI.LAW OF TAXATION.
CHAPTER XI.
THE VOTING OF THE TAX.
Necessity for legislative authority. There must be distinct
legislative authority for every tax that is levied. This is a prin
ciple that admits of no exception whatever,1 unless one is made by
the constitution of the state, operating to that extent as a restric
tion upon what would otherwise be the soverign legislative power
over this subject And in the several states the principle applies
to every tax, whether state or municipal.
But while the legislature must originate the power to tax, and
prescribe the rules under which taxes are to be levied, the determi
nation of the amount, even of a state tax, may be referred to some
other authority. When a state auditing board is provided for by
the constitution of the state, the allowances of the board will per
haps be made conclusive, and be required to go into the general
tax levy for the year.2 And in any case there seems to be no
objection in principle to legislation under which the salaries of
state officers, the general expenses of state government, and other
demands against the state, which are audited in accordance with
general legislation, shall be provided for by a levy made under
general rules, without the necessity of a special act prescribing
the amount of the particular tax. No legislative power is dele
gated by such an arrangement
The amount of the local taxes is determined in various ways :
1. In some cases they are fixed by the legislature or under its
direction ; as will be shown in a subsequent chapter. 2. In some
1See Norris v. Russel, 5 Cal., 249; Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y., 123; Allen
e. Peoria, etc. R. R. Co.. 44 11l., 85; Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass., 181; Stetson «
Kempton, 13 id., 272; Lisbon «. Bath, 21 N. H., 319; Daily v. Swope,47 Miss.,
367; Columbia v. Guest, 3 Head, 413; Cruikshanks v. Charleston, 1 McCord,
360; Statee. Charleston, 2 Speers, 623; Simmons v. Wilson, 66 N. C, 336;
Vanover v. Justices, 27 Geo., 354; Lott v. Ross, 38 Ala., 156; Richmond «
Daniel, 14 Grat., 385; Bullock e. Curry, 2 Met., Ky., 171; Bright e. Mc
Cullough, 27 Ind., 223.
• See People v. Supervisors of Queens, 1 Hill, 195.
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cases they are determined by local boards, which exercise a quasi
legislative authority ; such as the boards of supervisors of many
states, the county courts or boards of justices of others, the com
mon councils of cities and boroughs, the village boards of villages,
the township boards or selectmen of towns, and the corresponding
boards in other corporate bodies. 3. Many taxes are required to
be voted by popular assemblages composed of all the voters of
the municipality to be taxed, or, in some instances, of certain
classes of the voters, supposed to be specially interested in the
tax. It is consistent with the practice of early days that this
method shall be adopted in all districts whose population is not
too great to render it impracticable ; and we find it general in
school districts, and to a large extent also in towns, villages and
even some small cities. But in the larger districts like counties,
as well as in the cities generally, the authority is of necessity con
fided to representatives of the people, who are usually chosen by
popular ballot.
Toting taxes in popular assemblages. A popular assem
blage for any legal purpose must be regularly convened in such
manner as the law may have prescribed. The coming together
of a majority of the people of a municipality, or even of all the
people, at a time and in a manner not provided for by law, and
the voting upon the levy of a tax, will have np legal force or val
idity whatever. In levying taxes, or in exercising any other
function of government, the local community are wielding a part
of the sovereign power of the state, but only with the state's per
mission, and under such conditions, restrictions and regulations as
the state has prescribed. One of these invariably is
,
that the power
shall be exercised in an orderly manner, at a meeting assembled
after due notice, and conducted according to legal forms, in order
that there may be full opportunity for reflection, consultation and
deliberation upon the important work to be done. Nothing short
of this will insure deliberative meetings, or prevent popular gath
erings degenerating into mobs, and thereby defeating the purposes
for which they are authorized.
Corporate meetings may be appointed by general statute which
names a certain day in the year on which they are to be held. In
this manner provision is usually made for annual town meetings
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and school district meetings. Of such statutes every citizen takes
notice at his peril, and a meeting assembled at the time and place
appointed is a lawful meeting. This is probably the rule even
where the notice of the meeting, which some statutes require to
be given by publication, has been omitted ; the notice by publi
cation being only additional to the notice by statute, and being
provided for by way of additional precaution, to remind the people
of the statutory provision which they are nevertheless bound to take
'notice of, whether the publication takes place or not. The right
to hold the meeting comes from the statute, not from the pub
lished notice.1 The same statute will commonly specify the sub
jects which may be considered at such meetings, and will limit
any power to levy taxes which is permitted to be exercised.2
All special meetings must be regularly called as the statute may
have prescribed. The following are customary regulations : That
the meeting shall be called by the officers of the municipality,
either on their own motion or on the application of a certain num
ber of the voters or freeholders ; that it shall be notified either by
a warning8 delivered or its contents stated to the several voters,
or by notice published or posted in a manner particularly indi
cated by the statute ; and that the subjects to be considered at the
meeting shall be specified in the warning or notice. With all
these provisions there must be careful compliance, and the meet
ing when held must confine itself strictly to the subjects indicated
in the notice or warning.4
1People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y., 350; People e. Brenham, 3 Cal., 477; State v.
Jones, 19 Ind., 356; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich., 508; Dishon v. Smith, 10
Iowa, 212; State v. Orvis, 20 Wis., 235; State v. Gaetze, 22 id., 863. See
Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill, 646..
J As to the necessity of a vote of the electors before a school tax can be
levied in Arkansas, see County Court Robinson, 27 Ark., 116.
"
And in Cal
ifornia, see People v. Castro, 39 Cal., 65.
8Difference between "calling" a meeting and "warning" it: see Stone «.
School District, 8 Cush., 592; Rideout v. School District, 1 Allen, 232. And
.see as to the call, George e. School District, 6 Met., 497.
'That a tax can only be voted at a meeting legally warned, see Bowen v.
King, 34 Vt., 156. As to what is a sufficient warning, see Allen e. Burlington,
45 id., 202. Where the warrant for a meeting specified as the object " to adopt
such measures in relation to their ministerial concerns as may then and there
seem expedient, and to act thereon as they see cause," held sufficient to sup-
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In voting taxes all the local bodies act in a political capacity,
and their action is to be favorably construed, and not to be over
ruled or set aside by judicial or any other authority, so long as
they keep within the limits of the power bestowed upon them.
But their action in voting taxes should always appear of record.
" Every essential proceeding in the course of a levy of taxes," it
is said in one case, " must appear in some written and permanent
form in the record of the bodies authorized to act upon them.
Such a thing as a parol levy of taxes is not legally possible under
port a vote of money in fulfillment of a contract between the minister and a
committee, under which he was to discontinue the pastoral relation. Black
burn v. Walpole,9 Pick., 97. A warrant "To choose a district committee and
to act on other business that may be thought necessary," does not authorize pre
scribing a method for calling subsequent meetings by the clerk, and therefore
a subsequent meeting called by the clerk cannot legally vote taxes. Little v.
Merrill, 10 Pick., 543. A warning for a school meeting which stated the object
to be "to take into consideration the expediency of raising for the use of
schooling for the year ensuing," held sufficient. A vote was taken " to raise
one cent and five mills on the dollar" on the list for the year, without nam
ing any time of payment. Held to be sufficiently definite, and the tax would
be payable on demand, or within a reasonable time. Bartlett v. Kinsley, 15
Conn., 327. As to the effect of custom on the construction of votes of town
meetings, see Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 578-9. An article in the
warning of a school meeting, to sen whether the district will have a school
the ensuing winter, and to see what method the district will take to pay the
expenses of said school, is sufficient to authorize the district to vote a tax upon
the grand list to defray the expenses of the school. Chandler e. Bradish, 23 Vt.,
416. A warning to see if a town will vote a tax for the purpose of paying a
bounty does not authorize a vote to borrow money for that purpose. Atwood
v. Lincoln, 44 Vt., 332. A sihool district tax voted at a meeting not legally
called is void. Haines v. School District, 41 Me., 246; Rideout v. School Dis
trict, 1 Allen, 232; People v. Castro, 39 Cal., 65. A tax voted for a purpose not
specified in the notice of special meeting is void. Holt's Appeal 5 R. I.
,
603.
Construction of particular notices; Williams e.Larkin,3 Denio, 114; Torrey v.
Milbury, 21 Pick., 64. A tax voted at a meeting warned without naming the
hour of the meeting in the warrant is void, and it will not justify the collec
tor in an action of trespass against him for taking property to satisfy the tax.
Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt., 439. The return of a freeholder upon a warrant
from the selectmen for warning a meeting of the inhabitants of a school dis
trict, that he had warned them according to law, was held to be conclusive in
an action by one of the inhabitants against the assessors for assessing a tax
on him which had been voted at such a meeting. Saxton v. Nimms, 14 Mass.,
314. Under a statute which provided that " every town meeting shall be held in
pursuance of a warrant under the hands of the selectmen," a warrant signed
by one only was held void, and a tax voted at a meeting held pursuant thereto
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the laws.''1 And in another, in which the action of a convention
of town delegates in voting a county tax was in question,
" a
record of the doings of such a convention is the only evidence to
show a county tax duly granted."' But if the record is lost, the
was invalid, and one who had paid it might recover back of the town. Rey
nolds v. New Salem, 6 Met., 340. As to the effect of fraudulent neglect to
give notice or giving misleading notice, see People v. Allen, 6 Wend., 486 ; Peo-
pie e. Peck, 11 id., 604; Marchant e. Langworfhy, 6 Hill, 646; Randall v. Smith,
1 Denio, 214. That in proving notice of a meeting it is not sufficent to state
in the affidavit or return that the notice was given " in. accordance with the
act," but it should state the facts, see State e. Hardcastle, 26 N. J., 143; Hard-
castle v. State, 27 id., 551 ; Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H., 182; Tuttle e. Cary, 7
Greenl., 426 : compare People v. Highway Commissioners, 14 Mich., 528. But
see Briggs e. Murdock, 13 Pick., 305 ; Houghton e. Davenport, 23 id., 235 ; Bucks-
port v. Spofford, 12 Me., 487. Where thedefendants in an action of trespass justi
fied as assessors, and showed by the records of the town that they were duly
elected at a town meeting legally warned, they were held not bound to go be
hind the records to show that the proceedings of the warningofficer had been
regular. Thayer e. Stearns, 1 Pick., 109. In a vote of a school district laying a
tax for its purposes, it is not essential to its validity that the particular object for
which it was laid should be specified. West School District v.Mcrrils, 12 Conn.,
436. A school house having been erected under invalid votes, the district may
lawfully vote a tax to pay for ft. Greenbanks v. Boutwell, 43 Vt., 207. As to such
meetings in general, their regularity and powers, see Blackburn v. Walpole, 9
Pick., 97; Perry v. Dover, 12 id., 206; Littlee. Merril, 10 id., 543; Williams v.
School District, 21 id., 75 ; School Districte. Atherton, 12 Met., 105 ; Cardigan v.
Page, 6 N. H., 182 ; Nelson v. Pierce, id.., 194 ; Brewster «. Hyde, 7 id., 206 ; Lis
bon v. Bath, 21 id., 319; Schoff e. Gould, 52 id., 512; Hunte. School District, 14
Vt., 300; Pratt e.Swanton, 15 id., 147; Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 id., 337 ; Wyley
v. Nelson, 44 id., 404; Greenbanks e. Boutwell, 43 id., 207; Allen v. Burling
ton, 45 id., 202; Lander v. School District, 33 Me., 239; Jordan v. School Dis-
trict, 38 id., 164; Belfast, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brooks, 60 id., 568; State e. Hardcas
tle, 26 N. J., 143; Hardcastle v. State, 27 id., 551. The officers or the inhabi
tants merely treating the proceedings of an invalid meeting as valid does not
make them so. Pratt e. Swanton, 15 Vt., 147.
1Campbell, J., in Moser v. White, 29 Mich., 59, 60. See also appeal of Pow
ers, 29 id., 504: Doe v. McQuilkin, 8 Blackf., 335.
»Richardwn, J., in Cardigan e. Page, 6 N. H., 182, 191. See Farrar v. Fes-
senden, 39 id., 268, 277. Fowler, J., says : " The records of taxes were properly
received to prove the taxation which, being matter of record, could be proved
in no other way, unless the loss of the records were first shown." In Gear-
hart v. Dixon, 1 Penn. St., 224, 228, it is said of the record of a school tax,
that, " where it was defective, it might be explained or supplied by parol tes
timony. * * The law docs not require school directors to keep a record
o f their proceedings, although it is better that they should do so." Compare
Moor v. Newfield, 4 Greenl., 44.
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contents are subject to parol proof as in other cases.1 And any
informalities are to be overlooked and disregarded if the substan
tial requisites of a vote appear.2 It is always to be assumed that
all these inferior municipalities have decided wisely and well
upon the matters of discretion submitted to them, and it is in
competent anywhere to attack the validity of their action, upon
the ground that the facts and circumstances which were laid
before, and which surrounded them, did not call for the conclusion
which they reached. BVom this broad statement the only excep
tion that need be made, is that which rests upon the power of
legislative supervision and control, when they refuse or neglect to
perform a duty to the state, or when they vote local taxes which
seem to the legislature impolitic and oppressive.
A learned and able court has spoken very clearly and pointedly
concerning the absence of power in the judicial tribunals to enter
tain appeals from the municipal bodies, in the exercise of their
discretionary power to tax. The case was one in which the
attempt was made to enjoin school directors from the levy of a
tax regularly voted. " No such appeal lies, for none is given by
law. Most of our tax laws entitle the citizen to a hearing before
he is obliged to pay ; not to a judicial hearing, indeed, but to an
1Farrar v. Fessenden, 39 N. H., 268; Quinby v. North American, etc., Co.,
2 Heiskell, 596; Irwin v. Miller, 23 11l., 401.
8As to what is a sufficient vote in raising a town tax, see Blodgett e. Hol-
brook, 39 Vt., 336, 339. As to the particularity required in specifying the
purpose of the tax, Peek, J., says, in that case " all that is necessary in this
respect is that a vote of a town raising money should indicate, in general
terms, the purpose or object for which the money is raised; and if that pur
pose or object is such as comes within the scope of the powers of the town, it
is sufficient. It is. not necessary to the validi:y of the vote that it should state
the particular facts which show the present necessity of the town for the use
of the money. The object specified being within the powers of the town, it
is to be intended that the town has judged properly as to the occasion and
necessity for the exercise of the power in the particular instance." See, also,
as to the sufficiency of a vote for a school tax, Adams v. Hyde, 27 Vt., 221 ;
West v. Whittaker, 37 Iowa, 598. gV failure of the officers to sign the record of
the board of supervisors, does not vitiate a tax levied by it. Lacey v. Davis,
4 Mich, 143; People v. Eu;ekn, etc., Co., 48 Cal., 143: Martin v. Cole, 38 Iowa,
141. The record cannot be attacked collaterally, and its recitals shown to be
false. Taylor r. Henry, 2 Pick., 397 ; Manning v. Fifth Parish in Gloucester,
6 id., 6
;
Hartwell «. Littleton, 13 id., 229; Edd. v. Wilson, 43 Vt., 362; Bissel
t1.Jeffersonville, 24 How., 287.
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appeal to some special tribunal, generally the county commis
sioners; but the school law gives no such appeal. This is the
reason why the ear of the courts should be open to well founded
complaints on the part of the citizen ; but where he has no
irregularity, no neglect of duty, no excess of authority to com
plain of, nothing, indeed, but an indiscreet use of clearly granted
discretion, he will vex the judicial ear in vain, for the judicial
arm can redress no such wrong. The power of taxation, alto
gether legislative, and in no degree judicial, is committed by the
legislature, in the matter of schools, to the directors of school
districts. If the directors refuse to perform their duties, the court
can compel them. If they transcend their powers, the court can re
strain them. If they misjudge their power, the court can correct
them. But if they exercise their unquestionable powers unwisely,
there is no judicial remedy." 1 This is a clear and strong state
ment of a wise and salutary general principle.
Restrictions upon municipal taxation. Upon the power of
municipal corporations to tax, there are a number of restrictions
which may be stated as follows i
1. Those imposed by the constitution of the United States.
No state can confer upon its municipalities a power to tax, which
1Woodward, J., in Wharton v. School Directors, 42 Penn. St., 358, 364. See,
to the same effect, Williams v. School District, 21 Pick., 75, 82; Petition of
Powers, 52 Mo., 218. In each of these cases it was held, that after a school
district had properly decided upon the erection of a school house, the deter
mination was final, and that no inquiry could be entered upon regarding the
necessity for the building. So in Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass., 94, 104,
where the attempt was to enjoin a town from purchasing ground for a ceme
tery, on the ground that it was unnecessary, and that the expense would be
disproportionate and unreasonable, Ckapman, C J., after showing that the
language of the statute, authorizing towns to provide burial grounds, is very
broad, and leaves them to judge what sum shall be raised, what quantity of
land shall be appropriated for the purpose, and how it shall be fenced, laid
out, arranged and managed, without any specified restriction, denies the juris
diction of the court to control their discretion in these particulars, and de
clares that "the exercise of their discretion extends to matters of taste," in
the matter of making the burial grounds beautiful and attractive, instead of
unsightly and repulsive. That courts cannot restrict or restrain a power con.
ferred to grant licenses for revenue, see Kemper v. Louisville, 7 Bush, 599;
citing Mason e. Lancaster, 4 id., 496. As to the conclusiveness of a school
district vote, see Eddy e. Wilson, 43 Vt., 362.
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by the charter of general government is forbidden to itself. The
limitations imposed upon state authority are imposed with equal
emphasis upon every subordinate instrument of the state ma
chinery.1
2. Those imposed by the constitution of the state. And here
it is not a matter of course, that restrictions imposed on the state
are restrictions on its corporations also. Some restrictions are
sometimes imposed on the state itself as a corporation, which are
not intended to apply to its municipal creations, while others
declare a general policy, and are limitations upon the state
power to tax either generally or by delegation. It is clearly
within the province of the people, when they agree' upon a con
stitution, to limit the state as they think proper, and to give, in
some particulars, a larger liberty to the municipal corporations if
that shall be thought wise. The question upon these limitations
is one of construction merely.2 But except as these express
restrictions limit the state power specially, the state can delegate
to none of the subordinate bodies an authority which, if no such
body existed, it could not itself exercise.
3. Those which inhere in the nature of taxation itself. These
have been sufficiently dwelt upon in another place.8
4. Those which inhere in local taxation specially, and confine
it to purposes and objects which are local.
5. Those which the state attaches, as conditions or regulations,
to the exercise of the authority it gives.
One of the most important purposes to be subserved by formal
1Stuyvesant a. New York, 7 Cow., 588; 11linois Conference Female College
v. Cooper, 25 11l., 148; Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Geo., 404; O'Donnell v. Bai.
ley, 24 Miss., 386.
»See Slack v. Railroad Co., 13 B. Monr., 1, 16; Dubuque County v. Railroad
Co., 4 Greene (Iowa), 1 ; Clapp v. Cedar County, 5 Iowa, 15 ; State v. Wapello
County, 13 Iowa, 388; Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis., 136; Bushnell e. Beloit, 10
id., 195; Prettyman e. Supervisors, 19 11l., 406; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 id.,
451; Johnson v. Stark County, 24 id., 75; Perkins e. Lewis, 24 id., 208; But
ler e.Dunham, 27 id., 474; People v. Chicago, 51 id., 17, 34; Richmond v.
Scott, 48 Ind., 568; People e. Supervisor, etc., 16 Mich., 254; Bay City v. State
Treasurer, 23 id., 449, 504. An exemption from " public taxes," held not to
be an exemption from taxation for municipal purposes Morgan v. Cree, 46
Vt., 773; S. C, 14 Am. Rep., 640.
»See Chapter III.
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written constitutions is the protection of minorities against
oppressive action on the part of majorities. Such oppressive
action in the case of the local bodies might consist in the levy of
enormous taxes, or the incurring of enormous debts, under the
influence of temporary excitements and passions, for purposes
which cooler reflection would condemn. By some state constitu
tions it is expressly made the duty of the legislature, in conferring
local powers of taxation, to impose restrictions on the power in
order to prevent its abuse. Such a provision is addressed to the
discretion of the legislature, who will impose such and such only
as are deemed advisable.1 In the absence of such provisions in
conferring the power to tax, it is restricted only as is above shown.2
But in thus authorizing local taxation, the state does not deprive
itself of the general power to control. There is nothing in the
nature of a contract in such a delegation,8 and what the state
gives it may at any time take away. It may attach new con-
1People e. Mahaney, 13 Mich., 481, 487. In this case it was decided, that
the power of a police board, to determine what sums should be raised for
their purposes, was limited; the statute confining the power to the necessary
police expenses. And see Paine v. Spratley, 5 Kans., 525; Bank of Rome e.
Rome, 18 N. Y., 38; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. S., 243, 248; Northern Ind. R.
R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 id., 159, 165; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 id., 636. A provis
ion requiring the legislature to restrict the power of municipal taxation is
complied with, in an act for a special street assessment, by limiting it to an
assessment to the middle of the block upon adjacent property. Hines v.
Leavenworth, 3 Kans., 186.
s The state may give complete power to tax all the subjects of taxation
within the municipality. Wingate v. Sluder, 6 Jones L., 552; Durach's Ap
peal, 62 Penn. St., 491 ; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr., 330, 339; Augusta v.
National Bank, 47 Geo., 562. Authority to assess "all taxable property"
embraces all taxable at the time the authority is given, and all made taxable
by subsequent legislation. Buffalo v. La Couteulx, 15 N. Y., 451. A limitation
of taxes to a certain percentage of the assessed valuation is enlarged by im
plication when the legislature authorize the creation of any particular debt,
to the extent that may be necessary to meet the demand. Commonwealth e.
Commissioners of Alleghany County, 40 Penn. St., 348. Compare United States
v. Burlington, 2 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 374.
•Where a state has no power to lay a certain tax, or to contract a certain
debt, but it nevertheless assumes to do so, such a law is void, and cannot be
treated as a contract between the state and those who have claims for which
the law undertakes to provide payment. Ramsey v. Iloeger, Sup. Ct, 11l.,
1874, 6 Chicago Legal News, 318.
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ditions, it may impose new restrictions or make new regulations.1
These are matters of legislative discretion. Even after a tax had
been collected, if
,
in the opinion of the legislature, the purpose
was unwise and impolitic, it would doubtless have power to
interpose and forbid the money being appropriated to it. This
would seem to be a legitimate exercise of the general power of
control and supervision which the legislature retains over all the
inferior entities which have been created by it for political pur
poses. But the most efficient restriction of all, for practical pur
poses, is that rule of law which requires all municipal organ
izations or boards to show their grant of any authority they may
assume to exercise. Towns, it has been said and the remark
applies to all such organizations — are corporations of limited
powers ; they cannot vote and assess money upon the inhabitants
for all purposes indiscriminately, but must be confined to the
established powers of towns, as settled by positive enactment or by
well defined and ancient usage.2 They cannot, therefore, tax
1 A general authority given by a city charter to tax property for its pur
poses does not preclude the state making exemptions within the city after
wards. Richmond v. Richmond and Danville R. R. Co., 21 Grat, 604. If city
boundaries are extended after the time for the annual assessment has passed,
it is competent to provide for an assessment for the current year of the prop
erty newly added. Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush, 37. Compare Waldron v. Lee,
5 Pick., 323 ; Jackman v. School District, 5 Gray, 413. The right to tax may
be taken away by the legislature even after the tax has been levied. Augusta
v. North, 57 Me., 392.
sShaw, Ch. J., in Cushing v. Newburyport, 10 Met., 508, 510. There
is a very valuable statement in this case of the power of towns in respect to
schools, and its history. For a history of the legislation of Michigan terri
tory and state on the same subject, and the powers of the districts, see Stuart
e. School District, 30 Mich., 69.
As to the right to establish free schools in a particular district of a state by
a statute which leaves the final decision to the voters of the district, see Bull
e.Read, 13 Grat., 78. The right to refer such questions to the voters of the locality
was also affirmed in Slack v. Railroad, 13. B. Monr., 1, 9, 28; Stein v. Mobile,
24 Ala., 591, and numerous other cases. The legislature may, in its dis
cretion, create independent school districts without the assent of the resid
ents, and authorize a board chosen by its voters to make an annual levy
for the erection of buildings and the support of schools therein. (The
most plausible objections to the act seemed to be, that it took from the towns
authority which properly pertained to them, and that the district was com
posed of parts of two townships, and the constitution required township
officers to be chosen by " the voters thereof.") Kuhn e. Board of Education!
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except for the very purpose allowed by law, and in the manner
and under the conditions prescribed by law.1
Conditions precedent. In particular cases taxes have been
authorized to be levied only after they have been petitioned for
by a certain number of taxpayers. This is a condition precedent
to any tax.2 In Iowa it has been decided that if the township
trustees have passed upon the sufficiency of such a petition, and
declared it sufficient and levied the tax, this is conclusive in all
collateral inquiries; the decision being on a matter within their
jurisdiction.8 But in New York the decisions were otherwise.4
4 W. Va., 499. On the creation of a new district by the union of two, the
property of both becomes its property. It has no power to bargain and pay
over to the old district the value of its school house, or to levy a tax for the
purpose. Bacon v. School District, 97 Mass., 421. Where a district is divided
after a tax is assessed, the inhabitants set off remain liable for its portion of
the tax. Waldron e. Lee, 5 Pick., 323. That a school district tax is not
within a statute which limits the amount of a tax for town and county pur-
poses, see Taft e.Wood, 14 Pick., 362; Goodrich v. Lunenburg, 9 Gray, 38, 40;
BUckensderfer e. School Directors, 20 Penn. St., 38.
1A tax voted to build a school house on a site not legally designated is in
valid; that being a condition precedent. Marble v. McKenney, 60 Me., 332.
Where the statute required assessors, before assessing any school district tax,
to determine in which district the lands of persons residing out of the town
should be taxed, and to certify their determination to the town clerk, who
was to record the same: Held, that an assessment without complying with
this requirement was invalid, and an inhabitant of the district might avail
himself of the defect. The determination, it will be seen, was really as to
what should be the limits of the district. Taft v. Wood, 14 Pick., 362. Sec
also Rawson e. School District, 100 Mass., 134. By statute a town was not to
be redistricted oftener than once in ten years, " so as to change the taxation
of lands of proprietors." A tax levied in a new district established in viola-
tion of this provision, is void. Gustin v. School District, 10 Gray, 85. See
Holmes e. Baker, 16 id., 259.
»Where an extraordinary tax was authorized on the recommendation of
two-thirds of the grand jury, held, that this was a condition precedent, and
the adjournment of the grand jury without action upon it would not justify
the tax. Cooper v. Rowe, 42 Geo., 229.
"Ryan v. Varga, 37 Iowa, 78; West v. Whitaker, id., 598.
* Starin v. Genoa, 23 N. Y., 439; People v. Mead, 24 id., 114; Same e. Same,
36 id., 221. In the subsequent case of People v. Brown, 55 N. Y., 180, the
same point was somewhat considered, but it became unnecessary to decide it,
as the collector, who was defending a proceeding to compel him to pay over
moneys he had collected, was held incompetent to raise the question. See
poat, chapter XX.
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In some eases taxes are allowed to be voted by taxpayers only,
while taxes in general are voted by the whole body of the elec
tors. Such legislation is admissible, and the submission must
conform to it1 When taxes are voted by a city council or other
local body, a common and very useful provision is one that the
yeas and nays shall be entered on the journal, so that no member
shall escape his proper share of responsibility for the vote.3
Without such a provision, it would be necessary only that the
record should show a quorum present and a resolution adopted.8
Repeal or modification of local powers. The power to vote
local taxes is at all times subject to the legislative modification
and control.4 The general law may modify their powers even
when they were conferred by special charter, if the terms of the
general law are sufficiently comprehensive for the purpose.5 But
1In such cases, if the question is submitted to the whole body of the
voters, the vote is void. Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met., Ky., 171. It has been de
cided in North Carolina that the legislature may authorize less than a major
ity to vote taxes. State «. Woodside, 9 Ired., 496 ; Same v. Same, 8 id., 104,
106. As to what is a majority vote, see Stanford e. Prentice, 28 Wis., 358.
'Such a provision is mandatory. Dillon's Mun. Corp., § 229, and cases
cited. Compare Tobin v. Morgan, 70 Penn. St., 229, and Stcckert v. East Sag
inaw, 22 Mich., 104.
8Where the record stated that A., B., C, and others, justices of the county
court, were present, held not enough, as it did not affirmatively appear that a
majority was present. Dudley's Ex'rs v. Oliver, 5 Ired., 227. Compare State
e. Mcintosh, 7 id., 68; Insurance Co. v. Sortwell, 8 Allen, 217; Lacey e. Da
vis, 4 Mich., 140.
4Richmond e. Richmond, etc., R. R. Co., 21 Grat., 604 ; Tucker v. The Jus-
tices, 34 Ga., 370. A repeal of a law by..which a corporation was authorized
on vote of its electors to levy a tax in aid of a public work, takes away the
power, even though a favorable vote has already been had. Covington, etc.,
R. R. Co., v. Kenton Co. Court, 12 B. Monr., 144, 150. (The vote was in favor
of levying the tax, but the rate had not been determined upon at the time of
the repeal, and as this was a condition precedent, and had not been followed,
the county court had no power to levy the tax, at least none before determin
ing the rate.)
sA provision in a village charter that the village taxes shall he assessed
upon the freeholders and inhabitants " according to law," means, unless oth
erwise explained, according to the general law of the state. Ontario Bank v.
Bunnell, 10 Wend., 186, 194, per Nelson, Ch. J. Whenever a tax is authorized
by law, and no special provision is made as to the source from which the rev
enue is to be derived, the law implies that the tax shall be levied upon all
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where the power to tax is conferred by special charters, it is not
usual to modify them in this manner, and in doubtful cases we
should say the presumption was against an intent to do so.1
Exhausting authority. The taxing power once conferred is
presumptively continuous, and to be exercised again aud again
as often as may be required by the exigencies of government
and as often as may be consistent with the act of delegation. 1
But custom has much to do with the construction of such powers,
and sometimes a single exercise must be deemed to exhaust the
power for the time being, when the custom is to tax but once
within a certain period of time; as for instance, within the year.
And this is the general custom in the case of local taxes.8 But
an abortive attempt to make an assessment does not exhaust the
power, and if no other obstacle exists, the officers may disregard
the futile action and proceed anew.4
property subject to general taxation, and collected as other taxes. Hale v. Ke
nosha, 29 Wis., 599 ; State e. Bremond, 38 Tex., 116. As to the effect of gen.
eral legislation upon special charters, see House «. State, 41 Miss., 737 ; S. C,
2 Withrow's Corp. Cas., 563.
1In Ohio it was decided that special acts, giving authority to municipal
corporations to levy special taxes in aid of railroads, were not repealed by a
constitutional provision forbidding such legislation. Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio,
N. S., 607 ; Fosdick e. Perrysburg, 14 id., 472. In Iowa it was held that
where a special law limits the power of a municipal corporation to levy taxes,
a subsequent general law will not give power beyond the prior limitation.
Clarke «. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494. Contra, Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall., 575.
See United States v. Burlington, 2 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 394. A grant of pow
er to a municipal corporation to lay a tax for a particular purpose is a repeal,
pro tanto, of all prior statutory restrictions on the power of taxation. Com
monwealth v. Common Council of Pittsburgh, 34 Penn. St., 496.
' See Municipality e. Dunn, 10 La. An., 57; Williams e.Detroit, 2 Mich., 560.
»A school board having power to levy a tax not exceeding one per cent, in
one year, held that when they ordered a tax, though below the maximum,
they had exhausted their power for the year. Oliver v. Carsner, 39 Texas, 396.
So in Oregon it has been decided that after one assessment of all the taxable
property has been made and returned, and the tax levied thereon, there is no
power to make a new assessment in order to reach property, which has been
brought within the district since the regular assessment. Oregon Steam Nav.
Co. v. Portland, 2 Ore., 81. But an omission of the county court to exact
license taxes when making the general levy does not preclude requiring them
afterwards. State v. Maguire, 52 Mo., 420.
<Himmelman «. Cofran, 36 Cal., 411, citing Pond e. Negus, 3 Mass., 230;
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Strict execution of authority. It is also a familiar rule that
in the execution of the power to tax, the municipalities must con
fine themselves closely within the power conferred.1 Many illus
trations of this rule will be given further on, as the successive
steps, which are to be taken to render taxation effectual, are enu
merated and explained.
Libby e. Burnham, 15 Mass., 144 ; Bangor v. Lancy, 21 Me., 472. On the general
subject see also Woodruff v. Fisher, 17 Barb., 224; Howell e. Buffalo, 15 N. Y.,
512; People v. Haines, 49 id., 587; Lappin v. Nemaha County, 6 Kans., 403.
1That the provisions of the statute must be strictly pursued, see Henderson
e. Baltimore, 8 Md., 332; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 Hill, 92; State v. Davenport, 12
Iowa, 335 ; In re Trufier, 44 Barb., 46 ; Howell ^Buffalo, 15 N. Y., 512 ; Bennett
«. Buffalo, 17 id., 383; Smith e. Davis, 30 Cal., 536; Taylor v. Downer, 31
id., 480; Smith v. Cofran, 34 id., 310; Montgomery e. State, 38 Ala., 162; St.
Joseph v. Anthony, 30 Mo., 537; McComb v. Bell, 2 Minn., 295; Statee. Jersey
City, 26 N. J., 444; Municipality No. 1 v. Millandon, 12 La. An., 769; Kyle v.
Malin, 8 Ind., 34; Chicago v. Wright, 32 11l., 192; Scammon v. Chicago, 40 id.,
146; Doughty v. Hope, 3 DeniQ, 594; Tallman e. White, 2 N. Y, 66; Cruger v.
Dougherty, 43 id., 107.
17
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CHAPTEE XII.
THE ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY FOR TAXATION.
When taxes have been properly decided upon, an assessment
may become au indispensable proceeding in the establishment of
any individual charge against either person or property. This is
always requisite when the taxes are to be levied in proportion to
an estimate, either of values, of benefits or the results of busi
ness. It is of an assessment by the value of property that we
shall speak in this place.
It is proper to remark, that it is usual to provide by law that one
assessment shall be made use of for the levy of both state
and local taxes, for the year or other period for which assessments
are made, instead of directing a separate assessment for each des
cription of tax. This is a matter as well of economy as of con
venience, as one assessment answers all purposes. Independent
assessments are sometimes provided for in the case of school taxes
and some others, but they raise no peculiar questions, and require
no special consideration.
An assessment, strictly speaking, is an official estimate of the
sums which are to constitute the basis of an apportionment of a
tax between the individual subjects of taxation within the district
As the word is more commonly employed, an assessment consists in
the two processes of listing the persons, property, etc., to be taxed,
and of estimating the sums which are to be the guide in an appor
tionment of the tax between them. When this listing and esti
mate are completed in such form as the law may have prescribed,
nothing remains to be done in order to determine the individual
liability, but the mere arithmetical process of dividing the sum to
be raised among the several subjects of taxation, in proportion to
the amounts which they are respectively assessed. Sometimes the
word assessment is used as implying the completed tax list; that
is to say, the list of persons or property to be taxed, with the esti
mates with which they are chargeable, and the tax duly appor
tioned and extended upon it ; but this employment of the word
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is unusual except in the c.ises in which the levy is apportioned by
benefits ; and in those cases the act of determining the amount of the
benefits is of itself, under most statutes, a determination of the
individual liability, and its entry upon the roll is an extension of
the tax.1
Necessity for an assessment. Of the necessity of an assess
ment, no question can be made. Taxes by valuation cannot be
apportioned without it. Moreover, it is the first step in the pro
ceedings against individual subjects of taxation, and is the foun
dation of all which follow it Without an assessment they have
no support, and are nullities.2 It is, therefore, not only indispens-
1 In Pennsylvania it is said "by the terms of the law the taxable or his
property is assessed when the assessor has returned his list of property and
valuation thereupon, and the commissioners have apportioned the rate per cent,
upon the several townships." Wells «. Smyth, 56 Penn. St, 159, 162.
s A tax levied without any list and valuation is void. Thurston v. Little, 3
Mass., 429; Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick., 482; McCall v. Lorimer, 4 Watts, 351 ;
Miller e. Hale, 26 Penn. St., 432; Matter of Nichols, 54 N. Y., 62. A statute
which cures irregularities cannot cure this defect of jurisdiction. McRey-
noldse. Longenberger, 57 Penn. St., 13. See Brady v. Offutt, 19 La. An., 184;
McCready e. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 356. In California a tax, in order to be valid,
must rest upon an assessment duly made by an assessor chosen by the people
of the district assessed. People v. Hastings, 29 Cal., 449. See Ferris v. Coover,
10 id., 589. A school or other township assessment by county assessors is
void. People v. Hastings, 29 Cal., 449; People v. Sargcant, 44 id., 430; Wil
liams v. Corcoran, 46 id., 553; Reiley v. Lancaster, 39 id., 354. See Granger v.
Parsons, 2 Pick., 392. But in Massachusetts, school district taxes may be on
the town valuation, the statute providing for do other. Waldron v. Lee, 5
Pick., 323. In Weber v. Reinhard, 73 Penn. St., 370, 375, the act under consid
eration provided "that in addition to the taxes collectible under existing laws,
the owner or owners of ore beds, situated in Upper Saucon township, Lehigh
county, shall, from and and after the passage of this act, pay to the supervis
ors of the roads in said township, one and a half cents for each and every ton
of ore mined and carried away with teams over the public road, in said town-
ship, which said payments shall be made at the end of every six months after
the passage of this act ; and in default of payment, the same to be collected
as debts of like amount are collectible by law; provided, that the said super
visors shall appropriate to the same purpose, and render an account in the
same manner for the funds coming in their hands under this act, as they are
required by law with respect to other funds coming to their hands by virtue
of their office." Agneie, J., was of opinion that the act was void, because it
provided for no assessment ; but the other judges sustained the law. Shar3-
w«od, J., says of the tax payer: " He can save himself from the costs of a suit
by a tender, in time, of the amount actually due. It is not a case where aval
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able, but in making it
,
the provisions of the statute under which
it is to be made, must be observed with particularity. If this
were not compulsory, if the officers were to be at liberty to disre
gard important provisions of the statute in this initiatory step,
the chief protection which the law has intended for individuals in
tax cases would be removed. For if the proceedings which the
law has prescribed to insure uniformity and equality in the con
tributions which are demanded for the public service can be set
aside with impunity, it is difficult to suggest any reason why all
others may not be set aside with like impunity ; and the distinc
tion between regular taxation and arbitrary exaction will then
wholly disappear. It is the prescribed course of law for the one,
and the absence of it in the case of the other, which distinguishes
the two, and the prescribed course is only a course suggested but
not required, if it remains upon the statute book, but need not be
followed. But as the course unquestionably is prescribed in or
der that it shall be followed, and as without it the citizen is sub
stantially without protection from unequal and unjust demands,
the necessity for a strict compliance with all important require
ments is manifest.1
Date of the assessment. Assessments are made periodically,
and in many of the states every year. The customary regulation
is that the assessment shall be made or completed on a certain day,
or that it shall be made as of a certain day. This fixes the lia
bility of persons and property to taxation for the year. There are
some inconveniences and inequalities resulting from this, but some
regulation of the kind is indispensable. A force of tax officers can
not be kept employed for the year in watching the transfers of
property, the movements of persons, and vicissitudes of business, in
uation of property is required. It is a fixed rate upon the number of tons;
and that the owner may be presumed to know, or to have the means of ascer
taining, whether he is a landlord or himself the actual occupant. It is not,
indeed, expressly provided that the supervisors shall ascertain and assess the
amount But they must do so in order to maintain their suit and recover a
judgment; and they must do more; they must prove it by competent evi
dence."
1 Where the law provides for an annual assessment, copying the roll of a
former year does not make one. Nason v. Whitney, 1 Pick., 140; People v.
Hastings, 20 Cal., 449. See Greenough e. Fulton Coal Co., 74 Penn. St, 486.
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order to equalize the charges upon them ; periodical assessments,
if they produce injustice in one case, may correct them in the
next, and on the whole are likely to be fair. At any rate, they
constitute the best regulation the law can establish.
" In the im
position of taxes, exact and critical justice and equality are abso
lutely unattainable. If we attempt it, we might have to divide
one year's tax upon a given article of property among a dozen
different individuals who owned it at different times during the
year, and then be almost as far from the desired end as when we
started. The proposition is Utopian. The legislature must adopt
some practicable system ;
" 1 and this practicable system is found to
be the one which has been indicated. Every person is therefore
to be taxed for the year upon his personalty, estimated as of the
time of the assessment, and every parcel of land according to its
value at that time. Subsequent changes cannot be noticed until
another assessment2
Tax payers' lists. It has been deemed advisable in some of
the states to provide by law that persons resident within the sev
eral taxing districts shall, by a specified time, deliver to the asses
sor a written exhibit of their property or business for the purpose
of taxation. In some cases the list has been required to be made
1 Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm., 505, 518. A mortgage not in existence at the time
fixed by law for the making of the assessment cannot be taxed, though the as
sessment is made later. People v. Kohl, 40 Cal., 127.
s State v. Hardin, 34 N. J., 79. One is to be taxed where he resides, on the
day fixed by statute for taking the assessment, though set off into another
town before it is completed. Harmon v. New Marlborough, 9 Cush., 525. But
if he moves out of the town before the day fixed for its completion, he cannot
be taxed for his personalty in it. People v. Supervisors of Chenango, UN.
Y., 563 ; Ware v. First Parish, etc., 8 Cush., 267. In Vermont, a person resi
dent in a school district at the time of listing, and properly listed there, re
mains liable on the list while it continues in force, notwithstanding he has
subsequently removed from the district Woodward e. French, 31 Vt, 337 ;
Walker v. Miner, 32 id., 769; Ovitt v. Chase, 37 id., 196. Where plaintiff had
a place of business in Boston every year from 1st of December to 1st of March,
but none on 1st of May when assessment was to be made, held, that he was not
taxable in Boston. Field v. Boston, 10 Cush., 65. The fact that a debt is con
tracted while one is an inhabitant does not justify a personal tax upon him
in respect of it
,
after he has ceased to be such. Dow v. First Parish in Sud-
bury, 5 Met, 73. An illustration of the resorts to avoid taxation will be found
in Mitchell v. Leavenworth County, 9 Kans., 344.
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under oath. The failure to hand it in is made to subject the per
son to some specified liability; sometimes to the doubling for tax
ation such estimate as the assessor shall make of his property ;
sometimes to a definite penalty ; sometimes to deprivation of any
right to appeal against what he may regard as an unjust assess
ment The right to discriminate in some manner against those
who fail to hand in lists has been often recognized.1 When the
discrimination consists merely in submitting the party to the
" doom " of the assessor, and depriving him of any appeal, it
would seem that there could be no valid objection to it.2 But
where it goes further and subjects the party to penalties of any
kind, to be inflicted by a ministerial officer without a hearing, for
a neglect that may have been unintentional and perfectly excusa
ble, it is not so clear on what principle it can be defended.8 It
is certainly not consistent with the genius of the common law
that penalties for neglect of duty should be inflicted without ju
dicial investigation.4
It has been decided in Kentucky that penal provisions of this
character must be strictly construed ;' a decision that is in har-
>See State v. Bell, 1 Phil. (N. C), 76; Winnimisset Co. e. Chelsea, 6 Cush.,
477; Donovan v. Insurance Co., 30 Md., 155; State e. Welch, 28 Mo., 600;
State v. Leavell, 3 Blackf., 117; State v. Hamilton, 5 Ind., 310; Louisville, etc.,
R. R. Co. e. State, 25 id., 177.
8 See Porter e. County Commissioners, 5 Gray, 365 ; Otis Company e. Ware,
8 id., 609; State v. Apgar, 31 N. J., 358; State e. Board of Equalization, 7
Nev., 83.
8 In Minnesota it has been decided that where the constitution requires aH
taxation to be by value, it is incompetent to provide by law for increasing the
assessed valuation by a sum to be added as a penalty for not handing in a list.
McCormick e. Fitch, 14 Minn., 252. And see State v. Allen, 2 McCord, 55.
A contrary ruling in Indiana was made in the case of Boyer e.'Jones, 14 Ind.,
354, where a party had refused to list property which he claimed was not tax
able, and was subjected to a penalty of fifty per cent on the valuation, for the
refusal.
* Some statutes make provision for enforcing by suit the penalties for neg
lect to hand in lists. See Drexel v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn. St., 31.
EAlexander v. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb, 515 ; McCall v. The Justices, 1 id.,
516; Olds v. Commonwealth, 3 A. K. Marsh., 465; Chiles e. Commonwealth,
4 J. J. Marsh., 577. The point was made in Drexel v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn.
St., 31, but not decided, In Connecticut it is held that a list sufficient as to
the personal estate cannot be rejected as to that because not sufficient as to the
realty. New Canaan v. Hoy t, 23 Conn.. 148. In Alabama a statute requiring
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mony with the general rules of construction. But when the con
struction is clear, they are generally enforced. The Massachusetts
statute (1835) took away all right to abatement of an excessive as
sessment on appeal to the county commissioners, when the appel
lant had failed to bring in a list of his estate to the assessors, un
less he could show good cause for the failure ; and also when he
had failed to make oath to the truth of the list if required by the
assessors to do so. Under this statute it was held that the asses
sors could not waive the bringing in of the list ; that corporations
as well a3 natural persons must comply with it ; that an exhibi
tion to the assessors of a plan of the tax payer's real estate, or re
ferring them to the list of a preceding year, would not be a com
pliance with the statute j1 that the list must be handed in before
the tax is actually assessed,2 and that if not handed in, the tax
payer submits himself to the " doom " of the assessors.8
It has also been held on a construction of the statute, that no
abatement would be made before a list was brought in, though
a sufficient excuse for not bringing it in at the proper time was
shown.4 Handing in a list which, by mistake of the lister's rights,
every person in the state " who is liable to pay taxes " to render " a list of his
taxable property " to the assessors, and providing that if he does not, they may
call at his residence for a list of his taxables or for the amount of taxes due
from him, held applicable to one liable only to a poll tax. Carter e. Mercer, 9
Ala., 556. As to what is a sufficient listing in Vermont, see Blodgett v. Hoi
brook, 39 Vt., 336.
1Winnimisset Co., v. Chelsea, 6 Cush., 477. And see Otis Co. v. Ware, 8
Gray, 509. The statute required the assessors to notify the inhabitants, at the
town meeting or otherwise, to bring in lists. It was held in the first of these
cases that if a failure to give notice was relied upon, it devolved on the tax
payer to show it. Corporations may be required to furnish for taxation lists
of their stockholders to all the local authorities where they severally reside.
Donovan v. Insurance Co., 30 Md., 155.
8Porter v. County Commissioners, 5 Gray, 365 ; Otis Co. e. Ware, 8 id., 809.
8Lincoln e. Worcester, 8 Cush., 55, 63. But where a list was not brought in
until after the time limited for it had expired, but the delay was chargeable to
the assesors themselves, who expressly told the party's agent nothing should
be lost by the delay, it was held that the right to apply for an abatement wa?
not lost. Lowell e. County Commissioners, 3 Allen, 546.
4Charlestown v. County Commissioners, 101 Mass., 87. In abating a tax
'which has been paid, the county commissioners have no right to allow interest ;
the statute not providing for it. Lowell ^. County Commissioners, 3 Allen, 550.
Nor costs, for the same reason. Same v. Same, id, 556. Successors of asses
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is made to embrace property not liable to taxation, will not estop
him from claiming an abatement as to such exempt property ;
there being no reason of justice or public policy why it should.1
But while this is true, it is also true that the tax payer cannot
complain of any mere irregularity in the action of the assessors in
to which they have been led by an error or imperfection in his
own list, not affecting his substantial rights.2 These references
will perhaps sufficiently indicate the views which have been
taken by the courts of statutes of this nature.8
sore who have levied a tax may abate it if application therefor is made within
the statutory time. Hibbard v. Garfield, 102 Mass., 72; Carleton e. Ashburn-
ham, 102 id., 348. One who has handed in no list and is overtaxed, cannot
pay his tax, and then recover back on showing a mistake in the assessors : a
mistake not rendering the tax illegal. Lott v. Hubbard, 44 Ala., 593.
1Charlestown v. County Commissioners, 109 Mass., 270, citing Dunnell
Manuf. Co. e. Pawtucket, 7 Gray, 277, where the point was substantially the
same. In 11linois it has been decided that if one voluntarily lists for taxation
corporate stocks which are not taxable, and they are taxed accordingly, he
cannot complain, as it is his own fault. Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollak, 7
Chicago Legal News, 357, Sup. Ct. 11l., 1875.
•As where, the party's agent being called upon for a list, he furnished it
, but
omitted one parcel of land which was taxed as nonresident in consequence.
Kinsworthy v. Mitchell, 21 Ark., 145. To the same effect is Nelson v. Pierce,
6 N. H., 194. The tax payer giving an erroneous description of his lands to
the assessor is estopped from complaining of it. Hubbard e. Windsor, 15
Mich., 146.
» Where a list is required to be given in under oath, a refusal to swear to a
list is a refusal to give it in. Lee v. Commonwealth, 6 Dana, 311. The person
from whom a list is required under a penalty cannot excuse himself by show
ing as to an article he should have listed (a billiard table), that another person
had listed it. Olds v. Commonwealth, 3 A. K. Marsh., 465. Where one ex
cused himself from making a list, saying it was unnecessary, held to bo a re
fusal. State e. Parker, 33 N. J., 192. See State e. Bishop, 34 id., 45; Statee.
Parker, 34 id., 49; Statee. McChesney, 34 id., 63. The list is not conclusive
on the assessors. Thompson v. Tinkcom, 15 Minn., 295. But it has been said
they ought to adopt the valuation of the lister in the absence of any evidence
of its incorrectness. People e. Reddy, 43 Barb., 539 ; People v. Assessors of
Albany, 40 N. Y., 154: though they are not liable for any bona fide exercise of
of their power in this regard. Vose v. Willard, 47 Barb., 320; Bell e. Pierce,
48 id., 51 ; Stearns e. Miller, 25 Vt., 20 ; Wilson v. Marsh, 34 id., 352. But for a
failure to perform ministerial duties to the lister's prejudice the officers may
be liable. Kellogg v. Higgins, 11 id., 240; Fairbanks v. Kittredge, 24 id., 9
.
In Nevada, a tax payer who fails to hand in his list, is allowed no standing
before the board of equalization. State v. Board of Equalization, 7 Nev., 83.
In New Jersey he loses his right to appeal. State v. Apgar, 31 N. J., 358. An
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Right to a hearing. The summary nature of tax proceedings
has been remarked upon. Every inhabitant of the state is liable to
have a demand established against him on the judgment of others
regarding the sum which he should justly and equitably contribute
to the public revenues. Every property owner in the state, whether
an inhabitant or not, is liable to have a lien in like manner estab
lished against his property. Moreover, the persons who make
the assessment lighten the burden upon themselves in proportion
as they increase it upon others. In such proceedings, therefore, it
must be a matter of the utmost importance to the person as
sessed that he should have some opportunity to be heard before
the charge is fully established against him ; and it would seem to
be a dictate of strict justice that the law should make reasonable
provision to secure him as far as may be against partiality, malice
or oppression.
The obligation to make provision for this purpose is recognized
by the statutes of the several states. By some the person assessed
is allowed to reduce what he claims to be an excessive assessment
by his own oath ; by others he is allowed an appeal to some board
of review, and in all, perhaps, some method is provided by which
he may have a hearing before the assessment becomes fixed and
final against him. Thus the statutes have taken precautions
against oppression and injustice, and perhaps made all the provis
ion that is needful, if their directions are fully observed.
It is too often the case, however, that statutory provisions are
not strictly observed, and that either the public or individuals
must suffer in consequence. The question presented may then
be, whether the provisions which have not been obeyed are man
datory to the officers, or it may arise on the provisions of some
curative statute which proposes to heal the defects. In substance
the question will be, whether the right to be heard in tax cases is
a right which is indefeasible.
early statute in South Carolina provided that a " tax of ten thousand dollars "
should be imposed upon every person keeping open an office for the sale of
lottery tickets, and that " it shall be the duty of the tax collector in the dis
trict where such lottery offices are opened, in default of the person or persons
keeping such offices to return the same and pay the tax imposed by this law,
to issue his execution as in other cases of defaulters." The court held this,
though called a tax, to be really a penalty, which it was not competent to au
thorize the collector to impose. State e. Allen, 2 McCord, 55,
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We should say that notice of proceedings in such cases, and an
opportunity for a hearing of some description, were matters of con
stitutional right1 It has been customary to provide for them as
a part of what is "due process of law
" for these cases ; and it is
not to be assumed that constitutional provisions, carefully framed
for the protection of property, were intended or could be construed
to sanction legislation under which officers might secretly assess
one for any amount in their discretion, without giving him an op
portunity to contest the justice of the assessment. It has often
been very pointedly and emphatically declared that it is contrary
to the first principles of justice that one should be condemned un
heard ; and it has also been justly observed of taxing officers, that
"it would be a dangerous precedent to hold that any absolute
power resides in them to tax as they may choose without giving
any notice to the owner. It is a power liable to great abuse," and it
might safely have been added, it is a power that under such circum
stances would be certain to be abused. "The general principles
of law applicable to such tribunals oppose the exercise of any
such power." 2 This being the case, it is not to be supposed that
the legislature in any doubtful language has undertaken to confer
it. All reasonable presumptions in construction should favor jus
tice and right.
It is not customary to provide that the tax payer shall be heard
before the assessment is made, but a hearing is given afterwards,
either before the assessors themselves, or before some court or
board of review. And of the meeting of that court or board the
tax payer must in some manner be informed ; either by personal
notice, or by some general notice which is reasonably certain to
reach him, or, — which is equivalent — by some general law which
fixes the time and place of meeting, and of which he must take
notice. The last is a common method of enabling him to be
heard.8
1" Notice," it is said by Agnew, J., in Philadelphia e. Miller, 49 Penn. St.,
440, 448, " or at least the means of knowledge, is an essential element of every
just proceeding which affects rights of persons or property." And see Dar-
ling e. Gunn, 50 11l., 424; State e. Drake, 33 N. J., 194; Butler v. Supervisors ot
Saginaw, 26 Mich., 22.
»Baldwin, J., in Patten v. Green, 13 Cal., 325, 329. See also Cleghorn v. Pos-
tlewaite, 43 11l., 428.
»There being no jurisdiction to assess a personal tax upon a nonresident,
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All these provisions, being of vital importance to the tax pay
er, must be regarded as compulsory, and a compliance with them
as conditions precedent to any further step to charge him with a
tax.1
When they fix a certain time for the meeting of a board of re
view, and the board fails to meet; or a certain time for the return
and riling of the assessment for inspection before the meeting of
the board, and it is not filed, whereby opportunity for inspection
is lost ; the tax proceedings must be regarded as having failed to
become effectual, because of the failure of the officers properly to
follow them up as required by law. No argument can be admis
sible in such a case which proposes the acceptance of something
else as a substitute for the securities the statute has provided. To
substitute anything would require legislation; and even legis
lation for the purpose would be of doubtful validity if it failed to
provide what would fully accomplieh the same purpose. Such
regulations for the protection of individual rights are reasonable,
and they are demanded by justice and general convenience. On
general principles they must be regarded as mandatory,2 and a
strict observance of their provisions held to be essential.8
he is not chargeable with constructive notice of the action of assessors, and is
under no obligation to appear before them. St. Paul v. Merritt, 7 Minn., 258.
The determination of the tax to be paid by a corporation is not void because
of being made without notice, where the statute provides for a subsequent
notice — which was duly given — and an appeal. Commonwealth v. Rank,
26 Penn. St., 235.
1Thames Manuf. Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn., 550, 555 ; Lowell v. Wentworth, 6
Cush., 221 ; Kansas Pacific R. It. Co. v. Russell, 8 Kans., 558.
"Thames Manuf. Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn., 550, 555; Marsh v. Chestnut, 14
11l., 223; Cleghorn e. Postlewait, 43 id., 428; Nashville v. Weiser, 54 id., 245;
Mix v. People, Sup. Court, 11l., June term, 1874; Philips v. Stevens Point, 29
Wis., 594; Walker v. Chapman, 22 Ala.. 116; Insurance Co. v. Yard, 17 Penn.
St., 331, 338; French v. Edwards, 13 Wall., 506, 511. In the case in 7 Conn.,
550, the assessment was held void because an abstract thereof which the law
required should be filed by the first of December, was actually not filed till
the 20th, though this was ten days before the meeting of the board of review.
That the tax payer must take notice of the general law fixing the time and
place of hearing, see Methodist Pr. Church v. Baltimore, 6 Gill, 391; O'Neal
«. Bridge Co., 18 Md., 1, 26.
*When one has by city charter the right to appear " and be heard " before
the common council, it is cot competent for the council to limit the objections
to such as may be made in writing. State«. Jersey City, 25 N. J., 309. But
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The courts have been particularly careful to see that revisory
tax tribunals1 did not change assessments to the prejudice of tax
payers who, under the circumstances, had no reason to look for or
anticipate any such change. If the tax-payer himself does not
appeal, he has a right to suppose that the assessment against him.
will be allowed to stand as made. If authority is conferred upon
the board of review to change assessments under any specified
circumstances, the existence of those circumstances is a condition
precedent to their action. An illustration is afforded by a case in
New York. A city council had authority to correct descriptions
of lands returned for nonpayment of tuxes or assessments; but
this, it was held, gave them no right to put to a description of
land a new name, as that of the owner, when the effect, if valid,
would be to make the tax a personal charge against him. Sucb
a change in the assessment, if it could be supported, would de
prive the person assessed of the statutory right to notice, and of
the opportunity to apply for correction secured to those named in
the original roll.2 And in several states it has been decided that
after the assessment has been completed, no increase in valuation
can legally be made, without notice to the tax-payer, either ex
press or implied, with the opportunity for hearing.8
neither one who has made objection to the assessment in writing, nor those
who do not appear at all, can object. State v. Jersey City, 28 id., 500. And as
to the right to be heard in general the following cases may also be referred to.
Lorimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133 ; Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Penn. St., 374. And
that there must be opportunity afforded for it at the time and place fixed by
law, see Sioux City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Washington County, 3 Neb., 30.
1Courts, in reviewing assessments, exercise a special and limited jurisdic
tion. Hand, J., in Woodruff v. Fisher, 17 Barb., 224, 232.
>Bennett v. Buffalo, 17 N. Y., 383. Compare Overing v. Foote, 43 N. Y.,
290, 294, where this is said to be a " close case." Where the revisory board
orders a change made in the assessment, the assessor, it seems, may be com
pelled to make it in a certiorari proceeding. Keck v. Keokuk County, 37
Iowa, 547.
8Philips e.Stevens Point, 25 Wis., 594; Matherson v. Mazomanie, 20 id.,
191; Cleghorn v. Postlewaite, 43 11l., 428; Darling v. Gunn, 50 id., 424; Oris-
wold v. School District, 24 Mich., 262; Patten v. Green, 13 Cal., 325; Sioux
City, etc., R. R. Co. e. Washington County, 3 Neb., 30; Leavenworth County
v. Lang, 8 Kans., 284; Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Russell, 8 id., 558. Where a
party liable to taxation makes out and delivers to the assessor a list of his
taxable property, which is accepted by the assessor without question, the lat
ter has no power afterwards, of his own motion, to alter it
,
without giving
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Personal assessments. Little need be said of poll taxes, as
they are seldom levied, and wheti they are, the case is not likely
to raise any other question than that of the jurisdiction of the
assessors in the particular case. And this will generally be a'
question only of whether the person taxed has his domicile within1
the district Such a question is usually one more of fact than of,
law.1
A tax assessed against the person for personal estate is to be
notice to the party. McConkey v. Smith, Sup. Ct. 11l., 1875, 7 Chicago Legal
Kews, 210. Where, on appeal from assessment, the appellate board has power
to increase valuations on giving ten days' notice to the tax-payer, notice to
his tenant is not sufficient. State v. Drake, 33 N. J., 194. Where, after valua
tion by assessors, the party taxed is permitted by law to make affidavit of the
actual value of his property, this is only evidence to be considered, and not
conclusive, unless made so by statute. People v. Barker, 48 N. Y., 70. In
Oregon, the decisions of the assessors and county clerk, constituting a board
of review, are made reviewable in the supreme court. Rhea v. Umatilla
County, 2 Ore., 298, 300; Shumway e. Baker County, 3 id., 246.
'
1A poll tax can only be assessed on residents. Herriman v. Stowers, 43
Me., 497. On the question, what constitutes residence, the following cases
will throw light. Harvard College v. Gore, 5 Pick., 369, 373 ; Sears v. Boston,
1 Met., 250; Thorndike v. Boston, id., 242, 245; Lyman v. Fiske, 17 Pick., 231,
234; Otis e. Boston, 12 Cush., 44; Cabot «. Boston, id., 52; Lee v. Boston, 2
Gray, 484; Bulkley e.Williamstown, 3 id., 493; Carnoe v. Freetown, 9 id., 357;
Briggs v. Rochester, 16 id., 337; Warren v. Thomaston, 43 Me., 406, 412; Par
son e. Bangor, 61 id., 457; Foster v. Hall, 4 Humph., 346, 348; State « Ross,
23 N. J., 517; Daniel v. Sullivan, 46 Geo., 277; Bell v. Pierce, 51 K. Y., 12;
Matter of Nichols, 54 id., 62; Fry's Election Case, 71 Penn. St., 302; S. C, 10
Am. Rep., 698; Arnold v. Davis, 8 R. I.
,
341 ; Tripp e. Brown, 9 id., 240. One
living on lands, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, is
not subject to taxation on polls. Opinions of Judges, 1 Met., 580. One who
has left the town of his residence, without the intention of returning, is nev
ertheless taxable there while he remains in the commonwealth, until he has
acquired another residence. Bulkley v. Williamstown, 3 Gray, 493. Resi-
dence is presumed to continue where it has been until a change is affirma
tively shown, or at least until there is satisfactory evidence of abandonment.
Matter of Nichols, 54 N. Y., 62. If a line runs through one's house, he
must be taxed in the town which includes the most necessary and indispen
sable portion. He cannot be taxed in both. Judkins v. Reed, 48 Me., 386 ;
Chenery v. Waltham, 8 Cush., 327. If he is assessed in two towns, his election
to pay in one rather than the other is not conclusive, but he is liable in the
one of his actual inhabitancy. Lyman v. Fiske, 17 Pick., 231 ; Chenery e.
Waltham, 8 Cush., 327. See also Hardy e. Yarmouth, 6 Allen, 277, 284. His
being taxed in one is not evidence that his residence and proper place of tax
ation is not in another. Mead v. Roxborough, 11 Cush., 362.
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assessed to him at the place of his residence, because in contem
plation of law his movable property accompanies him wherever
he goes. This is the general rule, though, as has been shown
elsewhere, tangible personal property may be taxed where it is
,
irrespective of ownership, if the statute shall so provide.1 Property
1 Ante, p. 14. A vessel registered in New York, plying between Panama
and San Francisco, held not taxable in California. Hays v. Pacific Mail
Steamship Co., 17 How., 596. See also, State e. Haight, 30 N. J., 428; People
v. Commissioners of Taxes, N. S*. Ct. of Appeals (1875), 11 Albany Law Jour-
nal, 401. Ferry boats running to a city, but owned in an other state, are not
taxable to the city as property " within " it. St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall.,
423. See also Morgan v. Parham, 16 id., 471. So under a statute for the tax
ation of " all lands and personal estates within this state,'1 one cannot be as
sessed on capital invested in business in another state, or on chattels upon a farm
in another state. People e. Commissioners of Taxes, 23 N. Y., 224. A bond
is to be taxed where the owner resides, though the obligor resides elsewhere.
Hayne v. Dcliesscline, 3 McCord, 374; Augusta v. Dunbar, 50 Geo., 387. But
perhaps if both obligor and obligee reside within the state, it would be compe
tent to provide by statute for collecting the tax from the former. See Harper
v. Commissioners, 23 Geo., 566 ; Bridges «. Griffin, 33 id., 1 13. See what is said
of this last case in Augusta v. Dunbar, 50 id., 387. The personalty owned by
a citizen out of the state is taxable where he resides. Commonwealth v. Hays,
8 B. Monr., 1, 2. So are stocks he may hold in a foreign corporation. Mc-
Keen «. Northampton Co., 49 Penn. St., 519; Whitsell v. Same, id., 526. The
statute provided that nonresidents "doing business" in the state should bo
taxed on sums invested " in said business." Held not to apply to a manu
factured article merely sent into the state for sale by an agent, who sold and re
mitted the price. Parker Mills e. Commissioners of Taxes, 23 N. Y., 242.
That money due on a land contract in the hands of an agent of a non
resident is taxable, see People v. Ogdensburg. 48 id., 390. Compare Su
pervisors v. Davenport, 40 11l., 197. That nonresidents of a state or dis
trict may be taxed therein in respect to property there situate or business
there carried on, see Corfield «. Coryell, 4 Wash. C C, 371, S80; State e.
City Council, 2 Speers, 623 ; Harrison e. Vicksburg, 3 S. & M., 581 ; Worth
e. Fayetteville, Winston's L. & Eq., 70; Padleford v. Mayor, 14 Geo., 438;
Peace v. Augusta, 37 id., 597 ; Shirver v. Pittsburg, 66 Penn. St., 446 : compare
Bennett v. Birmingham, 31 id., 15. Personalty received by a distributee in the
state from the estate of one abroad is liable to taxation in the state under a stat
ute taxing property distributed " to or among the next of kin " of an intestate.
Alvany v. Powell, 2 Jones Eq., 51. The personal property belonging to the
estate of a deceased person is held in Connecticut to be taxable at his last
domicile; the representatives of the estate not being trustees in the sense of the
statute which makes personal property in the hands of a trustee taxable in the
town where the trustee resides. Cornwall v. Todd, 38 Conn., 443. A town
which taxes a man as a resident takes the burden of showing that he is such, if
the right is questioned. Hurlburt v. Green, 41 Vt., 490; Same e. Same, 42
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held in trust should be assessed to the trustee where hs resides,1
except where the trust is under the direction of a court, in which
case it would be taxable in the jurisdiction having control of it?
A partnership being only a business association of individuals,
the members are severally taxable for their interests where they
reside,8 unless the statute lays down a different rule.4 But a pri
vate banker living in one place, and having a bank in another, is
for the purposes of taxation to be regarded as resident where the
bank is located.5
The principles upon which personal assessments are made are
different under different statutes. The most common method is
to assess the owner a sum which is supposed to represent the value
id., 316. Consent by a person to be taxed where he does not reside does not
give jurisdiction and would not bind him. Blood v. Sayre, 17 id., 609.
1State v. Mathews, 10 Ohio St., 431, 437; Hardy v. Yarmouth, 6 Allen, 277,
285; Catlin e. Hull, 21 Vt., 152; Baltimore e. Stirling, 29 Md., 48; Carlisle v.
Marshall, 36 Penn. St., 397 ; People v. Assessors of Albany, 40 N. Y., 154. If
there are two trustees, one half may be assessed to each. State v. Mathews,
supra; Baltimore v. Stirling, 29 Md., 48. Residence of cestui que trust imma
terial. People v. Assessors of Albany, supra.
* Lewis v. Chester County, 60 Penn. St., 325. But it is said in this case that if
the trustee invests money on mortgage in another state, he may be taxed upon it
at the place of investment And see Supervisors e. Davenport, 40 11l., 197.
An executor may be assessed personally for (axes against the estate, and have
them collected from his own property. Williams v. Holden, 4 Wend., 223. So
it is competent by statute to make the tax on a minor's estate a personal
charge against his guardian. Payson v. Tufts, 13 Mass., 493.
s Bemis v. Boston, 14 Allen, 366, citing Dwight e. Boston, 12 id, 316; Pea-
body v. County Commissioners, 10 Grey, 97. To the same effect is Fairbanks
v. Kittredge, 24 Vt., 9.
*Hoadley v. County Commissioners, 105 Mass., 519.
*Miner e. Fredonia, 27 N. Y., 155. And see Gardiner, etc. Co. e. Gardiner,
5 Greenl., 133 ; Bates v. Mobile, 46 Ala., 158. But it has been held that the
furniture of an inn is only taxable to the innkeeper at the place of his residence.
Charlestown v. County Commissioners, 109 Mass., 270. An army officer held
taxable on his furniture where he was temporarily stationed in the service. Fin-
ley v. Philadelphia, 32 Penn. St., 381. Under a statute in California, personal
property is to be assessed and taxed in the county where it is situated, except
money and gold dust, which may, at the option of the owner, be taxed at the
place of his domicile. But to authorize the assessment of any property in
another county from the one in which he resides, it must appear that the
property is kept and maintained there, and is not there temporarily or in
transitu. People «. Niles, 35 Cal., 282; City of Oakland v. Whipple, 39 id.,
112.
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of his personal property in bulk ; though an enumeration of cer
tain articles is sometimes provided for.1 The statute may or may
not designate what shall be included by the assessors in their es
timate ; but the taxable property will be indicated in some form,
either by an enumeration of what shall be considered taxable
property, or by some general provision that all property shall be
taxed except what is specifically exempt8
1Compare Falkner v. Hunt, 16 Cal., 167, and People v. Sneath, 28 id., 612.
Eveiy article specified in an assessment list must on the face of the list be so
described as to appear to be taxable. Adam v. Litchfield, 10 Conn., 127 ;Whit
tlesey v. Clinton, 14 id., 72.
•Taxable property does not necessarily include all subjects of taxation : e.
g. polls may be taxable, gross sales by merchants, etc. " When the words
' taxable property ' occur in an independent act, it would seem that they should
be understood in the sense of things taxed which are susceptible of owner
ship or possession, unless there is something in the context which affixes to
them a different meaning, or unless the plain object of the law will be de
feated if they are not held to cover subjects of taxation which are not property
in the ordinary sense." JS. W. Walker, J. in Lott v. Ross, 38 Ala., 156, 160,
citing Mosely v. Tift, 4 Fla., 402; De Witt v. Hays, 2 Cal., 468. " Property "
in a statute authorizing the imposition of taxes, without further explanation,
would not include a mere right to wharfage fees, though that as a franchise
has property value. De Witt e. Hays, 2 Cal., 468. It will include solvent
debts. Savings and Loan Association v. Austin, 46 id., 415. See People v. Park,
23 id., 138; Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt., 152.
Damages to which a land owner is entitled for the taking of his land for a
highway are not taxable as a " debt " before they have become fixed and re
ceivable. (A suit was pending.) Lowell v. Boston, 106 Mass., 540. As to what
is included in taxable property, see further, Louisville v. Henning, 1 Bush, 381.
Where "certifi«ate* of deposit" are taxable, an entry on a pass book is held to
be one. Oulton v. Savings Institution, 17 Wall., 109; S. C, 1 Sawyer, 695.
The word machinery held to include gas pipes laid under the streets, and
gas meters. Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 12 Allen, 75. See
Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber, 2 R. I., 15.
As to meaning of " interne" when that is taxable, see People v. Supervisors
of New York, 18 Wend., 605 ; Matter of Western Railway, 5 Met., 596 ; Com-
monwealth e. Ocean Oil Co., 59 Penn. St., 61. Where dividends are taxed, the
tax may be laid though the dividends are declared in stock. Commonwealth
v. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co., 29 Penn. St., 370. If dividends are applied to in
crease capital, they are taxable the same as if paid over. State v. Farmers'
Bank, 11 Ohio, 94; Lehigh Crane Iron Co. v. Commonwealth, 55 Penn. St., 448
As to tax on dividends in general, see State v. Charleston, 5 Rich., 561 ; Haight
e. Railroad Co., 6 Wall., 15; Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 id., 262; United
States v. Railroad Co., 17 id., 322; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Page, 1 Bissell,
461 ; Phoenix Iron Co. e. Commonwealth, 59 Penn. St., 104.
CH. XII.] THE ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY FOR TAXATION. 273
Assessment of corporations. As regards corporations,
special rules are generally made. It has been decided, that
corporations are to be regarded as inhabitants, under a. statute
which makes the personalty of inhabitants taxable.1 But this
is matter of construction, and must depend on the intent to be
gathered from the context.2 All corporations are taxable when
the state has not expressly relinquished the right to tax by a
stipulation in the charter,8 and the method of taxation, and what
shall be taken as the measure of the tax, are in the discretion of
the legislature. It has been shown elsewhere, that sometimes the
franchise is specifically taxed, sometimes the capital, or capital
stock,4 sometimes the tangible property, and so on. Where rail
road property is taxed as other property is
,
the personalty should
be assessed to the company at the place of its business office ;
that being the legal situs of its personalty ,s and for the purposes
1 Baldwin v. Trustees, etc., 37 Me., 369. The word " persons " in the tax law
includes corporations. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. e. Commonwealth, 1 Bush,
250.
sThe word held not to include corporations. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. •
Hartford, 3 Conn., 15; Cherokee, etc., Ins. Co. v. The Justices, 28 Geo., 121.
Compare British Commercial Life Ins. Co. e. Com'rs of Taxes, 1 Keyes, 303.
»Bank of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 19 Penn. St., 144; Portland Bank
e. Apthorp, 12 Mass., 252. And see ante, pp. 15, 25.
4Where a mutual insurance company was authorized to accumulate from
its profits a fund to continue liable for its losses during the term ot its exist
ence, held that this accumulation was capital, and liable to taxation as such.
Sun Mut Ins. Co., v. New York, 8 N. Y., 241 ; People v. Supervisors of New
York, 16 id., 424. For a peculiar question on taxation of capital see Com
monwealth v. Penn Gas Coal Co., 62 Penn. St, 241.
' Portland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Saco, 60 Me., 196 ; State v. Person, 32 N. J., 134 ;
Pacific R. R. Co. v. Cass County, 53 Mo., 17 ; Orange and Alexandria R. R. Co.
v. Alexandria, 17 Grat., 176. It is so held of the rolling stock of a railroad,
though it has also been held competent to distribute the taxation of rolling
stock through the various counties where the road runs. Kansas City, etc.,
R. R. Co. v. Severance, 55 Mo., 378. But on the point, whether the rolling
stock of a railroad is to be regarded as real or personal estate, there is great
diversity in decisions. See Randall e. Elwell, 52 N. Y., 521. Other corpora
tions are also to be taxed on personalty at the place of their principal office.
Western Transportation Co. e. Scheu, 19 N. Y., 408. Where a manufacturing
csrporation is required to be assessed in the town
" where the operations of
the company are to be carried on," this means the manufactory, and not the
place of financial operations. Oswego Starch Factory v. Dolloway, 21 N. Y.,
449. As to assessment of railroad beds, see ante, 114.
18
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of taxation, it is sometimes provided that all railroad property
shall be considered personal and taxable accordingly ; a provision
which the legislature is supposed to be entirely competent to
make.1 The corporation is
,
of course, taxable on corporate
property only ; the individual corporators, if taxed on their
shares of stock, are to be taxed where they respectively reside,2
though they may be, and sometimes are taxed at the place where
the corporate business is carried on, and the corporation made
the collector. In some states railroad companies are taxed upon
the road and property as a unit ; 8 in others the line in each
county is separately assessed,4 and in still others the whole is
assessed, and then the assessment apportioned between the several
counties and towns. A railroad track, it is held, cannot be
assessed as "nonresident" lands; that term being applied to
property not occupied and used.8 The track of a local railway
company may be assessed as real estate, though laid down in a
highway where the company has no title.6
1 Held, under such a provision, that it was not competent to tax it as real.
Bangor and Piscataqua R. R. Co. v. Harris, 21 Me., 533. See Cumberland Ma
rine R'y. v . Portland, 37 id., 444, where it is said that a statute which would have
required a different decision was overlooked in the previous case. The right
to treit the rolling stock of a railroad as personal estate for the purposes of
taxation affirmed. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. State, 25 Ind., 177. See Maus
«. Logansport, etc., R. R. Co., 27 11l., 77 ; Sangamon, etc., R. R. Co. v. Morgan
County, 14 id., 163.
»Cornwell v. Connersville, 15 Ind., 150; Madison v. Whitney, 21 id., 261.
Compare Whitney v. Madison, 23 Ind., 331 ; Cumberland Marine R'y e. Port
land, 37 Me., 444. The word " stock " in a statute authorizing the taxation
of stock in corporations, means not only the stock subscriptions, but the
actual tangible property of the corporation. State v. Hamilton, 5 Ind., 310;
Auditor of Floyd County v. New Albany and Salem R. R., 11 id., 570; Mich.
Cent. R. R. Co. v. Porter, 17 id., 380 ; Whitsell v. Northampton County, 49 Penn.
St., 526; McKeen v. Same, 49 id., 519; State v. Branin, 23 N. J., 484.
8 See Toledo and Wabash R. R. Co. v. Lafayette, 22 Ind., 262.
4 See Albany, etc., R. R. Co. e. Osborn, 12 Barb., 223 ; Albany, etc., R. R. Co
e. Canaan, 16 id., 244; Th3 Tax Cases, 12 Gill & J., 117; State v. 11l. Cent. R.R.
Co., 27 11I., 6i; Sangamon, etc., R. R. Co. v. Morgan County, 14 id., 163; Prov.
idence, etc., R. R. Co. e. Wright, 2 R. I., 459.
'People v. Barker, 48 N. Y., 70; Buffalo and State Line R. R. Co. e. Super
visors of Erie, 48 N. Y., 93.
• People «. Cassity, 46 N. Y., 46 ; New Haven v. Fair Haven, etc., R. R. Co.,
38 Conn., 422.
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Taxes on real property. In regard to the assessment of real
estate it is customary, and is certainly extremely proper, to give
very careful and specific directions by statute.1 These directions
for the most part have in view the protection of persons taxed.
Very simple proceedings might be all that would be requisite to
enable the state to collect its revenues if its interests alone were
to be regarded ; but so many circumstances are liable to leave
the owner of property in ignorance that proceedings are being
taken for that purpose, and possibly in ignorance or forgetfulness
that any duty on his part remains undischarged, that a govern
ment careful of the interests of its individual citizens will not fail
to make such provisions a3 will be reasonably certain to notify
him of any default, and give him ample opportunity to protect
his property from sacrifice or forfeiture. And this is seen to be
specially important in tax cases when it is remembered that prop
erty sold for taxes, — particularly real estate — seldom brings
more than a small fraction of its value.
Seated and unseated lands. Among the most useful of
these provisions for the protection of persons taxed is one that
unoccupied lands, unseated lands, or nonresident lands shall be
assessed on a different list from the occupied or seated lands ; or
if not on a different list, then on a different part of the same list.
The purpose is that the two distinct classes of land shall be as
sessed separately, so that the owner of any parcel, knowing its
character, shall know exactly where to look for his, and shall
thus be more certain to discover any claim made upon him by
reason of its ownership, and be enabled to discharge it before
any thing shall be lost to him in consequence of a default2
1That a possession of and claim to public lands is taxable to the claimant,
see People v. Shearer, 30 Cal., 656 ; People v. Frisbie, 31 id., 146 ; People v.
Cohen, id., 210; People v. Mining Co., 37 id., 54. That in Massachusetts, a
house built by one man on the land of another and owned by a nonresident
is not taxable as personalty in the town where it is, nor as realty, separate
from the land, see Flanders v. Cross, 10 Cush., 514. As to assessment of In-
dian lands after the Indian title is extinguished by treaty, see Fellows v. Den-
niston, 23 N. Y., 420. It has been decided in Connecticut that in the assess
ment of " mills," the machinery contained therein should be included, even
though it was personalty, and the owner a nonresident. Sprague v. Lisbon,
30 Conn., 18.
•See Burd v. Ramsey, 9 S. & R., 109.
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The terms " seated," " resident." and " occupied
" lands may not
convey precisely the same idea as they are employed in the several
state statutes, and probably do not.1 They will in general, how
ever, be found sufficiently explained in the several statutes. The
general idea of the statutes classifying lands for taxation is
,
that
those which are cultivated or occupied, so that some one within
the taxing district is personally liable for taxation in respect to
them, shall be taxed in a list by themselves. There are very es
sential distinctions, however, to be observed in considering the
several statutes. The custom in most of the states is that, when
the periodical assessments are made, the lands are examined or
their condition inquired into, and they are classed irrespective of
any former assessment ; while in Pennsylvania the rule is that
lands once seated are presumed to continue so, and nothing but
an unequivocal abandonment by the occupier, without the inten
tion of returning, will warrant their being changed to the unseat
ed list.' And the abandonment of part of an entire tract while
the occupation of the remainder continues will not prevent the
1 As to what are to be regarded as " seated " lands in Pennsylvania, see Wil
son e. Waterson, 4 Penn. St., 214, in which it is held that lands having a
house upon them and some improvements, though not occupied, are not to be
regarded as unseated without unequivocal marks of the abandonment of the
improvement, and its permissive return to its natural state. The improve
ment of part of a tract makes the whole seated, though divided by a county
line. Ellis v. Hall, 19 Penn. St., 292. Where a number of unoccupied tracts
are to be used in the supplying a mill with timber to cut, this does not make
them seated. Heft e. Gephart, 65 id., 510. Lands are seated when occupied,
even though the occupant is an intruder. Campbell v. Wilson, 1 Watts, 503;
Lorimer e. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133. And the occupation and cultivation of part
of a warrant fixes the character of the whole. Biddle «. Noble, 68 Penn. St.,
279. Residence without cultivation, or cultivation without residence, will
preclude land being sold as unseated. George v. Messenger, 73 id., 418. As
to what will constitute seated lands in general, see Campbell v. Wilson, 1
Watts, 503; Sheafer e. McCabe, 2 id., 421; Fish v. Brown, 5 id., 441; Ken-
nedy v. Dailey, 6 id., 269 ; Wallace v. Scott, 7 W. & S., 247 ; Lorimer v. Mc
Call, 4 id., 133 ; Michell e. Bratton, 5 id., 431; Millikin e. Benedict, 8 Penn.
St., 169; Jackson e. Sassamnn, 29 id., 106; Hathaway v. Ellsbree, 54 id., 498;
Lackawana Iron, etc., Co. v. Fales, 55 id., 90; Stewart v. Trevor, 56 id., 374;
Green e. Watson, 34 id., 332 ; Hoffman v. Bell, 61 id., 444 ; George e. Messen
ger, 73 id., 418.
»Harbeson «. Jack, 2 Watts, 124; Millikin v. Benedict, 8 Penn. St., 169;
Negley e. Breading, 32 id., 325 ; Arthurs v. Smathers, 38 id., 40, 44 ; Stewart v.
Trevor, 56 id., 374.
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whole being regarded a8 seated.1 So again, the general rule is
that while the owner or occupant is taxed personally for the land
he owns or occupies, the tax is also made a lien upon the land,
and the land will be sold for its satisfaction in case it is not col
lected of the person. In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, while
the tax on seated lands is a personal charge, that on the unseated
lands alone has until recently been made a lien to be enforced by
sale. And even since the recent law which makes seated lands
liable to sale for taxes, the proceedings are different; personal
notice to the owner being required.2
Under all the statutes, however, the requirement of a classifica
tion of lands as seated and unseated, resident or nonresident, etc.,
is probably to be considered imperative.5 It has been so held in
Maine,4 Massachusetts,5 New York,6 Pennsylvania,7 and in so
many other states that any question that might once have been
an open one must now be regarded as finally settled.8
1Patterson e. Blackmore, 9 Watts, 104. See Ellis v. Hall, 19 Penn. St., 292.
* See Broughton v. Journeay, 51 Penn. St., 31 ; Lovejoy v. Lunt, 48 Me., 377.
* Possibly Connecticut is an exception. See Adams e. Seymour, 30 Conn., 402.
4The law required improved lands to be assessed to the owner. Held, that
an assessment to person unknown was void. Brown v. Veazie, 25 Me., 359 ;
Barker e. Hesseltine, 27 id., 354. To same effect are Carmichael v. Aiken, 13
La. An., 205 ; Bidleman v. Brooks, 28 Cal., 72. An assessment of a whole lot
to a person, and a sale of the whole is void if a part was never owned or pos-
sessed by him. Barker e. Blake, 36 Me., 433. For a case of resident land as.
sessed as nonresident, sec Lunt v. Wormell, 19 Me., 100.
5Rising e. Granger, 1 Mass., 48.
*Whitney v. Thomas, 23 N. Y., 281 ; Crooke e. Andrews, 40 id., 547 ; Newell
v. Wheeler, 48 id., 486.
' Milliken v. Benedict, 8 Penn. St., 169. As to effect of consent to land be
ing assessed in the wrong list, see Lorimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133; Milli
ken v. Benedict, supra; Negley v. Breading, 32 Penn. St., 325; Hathaway v.
Ellsbree, 54 id., 498. And as to erroneous listing in general, see Commercial
Bank v. Woodside, 14 Penn. St., 404; Stewart v. Trevor, 56 id., 374. Lands
assessed as seated cannot be transferred to the unseated list without notice to
the owner where practicable. Lorimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133; Milliken v.
Benedict, 8 Penn. St., 169; Commercial Bank, v. Woodside, 14 id., 404; Stew
art v. Trevor, 56 id., 374; Bechdle e. Lingle, 66 id., 38. But if a parcel has
been on no list for severai years, the owner has no such right. Bechdle v.
Lingle, supra. Nor generally, it seems, in case of abandonment. Laird v.
Hiester, 24 Penn. St., 452.
! See Messenger v. Germain, 1 Gilm., 631 ; Green e. Craft, 28 Miss., 70; Ray.
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Assessment of resident lands. There has been the same
strictness of ruling under statutes which require the assessment
of resident or seated property to be made to the owner personally,
or to the occupant1 Such an assessment is intended to establish
a personal liability, and it is very manifest that assessors can have
no power to charge one class of persons, when the statute speci fies a
different class for the purpose. Thus if the statute says the own
ers shall be assessed, the assessors cannot lawfully charge occu
pants who are not owners,2 though if the statute only requires the
nor e.Lee, 20 Mich., 384; Milwaukee Iron Co. e. Hubbard, 29 Wis., 51, 56 ;
Washington v. Pratt, 8 Wheat, 681. Where the law requires the land to be
assessed to the patentee when the owner is unknown, any other assessment
is invalid. Yenda v. Wheeler, 9 Texas, 408.
Putting to an assessment of nonresident lands the name of a former owner,
held immaterial. Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick., 418. See Miller v. Hale, 26
Penn. St., 432; Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 id., 440; O'Grady v. Barnhisel, 23
Cal., 287; O'Neal v. Virginia, etc., Co., 18 Md., 1. If one is owner when pro
ceedings are commenced, an assessment to him is not rendered invalid by a
change in ownership, before they are confirmed, of which the assessors have
no notice. Morange e. Mix, 44 N. Y., 315.
1It need not be so assessed unless the statute requires it. Thompson v.
Carroll's Lessee, 22 How., 422; Witherspoou e. Duncan, 4 Wall., 210, 219. The
rule has been applied with great strictness in Wisconsin in holding that an
assessment of the wife's separate estate to the husband, he living with her
upon it
,
was void under a statute requiring lands to be assessed to the owner
or occupant. Hamilton e. Fond du Lac. 25 Wis., 496. Listing of land belong
ing to an estate to " widow and heirs," of the deceased person, held suf.
ficient. Wheeler v. Anthony, 10 Wend., 346. But a listing to the widow
alone was held void in Yancey v. Hopkins, 1 Munf., 419. A listing to " estate
of J. B. Coles," held good. State v. Jersey City, 24 N. J., 108. Compare Cru-
ger e. Dougherty, 43 N. Y., 107.
They have a statute in Arkansas that " no sale of any lands or town lots for
the payment of taxes shall be considered invalid on account of its having been
charged on the tax book in any other name than that of the rightful owner, if
such land be in other respects sufficiently described in the tax book, and the
taxes for which the same is sold be due and unpaid at the time of such sale."
This statute enforced in Merrick v. Hutt, 15 Ark., 331. And see Kinsworthy
e. Mitchell, 21 id., 145; Garabaldi v. Jenkins, 27 id., 453, 456. Compare the
Missouri cases of Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 162; S. C, 46 id., 291;
Hume v. Wainscott, 46 id., 145. Mistakes in names, not calculated to mislead
will not vitiate. Van Voorhis «. Budd, 39 Barb., 479; Pierce v. Richardson,
37 N. H., 306.
»Mansfield e. Martin, 3 Mass., 419. But the assessment of the lands of a
company to one membe1 who was in possession as agent was held sufficient,
and the addition of " agent " to his name treated as surplusage. Wells v. Bat
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assessors to list in the names of the owners respectively, ifknou v,
if they emit the name in the list, or set down the lands as belong
ing to persons unknown, the presumption that they performed
their duty in endeavoring to ascertain the owner may support the
assessment, until evidence that the officers did know the owner
overcomes this presumption.1
'
Separate tracts to be separately assessed. It is also gener
ally made a requirement that separate and distinct parcels of land
shall be assessed separately. This is certainly essential where the
lands are resident or seated, and owned by different persons, each
of whom has a right to know exactly what demand the govern
ment makes upon him.2 And a failure to do this is not a mere
" omission, defect or irregularity," which can be overlooked, under
a statute which provides that assessments for taxation shall be
valid " notwithstanding any omission, defect or irregularity
" in
telle, 11 Mass., 477. See further, Coombs v. Warren, 34 Me., 89; Knox v. Huide-
koper, 21 Wis., 527; Cardigane. Page, 6 N. H., 182; Ainsworth e. Dean, 21
id., 400; Kelseye. Abbott, 13 Cal., 609; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 162;
S. C, 46 id., 291 ; Hume e.Wainscott, 46 id., 145; Johnson v. Mc1ntire, 1 Bibb,
295..
1Blackwcll on Tax Titles, 145, citing Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H., 182; Smith
v. Messer, 17 id., 420; Nelson v. Pierce, 6 id., 194; Ainsworth v. Dean, 21 id.,
400; Brown v. Veiizie, 25 Me., 359; Merritt v. Thompson, 13 111., 716; Shim-
min v. Inman, 26 Me., 228 ; Jaquith v. Putney, 48 N. H., 138.
The statute provided that the assessment should show " the owner of each
lot or portion of a lot (if known to the superintendent), if unknown, the word
' unknown ' shall be written opposite the number of the lot," etc. Held, that
when the assessment was returned with the word " unknown " thus placed,
" it amounted to an official certificate, by the proper officer, that in point of
fact the owner of the particular lot designated was unknown to him," and
this was conclusive of the fact certified, and could not be collaterally called
in question in an action brought to recover the tax. Chambers v. Satterlee,
40 Cal., 497, 518, per Wallace, J.
The assessment to S. M. Whipple of property belonging to S. B. Whipple,
held void. People v. Whipple, 47 Cal., 591. That where land required to be
assessed to the owner is assessed to another, the proceedings are void, sec
Dunn v. Winston, 31 Miss., 135; Abbott e. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 162; Hume
e. Wainscott, 46 id., 145; People v. Castro, 39 Cal., 65; Himmclmane. Steiner,
38 id., 175; Bidleman v. Brooks, 28 id., 72; Kelsey v. Abbott, 13 id., 609;
Yenda v. Wheeler, 9 Texas, 408.
8Barker v. Blake, 36 Me., 433; State v. Williston, 20 Wis., 228; Roby«. Chi
cago, 48 11l., 130; People v. Shimmins, 42 Cal., 121; Bourdman v. Bourne, 20
Iowa, 135 ; Ware v. Thompson, 29 id., 65.
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the proceedings.1 The like separate assessment is also essential
in other cases if the statute requires it The reasons are suffi
ciently manifest If separate parcels of land belonging to differ
ent individuals, and presumably of different values, can b6
assessed together, neither of the owners has any means of deter
mining the amount of tax which is properly chargeable to his
property, and consequently no means of discharging his own land
from the lien, and of protecting his title, except by paying the
whole of a demand some undefined and unde-inable portion of
which is neither in equity nor in law a proper charge against him.2
Nay, when the two parcels are owned by the same person, if the
statute requires a separate assessment, obedience to the require
ment is essential to the validity of the proceedings. It cannot be
held in any case that it is unimportant to the tax payer whether
this requirement is complied with or not Indeed it is made
solely for his benefit ; it being wholly immaterial, so far as the
interest of the state is concerned, whether separate estates are or
are not separately assessed. And where a requirement has for its
sole object the benefit of the tax payer, the necessity for a com
pliance with it cannot be made to depend upon the circumstances
of a particular case, and the opinion of a court or jury regarding
the importance of obedience to it in that instance. That method
of construing statutes would abolish all certainty.8
1Hamilton v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis., 490. Compare Stewart v. Shoenfelt, 13
S. & R., 360; Brattone. Mitchell, 1 W. & S., 310; Mitchell v. Bratton, 5 id.,
451 ; Russell v. Werntz, 24 Penn. St., 337; Miller e. Hale, 26 id., 432; McRey-
nolds v. Longenberger, 57 id., 13 ; Dietrich v. Mason, id., 40 ; Rogers v. John
son, 67 id., 43; Sargeant e. Bean, 7 Gray, 125.
»See Bhimmin e. Inman, 26 Me., 228; Baker v. Blake, 36 id., 433; Hayden
r7.Foster, 13 Pick., 492; Jennings e. Collins, 99 Mass., 29; Crane v. Janesville,
20 Wis., 305 ; Orton e. Noonan, 25 id., 672, 677 ; Siegel v. Outagamie Co., 26
id., 70; Willey v. Scoville's Lessee, 9 Ohio, 44; Douglass v. Dnngerfield, 10
id., 152, 156; Cooley v. Waterman, 16 Mich., 466; Hanscom v. Hinman, 30 id ,
419; McLaughlin v. Kain, 45 Penn. St., 113; Dunn v. Winston, 31 Miss., 135;
Terrill v. Groves, 18 Cal., 149.
8See Ins. Co. v. Yard, 17 Penn. St., 331, 338; French e. Edwards, 13 Wall.,
506, 511; Walker v. Chapman, 22 Ala., 116; Martin e. Cole, 38 Iowa, 141, 153;
Sandwich v. Fish, 2 Gray, 298, 301. But the grouping of two or more parcels
owned by the same person was held in Russell v. Werntz, 24 Penn. St., 337, to
be only an irregularity, and therefore cured under a statute which provided
that " no irregularity in the assessment, or in the process or otherwise, shall
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What are separate parcels. Assessors are sometimes em
barrassed by the necessity for determining what is to be regarded
a separate parcel for the purposes of taxation.
" A dwelling
house with the land and appurtenances occupied with it
,
a ware
house so occupied, a farm or other parcel of real estate let to the
same tenant by one and the same lease, parcels detached from
each other, and used and occupied for different purposes, may re
spectively be regarded as separate and distinct estates. When
this can be done, they must be deemed to be separate and distinct
estates, to be distinctly valued and assessed."1 But in the case of
unimproved lands, the general understanding appears to be, that
an assessment as one parcel of that which was purchased by the
owner as such is sufficient, though by the government survey it
was subdivided, for the purpose of being offered for sale, into
several parcels, each of which might have been sold separately.
Thus, an assessment of the whole south half of a section has
been held good, though it contained four distinct eighty acre lots.2
This is on the assumption that the whole is still owned as one
parcel,8 or at least that it is not known to the assessors to have
be construed or taken to affect the title of the purchaser, but the same shall
be declared to be good and legal." But this would not validate the assess
ment of unseated land on the seated list, and then transferring it to the un
seated without notice. Milliken e. Benedict, 8 Penn. St., 169.
1Sfuiw, Ch. J., Hay den v. Foster, 13 Pick., 492, 497.
»Atkins e. Hinman, 2 Gilm., 437, 443. And see Spellman v. Curtenins, 12
El., 409, where the two halves of a half section were separately described, but
assessed together. The assessment and sale of a whole section together was
sustained in Martin v. Cole, 38 Iowa, 141. There is a good deal of discussion
in this case as to what is to be regarded as a separate parcel for the purposes
of assessment and sale.
' In Jennings v. Collins, 99 Mass., 29, 31, several lots were assessed together
to one Packard, who was owner of a part of them only. Wells, J., says " If
the lots had all been the property of Packard at the time the tax was laid, the
mere fact thai he had divided the land into small lots for the purposes oi sale,
would not require the assessors to make a separate valuation of each lot. But
where lands are separated, either by the use or purpose to which they are de
voted, or by the mode of their occupation, or are disconnected in location, a
tax laid generally upon an entire valuation cannot be made a lien upon each
separate parcel, even when they are all owned and occupied by the same per
son." In California the decisions are that blocks of land in a city may be as
sessed by blocks when assessed to the owner, even if they have been subdi
vided into lots. People v. Culverwell, 44 Cal., 620 ; People v. Morse, 43 id., 534.
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been divided by sale.1 But an assessment which divides such a
parcel into the lowest legal subdivisions can not prejudice the
owner where the land is unoccupied and unimproved,2 and would
seem to be unobjectionable. Unimproved water power, it has
been held, cannot be taxed independently of the land on which
the power is obtained,8 and the authorities in general are im
perative in holding that an unauthorized division of a tract in the
assessment, which tract has no known legal subdivisions, is as fatal
as an unauthorized grouping of distinct parcels would be.4
Description. In listing the land, it must be described with
particularity sufficient to afford the owner the means of identifica
tion, and not to mislead him.* A description that would be suffi-
It is proper to assess partnership lands to the partnership, instead of the indi
vidual partners. Hubbard v. Winsor, 15 Mich., 146.
1It is usual to provide by statute for the case of lands where different per
sons claim distinct interests in different portions ; allowing each to pay the tax
on any portion he will distinctly define; the amount being ascertained by the
proportion in quantity which that tax bears to the whole.
»See Jennings v. Collins, 99 Mass., 29, 31. If two town lots are occupied and
used as one lot, the buildings thereon being partly on each, they may be sold
for taxes together as one lot, their use and nature determining that they are to
be regarded as one lot. Weaver v. Grant, Sup. Ct. Iowa, 8 Western Jurist, 587.
8Boston Manuf. Co. v. Newton, 22 Pick., 22. It was held in Stein e. Mobile,
17 Ala., 234, that where one holds real estate within a city, and in connection
therewith an exclusive right to supply the city with water, this intangible right
is subject to valuation and taxation like tangible property.
4Reading v. Finney, 73 Penn. St., 467. In Brown v. Hays, 66 id., 229, it ap
peared that warrant No. 4023 containing 1026 acres, all but 16 of which was
in Polk township, was assessed in Polk by the number, and the taxes paid for
several years. Afterwards it was assessed by number in Polk as 726 acres,
and the remaining 300 acres in the other township. The owner paid the taxes
:n Polk, and the remainder was sold. Held, that the payment by the number
of the warrant was payment in full, and the sale of the 300 acres was wholly
void. The assessor had no right to divide the tract in Polk into two parcels
when not divided by the owner ; and the assessment with a wrong specification
of quantity would not be notice to the owner that the remainder was assessed
elsewhere. And see Williston v. Colkett, 9 Penn. St., 38, where an assessment
of a tract as 200 acres was held good, though it contained 600 ; the remainder
of the description sufficiently identifying it.
'Mr. Blackwell, in his Treatise on Tax Titles, p. 124, says: "A description
sufficiently certain to convey land between man and man which, if contained
in an agreement to convey, would authorize a court of equity to decree a spe
cific execution, will not answer in the proceedings to enforce collection of a
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cicnt in a conveyance between individuals would generally be
sufficient here. It is, nevertheless, possible for cases to arise in
which such a criterion would be an unsafe one to apply. In a
deed v/hich one executes for the purpose of conveying a particular
description of land, if -errors of description occur, they may well
be rejected and the deed sustained if
, after rejecting them, a suffi
cient description remains to identify the land intended ; because
the erroneous circumstances which were added could not have mis
led the party conveying, who, all the time, had in mind a particular
parcel which the erroneous particulars did not fit. But the same
errors in a description prepared by another, might very likely
tax. In the case of private transactions, the courts, in construing the docu
ment, endeavor to collect the intention of the parties, and give that intention
effect. If a latent ambiguity exists in the description, parol evidence is re
sorted to for the purpose of explaining it
,
and giving to the intention of the
parties complete operation ; and where the estate to be conveyed is sufficiently
described in the deed, or other writing, the addition of a circumstance, false
or mistaken, will be rejected as surplusage, in order to carry that intention
into effect. In tax proceedings the owner of the estate has nothing to do —
he intends nothing; the government is acting, through its agents, in hostility
to him, and with a view of enforcing the collection of a tax from him. If the
officers undertake to list for him lands lying in one place for those which lie
in another, or have no existence at all, they intend to do what the law, under
which they profess to act, does not permit. The rule is laid down that a list
ing is fatally defective and void, if it contain such a falsity in the designation
or description or the land listed as might probably mislead the owner, and
prevent him from ascertaining by the notices that his land is to be sold or
redeemed. Such a mistake or falsity defeats one of the obvious and just
purposes of the law]— that of giving the owner an opportunity of preventing
the sale by paying the tax." With deference it may be suggested that quite
too much importance is sometimes attached to the idea that " the government,
through its agents, is acting in hostility to" the tax payer, "and with a view
to enforcing the collection of a tax from him." The proceedings in the
assessment of a tax, are not, in any proper sense, hostile to the citizen; they
lire, on the other hand, proceedings necessary and indispensable to the deter
mination of the exact share which each resident, or property owner, ought to
take, and may and ought to be supposed desirous of taking in meeting the
public necessity for a revenue;— proceedings which the willingness of the
tax payer cannot dispense with, and which only become hostile when the
duty to pay, once fixed, fails to be performed by payment. Then, and then
only, do the steps taken by the government assume a compulsory form; until
then the reasonable presumption is that government and taxpayer will act
together in harmony, and that the latter will meet his obligation to pay as
soon as the former has performed its duty in determining the share to be paid.
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mislead the owner who would be informed of no error, and who
must, from the description alone, discover what land was intended.
The same may be said of any imperfection in the description ; the
owner, if it has been prepared by himself, will read it in connec
tion with his own knowledge of those surrounding circumstances,
in the light of which he has framed it; but an equally imperfect
description, prepared by another and unaccompanied by any such
circumstances, would fail to convey to his mind any idea that his
own land was intended. It certainly would be much less likely
to do so than where he had prepared it himself.
The purposes in describing the land are, first, that the owner
may have information of the claim made upon him or his prop
erty ; second, that the public, in case the tax is not paid, may
be notified what land is to be offered for sale for the nonpayment ;
and third, that the purchaser may be enabled to obtain a sufficient
conveyance. If the description is sufficient for the first purpose,
it will ordinarily be sufficient for the others also. Several at
tempts have been made to lay down some general rule as to what
is sufficient, and what not, for a description in the listing. " No
tice," it is well said, " or at least the means of knowledge, is an
essential element of every just proceeding which affects rights of
persons or of property. But how can the duty of the payment
of taxes be performed without the identity of the subject matter
of the duty being made known to him who is to perform it
,
by name or description ? A thing, whether land or chattel, to be
the subject of legal action, must be proceeded against by name
or by description, but a name is descriptive only because it ha3
become associated with the person or thing named. A name,
therefore, which has never become connected in any manner with
any title or possession of land, clearly infers no means of its iden
tification. So the mathematical contents expressed in figures is
not a mark of identity peculiar to the land ; but like a common
noun, has no immediate or cognate relation to a particular tract.
* * Identity is said to be a matter for the jury. Certainly this
is so ; but from its very nature, the fact of identity is dependent
on circumstances which attach themselves to the land. It is be
cause the thing described answers to the circumstances of descrip
tion, we are able to identify it The evidence of identity is the
record which contains the description and fixes the duty. As
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sessment is
,
from its legal requirement, and the necessity of pre
serving its evidence, a written entry, and must depend upon the
records of the commissioner's office, and not upon parol testi
mony, or the private duplicate of the assessor." 1 And after an
examination of cases decided, it is added : " The result of the
whole is
,
that where the assessment wholly fails to lead to identi
fication, so that neither the owner nor the officer can tell that his
land is taxed, the duty of payment cannot be performed, and the
assessment is void." * The rule thus given is quite as liberal in
-support of imperfect or inaccurate descriptions as would be ap
plied to conveyances inter partes. In another case in the same
state, it is said a sale " will pass the title, although assessed in a
wrong name or by a wrong number, if otherwise designated and
capable of identification. The reason for this is the recognized prin
ciple, that it is the land, and not the owner, which is chargeable,
and to be charged with the tax. It must, however, be suscepti
ble of identification as the land assessed, otherwise the sale would
be void." 8 But identification may possibly be made out to the
satisfaction of a jury by a description that would be extremely
likely to mislead the owner himself ; the jury having their atten
tion called to the errors or defects which exist, and the owner not
1 Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Penn. St., 440, 448,.per Agnew, J., citing and com
menting upon McCall e. Lorrimer, 4 Watts, 351, 355 ; S. C, 4 W. & S., 133;
Dunn e. Relyea, 6W. & S., 475; Stewart e. Shoenfelt, 13 S. & R., 360; Luff-
borough v. Parker, 16 id., 351 ; Morton e. Harris, 9 Watts, 319, 325; Hubley v.
Keyser, 2 P. & Watts, 496 ; Strauch v. Shoemaker, 1 W. & 8., 166 : Burns e.
Lyon, 4 Watts, 363; Harper e. McKeehan, 3 W. & S., 238; Russel e.Werutz, 24
Penn. St., 337; Laird e. Heister, id., 452; Miller v. Hale, 26 id,, 432; Cooper
v. Brockway, 8 Watts, 162, 165 ; Thompson v. Fisher, 6 W. & S., 520 ; Dunden
«. Snodgrass, 18 Penn. St., 151; Woodside v. Wilson, 32 id., 52. These cases
pass upon a great variety of descriptions, some of which are held sufficient,
and some are not.
» Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Penn. St., 440, 455 ; Harris «. Tyson, 24 id., 347.
See also Glass v. Gilbert, 68 id., 266. It is the return of the tract by the asses
sors which fixes its identity and liability to taxation. Brown v. Hayes, 66
Penn. St., 229. In some states, however, provision is made by law for a cor
rection of the descriptions by the county board.
8 Thompson, J., in Woodside v. Wilson, 32 Penn. St., .'i2, 54. This statement
would, of course, be inapplicable to the case of an assessment of resident
land. When the law requires it to be assessed to the owner, it must be so
assessed, as preceding cases show.
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being aware that there are any, but having a right to assume, until
notified to the contrary, that all descriptions in the list have
accurate application to some particular pieces of property, and fit
some others when not appearing to fit his. A more satisfactory
rule would seem to be that " the designation of the land will be
sufficient if it afford the means of identification, and do not posi
tively mislead the owner," 1 or be calculated to mislead him.2
It is thus expressed in a New York case: "An assessment of
nonresident land is fatally defective and void if it contain sucb a
falsity in the designation or description of the parcel assessed, as
might probably mislead the owner and prevent him from ascer
taining by the notices that his land was to be sold or redeemed.
Such a mistake or falsity defeats one of the obvious and just pur
poses of the statute— that of giving to the owner an opportunity
of preventing the sale by paying the tax."8 Under this rule
each case must depend so much upon its own special facts that
little service could be done by giving the decided cases in detail
here. Several are given in the note, and others are referred to.*
1Thompson, J., in Woodside e. Wilson, 32 Penn. St, 62, 55.
8See Curtis e. Supervisors of Brown County, 22 Wis., 167, in which it is
denied that a description sufficient as between parties will be sufficient al
ways in an assessment, or that particulars in it which are erroneous can be
rejected as surplusage. To the same point is Dike e. Lewis, 4 Denio, 237;
see also Orton v. Noonan, 23 Wis., 102, in which it is said words cannot be sup
plied by intendment. It is to be observed of this case, however, that the
words it was proposed to supply would have wholly changed the apparent
meaning.
8Buggies, J., in Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y., 66, 71. See also Lafferty «. By-
ers, 5 Ohio, 4o8; Turncy v. Yeoman, 16 id., 24; Farnum v. Buffum, 4 Cush.,
260: Amberg v. Rogers, 9 Mich., 332; Green v. Lunt, 58 Me., 15; State v.
Union, 36 N. J., 309. In Hill v. Mowry, 6 Gray, 551, the rule is laid down
that a tax deed, taking effect only as the execution of a statute power, should
be construed with some strictness, so as to enable the grantee to identity the
land, and to enable the owner to redeem it. And it was held that a deed
which bounds the land correctly on two sides, bounds it on the third by land
on which in fact it is bounded in part only, and on the fourth by land from
which it is separated by the land of a third person, is void for uncertainty.
4Where the only*description was "William Bush's heirs, 2560 acres," held
insufficient Bushe. Williams, Cooke (Tenn.), 274. So where the description
was " Moses Buffum, house and land," Buffum not being the occupant.
Farnum v. Buffum, 4 Cush., 260. Compare Coombs v. Warren, 34 Me., 89.
So where the description is part of a lot without showing how much, or giv-
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Talnation. Where the grouping of lands for assessment is
inadmissible, the valuation of several parcels in gross is equally
so. No valuable purpose could be subserved by separate de
scriptions if the parcels, though separately described, were to be
grouped in valuation.1
ing boundaries. Detroit Young Men's Society e. Detroit, 3 Mich., 172;
Massie e. Long, 2 Ohio, 237, 289; Green e. Lunt, 58 Me., 518. But
a description, as "that part of private claim 61, lying cast of the north
branch of the- river Ecorse," in a township named, is sufficient. Gil
man e. Riopelle, 18 Mich., 145. Error in stating the quantity of the land,
however great, will not vitiate. Brown v. Hays, 66 Penn. St., 229; Williston
v. Colkett, 9 id., 38; Gilman e. Riopelle, 18 Mich., 145. Omission of the
number of a town lot, or the name of the owner, is fatal where the law re
quires them to be given. Thacher ex parte, 3 Sneed, 344. Description in the
notice of tax sale, as " Tract No. 8, S. D., advertised, 4197," held wholly insuf
ficient. Griffin e. Crippen, 60 Me., 270. Compare Glass e. Gilbert, 58 Penn.
St., 266, 290. An assessment as definite as the grant under which the laud is
held, is sufficient. People e. Crockett, 33 Cal., 150. A description, " one
hundred v&ras square," with definite boundaries on three sides, is sufficient
Garwood e. Hastings, 38 Cal., 210. An assessment of a large tract of land,
which describes it by metes and bounds, and then excepts from the tract par
cels of the same which have been previously conveyed, but does not describe
the excepted portions by metes and bounds, nor in any manner but by a ref
erence to recorded deeds, is void on its face. People e. Cone, 48 -Cal., 427;
People e. Hyde, id., 431 ; see also People e. Hancock, id., 631. A description
of the land by well understood abbreviations is sufficient, thus: " E. %, s. w.
}4, sec. 24, town 3 south, of range 7 west," etc. Sibley e. Smith, 2 Mich., 486,
503 ; see also Long e. Long, 2 Blackf., 293 ; Jordan, etc.. Association, etc., e.
Wagoner, 33 Ind., 50; Atkins e. Hinman, 2 Gilm., 437; Olcott v. State, 5 id.,
481; Blakely v. Bcstor, 13 11l., 714; Stevens e. Hollister, 18 Vt., 294; Goodell
e. Harrison, 2 Mo., 124. Further, as to what is a sufficient description, the
following cases are instructive. Ronkendorf e. Taylor, 4 Pet., 319; Lafferty's
Lessee e. Byers, 5 Ohio, 458; Trevor e. Emerick, 6 id., 391 ; Larrabee v. Hodg-
kins, 58 Me., 412; Griffin v. Crippin, 60 id., 270; Orono e. Veazie, 61 id.,431;
Currie e. Fowler, 5 J. J. Marsh, 145 ; Le Fever e. Detroit, 2 Mich., 586; Wright
e. Dunham, 13 id., 414; Atwell v. Zeluff, 26 id., 118, 121; Jaques v. Kopman,
6 La. An., 542; Woolfolk e. Foubene, 15 id., 15; Latchman v. Clark, 14 Cal.,
131; Hi^h v. Shoemaker, 22 id., 363; Bosworth e. Danzien, 25 id., 296; Peo
ple e. Flint, 39 id., 670; Ainsworth e. Dean, 21 N. H., 400; Bidwell e. Webb,
10 Minn., 59; Bidwell v. Coleman, 11 id., 78; St. Peters Church e. Scott Coun
ty, 12 id., 395; Shaw e. Orr, 30 Iowa, 355. A falsity in the description which
might mislead, runs through and invalidates all the subsequent proceedings.
Yenda v. Wheeler, 9 Texas, 408.
1People e. Mining Co., 39 Cal., 511; People e. Hollister, 47 id., 408. In
this last case there was a separate valuation of each parcel in the column with
the descriptions, but not carried into the appropriate column. " Value," it is
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It is elsewhere shown1 that valuation is in its nature a judicial
act, and the assessors in making it are entitled to the customary
protection which the law accords to officers exercising correspond
ing judicial functions. The party injured by their errors, com
mitted without fraud or malice, has in general only such remedy
as the statute may afford him. And in no proceeding is one to
be heard who complains of a valuation which, however erroneous,
charges him only with a just proportion of the tax. If his own
assessment is not out of proportion, as compared with valuations
generally on the same roll, it is immaterial that some one neigh
bor is assessed too little and another too much.'
The legislature cannot make the valuations of property for taxa
tion.8 The nearest approach to the exercise of such an authority
by the legislature is where it definitely fixes the basis for a local
assessment, by the acre, by frontage, etc. But in such cases the
considerations which affect benefits are matters of notoriety, and
may well be taken notice of by the legislative body when pre
scribing a rule which, at least in the particular case, is to operate
generally and with uniformity. In a majority of the states the
rule prescribed by the statutes is that lands and other real estate
shall be valued as such, irrespective of the separate estates that in
dividuals may have in them. Under such a practice, he who, for the
time being, enjoys the possession of the real estate, and the per
nancy of the profits may be charged with the tax.4 The prac
tice, however, has not been universal ; in some states, and partic-
said, " can only be determined by the ordinary selling and buying prices, for
cash, at the time." Caruthers, J., in Brown e. Greer, 3 Head, 695, 697. This
is a criterion which, it is safe to say, is very seldom applied.
1See Chapter XXIV.
"Chicopee e. County Commissioners, 16 Gray, 38. As to actual value,
and how it is to be got at, see State v. Ferris, 23 N. J., 546 ; State e. Randolph,
25 id., 427; Oswego Starch Factory v. Dolloway, 21 N. Y., 449; People v. Do-
lan, 36 id., 59, 62; People e. Ferguson, 38 id., 89; People v. Barker, 48 id., 70.
8People v. Hastings, 29 Cal., 449. Of course the assessment is fatally de
fective if it lacks the valuation. Garwood v. Hastings, 38 id., 216. As to the
valuation of railroad property, see State v. 11linois Central R. R. Co., 27 11l., 64.
4Turner v. Smith, 14 Wall., 553; Atkins v. Hinman, 2 Gilm., 437, 449;
Parker v. Braxton, 2 Gray, 185; Willard v. Blount, 11 Ired., 624; Brown *1.
Austin, 41 Vt., 262; Merrick v. Hutt, 15 Ark., 331 ; Briscoe v. Coulter, 18 Ark,
423 ; Blackwell on Tax Titles, ch. 38 and notes.
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ularly in some special proceedings, the statutes have required
separate interests to be separately assessed.1 When the whole is as
sessed as an entirety, provision is usually made under which the
respective owners may pay their proportions of the tax, and have
their respective interests discharged of the lien.8
Authentication of the assessment. The result of the action
of the assessors is embodied in an assessment roll or list The
statutes provide how this shall be authenticated, and compliance
with their provisions is essential.8 The methods are different in
the different states, and are sometimes changed in the same state.
But the rule of law is clear. Where the law required the roll to
1Separate interests in Pennsylvania assessed and sold separately. See Mc
Laughlin v. Kain, 45 Penn. St., 113. As to Mississippi, see Dunn v. Winston.
31 Miss., 135. As to Kentucky, see Oldhams v. Jones, 5 B. Monr., 464. In
the case of special assessments it has been more usual to assess distinct inter
ests separately, sometimes, however, providing for a sale of the fee. See Jack
son v. Babcock, 16 N. Y., 246; Matter of De Graw St., 18 Wend., 568. And
see further Williams v. Brace, 5 Conn., 190. The case of Jackson v. Babcock,
16 N. Y., 246, was this: The statute provided for proceedings in court un
der which, in street opening cases, where there were distinct interests in lands
which were subject to a lien for the assessment, one owner of an interest
might proceed in the supreme court against all the others, including unknown
owners, for an equitable apportionment of the assessment, and after advertis
ing for the appearance of the unknown owners, obtain an order for an abso
lute sale of the fee ; the proceeds to be applied, so far as necessary, to the dis
charge of the assessment. This statute was held to be valid, and effectual to
cut off all contingent as well as vested rights.
* There are some cases in which it has been held that the omission of the
dollar mark as a prefix to the figures which represent the value of the prop
erty in the assessment roll will render the assessment nugatory; there being
nothing in its absence by which to determine what the figures indicate. Bra-
ley v. Seaman, 30 Cal., 610; People v. Savings Union, 31 id., 132. And see
People v. Empire, etc. Co., 33 Id., 171. The contrary has been held in New
Hampshire. Cahoon v. Coe, 52 N. H., 518, 524. And see State «. Eureka, etc.,
Co., 8Nev., 15; Checkering v. Faile, 38 11l., 342; Elston v. Kennicott, 46 id.,
187, 202. In 11linois it is decided that a judgment for taxes in which the sums
are expressed in figures without a dollar mark prefixed, is void for want of
certainty. Lawrence v. Fast, 2011l., 338; Lane v. Bommelmann, 21 id., 143;
Epingere. Kirby, 23 id., 521, 523; Dukes v. Rowley, 24 id., 210; Checkering e.
Faile, 38 id., 342; Cook v. Norton, 43 id., 391; Potwin e. Oades, 45 id., 366;
Elston v. Kennicott, 46 id., 187 ; Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. e. Chicago, 53 id., 80.
These decisions were followed in Woods v. Freeman, 1 Wall., 398; and Ran
dolph v. Metcalf, 6 Cold., 400, 408.
8Warner v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich., 24.
1.9
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be signed, and a certificate to be attached, the signing of the cer
tificate was held not to dispense with a signing of the roll, and if
that was not signed, no proceedings could be taken upon it.1
Where the statute required the assessors to certify that they had
assessed the property at its true value, according to the best of
their knowledge and belief, a certificate that they had assessed it
" according to the usual way of assessing" was declared void.2
The same was held of a certificate that the assessors had estimated
the real estate " at a sum which, for the purposes of the assessment,
we believe to be the true value thereof." 8 In these cases the asses
sors had endeavored to make the certificates correspond to the
fact, it being notorious that whatever they may certify, they are
not in the practice of estimating property at its true value. A
failure, however, to comply literally with a statutory form will
not vitiate if there is a substantial compliance.4
Equalization. In some states, when assessment rolls are com
pleted and signed, they are subject to review by a higher authori
ty, for the purpose of an equalization, in case the assessment of
one district is found to be relatively higher or lower than that of
1Sibley e. Smith, 2 Mich., 486. The statute was afterwards changed. See
Lacy v. Davis, 4 Mich., 140. See further Colby v. Russel, 3 Greenl., 227 ; Fox-
croft v. Nevens, 4 id., 72 ; Kelley v. Craig, 5 Ired., 129 ; Johnson v. Elwood, 53
N. Y., 431, 435. A similar defect held a mere irregularity and cured as such
by a statute that no irregularity should defeat the tax title. Townsen v. Wil
son, 9 Penn. St., 270.
8Van Rensselaer v. Whitbeck, 7 N. Y., 517 : compare Parish v. Golden, 35
id., 462.
•Clark v. Crane, 5 Mich., 151. See also Colby v. Russell, 3 Greenl., 227 ;
Foxcrofte. Nevens, 4 id., 72; Johnson v Goodridge, 15 Me., 29; Kelar v. Sav
age, 20 id., 199.
*Parish v. Golden, 35 N. Y., 462; Buffalo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Supervisors of
Erie, 48 N. Y., 93 ; Bradford v. Randall, 5 Pick., 496; People v. Mining Co.,
39 Cal., 511. See Bangor v. Lancey, 21 Me., 472. In this case it appeared that
the statute required the list to have the official sanction of a majority of the as
sessors, evidenced by their signatures. The original list was not signed, but
a supplementary list referring to it as containing the assessment for the year
was duly signed. Held sufficient. As to what irregularities will defeat an as
sessment the following cases may- be consulted. Willey v. Scoville's Lessees,
9 Ohio, 44; Shimmin e. Inman, 26 Me., 228; Smith e. Davis, 30 Cal., 536, cited
in Huntingdon «. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 2 Sawyer, 503. What will not
avoid : Gulf R. R. Co. v. Morris, 7 Kansas, 210 ; Smith v. Leavenworth Co., 8
id., 296.
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another ; so that, if the general taxes were to be assessed upon it
,
the district would pay more or less than its due proportion.1 Thus,
town assessment rolls are equalized by county boards of super
visors or commissioners, and the aggregate of the county assess
ments by a state board, established for the purpose. This is not
done by changing individual assessments, but by fixing the ag
gregate sums for the several districts at what, in the opinion of
the board, they should be, so that general taxes may be levied ac
cording to this determination, instead of on the assessor's foot
ings. These boards act judicially in equalizing, and their de
cision is conclusive. The boards are composed of popular repre
sentatives, and they act upon their own judgment of what is
equal and just2 But such a board has a special and limited ju
risdiction, and any unauthorized action is void.8 And their
powers, like those of all similar boards, are to be strictly con
strued.4 They cannot release a tax, or its lien, when not ex
pressly empowered to do so.5
1As to the equalization and the necessity therefor, see County Commission
ers v. Parker, 7 Minn., 267; Tweed e. Metcalf, 4 Mich., 579; Tallmadge v. Su-
pervisors of Hensselaer, 21 Barb., 611 ; State v. Allen, 43 11l., 456 ; People v.
Nichols, 49 id., 517. The members of a state board of equalization are really
assessors, and, where all assessors are required to be elected by the people,
this board cannot be created by appointment Houghton e. Austin, 47 Cal.,
646; People v. Raymond, 37 N. Y.,428.
»See Tweed v. Metcalf, 4 Mich., 579; Case v. Dean, 16 id., 12; Bellinger «.
Gray, 51 N. Y., 610.
8 See State v. Allen, 43 11l., 456; Peoplee. Nichols, 49 id., 517; Darlings
Gunn, 50 id., 424; McKee v. Supervisors of Champaign, 53 id., 477. Thp.t the
valuation of assessors is conclusive on the county board, except when the
statute otherwise provides, see Respublica v. Deaves, 3 Yeates, 465. In rais
ing or reducing the assessment of a district, it is sufficient if the board desig
nate the percentage increase or reduction. Hubbard v. Winsor, 15 Mich., 146.
4 Sioux City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Washington County, 3 Neb., 30.
5 State v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 9 Nev., 79. Where the board has au
thority to equalize, and also to discharge assessments, they do not exhaust
their authority by a hearing and decision on equalization. State v. Ormsby
County Com'rs, 7 Nev., 392.
A board, having authority to equalize assessments as between townships,
cannot, of their own motion, increase an individual assessment above that re
turned by the assessor. McConkey e. Smith, Sup. Ct. 11l., 7 Chicago Legal
News, 210.
292 [CIL XIII.LA"W OF TAXATION.
CHAPTER XIII.
THE COLLECTOR'S WARRANT.
Before the collector is authorized to proceed in the collection
of the taxes, he must have his warrant for the purpose, in due
form of law. This, in different states, may be the assessment
roll or list, with the tax extended upon it
,
or it may be a dupli
cate of the list with a like extension, or it may be either of these,
with a formal warrant attached, particularly indicating what are
his duties under it
,
and commanding their performance.1 Whatever
the statute provides for, in this regard, the collector must have,
and he is a trespasser if he proceeds to compulsory action with
out it.8 Upon this point the decisions are numerous and uniform.
In a case arising under a statute which required that a warrant
should be attached to the tax duplicate, the following remarks
have been made : " The authority of a collector of taxes to col
lect is his warrant The duplicate is but a memorandum of the
amount he is to collect from the parties therein named respectively.
Without a warrant, the collector becomes a trespasser as soon as
he intermeddles with the property of the tax payer. There must
also be a law authorizing the issue of a warrant, and some per
son appointed to issue it
,
and it must conform to the law author
izing it
,
and be issued by the proper person designated by law,
or it is no protection to a collector."8 No question is made any
where of the correctness of this doctrine
Whatever may be the requisites of the warrant under the statute,
care must be taken that they be observed. One of the most im-
1 The tax roll is void if made out before the tax is voted. Gale v. Mead, 4
Hill, 109.
s Blackwell on Tax Titles, 168, and cases cited.
* Hilbishe. Horner, 58 Penn. St., 93, citing Pearce e. Torre nee, 2 Grant's
Cases, 82; Stephens v. Wilkins, 6 Penn. St., 260. And see Chalker e. Ives, 55
id., 81. The same doctrine is declared under a different law, in Slade v. Gov
ernor, 3 Dev., 365 ; Kelly v. Craig, 5 Ired., 129. And see Brown v. Wright, 17
Vt., 97.
CH. XIII.] 293THE COLLECTOR'S WARRANT.
portant of these is the direction. If it is directed to one officer
when under the statute it should be to another, the process is fa
tally defective.1 It has been decided in Maine, under a statute
which gives a form to be followed " in substance," that the omis
sion of that part of the form which directs the treasurer to levy
distress in default of payment renders the warrant nugatory, and
the treasurer may refuse to execute it."1 But variances in immateri
al matters will not vitiate the warrant. Thus under the Maine
statute it is held that the omission in the warrant, " In the name
of the state of Maine," which is a part of the form, is immaterial.8
In Vermont the question is made whether the date is an indis
pensable part of the warrant, but if it is
, it is held that an error in
the date will not avoid it* The decisions in the same state are
very liberal in holding that other accidental errors and defects
shall not vitiate the process.5 In Massachusetts where the statute
provides that " the assessors shall commit the tax list, with the
warrant under their.hands, to the collector for collection," a failure
to attach them, if both are delivered to the collector, is immateri
al.6 And in the same state an error in the command of the war
rant, by which the collector was directed to arrest the person taxed
within twelve days, instead of fourteen, as it should have been,
after demand of the tax, if the same should not be paid, etc., will
not vitiate the warrant, nor become material, unless the direction
to arrest is acted upon.7 In New York a warrant issued and
1 Stephens v. Wilkins, 6 Penn. St., 260; Cannell v. Crawford County, 59 id.,
196.
8 Bachelder v. Thompson, 41 Me., 539. In Wilson v. Seavey, 38 Vt., 221, it
was held that naming the collector's predecessor in the address of the war
rant, instead of naming him, did not invalidate it.
1 Mussey v. White, 3 Greenl., 290. A constitutional provision that all pro-
cess shall run " in the name of the people," etc., held not applicable to a col.
lector's warrant. Tweed v. Metcalf, 4 Mich., 579; Wisner v. Davenport, 5 id.,
501; Curry v. Hinman, 11 11l., 420; Scarritt «. Chapman, 11 id., 443; State «
Birchard, 1 Wis., 457.
* Bellows v. Weeks, 41 Vt., 590.
5 Goodwin e. Perkins, 39 Vt., 598. See Spear v. Braintree, 24 id., 414 ; Chand-
ler e. Spear, 22 id., 388.
•Barnard v. Graves, 13 Met., 85.
' Barnard v. Graves, 13 Met., 85, citing King v. Whitcomb, 1 id., 328. In
Connecticut it is held that if the warrant is not attached to the list, and the of
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signed by the supervisors as required by law, is good, though they
fail to add to their signatures the official title.1 An error in the
direction to the collector by which he is commanded to account
to the wrong officer is immaterial ; this being a matter that does
not concern the tax payers.2 The same is true of a failure to limit
by the warrant the time within which the treasurer shall collect
the tax.8
Different rolls for different taxes. It is not always the
practice to have one assessment and tax roll for the state taxes
and another for the local taxes. On the contrary, for what may
be called the general taxes of the municipality, it is customary to
provide that, when voted, they shall be certified to such state
or county officer or board as is authorized to issue the tax warrant
for state or county taxes, and by such officer or board shall be
spread upon the same roll or list, though in a separate column,
and be collected by authority of the same warrant The regulation
may be the opposite of this ; that the state taxes shall be certified
to county or town officers, and by them spread upon the roll.
Such provisions do not give the state or county functionaries any
power to review, revise or set aside, the local action, but they
must levy what has been voted, and may be compelled to do so.4
fleer is commanded by his warrant " to collect of the persons named in the
annexed list," etc., there is' nothing to which these words can apply; the
command in the warrant is nugatory, and he can take the property of no in-
dividual. Picket v. Allen, 10 Conn., 145.
1Sheldon v. Van Buskirk, 2 N. Y., 473.
•Clemons v. Lewis, 36 Vt., 673. Compare Tweed v. Metcalf, 4 Mich., 579.
5Walker v. Miner, 32 Vt., 769. Such a warrant may be defective as between
the collector and the pnblic he acts for, but the defect does not invalidate any
action taken to collect the tax under it. Id. In Iowa it seems that the au
thority to sell lands comes from the statute and not from a tax warrant See
Parker e. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 421 ; Rhodes «. Sexton, 33 id., 540.
4Where the law gives a city full authority to vote money for the support of
the poor, etc., and requires the supervisors to " cause the same to be raised, as
sessed and collected," the supervisors have no discretion to refuse on the
ground that funds for the like purposes have previously been misapplied. Ex
parte Common Council of Albany, 3 Cow., 358. Compare Williams e. School
District, 21 Pick., 75. Sometimes the auditing of accounts is made by law
equivalent to the vote of a tax. See People «. Supervisors of Queens, 1 Hill,
195.
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Delivery of the warrant. A provision of statute that the of
ficer or board making out the warrant shall deliver it to the col
lector by a day named is only directory.1 But any such delay as
would leave the collector insufficient time for compulsory proceed
ings under the statute, would of course preclude their being taken.
Exhausting authority. The issue of a void tax warrant
would not exhaust the authority to issue a valid one. In some
states by statute, or by a customary course of procedure, when
one valid process does not result in the collection of all the tax,
another may issue.2 For personal taxes which remain uncollected
suits are sometimes provided for, especially where the failure to
collect is in consequence of a removal of the party taxed from the
treasurer's jurisdiction.
Blending taxes. A very common provision of statute, where
several taxes are to be spread upon the same roll is
,
that they shall
be kept separate and placed in distinct columns on the roll. This
advises the tax payer of the nature of the several demands that
are made upon him, and enables him to pay or tender the amount
of any one the justice and legality of which he concedes, and to
decline to pay any other if he considers it unwarranted. Such
p1ovision is mandatory, and if not obeyed, the taxes cannot be
enforced.8 A custom to blend them cannot make the roll valid.4
Bui separating the taxes when the statute does not require it will
not affect the roll ; as this deprives no one of any right whatever.5
Excessive taxes. All statutes are mandatory which express
ly or by implication limit the amount of taxes which may be
levied. When these are exceeded by a sum which is spread upon
the wlole roll, the whole levy is void. The levy is in excess of
the jurisdiction of the officers, and will be as deficient in the legal
1 Alvori v. Collins, 20 Pick., 418 ; Hubbard v. Winsor, 15 Mich., 146 ; Smith
v. Crittenden, 16 id., 152. The case of Cardigan e. Page. 6 N. H., 182, is contra.
»See E(dy v. Wilson, 43 Vt., 362. The warrant is sometimes extended or
renewed, inder statutes providing therefor. See Griswold v. School District,
24 Mich., S62.
•Thayer >
.
Stearns, 1 Pick., 482; Case v. Dean, 16 Mich., 12.
4 State v. lalkinburge, 15 N. J., 320; Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Hille-
gas, 18 id., 11.
'Wall v. T-umbull, 16 Mich., 228: compare Torrey v. Milbury, 21 Pick., 64.
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competency to make out a valid charge, as if made without any
authority whatever. This would not defeat a separate tax placed
in a separate column on the roll, but it would invalidate whatever
is blended with the excessive levy, and incapable of being sepa
rated.
Excess in a levy may happen from a sum which has been voted
for an unauthorized purpose being included with others that are
authorized, or from imposing more than is permitted for lawful pur
poses, or from the addition of unauthorized charges, or from
errors of the officers, by which either the aggregate is made too
large, or individuals are charged more than their proportion. In
the latter case the individual taxes which were unjustly increased
would alone be void ; in the others the whole levy.1 Some dis
position has been manifested to save the taxes when the excess
was comparatively insignificant, on the maxim, de minimis lex
1" The authority to impose taxes, while it is an inherent and essential power
of government, which is fully recognized in our constitution and conferred on
the legislature in clear and comprehensive terms, is nevertheless a delicate
trust, nearly affecting the rights and interests of the citizens, and to be exer
cised carefully, and within the exact limits which are prescribed by that
clause in the frame of government which creates the power and defines tie
extent to which the legislature may go in its exercise. If they have exceeded
it, if the constitutional boundary has been overstepped, therje can be no dotbt
of the right of the citizens to resist such unauthorized exercise of power, md
of the duty of this court to declare such legislative action void, and to prctect
all persons against its unlawful exactions." Bigtlow, Ch. J., Commonwealth
v. Savings Bank, 5 Allen, 428, 430. See Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass, 272 ;
Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass., 144. In Joyner v. School District, 3 Cusl:., 567,
572, where an excessive school tax was levied, Dewey, J., says : " Each mem
ber of a school district has a right to insist that no more than his proportional
amount be demanded of him, .to pay the debts of the school district, ;hat the
assessments shall be in a legal form, and in a form that will also conpel the
other members of the district to pay their proportionate share of the corporate
debts." See also School District v. Merrills, 12 Conn., 437; HuJbard v.
Brainard. 35 id., 563; First Ecclesiastical Society e. Hartford, 38 id., 274;
Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Grcenl., 339; Huse v. Merriam, 2 id., 370; L>icy v Davis, 4
Mich., 140; Gerry v. Stoneham, 1 Allen, 319; Goodrich v. Luneubuig, 9 Gray,
38,41; Stone v. Bean, 15 id., 42; Kemper v. McClelland, 19 Oh it
,
308 324;
Mason v. Roe, 5 Blackf., 98; Hutchins v. Doe, 3 Ind., 528; Drew i. Davis, 10
Vt., 506; Johnson v. Colburn, 36 id., 693; Wells v. Burbank, 17 N H., 393;
Kinsworthy e. Mitchell, 21 Ark., 145; Bucknall e. Story, 36 Jal., 67, 72;
Tucker v. The Justices, 34 Geo., 370. As to levy of excessive fees see Mosher
'e.Robie, 11 Me., 135; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass., 272; Buell v. Irwin, 24
Mich- 245; Prindlo «. Campbell, 9 Minn., 212. ,
CH. XIII.] 297THE COLLECTORS WARRANT.
non curat. Of this maxim it has been said in a case where a tax
was but slightly in excess of authority : " The maxim is so
vague in itself as to form a very unsafe ground of proceeding or
judging ; and it may be almost as difficult to apply it as a rule in
pecuniary concerns as to the interest which a witness has in the
event of a cause ; and in such case it cannot apply. Any interest
excludes him. The assessment was therefore unauthorized and
void. If the line which the legislature has established be once
passed, we know of no boundary to the discretion of the assess
ors." 1 The like rule has been adopted in another case, which
has held that any addition perceptibly increasing an individual
tax avoids it.8
1JUellen, Ch. J., in Husc v. Merriam, 2 Greenl., 375, 376.
8Case v. Dean, 16 Mich., 12. But an unintentional error may not have thio
effect. Kelley v. Corson, 8 Wis., 182 ; O'Grady v. Barnhisel, 23 Cal., 287, 296.
See State v. Newark, 25 N. J., 399. In Iowa there is a statute that a tax sale
shall be upheld if any portion of the tnx for which the sale was made was
legal. See Parker e. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 421. Where part is legal and part is
illegal the former will be sustained if they are capable of being distinguished.
See O'Kane v. Treat, 25 11l., 557; Briscoe v. Allison, 43 id. ,291 ; State v. Allen,
43 id., 456 ; Allen e. Peoria, etc., It. R. Co., 44 id., 85 ; People v. Nichols, 49
id., 517; Mix v. People, Sup. Ct. 11l. (1875), 7 Chicago Legal News, p. 2;
State v. Plainfield, Sup. Ct. N. J. (1875), 12 Albany Law Journal, p. 172. And
as to sale on judgment for taxes, see Reeve v. Kennedy, 43 Cal., 643. An ex
cess inserted to cover possible contingencies in collecting, held not to render
assessors liable in trespass where they had acted in good faith, and only erred
in judgment. Colman v. Anderson, 10 Mass., 105, 117, 120.
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CHAPTER XIV.
TIIE COLLECTION OF THE TAX.
Summary remedies necessary. Very summary remedies
have been allowed, in every age and country, for the collection by
the government of its revenues. They have been considered a
matter of state necessity. Without them it might be possible for
defeated and dissatisfied parties to cripple and, possibly, to break
up the government, by depriving it of the resources for continuing
its existence until they could be gathered in by the slow pro
cesses which are available to private parties. It has been shown
in the preceding chapters, that the invaluable principles of the
common law are not supposed to be violated by a resort to sum
mary proceedings in these cases. Summary processes are not
necessarily unjust They would be so if they deprived the party
of a hearing, or if they precluded the opportunity for a patient
and deliberate examination of the questions upon which his rights
depend, before such rights could be finally concluded and cutoff.
But this it is not the design of legitimate tax legislation to ac
complish in any case. It may reverse somewhat the course of
ordinary proceedings to enforce rights at the common law, but it
can never finally and conclusively condemn without a hearing.
When a tax is duly and properly levied 1 it is to be collected
after some method prescribed by law. The several methods may
be classified as direct, when the taxes are demanded from the par
ties taxed in person, or enforced against the property on which they
are laid ; and indirect when, for convenience, they are collected of
others than the persons upon whom the burden is in the end to
rest A^l such taxation as comes in this second class, seems
to require no special mention. But provision is sometimes
made by law under which other taxes are, for the convenience of
the government, indirectly collected. A government which taxes
l''Le«y,u as applied to a tax, "imports the ascertainment of the amount to
be raised, and the performance of such acts as would authorize the tax col
lector to proceed to collect." Handy, J., in Moore v. Foote, 32 Miss., 469, 479.
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the salaries of its officers might be its own collector ; first deduct
ing the tax and then paying over the remainder ; and the like
might be provided for in any case where moneys were to be paid
over by the government itself.1 So a convenient method of col
lecting taxes on the dividends or other receipts of shareholders
from the profits of corporations, or on payments to creditors, may
be to make the corporation itself the collector, and require it to
deduct the tax, and pay it to the government before paying over
to the parties thus taxed.2
The methods of collecting taxes which have been provided for
under various statutes are : 8
1. By suit
2. By the arrest of the person taxed.
3. By distress of goods and chattels.
4. By taking possession of goods and chattels and retaining
them until the taxes are paid, or selling them for the payment
5. By the sale of lands.
6. By imposing penalties for nonpayment
7. By forfeiting to the government the property upon or in
respect to which the tax is payable.
8. By making the payment a condition to the exercise of some
lawful right
8So a court, where a fund is in its charge, may order the taxes paid out of
it before the fund is paid over.
8Maltby v. Reading R. R. Co., 52 Penn. St., 140; Haight e. Railroad Co.,
6 Wall., 15 ; National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 id., 353 ; United States e.
Railroad Co., 17 id., 322; Minot v. Railroad Co., 18 id.. 206, 230.
*An important principle of the common law may also be called an assis
tant in the collection of taxes. It is this: That all contracts and arrange-
ments made for the defeat or evasion of the revenue laws of a country arc
illegal, and the courts will give the parties no remedy in respect to them.
Clugas v. Penaluna, 4 T. R., 466; Waymell v. Reed, 5 id., 599; Cope v. Row
lands, 2 M. A W., 149; Smith v. Mawhood, 14 id., 452; Favor v. Philbrick, 7
N. H., 326, 340; Harris v. Runnels, 12 How., 79. See, also, Bancroft v. Dumas,
21 Vt., 456; Alexander v. O'Donnell, 12 Kan., 608; Howard v. First Inde-
pendent Church, 18 Md., 451. It is necessary, perhaps, that both parties
should have knowledge of the intent to violate the law; for if one be inno
cent there is no reason why the guilty intent of the other shall cause him to
suffer. See Briggs v. Lawrence, 3 T. R., 454; Lightfoot v. Tenant, 1 B. & P.,
551, 556; Clugas v. Penaluna, 4 T. R., 466; Kreiss v. Scligman, 8 Barb., 439;
Ritchie v. Smith, 6 M., G. & Scott, 462; Pellecat v. Angell, 2 Cromp. M. & R.,
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These will be briefly considered in their order.1
1. Collection by suit. It has been shown that taxes are not
debts in the ordinary acceptation of that term, and that the
statutory measures are to be resorted to for their collection.
Generally no others are admissible.2 But the remedy by suit
may be given by statute either directly or by implication. If
no specific remedy is expressly given, or only an imperfect or in
adequate one, the presumption that a remedy by suit was in
tended is but reasonable.8 Nothing need be said regarding
the proceedings in such suits beyond this : that they would take
the ordinary course prescribed by law for the collection of money
demands, except as the statute may have otherwise provided.4
311; Foster v. Thurston, 11 Cush., 322; Webster v. Munger, 8 Gray, 584;
Cambioso v. Maffltt, 2 Wash. C C, 98; Armstrong e. Toler, 11 Wheat., 258.
The principle does not apply to contracts made in evasion of the laws of a
foreign country, but it does apply to all contracts made abroad to be per-
formed here. See cases above cited. Also Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp., 341.
And compare Dater e. Earl, 3 Gray, 482, with Cambioso v. Maffitt, 2 Wash. C
C, 98.
1 Farming out the revenue for collection, has been a favorite method in some
countries. It consists in putting the collection into the hands of contractors,
who are to return to the treasury a certain net result, having the remainder
for their own compensation. Such a system, by making it the personal inter
est of those who are to administer the tax laws to render them as productive
as possible, might increase the public revenues both by inducing a more vigil-
ant search for subjects of taxation, and by ensuring more strict enforcement
of collections; and Bentham has defended it on these grounds. Works,
Edinb. ed., Vol. 2, p. 241-251. But it is so much liable t» abuse and oppres
sion as to bo generally condemned. Before the Revolution in France it was
estimated that of the taxes extorted from the people, not more than one fifth
was paid into the public treasury! The farming of the revenue would not
be eveu proposed in America; much less tolerated.
1 Ante, page 13. It is no defense to a suit to coHect a tax that the relative
valuations between individuals are unequal. "If an assessment can be set
aside and the right to collect taxes defeated by proof of this kind, there never
was and there never will be a valid assessment in the state, for it is impossible
to find two persons who will concur in all respects in their estimate of a par.
ticular piece of property, and of its value compared to another piece." Rich-
ird3on, J., in Potosi v. Casey, 27 Mo., 372, 373. A fraud in the valuation,
may, however, constitute a defense. State v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 7 Nev.,
99; Western R. R. Co. v. Nolan, 48 N. Y., 513.
»Dillon Man. Corp., § 653. See Territory e. Reyburn, McCahon, 134; State
e. Williams, 8 Texas, 384; Houston, etc., R. R. Co. v. State, 39 id, 148.
4Where action is given for taxes, interest is not recoverable, unless the statute
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2. By the arrest of the person taxed. "We refer here to arrest
as the ordinary proceeding, and not in the course of prosecution
for a penalty or forfeiture. The early state laws authorized pro
cess against the body of the person taxed, as an ordinary process
for all personal taxes.1 They have generally been repealed. It
is only needful to say of such proceedings, that the officer must
be sure of his process and follow its command. What is
said under the next subdivision regarding process is applicable
here.
3. By distress. To authorize distress, the collector must have
gives it. Danforth v. Williams, 9 Mass., '324. Tax assessed against a person
by name after his death. This is no debt against the administrator on which
suit can be brought. The assessment should have been against the heirs or
whoever else was in possession. Cook e. Leland, 5 Pick., 236. The statute
gave a suit for taxes against anyone who should remove out of the precinct after
assessment. This applied to the case of one who left, but with the intention
of returning after six months. Houghton v. Davenport, 23 Pick., 235. Where
by statute the personalty of an estate was to be assessed to the executor or
administrator, if it is taxed to " the estate " of the deceased, a suit will not
lie against the administrator for the tax. Wood e. Torrey, 97 Mass., 321.
One cannot be made liable for a tax assessed after he has removed from the
municipality, even though the vote granting the money was had while he was
a resident. Wade v. First Parish, 8 Cush., 267. A collector who pays over a
tax without having collected it
,
may recover by suit of the taxpayer. Mc-
Cracken v. Elder, 34 Penn. St., 239. Compare Wallace's Estate, 59 id.,
401. That taxes must be demanded before suit can be brought, see Thompson
e. Gardner, 10 Johns., 404; St. Anthony, etc., Co. v. Greely, II Minn., 321, 325.
It may be otherwise under a statute of Arkansas. Kinsworthy v. Mitchell,
21 Ark., 145; Garbaldi v. Jenkins, 27 id., 456. The words "ordinary process
of law," in the Missouri tax laws, do not mean an ordinary judgment and ex
ecution, but such proc2Ss as is adapted to enforce a lien or specific charge
upon the property assessed. Neenan v. Strith, 50 Mo., 525. Contractors for
municipal improvements are under some statutes allowed to bring suit in
their own names for the collection of the assessments made to cover the cost
of such improvements. The case last cited was one of this kind.
1 Arrest is allowed usually only after a failure to find property. Lothrop v.
Ide, 13 Gray, 93; Halle. Hall, 3 Allen, 5. Arrest after return day sustained,
liassett v. Porter, 4 Cush., 487. As to relief from arrest, see Aldrich v. Aldrich,
8 Met., 102. It is competent to provide for enforcing license taxes, by impris
onment of the delinquent. Commonwealth e. Ityrne, 20 Grat., 165 (citing
Barrett «. Porter, 4 Cush., 487; Daggett v. Everett, 19 Me., 373; Rising v.
Granger, 1 Mass., 47 ; Appleton v. Hopkins, 5 Gray, 530 ; Kingman v. Glover,
8 Rich., 27). And see post. Chapter XIX
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the proper legal warrant1 Of this, sufficient has been said in the
preceding chapter.
Collection by distress has been objected to, as a process which
condemned the party before he had been heard, and proceeded
to execution without trial. In a very important sense, the
objection states the case with accuracy. The process, in the
nature of an execution, does issue, at least under some tax laws,
before the liability of the party has been finally and conclusively
determined. But, as has already been said, this does not deprive
a party aggrieved of his remedy. It only makes his remedy
wait the superior urgency of government necessities. It has
been well said of collection by distress : " This method of col
lecting taxes is as well established by custom and usage as any
principle of the common law. A similar practice prevailed in
all the colonies from the first dawn of their existence ; it has
been continued by all the states since their independence, and
had existed in England from time immemorial. Indeed, it is
necessary to the existence of every government, and is based
upon the principle of self preservation. * * * I think, there
fore, that any legal process that was founded on necessity, has
been consecrated by time, and approved and acquiesced in by
universal consent, must be an exception to the right of trial by
jury, and is embraced in the alternative — the law of the land.
Such I consider to be the summary proceedings allowed in the
collection of taxes."2 No judge, and no writer ever presented
the point with more terseness, more precision or more accuracy.
But it has sometimes been deemed necessary, after giving the
ordinary remedy by distress, to go further. That remedy will
not justify any invasion of the rights or any interference with the
property of others than the very persons upon whom the tax is
imposed. If the property of another is distrained, the officer may
be sued in trespass, or the property may be taken from him on
writ of replevin.8 Under pretense of this right, it has been found
1A municipal corporation cannot provide for such a warrant by ordinance,
without statutory authority for the purpose. Bergen v. Clarkson, 6 N. J., 352.
»Nolt, J., in State v. Allen, 2 McCord, 55, 60. See also Harris v. Wood, 6
T. B. Monr., 641, 643; McCarrol v. Weeks, 5 Hayw., 246; Willis v. Wetherbee,
4 N. H. 118; New Orleans v. Cannon, 10 La. An., 764.
8A chattel belonging to A. cannot be taken for a tax against B., even
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possible seriously to embarrass the officer in the performance of
his duties, by means of unfounded claims, or those the officer
believes to be such. To preclude this, statutes have, in some
cases, been passed, taking away the ordinary remedies against the
collector, and leaving the claimant to some other remedy. Some
of these statutes, which merely prohibit replevin being brought
against the officer, are referred to elsewhere. The New York
revised statutes authorized the collector to seize and sell not only
goods and chattels of the party taxed, but any goods and chattels
in his possession, and declared that "no claim of property made
by any other person shall be available to prevent a sale." This
statute was enforced without question of its validity.1 A similar
statute in Michigan was strongly contested as not being due
process of law, and was upheld by a divided court2 In Pennsyl
vania a statute has been enforced which empowered the collector
to distrain the property of an occupier of land wherever found,
for the satisfaction of a tax assessed in respect to the land against
the owner.8 So it has been held competent by law to make a
purchaser of land, who enters into possession, chargeable per
sonally with the tax previously assessed.* These are illustrations
of the stringent rules which are sometimes applied in cases of
taxation.
though it formerly belonged to B., and is still in his possession. Daniels v.
Nelson, 41 Vt., 161.
1Sheldon v. Van Buskirk, 2 N. Y., 473. No point was made of the consti
tutional competency of such legislation.
8Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich., 251.
8McGregor v. Montgomery, 4 Penn. St., 237. The warrant is no lien upon
personalty until actual seizure. Moore v. Marsh, C0 Penn. St., 46.
4Henry v. Horstick, 9 Watts, 412. See also Smeich v. York County, 68 Penn.
St., 439. But an express statute would be requisite to create such a liability.
Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cleino, 2 Dillon, 175. Where property, after aliena-
nation is allowed by the vendor to remain on the tax books of the county, and
he fails to avail himself of the means provided by law to have the assessment
corrected, he is liable for such taxes, and they may be recovered by suit.
County Commissioners v. Clagett, 31 Md., 210. Where, on a tax warrant issued
by assessors having jurisdiction, and fair on its face, bank shares we sold, the
cashier of the bank is justified in issuing new certificates to the purchaser,
who, thereby, becomes entitled to the dividends, whether the tax was rightfully
assessed or not. Smith e. Northhampton Bank, 4 Cush., 1.
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It is very proper that a demand of the tax should be made a
prerequisite to the levy by distress ; 1 and it is not often that stat
utes are passed which are so little regardful of the rights of the
citizen, as to authorize distress without the persons taxed being
at least called upon, and given the opportunity to pay without the
expense and annoyance of a levy. A requirement by statute of
demand or personal notification is imperative, and distress with
out it would be illegal.2 Statutes regarding notice, and limiting
the time within which sale of the distrained property shall be
made, are also imperative, and the officer becomes a trespasser ab
initio, if he proceeds to a sale in disregard of them.8
1Such a demand is not essential before levy of distress unless the statute
requires it. Ives v. Lynn, 7 Conn., 504.
»Cones v. Wilson, 14 Ind., 465, 466. The collector's authority must bo
strictly pursued. Bishop v. Lovan, 4 B. Monr., 116. Where the sheriff
'was to distrain for taxes, if on presenting an account of the taxes and offering
a receipt they were not paid, a distress without these was illegal. Hoozer v.
Buckner, 11 B. Monr., 183, 184. See to the same point Johnson e. Mc1ntire, 1
Bibb, 295; Atkinson v. Amick, 25 Mo., 404; Thompson v. Rogers, 4 La., 9;
Burd v. Ramsey, 9 S. & R., 109; St. Anthony, etc., Co. v. Greely, 11 Minn.,
321 ; Bonnell v. Roane, 20 Ark., 114; Moultou v. Blaisdell, 24 Me., 283; Ives v.
Lynn, 7 Conn., 504; Harrington v. Worcester, 6 Allen, 576. A demand at the
last and usual place of abode of a nonresident in the t«wn, if he has no agent
there, is sufficient to justify a subsequent seizure and sale of his goods under
the statute which requires that "the collector shall, before distraining the
goods of any person for his tax, demand payment thereof of such person, if
to be found within his precinct." King «. Whitcomb, 1 Met., 328. Where
the law required supervisors, before issuing duplicate and warrant for the col
lection of road taxes, to give notice to all persons rated for such taxes, by
advertisement or otherwise, to attend at such times and places as such super-
visors may direct, so as to give such persons full opportunity to work out
their respective taxes; held to be mandatory and a condition precedent. Mil
ler e. Gorman, 38 Penn. St., 309.
8The statute required property seized for taxes to be sold within four days
Keeping it longer held to make the officer a trespasser ab initio. Brackett v
Vining, 49 Me., 356. Sale void which is made after the time thus limited.
Pierce e. Benjamin, 14 Pick., 356; Xoyes e. Haverhill, 11 Cush., 338. As to
defects in a notice of sale that do not avoid it
,
see Barnard v. Graves, 13 Met.,
85 ; Scott v. Watkins, 22 Ark., 556. Where the statute provides for notict, the
party cannot be in default until he has received it. Smith v. State, 43 Ala.,
344. A premature levy by a collector without sufficient cause, renders him
liable in trespass. Vcit v. Graff, 37 Ind., 53. Where the collector is required
to appoint a time and place to receive payment of the tax, if the tax payer
when called upon expresses a purpose not to pay at all, the collector need not
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4. By the detention of goods and chattels. We refer here,
not to the proceedings in which goods are distrained or seized for
forfeitures or penalties, but to those under which goods, in respect
to which the tax is demanded, are required to pass through the
hands of government officers, who are to exact the tax before the
owner or consignee is entitled to their custody. Cases of this na
ture arise under the laws for the collection of customs duties, but
do not require special mention.
5. By sale of lands. Taxes are not commonly a lien upon
lands, unless made so by express legislative authority.1 It is com
petent by legislation to declare that they shall constitute a lien,
and as such take precedence of all other liens and claims what
ever.2 And where the tax is assessed upon the land itself — not
upon any particular interest in it— and when all the legal reme
dies, if any, for collection of the tax without resort to the land are
exhausted, leaving the land liable to sale, the assessment acquires
the full force of a lien, overriding all other claims,8 since a sale
name time and place for the purpose, but may levy at once. Downer e. Wood
bury, 19 Vt, 329; Wheelock e. Archer, 26 id., 380; Hurlburt v. Green, 42 id.,
316. In Vermont it is decided that provisions in a statute requiring the col
lector to keep a distress four days before advertising, and to advertise six days,
do not restrict him to this exact time, though he may not sell in less. Clem-
ous v. Lewis, 36 Vt., 673. That a levy on personalty is prima fa«ie a satisfac
tion of a tax, see HeDry v. Gregory, 29 Mich., 68. In Indiana there seems
to be a lien for taxes on personalty from the time when the duplicate comes
to the collector's hands. Barber v. Morton, 19 Ind., 146. And this would not
be divested in favor of an execution subsequently issued. Evans v. Bradford,
35 Ind., 527; McNeil e. Farneman, 37 id., 203.
1Hine v. Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall., 655. In Kansas under the ordin
ary tax warrant, lands cannot be sold. Kirkwood v. Magill, 6 Kansas, 540.
That is the general rule throughout the country.
sWallace's Estate, 59 Penn. St., 401, 404; Durgan's Appeal, 68 id., 204. A
provision that a tax shall be preferred to all judgments, executions, incum
brances and liens of any description whatsoever, and shall be a lien on the
real estate, does not make it a lien on the personal estate also. Anderson v.
State, 23 Miss., 459 ; Bailey v. Fuqua, 24 id., 497. In Indiana, lands are liable
for the poll tax, and tax on personal property assessed against the owner, not
withstanding his title is afterwards extinguished by the foreclosure of a mort
gage of older date than his purchase. Isaac v. Decker, 41 Ind., 410.
8See Hutchins v. Moody, 30 Vt., 655 ; Same v. Same, 34 id.. 433 ; Post v. Lect,
8 Paige, 337 ; Kern e. Towsley, 45 Barb, 150 ; Dowdney v. New York, 54 N. Y.,
186 ; Cochran v. Guild, 106 Mass , 29. Compare Holmes v. Taber, 9 Allen, 246.
20
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of the lands, unless the tax is voluntarily paid, must take place in
the ordinary course of law, and extinguish other liens and incum
brances.1 A change in the ownership would not affect such a
lien, the law taking no notice of such change.2 Where, as is
often the case with the lien for special assessments, provision is
made for its enforcement by judicial proceedings, mere delay in
taking steps for the purpose will not extinguish it.8 Sometimes
by statute a particular day is named, from which a tax shall be
deemed a lien upon lands, and this, it is held, will determine, as
between vendor and vendee, which should pay the tax in the
absence of any stipulation on the subject4
In California a lien for taxes relates to the time of the assessment. Reeve v.
Kennedy, 43 Cal., 643.
1Parker v. Baxter, 2 Gray, 185. See Dale v. McEvers, 2 Cow., 118; Bris
coe A. Coulter, 18 Ark., 423. Where separate interests are taxed, previous
liens would not he reached by the tax unless the statute should so declare.
See Appeal of Pittsburgh, 40 Penn. St., 455; Alleghany City's Appeal, 41 id.,
60 ; Cadmus v. Jackson, 52 id., 295.
sOldham e. Jones, 5 B. Monr., 458, 465 ; Covington v. Boyle, 6 Bush, 204.
8Swan v. Knoxville, 11 Humph., 130, 132. An act of congress made a tax
a lien on land for two years. Held that this did not preclude the land being
sold for the tax after the two years had expired, the title not having changed.
Holden v. Eaton, 7 Pick., 15. Where by law taxes are a lien on land, but sub
ject to be divested by a subsequent judicial sale, except as to any sum which the
proceeds of the sale should be insufficient to pay, a sale sufficient prima facie
to pay all taxes, and the bringing the money into court, divests the tax lien,
though the money is not applied to the satisfaction of the taxes. Smith v.
Simpson, 60 Penn. St., 168. A personal action brought for a tax does not divest
the lien. Eschbach e. Pitts, 6 Md., 71. If a time is limited by statute for
proceedings to enforce a lien, it is sufficient if they are begun within the time,
and they may proceed to judgment afterwards. Randolph v. Bayne, 44 Cal.,
366 ; Dougherty v. Henarie, 47 id., 9 ; Himmelman v. Carpenter, 47 id., 42.
That a statute giving a lien is to be strictly construed, see Creighton «. Manson,
27 id.,«13.
4Harrington e. Hilliard, 27 Mich., 271. See Rundell v. Lakey, 40 N. Y.,
513; Gromley's Appeal, 27 Penn. St., 49; Densmore v. Haggarty, 59 id., 189.
As to the liability as between tenant for life, and remainder man, see Plymp-
ton v. Boston Dispensary, 106 Mass., 544.
The following are decisions as to the liability to taxes under special agree
ments : A clause in a mortgage that the mortgage moneys should be paid
" without any deduction, defalcation or abatement to be made of any thing
for or in respect to any taxes," held to refer to taxes on the land and not on
mortgage security. Clopton v. Phila., etc., R. R. Co., 54 Penn. St., 356. A
covenant to pay " all assessments for which the premises shall be liable," will
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Municipal corporations, of course, have no authority to create
liens, by ordinance or otherwise, when none has been expressly
conferred upon them.1
Return of "No Goods," etc. Where a tax against lands is
assessed to a resident, and is a personal charge against him, the
statutes, with almost unvarying uniformity, have made the per
sonal property of the person taxed the primary fund for the pay
ment, and have given a remedy for enforcing payment from it.
Until that remedy has been exhausted, no authority exists to go
further. It is also customary to allow a certain time after the
levy of a tax on nonresident or unseated lands, before any pro
ceedings are taken against the land. To authorize further pro
ceedings in either case, there must be the proper official evidence
that in the one case the remedy against the personalty is exhausted,
and in both that the taxes are still unpaid.2 This evidence will
consist of such official return, affidavit, or other document by the
collector, as the statute may indicate. This document will be
void if made prematurely ; 8 and it will be void, also, if it fails to
embrace an assessment only authorized by a law passed after the covenant.
Post e. Kearney, 2 N. Y., 394. One who conveys by warranty after an assess
ment is completed, is liable on his covenant for a tax laid in pursuance of this
assessment. Held, therefore, the vendee who had paid it might recover the
amount of the vendor'on an agreement of the latter to repay " in case he was
legally liable to pay it." Rundell v. Lakey, 40 N. Y., 513.
1Philadelphia v. Greble, 38 Penn. St., 339. As to what will give the power,
see Eschbach v. Pitts, 6 Md., 71. The lien cannot exist where the statutory
steps have not been taken, and a simple allegation in a proceeding to enforce
a lien that the taxes are due and unpaid, is not sufficient to show a lien. Lou
isville v. Bank of Kentucky, 3 Met., Ky., 148. As to the liability of land for
personal assessments in Indiana, see Bodertha e. Spencer, 40 Ind., 353.
•See Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat., 119; Jones v. McLain, 23 Ark., 429;
Scales v. Alvis, 12 Ala., 617; Francis v. Russell, 5 Hayw., 294; Schseffer v.
People, 60 11l., 179; St. Anthony, etc., Co. v. Greely, 11 Minn., 321; Kelley v.
Craig, 5 Ired., 129; Harrington v. Worcester, 6 Allen, 576; Huntington v.
Brantley, 33 Miss., 451; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 Hill, 92; Ring v. Ewing, 47 Ind.,
246. No title can be made to lands on a sale for taxes if personalty is not
sought for. Catterlin e. Douglass, 17 Ind., 213.
8Ronkendorff v. Taylor's Lessee, 4 Pet., 349. Where the law gave a non
resident owner nine months to pay taxes in, before they were to be returned
by the collector as delinquent, a return one day before the nine months were
fully completed, was held to make void the proceedings. Flint v. Sawyer, 30
Me., 226. A similar ruling was made in Hobbs v. Clements, 32 id., 67. A
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set forth all the facts that the statute requires shall be shown by
it. If the collector is required to demand the tax, his return, it
would seem, should show that he has done so ; if he is required
to make collection by distress and sale of goods, if any can be
found to levy upon, there should be such a showing of diligent
search for goods, and failure to find them, as would be required
of officers to whom executions are committed for service. In
other words, the return should show full and complete compli
ance with all the conditions which, under the statute, are to pre
cede a resort to the land.1 Such is unquestionably the general
rule ; 2 though doubtless if the statute should prescribe the form
of a return, it would be sufficient for the officer to follow that8
But the decisions are justly very rigid in requiring conformity to
the statute in the substantial matters of the return.4 The return,
if in conformity to the law, is not only a support to subsequent
proceedings, but is evidence, also, in favor of the officer himself.5
sale of land is not to be made where the taxpayer is not in default. There
fore, if he tenders the tax, his land is not subject to sale, even though at the
time, the collection of the tax is enjoined in a suit to which the taxpayer is
not a party. Jones e. Burford, 26 Miss., 194. For a decision that, under the
statute in question, resort might be had, either to the land or to chattels, see
Den e. Carron, 26 N. J., 228.
1A recital in a collector's return that, " not knowing of any goods or chat
tels, etc.," is not equivalent to a return that none could be found. Jones v.
McLain, 23 Ark., 429. But it is sufficient to throw the burden of proof on the
taxpayer, to show that there was enough of personalty to satisfy the tax.
sWhere the statute provided that "when the delinquent has no goods an«i
chattels within the county, then the lands and tenements of said delinquent
may be sold," etc., held, that if the delinquent were shown to have such goods
and chattels it was fatal to a sale of the lands. The delinquent's knowl
edge of the sale, and assent to it do not bind him. Scales e. Alvis, 12 Ala.,
617 ; citing Jackson e. Sheppard, 7 Cow., 88.
8Such has been the ruling of the supreme court of 11linois. Taylor v. Peo
ple, 2 Gilm., 349 ; Job e. Tibbetts, 5 id., 376, 382. Judge Pope, the federal
district judge, held otherwise. Mayhew e. Davis, 4 McLean, 213.
* See Harmon e. Stockwell, 9 Ohio, 93 ; Harrington v. Worcester, 6 Allen,
576; Sharp e. Johnson, 4 Hill, 92; Spellman e. Curttnins, 12 11l., 409; Homer
v. Cilley, 14 N. H., 85; Hannell v. Smith, 15 Ohio, 134; Tallman v. White, 2
N. Y.. 66. A return not made in the time prescribed by statute, held not to
support subsequent proceedings to forfeit the land. Hopkins e. Sandidge, 31
Miss., 668, 676.
8Bruce v. Holden, 21 Pick., 187 ; Brainerd v. Graves, 13 Met., 85. See cases
cited, ante, p. 185, 186.
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Under some tax laws the same officer who collects the taxes is
empowered to make sale of the lands of delinquents. In such
cases no return is required, though the filing of some official doc
ument showing the delinquency is sometimes provided for.
Such a document takes the place of a collector's return, and will
be governed by the rules above laid down. If none is required
by law, the collector is allowed to proceed and sell lands on his
own knowledge of the delinquency. How far his proceedings
will be open to question afterwards, must depend, to some extent
at least, on the force given by statute to such report or certificate
of sale as he is subsequently required to make, or to the official
conveyance.
The proceedings in making sale of lands for taxes, the privilege
of redemption, and the conveyance when redemption is not made,
require, and will receive, separate consideration.
6. By the imposition of penalties. In tax laws penalties are
imposed for mere delinquencies, in order to hasten payment, and
they are also imposed as a punishment for frauds, evasions, and
neglect of duty. In some cases, also, special inducements are
held out to prompt performance of duty, by making deductions
in case of early payment.1
Great use is made of penalties in the federal tax laws, especially
under the internal revenue laws, and the laws for the collection
of customs duties. The justification for this is the supposed
necessity of the case, and the absolute impossibility of securing a
collection of the revenues without resort to these extreme meas
ures.2
1Sprague v. Bailey, 19 Pick., 436.
»A charge by District Judge Benedict, of the southern district of New
York, to the grand jury, and given in an appendix to 6 Blatchford's Reports,
is deserving of being copied here, for the reasons it gives for stringent meas
ures in revenue cases:
" The war, which decided the question whether a government framed like
ours had the ability to quell by force of arms a great rebellion, raised another
question, which is now in process of solution, namely, whether such a gov
ernment can surely provide for the payment of the interest upon a great debt.
The interest upon the public debt must be obtained by taxation, and this tax
ation, under the most favorable circumstances, must be heavy. It will become
odious and intolerable, if it is to be borne by the honest and well disposed
classes alone, and avoided by those willing to grow rich at the expense of
their fellow citizens, through fraudulent evasions of the law. This latter
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In some cases they are imposed by the taxing officers, in others
they are recovered by suit, or indictment. Under the state laws
class, numerous and powerful, both socially and politically, has, from the
beginning, confronted the government in its efforts to collect the revenue.
At first, the government attempted to compel their obedience by seizure of
their property, and large quantities of merchandise detected in the act of
escaping taxation was forfeited and sold. But the attempt was a failure; the
frauds increased both in number and in magnitude, and the government was
compelled to turn to its last resort — the criminal jurisdiction of its courts.
It is now, therefore, here and elsewhere, engaged in the effort to check these
frauds by means of criminal prosecutions — the indictment, trial, conviction
and imprisonment of defrauders of the revenue. Inasmuch then, as no man
can be tried until accused by a grand jury, the government and the com
munity, of which the government is but the representative, now turns to the
grand juries of the land, and asks the indictment of every man, whether high
or low, rich or poor, who is found to be engaged in fraudulent evasions of
legal taxes. Time would fail me to describe to you the various forms which
these frauds assume ; but it is my duty to put you in possession of what I
have understood to be the facts in regard to some transactions which must
come before you, and to allude in general terms to others which your own
inquiries will expose.
" I begin with what have been designated the drawback cases. These cases
have been the subject of examination in the adjoining district, aDd are trans
ferred to this district because most of the transactions took place here. They
are frauds perpetrated under cover of the provisions of law which enable a
person who has paid taxes upon manufactures which he afterwards exports,
to receive back the taxes which he has paid, upon proving actual exportation of
the goods. To obtain this drawback, a set of papers is necessary in every
case, consisting first of an internal revenue collector's certificate, that the tax
on the goods has been paid ; second, a certificate of the collector of customs,
that such goods appear on a ship's manifest, on file in the custom house, as
actually exported; third, an affidavit by the shipper as to the identity of the
goods upon the manifest and the goods upon the tax receipt; fourth, a certifl
cate of an internal revenue collector, that a proper bond to secure the govern
ment against any relanding of the goods has been filed with him. These
pagers must be certified to at the custom house, and then go to the department
at Washington, to be examined there. If found correct, a check for the
amount of tax, drawn to the order of the shipper, upon the treasury, is re
turned. Numerous sets of such papers, representing sums of from $300 to
$7,000 each, all false, no such goods having been exported, there being no
Buch shipper, and no such manifest on file, the bonds being fraudulent,
the signatures forgeries, and the affidavits perjuries, have, within a space of
six months time, passed through the custom house here and been certified ;
have then passed through the department at Washington and been there ap
proved, and corresponding checks have been drawn and paid, every one, or
nearly every one, upon a forged indorsement, until the total probably exceeds
the sum of $700,000. The fraud, which I am thus enabled to describe because
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they are not so common. Where lists or statements are required
to be furnished as a basis for taxation, the privilege of being
it has already been the subject of examination in the adjoining district, is not
disputed, and the money is gone. It will be your duty to say who shall bo
accused before this court as criminally responsible for the transaction. Some
of the parties supposed to have been engaged in this affair are already under
bail. One has been brought from Florida; for the arm of the government is
long. Others have escaped beyond the seas. It will be your duty, however,
to indict all who appear to have been connected in the design, whether
present or absent. In your examination of this case, you will have occasion
to see with what looseness the public business is sometimes conducted, for it
will appear that great numbers of bonds required by law have been accepted
as good, without any identification of signatures or of persons, and without
any inquiry as to the sufficiency or even existence of the sureties, the greater
part being, in fact, executed in fictitious names, or by persons entirely worth
less. It will also appear that the genuine seal of an internal revenue collector
can constantly appear upon certificates now claimed to be forged, and that
part of the files of the collector's office, being bonds required by law, can be
removed and taken to a neighboring city by persons having no connection
whatever with the government, there to be dealt with as unknown parties may
desire, and then be returned without objection or remark. I have explained
the features of this case to you fully, because you will be called on to act in re
gard to it
,
and not because it is to any very great extent exceptional.
" If you extend your inquiries into other departments of the custom house,
you will find that similar frauds have been there committed. You will find
that in the warehouse department, it has been possible for certain parties to
withdraw dutiable goods without payment of any duty, until the loss from a
single warehouse has equalled $400,000, according to the estimate of an of
ficial. The parties who committed this fraud walk the streets to-day, well
known, but unprosecuted and unpunished, unless the repayment of a part of
their great gains is to be called punishment. Nor is the case to which I am
now alluding, and which you will find fully disclosed upon the files of this
court, the only one of this class which has occurred, and with a similar re
sult, if I am correctly informed. You may think proper to inquire into them
all. Frauds like these are, of course, not to be accomplished without conniv
ance on the part of officials ; and you will have occasion, no doubt, to con
sider what persons shall be accused before this court, forgiving or accepting
bribes.
" There is also an abuse at the custom house, proper to be spoken of in this
connection, which I notice, by the public prints, is now attracting some atten
tion, and of the evil effects of which the drawback cases will give you pain
ful proof. I refer to the custom of giving and taking gratuities for the per-
formancc of official duties. Strengthen the hands of the collector, gentlemen,
in any effort to stop this steady flow. The law lies at your hands, and it reads
thus (Act of March 3
,
1863, § 4
,
12 U. S. Stat, at Large, 793):
' If any officer
of the revenue * * * shall knowingly accept, from any person engaged
in the importation of goods, wares or merchandise into the United States, or
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heard in abatement of the tax is sometimes taken away as a pen
alty upon the tax payer for not furnishing it. Perhaps it would
interested, as principal clerk or agent, in any such Importation or in the en
try of any goods, wares, or merchandise, any fee, gratuity or emolument
whatever, such officer shall, on conviction thereof, be removed from office and
shall he fined in any sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, or be impris
oned not exceeding two years at the discretion of the court.' The 6th sec
tion of the same act is as follows: 'If any person who shall be engaged in
the importation of goods, wares or merchandise, into the United States, or
shall be interested, as principal, clerk or agent, in the entry of any goods,
wares or merchandise, shalljat any time make, or offer to make, to any officer
of the revenue any gratuity or present of any money or other thing of value,
such person shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not exceeding
five thousand dollars, or be imprisoned not exceeding two years, at the dis
cretion of the court.'
" The market price of whisky is still less than the first cost of manufacture,
with taxes added. From the tobacco trade, honest dealers are fast being
driven out. Much of the income tax remains uncollected. The fraudulent
bond-maker still plies his busy trade. Men known to have grown rich by il
legal means have escaped even the accusation of fraud, and flaunt their wealth
before the public eye. Honest officials have been compelled to leave the ser
vice for want of due support in the performance of their duty, while other
officers of the revenue who have remained and dared to endeavor to protect
the government have found the very government they sought to serve turned
against them and used with effect to accomplish their destruction and dis
grace. Iu view of a demoralization such as these facts disclose, do you won
der that some men query whether the proper enforcement of revenue laws is
possible for such a government as ours, with such a civil service as it has
hitherto had » These remarks will have failed of their intended effect, if they
have not served to deepen your sense of the responsibility.which rests on you,
and to strengthen your determination to discharge yourselves of that responsi
bility in such a manner as to satisfy the proper demands of the community
in which you live. To enable you to do this, great powers are given you.
No matter within the jurisdiction of the court is exempt from your scrutiny.
No man, of whatever degree, can refuse to obey your summons or decline to
answer your proper interrogatories. No compromise of a department can
have effect to stay your hand. Within your extended sphere you are supreme.
Use, then, these great powers freely, examine diligently and inquire widely,
but accuse with all due care, mindful always, that the mere examination of a
transaction iu open court, is often of great public benefit, but, also, mindful
that such an examination is often, of itself, a great punishment It is not
your province to try the cases which you may consider. That duty devolves
upon the petit jury and the court; but you are diligently to inquire and true
presentment make of every offense arising under the laws of the United
States which shall be made to appear by reasonable prima fa«ie proof. This
duty I charge you to perform, and if to its performance you shall bring that
patience, that intelligence and that good courage which the occasion demands,
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be more proper to say that his right to be heard is made to de
pend upon this, not unreasonable condition.1 A more common
provision is one that adds a penalty to the assessed taxes for neg
lect to pay them in due season.
There are some cases in which the right to impose any penalty
except on a judicial investigation by a competent court has been
denied, as being the imposition of punishment without a trial.5
you will render an important service to your fellow citizens, as well as to the
government which protects you and under which it is your good fortune to
live."
1See Winnisimmet Co. v. Chelsea, 6 Cush., 477; Otis Co. v. Ware, 8 Gray,
509; Lincoln v. Worcester, 8 Cush., 55; Porter v. County Commissioners, 5
Gray, 365; L )tt v. Hubbard, 44 Ala., 593: State e. Apgar, 31 N. J., 358; Young
e. Parker, 33 id., 192. Compare McCormick v. Fitch, 14 Minn., 252.
* In Scammon v. Chicago, 44 111, 269, 278, the court held a provision of a
statute imposing a penalty of five per centum for delay in making payment
of an assessment beyond a certain day to be void. On application for a re
hearing on this point, the following opinion was given by Breese,J.: "On
this application for a rehearing, we are referred to the case of Bristol v. The
City of Chicago, 22 11l., 587, as controlling the question of imposing five per
cent, on the amount of taxes not paid on or before the 1st day of January in
each year. In that case the law authorized the collection of ten per cent, on
the amount of the special assessment, in case the owner refused to pay it be
fore the collector filed the delinquent list, on an application for an order of
sale, as additional costs. That the legislature may provide for the recovery
of reasonable costs, either by a percentage on the amount of the recovery, or
by fixing specific sums in a bill of items, there can be no doubt. In that case
the law was sustained, as it gave that per cent, as additional cost, which was
manifestly designed to cover the expense of making and advertising the de
linquent list, together with other expenses and outlays incurred by the appli
cation.
"The per cent, imposed in that case was upon a special assessment levied
for the improvement of a wharf in the city. In such cases, after the levy has
been made, labor is performed and expenses incurred by the city in com
pleting the improvement, on the faith of the collection of the assessment to
meet the outlay ; and it is therefore but reasonable, that the person failing or
refusing to pay his assessment, should contribute to the payment of interest
which may have accumulated, by delay in paying for labor and material pro
cured by the city for the construction of the improvement. One of the ob
jects in giving costs is to cover expenses incurred in prosecuting a suit for
the recovery of the demand. Hence it is reasonable that the delinquent tax
payer should in some mode be required to meet the.expense incurred in prose
cuting a suit for the recovery of the amount which remains delinquent, and
the same is equally true of unpaid special assessments.
" That the legislature may authorize the court to impose and render a judg
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But when the penalty is imposed in the course of the proceed
ings to assess, and by officers who, for that purpose, exercise a
quasi judicial authority, and where the party is given the oppor
tunity to be heard and to contest his delinquency, either before
the assessing officer, or in some form of appeal, the imposition of
ment for such a penalty, we have no doubt; but we do not believe that such a
power can be conferred upon a mere ministerial officer, without any opportunity
to be heard by the taxpayer. It will be observed that in Bristol's case the law
did not authorize the collector to impose the additional per cent, until be
filed his report on the application for the order of sale of the property, and it
was then adjudicated upon by the court; while in this case the officer was au
thorized to impose it long before the term of the court at which he is required
to file his report of the delinquent list, which is at the term at which he ap
plies for judgment. Had the ordinance in this ease only provided for the
imposition of this five per cent, at the time of passing the order for the sale
of the lands, thus affording the taxpayer an opportunity until that time to
pay his tax, and to be heard in the court whether he was liable to the forfeit
ure, this case would then have come within the principle of Bristol's.
" The facts in this case afford an illustration of the hardship that is liable to
occur, from accident or otherwise, by imposing a penalty at a previous time.
It appears that there was a mistake of a large amount in the case of the
Chamber of Commerce, and before it could be corrected, the first of January
had arrived and the penalty was claimed and attempted to be imposed without
any fault on their part. To impose such a penalty under these circum
stances, would be, to say the least, a hardship and a wrong. If, however, the
penalty should not be imposed until after the collector's report is filed on the
application for the judgment, then all have a fair opportunity to pay their
taxes or to be heard against a forfeiture. We are aware of no case where a
forfeiture may be imposed and enforced except by a judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction. If the collector may impose this per cent., he can en
force it by distress and sale of property, without the taxpayer having been
legally adjudicated to have incurred a penalty. When a per cent- is imposed
for taking an appeal for delay, or for faihng to pay a note due to the school
fund, the penalty is imposed by the judgment of the court and not by the
creditor or a ministerial officer. It is believed to be a general rule, without
an exception, that forfeiture cannot be enforced except through the judgment
of a court of competent jurisdiction, and this is true whether it be called
costs, damages, or a penalty. A judgment must be first had before satisfac
tion can be enforced.
"We do not, therefore, regard Bristol's case as governing this, as it is mate
rially different both in the facts and principles involved." See also Clayton
'e. Chicago, 44 11l., 286; Burger e. Caster, 1 McMullen L., 410, 420; Black-
well on Tax Titles, 30. In Wauwatosa v. Gunyon, 25 Wis., 271, 276, Judge
Dixon, referring to an objection that a provision authorizing the clerk of the
board of supervisors to impose a penalty of fifty per cent, of the assessment
for the refusal of the person assessed to swear, was void because, " being a
CH. XIV.] 315THE COLLECTION OF THE TAX
a penalty does not seem to be out of harmony with the general
spirit or general course of tax proceedings, and perhaps may be
sustained on the same principles that support tax laws in general.
But we- should doubt the right to make any finding by any such
tribunal conclusive; and there may be reason to question whether,
for delay in the payment of a tax, it is competent for the govern
ment to authorize any merely ministerial officer to impose a pen
alty, though a reasonable interest, and the expenses and costs
occasioned by the delay, might doubtless be demanded and col
lected.1 The point is not left in a very satisfactory state on the
authorities.
7. By forfeiture of property taxed. It is provided by law
in some states, that if the taxes assessed against lands shall not
punishment for the violation of public law, it cannot, under our constitution,
be legally imposed except by prosecution in the courts of justice," says :
" this
proposition is not without some well considered authorities in its favor, and
none that we are aware of against it;" and on rehearing, he says (p. 282):
"We think that the fifty per centum mentioned is a penalty which can be im
posed only in the due course of judicial prosecution, and consequently that
the clerk had no lawful or constitutional authority to add it to the value of
the property returned." In Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich., 140, a penalty of ten per
centum added to taxes remaining unpaid after a certain day, was sustained as
not being unreasonable ; and in Scott v. Watkins, 22 Ark., 556, a penalty of
twenty -five per centum on nonresidents who should fail to pay their taxes in
due season, was sustained against the objection which was deemed insupera
ble in 11lmois and Wisconsin. See also Craig v. Flanagin, 21 Ark., 319 ; Pope
e. Macon, 23 id., 644; High v. Shoemaker, 22 Cal., 363; People v. Todd, 23 id.,
181; Mulligan v. Hintrager, 18 Iowa, 171. In Butler e. Bailey, 2 Bay, 244, it
was held competent to impose double taxes as a penalty for failure to make
due return of property to be taxed.
1Bristol v. Chicago, 22 11l., 587. For cases of penalties imposed in Penn
sylvania by the taxing officers, under laws which gave an appeal to the courts,
reference may be made to Drexel v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn. St., 37; Com
monwealth v. Wyoming Valley Canal Co., 50 id., 410. As to penalties collected
by prosecution, see State v. Welch, 28 Mo., 600; Olds v. Commonwealth, 3 A.
K. Marsh., 465; Lee v. Commonwealth, 6 Dana, 311; Alexandere. Common
wealth, 1 Bibb, 515; McCall v. Justices, id., 516; Chiles v. Commonwealth, 4
J. J. Marsh., 578; State v. Manz, 6 Coldwell, 557; Elam v. State, 25 Ala., 53;
Smith v. State, 43 id., 344. These cases, as well as that of Delaware Division
Canal Co. v. Commonwealth, 50 Penn. St., 399, recognize the rule that all
statutes of this nature must be construed strictly. A municipal corporation
cannot impose a penalty for neglect to pay taxes promptly, unless expressly
authorized by law to do so. Augusta v. Dunbar, 50 Geo., 387.
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be paid by a certain time, and, after some prescribed notice, the
land shall be forfeited to the state. The Virginia statute of 1790
may be taken as an illustration. After making provision for the
taxation of lands ; that the sheriff should make to the auditor of
public accounts a return, under oath, of all those, the taxes upon
which he could find no effects for the satisfaction of ; that certain
prescribed steps should be taken for collection the following year,
and, if these failed, there should be published in the Virginia
Gazette, for three weeks, the names of delinquents, the quantity
of land, the situation thereof and the taxes due thereon, and that
in case the tax on any part should not be paid for the space of
three years, "the right to such lands shall be lost, forfeited and
vested in the commonwealth," etc. This was a more liberal stat
ute, in the time it allowed for payment, than those usually are
which provide for such a forfeiture, but the general characteris
tics of all are alike.
Serious question has been made of the right of the govern
ment to take to itself title to lands, under a forfeiture based on a
personal default, without a judicial finding that such a default
exists. The question was made in the early cases arising under
these statutes, and has continued to be made ever since, without
having yet reached conclusive settlement One of the most learned
and able of the early Virginia judges declared his opinion, under
the act of 1790, that the forfeiture could not be perfected so as to
divest the title of the former owner without inquest of office.1
This view was accepted in Kentucky,8 and has recently been as
sented to in an elaborate opinion by the supreme court of Missis
sippi.8 But the settled doctrine in Virginia is now the other
way,4 and the decisions are supported by those of Maine.5
1Tu«ker, J., in Kinney v. Bcverle}-, 2 H. & M., 318. The other judges gave
no opinion on this point.
»Barbour v. Nelson, 1 Litt., 60 ; Robinson v. Huff, 3 id., 38. And see Currie
e. Fowler, 5 J. J. Marsh., 145 ; Harlan's Heirs v. Seaton's Heirs, 18 B. Monr.,
312. The decisions in Minnesota favor the same doctrine. See St. Anthony
Co. v. Greely, 11 Minn., 321 ; Baker v. Kelley, id., 480; Hill e. Lund, 13 id., 451.
•Griffin v. Mixon, 38 Miss., 414. There is an able dissenting opinion in this
case by Handy, J.
4Wild's Lessee v. Serpell, 10 Grat., 405; Hale e. Branscum, id., 418; Flana
gan v. Grimmet, id., 421 ; Usher v. Pride, 15 id., 190.
5Hodgdon v. Wight, 36 Me., 326 ; Adams v. Larrabee, 46 id., 516, 519.
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Some ground we may safely occupy here without liability to con
troversy. It is conceded on all sides that an intent to transfer
title to the government by forfeiture will not be inferred in any
case from language capable of any milder construction.1 The
courts of Ohio acted upon this view when they held that a statute
which ,declared, that after due record of the default, the land
"shall be considered as forfeited to the state of Ohio, and be sub
ject to be disposed of in such manner as any future legislature
may direct," did not work an absolute forfeiture, and the owner
might redeem afterwards. But this was partly, at least, on the
ground that the legislature had never treated this forfeiture as
vesting a title in the state for any other purpose than as security
for taxes due and owing.2 That statutes of forfeiture are strictly
construed, is an elementary principle,8 and there are no cases in
which the rule requiring a substantial compliance with all the
important provisions of the statute will more rigidly be insisted
upon.4
Where the power of legislation ipso facta to work a forfeiture
is in question, it is important that there be a clear and precise
understanding of what is intended in the use of this word for
feiture. The usual method of enforcing the payment of taxes
upon property is by putting the property up to a public sale. No
one questions the right to do this, and no one doubts that the
sale, if fair and made in compliance with the law, and after all
the necessary preliminary steps have been taken, vests a perfect
1 Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch, 603, 625 ; Schenck v. Peay,
1 Dillon, 267 ; Bennett v. Hunter, 18 Grat, 100; S. C in error, 9 Wall., 326,
336.
2Thevenin e. Slocum's Lessee, 16 Ohio, 519, 532. This case is cited and re
tied upon in St. Anthony, etc., Co. v. Greely, 11 Minn., 321.-
» See Schenck v. Peay, 1 Dill. C C, 267 ; Lohrs v. Miller's Lesssee, 12 Grat.,
452; Twiggs v. Chevallie, 4 W. Va., 463. A subsequent taxing of lands by
the state, and the receipt thereof from the former owner, was held in Hodgdon
v Wight, 36 Me., 326, to be no waiver of the forfeiture. The same decision
was made in Crane v. Reeder, 25 Mich., 303, which was a case of escheat. In
that case Campbell, J., discusses at length the question of necessity of inquest
of office, and concludes that it is not necessary.
4 See Hopkins v. Sandige, 31 Miss., 668, 676, in which the delay of a few
days after the time fixed by statute for the return of the list was held to defeat
the forfeiture. See also Kinney v. Beverley, 2 H. & M., 318, 331 ; Dentler v.
State, 4 Blackf., 258; Williams v. State, 6 id., 36.
318 [CH. XIV.LAW OF TAXATION.
title in the purchaser to the full extent that the statute shall de
clare. No judicial proceedings are required to perfect the title,
and if the purchaser have need of a resort to them, in order to
obtain possession, it is only what might occur to any owner of
property under any undisputed title. In what important par
ticular does this differ from the case of forfeitures, except «that to
the proceedings which are to work the forfeiture there is added
the one requirement of a public sale? But there are in the sale
no elements of an adjudication ; it does not stand in the place of
one ; its purpose is only to bring to the public treasury the tax
for which the sale is made. Incidentally in the proceedings a
purpose is kept in view, not to sacrifice any farther than shall be
necessary the interests of the owner ; and to this end notice of
the sale is required with a view to invite competition among
bidders. But we are not aware of any constitutional principle
that entitles a party to have his duty coerced by a public sale of
property, rather than by a forfeiture of it. A sale by a ministerial
officer which, as the closing step in administrative action, is to di
vest the owner of his title, is as much obnoxious to the charge
that it deprives him of his freehold without a hearing, as is the
legislative forfeiture. Whatever there is of the nature of judi
cial inquiry lies back of these proceedings in the action of the
assessing officers, and, as has already been stated, is the same in
both cases. If the owner is condemned without a hearing in the
one case, he is in the other.
It may be that a public sale would be most advantageous to
the person taxed, because it might leave to him some portion of
his property after the tax was satisfied. In the vast majority of
cases, however, the sale is of the whole land, and the possible
benefit is not had. But there is no imperative principle of gov
ernment which requires the legislature in prescribing rules of ad
ministration, to fix upon those which would be most for the ad
vantage of a negligent or defaulting citizen. We suppose, on
the other hand, that the legislature has very ample discretion to
determine the rule on its own view of public policy. If it deems
a sale more advantageous to the state than a forfeiture, it will
provide for it ; otherwise not
But if by forfeiture is understood the vesting in the state a
title which shall be absolute and beyond dispute, the question
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presented is different It is impossible that there can he any
right to declare such a forfeiture, except as the result of an adju
dication to which the owner was a party, which has determined
that the default, upon which the forfeiture was based, existed in
fact, and that the requisite steps which were to precede the for
feiture have actually been taken. In some judicial tribunal, the
party whose freehold is seized has a right to a hearing on these
questions : a constitutional right, if constitutional protections to
property are of any avail. But if by forfeiture is understood
only that without sale there shall pass to the state such title as a
purchaser would acquire if a sale were to take place, the decla
ration of forfeiture can, of itself, work no absolute deprivation of
right If the default existed and the tax proceedings are regular,
the state has the title ; if not, it remains -in the person taxed.
And in the absence of any statute changing the burden of proof,
it would devolve on the state to prove the regularity of the pro
ceedings, precisely as it would on the purchaser when demanding
the land under a purchasa1
8. By conditions on the exercise of a right. In some in
stances statutes have attached to the privilege of exercising the
elective franchise, the condition that taxes should have been
paid for the current year, or within some short period preceding.
In some states this is a matter of constitutional requirement If
one evades his duty to the government, he may reasonably be
denied the privilege of participating in the direction of its affairs ;
and these constitutional provisions appear to assume that he, who,
in his own business, acquires nothing upon which he can be
taxed, must lack the wisdom and discretion to take part in the
business of the state.2 In some instances the payment of a tax
1See Kinney v. Beverly, 2 H. & M., 318, 331 ; Hopkins v, Sandige, 31 Miss.,
668, 676. See, also, post, Chapter XVII.
The proceedings for forfeiture, where a judicial prosecution is required, it
seems unnecessary to consider. An intent to defraud is made a ground of
forfeiture under some of the federal revenue laws. See United States v. Hogs
heads of Tobacco, 2 Bond, 137 ; United States e. Caddies of Tobacco, 2 id.,
305 ; Henderson's Spirits, 14 Wall., 44. The statute imposing the penalty of
forfeiture of land and buildings employed in violation of a revenue law, sus
tained as constitutional. United States v. McKinley, 4 Brewster, 246. See
United States v. Spreckens, 1 Sawyer 84; Quantity of Tobacco, 5 Ben., 407.
sConstitutional provisions of the kind exist in Dcleware, Georgia, Massa.
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assessed against one in respect to a chose in action owned by him
has been made a condition to the maintenance of a suit upon it1
In some instances the right to maintain a suit to recover property,
which the party claims has illegally been taken from him, has
been subjected to the condition that he should first pay the tax
for which the property was sold, and perhaps all subsequent taxes ;
but this, we think, has been pushed beyond the constitutional
power of the legislature, as we shall endeavor to show hereafter.2
Stamp taxes are collected by requiring them to be affixed to
some commodity before it can be sold, some written instrument
before it can be made use of, and the like. An early law of con
gress provided for such taxes, and they were imposed again dur
ing and since the rebellion. No reasonable objection in principle
can be opposed to such taxes, and except where they were so made
use of as to invade the province of state authority, their validity
was not seriously questioned.3
chusett8 and Pennsylvania. As to liability of assessors for depriving one of
his right to vote by not assessing him, see Griffin v. Rising, 11 Met., 339:
And see lie Duffy, 4 Brewster, 531 ; Batterson v. Barlow, 60 Penn. St., 54.
1See Lott v. Dysart, 45 Geo., 355 ; Redwine v. Hancock, id., 364 ; Scruggs v.
Gibson, id., 509; Green v. Lowrey, 46 id., 55; and many other cases in the sub
sequent Georgia reports.
»See Taylor v. Burdett, 11 Leigh, 334, in which it was decided to be com
petent to require evidence of the payment of the taxes as a condition prece
dent to maintaining a suit for the recovery of the lands taxed. See, also,
Tharp v. Hart, 2 Sneed, 569. But such a provision is to be strictly construed,
and will not be applied to the case of special assessments, unless made ap
plicable in terms. Glass «. White, 5 Sneed, 475. Sec Williamsburg e. Lord, 51
Me., 599. In Maine, in a contest between the original owner of land and a
tax purchaser, it is held that the former is not required to tender taxes until
the latter has made out a prima fa«ie case. Orono e. Veazie, 57 Me., 517; S.
C, 61 id., 431. Nor need he make a tender where several parcels have been
sold together, so that it cannot be determined how much he should pay.
Phillipps v. Sherman, 61 Me., 548, 551. In Weller v. St. Paul, 5 Minn., 95, the
right to enact such laws was denied as being inconsistent with the constitu
tional right of every citizen to "obtain justice freely and without purchase."
Similar rulings have been made In 11linois. Wilson v. McKenna, 52 11l., 43;
Reed e. Tyler, 56 id., 288. A requirement that no person shall be permitted
to question a tax title, without showing payment of all taxes due upon the
land will only be applied to plaintiffs, and not to parties in possession de
fending agamst a tax deed. Curry v. Hinman, 11 11l., 420. Power denied to
make it applicable. Conway v. Cable, 37 id., 82.
5For cases under the Virginia Stamp Act of 1812, Mumford's Reports may
be referred to. The cases, however, are not very important.
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It is competent in the case of such taxes on business as cannot
be collected in advance, to require security for their payment be
fore the business is entered upon.1
Collection as between the state and its municipalities.
Where state levies are collected through the agency of county,
city or township officers, it is competent for the state to make the
county or other district liable as principal debtor for the quota of
the state tax assessed within it.2 Provisions to this effect are
common in the statutes. And where the county treasurer is re
quired to give bond to the state for the state taxes to be received
by him, the failure to give a sufficient bond will not excuse the
county. The state is not to suffer from the laches of its agents
in such matters.8
1Mason v. Rollins, 2 Biss., 99; United States e. Mathoit, 1 Sawyer, 142.
»Schuylkill County v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St., 524; People v. Supervi-
sors of St. Ulair, 31 Mich. When the state treasurer charges over to a county
its proportion of the state tax, the county becomes debtor, and cannot burden
the state with any drawback of percentage. Multnomah Co. v. State, 1 Ore
gon, 358.
* See cases cited in the preceding note. A county is liable to towns for
money collected by a defaulting county treasurer. Potter County v. Oswayo, 47
Penn. St, 162. But it is not liable to the town for its quota until the amount
has been actually collected. Guittard v. Marshall County, 4 Kans., 388.
21
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CHAPTER XV.
THE SALE OF LANDS FOR UNPAID TAXES.
When made. Lands are sold by the government for taxes,
either because the assessments made upon them are not paid with
in the time allowed by law for their voluntary satisfaction by the
owner, or because a personal assessment against the owner remains
uncollected by the ordinary process. "Whether the sale is to be
made for the one reason or for the other, the same principles will
govern it
,
though in some particulars the proceedings will differ.
The land must be liable. As government has no inherent
right to deprive the citizen of his property except in pursuance of
regular and lawful proceedings, and for a lawful demand, a sale
of lands will be void if they were not liable for the tax. If by law
they were exempt from taxation, «
i sale will be void though for a
tax actually assessed ;1 and so it will be if made for a tax legally
assessed but which in some lawful manner has been discharged.
Payment of the tax by the owner, or by any one entitled to
make it
,
is an absolute defeat and termination of any statutory
power to sell.2 The persons who, besides the owner, are entitled
to make payment, are those who are assessed for the tax, and any
others whose interests would be injuriously affected by a sale,
either because of liens they may have, or of contract relations and
any one having the right may depute another to make it for him.
Whether any third person may make payment is not so clear ; but
1 Hobson v. DuttoD, 9 Kans., 477.
» Dougherty v. Dickey, 4 W. & S., 146 ; Hunter v. Cochran, 3 Penn. St, 105 ;
Montgomery v. Meredith, 17 id., 42; Ankeny v. Albright, 20 id., 157; Laird v.
Heister, 24 id., 452 ; Jackson v. Morse, 18 Johns., 441 ; Den v. Terrell, 3 Hawks,
283; Rowland v. Doty, Har. Ch., 3; Johnson v. Scott, 11 Mich., 232; Rayner v.
Lee, 20 id., 384; Curry v. Hinman, 11 11l., 420; Morrison e. Kelley, 22 11l., 610;
Walton e. Gray, 29 Iowa, 440 ; Sprague v. Coenan, 30 Wis., 209 ; Wallace v.
Brown, 22 Ark., 118 ; Bennett e. Hunter, 9 Wall., 326.
8 See Bennett e. Hunter, 18 Grat., 100 ; Same case in error, 9 Wall., 326 ; Ta-
cey v. Irwin, 18 id., 549.
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as the state is only interested in obtaining the revenue it has called
for, it would seem that, before any sale, and consequently before
any rights of third parties have intervened, any mere volunteer
may pay the tax if he chooses j1 and certainly if the proper officer
should receive payment, any question concerning the right to
make it would be precluded. Payment is an act in pais, which
may be proved not only by the record, but by the original re
ceipt ;8 and it may also be made out by any other evidence which
satisfies a jury of the fact.8 But payment cannot be shown in op
position to a judicial finding ; at least as between the parties
thereto and their privies.4
Tender of the tax by any one who has a right to make pay
ment, is effectual to prevent a sale, whether the tender is accepted
or not5 But a tender, in order to be effectual, must be of the
full amount of the tax ; it can not be of any thing less, unless the
statute makes provision for payment of a part by itself, a3 it does
sometimes for the benefit of tenants in common or owners of dis
tinct portions of the premises taxed.6
Necessity for regular proceedings. To the validity of any
sale of lands for taxes, it is imperatively necessary that there shall
1See Reading v. Finney, 73 Penn. St., 467; Martin v. Snowden, 18 Grat., 100;
Kinsworthy v. Austin, 23 Ark., 375.
* Johnstone v. Scott, 11 Mich., 232; McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 Penn.
St., 13; Deen v. "Wills, 21 Texas, 642.
8Dennett v. Crocker, 8 Greenl., 239; Hammond v. Hannin, 21 Mich., 374;
Rande. Schofield,43 1ll., 167; Cook e. Norton, 61 id., 285; Adams e.Beale, 19
Iowa, 61.
*Gaylord v. Scarff, 6 Iowa, 179; Cadmus v. Jackson, 52 Penn. St., 295; Wal
tace e. Brown, 22 Ark., 118. In this last case it is strongly intimated that if
the collector, after the tax has been paid to him, proceeds to a sale of the land,
and then obtains a judicial confirmation of the sale under a statute providing
therefor, and which makes the confirmation " a complete bar against any and
ail persons who may thereafter claim said land in consequence of informality
or illegality in the proceedings," the sale might and ought, in a direct pro
ceeding for the purpose, to be set aside for fraud, though it could not be at
tacked collaterally.
8Schenck v. Peay, 1 Dill. C C, 269; Loomis v. Pingree, 43 Me., 299; Kins-
worthy v. Austin, 23 Ark., 375; Tacey e. Irwin, 18 Wall., 549.
•Hunt «. McFadgen, 20 Ark., 277; Heft v. Gebhart, 65 Penn. St., 510; Crum
v. Burke, 25 id., 377.
324 [CH. XV.LAW OF TAXATION.
have been a substantial compliance with the law in all the official
proceedings which have led to it.1
Tax sales are made exclusively under a statutory power. The
officer who makes them sells something he does not own, and
which he can have no authority to sell except as he is made the
agent of the law for the purpose. But he is made such agent
only by certain steps which are to precede his action, and which
under the law are conditions to his authority. If these fail, the
power is never created. If one of them fails, it is as fatal as if
all failed. Defects in the conditions to a statutory authority can
not be aided by the courts ; if they have not been observed, the
courts cannot dispense with them, and thus bring into existence
a power which the statute only permits when the conditions have
been fully complied with. Neither, as a general rule, can the
courts aid the defective execution of a statutory power ; they may
do this when the power has been created by the owner himself,
and when such action would presumptively be in furtherance of
his purpose in creating it; but a statutory power must be exe
cuted according to the statutory directions, and presumptively any
other execution is opposed to the legislative will, instead of in
furtherance of it. It is therefore accepted as an axiom when tax
sales are under consideration, that a fundamental condition to
their validity is that there should have been a substantial com
pliance with the law in all the proceedings of which the sale was
the culmination. This would be the general rule in all cases in
which a man is to be divested of his freehold by adversary pro
ceedings ; but special reasons make it peculiarly applicable to the
case of tax sales. These reasons are thus summarized by the su
preme court of Maine :
" Sales of real estate for the nonpayment
of taxes must be regarded in a great measure as an ex parte pro
ceeding. The owner is to be deprived of his land thereby ; and
a series of acts preliminary to the sale are to be performed to au
thorize it on the part of the assessors and collector, to which his
attention may never have been particularly called ; and experi
ence and observation render it notorious that the amount paid by
1There must be express statutory authority for selling lands for taxes. A
power to tax does not include the power to cause lands to be sold for nonpay
ment of the taxes. See Mc1nery e. Reed, 23 Iowa, 410 ; Sibley v. Smith', 2
Mich., 486; Sharp e. Spier, 4 Hill, 76.
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purchasers at such sales is uniformly trifling, in comparison with
the value of the property sold. It has therefore been held, with
great propriety, that to make out a valid title under such sales,
great strictness is to be required ; and it must appear that the
provisions of law preparatory to'and authorizing such sales, have
been punctiliously complied with." 1
In Virginia, somewhat stronger language has been employed.
''These sales and purchases," it is said, "founded on forfeitures,
deserve no indulgence from the court It is therefore the well
settled law that he who claims under a forfeiture, must show that
the law has been exactly complied with." 2 This language, if
strictly taken, is unquestionably more exacting in its require
ments than the authorities generally will justify. It is not neces
sary, we apprehend, in any proceedings so complicated as those
in which lands are sold for taxes, that there should be shown an
exact and punctilious compliance with all the provisions of law
before they can be supported. With many of these provisions,
as we have endeavored to show in a preceding chapter, the party
interested in defeating such a sale could have no concern what
ever. They are not made for his protection or benefit, and whether
observed or not, they do not affect his interest A failure to ob
serve them, can, therefore, furnish no ground of complaint on his
behalf; and it is not perceived that it can constitute for him any
just or equitable protection against the demands of the state for
its lawful revenues. It is sufficient for his case if the provisions
which do concern him have been observed ; and if others which are
made in the interest of the public are overlooked or disregarded,
the public, through its proper authorities, must be the proper
1Whitman, Oh. J., in Brown v. Veazie, 25 Me., 359, 362. See also Keene v.
Honghton, 19 id., 368; Smith v. Bodflsh, 27 id., 289; Flint v. Sawyer, 30 id.,
226; Payson v. Hall, 30 id., 319; Matthews v. Light, 32 id., 305; Howe e. Rus-
sel, 36 id., 115; Stevens v. McNamara, 36 id., 176; Loomis v. Pingree, 43 Me.,
299; Lovejoy v. Lunt, 48 id., 377; Williamsburg v. Lord, 51 id., 599; French u
Patterson, 61 id., 203.
»Carr, J., in Wilson v. Bell., 7 Leigh, 22, 24. And see Yancey v. Hopkins,
1 Munf., 419; Christy v. Minor, 4 id., 431; Nalle v. Fenwick, 4 Rand., 585;
Allen v. Smith, 1 Leigh, 231, 254; Chapman v. Doe, 2 id., 329, 357; Jesse v.
Preston, 5 Grat., 120; Martin v. Snowden, 18 id., 100. In California it has
been said that the proceedings in these cases are strictisumi juris. Ferris v
Coover, 10 Cal., 589, 632; Kelsey v. Abbott, 13 id., 609.
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party to complain. This~is reasonable, and this is the rule that
is laid down by the authorities.
Onus of proof. At the common law it was necessary that one
who claimed to have obtained title to property of another, under
proceedings based upon a neglect of public duty, should take upon
himself the burden of showing that the law had been complied
with by those who had had the proceedings in charge. Especially
if the proceedings would operate with severity, and be in their
effects something in the nature of a forfeiture, the law was strict
in its requirement that his evidence should exhibit the proceed
ings from step to step, and show that each of the safeguards with
which the statute had surrounded the delinquent for his protec
tion in this very emergency, had been duly observed. And this
tenderness for his interests appeared but reasonable. Of what
service could it be that safeguards were provided, if observance
was not essential ; if a careless or incompetent officer might over
look or disregard them with impunity, and deal with the property
of the citizen as if his position as an officer of the government
vested him with a dispensing authority over legislation, and
authorized him to make, in his discretion, a law for the case as he
proceeded ?
This rule of the common law has not been modified by decisions,
and is still recognized and enforced, where statutes have not
changed it It may consequently be said to be the general rule,
that the party claiming lands under a sale for taxes, must show
affirmatively that the law under which the sale was made, has
been substantially complied with, not only in the sale itself, but
in all the anterior proceedings.1 But although the authorities
1Stead's Ex'rs e. Course, 4 Cranch, 402 ; Parker «. Rule's Lessee, 9 id., 64 ;
Williams v. Peyton's Lessee, 4Wheat., 77 ; McClung e. Ross, 6 id., 116 ; Thatch
er v. Powell, 6 id., 119; Games v. Stiles, 14 Pet., 332; Pillow e. Roberts, 13
How., 472; Moore B.Brown, Hid., 414; Early e. Doe, 16 id., 610; Parker v. Over
man, 18 id., 142; Little v. Herndon, 10 Wall., 26; Hughey's Lessee e. Horrell, 2
Ohio, 233 ; Holt's Heirs v. Hemphill's Heirs, 3 id., 232 ; Lafferty's Lessee v. Byers,
5 id., 458 ; Thomson's Heirs v. Gotham, 9 id., 170 ; Kellogg v. McLaughlin, 8
id., 114; Polke. Rose, 25 Md., 153; Popee. Headen.5 Ala., 433; Elliott e. Ed-
dins, 24 id., 508; Garrett v. Wiggins, 1 Scam., 335: Fitch e. Pinckard, 4 id.,
69; Doe v. Leonard, 4 id., 140; Wiley v. Bean, 1 Gilm., 302; Irving v. Brown -
ell, 11 11l., 402; Spellman e. Curtenins, 12 id., 409; Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 id.,
224; Goawey v. Urig, 18 id., 242; Lane v. Bommelmann, 21 id.. 143; Charles
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concur in this rule with great unanimity, they are not so entirely
in accord when the question regards the strictness required in the
showing that shall be made. On this point some of the cases,
particularly those which were decided at a very early day, have
used language importing a strictness greater than in most cases
would be possible, and greater than is demanded by any consid
erations of policy or of justice to the party whose estate is in ques
tion. The later cases lay down a more just and reasonable
rule, and warrant us in saying, that the requirement of a compli
ance with the law, when the question arises as one of title, is satis
fied by obedience to those provisions of the law which are in
the nature of conditions to the power to sell, and are not merely
directory under the rules laid down in another chapter.1 To re
quire more than this would be needless for any beneficial purpose,
and would greatly embarrass, and in innumerable cases, defeat the
collection of the revenue.
The requirement that the claimant under a tax sale should show
the proceedings to have been regular, was entirely according to the
natural order of evidence. The original owner would show a
prima facie right by producing the documents and evidence which
demonstrated his original ownership. To overcome this, there
must be evidence of a title overriding or extinguishing it ; and
such a title would not appear in the tax purchaser until the suc
cessive steps, taken in compliance with the tax law, and ending in
a sale and conveyance, had been shown. To prove merely a sale,
would be futile, unless the power to make the sale was estab
lished ; and to prove merely an instrument purporting to be a
conveyance, would be even more idle.
v. Waugh, 35 id., 315; Norris v. Russell, 5 Cal., 250; Keane e. Cannovan, 21
id., 291 ; O'Brien v. Coulter, 2 Blackf., 421 ;Williams v. State, 6 id., 36 ; Wiggins
v. Holley, 11 Ind.,2; Gavin e. Sherman, 23 id., 32; Ellis v. Kenyon, 25 id., 134;
Jackson v. Shepard, 7 Cow., 88; Atkins v. Kinman, 20 Wend., 241; Sharp v.
Spier, 4 Hill, 76; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 id., 92; Newell v. Wheeler, 48 N. Y.,
486; Westfall v. Preston, 49 id., 349; Hall «. Collins, 4 Vt., 316; Bellows v. El-
liott, 12 id., 569; Brown v. Wright, 17 id., 97; Waldron v. Tuttle, 3 N. H.,340;
Cass v. Bellows, 31 id., 501 ; Hawley v. Mitchell, 31 id., 575 ; Annan v. Baker,
49 id., 161; Scott e. Young Men's Society, 1 Doug. Mich., 119; Latimer v.
Lovett, 2 id., 204; Scott v. Babcock, 3 Green, Iowa, 133; Gaylord v. Scarff, 6
Iowa, 179: McGahen v. Carr, 6 Iowa, 331; Morton e. Reads, 6 Mo., 64; S. 0.
9 id., 878; Nelson v. Grebel, 17 id., 161; Kelly v. Medlin, 26 Texas, 38
1Chapter IX.
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Nor was there any special injustice or hardship in the rule of
the law, which required the tax purchaser to prove the regularity
of the proceedings under which he claimed. Whether the inter
est of the state might not be best subserved by casting the anus
of showing defects in the title on the adverse claimant, and
whether, therefore, on grounds of public policy it might not be
advisable to change the rule accordingly, are questions that stand
quite apart from any which concern the claims or rights of the
purchaser ; but regarding his position only, there was no hardship
in calling upon him to give proof of his title by showing a sale
made with due authority. A tax sale is the culmination of pro
ceedings which are matters of record ; and it is a reasonable pre
sumption of law that, where one acquires rights which depend
upon matters of record, he first makes search of the record in or
der to ascertain whether anything shown thereby would diminish
the value of such rights, or tend in any contingency to defeat
them.1 A tax purchaser consequently cannot be, in any strict
technical sense, a bona fide purchaser, as that term is under-
1That the proceedings on which tax sales depend are to be proved by the
records, or by the originals from which the records should be made up ; the
following cases are authority, if indeed any is necessary : Job v. Tebbetts, 5
Gilm., 376, 380; Graves e. Bruen, 11 11l., 431,442; Schuyler e. Hull. 11 id.,
462,465; Boston v. Weymouth, 4 Cush., 538; Bucksport v. Spoflbrd, 12 Me.,
487 ; Adams v. Mack, 3 N. H., 493, 499 ; Blake v. Sturtevant, 12 id., 567 ; Pitts-
fiekU. Barnstead, 40 id., 477 493; McCrory v. Manes, 47 Geo., 90; Sheldon,
Lessee v. Coats, 10 Ohio, 278; Thevenin v. Slocum, 16 id., 519, 531 ; Blodgett
v. Holbrook, 39 Vt., 336; Iverslie e. Spaulding, 32 Wis., 394; Gearhart v.
Dixon, 1 Penn. St., 224; Diamond Coal Co. v. Fisher, 19 id., 267; Miner e. Mc
Lean, 4 McLean, 138 ; Games v. Stiles, 14 Pet., 322. But such records do not
import absolute verity like those of courts, and it may be shown in contradic
tion to their recitals that the facts were otherwise than as there stated. Dia
mond Coal Co., v. Fisher, 19 Penn. St., 267, 273; Boston v. Weymouth, 4 Cush.,
538, 541; Blake e. Sturtevant, 12 N. H, 567; Graves v. Bruen, 11 11l., 431,
443; Tebbetts v. Job, 11 id., 453; Schuyler v. Hull, 11 id., 462 465. In Kellogg
v. McLaughlin, 8 Ohio, 114, 116, the record of tax proceedings was held to be
conclusive against the party claiming under a tax sale, but not against the
party contesting it. In Miner v. McLean, 4 McLean, 138, 140, it is said that
" parol evidence is not admissible to supply a defect in the record. This well
established rule can admit of no exception." In Coit v. Wells, 2 Vt., 318, it
was decided that the records of the advertisements in the case of road taxes
were not evidence at all unless they contained all the particulars required by
the statute. These cases, however, are not inconsistent with a resort to parol
evidence as secondary to that of record when the latter is lost or destroyed.
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stood in the law ; because a bona jvh purchaser is one who buys
an apparently good title without notice of anything calculated
to impair or affect it ; but the tax purchaser is always deemed to
have such notice when the record shows defects. He cannot shut
his eyes to what has been recorded for the information of all
concerned, and relying implicitly on the action of the officers,
assume what they have done is legal because they have done it
It is indeed a presumption of law that official duty is performed ;
and this presumption stands for evidence in many cases ; but the
law never assumes the existence of jurisdictional facts; and
throughout the tax proceedings the general rule is
,
that the taking
of any one important step is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the
next ; and it cannot therefore be assumed, because one is shown to
have been taken, that the officer performed his duty in taking
that which should have preceded it.1
Presumptions of regularity. But while the tax purchaser
is making his showing, the strictness required in the proof may
reasonably be made to depend, to some extent, upon the circum
stances. Presumptions are indulged in every class of proceed
ings; and in some cases presumptions may give an efficient sup
port to evidence which, without them, would be insufficient to
establish the necessary facts. Indeed, in some cases, presump
tions may supply links which appear to be missing in the testi
mony. It was once said by an eminent judge in a tax case, that
" full evidence of every minute circumstance ought not, especially
at a distant day, to be required. From the establishment of some
facts it is possible that others may be presumed, and less than
positive testimony may establish facts."2 Nothing, under some
1 A tax purchaser comes strictly within the rule caveat emptor. If his title
fails hecause the collector failed to give notice of sale, he has no remedy
against the collector. Hamilton v. Valiant, 30 Md., 139. Neither has he for
any error or irregularity which defeats his title a remedy against the town.
Lynde v. Melrose, 10 Allen, 49. And see Jenks v. Wright, 61 Penn. St., 410,
414. In Michigan the Auditor General is authorized to refund the hids to
purchasers in some cases in which titles prove defective ; but his right to do
so is limited strictly to the cases enumerated in the statute ; the state taking
no responsibility for the action of officers where the purchaser has the same
opportunity for knowing the facts that the state officers have. People e.
Auditor General, 30 Mich., 12.
^Marshall, Ch. J., in Stead's Executors v. Course, 4 Cranch, 413. See, to the
same effect, Freeman v. Thayer, 33 Mc., 76.
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circumstances, could be more just or reasonable. But when that
" distant day
"
arrives, when presumptions are relied upon, it wili
be found necessary to observe, with some circumspection, what
has been the position of the parties, relative to the property
claimed, from the time the sale was made. That position may
sometimes very reasonably have a controlling influence. If the
tax purchaser has made no claim under his title, and has left the
original owner to treat the property as his own, it is difficult to
understand on what ground any presumption can be built up in
aid of the tax title, deriving its force from the lapse of time.
"The older it is without any claim being made under it
,
the
weaker it is
,
and the weaker are all presumptions in its favor."1
If
,
on the other hand, he has made claim in practical and effect
ive form by taking possession, and especially if
,
after the posses
sion was taken, the other party, with full knowledge thereof, has
neglected, for any considerable period, to assert his own rights- it
must be conceded that the claim of the tax purchaser will come
before the courts under circumstances entitling it to much greater
indulgence.
The reasons for this are manifest. If one who claims to have
title to property shall lie by for a long term of years without
asserting it
,
while another is in the enjoyment of that which, if
the title is valid, should be enjoyed by himself, it is not a very
violent presumption that his supineness is due to his being
aware of some defect which would defeat his claim if he were to
assert it in legal proceedings. The longer he delays the stronger
this presumption becomes ; and if the time could ever arrive
when, because the claim is old, it could be presumed without de
fects, it is obvious that it could only be on an indulgence of pre
sumptions that are opposed to reason. That he may lie by
because of defects, until the time can arrive when, because of his
lying by, it will be presumed that no defects exist, and then be
put by the law in possession of that which it is inferable he did
not venture to demand before, is an absurdity so manifest that
time need not be wasted in the attempt to make it more so.
1Alexander v. Bush, 46 Penn. St., 62. See, to the same effect, Read v. Good
year, 17 S. & R., 350 ; Hole v. Rittenhouse, 19 Penn. St., 305 ; Worthing v.
Webster, 45 Me., 270; Richardson v. Dorr, 5 Vt, 9; Townsend v. Downer, 32
id., 183.
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It is different when tlie tax purchaser ha3 been in possession.1
That fact is some evidence that he at least believes his title to
have validity ; and if those who might dispute it neglect to do so,
the inferences will be more or less strong, according to the circum
stances, that their action is attributable to the belief that a con
test must be ineffectual. It is doubted if in any case, on common
law principles, a tax title could be presumed valid before the full
period allowed by the statute of limitations for bringing suit had
expired. The court of appeals of Virginia decided at an early
day that it could not be,2 and no satisfactory reason has been sug
gested in any quarter to cast a doubt upon the correctness of this
conclusion. Still, presumptions may be very forcible in some
cases, where, on the evidence, it is left in doubt whether the tax
proceedings have or have not been conducted in conformity to
law. If possession has been held under them for a considerable
period, though it may not have been for a length of time sufficient
to bar suits for the recovery of lands, there may reasonably spring
from such possession an inference in favor of its legality, of suf
ficient force to turn the scales on any point left in doubt on the
proofs, and to justify a jury, to whom the case is submitted, in
drawing the conclusion which supports the possession. The
longer the possession has continued, the stronger should be the
intendments in favor of the title under which it is "held ; and
although -these cannot make valid that which in itself is void,
they may, and should, be allowed their weight when a case is to
be determined which the evidence has left in doubt What their
weight should be must depend on the circumstances ; there can
1Possession, recovery against the grantor of defendant in trespass, and pay.
ment of taxes, are evidence in favor of a tax deed thirty years old that a sur
plus bond, the cost of which is receipted in the deed, was given. Lackawana
Iron Co. e. Failcs, 55 Penn. St., 90. As to the force of recitals in deeds generally,
where there has been possession under them, see Worthing v. Webster, 45
Me., 270.
sAllen «. South, 1 Leigh, 231, 255. The validity of a tax sale is^not to be
presumed from the mere deed of the collector, unaccompanied by extrinsic
evidence that the prior proceedings were regular. Nor, in an action of eject
ment, will any presumptions be made in favor of the validity of the deed,
merely because the party claiming it proves a possession adverse to the title
of another party, but for a period short of that prescribed by the statute of
limitations. Townsend v. Downer, 32 Vt., 183.
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be no definite rule of law on the subject which can be applied in
all cases.1
Presumptions could in no case supply the want of a record
when the law requires one, and it has never been made ; neither
can they help out a record which is so defective as not to answer
the requirements of the law.2 But when it has been once made
to appear that a record has existed which is now lost or destroyed,
presumptions may justly be allowed great weight in support of
the secondary evidence, in proof of the contents of the record,
and that it was in compliance with the law.8
1Five years' possession does not warrant a finding in favor of the regularity
of proceedings, when their correctness is not shown by the evidence. Phil-
lips v. Sherman, 61 Me., 548. See Pejepscut Proprietors v. Ransom, 14 Mass.,
145. As to what will be overlooked in Pennsylvania, under their statute,
which declares that no irregularities in the assessment, process, or otherwise,
shall be allowed to affect the title of the purchaser, see Laird v. Hiester, 24
Penn. St., 452. As to the force of the presumption in favor of the correctness
of official action under that statute, see Cuttle «. Brockway, 24 Penn. St., 145 ;
Heft v. Gephart, 65 id., 518. In SchofF v. Gould, 52 N. H., 512, the tax pro-
ceedings depended on the vote of a meeting, and the question was made upon
proof of the warrant for holding it. The court say: " The meeting was held
in March, 1841— more than thirty years ago — and officers were chosen who
acted as such, and the jury might have presumed that the warrant remained
posted the requisite time. Bishop v. Cone, 3 N. H., 513 ; Northwood «. Bar-
rington, 9 id.,373; Petersborough v. Lancaster, 14 id., 372; School District «.
Bragdon, 23 id., 514. In Cavis v. Robertson, 9 N. H., 524, it was held that this
rule did not apply where the facts were recent, and the records might be
amended, but would apply where, from the lapse of time, it may be presumed
that the officers who made the records arc no longer living, or have no recol
lection of the facts. It does not appear that the officers who made the record
are dead, but it is a fair presumption that they have lost recollection of the
fact that the notice remained posted."
The following cases are important, as showing what, under their varying
circumstances, was held sufficient evidence of an assessment: Bratton v. Mitch
ell, 1W.A S., 259; Crum v. Burke, 25 Penn. St., 377, 381; Heft v. Gephart, 65
id., 510 ; McDermott v. Hoffman, 70 id., 31 ; McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57
id., 13; Pittsfield v. Barnstead, 40 N. H., 477. The sale book does not prove
an assessment. Britton v. Mitchell, 1 W. & S., 310. Neither do the recitals
in the tax warrant- Hoffer e. Matteson's Ex'rs, 16 N. J. Eq., 382.
»Coit v. Wells, 2 Vt., 318 ; Capron v. Raistrick, 44 id., 515 ; Kellogg •. Mc
Laughlin, 8 Ohio, 114; Porter v. Byrne, 10 Ind., 146; Iverslie v. Spaulding,
32 Wis., 394; Moser v. White, 29 Mich., 59.
•Where a record is not found in the proper office, and it is not shown that
one was ever in existence, there is no presumption that one was made. Hall
n. Kellogg, 16 Mich., 139. In Cass v. Bellows, 31 N. H., 501, 510, Eastman, J,
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Special authority to sell. The various proceedings which
usually are required to precede a sale of the lands have been suc
cessively mentioned. Whether, when these have been taken, the
officer will require any special warrant or process as his authority
for proceeding to a sale, must depend upon whether something of
that nature is provided for by law. In some of the states a list
of delinquent lands is made out and properly certified by the
state auditor, or some other designated officer of state, to whom
the returns of delinquent taxes have been made, and this list is
transmitted to the county or township official who by law is en
trusted with the duty of making sales, and constitutes his war
rant for doing so. In other states, the statutes make other special
provisions for the purpose. Whatever list, certificate or warrant
is prescribed by the statute, it is to be looked upon as in the na
ture of process, and it is indispensible that the officer should
have it before taking any steps towards making a sale.1 And in
all his action he must keep within the command of his warrant
and of the law ; for his authority will fail to support him when
he fails to observe it'
uses the following language : " In Cavis v. Robertson, 9 N. H., 524, it was held
that there are cases in which it may be submitted to a jury to presume, from
a defective record of the election of a town officer, and from his having
acted under the appointment, that the meeting was duly held, the proceedings
of the town regular and the officer duly sworn ; but that this cannot be done
where the proceedings are recent, and no cause is shown why the defective
record cannot be amended If the truth will warrant it." And, after comment
ing upon Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H., 168, he adds : " In the case before us, the
town clerk had deceased before the suit was brought. The record was de
fective, but showed that the collector was evidently sworn in some way.
Nearly forty years had elapsed from the making of the record to the com
mencement of the suit, and, from the authority of the cases cited, and the
principles therein stated, we think the evidence was competent to be submit
ted to a jury, as tending to show the collector to have been duly elected and
duly sworn. It can make no difference whether the demandant was the pro-
prietor of the lot at the time it was sold, or a subsequent purchaser. The
record that the collector ' was sworn into office ' was open to all ; and, if he
purchased with that before him, he took the title, subject to the same rights
in regard to the record, as had existed with respect to former owners."
1See Horner e. Cilley, 14 N. H., 85; Hannel v. Smith, 15 Ohio, 134; Kelley
e. Craig, 5 Ired., 129; Gossett v. Kent, 19 Ark., 602; Miner v. McLean, 4 Mc
Lean, 138.
*Where the statute requires the sale to be made within two years from the
date of the warrant, a sale at a later day is void. Usher v. Taft, 13 Me., 199.
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Notice of sale. The first proceeding usually required of the
officer who is to make sale is
,
that he shall give public notice of
his intention to do so. Under different statutes notices in va
rious forms are required, as may be thought most suitable to the
case. If the statute fails to specify the character of the notice,
doubtless one in writing must be intended ; 1 but a provision so
indefinite will not often be met with. Unusual care is required
in obeying the directions of the statute regarding notice, as no
one who is entitled to notice can be bound by a sale which has
been made without it There is no constitutional provision enti
tling one to notice in a particular mode: what the statute has
made sufficient must be deemed so. In the case of residents, per
sonal notice is sometimes required but for nonresidents, a notice
published in a newspaper is generally all that is provided for.8
Sometimes the published notice is all that is made requisite even
in the case of residents ; while other statutes direct that the tax
list shall be kept posted in some public place or places for a cer
tain period. Whatever the provision is
, it must be complied with
See, for the same principle, Avery e. Rose, 4 Dev., 549 ; Doe e. Allen, 67 N.
C, 346. A sale preceding the day is of course void. Conrad v. Darden, 4
Yerg., 307. See Orr v. Travacier, 21 Iowa, 68.
It has been decided that where, by the statute, the proceedings are different
in the case of nonresidents from what they are in the case of residents, the
subsequent proceedings will be invalid unless they follow the assessment.
Merrick v. Hutt, 15 Ark., 331 ; Kinsworthy v. Mitchell, 21 id., 145 ; McDermo't
v. Skully, 27 id., 226; Garabaldi v. Jenkins, id., 453.
1 Pearson v. Lovejoy, 53 Barb., 407.
s Where the statute required notice to be given to the occupant, if the land
was occupied, it was held that one having a paper title to a lot of 169 acres,
and who, though not on it
,
cultivated a small piece of it
,
was entitled to no
tice, and a sale made without giving it was void. Leland v. Bennett, 5 Hill,
286, citing Comstock v. Beardsley, 15 Wend., 348 ; Bush e. Davison, 16Wend.,
550. In North Carolina it seems that the mortgagee is regarded as the owner
of land mortgaged, so as to be entitled to the notice required to be given to
the owner. Whitehurst v. Gaskill, 69 N. C, 449; S. C, 12 Am. Rep., 655.
»The owner of unseated lands is only entitled to such notice as the statute
shall provide for, and he must take notice of the tax proceedings at his peril.
Cuttle v. Brockway, 32 Penn. St., 45. It is said in Louisiana that it is in the
power of the legislature to determine what shall be sufficient to bring parties
into court in tax cases, and if a published notice is provided for and given,
that is sufficient. New Orleans v. Cordeviolle, 10 La. An., 732 ; Draining, Co.
Case, 11 id., 338.
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strictly. This is one of the most important of all the safeguards
which has been deemed necessary to protect the interests of par
ties taxed ; and nothing can be a substitute for it or excuse the
failure to give it1 The notice being a prerequisite to the officer's
authority, the fact that in the particular case it can be shown that
the party concerned was fully aware of the proceedings, will be
of no avail in supporting them. He is under no obligation to
take notice of the proceedings unless duly notified. Mere inform
alities or unimportant variances in an attempt to comply with the
law may not be fatal, but variance in substance cannot be over
looked.
It may be useful to notice some of the cases on the subject.
"Where the statute required the notice to contain a particular
statement of the taxes on each lot, a notice not containing it was
held void.2 So where the notice was for less than the statutory
time, though but for a single day, the proceeding was held to be
as fatally defective as if no notice at all had been given.8 So
where the notice was required to be published for a certain time
in the paper of the state printer, and the publication was duly
begun, but before completion the paper ceased to be that of the
state printer, it was held insufficient4 So a notice is defective if
1Washington v. Pratt, 8 Wheat., 681 ; Early v. Doe, 16 How., 610; Moulton
e. Blaisdell, 24 Me., 283; Flint v. Sawyer, 30 id., 226; Hill e. Mason, 38 id.,
461; Bush e. Davison, 16 Wend., 550; Alexander v. Pitts, 7 Cush., 503; Bla-
lock v. Gaddes, 33 Miss., 452; Reed v. Morton, 9 Mo., 878; Prindle v. Camp-
bell, 9 Minn., 212; Jenks e. Wright, 61 Penn. St., 410. A written notice will
not answer where a printed notice is required by statute. Lagrone v. Rains,
48 Mo., 536. Nor can posting the list be omitted when required by statute.
Yenda v. Wheeler, 9 Texas, 408 : see Pitts e. Booth, 15 id., 453.
8Washington v. Pratt, 8 Wheat., 681 : see Jenks v. Wright, 61 Penn. St., 410.
* State «. Newark, 36 N. J., 288. A similar ruling was made in Pope v.
Headon, 5 Ala., 433. And see Elliott v. Eddins, 24 id., 508 ; Flint v. Sawyer,
30 Me., 226; Hobbs v. Clements, 32 Me., 67. Twelve weeks' notice of sale re
quires eighty-four full days. Early v. Doe, 16 How., 610. Where notice is
required to be for ten days, Sundays excepted, and it is omitted two days, not
Sundays, it is void. Haskell v. Bartlett, 34 Cal., 281. See further as to time
of publication, Kellogg v. McLaughlin, 8 Ohio, 114; Cass v. Bellows, 31 N.
H., 501; Moore v. Brown, 4 McLean, 211; S. C, in error, 11 How., 414; West-
brook v. Wiley, 47 N. Y., 457 ; Dubuque v. Wooton, 28 Iowa, 571.
4Bussey v. Leavitt, 12 Me., 378. Compare Pope v. Headon, 5 Ala., 433;
Lyon v. Hunt, 11 id., 29j; Sharp v. Johnson, 4 Hill, 92; Cambridge v. Chan
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the collector in appending his name fails to add his name of office,
so that it does not appear to be official ; 1 or if given before the
person has in fact been sworn into office ; ' or if delayed after the
time prescribed by law for its publication.8 And the notice is
bad if it differs from the assessment in giving the name of the
person to whom the land is taxed ; 4 or if it fails to give the name
of the person taxed when the statute requires it;' or if the de
scription of the land is insufficient.6 As regards all such cases,
the law is well summed up in a case in which the statute required
the notice to state the " amount of taxes assessed," and the notice
given was incorrect in this particular.
" The advertisement did
not state the amount of the tax assessed on the land, but stated a
wholly different amount, and for all legal purposes might as well
have contained no statement whatever of the amount of the tax.
To comply with the statute the exact amount must be given. A
deviation, however small, must be fatal, because a rule of law
cannot be made to fluctuate according to the degree or extent of
its violation."1
The most important of the usual requisites of notice of sale,
are that it shall give a proper description of the land to be sold,
and a statement of the time and place when and where the sale
dler, 6 N. H., 271. A. change in the name of the paper in which the notice is
required to be published will not affect the notice. Isaac v. Shattuck, 12 Vt,
668. Where a city common council is required to give notice in a paper to
be designated, the designation must be made by the council. Appeal of Pow
ers, 29 Mich., 504.
1Spear v. Ditty, 9 Vt., 282. See Broughton v. Journeay, 51 Penn. St., 31.
8 Langdon v. Poor, 20 Vt., 13. See Hannell v. Smith, 15 Ohio, 134.
8Hill v. Mason, 38 Me., 461. Compare Brackett e. Vining, 49 Me., 356;
Kelly e. Craig, 5 Ired., 129 ; Magee v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn. St., 358 ; Pierce
v. Benjamin, 14 Pick., 356 ; Noyes v. Haverhill, 11 Cush., 338.
4Bettison v. Rudd, 21 Ark., 578, citing Wait v. Gilmore, 2 Yeales, 330;
Shimmin v. Inman, 26 Me., 232. And see Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick., 418.
* Sargeant r1.Bean, 7 Gray, 125.
«Such a defect could not be aided by any information imparted by the auc
tioneer to the bidders at the sale. Ronkendorf v. Taylor, 4 Pet., 349.
' Bigelow, J., in Alexander v. Pitts, 7 Cush., 503. The amount of the tax
was $3.30; that stated in the notice was $4.12. Compare Clarke «. Strick
land, 2 Curt. C C, 439. That an immaterial variation in the notice from that
required by the statute may be overlooked, see Ogden e. Harrington, 6 Mc
Lean, 418; Scott e. Watkins, 22 Ark., 556.
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will be made. The requisites for a description in the assessment
roll have been heretofore given. In the notice as in the assess
ment, there is precisely the same necessity that the description
shall be sufficiently definite to identify the land, in order that the
owner may be apprised of the peril to which his interests are
exposed.1 What has been said regarding the description under
the head of assessment, is consequently applicable here. The cases
referred to in the margin discuss other defects, or alleged defects,
in notices of sale, and may be useful for reference.2 Consent o£ the
owner of land to a defective publication of notice, it has been
held, would not bind him, as he cannot, in that manner, confer an
authority upon an officer of the law, nor can he pass a title to
his freehold by mere waiver.8 Proof of giving the notice should
be duly made of record, and it ought to show what the facts are,
so that any one inspecting the record may know that the statute
has been complied with. An affidavit, or a return, which under
takes to state merely the legal conclusion, that " due notice
" was
given, or "legal notice," or " notice as required by the statute,"
or to make any other general allegation of a similar nature, ought
not to be received as sufficient evidence that the law has been com
plied with. It is, in fact, evidence only of the officer's opinion
that he has performed his duty.4
1 See Farnum e. Buffum, 4 Gush., 260; Eastman v. Little, 5 N. H., 290; Wil
liams v. Harris, 4 Sneed, 332; Bidwell v. Webb, 10 Minn., 59; Bidwell v. Cole
man, 11 id., 78.
s Porter v. Whitney, 1 Greenl., 306; Shimmin v. Inman, 26 Me., 228; Hobbs
e. Clements, 32 id., 67 ; Greene v, Lunt, 58 id., 518 ; Smith v. Messer, 17 ST. H.f
420; Piercee. Richardson, 37 id., 306, 314; Langdoni. Poor, 20 Vt.,13; Hughey
v. Horrell, 2 Ohio, 231 ; Styles v. Weir, 26 Miss., 187 ; Sutton v. Calhoun, 14 La.
\p t 209. If the statute gives a form for a notice, it is sufficient to follow it,
even though it does not specially name the place of sale ; that being otherwise
fixed. Clark v. Mowyer, 5 Mich., 562. Mr. Blackwell says: "Where the
form is prescribed by the statute, that form must be strictly and literally fol
lowed ; the court will not admit the substitution of a different one." Blackw.
on Tax Titles, 223. True, if it is different in substance ; but to say that the
statute form must be literally followed, is stating a more strict rule of compli-
ance than we can find authorities to justify. The publication of notice, not
in the regular issue of a paper, but in extra sheets, is insufficient, unless these
are sent to all the subscribers. Davis v. Simms, 4 Bibb, 465.
J Scales v. Alvis, 12 Ala., 617.
4Gilbert e. Turnpike Co., 3 Johns. Cas., 107; Cheatham v. Howell, 6 Yerg.,
22
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Time and place of sale. The sale must be made at the very
time and place provided by law for that purpose. In this re
gard, the utmost strictness is required, since otherwise the whole
purpose of the notice, both as regards information to the public
and protection to the owner of the land, will be defeated. A
sale inside a building, when the law requires it to be at the outer
door, has been held to be void.1 So a sale either before or after
the time which has been named for the purpose, is wholly with
out warrant of law, and cannot be sustained.2 If, however, an
adjournment from day to day is authorized, in order to complete
a sale after it has been begun, perhaps a reasonable presumption
that the sale was begun in season, and adjourned as thus pro
vided, should uphold a sale appearing to have been made after
wards, in the absence of any showing to the contrary.8
311; Gwine. Van Zant,7 id., 143; Nelson e. Pierce, 6 N. H., 194; Wells v.
Burbank, 17 id., 393; Lovejoy e. Lent, 48 Me., 377; Briggs v. Whipple, 7 Vt.,
18; Farnum v. Buffum, 4 Cush., 260; People v. Highway Commissioners, 14
Mich., 528; Games v. Stiles, 14 Pt., 322. As to the strictness of proof required
in showing notice, see County Commissioners v. Clarke, 36 Md., 206 ; Jarvis
e. Silliman, 21 Wis., 607; Iverslie v. Spaulding, 32 id., 394; Pierce e. Sweetzer,
2 Ind., 649. Evidence of the officer, in general terms, that a sale was made in
exact pursuance of the statute, is not sufficient without specifying what was
done. Jesse v. Preston, 5 Grat., 120.
1Ruby v. Huntsman, 32 Mo., 501 ; Vassar v. George, 47 Miss., 713, 721. See
State v. Rollins, 29 Mo., 267; McNair e. Jenson, 33 Mo., 312.
2Wilkins' Heirs v. Huse, 10 Ohio, 139; Hopee. Sawyer, 14 11l., 254. The
sheriff has no general power to sell for taxes, but only to sell at the time and
place fixed by law. Hogins v. Brashears, 13 Ark., 242 ; Merrick v. Hutt, 15 id.,
331 ; Bonnell e. Roane, 20 id., 114. Where the regular time for sale is the first
Monday of March, but a sale at another time may be ordered by the county
court, a deed reciting a sale at another time, but reciting no order, is void on
its face. McDermott v. Skully, 27 Ark., 226. A sale not begun on the clay
fixed by law, is void on its face. Prindle v. Campbell, 9 Minn., 212; Park v.
Tinkham, 9 Kan., 615; Entrekin e. Chambers, 11 id., 368.
8See Burns «. Lyon, 4 Watts, 363; Bestor v. Powell, 2 Gilm., 197; Lacye.
Davis, 4 Mich., 140 ; Harlcy v. Street, 29 Iowa, 429 ; Love «. Welch, 33 id., 192.
Where a collector's sale was advertised at a particular time and place, and the
collector's return states it to have been held in the town and on the day desig
nated, it will be presumed, in absence of proof to the contrary, that it was
held at the precise time and place specified. Spear e. Bitty, 8 Vt., 419. In
Connecticut, it seems, a tax collector need not specify in his return the day
on which the sale was made. Picket v. Allen, 10 Conn., 146. In Iowa a tax
deed showing that the land was sdftl at an adjourned sale, without reciting
CH. XV.] THE SALE OF LANDS FOR UNPAID TAXES. 339
Competition at the sale. The sale must be a public sale, with
opportunity for open competition.1 This is a universal require
ment ; and it may seriously be questioned whether the legislature
possesses the power to provide for the extinguishment of the own
er's title by a secret or private sale. The sale itself is a proceed
ing to perfect a statutory forfeiture. The legislature has proba
bly authority to declare a forfeiture of property taxed, for delin
quency in making payment ; but in such an act the sovereign
power of the state is pushed to the very limit, and it is believed
that a statute which comes short of such a declaration, and leaves
the title still in the owner, could not provide for divesting him of
it by means of administrative proceedings secretly taken, and of
which neither actual nor constructive notice was to be given him.
A public sale is the usual and proper course; and this, in order
to constitute any protection to the owner, must be so made as to
invite competition. And, as having an important influence on
this subject, the courts have been compelled to take notice of
fraudulent practices, which are almost as common as tax sales
themselves. "Iam aware," says one learned judge, " that there
is much management and fraudulent perversion of the law about
purchasing at treasurer's sales. It is our duty to discountenance
it" 8 " Over a sale of this description," says another, " the owner
has no control ; he cannot refuse a bid, or adjourn the sale, or fix
a sum below which the property shall not be struck down. The
sale is managed by the agent of the state. The owner is not con
sulted. The highest bidder becomes the purchaser, although the
sum bid be less than a hundredth part of the value of the prop
erty." 8 Acres for cents is the rule; the purchasers who congre
gate at the sale are usually speculators anticipating enormous
profits on their investments ; and competition in purchases is usu
ally the last thing they desire. The persons in default will, in
many cases, be poor and friendless ; at any rate they will not be
present; and the officer will commonly be found sufficiently dis
the causes justifying it
,
is at least prima fa«ie evidence that the sale was prop
erly held, and that a proper cause for adjournment existed. Lorain e. Smith,
37 Iowa, 67.
1 Jenks e. Wright, 61 Penn. St., 410.
' Burnside, J., in Donnel v. Bellas, 11 Penn. St., 341, 351.
•Dudley r. Little, 2 Ohio, 504.
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posed to be complaisant to the interests of those who are at hand.
It is not surprising, therefore, if in some instances it is discovered
that he has accommodated them to an extent that practically ex
cludes all competition.1 It is still more common, perhaps, that
purchasers in a friendly way arrange among themselves, that no
competition shall take place, and that the harvest shall be equit
ably apportioned between them. All such arrangements are a
fraud upon the law, and upon those whose protection is had in
view when a public sale is provided for. " It is essential to the
validity of tax sales, not merely that they should be conducted
in conformity with the requirements of the law, but that they
should be conducted with entire fairness. Perfect freedom from
all influences likely to prevent competition in the sale should be
in all cases strictly exacted. The owner is seldom present, and is
generally ignorant of the proceeding until too late to prevent it.
The tax usually bears a very slight proportion to the value of
the property ; and thus a great temptation is presented to parties
to exclude competition at the sale, and to prevent the owner from
redeeming when the sale is made. The proceeding, therefore,
should be closely scrutinized, and whenever it has been character
ized by fraud or unfairness, should be set aside, or the purchaser
be required to hold the title in trust for the owner." Such is the
language of the supreme court of the Union, in a case in which
the purchaser of land at a tax sale had contrived to prevent com
petition, by the representation that the owner would defeat the
sale by redemption. The court, very properly and justly, held
ihe sale to be void as a fraud,2 following in this regard an early
case in Ohio, where a combination between bidders to preclude
competition was also held fatal to the sale.8
1As in Brown «. Hogle, 30 11l., 119, where the treasurer in proceeding to
make sale, permitted favored persons to go through his list and select out in
advance the lands they would purchase.
* Field, J., in Slater v. Maxwell, 6 Wall., 268, 276. See also Kerwer v, Allen,
31 Iowa, 578.
•Dudley v. Little, 2 Ohio, 504. In Case e. Dean, 16 Mich., 12, it was decided
that such a combination between bidders would not defeat the title of a pur
chaser who was nor a party to, nor shown to be aware of it. See also Martin
e. Cole, 38 Iowa, 141. In Reeve «. Kennedy, 43 Cal., 643, it is held that a sale
cannot be attacked collaterally for fraud in obtaining it.
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Officer not to boy. In order that there may be free competi
tion, it is essential that the officer who makes the sale should act
as salesman only, and not become interested in the purchases.
He cannot be allowed to occupy the inconsistent positions of pur
chaser and seller, in which his cupidity would draw him in one
direction and his duty in another. The law cannot safely intrust
the securities provided for private parties to the care of those who
are interested to prevent their accomplishing the purpose for
which the securities are provided. No provision of law, it is as
sumed, would ever be made which would subject official integrity
to the trial of such conflicts between interest and duty, as would
be sure to arise if the officer were allowed to bid at a sale where
his duty would be to obtain the highest practicable bid in the in
terest of another. To put himself in that position is regarded as
a fraud in the officer upon the law ; and on general principles of
public policy, the sale which he makes to himself is void.1 On
no other principle can integrity and good faith be secured in pro
ceedings of this ex parte character.
Sale in separate parcels. The sale should also be made of
the parcels of land as they appear in the list. This is the general
rule. Exceptions are made by statutes for various reasons.
Where a tract is capable of subdivision, the statute may author
ize the owner of a part to relieve such part from liability by pay
ing a proportionate part of the tax.2 Under some statutes, any
one who will distinctly define any portion of an unimproved
tract of land, may pay the tax upon that portion. So statutes
permit the owner or claimant of an undivided interest to pay
upon that by itself.' In any of these cases the part of the land,
1Pierce e. Benjamin, 14 Pick., 356; Clute v. Barron, 2 Mich., 192; Parson v.
Hall, 30 Me., 319; Taylor v. Stringer, 1 Grat., 158; Chandler v. Moulton, 33
Vt., 245. In Fox v. Cash, 11 Penn. St., 207, it is decided that this principle
will not preclude a clerk in the treasurer's office from becoming a purchaser.
To the same effect is Wells v. Jackson Manuf. Co., 47 N. H., 285. The officer
selling cannot act as agent for others in buying; though if he does so, and
the purchase is afterwards set aside on that ground, the owner must refund to
the purchaser what he has paid. Everett v. Bebe, 37 Iowa, 452.
»See Fellows e. Denniston, 23 N. Y., 420.
8Without express statutory authority, undivided interests cannot be sold
separately when the tract is assessed as an entirety. Roberts v. Chan Tin Pen,
23 Cal., 259. In Vermont, it appears that a collector's deed of land sold for
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or the interest in the land, upon which the tax is not paid, re
mains subject to sale and may be sold by itself. But in other
respects the listing is to be followed in the sale.1 To group lands
in the sale which are assessed as separate interests, is incompe
tent, even though they be owned by the same person.2 Each
parcel is chargeable with its own taxes, and is to be redeemed by
paying them; but such a joint sale charges it with the tax upon
the other also, and is like issuing one execution upon several
judgments, and selling jointly the lands which are charged with
separate liens.8 It may or may not be important to the owner
taxes, which describes the land simply as so many acres of a large lot, passes
an undivided interest in such lot equal to the proportion which the number of
acres sold bears to the whole number of acres in the lot. Sheafe v. Wait, 30
Vt., 735.
1Ballance e. Forsyth, 13 How., 18; Walker e. Moore, 2 Dill. C C, 256; Mor
ton v. Harris, 9 Watts, 319; Woodburn v. Wireman, 27 Penn. St., 18; Hayden
v. Foster, 13 Pick., 492; Willey v. Scoville, 9t Ohio, 43; Atkins e. Hinman, 2
Gilm., 437; Spellman e. Curtenins, 12 11l., 409; Pitkin v. Yaw, 13 id., 251 ;
Penn v. Clemans, 19 Iowa, 372 ; Ware o Thompson, 29 id., 65 ; Martin e. Cole,
38 id., 141; Moulton v. Blaisdell, 24 Me., 283; Wallingford v. Fiske, id., 386;
Andrews v. Senter, 32 id., 394; State v. Richardson, 21 Mo., 420; Baskins e.
Winston, 24 Miss., 431. Though a sale together of several lots which really
constitute one tract may be good, yet this can only be so when they were as
sessed together, or when they constitute a definite portion or fraction of what
was assessed, so that, by mere division or subtraction, the amount of tax
chargeable on the property sold can be determined from the assessment roll.
McQuesten e. Swope, 12 Kans., 32. In Pennsylvania, the sale of seated lauds
with unseated is void for want of jurisdiction. Dietrick e. Mason, 57 Penn.
St., 40. Unseated lands are sold without regard to ownership. Reading v.
Finney, 73 Penn. St., 467. See Cuttle e. Brockway, 32 id., 45. In New York,
it is held competent, where distinct interests are held subject to a lien for
taxes, to provide by statute for a judicial sale of the whole fee, on the appli
cation of one party, after publication of notice to unknown owners. Jackson
v. Babcock, 16 N. Y, 246.
2Andrews v. Senter, 32 Me., 394; Woodburn v. Wireman, 27 Penn. St., 18;
Hayden v. Foster, 13 Pick., 492. In Minnesota, when an assessment is of a
whole block, the treasurer cannot sell in parcels. Moulton v. Doran, 10 Minn.,
67.
5To sell one's " right, title and interest " in land is not equivalent to a sale
of the land itself. Clarke v. Strickland, 2 Curt. C C, 439. Where the sale
was of an undivided interest when all was assessed together, the sale was held
void. Roberts v. Chan Tin Pen, 23 Cal., 259. It would be otherwise if the
statute provided for the sale of undivided interests after the tax on other in-
terests had been paid.
CH. XV.] THE SALE OF LANDS FOR UNPAID TAXES. 343
that he have the opportunity of a separate redemption, but the
fact that it possibly may be so is sufficient reason why the law-
should protect the right
Surplus bond. Various methods are adopted in different
states to save something to the owner, if that shall be possible,
when his land is sold. One of these is
,
to have the land put up
for sale for what it will bring, and if the bid exceed the tax, with
interest and expenses, require the surplus to be deposited in the
state or county treasury for the benefit of the party who shall
show his right Another is to require a bond to be given by the
purchaser to account for the excess over the taxes and charges,
which bond shall be a lien on the land.1 Still another is to require
so much of the land to be sold as may be requisite to satisfy the
tax and charges, either prescribing a general rule as to where the
parcel sold shall be taken off, or allowing a discretion to the offi
cer in that regard.
Excossive sale. It has been said that in the absence of any
statute limiting the officer's right to sell, to so much as would be
requisite to pay the tax and charges, a restriction to this extent
would be intended by the law.2 Whether this is so or not is per
haps not very material, as it is not for a moment to be supposed
that any statute would be adopted without this or some equivalent
provision for the owner's benefit And such a provision must be
strictly obeyed. A sale of the whole when less would pay the
tax is void,8 and a sale of the remainder after the tax had been
1 Peters v. Heasley, 10 Watts, 208 ; Loud v. Penninan, 19 Pick., 539 ; People
e. Hammond, 1 Doug., Mich., 276. The giving of the surplus bond is a con
dition precedent to the passing of the title to the purchaser at the tax sale.
Sutton v. Nelson, 10 S. & R., 238; McDonald v. Maus, 8 Watts, 364; Donnel
v. Bellas, 10 Peim. St., 341 ; Cuttle v. Brockway, 24 id., 145. As to suit upon
it
,
see Crawford v. Stewart, 38 Penn. St., 34. That there is no presumption
such a bond was given, where the tax purchaser does not take possession or
pay taxes, sec Alexander v. Bush, 46 Penn. St., 62.
» O'Brien v. Coulter, 2 Blackf., 421. The power to provide by law that the
whole should be sold, when .not necessary to pay the tax, was denied in Mar
tin v. Snowden, 18 Grat., 100 ; Downey v. Nutt, 19 id., 59.
8 Loomis v. Pingree, 43 Me., 299 ; Lovejoy v. Lunt, 48 id., 377 ; French v.
Patterson, id., 203, 210; Ainsworth v. Dean, 21 N. H., 400; Lyford b. Dunn,
32 id., 81 ; Jaquith v. Putney, 48 id., 138; Avery e. Rose, 4 Dev., 554; Love v.
Welbourn, 5 Ired., 347 ; Baskins e. Winston , 24 Miss., 431 ; Crowell v. Good-.
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satisfied by the sale of a part would also be void, for the very
plain reason that the power to sell would be exhausted the mo
ment the tax was collected.1
It has been shown in a preceding chapter that an excessive levy
is void, whether it is made excessive by including with lawful
texes those which are unlawful, or in any other manner. If the
levy would be void, there would of course be nothing to uphold
a sale. And if a valid levy were to be increased afterwards by
unlawful additions, the sale would be equally bad. A sale for
anything more than is lawfully chargeable is a sale without juris
diction, and therefore void.2
Sale to highest bidder and for cash. The sale must be to
the highest bidder, or, which is equivalent, when that method is
prescribed, to the person who offers to pay the tax and charges
for the smallest parcel of land.8 And as the conveyance must be
in execution of a sale actually made, if the sale is made to one
man, and by arrangement the deed is made to another, such deed
can convey no title whatever.* The sale must be for cash. The
officer can give no credit where the statute provides for none.*
win, 3 Allen, 535 ; Stead's Executors v. Course, 4 Cranch, 403 ; Mason v. Fear-
son, 9 How., 248 ; French e. Edwards, 13 Wall., 506. Under the Massachusetts
statute providing that if an estate is capahle of division the collector may sell
so much thereof as would be sufficient to discharge the taxes and intervening
charges, it must appear by the collector's deed or otherwise, that the land was
so divided that no greater portion was sold than was necessary to satisfy the
tax and charges, or that it could not be conveniently divided to that extent
Crowell v. Goodwin, 3 Allen, 535.
1See Washington v. Pratt, 8 Wheat,, 681 ; Mason v. Fearson, 9 How., 248.
When the land as assessed consists of several distinct parcels constituting one
tract, if the several parcels are offered separately and no bids obtained, the
whole may then be offered together. State e. Maxwell, 6Wall., 268. Where a
quarter section contained several villnge lots, it was held incompetent to sell
off an acre from one side for the tax on the whole. Ballance e. Forsyth, 13
How., 18.
»McQuilkine. Doe, 3 Black f.
,
581; Hutchens e. Doc, 3 Ind., 528; Harden-
burgh v. Kidd, 10 Cal., 402 ; McQuesten v. Swope, 12 Kans., 32. Sale void
where an illegal percentage is added. Bucknall v. Story, 36 Cal., 67. And
see ante pp. 295-297.
8See Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H, 182; Bean v. Thompson, 19 id., 290.
4 Keene e. Houghton, 19 Me., 368.
'Cushing e. Longfellow, 26 Me., 306. In Longfellow v. Quimby, 29 id.,
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It must not be for more than is due, as this would be a plain
excess of jurisdiction.1 Observing the statutory directions and
precautions, and the principles of the common law and of public
policy, to which reference has been made, the officer may trans
fer to the purchaser the full interest in the land which has been
assessed, and may convey a complete and perfect title, if such is the
provision of law on the subject.2 And inadequacy of price does
not defeat such a sale ; if it did, the power to collect revenue by
this method would be futile.8
Who may acquire tax titles. Some persons, from their rela
tion to the land or to the tax, are precluded from becoming pur
chasers. The title to be transferred on such a sale is one based
on the default of the person who owes to the government the
duty to pay the tax. But one person may owe this duty to the
government, and another may owe it to the owner of the land.
Such a case may exist where the land is occupied by a tenant,
who, by his lease, has obligated himself to pay taxes. Where
this is the relation of the parties to the land, it would cause a
shock to the moral sense if the law were to permit this tenant
to neglect his duty and cut off his lessor's title by buying in the
land at a tax sale. So the mortgagor, remaining in possession of
the land, owes it to the mortgagee to keep down the taxes ; and
196 it was decided, that where the sale was for cash, the giving of credit to
the purchaser afterwards would not defeat it. In Donnel e. Bellas, 34 Penn.
St., 157, the treasurer took a note from the purchaser instead of cash. The
sale was held void, and incapable of being affirmed by the treasurer by
receiving payment after leaving office. Sec the same case, 10 Penn. St., 341;
11 id., 341.
1Peters v. Heasely, 10 Watts, 208 ; Loud «. Penniman, 19 Pick., 539. A sale
for the taxes of several years, one of which has been paid, is void. Kins-
worthy v. Mitchell, 21 Ark., 145. And see Douglass v. Short, 3 Dev., 432. Sale of
lands for the tax of the wrong party is void. Gardner v. Brown, Meigs, 354.
Sale for two taxes, one of which is illegal, also void. Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Greenl.,
339; Hardenburgh e. Kidd, 10 Cal., 402.
* It has already been stated, that the separate interests of different owners
arc, under some laws, assessed separately. In such a case, a sale of the land
for a tax assessed against one does not cut ofl the interests of others. Irwin
v. Bank of United States, 1 Penn. St., 349. Where the whole title is sold, it
cuts off back taxes, unless other provision is made. Trego e. Huzzard, 19
Penn. St., 441 ; Irwin b. Trego, 22 id., 368; Same v. Same, 35 id., 9.
»Sec State v. Maxwell, 6 Wall., 268.
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the law would justly be chargeable with connivance at fraud and
dishonesty, if a mortgagor might allow the taxes to become
delinquent, and then discharge them by a purchase which would
at the same time cut off his mortgage. There is a general prin
ciple applicable to such cases ; that a purchase made by one
whose duty it was to pay the taxes shall operate as payment
only ; he shall acquire no rights as against a third party, by a
neglect of the duty which he owed to such party. This principle
is universal, and is so entirely reasonable as scarcely to need the
support of authority. Show the existence of the duty, and the
disqualification is made out in every instance.1
The cases to which attention is called in the margin, and many
others to which they refer, will show the application of the rule
under a great variety of circumstances. It has been applied to
Cases where the default was only in part that of the purchaser;
as where he was tenant in common with others,8 or where his
own land was taxed as one parcel with that of another, and the
1Varney v. Stevens, 22 Me., 331; Gardiner e. Gerrish, 23 id., 46; Fuller «.
Hodgdon, 25 id., 243 ; Mathews e. Light, 32 id., 305 ; Coombs e. Warren, 34
id., 89; Williams «. Hilton, 35 id., 547: Haskell e. Putnam, 42 id., 244; Coxe
v. Wolcott, 27 Penn. St., 154; Coxe v. Gibson, id., 160; Oldhams «. Jones, 5 B.
Monr., 458, 467; Blake v. Howe, 1 Aikens, 306; Willard v. Strong, 14 Vt., 532;
Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich., 140; Taylor «. Snyder, Wal. Ch., 492; Frye v. Bank of
11linois, 11 11l., 367; Prettyman v. Walston, 34 id., 175; Higgins v. Crosby, 40
id., 260; Smith v. Lewis, 20 Wis., 369; Avery e. Judd, 21 id., 262; Barrett v.
Welch, 22 id., 175; Phelan «. Boylan, 25 id., 679; Edgarton v. Schneider, 26
id., 385 ; Brown e. Simons, 44 N. H., 475 ; McLaughlin <t.Green, 48 Miss., 175,
207; Carithers v. Weaver, 7 Kans., 110; Krutz v. Fisher, 8 id., 90; Kelsey v.
Abbott, 13 Cal., 609; Barrett e. Amerein, 36 id., 322; McMinn v. Whelan, 27
id., 300; Cofflnger e. Rice, 33 id., 408; Garwood v. Hastings, 38 id., 216;
Savings and Loan Society e. Ordway, 38 id., 679.
s Lloyd v. Lynch, 28 Penn. St., 419 ; Maul v. Rider, 51 id., 377 ; Piatt v.
St. Clair's Heirs, 6 Ohio, 227; Page e. Webster, 8 Mich., 263; Butler v. Porter,
13 id., 262; Dubois v. Campau, 24 id., 360; Choteau v. Jones, 11 11l., 300, 322;
Brown v. Hogle, 30 id., 119; Chickering v. Faile, 38 id., 342; State v. Willis-
ton, 20 Wis., 240; Phelan v. Boylan. 25 id., 679; Baker v. Whiting, 3 Sum.,
475, Downer's Adm'r v. Smith, 38 Vt., 464. That payment by one tenant in
common enures to the benefit of all, see Chickering v. Faile, 38 11l., 342 ;
McConnel e. Konepel, 46 id., 519. As to what right one might have to buy
the interest of his cotenant after paying his own tax, there is some discussion
in Butler v. Porter, 13 Mich., 262. As to the right of one tenant in common
to buy in a matured tax title, see KirkpaU ick v. Mathiot, 4 W. & S., 251;
Reinboth v. Zerbe Run Co., 29 Penn. St., 139; Frentz v. Klotsch, 28 Wis., 312.
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whole was sold together ; 1 and to a case where an agent to pay
taxes made a purchase of his principal's lands, assuming to jus
tify himself on the ground that his principal had neglected to
supply him with the means of making payment.2 In all such
cases, and all to which the like reasons apply, the purchase, as
between the parties, is in law a payment only ; or, if made at sec
ond hand, from another who was purchaser at the public sale, it
is allowed to operate, for the purposes of justice, only as a redemp
tion,8 and the party making it may have a remedy over for the
money paid, or for any portion thereof, if in equity any other
person who is benefited by the purchase ought to have paid it ;
otherwise not.
Some other cases are not so plain, because the duty as between
the parties is not so definitely determined by their contract, or by
their legal relation. While a mortgagor in general cannot be
allowed to cut off his mortgage, by buying in the land at tax
sale, yet if the mortgagee were in possession, receiving the issues
and profits, and bound to pay the taxes himself, it might not be
so clear that the mortgagor should be precluded from taking ad
vantage of the mortgagee's neglect. If it were to be so held,
there would seem to be reason for holding that the mortgagee
also, by reason of his relation to the title, was precluded from
becoming purchaser of the mortgagor's interest at a tax sale, and
that his remedy would be confined to a payment for the protec
tion of his lien, with a remedy over for the amount paid. It
cannot be said in such a case, that either mortgagor or mortgagee
is under no obligation to the government to pay the tax. On
1Cooley v. Waterman, 16 Mich., 366.
sMcMahon v. McGraw, 26 Wis., 614. As to the disqualification of the agent
to purchase his principal's land at tax sale, see further Oldhams v. Jones, 5
B. Monr., 458 ; Bartholomew v. Leach, 7 Watts, 472 ; Matthews «. Light, 32
Me., 305; Lindsley e. Sinclair, 24 Mich., 380; Krutz e. Fisher, 8 Kans., 90;
Schedda v. Sawyer, 4 McLean, 181 ; Kelsey v. Abbott, 13 Cal., 609 ; Bernal v.
Lynch, 36 id., 135, 146 ; Barton v. Moss, 32 11l., 50. One who has bargained
for the land, and is in possession under an agreement to purchase, occupies a
similar position. Haskell v. Putnam, 42 Me., 244 ; Voris e. Thomas, 12 11l.,
442; Oliver e. Croswell, 42 id., 41. See Coxe v. Wolcott, 27 Penn. St., 154;
Quin v. Quin, 27 Wis., 168.
* See Shepardson v. Elmore, 19 Wis., 424; Coxe v. Wolcott, 27 Penn. St., 154;
Oarithers v. Weaver, 7 Kan., 110; Bernal v. Lynch, 36 Cal., 135, 146.
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the contrary, the tax being one that purposely is made to over
ride the lien of the one as well as the title of the other, it might
well, as it seems to us, be held that neither mortgagor nor mort
gagee was at liberty to neglect the payment, as one step in bet
tering his condition at the expense of the other, but that the pre
sumption of law should be that the party purchasing did so for
the protection of his own interest merely. And so are some of
the authorities.1
Whether one should be precluded by the naked fact that he
claims title to the land, or that he has possession of it
,
from making
a purchase in extinguishment of the right of another with whom
he stands in no contract or fiduciary relations, is a question ofteu
touched by the discussions of courts without having as yet been
very fully or comprehensively examined. So far as the cases
hold that one who ought, as between himself and some third per
son, to pay the taxes, shall not build up a title on his own default,
the principle is clear and well founded in equity. But when one
owes no duty to any other in respect to the land, it is not so clear
upon what principle of equity or of estoppel such other is to set
up, as against him, his neglect to perform in due season his duty
to the government.
There are some cases in which it has been distinctly held that
possession, when the tax was assessed, fixed upon the possessor
1 Fisk v. Brunette, 30 Wis., 102. In this case the mortgagee held the legal
title, and he is spoken of in the opinion as being, in a certain sense, a trustee.
Dixon, Ch. J., delivering the opinion, makes no mention of the earlier case of
Sturdevant v. Mather, 20 Wis., 576, 585, in which he had referred to the same
question, and to the decision in Williams v. Townsend, 31 N. Y., 411, 415, in a
manner understood by the reporter to imply an approval. In the same
connection he also referred " to Walthall v. Rives, 34 Ala., 91, and Harrison v.
Roberts, 6 Fla., 711, in which it was held that a mortgagee may purchase and
hold a paramount title under older judgment lions, and to Chapman v. Mull,
7 Ired. Eq., 292, and the observations of Sir Thomas Plummer, M. R., in
Cholmoudely v. Clinton, 2 Jac. & Wal., 181, et seq., upon the general question
how far the principles applicable to dealings between trustee and eestui qtu
trust apply to the case of mortgagor and mortgagee." The 11linois cases are
very emphatic, that a mortgagee, like a trustee, cannot affect the rights of the
mortgagor by purchasing the property at a sale for delinquent taxes accruing
on the premises. Chickering e. Faile, 26 11l., 507; Moore e. Titman, 44 id.,
367. In Brown v. Simons, 4 N. H., 475, is a like decision, in a case in which
the mortgagee was in possession. It is not very clear how far Williams v.
Townsend, supra, was designed to lay down a contrary doctrine.
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the duty to pay, and precluded his becoming a purchaser at a sale
for the taxes when they became delinquent In the leading case
the occupant had gone into possession under an invalid tax title, and
by the decision he was precluded from relying upon a second title
which acccrued while he was in the occupancy of the land.1 The
subject 'is dismissed with very brief mention, the court appearing
to regard the claim as inequitable and unjust, but for what reason
is not very clearly explained. Other cases treat the point as
equally plain.2 But it seems to us that it is deserving of more
1Douglas e. Dangerfield, 10 Ohio, 152.
8Choteau v. Jones, 11 11l., 300, 322, per Treat, Ch. J. " The purchase of a
portion of the land by George W. Jones, at a sale for taxes, did not stregthen
his title. That purchase was made prior to the sale by the administrator. Ho
was then one of the owners of the land, and as such bound to pay the taxes
assessed upon it. The purchase was but a mode of paying the taxes legally
chargeable against him." " He admits in his answer that he suffered the land
to be sold, and bid it in for the purpose of defeating an older tax title, and not
with a view of acquiring any new title." This doctrine is affirmed in Lacey v.
Davis, 4 Mich., 140, 152, where it is said by Martin, J., to be of no importance
whether a party claiming title to land is assessed personally for the tax or not.
" It is the possession which creates the disability in the purchaser." The case
holds that if one acquires the possession while the tax is a lien on the land, he
is bound to discharge the lien, and cannot buy at tax sale. But see Lybrand v.
Haney, 31 Wis., 230; Blackwood v. Van Vleet, 30 Mich., 118. In Tweed v.
Metcalf,4 id., 579, it was decided that one who had bought at a tax sale might
buy the same land at a subsequent sale made at any time before redemption
from the first had expired. The doctrine of Choteau e. Jones, supra, was
affirmed in Voris e. Thomas, 12 11l., 442, and the same general doctrine is as
serted in Smith «. Lewis, 20 Wis., 350, 354, though there the case was between
mortgagee and the assignee of the mortgage, and the relation of the parties
precluded a purchase. The same remark may be made of Dubois e. Campau,
24 Mich., 368. Bassett v. Welch, 22 Wis., 175, goes the full length of deciding
that the mere fact of possession when the taxes are assessed is a disqualifica
tion to buy. Jones v. Davis, 24 Wis., 229, was a case where one in possession
of land had endeavored to cut off a judgment lien by a purchase at tax sale,
corresponding to the case of purchase by a mortgagor. Whitney v. Gunder-
son, 31 Wis., 359, 379, asserts the broad doctrine that if one was in possession
when the tax was assessed, "it then became his duty to pay the taxes, and he
could not permit the lands to be sold for such taxes, and obtain a tax deed for
the purpose of destroying an outstanding title." And see McMinn v. Whelan,
27 Cal., 300; Burrett v. Amerein, 36 Cal., 322. In Blakely v. Bestor, 13 11l.,
708, 714, Trumbull, J., apparently puts the case on the ground of an obligation
or duty as between parties. " It is insisted," he says, " that the defendant is
not in a position to avail himself of an outstanding tax title, be it ever so reg-
ular, for the reason that he is shown by the record to have been in the poss es
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consideration whether, where parties stand to each other in the
position of adverse claimants to land, either of them can insist
that the other shall discharge a duty to the government for his
protection. There being nothing in the relation of the parties to
each other upon which an estoppel can be raised, it is necessary
to look elsewhere for the disqualification insisted upon ; and this
can only be found in some general rule of public policy. It is
certainly an imperative requirement of public policy that the rev
enues of the state shall be collected, and that no one shall be al
lowed to defraud the treasury of his due proportion ; but in the
case where a tax sale has been made there is no fraud, and the
revenue chargeable upon the land has been received. No wrong
has consequently been done to the state. There has been delay
in payment, but it is one for which the state makes ample provis
ion, and for which it charges the party concerned with all costs,
and an interest sufficient fully to compensate for any public in
convenience. It is not perceived that the state can then have
any complaint to make, as the duty owing to it
,
though performed
tardily, has been performed at last The state, then, not being
wronged in the purchase, it would seem that whatever individual
objects to it ought to be able to point out how and in what par
ticular it wrongs him.
It is difficult to dispute the truth of what is said by the supreme
court of Pennsylvania, that " there is nothing in reason or law to
sion of the premises at the time the taxes accrued and the sale took place,
wherefore it is said that it was his duty to have paid the taxes, and that he
ought not to he permitted to avail himself of a tax title acquired through his
default. This may or may not be so. It does not necessarily follow that be
cause a person is in possession of premises he is bound to pay the taxes as
sessed upon them; he may occupy them as a tenant under an agreement that
his landlord shall pay the taxes, and in such case there would be no obliga
tion on the tenant to pay them, particularly if
,
in pursuance of the agreement,
they were listed for taxation in the landlord's name." In Swift v. Agnes, 33
Wis., 228, it is decided that where one owning land, and bound to pay taxes
thereon, permits them to be sold and deeded for such taxes, and then purchases
the tax title, and causes it to be conveyed to a third person for his benefit, he
cannot set up such title as a defense in ejectment against one who has pur
chased at a sale on execution against him since the execution of the tax deed.
There is nothing in the fact that the owner of land has become the purchaser
at tax sale which can estop him from claiming the surplus moneys. Russell
v. Reed, 27 Penn. St, 166.
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prevent A man who holds a defective title from purchasing a bet
ter at a treasurer's sale for taxes." 1 As between himself and any
adverse claimant it is an unimportant consideration whether the
one or the other was in possession. If the state, in taxing land,
takes any notice of ownership, it is either for the convenience of
the officers in making collections, or for information to parties
concerned. The tax is upon every possible interest in the land ;
and all parties having interests are equally under obligation to
the state to make payment The penalty for failure is a forfeiture or
sale which will cut them all off ; and while, without doubt, any one
may defeat such a sale who can give satisfactory reasons for an
assertion that it would be unjust to him for the purchaser to be
allowed to rely upon it
, it is not perceived that any other person
can well insist upon a right to do so. This, of course, is aside
from any question of irregularities or defects ; in general, any per
son may rely upon those when the tax title is made use of against
him ; as they go, or may go, to the power of the officer to sell
at all.2
Bids by the state or county. It is not an uncommon provis
ion that, if no bidders offer to take the land and pay the tax, it
shall be bid in for the state or for the county. A purchase on
such a bid would give the state or county the usual rights of a
1 Woodward, J., in Coxe v. Gibson, 27 Peun. St., 160, 165. And see Black-
wood v. Van Vleet, S0 Mich., 118.
* It is held in California that one in possession of lands, if under no legal cr
moral obligation to pay the tax, may buy in the lands at tax sale. Moss v.
Shear, 25 Cal., 38. The same ruling is made in Kansas. Bowman e. Cock-
rill, 6 Kans., 311, 332. In Blackwood e. Van Vleet, 30 Mich., 118, it is said
that " to preclude any person from making and relying upon a purchase of
lands at tax sale, there must be something in the circumstances of the case
which imposes upon him a duty to the state to pay the tax, or something
which renders it inequitable, as between himself and the holder of the exist
ing title, that he should make the purchase." And it is denied that the mere
fact, that one is in possession of the land when the tax is levied, should pre-
elude liis becoming purchaser when the land is not assessed to him, and he
is bound by no contract relations to pay the tax. The person taxed cannot
get a title at tax sale. Garwood v. Hastings, 38 Cal., 216 ; McMinn v.Whelan,
27 id., 300. A collusive purchase, made to cut off a mortgage, may be set
aside. Savings and Loan Society v. Ordway, 38 Cal., 679 ; Stears e. Hollen-
beck, 38 Iowa, 550.
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purchaser, and no more. "Whether a deed would be requisite to
carry into effect such a purchase must depend upon the statute.1
Different sales at the same time. Where the taxes of several
years are delinquent at the same time, sales are sometimes per
mitted to be made separately for each year's tax. Such sales
might raise serious questions as between purchasers, if two or
more should severally buy the land at sales bearing the same date,
and subject to the same redemption. In Iowa it seems that such
separate sales are unauthorized.2 Such questions might and
should be settled by statute.
Certificate of sale. The sale is usually accompanied or fol
lowed by tho issue to the purchaser of a certificate, which recites
the fact of sale, and states the time when the purchaser will be
come entitled to a conveyance.» No title passes until the time
1Commissioners authorized to bid the Amount of the tax on behalf of the
county, if they bid more, may have the land left on their hands unless the
county see fit to take it. The bid cuts off the prior title. Russell v. Reed, 27
Penn. St., 166. And see Cuttle v. Brockway, 32 id., 45. Commissioners ait-
thoriztd to bid off land for the United States, unless some person will bid two-
thirds the appraised value, are not compelled to do so, and a sale to another
bidder for less is not invalid. Turner v. Smith, 14 Wall., 553, 562. Where
lands are bid in by a county at a tax sale, and the law provides for their being
subsequently sold after a specified notice, a private sale without the notice is
void. The provision for such a sale is to be regarded as a proceeding to col
lect taxes, and must be followed. Jenks v. Wright, 61 Penn. St., 410.
In Kansas, the county treasurer holds a certificate of sale to the county
until it can be sold to an individual, and then assigns the certificate. The
county commissioners cannot control his action in this regard. State v.
Magill, 4 Kan., 415.
»Preston v. Van Gorder, 31 Iowa, 250; Shoemaker e. Lacey, 38 id., 277. In
Iowa, where the treasurer, on the same day, made different sales of the same
land for the taxes of different years, and the owner, being aware of but one
sale, had redeemed therefrom in good faith, he was held entitled to redeem from
the other after the statutory time, by paying the amount for which the land
was sold, with legal interest and penalty. Shoemaker e. Lacey, 38 Iowa, 277,
citing Noble v. Bullis, 23 id., 559. In California, it is held that a sale for a
city tax of one year will not cut off the tax for the preceding year. Cowell v.
Washburn, 22 Cal., 519.
* The certificate is evidence of the sale, but the record of sale is better evi
dence. McCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 356; Henderson v. Oliver, 32 id., 512;
Clark v. Thompson, 37 id., 536.
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allowed for redemption, if any, has expired,1 nor until the proper
conveyance has been executed. Until then the purchaser has an
inchoate right, which he might perhaps protect as a purchaser on
execution might ;2 but he has no title.8
The deed. The requirements of a deed are not uniform in the
different states. In general it should recite enough to show an
authority to sell, but it need not set out all the prior proceedings.4
The tax deed as evidence. It has been shown that, according
to the principles of the common law, the purchaser at a tax sale
when he attempts to enforce rights under his purchase, is under
the necessity of taking upon himself the burden of showing that
the purchase was made pursuant to law. To do this he must show
the substantial regularity of all the proceedings. The deed of
1In Kansas it seems to be held that title passes at the sale, subject to be de
feated by redemption. Stebbins v. Guthrie, 4 Kans., 353.
•See Ferguson v. Miles, 3 Gilm., 358; Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug., Mich., 184.
Under the Missouri statute it has been held that the tax deed does not relate
back to the sale, where redemption was allowed afterwards. Donohoe v. Veal,
19 Mo., 331.
»Tilson v. Thompson, 10 Pick., 359; Hightown v. Freedle, 5 Sneed, 312;
Alexander v. Bush, 46 Penn. St., 62; Stephens v. Holmes, 26 Ark., 48. A deed
executed after the officer's term has expired is void. Hoffman v. Bell, 61 Penn.
St., 444. But it is no objection that it was executed after the taxpayer's death.
Curry v. Fowler, 3 A. K. Marsh., 504.
*See Little v. Herndon, 10 Wall., 26; Sibley v. Smith, 2 Mich., 486; Elston
v. Kennicott, 46 11I., 187 ; Wetherbee x. Dunn, 32 Cal., 106 ; Large v. Fisher, 49
Mo., 307. "Where a statute authorized a sale of real estate after fourteen days
demand of payment, but required the deed to " state the cause of sa le," etc.
and also the particulars of the proceedings preparatory to a sale : Held, that a
deed was void which did not state that the taxes were not paid within fourteen
days after demand. Harrington v. Worcester, 6 Allen, 576. Where notice is
required by law to be given to the owner before a deed is made, the require
ment must be strictly complied with. Denike v. Rourke, 3 Biss., 39. A tax
deed is not void for slight irregularities or variances from the statutory form
Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kans., 311 ; Haynes e. Heller, 12 id., 381. The recitals
in a tax deed are in Ksmsas prima facie evidence of the facts recited. Hobson
v. Dutton, 9 Kans., 477. The deed shows no title without acknowledgment.
Tilson v. Thompson, 10 Pick., 359 ; Stierlin v. Daley, 37 Mo., 483 ; Dalton v.
Fenn, 40 id., 109. In New York it seems that if the deed purports to be given
on a sale of the lands as nonresident, when in fact they were assessed to a
former owner, it is void. Ratler «.Worth, N. Y. Court of Appeals, 11 Albany
Law Journal, 401.
23
354 [CH. XV.LAW OF TAXATION.
conveyance would not stand for this evidence. It would prove
its own execution ; nothing more. The power to execute it must
be shown before the deed itself could have any force ; for no of
ficer can make out his own jurisdiction to act by the mere fact of
acting. In all administrative proceedings the facts upon which
jurisdiction depends must always be shown by him who claims
anything under its exercise. This principle is undisputed. It
leads us inevitably to this conclusion ; that whoever claims lands
under a sale for delinquent taxes, must take upon himself the bur
den of proving that taxes were duly assessed, which were a charge
upon the land, and that the successive steps were taken which led
to a lawful sale therefor, at which he or some one under whom he
claims became the purchaser.1
The difficulty of making the complete showing in these cases
has been thought to be so great as to render some modification of
the rule reasonable, and statutes have from time to time been
made in that direction. The early statutes were probably not as
comprehensive in their terms as their authors intended ; at least,
1Stead's Lessee «. Course, 4 Cranch, 403; Williams v. Peyton, 4 Wheat, 77;
McClung v. Ross, 5 id., 116; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Id., 119; Rondendorff v.
Taylor, 4 Pet., 349; Clarke v. Strickland, 2 Curt. C C, 439; Minor e. McLean,
4 McLean, 138; Moore v. Brown, 4 id., 211; same case in error, 11 How., 414;
Mahew v. Davis, 4 McLean, 213 ; Parker v. Overman, 18 How., 137 ; Brown e.
Veazie, 25 Me., 359 ; Payson v. Hall, 30 id., 319; Loomis e. Pingree, 43 id., 299;
Lovejoy v. Lunt, 48 id., 377; Williamsburghe.Lord, 51 id., 599; French e. Pat
terson, 61 id,. 203 ; Doe e. "Roe, 2 Hawks, 17 ; Avery v. Rose, 4 Dev., 549 ; Love
«. Gates, 4 Dev. & Bat, 353 ; Garrett v White,, 3 Ired. Eq., 131 ; Jordan v. Rouse,
1 Jones, L, 119; Yancey v. Hopkins, 1 Munf., 419; Christy e. Minor, 4 id., 431;
Nalle e. Fenwick, 4 Rand., 585 ; Allen e. Smith, 1 Leigh, 231 ; Chapman v. Doe,
2 id., 329; Polk e. Rose, 25 Md., 153; Beatty v. Mason, 30 id., 409; Dyere.
Boswell, 39 id., 465 ; Doe « .Insurance Co., 8 S. & M., 197 ; Natchez «. Minor, 10
id., 246; Rule v. Parker, Cooke, 278; Hamilton v. Burum, 3 Ycrg., 355; Pope
e. Headen, 5 Ala., 433 ; Lyons v. Hunt, 11 id., 295; Blakeney v. Ferguson, 8 Ark.,
272; Shearer v. Woodburn, 10 Penn St, 511; McReynolds v. Longenberger,
57 id., 13; Bucknall v. Story, 36 Cal., 67; Richardson e. Dorr, 5 Vt., 9; Fitch
v. Casey, 2 Greene, Iowa, 300; Kellog e. McLaughlin, 8 Ohio, 114; McMillan
e. Robbins. 5 id., 31; Williams v. State, 6 Blackf., 36; Doe v. Flagler, 1 Ind.,
B42; Doe v. Sweetzer, 2 id., 649; Barnes v. Doc, 4 id., 132; Kylee. Malin, 8 id., 34;
Atkins v. Kinman, 20 Wend., 241; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 595; Waldron
«. McComb, 1 Hill, 107; Sharp v. Spier, 4 id., 76; Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y.,
66; Bennett v. Buffalo, 17 id., 383; Cniger e. Dougherty, 43 id., 107; Chicago
e. Wright, 3211l., 192; Scammon v. Chicago, 40 id., 146.
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as construed by the courts, they did not change to any con
siderable extent the former rule. Thus, a statute which declared
that the deed should be evidence of the regularity of the sale, was
held to prove only the regularity of the proceedings at the sale,
leaving the purchaser still under the necessity of showing the
regularity of the prior proceedings.1
Where the statute makes the deedprima facie evidence that the
requirements of the sale have been complied with, it is necessary
first that the holder of the tax title should prove the performance
by the assessor and collector of the several acts which are condi
tions precedent to the power to sell; and then the contestant is
put to proof that the requirements of the law, as to time and man
ner of sale, were not complied with.* So a statute which makes
the deed evidence of a title in fee simple in the owner, is held to
be evidence only of such a title after the right to give the deed
has been shown by the proof of anterior proceedings that support
it.8 In later statutes language has been chosen with more care,
and the tax deed, given by a competent officer, has been declared
prima fade evidence not only of the regularity of the sale, but of
all prior proceedings, and of title in the purchaser. This, it will
be seen, changes wholly the burden of proof, which before rested
upon the purchaser, and casts it upon the party who would con
test the sale. The purchaser is no longer under the necessity to
show the correctness of the proceedings, but the contestant must
show in what particular he claims them to be incorrect. The
power to enact such laws has been denied in argument, but the
decisions sustain them.4 These decisions are that the statutes
1Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y. 66 ; Striker e. Kelly, 2 Denio, 323 ; Doughty v.
Hope, 3 id. 594; Beekman e. Bigham, 5 N. Y. 366; Westbrook v. Willey, 47
id. 457; Rowland e. Doty, Har. Ch. 3 ; Scott v. Young Men's Society, 1 Dong.
Mich. 119; Latimer e. Lovett, 2 id. 204; Ives v. Kimball, 1 id. 308; Yenda
e. Wheeler, 9 Texas, 408 ; Wilson v. Lemons, 23 Ind. 433.
»Robson v. Osborn, 13 Texas, 298.
8Sec cases above cited. Also Merrick v. Hutt, 15 Ark. 331. A declaration
in a tax law that the tax deed should be " good and effectual both at law and
in equity," gives no special sanction to the conveyance beyond that derived
from the general principles of law. The purchaser must show that all pre
requisites were complied with. Hadley v. Tankersley, 8 Texas, 12.
4Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How. 472; Williams e. Kirtland, 13 Wall. 306, 310;
Freeman «. Thayer, 33 Me. 76; Orono e. Veazie, 57 id. 517; Hand v. Ballou,
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take away no substantial rights ; they only regulate the order of
proceeding in the legal tribunals, in exhibiting the evidence of sub
stantial rights; and they rest on the solid foundation of the
supreme authority of the legislature over the whole subject of
evidence ; an authority, however, which has this very plain limit ;
that it cannot deprive one of his property by making his adver
sary's claim to it
,
whatever that claim may be, conclusive of its
own validity. It cannot, therefore, make the tax deed conclusive
evidence of the holder's title to the land.1
Statutes giving a peculiar effect to conveyances on sales made
for taxes, unless in express terms declared applicable to the case
12N. Y., 541 ; Forbes e. Halsey, 26 id., 52 ; Johnson e. Elwood, 53 id., 435 ; Steed-
man e. Planter's Bank, 7 Ark., 424; Briscoe e. Coulter, 18 Ark., 423; Butts e.
Francis, 4 Conn., 424 ; Ray v. Murdock, 36 Miss., 692 ; Belcher v. Mhoon, 47
id., 613; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 162; S. C,46 id., 291 ; Cook v. Hackle-
tnan, 45 id., 317; Hoffman e. Bell, 61 Penn. St., 444; Delaplaine e. Cook, 7
Wis., 44; Stewart v. McSweeney, 14 id., 468; Whitney e. Marshall, 17 id., 174;
Smith e. Cleveland, 17 id., 556; Lumsden v. Cross, 10 id., 282; Allen «. Arm
strong, 16 Iowa, 508; Adams v. Beale, 19 id., 61; Eldridge v. Kurhl, 27 id.,
160; Clark v. Connor, 28 id., 311, 315; Hurley e. Woodruff, 30 id., 260; Gen-
ther v. Fuller, 36 id., 604; Sprague v. Pitt, McCahon, 212; Sibley v. Smith, 2
Mich., 486 ; Lacey v. Davis, 4 id., 140; Amberge. Rogers, 9 id., 332; Wright
v. Dunham, 13 id., 414; Groesbeck e. 'Seeley, id., 329; Stanbery «. Sillon,
13 Ohio (N. S.), 571; Turncy e. Yeoman, 14 Ohio, 207; Smith e. Chapman, 10
Grat., 445. It is competent to make certificate of city engineer prima fa«ie
evidence of the validity of a charge against owners of property for special
assessment. St. Louis v. Coons, 37 Mo., 44; St. Louis e. Armstrong, 38 id., 29.
1 In Iowa statutes are sustained which make tax deeds conclusive evidence
that the property was regularly listed and assessed, and that it was regularly
advertised and sold. Allen v. Armstrong 16 Iowa, 508; McCready e. Sexton,
29 id., 356; Rima v. Cowan, 31 id., 125; Clark e. Thompson, 37 id., 536;
Madison v. Sexton, id., 562; Smith v. Easton, id., 584; Easton v. Perry, id., 681.
The original owner may still contest the liability of the land to any tax; and
it is said in general terms by the court that on all jurisdi«tional questions the
deed cannot be made conclusive. See Martin v. Cole, 38 Iowa, 141. It is
manifest, however, that this word jurisdictional is not employed in the samo
sense here as it often is in tax cases ; a sense that makes each necessary step a
jurisdictional requisite to the next; for in Iowa some of the most important
steps in the proceedings are held to be conclusively established by the deed.
On the question what shall be sufficient to rebut the prima fa«ie case made for
the tax purchaser by his deed, and cast upon him the onus of showing regular
proceedings, the following cases are instructive: Bidleman e. Brooks, 28 Cal.,
72; Rayburne. Kuhl, 10 Iowa, 92; Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich., 140; Wrighte.
Dunham, 13 id., 414; Case v. Dean, 16 id., 12; Hall v. Kellogg, id., 139.
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of local and special assessments, such as those for paving streets,
etc, do not apply to them at all, and the purchaser under proceed
ings of that nature will be compelled to rely upon the common
law rule, and prove regularity.1
Judicial sales for taxes. In some of the states it has been
deemed advisable to provide that, before sales shall be made of
lands for the satisfaction of delinquent taxes, a judicial determina
tion of the delinquency shall be had.2 A judicial hearing in such
a case may fairly be understood to have in view, first, the pro
tection of the parties taxed, by giving them the opportunity to
inspect the proceedings and make their objections, before the
final steps are taken which might conclude their rights forever;
and, second, the greater security of purchasers at the sales, which
may reasonably be supposed to follow a judicial determination
that the proceedings are such as, under the law, will justify a
sale being rrrade. It has not been deemed advisable, in a work so
general in its plan as the present, to enter at large into an exam
ination of the proceedings for which provision is made under
statutes of different states. The same general principles apply
to them all. In some cases — usually cases of street or other
special assessments — the judicial proceedings begin when the
assessors have completed their work, and the assessment is ex
amined and confirmed before process for^collection is issued ; or,
if the assessment i» found to be defective, or is believed to be un
just, it is set aside at that stage, and the case sent back to the
assessors for new action ; or the proceedings are simply quashed,
leaving the authorities to begin anew if they shall think it advis
able to do so.8 The local statutes differ so much in the authority
1Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76 ; Bucknall v. Story, 36 Cal., 67 ; Kelly «. Medlin,
26 Tex., 48; Stierlin v. Daley, 37 Mo., 483; Glass v. White, 5 Sneed, 475.
•The present constitution of 11linois requires the legislature to provide, in
all cases where it is necessary to sell real estate for the nonpayment of taxes or
assessments, for state, county or municipal purposes, that a return shall be
made to some general officer of the county having authority to receive state
and county taxes; and such officer alone, upon the order or judgment of some
court of record, is to have the power to sell. Hills v. Chicago, 60 11l., 86 ; Otis
v. Chicago, 62 id., 299; Webster v. Chicago, 62 id., 302.
8The following are cases of confirmation of special assessments under New
York statutes : Matter of Harman Street, 16 Johns., 231 ; Matter of Dover
Street, 1 Cow., 74; Matter of Fourth Avenue, 3 Wend., 452; Matter of Twenty.
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they confer upon the courts, that the decisions made in one state
are commonly of little service as affording a guide to the action
of courts in other states. Under some statutes the action of the
assessing boards is allowed to be reviewed on the facts as well as
on the law; under others, only questions of the regularity and
legality of the proceedings are submitted to the court. More
generally the court takes up the case at the point were the col
lector has demonstrated his inability to collect the tax from resi
dents by distress and sale of goods and chattels, and when the
tax upon nonresident or unseated lands has remained unpaid, for
the period allowed by law for making voluntary payment, before
compulsory proceedings are suffered to be resorted to.
In any judicial proceeding the court which assumes to act must
have that authority of law for the purpose which is called jurisdic
tion. This consists in first, authority over the subject matter, and
second, authority over the parties concerned. The first comes
from the statutory law, which designates the particular proceed
ing as one of which the court may take cognizance when the par
ties are properly before it ; the second comes from the proper in
stitution of proceedings, and the service of process upon the par
ties concerned, or something which is equivalent to such service.
Concerning jurisdiction of the subject matter, it is only necessary
to observe that it must come wholly from the constitution or stat
utes of the state ; the common law giving to the courts no author
ity in such cases. Moreover that which is conferred is a special
and limited jurisdiction. The importance of this fact appears in
that familiar principle that nothing is taken by intendment in fav-
Sixth Street, 12 id., 203 ; Matter of Furman Street, 17 id., 649 ; Matter of Liv.
ingston Street, 18 id., 556 ; Matter of De Graw Street, 18 id., 568 ; Matter of
Pearl Street, 19 id., 651 ; Matter of John and Cherry Streets, 19 id., 659 ; Mat
ter of William and Anthony Streets, 19 id., 678 ; Matter of South Seventh
Street, 48 Barb., 12; Matter of Bushwick Avenue, 48 id., 9; Matter of Central
Park, 51 id., 277, 303; In re Sharp, 56 N.Y., 257; In re Van Antwerp, 56 id.,
261 ; Striker v. Kelley, 7 Hill, 9; S. C, 2 Denio, 323; Embury e. Connor, 3 JT.
Y., 511, 523; Matter of Canal and Walker Streets, 12 id., 406; King «
Mayor, etc., of New York., 36 id., 182 ; Matter of Broadway, 49 id., 150. That
the court in passing upon the assessment cannot review political action, such
as the determination of the necessity or propriety of opening the street, or the
proper limits of an assessment district, see Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend.,
149 ; Matter of William and Anthony Streets, 19 id., 676 ; Matter of John and
Cherry Streets, 19 id., 659 ; Matter of Livingston Street, 18 id., 556.
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or of the action of a court of special and limited jurisdiction, but
it must appear, by the recitals of the record itself, that the facts
existed which authorized the court to act, and that in acting the
court has kept within the limits of its lawful authority. And
this principle is applicable to the case of a court of general juris
diction, which in the particular case is exercising a special and lim
ited authority, as well as to the case of special courts created for
such special and limited authority only.1
Taking up the case after a failure to make collection is sup
posed to have occurred, the first step commonly required to be
taken is
,
the making by the collector or some proper officer, of a
report to the court showing that the supposed delinquency actu
ally exists. This being the document that calls into activity an
authority of the court before latent, it must conform to the law
in every substantial requirement, or it will fail entirely to have
any efficiency for the purpose.2
The next step will perhaps be, the giving of notice which shall
stand in the place of the process which in ordinary cases brings
the parties before the court.
Proceedings of this nature are not usually proceedings against
1McClung e. Boss, 5 Wheat., 116; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 id., 119; Francis'
Lessee v. Washburn, 5 Hayw., 294; Tift v. Griffin, 5 Geo., 185; Dakin v. Hud
son, 6 Cow., 221; Deming v. Corwin, 11 Wend., 647; Sheldon v. Wright, 5
N.Y., 497; Bridge v. Ford, 4 Mass., 641; Smith v. Rice, 11 id., 511; Barrett
«. Crane, 16 Vt., 246; Jennings e. Stafford, 1 Ired., 404; Harshaw v. Taylor, 3
Jones (N. G), 513; Perrine v. Farr, 22 N. J., 356; Piatt v. Stewart, 10 Mich.,
260. Proceedings in these cases are governed by the same principles which
govern other judicial sales. Jones e. Gill is
,
45 Gal., 541; Eitel e. Foote, 39
Cal., 439. Certain lands were sold for taxes. In all the proceedings, includ
ing the order of sale, the lands were described as in A. county. In point of
fact two-thirds thereof were in B. county. Held, that as to these at least the
sale was void. "Williams v. Harris, 4 Sneed, 332. The confirmation of an as
sessment by the court fixes the character of the property as resident or nonres
ident, and if a resident becomes nonresident afterwards, the collector will
still proceed as against a resident. Gossett «. Kent, 19 Ark., 601.
•See Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 11l., 223; Charles v. Waugh, 35 id., 315; Morrill
«. Swartz, 39 id., 108; Fox e. Turtle, 55 id., 377; People e. Olin, Sup. Ct. El.,
(1875) ; 7 Chicago Legal News, 323. The collector's report is only prima facie
evidence of delinquency, and is subject to be disproved. Andrews v. Rnmsey,
Sup. Ct. 11l. (1875), 7 Chicago Legal News, 322. See Denham v. Peuple, 67
11l., 414.
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parties,1 nor, in the case of lands or interests in lands belonging to
persons unknown, can they be. They are proceedings which have
regard to the land itself rather than to the owners of the land,
and if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal no
tice is provided for, it is rather from tenderness to their interests,
and in order to make sure that the opportunity for a hearing shall
not be lost to them, than from any necessity that the case shall
assume that form. As in all other cases of proceedings in rem,
if the law makes provision for publication of notice in a form and
manner reasonably calculated to bring the proceedings to the
knowledge of the parties who exercise ordinary diligence in look
ing after their interests in the lands, it is all that can be required.
We refer to a few cases as illustrative of the general prin
ciples on which the judicial action must be supported. In a lead
ing case in the federal supreme court, it appeared that the statute
under which the proceeding was had, required the sheriff, in the
event of nonpayment of taxes by a specified time, to levy the
same by distress and sale of the goods and chattels of the person
in default. Failing thus to collect, he was to report the failure
to the county court, whose duty it then was to direct its clerk to
make out a certificate of the lands liable for the taxes, together
'with the amount of the taxes and charges due thereon, and to
publish the same, and if the taxes and charges were not then paid
within thirty days, judgment was to be entered for the amount
due, and execution to issue upon which the land might be sold
and conveyed. The sheriff made no such report as the statute
provided for, and for want of this it was held that the court never
obtained jurisdiction to proceed in the case.2 Moreover the clerk
never made publication of the list, and this failure would have
1Parks e. Miller, 48 11l., 360; Schaeffer v. People, 60 id., 179. Where a sale
is to be confirmed by a court, no one is to be heard to oppose it who is not ad
versely interested. One describing himself simply as " tenant in possession "
shows no right to be heard. Black e. Percifield, 1 Ark., 472.
4Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat., 119, following with approval Francis' Les
see e. Washbnrn, 5 Hayw., 294. To the same effect is McClung v. Ross, 5
Wheat., 116. And see Thacher ex parte, 3 Sneed, 344; Spellman«. Curtenins,
12 11l., 409; Morrill v. Swartz, 39 id., 108; Fox v. Turtle, 55 id., 377; Fortmau
v. Ruggles, 58 id., 207 ; Schasffer v. People, 60 id., 79 ; Mayo v. Ah Loy, 32 Cal.,
477.
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been fatal to the proceedings if the proper report had been made.1
In other cases the following errors and imperfections have been
held to render the judicial proceedings void : Proceeding to judg
ment before the time limited for voluntary payment of the taxes
had expired;* rendering the judgment in a proceeding not taken
against " all owners and claimants," and by service on the land,
as the statute required ; s rendering judgment upon a collector's
report which failed to show, as the statute required, whether the
delinquent taxes were state taxes or county taxes ;4 applying for
and obtaining judgment at a different term from that at which
the statute required the application to be made.5 And a judg
ment is void which is given in figures merely, with neither words
nor signs to indicate that money is intended, or if it is
,
what de
nomination of money the figures stand for.8
The defects which were held fatal in the cases referred to, it
will be seen, were with one exception in which the judgment was
meaningless, all defects which went to the power of the court to
act at all. The proceeding to judgment and sale is an ulterior
proceeding which, under the law, must have for its antecedents
the proper showing that an attempt to collect has proved ineffec
tual, 7 and that the case has been brought before the court by
proper notice and at a proper time. But when those facts ap-
1 Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat., 119. See also Spellman e. Curtenins, 12
11l., 409; Charles v. Waugh, 35 id., 315; McKee v. Champaign County, 53
id., 477; Fortman v. Ruggles, 58 id., 207; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo.,
162 ; McGahen v. Case, 6 Iowa, 331.
"Williams e. Gleason, 5 Iowa, 284. For the same principle, see Pickett v.
Hartsock, 15 11l., 279.
» Mayo v. Ah Loy, 32 Cal., 477.
4Morrill v. Swartz, 39 11l., 108. Sec also Pickett v. Hartsock, 15 id., 279.
•Brown v. Hogle, 30 11l., 119.
4 Lawrence e. Fast, 20 11l., 338; Lanee. Bommelmann, 21 id., 143; Eppin-
ger v. Kirby, 23 id., 521 ; Dukes v. Rowley, 24 id., 210; Bailey v. Doolittle, 24
id., 577; Woods v. Freeman, 1 Wall., 398.
TIt can be no objection to a judgment against the land for taxes, that
the collector did not make the tax out of the personalty, when the collec
tor did distrain the personalty, and the objector replevied the same out of the
collector's hands. Deerham e. People, 67 11l., 414. It is no objection to an
application for judgment against lands that the valuation is excessive. Spen
cer e. People, Sup. Ct. 11l. (1874), 6 Chicago Legal News, 215.
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pear by the record of the court, and the judgment has been ren
dered, all questions of regularity in the prior proceedings are fore
closed..1 And not only that, but irregular action of the court it
self will not render its judgment invalid, though it might author
ize a reversal in an appellate court if a review is allowed by
statute. It is a principle of general application, that while a judg
ment which has been rendered without competent jurisdiction
may be treated as a mere nullity everywhere, yet that for mere
irregularities it can be assailed only in a direct proceeding for that
purpose ; that is to say, by motion or petition in the same case, or
by some proceeding in the nature of a review in error.2
In the proceedings subsequent to judgment the rules which
govern ordinary judicial sales are applicable.8 The deed given
by the officer who sells by virtue of such a judgment should
show, by its recitals, an authority presumptively sufficient to
authorize it
,
and indeed this is usually required by the statute,
which prescribes a form reciting the judgment and sale.4 The
deed cannot be evidence of the regularity of the proceedings un
less made so by statute.5
1 See Mayo v. Foley, 40 Cal., 281 ; Reeve v. Kennedy, 43 id., 643 ; Jones e.
Gillis, 45 id., 541.
» Chestnut v. Marsh, 12 11l., 173, is a leading case in tax matters illustrative
of this principle. See also Atkins e. Hinman, 2 Gilm., 437 ; Merritt v. Thomp
son, 14 id., 716; Wilkins' Lessee v. Huse, 9 Ohio,154; Eitel v. Foote, 39 Cal.,
439; Ex parte Kellogg, 6 Vt., 509; Edgarton v. Hart, 8 id., 207; Wall e. Trum
bull, 16 Mich., 228; Daily v. Newman, 14 La. An., 580; Cadmus v. Jackson,
52 Penn. St., 295 ; Wallace v. Brown, 22 Ark., 118; Carter v. Walker, 2 Ohio
(N. S.),339. As to the recitals necessary in such cases see Atkins v. Hinman,
2 Gilm., 437; Young v. Thompson, 14 11l., 380; Dukes e. Rowley, 24 id., 210;
Bailey v. Doolittle, 24 id., 577; Dentler e. State, 4 Blackf., 258; Williams v.
State, 6 id , 36. In Cadmus v. Jackson, 52 Penn. St., 295 ; it was held that a
tax sale under a judgment could not be defeated by showing that the tax was
paid before judgment. This showing is sometimes permitted under statutes.
See Curry v. Hinman, 11 11l., 420; Conway e. Cable, 37 id., 82.
' Jones e. Gillis, 15 Cal., 541.
* As to the necessary recitals in the deeds, see McDermott e. Scully, 27 Ark.,
226 ; Brown v. Hogle, 30 11l., 119 ; Wetherbee e. Dunn, 32 Cal., 106.
* SeeElston v. Kennicott, 46 11l., 187; Little e. Herndon, 10 Wall., 26. In
California where lands are assessed as an entirety to several, a part of whom
pay portions of the tax, the court in rendering judgment should ascertain
what interests are delinquent, and exonerate the rest. People e. Shimmins,
42 Cal., 121.
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CHAPTER XVI.
REDEMPTION OP LANDS FROM TAX SALES.
It is not the policy of the law that any man should forfeit his
estate because from inability, or even from negligence, he has
failed to meet his engagements or to perform his duties by some
exact day which has been prescribed by statute. On the contrary,
it is for the welfare of every community, that the law should
favor the citizen in all reasonable measures for the preservation
of his estate, against losses which might result from his misfor
tunes or his faults, extending to him all the liberality that is con
sistent with justice to others and a proper regard to the interest of
the state. The principle is recognized in the liberality shown to
those desirous to redeem from the forfeiture of mortgages, and in
the provisions made for redemption from judicial sales. It is also
recognized in the laws providing for redemption from tax sales.
The statutes on this subject have little uniformity, but certain
general rules govern the right to redeem under them all ; and it
may be sufficient for our purposes to refer to these.
1. The statutes which give the right are to be regarded favora
bly and construed with liberality. Abundant reason for this is
assigned in the cases which recognize the rule. It has been justly
remarked that the right of the government to sell lands for taxes,
as it is accustomed to do, can only be maintained on " the abso
lute sovereignty of the state in the exercise of its taxing power.
But it is a severe exercise of power. To divest ownership, without
personal notice and without direct compensation, is the instance
in which a constitutional government approaches most near to an
unrestrained tyranny. Whatever tends to modify this right is
favorable to the citizen, and ought to be liberally construed, on
the principle that remedial statutes are to be beneficially ex
pounded. Redemption is the last chance of the citizen to recover
his right of property."1
^Woodward, J., in Gault's Appeal, 33 Penn. St., 94, 97. See also Dubois v.
Hepburn, 10 Pet., 1; Corbett e. Nutt, 18 Grat, 674, and 10 Wall., 464; Patter.
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2. But while the statutes are to be favorably regarded, it is at
the same time to be borne in mind that the right to redeem comes
from the statute exclusively, and is to be asserted only in the
cases and under the circumstances which are there prescribed.
The courts can grant no extension of the statutory time ; they
can make no exceptions from general provisions of the statutes to
meet the circumstances of hard cases ; and if the statutes fail to
provide for the cases of disability, like those of infancy, coverture
or absence from the country, the courts are without authority to
do so.1 The statutes of some states make special provisions for
the cases of infants, and sometimes for other classes, permitting
redemption by them after the time allowed to owners generally
has expired ; but such statutes are far from general.2 And where
son e. Brindle, 9 Watts, 98; Masterson v. Beasley, 3 Ohio, 301; Jones v. Col
lins. 16 Wis., 594; Winchester e. Cain, 1 Rob., La., 421; Rice v. Nelson) 27
Iowa, 148; Schenck e. Peay, 1 Dillon, 267. Where the deed was required to
lie twelve months in the town clerk's office, during which the party might re
deem, it was held that it should be deposited with all convenient speed.
Four years after the sale was too late. Ives v. Lyon, 7 Conn., 504. Statutes
have sometimes provided for judicial proceedings to foreclose or cut off the
right to redeem, not only in cases where lands were to be forfeited for delin
quent tixes, but also in case of sales. In the latter case the proceedings will
bo taken by the purchaser, who will be held to great strictness in complying
with the statute. See Dentler e. State, 4 Blackf.,258; Gaylord e. Scarff, 6
Iowa, 179 ; Abell v. Cross, 17 id., 171. Such proceedings are not applicable
to sales for municipal taxes unless expressly made so. Grimmer e. Sumner,
21 Wis., 179.
1McCormack v. Russell, 25 Penn. St., 185; Smith v. Macon, 20 Ark., 17;
Heard v. Walton, 39 Miss., 388. Redemption cannot be had in equity. Mitch
ell v. Green, 10 Met., 101. Except as it may be permitted by statute, and then
it must be under such conditions as the statute may attach. Craig v. Flana-
gin, 21 Ark., 319. Where the owner neglected to pay taxes or to redeem his
lands after sale, under a belief that the taxes had been paid, the mistake does
not entitle him to relief against the consequences of the omission. Playtere.
Cochran, 37 Iowa, 258. A purchaser of lands which had been sold for taxes
prior to his purchase is not entitled to redeem because of having, after the
purchase, inquired of the treasurer if there were unpaid taxes, and been told
there were not; at the same time making no inquiry for tax sales. Moore v.
Hamlin, 38 Iowa, 482. Compare Van Benthuysen v. Sawyer, 36 N. Y., 150.
The pendency of the civil war, and the fact that the owner resided in a state
in rebellion, cannot enlarge his statutory right to redeem. Finley e. Brown,
22 Iowa, 638.
*An infant who has a right to redeem may sell it with the land. Stout v.
Merrill, 35 Iowa, 47. As to redemption by infants and married women under
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the statute makes no provision for the redemption of an undivided
interest, the party owning such an interest can only redeem by
paying the whole redemption money.1
3. Whatever the statute may make provision for, subsequent
to the sale, in order to the protection of the interest of the parties
having the right to redeem, must be strictly performed. The
reasons which require this are the same that render imperative a
strict compliance with all those provisions which are to be ob
served in the interest of the tax payer before the sale is made.
Perhaps the most usual requirement is
,
the publication of a no
tice to the tax payer, with sometimes a personal service upon the
owner in case he is known, and is a resident All provisions
of this nature must be strictly complied with. Nothing can be
substituted for it by the officers ; 2 the right to it cannot be waived
by one who chances to be in possession of the land but who has
no interest in it,5 and the owner may rely on his right to it
,
and
statutes making exceptions in their favor, see Jones v. Collins, 16 Wis., 594;
Lynch v. Brudie, 63 Penn. St., 206.
1
Quinn v. Kenney, 47 Cal., 147 ; People v. McEwen, 23 id., 54 ; Curl «.Watson,
25 Iowa, 35. Where the statute permits redemption of an undivided interest,
the right may be enforced by mandamus. People v. Treasurer of Detroit, 8
Mich., 14. That rents and profits received by the tax purchaser cannot be
applied by way of equitable redemption, see Spengin e. Forry, 37 Iowa, 242.
As to the right of one tenant in common who redeems for all to retain the
land until the others repay their share, see Watkins v. Eaton, 30 Me., 529.
* Where a leasehold interest was sold and was to be conveyed at the ex
piration of two years from the sale, but the statute required the corporation, at
least six months before the expiration of two years from the sale, to cause an
advertisement to be published at least twice in each week, for six weeks suc
cessively, that unless the lands were redeemed by a certain day they would be
conveyed, held, that this was imperative, and that the six weeks must be com
pleted six months before the expiration of two years. Doughty e. Hope, 3
Denio, 594. See Jackson v. Estey,7 Wead., 148; Comstock e. Beardsley, 15
id., 348; Westbrook v. Willey, 47-N. Y.,457; Jenks e. Wright, 61 Penn. St.,
410; Wilson v. McKenna, 52 11l., 43. And compare Wrighte. Sperry, 21 Wis.,
331. If lands are improperly grouped and sold, this does not affect the right
to redeem in parcels. Penn v. Clemans, 19 Iowa, 372.
* So held under the New York statute. The statute required notice to be given
to the party iu possession if any; but it was held that an occupant who had
no interest in it could not waive the right to the notice. Jackson v. Estey, 7
Wend., 148. As to who is to be deemed in possession, see Comstock v. Beards-
ley, 15 Wend., 348; Bush e. Davison, 16 id., 550. The occupation intended by
the statute is that at the time notice is given. Hand v. Ballou, 12 N. Y., 541.
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wait until he receives it before taking proceedings to redeem.1
Notice, when to be given by an officer, is an official act, and
should be put in writing; but whether in writing or not, must be
distinct and full, and the evidence of giving it should be pre
served in the proper office.2
4. As to the persons who may redeem, something may depend
upon the phraseology of the statute. The general rule is
,
that any
one may redeem who has in the land an interest which would be
affected by the tax conveyance.8 A statute giving the right to
redeem to the "owner," will be construed to embrace the case of
the original owner, notwithstanding there is an outstanding tax
title.4 It may also embrace any one who has a substantial interest
in the premises ; even a wife having a homestead right in her hus
band's lands,5 or a lien creditor.6 A purchaser at sheriff's sale
of the right of one in possession, may redeem, though he shows
no title in the occupant'' And so may a husband who claims in
right of his wife ; 8 or a dowress ; • or the assignee of a mortgage ;
10
1Arthurs v. Smathers, 38 Penn. St., 40; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 594;
Dentler v. State, 4 Blackf., 258. In 11linois it has been decided that where by
law notice to redeem was required to be served on the person who was as
sessed, and the notice was not given, the tax deed was void even though the
person assessed had no interest in the land, and though the purchaser had pub
lished notice in a newspaper three months before the time to redeem had ex
pired, describing the land, stating his purchase, and also when the redemption
would expire. Barnard e. Hoyt, 63 11l., 341. In Missouri the statute required
the certificate of purchase to be recorded, and gave the owner two years af
ter the sale in which to redeem. It was held that recording the certificate
was essential. Morton e. Keeds, 9 Mo., 878.
• Broughton v. Journeay, 51 Penn. St., 31.
8 Dubois v. Hepburn, 10 Pet., 1 ; Schenck v. Peay, 1 Dillon, 261 ; McBride v.
Hoey, 2 Watts, 436.
4 Lancaster v. County Auditor, 2 Dillon, 478.
• Adams v. Beale, 19 Iowa, 61.
6 Schenck v. Peay, 1 Dillon, 269. And see as lessees, etc., Byington e. Rider,
9 Iowa, 566.
7 Shearer v. "Woodburn, 10 Penn. St., 511.
• Dubois v. Hepburn, 10 Pet. 1.
•Rice v. Nelson, 27 Iowa, 148.
» Faxon v. Wallace, 101 Mass., 444. The statute gave the right to the " mort-
ka&ee," and it was held the assignee was included. The redemption is for
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or a party claiming the land by executory contract.1 And one
interested in lands sold in solido may redeem for all.8 Probably
none of the statutes are so restricted in the terms in which they
grant the right to redeem as to fail in protecting all interests like
those which hare been mentioned, and all others of a beneficial
character.
5. A stranger to the title cannot defeat a tax purchase by re
demption. The purchaser has acquired a title which is subject
only to the right of those interested to redeem ; and no payment
of the amount by a stranger, and no acceptance of it by any
official from a stranger, can affect this right.8 Probably the ac
ceptance of the redemption money by the purchaser himself would
preclude his afterwards claiming rights under his purchase ; but
nothing short of his own recognition of the unauthorized act of
one who, if he had no interest, would be a mere intermeddler,
could conclude him in such a case.4
6. Although redemption is a statutory right, yet a party at
tempting in good faith to make it may be relieved against the
mistakes or frauds of the officer or of the purchaser. If he has
attempted to redeem, and done all he was required to do by those
entitled to receive the money, the sale is discharged even though,
in consequence of the mistake of the officer, he has paid less than
the proper amount.5 But where one claims to have discharged
the benefit of the owner as well as the holder of the mortgage. Duncan v.
Smith, 31 N. J., 325.
1One who has bought the land by executory contract may compel the pur
chaser for tuxes to assign to him on receipt of the redemption money. Rogers
v. Rutter, 11 Gray, 410.
»Loomis e. Pingree, 42 Me., 299. It appears to be the rule in Iowa that one
must redeem all he has a right to redeem, and cannot compel the purchaser
to accept less. Curl v. Watson, 25 Iowa, 135 ; Jacobs v. Porter, 34 id., 342,
345. See People e. McEwen, 23 Cal., 54.
•See Eaton v. North, 25 Wis., 514; Cousins v. Allen, 28 id., 232.
4Byington v. Bookwalter, 7 Iowa, 512; Penn v. Clemens, 19 id., 372. The
officer to whom redemption is made need have no proof that the person offer
ing to make it is authorized to do so, unless the statute requires this. Cnapin
e. Curtenins, 15 11l., 427.
1Thus, in Budd, e. Tompkins, 47 Penn, St., 359, it was decided that the re
demption was effectual, though by mistake of the county treasurer all of the
taxes were not included which should have been. And see Price e. Mott, 52
.Penn. St., 315 ; Dietric k v. Mason, 57 id , 40 ; Noble v. Buliis, 23 Iowa, 559.
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lands from a tax sale, by the payment of all taxes demanded of
him, which was less than the whole, it must appear that no re
sponsibility for the error rests upon him. If when he applied to
the treasurer to redeem, that officer was left to understand that
only a certain sale was inquired for, and received the money upon
that alone, this will not discharge any other sale.1
7. The purchaser may waive strict compliance with the statutes.
This he will do if he receives payment after the day.2 But such
a transaction is to be regarded purely as a redemption, and not as
a purchase ;8 as would be also an assignment made by the pur
chaser to the original owner, on a claim being made by the latter
of a right to redeem.4
8. Redemption gives no new title ; it simply relieves the land
from the sale which had been made. And this is true whether
redemption is made before the statutory time had expired, or by
consent of the purchaser afterwards.5 If the purchaser had any
other title or interest in the land besides that redeemed from, it
remains entirely unaffected ; his acceptance of the redemption
money cannot estop him from setting it up and relying upon it«
9. The purchaser has no title to the land until the time for re
demption has expired. He has consequently no constructive pos-
1Lamb v. Irwin, 69 F*cnn. St., 436. If redemption is prevented by the officer
refusing to give a statement and receive the amount, the title is not cut off.
Van Benthuysen e. Sawyer, 36 N. Y., 150.
* Coxe v. Wolcott, 27 Penn. St., 154; Philadelphia v. Miller, 40 id., 440.
! Coxe v. Wolcott, 27 Penn. St., 154. In Rogers v. Johnson, 70 id., 224, a
written agreement given by the purchaser to the owner, agreeing to convey
on being paid the amount of the bid with twenty-five per cent, additional, wai
regarded as a good redemption. So is a tender to the purchaser sufficient)
though, under the law redemption is to be made to the treasurer. Broughton
e. Journeay, 51 Penn. St., 31. And see Price v. Mott, 52 id., 315. In Mas
sachusetts one entitled to redeem should make tender to the purchaser, not
withstanding he has while disseized made conveyance to another. Faxon iv
Wallace, 98 Mass., 44. See Same v. Same, 101 id., 444. A tender, accepted
or not, is equivalent to redemption. Sperry e. Gibson, 3 W. Va., 522; Brooks
e. Hardwick, 5 La. An., 675.
* Coxe v. Sartcll, 21 Penn. St., 480. See Steiner v. Coxe, 4 id., 13.
•Coxe e. Wolcott, 27 Penn. St., 154. For the general rule, see Phillips e.
Improvement Co., 25 id., 56 ; Cuttle v. Brockway, 32 id., 45 ; Jenks v. Wright,
61 id., 410; Gray v. Coan, 30 Iowa, 536.
•Cooper v. Bushley, 72 Penn. St.. 252.
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session of the premises, and no more right to go upon and make
use of them than any strangerto the title would have. His entry
upon the premises would he a trespass upon the possession, ac
tual or constructive, of the owner, who might recover against him
for any injury committed.1
10. Neither the purchaser nor the officer can add conditions to
the right to redeem. A direct attempt to do this would so man
ifestly be an attempt to legislate to the prejudice of the owner,
that nothing could be said in justification of it. But peculiar
cases, which would amount to this in legal effect, sometimes re
quire to be tested by the general principle. Thus, where the
land of one person was irregularly sold with that of others, but
the infirmity in the sale was afterwards cured by a healing act, it
was held, that the owner could not be required, as a condition to
redemption, to pay any more than the proportion of the bid that
was fairly chargeable to his land ; this being all that he could
have been charged with had the sale been regular.2 So if the
purchaser has paid taxes, subsequently assessed upon the land,
he cannot demand these as a condition to redemption, unless this
is the provision of the statute.8 And, if a resident's lands have
been assessed and sold as nonresident, their character has been
fixed for all the purposes of that proceeding, and the owner can
not be required to redeem on any different terms from a nonresi
dent4
11. In the matter of tax sales, it is important to understand
what authority the legislature retains over them, especially in
view of the very frequent and radical changes which are made in
the law, and which in terms if not in intent apply to inchoate
transactions previously had, as well as to those which are to take
place under the new law. The question, for instance, whether
a statute extending the right to redeem can be applied to pre-
1Shalemiller v. McCarty, 55 Penn. St., 186. See Gault's Appeal, 33 Penn.
St., 94; Lightner v. Mooney, 10 Watts, 407. This may possibly be otherwise
under some statutes, but there can be no question that the general rule is
stated in the text.
8Dietrich v. Mason, 57 Penn. St., 40. As to the right to redeem from the
counties in Kansas, see Farr v. Haughey, 5 Kan., 025.
s Stephens e. Holmes, 28 Ark., 48.
4Garabaldi e. Jenkins, 27 Ark., 453.
24
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vious sales, is one constantly liable to arise, and which, in fact,
has arisen in several cases.
If the time to redeem has already expired before the passage
of the statute, it is manifest the statute can have no effect upon
the sale. The title has now become absolute, and the legislature
can no more create rights in the land in favor of the former owner
than in favor of any other person. But if the time has not ex
pired, and redemption is still open to the owners, the want of
power is not so entirely beyond dispute
In one case it has been decided that the time for redemption
might lawfully be extended from one year to two, after the sale
had taken place. The decision is reasoned on the liberal con
struction which should be put upon redemption laws ; and the con
clusion was just, if no other considerations need be taken into the
account.1 Other cases have held the contrary, and, as we believe,
on reasons that are conclusive. They plant themselves upon the
principle that the obligation of contracts is inviolable. Now the
purchase at a tax sale is clearly a contract. It is made under the
law as it then exists, and upon the terms prescribed by the law.
No subsequent statute can import new terms into the contract, or
add to those before expressed. If it could be changed in one
particular, it could be in all ; if subject to legislative control at
all, it is wholly at its mercy.2 The same rule ought in morals to
apply to a statute shortening the time to redeem ; as it is equally
unjust to legislate against the owner of the land in such circum
stances as in his favor. But with him there is no contract when
the sale is made, and perhaps the remedy by redemption which
the statute gives him, like remedies in general, is subject to legis
lative discretion.8
1Gault's Appeal, 33 Penn. St., 94.
8Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis., 341; Dikeman e. Dikeman, 11 Paige, 484;
Goenen e. Schroeder, 8 Minn., 387. And see Cargill v. Power, 1 Mich., 369.
5It was so intimated in Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis., 341, and Smith v. Pack
ard, 12 id., 371. The right to shorten the time to redeem from a mortgage
sale was affirmed in Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324, but denied in Cargitl v.
Power, 1 Mich., 369, on the ground that the right pertained to the contract it
self which the parties had made; that is to say, to the mortgage. And see
State v. Commissioners of School, etc., Lands, 4 Wis., 414.
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CHAPTER XVII.
PROCEEDINGS AT LAW TO RECOVER LANDS SOLD FOR TAXES.
Where lands have been sold and conveyed in satisfaction of
delinquent taxes, the purchaser, if he finds the land occupied,
may bring ejectment in the common law courts to obtain posses
sion. If, on the other hand, he finds the land unoccupied and takes
possession without suit, the original owner may have the like
remedy against him.
It has in some cases been thought proper, with a view to a
speedy settlement of all questions concerning the validity of tax
titles, to establish, by statute, some special rules regarding the
proceedings to contest them. These rules are to be classed under
two heads : Those which make it a condition to any recovery by
the original owner of lands sold for taxes, that he should do
equity in the premises ; and those which require him to bring his
suit in a very short time, specially limited for the purpose.
1. Under the first head may be ranged those provisions which
require, as a condition to maintaining any suit, that the owner of
the title adverse to the tax title shall pay the taxes for which the
land was sold, and those which, in the event of his establishing
his title to the land, require him to pay for any betterments that
have been made by the tax purchaser or his assignees in reliance
upon the purchase.
The requirement, that the party recovering in ejectment, shall
pay the fair value of betterments which an adverse claimant has
made in good faith upon the land, and which the party making
them must now lose, is one that, under ordinary circumstances,
is eminently just and proper. No serious question of the right
of the legislature to make such requirements can well arise, and
if it could, it must now be considered as conclusively settled by
the decisions in its favor.1 There is more difficulty with the
requirement of payment of taxes.
1Brown v. Storm, 4 Vt., 37; Whitney v. Richardson, 31 id., 300, 306; Arm-
strong v. Jackson, 1 Blackf., 375; Fowler v. Halbert, 4 Bibb, 52, 54; Brackett
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It ha^ been decided in one state that an act which provided
that " no person shall be permitted to institute any proceedings
to set aside any assessment or special tax, hereafter levied or
assessed upon any lot or tract of land, or to set aside any deed
executed in consequence of nonpayment of such taxes, and the
sale of the premises therefor, unless such person shall first pay
or tender to the proper party, or deposit for his use with the treas-
v. Norcross, 1 Greenl., 89, 92 ; Withington v. Corey, 2 N. H., 115 ; Hunt's Lessee
v. McMahan, 5 Ohio, 133; Longworth e. Worthington, 6 id., 9, 10; Bacon v.
Callender, 6 Mass., 303; Jones v. Carter, 12 id., 314; Scott e. Mather, 14 Texas,
235; Saunders v.Wilson, 19 id., 194; Childs e. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261; Pacquette
e. Pickness, 19 Wis., 219; Coney e. Owen, 6 Watts, 435; Steele e. Spinance, 22
Penn. St., 256; Lynch v. Brudie, 63 id., 206; Dothage v. Stuart, 35 Mo., 251;
Fenwick v. Gill, 38 id., 510; Craig v. Flanagin, 21 Ark., 319; Pope t>.Macon,
23 id., 644; Marlow v. Adams, 24 id., 109; King v. Harrington, 18 Mich., 213;
Howard e. Zeyer, 18 La. An., 407; Love v. Shartzer, 31 Cal., 487; Stebbins v
Guthrie, 4 Kans., 353. Some of the statutes give the value of the improve
ments to those only who have been in possession, claiming title in good faith.
In Texas it has been held, that the tax purchaser is not a possessor in good
faith, and, consequently, not entitled to compensation for improvements, if
his deed was void for want of authority in the officer to sell, and by proper
diligence he might have known the fact. Robson e. Osborn, 13 Texas, 298,
307. In Indiana the claimant must have had at least color of title. Cain
v. Hunt, 41 Ind., 466. But in Pennsylvania, and, perhaps, in most of the states,
the owner, recovering his lands, may have judgment against him for im
provements, though the tax proceedings were wholly void. Gilmore e. Thomp
son, 3 Watts, 106, (where the tax had been paid before sale) ; Coney v. Owen, 6 id.,
435, (where the land was exempt from taxation) ; Lynch v. Brudie, 63 Penn. St.,
206. But it would be otherwise if the lands were seated so that the sale would
be void, not because of defective proceedings, but because of the absence of
jurisdiction to proceed at all. See Lambertson e. Hogan, 2 Penn. St., 22, ami
cases cited. In Rogers v. Johnson, 67 id., 43, 47, Agnew, J., gives the expla
nation of the difference: "The distinction between a sale absolutely void,
from want of jurisdiction to sell, and one merely void because of a fatal defect
in the proceedings, is palpable. Thus in McKee v. Lamberton, 2 W. & S.,
107, 114, and Cramer v. Hall, 4 id., 36, where the land was seated and the
treasurer had no authority to sell, it was held, that the purchaser was not
entitled to be compensated for his improvements ; while in Coney v. Owen,
6 Watts, 435, and Gilmore «. Thompson, 3 id., 106, where the lands were
unseated and the treasurer had general jurisdiction, but the sales were void
because, in the first place, of exemption from taxation, and in the second,
because of a prior pnyment of the taxes, the purchaser was held to be entitled
to his improvements. There are other cases, even where the irregularity has
deprived the owner of his surplus bond, where the sales have been sustained.
Thus, the sales were supported in Gibson e. Robbins, 9 Watts, 156, where
the treasurer charged too much costs, and appropriated the whole bid, where
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urer, the amount of all state, county and city taxes that may remain
Unpaid upon such lot or tract, together with the interest and
charges thereon," was void as being inconsistent with that clause
in the constitution that declares that every person "ought to ob
tain justice freely, and without purchase."1 If this statute were
confined to the requirement of a payment or tender of legal taxes
and costs for which the sale may have been made, the soundness
of the conclusion might well be made a question. No one is de
nied a remedy in the courts, when he is merely required to sub
mit to a condition which, under the circumstances, is reasonable.
Conditions to the assertion of a right in court are imposed in many
cases, none of which are supposed to work to the detriment of
justice. The requirement of security from a plaintiff in replevin
or attachment is an instance, and the payment of taxes upon the
legal process or upon the entry of the suit is another.2 Court3
of equity on general principles of right are in the frequent habit
of imposing conditions where one seeks in equity to restrain a tax,
only a part of which is illegal. The authority of the legislature
over the whole subject of legal remedies is very ample, and it is
not to be supposed that any general declaration of the right of the
a surplus would have existed for which a bond should have been taken ; and
in Peters v. Heasley, 10 Watts, 208, and Russell v. Reed, 27 Penu. St., 166,
where the commissioners of the county bid more than the taxes and costs,
and the owner was thereby deprived of his security for the surplus. So also
the sale was supported in Frick v. Sterrett (4 W. & S., 269), where the treas
urer, by mistake, took the bond for less than the true surplus. To these cases
may be added Bayard «. Inglis (5 W. & S., 465), and Burd v. Patterson (22
Perm. St., 219>,where no bonds were given when the sale was made and deed
delivered. In the former the bond was not given until nearly two years after
wards, and it was never filed."
1See ante, p. 320, note 2.
»The validity of a tax on the unsuccessful party to a lawsuit was questioned
in Harrison v. Willis, 7 Heis., 35, as " the imposition of a burthen upon the
right of the citizen to go into the courts to have his wrongs redressed, and his
rights vindicated," and as an infraction of that section of the bill of rights
which declares that "all courts shall be open, and every man for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial, or de
lay." The court sustained the law, remarking that such laws had long existed,
and this clause, taken from magna charta, was not to be understood as pro
hibiting such a tax, but to be interpreted in the light of the history of the
times when adopted.
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citizen to his day in court was intended to preclude the legisla
ture from exercising its authority to require him to do equity
when he did come. Other cases have distinctly affirmed the right
to require payment of the taxes, as a condition precedent to a
recovery of the land from the tax purchaser, when it was proposed -
to do so on the ground of the invalidity of the tax proceedings.1
These decisions, if limited in their application to cases in which
taxes were justly and equitably a charge upon the land, and only
failed to become a legal charge by reason o£ the negligence or
mistakes of officers in the discharge of their duties under the tax
law, may fairly be said to rest upon sound grounds of broad equity,
and to be supported on the same reasons which support remedial
laws in general. If the tax purchaser has, by his purchase, paid a
charge which the state might fairly and justly make a legal one
upon the land, and which the owner of the land ought himself to
have paid to the state, there is no reason why the state should
not give to the purchaser, when he loses the expected benefit of
the purchase, a remedy to recover the amount of the tax from the
party who ought to have paid it This is the province of remedial
laws ; to give new remedies where none at all or only inadequate
remedies existed before. And so favorably are such laws regarded
that they always receive at the hands of the courts a benign and
favorable construction
1Tharp v. Hart, 2 Sneed, 569 ; Glass e. 'White, 5 id., 475 ; Craig e. Flanagin,
21 Ark., 319 ; Pope v. Macon, 23 Ark., 644. Compare Wakely v. Nichols, 16
Wis., 558. In Henderson v. Staritt, 4 Sneed, 470, it was decided that the
plaintiff in ejectment to recover land sold for taxes may show that any neccs-
sary proceeding subsequent to the judgment and order of sale, such as the ad
vertisement of the sale itself, was irregular and void, without first being
required to show that the taxes had been paid anterior to such judgment and
order of sale. A constitutional provision that "appeals and writs of error
shall be allowed from the final determination of county courts as may be pro
vided by law," is not violated by a statute which, in tax cases, requires the
appellant to deposit with the county treasury the amount of the judgment.
Andrews e. Rumsay, Sup. Ct. 11l. (1875), 7 Chicago Legal News, 321 ; citing
People v. Wallace, in same court, same term. A statute precluding the owner
from contesting a tax sale, unless he has paid or tendered the taxes, cannot
be extended by contstruction to embrace the case of lands forfeited to the
state. Williamsburg v. Lord, 51 Me., 599.
A decree settling the title to land in the original holder, as against a tax
purchaser, does not bar an action to recover for taxes paid by the latter In
good faith upon the land in controversy. Stewart v. Corbin, 38 Iowa, 571.
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But if the tax itself were vicious ; if it were laid for a private,
and not a public purpose; if it were a special and arbitrary exac
tion from one person while the rest of community equally inter
ested was not taxed at all, or if for any similar reason the charge
was not just and equitable as against the owner of the land or the
land itself, so that the legislature could not have validated it re
trospectively by a direct enactment, it is not perceived on what
grounds an authority to validate it by this indirect and circuitous
method can be supported. The legislature can have no more au
thority to compel the land owner to pay a lawless exaction to ft
third person than it has to compel a like payment to the state
directly. The one as much as the other would be robbery. If
the land owner performs all his duty to the state, nothing which
the tax officers can do without his consent, and in the direction of
depriving him of his freehold, can raise against him any equity
requiring him to do more. The rule caveat emptor applies to the
purchaser. He takes all the risks of his purchase, and if he finds
in any case that he has secured neither the title he bid for nor any
equitable claim against the owner, the state may, if it see fit, make
reparation itself, but it has no more authority to compel the owner
of the land to do so than to exercise the like compulsion against
any other person.1
1This is the substance of the decision in Hart e. Henderson, 17 Mich., 218. How
far it may be just, and therefore competent, to compel the land owner, in cases
where the tax was just but the proceedings to make it a charge.on persy or
property void, to pay the cost of such void proceedings, is a question that will
be very likely at some time to come up for determination. It is certainly dif
ficult to perceive how any equitable claim can exist against any one for the
cost of void proceedings. The 11linois statute of 1839 provided that " no
person shall be permitted to question the title acquired by a sheriffs deed with
out first showing that he or she, or the person under whom he or she claims
title, had title to the land at the time of the sale, or that the title was obtained
from the United States or this state after the sale, and that all taxes due upon
the land have been paid by such person or the person under whom he claims
title aforesaid." It has been decided that notwitstanding this statute, the par
ty defendant may contest the tax title, if the taxes due to the state have been
paid, no matter by whom. Curry v. Hinman, 11 11l., 420. See Conway v. Ca
ble, 37 id., 82. Also that if one was in possession of the land claiming title
when the sale was made, that is sufficient evidence of title. Lusk v. Harber,
3 Gilm., 158; Curry v. Hinman, 11 11l., 420. The following cases throw light
on the construction of this statute: Hinman v. Pope, 1 Gilm., 131, 138; Bestor
e. Powell, 2 id., 119 ; Atkins e. Hinman, 2 id., 437, 453 ; Spellman v. Curtenins,
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2. The statutes limiting a short time within which the owner of
the original title shall contest the tax claim, are supposed to be
enacted in pursuance of a sovereign authority in the legislature
to fix a reasonable time within which a party shall be allowed to
assert his rights by suit, or be debarred. The policy of such laws
is unquestionable, and the power to enact them is undisputed.
But like all other powers in government, this has its limits, and it
is probable that some of the statutes to which we have referred,
if literally construed, would be found to be unwarranted.
The most common limitation of actions for the recovery of
lands is twenty years after the right of action accrued. But
whenever the legislative wisdom shall determine that a shorter
limitation for all cases or for any class of cases would be wise, it
is unouestionably competent to prescribe it Advantage has been
taken of this power in some instances, by parties interested in tax
titles, and laws have been secured which, in tax cases, limit the
time to five years, or to three years. But in some of these laws
another peculiarity will be found besides the short period that is
prescribed for contesting the tax claim. They do not on their
face purport to be statutes which limit the time in which a party
may bring suit against one in possession, claiming by tax title,
but they fix a time after which the tax title shall not be ques
tioned. The short period of limitation it is entirely competent
for the legislature to prescribe,1 but it may be questioned whether
an act which merely limits a time within which a bad title may
ripen into a good one is
,
either in spirit, purpose or effect, an act
in the nature of an act of limitations.
Three different classes of cases may be affected by such stat
utes : 1. Those in which the owner of the original title remains
in possession after the tax sale. 2
. Those in which the land is
then and remains afterward unoccupied. 3. Those in which the
tax purchaser enters and holds possession claiming title.
In the third class of cases there can be no sufficient reason why
12 11l., 409; Hope v. Sawyer, 14 id., 254; Billings v. Detten, 15 id., 218: Polk
e. Hill, 15 id., 130 ; Chapin v. Curtenins, 15 id., 427, 432. And sec ante, p. 227,
etseq.
1 Thomas v. Stickle, 32 Iowa, 71 (citing Henderson e. Oliver, 28 id., 20; El-
dridge «. Kuehl, 27 id., 160); Shiek v. McElroy, 20 Penn. St., 25; Edgerton e.
Bird, 6 Wis., 527, 532; Sprecker v. Wakely, 11 id., 432.
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the holder of the original title should not be required to bring
suit in a time less than twenty years. By the adverse possession
he is excluded from the enjoyment of any right he may claim,
and public policy no less than justice to the tax purchaser re
quires that he should bring his suit within a reasonable time, in
order that all contested questions may be put at rest while the
facts are recent and presumably susceptible of proof. In the first
class of cases it would be manifest and most gross injustice to
make lapse of time alone extinguish the owner's title. He is in
full possession of his rights, and it is the adverse claimant and not
himself who is negligent in not bringing suit And it seems to
us very clear that, under such circumstances, it is not competent
to limit a period at the expiration of which the tax title shall be
come a perfect title and not open to controversy or dispute.1
In the second class of cases the proper rule is not so clear. If
no provision is made by statute under which ejectment can be
brought in the case of a vacant possession, it would seem that
neither claimant could be considered in law negligent, so as to
render his claim the proper subject of a statute of repose, until
possession was taken by his adversary ; but if ejectment is al
lowed in such cases, then it may possibly be within the power of
the legislature to declare that the title of that one of the parties
'who, constructively, is to be regarded as in possession, shall be
come absolute if not questioned by suit within the time by the
statute limited for that purpose.
The Pennsylvania statute of 1804 declared that no action for
the recovery of lands sold under the act should lie, unless
brought within five years after the sale. But this the courts
refused to apply literally, because, in the case of a vacant posses
sion, it would cut off the original owner without giviug him the
right to contest the title ; there being no statute permitting eject
ment in such cases. They consequently held that the statute
began to run, not from the sale, but from the time of posession
taken under it.2 Subsequently, when the right to maintain eject
ment for an unoccupied tenement had been conferred by the stat-
1Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich., 329. See Conway e. Cable, 37 11l., 82; Case
v. Dean, 16 Mich., 12; Wain v. Shearman, 8 S. & R., 357.
»Wain e. Shearman, 8 S. & R., 357; Cranmer v. Hall, 4 W. & S., 36. See
also Baker e. Kelly, 11 Minn., 480.
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ute, it was held that the statute began to run in favor of the tax
purchaser at the time the sale was perfected by deed, he being
constructively in possession of the unoccupied premises from that
time.1 These decisions have perhaps given effect to the statute as
near as was possible, consistent with fundamental rules of right*
The Wisconsin statute provides that " any suit or proceeding for
the recovery of land sold for taxes, except in cases where the taxes
have been paid or the lands redeemed as provided by law, shall be
commenced within three years from the time of recording the tax
deed of sale, and not thereafter." That this statute is valid does
not seem to have been very seriously questioned.8 That it ap-
1" It was argued that the limitation iii the act of 1804 does not apply to a
case where the owner is in possession. That is true, as was determined in
Bigler v. Karnes, 4 W. & S., 137, and Shearer «. Woodburn, 10 Penn. St., 511.
But that ia where the possession is actual, and the owner is thus daily and
hourly challenging the validity of the tax title. It is not so, however, in any
other case, and it is settled that in all other cases the limitation runs from the
time of the sale, and not from the time when possession is taken by the pur
chaser. Parish v. Stevens, 3 S. & R., 298, the first case decided under the act
of 1804, on this point, was overruled by Wain v. Shearman, 8 S. & R., 357, on
the ground that an ejectment would not lie against a vacant possession. But
the act of 29th March, 1824, having provided a remedy for the owner in the
case of a vacant possession, this court returned to the doctrine of Parish e.
Stevens, and it is now held that the limitation runs from the time of the sale,
and not of possession. Robb v. Bowen, 9 Penn. St., 71; Sheik v. McElroy, 20
id., 25 ; Burd v. Patterson, 22 id., 219 ; Stewart v. Trevor, 56 id., 385. In the
last case, Justice Strong summing up the cases, says: "Since the act of
29th March, 1824, the limitation is perfect at the end of five years from the
delivery of the deed to the purchaser, without regard to possession." Agnew,
J., in Rogers v. Johnson, 67 Penn. St., 48. See also to same effect, Johnston v.
Jackson, 70 id., 164.
•A statute providing that no action for the recovery of land sold for taxes
shall lie, " unless brought within five years after the sale thereof for taxes, as
aforesaid," will not benefit the holder of the tax title when suing as plaintifl ;
and if he sues after five years he must show a valid title. Bigler v. Karnes, 4
W. & S., 137; Shearer e. Woodburn, 10 Penn. St., 511; Hole v. Rittenhouse,
19 id., 305; McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 id., 13. It has been decided in
Pennsylvania that as against a mere intruder, the tax deed, with evidence of
title out of commonwealth, is sufficient. Crum v. Burke, 25 Penn. St., 371,
381, citing Foust e. Ross, 1 W. & S., 501 ; Foster e. McDivitt, 9 Watts, 341,
344; Dikeman v. Parrish, 6 Penn. St., 210. And see Shearer v. Woodburn, 10
Penn. St, 512; Troutman v. May, 33 id., 455; Wheeler v. Winn, 53 id., 122;
Hess v. Hcrrington, 73 id., 438.
' For decisions sustaining like statutes where the tax purchaser has been in
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plies against the holder of the tax title as well as in his favor has
been the conclusion of the courts, and it therefore cuts off either
the original owner or the tax purchaser, if the adverse claimant
has been in the occupation of the land for the period named.1 It
is also decided that, when the land is unoccupied, the holder of the
tax title has constructive possession, and if the owner of the origi
nal title does not bring ejectment (which the statute permits in
such case) within the three years, he is barred,2 but that if the tax
deed is void on its face, the grantee in it has no constructive pos
session, and in such case the statute doe3 not run in his favor,8
though it would do so, even under a void deed, if his possession
were actual, open and notorious4
possession, see Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How., 472; Vancleave v. Milliken, 13
Ind., 105; Doe v. Hearick, 14 id., 241, 245; Cofer v. Brooks, 20 Ark., 542;
Sprague v. Pitt, McCahon, 212 ; Bowman v. Cockrill,6 Kans., 311. See DeGraw
e. Taylor, 37 Mo., 310 ; Pease e. Lawson, 33 id., 35 ; McNamara v. Estes, 22
Iowa, 246; Eldredge v. Kuehl, 27 id., 160; Henderson v. Oliver, 28 id., 20;
Case of Albee, 28 id., 277; McCready e. Sexton, 29 id., 356; Henley v.
Street, 29 id., 429; Thomas v. Stickle, 32 id., 71; Douglass v. Tullock, 34 Id.,
262; Jeffrey v. Brokaw, 35 id., 505.
1Edgartqn v. Bird, 6 Wis., 527; Sprecker e. Wakeley, 11 id., 432; Knox
v. Cleveland, 13 id., 245; Jones e. Collins, 16 id., 594; Parish v. Eager, 15 id.,
552; Whitney e. Marshall, 17 id., 174. These decisions held applicable to the
Iowa statute. Brown v. Painter, 38 Iowa., 4?6.
»Gunnison v. Hoehn, 18 Wis., 268; Lawrence e. Kenney, 32 id., 281. See
Hille. Kricke, 11 id., 442; Dean v. Early, 15 id., 100.
8Lain v. Shepardson, 18 Wis., 59. To the same effect are Taylor v. Miles, 5
Kans., 498 ; Shoat v. Walker, 6 id., 65. See Leffingwell e. Warren, 2 Black, 599.
4Lindsay e. Fay, 25 Wis., 460. On this point, see also Cofer e. Brooks, 20
Ark., 542 ; Hoffman v. Harrington, 28 Mich., 90 ; Washburn e. Cutter, 17 Minn.,
361. The statute does not apply to a tax title fraudulently obtained, as for ex
ample, by an agent who bought in his principal's land when he should have
paid the tax. McMahon v. McGraw, 26 Wis., 614. And see Carithers v.
Weaver, 7 Kans., 110. The Michigan statute has been held not to apply in
favor of one who was in possession under another claim at the time of acquir
ing the tax title. Gilman v. Itiopclle, 18 Mich., 143, 163. Neither the fact
that one is assessed for the land, or that he has paid taxes for a series of years
thereon U sufficient proof that he is in the adverse possession of it. McDer-
mott e. Hoffman, 70 Penn. St., 31, 54; Chapman e. Templetcn, 53 Mo., 463.
And merely cutting timber without actual possession, cultivation or inclosure,
is not adverse possession, but a mere trespass on the constructive possession
of the owner. Washburn v. Cutter, 17 Minn., 361 ; Safford v. Basto, 4 Mich.,
406 ; River? r. Thompson, 46 Ala., 835.
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There is serious objection in point of policy to making the tax
deed give constructive possession of the land, with the conse
quences that have been made to follow, whether there are, or are
not, any in point of law. The principal hardships perhaps under
any system of tax sales spring from the fact that, in a consider
able portion of the cases in which valuable lands are lost to the
owners from delinquency, it is not so much in consequence of
culpable neglect of the owners themselves, as through the negli
gence of agents, or through circumstances which have cast the
ownership upon children, or other persons unaccustomed to busi
ness, who are found to be in default before they have fully be
come possessed of a knowledge of either their rights or their
duties. In all these cases the tax purchaser knows that he has
bought a title which, if legal, is to dispossess some title previously
valid ; while the adverse claimant frequently does not know or
suspect that he or his land has been proceeded against for delin
quency, and he may, for a series of years thereafter, continue to
pay taxes without any suspicion that he is paying upon the land
of another. No man thinks of making periodical visits to the
records, in order to see that his land is clear of liens, when he is
not conscious of any default ; and to allow the tax purchaser to
lie by under such circumstances, without asserting a claim by
entry or notice, until, by the lapse of a few years, his deed shall
ripen into an indisputable title, is to encourage him to commit
what, in morals at least, is a fraud upon the original owner. And
the fraud is still more gross and palpable if
,
in point of fact, the
original owner was not at all in default, and his land has been
sold and conveyed in consequence of the carelessness, incompe
tency or fraud of public officers.
There is another difficulty with those cases which bar a right
by constructive adverse possession of the tax claimant If they
proceed upon the statute alone, which bars an action unless
brought within a certain number of years after it accrued, then it
would seem they might have held the tax purchaser barred with
the same propriety as to make the like holding against the origi
nal owner; since either might have brought the suit, and, there
fore, the one is as much within the words of the statute as the
other.1 If, on the other hand, they attach importance to adverse
' The Wisconsin statute authorizes an action for the recovery of lands to be
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possession as by implication limiting the application of the statute
to one only of the two classes of persons, who equally might have
brought suit, then they import new principles into the law ; for
the law, unless by the force of these decisions, has no knowledge
or recognition of such a thing as an adverse possession that is
merely constructive.
Possession of a vacant tenement is and must be purely a matter
of fiction. Constructive possession is recognized for some pur
poses, because, under our peculiar forms of action, it is found
necessary in order to the protection of the rights of the owner
against trespassers. The fiction is accepted, as all fictions in the
law are, for the sake of justice; never to do injustice.1 But if
one's freehold has been illegally sold under adverse proceedings,
there is no justice in resorting to a fiction of law in order to sus
tain the sale. What equity could exist in such a case, if one has
honestly paid all that was demanded of him, or all that he has
any reason to believe he owed ? 2
brought, when the premises are unoccupied, against " some person exercising
acts of ownership on the premises claimed, or claiming title thereto, or some
interest therein, at the commencement of the action." R. S., 1858, p. 838.
This would seem to apply as well to the tax claimant as to the original owner,
and if both are liable to suit, the obligation to sue would seem to be fairly
divided between them.
1Truett v. The Justices, 20 Geo., 104; Low v. Little, 17 Johns., 346; Johnson
v. Ballou, 28 Mich., 379, 396. In Taylor v. Miles, 5 Kans., 498, in which it is
held that the recording of a void tax deed cannot be made the date from
which the statute of limitations shall run, Valentine, J. says (p. 515): "First.
A statute of limitations can only be applied where one person has received or
suffered some injury from another person, cither in contract or tort. It must
operate to bar a cause of action, for it seems absurd to say that a cause of
action can be barred, if no cause of action has ever accrued. Second. Every
statute of limitation must give the injured party a reasonable time in which
to commence his action, or the statute itself Is void, tending to disturb vested
rights. Third. When the statute has run its full time, the effect is to leave
the parties in possession of just what they had before, nothing more and
nothing less; and neither party has a right of action against the other; the
injured party has lost his remedy." Compare Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kans., 311.
8We employ here the language of Agnew, J., in Brown v. Hays, 66 Penn. St.,
229, 236. The case was one in which a single warrant of 1026 acres had been
assessed as two of 726 and 300, respectively, and the owner had paid the
assessment on the warrant by the number. Meld, that the assessment of the
warrant at 726 acres was not, by implication, notice to him that the 300 acres
were assessed separately.
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In the very worst light in which his equities may be viewed,
they are at the least equal to those of the purchaser ; and to make
a fiction the instrument by which he is to be debarred of his
rights is a very severe, if not excessive, exercise of authority,
where the legislature had already put him quite sufficiently at
disadvantage. Rules of evidence are subject to legislative con
trol ; and therefore the legislature may make the tax deed evi
dence of title. Rules of limitation are also subject to its control,
and therefore the statute may quiet an open and public exercise
of a right which remains unchallenged ; but a purely nominal and
fictitious exercise of aright by means of the record of a paper, or
even without that, if the legislature shall think proper to dispense
with it
,
is a very unsubstantial basis for a conclusive muniment
of title to land. Constructive possession in any case it would
seem should be in the party having the legal title ; and this would
leave questions of title open so long as actual possession was had
by no one.1
Peculiar questions arise under some statutes regarding the
nature of the claim under which possession is held. The
Illinois statute of 1839 declared the person in possession of land
" under claim and color of title," who should continue in posses
sion for seven years, and pay all taxes, should be held and ad
judged the legal owner, " to the extent and according to the pur
port of his or her paper title." Here was a distinct requirement of
a paper title of some kind, and of one also that should give
" color " of title. Where the tax deed is made prima facie evi
dence of title, it is plain that it gives color of title ; and the decis
ions have been that the seven years possession under the cir
cumstances required by the statute was sufficient with such a
conveyance.2 The same decisions hold, however, that the deed
1Possession and cultivation of a few acres cannot be constructive possession
of a whole township. Chandler v. Spear, 22 Vt., 388.
»Dawlcy v. Van Court, 21 11l., 460; Pell «. Cessford,26 id., 522, 525; Hallo-
way e. Clark, 27 id., 483; Bride v. Watt, 23 id., 507; Webster e. Webster, 55
id., 325; Worthy v. Bowman, 47 id., 17; Morrison e. Norman, 47 id., 477;
Dickerson v. Breeden, 30 id., 279, 325 ; Hardin e. Crate, 60 id., 215. To consti
tute color of title it is only necessary that the deed purports to convey title,
and has been received in good faith. Winstanlay v. Meacuam,58 11l., 97. See
Halloway v. Clark, 27 id., 483, 486, per Walker, J.; Dalton v. Lucas, 63 id.,
337. But where he goes into possession and continues to hold the land and
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must be one, not by reason of defects, or of its recitals, void on its
face.1 In Iowa the statutes are different, and protect the occu
pant who has been in possession under "claim
" of title for the
requisite period ; and this may be with or without a deed or other
documentary evidence giving color of right to the claim.3 It is
a principle of the law that where the statute of limitations has
run ii favor of any party, this perfects his right, and he may make
it the ground of affirmative proceedings thereafter. This princi
ple applies in favor of the tax title, and dispenses with any neces
sity for proof of the proceedings when the title is subsequently
brought in question, and precludes its being attacked.8
pay taxes for seven years, he will be protected, although the deed is void on
its face; and good faith will be presumed, but the contrary may be shown.
Dalton v. Lucas, 63 11l., 337. An instrument which merely purports to contain
an agreement to convey title at a future time, cannot constitute color of title.
Ostermnn v. Baldwin, 6 Wall., 116. " What is meant by color of title t It may
be defined to be a writing, upon its face professing to pass title, but which does
not do it
,
either from want of title in the person making it
,
or from the defect-
ive conveyance-that is used — a title that is imperfect, but not so obviously
that it would be apparent to one not skilled in the law: " per Lumpkin, J., in
Beverly v. Burke, 9 Geo., 440, 443.
1 See besides the 11linois cases above referred to, Shoat v. Walker, 6 Kansas,
65 ; Carithere e. Weaver, 7 id., 110 ; Sapp e. Morrill, 8 id., 677 ; Wofford v. Mc-
Kenna, 23 Texas, 36 ; Kilpatrick v. Sisneras, id., 114; Cain v. Hunt, 41 Ind.,
466. A tax deed which does not show that the land it purports to convey was
sold for delinquent taxes, is void on its face; and where the holder of such
deed has not been in actual possession of the property, the statute of limita
tions will not run so as to bar the right to bring an action in two years, to
have the deed declared void. Hubbard v. Johnson, 9 Kans., 632.
1 Hamilton v. Wright, 30 Iowa, 485. And see Taylor v. Buckner, 2 A. K.
Marsh., 18; McCall v. Neeley, 3 Watts, 69, 72. That a tax deed in due form is
color of title, sea also Dillingham v. Brown, 38 Ala., 311; Rives v. Thomp
son, 43 id., 633, 641 ; Cofer v. Brooks, 20 Ark., 542 ; Pleasants v. Scott, 21 id.,
370, 374; Chapman v. Templeton, 53 Mo., 463; King v. Harrington, 18 Mich.,
213. See further, Moore v. Brown, 4 McLean, 21 ; S. C in error, 11 How., 414 ;
Pillow v. Roberts, 13 id., 472.
8Spreckere. Wakeley, 11 Wis., 432; Knox v. Cleveland, 13 id., 245, 219;
Pleasants v. Rohrer, 17 id., 557; Lawrence v. Kenney, 32 id., 281; Morton e.
Sharkey, MoCahon, 113; MoKenney v. Springer, 8 Blackf., 606; Slipp v.
Brown, 2 Ind., 647 ; Lewis v. Webb, 3 Greenl., 326 ; Atkinson e. Dunlap, 50
Me., Ill; Thompson v. Caldwell, 3 Lit., 137; Couch v. McKee, 1 Eng. (Ark.),
484, 495 ; Girdner e. Stephens, 1 Heisk., 280 ; S. C, 2 Am. Rep., 700 ; Bradford
e. Shine's Adm'r, 13 Pla., 393; S. C, 7 Am. Rep., 239; Holden v. James, 11
Mass., 596; Wright v. Oakley, 5 Met., 400; Woart v. Winnick, 3 N. H, 473;
0
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CHAPTER XVIII.
TAXATION OF BUSINESS.
The general right. It has been seen that government may,
in the discretion of its legislature, levy a tax on every species of
property within its jurisdiction, or, on the other hand, that it may
select any particular species of property, and tax that only. The
same is true of occupations ; government may tax one, or it may
tax all. There is no restriction upon its power in this regard un
less one is expressly imposed by the constitution.1
Federal taxation. The government of the United States has
general power to levy taxes on all the subjects of taxation within
the several states and territories, and in the District of Columbia.*
The exceptions to this general power have been mentioned in
preceding pages 8 and need not be repeated. But although it has
this general power, its exercise is commonly limited to compara
tively few subjects, and the government revenues are collected
in the main from taxes levied in various forms upon business.
Customs duties are levied exclusively by the United States,
but internal taxes on business may be laid by the United States
and the states as well ; and what is said in this chapter is as ap
plicable to taxation by the one as by the other, where the con
trary is not indicated.
The methods in which business shall be taxed are also in the
legislative discretion. The taxes which are most customary
are: 1. On the privilege of carrying on the business. 2. On
the amount of business done. 3. On the gross profits of the bus-
Martin v. Martin, 35 Ala., 560; Briggs «. Hubbard, 19 Vt., 86; Wires e. Fair,
25 id., 41 ; Davis «. Minor, 1 How. (Miss.), 183; Moore «. Luce, 29 Penn. tit.,
262; Hinchman v. Whetstone, 23 11l., 185; Chiles v. Davis, 58 id., 411.
1Butler's Appeal, 73 Penn. St., 448, 451, per Mereur, J., citing Durach's
Appeal, 62 Penn. St., 491. As to equality in such taxation, see Dillon, Mun.
Corp., § 593 et seq.
»Loughborough e. Blake, 5 Wheat., 317.;
•See Index, tit United States.
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iness. 4. On the net profits or profits divided. But the tax may
be measured by other standards prescribed for the purpose as well
as by these.
It has been seen that it is no conclusive objection to any such tax
that it duplicates the burden to the person who pays it To tax
a merchant upon his stock as property, and also upon his gross
sales, may seem burdensome, but it is not unconstitutional when
not expressly forbidden by the constitution.1 The two taxes are
not identical, and though they may operate unjustly in particu
lar cases, they are supposed to be imposed because the general
result is equal and ju3t.
Taxes on privileges- A tax on the privilege of following any
particular employment, is usually confined to those which in some
particular are exceptional, either because supposed to be spe
cially profitable, or because they require special regulations, or be
cause the privilege is in the nature of a franchise, or because they
supply a general demand, so that the burden imposed will be
generally distributed.* But no employment is absolutely exempt
from the liability to be taxed. The necessities of the government
may require that the lowest employment as well as the most lu
crative shall contribute to its support, and if any is exempted,
motives of policy will govern the discrimination.
When the tax takes the form of a tax on the privilege of fol
lowing an employment, convenience, in collection will commonly
dictate the requirement of a license, and the person taxed will be
compelled to pay the tax as a condition to the right to carry on
the business at all.8 In such a case the business carried on
without a license will be illegal, and no recovery can be had upon
contracts made in the course of it* This distinguishes such a
case from one of neglect to pay taxes in general ; for except
1See Washington v. State, 13 Ark., 752; Straub e. Gordon, 27 id., 625; Ma-
bry v. Tarver, 1 Humph., 94; Lewellen e. Lockharts, 21 Grat., 570.
•The following of an ordinary employment, e. g., that of keeping a livery
stable, is not to be regarded as a " privilege " unless made so by statute. Co
lumbia e. Guest, 3 Head, 413.
8License Tax Cases, 5 Wall., 472. As to the nature of licenses as taxes, sec
Lucas e. Lottery Commissioners, 11 Gill. & J., 490.
4Bancrofte. Dumas, 21 Vt., 456; Alexander v. O'Donnell, 12 Kara., 608. See
Page v. State, 11 Ala., 849.
25
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where payment is thus made a condition to the right to transact
business, a default therein cannot affect the validity of business
transactions.1 But license and tax do not necessarity go together ;
a license may be required when no tax is imposed, and an un
conditional license does not exempt the licensee from being taxed
upon the privilege it gives him. In this particular all valuable
privileges stand upon the same footing ; they are all liable to tax
ation at the will of the state, unless the state has bargained to
exempt them. As is said in one case, " There is a clear distinc
tion recognized between a license granted or required as a condi
tion precedent, before a certain thing can be done, and a tax as
sessed on the business which that license may authorize one to
engage in. A license is a right granted by some competent au
thority to do an act which, without such authority, would be ille
gal. A tax is a rate or sum of money assessed upon the person,
property, etc., of the citizen."2 The privilege obtained by the li
cense may therefore be taxed in consideration of the property value
it possesses,8 and this not only by the state directly, but by the
county and town also, if proper authority has been conferred upon
them for the purpose.4
1Larned v. Andrews, 106 Mass., 435, citing Smith v. Mawhood, 14 M. &. W.
452.
»Trippe, J., in Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 50 Geo., 530, 537. And see Savan
nah e. Charlton, 36 id., 460; Burch v. Savannah, 42 id., 596; Robinson v.
The Mayor, etc., of Franklin, 1 Humph., 156; Ould v. Richmond, 23 Grat.,
464; Drexel v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn. St., 31; Reed v. Beall, 42 Miss., 472.
•See authorities cited in last note. Also Coulson v. Harris, 43 Miss., 728, in
which a license for which a large sum was paid was held taxable as property.
Also Drysdale v. Pradai, 45 id., 445.
*Where one is licensed by the state to carry on any particular business, a
county, city, or town cannot compel him to take out a further license as a con
dition of doing business within it. Durham v. Rochester, 5 Cow., 462; Ould
e. Richmond, 23 Grat, 464; Napier v. Hoge, 31 Texas, 287; Floyd v. Edenton,
14 Geo., 354: Cuthbert e. Conly, 32 id., 211; Savannah e. Charlton, 36 id., 460;
Burch v. Savannah, 42 id., 596; Ordinary v. Retailers of Liquors, 42 id., 325 ;
Home Ins. Co. e. Augusta, 50 id., 530. So a town cannot defeat a county li
cense by requiring a town license in addition. Dunham v. Rochester, supra;
Rome v. Lumpkin, 5 Geo., 447. But these several cases recognize the right
of the state to give to the municipalities the authority to tax occupations
licensed by the state. In Heise v. Columbia, 6 Rich., 404, it was decided that
a license granted by the state could not be forfeited by a municipal corpora
tion for breach cf condition, any more than could any other thing of value.
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Construction of municipal powers. The general rule that
the powers of a municipal corporation are to be construed with
strictness, is peculiarly applicable to the case of taxes on occu
pations. It is presumed the legislature has granted in plain terms
all it has intended to grant at all. If it is not manifest that there
has been a purpose by the legislature to give authority for col
lecting a revenue by taxes on specified occupations, any exaction
for that purpose will be illegal.1 If a minimum tax is prescribed
by statute, one measured by the business, and which may exceed
the sum named, is unauthorized and void;' but where a discre
tionary power is conferred, its exercise will not be interfered with,
unless it clearly appears to have been abused.8
Kinds of business taxed. If taxes were levied on any well
matured or intelligible system, it might be practicable to classify
those whicb are levied upon business, with reference to the special
reasons which have induced the selection of particular branches
of business for taxation, and the exemption of others. But this
is wholly impracticable. Many impolitic taxes are laid, and
many unjust taxes, without any purpose to do what is not for the
public interest, or what is unfair and unequal. A vast number
1See Kip e. Patterson, 26 N. J., 298, in which the requirement of a fee of five
cents from every person selling hay or other produce within the city was held
unauthorized, the power to tax in that manner not having been conferred, and
the requirement not appearing to be made as a police regulation. For the
general principle, see Robinson v. Franklin, 1 Humph., 156; St. Louis v.
Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559 ; Dubuque v. Life Ins. Co., 29 Iowa, 9.
•Kniper v. Louisville, 7 Bush, 599. On the principle of a strict construc
tion of powers, it was held in Butler's Appeal, 73 Penn. St., 418, that the au
thority to impose a license fee did not carry with it authority to punish the
failure to pay the fee by fine and imprisonment.
8Burlington v. Putnam Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 102; Kniper e. Louisville, 7 Bush,
599; citing Mason v. Lancaster, 4 id., 406. It was decided in the case first
named , that the city might graduate the rate of licenses when not restricted
in that regard. And see East St Louis v. Wehrung, 46 11l., 392. Authority " to
make such assessment on the inhabitants of Augusta, or those who hold taxa
ble property within the same, as may seem expedient," will warrant a tax on
a foreign insurance company doing business within the city. Home Ins. Co.
v. Augusta, 50 Geo., 530. See Commonwealth v. Milton, 12 B. Monr., 212.
That special powers conferred upon towns to charge license fees are valid,
though the like licenses are not allowed by the general laws of the state, see
Woodward v. Turnbull, 3 Scam., 1 ; Ottawa v. La Salle, 12 11l., 339 ; Byers v.
Olney, 16 id., 35
1
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of subjects are sometimes selected for taxation, because it is sup
posed justice requires it
,
when, had the same burden been laid
upon a few, it would have been quite as just, quite as equally dis
tributed, and the tax collected with greater economy. Classifica
tion will, therefore, not be attempted, but some reference may be
made to those occupations which are most often selected for taxa
tion.
Bankers. There are various methods of taxing the business
of bankers. When it is carried on under corporate powers, the
franchise is sometimes subjected to a specific tax ; but taxes are
also imposed which are measured by the business done, the de
posits received, the profits made, etc. Brokers are taxed after
similar standards.1
Carriers o
f Goods and Persons. While railway corporations
are generally taxed upon their property, they are also sometimes
taxed in other modes. In some states they are taxed a specific
rate on their capital, in others the franchise is taxed, in others
the business or profits.2 The vehicle, by means of which the busi
ness is carried on may also be taxed, when the tax does not
amount to a regulation of inter-state commerce.8
Practitioners o
f Law and Medicine. These are frequently
taxed a specific sum upon the privilege of pursuing their calling
for a year or other specified time. Such a tax is not a poll tax,
and may therefore be levied when poll taxes are forbidden.4
1 As to definitions of bankers and brokers under the federal revenue laws,
see Northrup v. Shook, 10 Blatch.,243; U. S. v. Cutting, 3 Wall., 441; U. S. v.
Fisk, id., 445. Of cattle brokers, see U. S. e. Kenton, 2 Bond, 97. Of brokers,
State e. Field, 49 Mo., 270. A statute of Tennessee required those buying
notes at a greater share than six per cent, to take out a license, make a state
ment of the amount employed in the business the preceding year, and pay
thereon a tax of five cents on each $100. The penalty for a failure to comply
'with it was $500. This act enforced. Young e. The Governor, 11 Humph.,
147. Bankers whose whole capital is invested in government securities are
not taxable as such. Chicago e. Lunt, 52 111.,414.
» See State Tax on Gross Receipts, 15 Wall., 284.
8 See ante, pp. 61-64. A wharfage tax may be levied by a city as a tax on all
vessels touching at its wharves. Marshall v. Vicksburgh, 15 Wall., 146. As to
duties on tonage, see ante, p. 61.
4 Egan v. County Court, 3 H. & McH., 169. Authority to tax " trades, occu
pations and professions," does not authorize a tax on notaries public. New
Orleans v. Bienvenu, 23 La. An., 710.
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Sometimes the tax is graduated by the supposed value of the
privilege.1
Auctioneers and Commission Dealers. These are commonly
taxed either a specific sum periodically, or a sum measured by
the extent of their dealings.2 It has been held that a tax " on
the gross amount of auction sales made in and during the tax
year
" is to be assessed against and paid by the auctioneer, and
not by the owner of property sold.* This is doubtless correct,
though in the end such a tax is paid by the employer.
Merchants. This class of persons is often selected for taxa
tion.4 The fact that they pay taxes on their stock in trade as
property, does not preclude their occupation being specially taxed.5
1See Simmons e. State, 12 Mo., 268; Ould v. Richmond, 23 Grat., 464. A
tax on the "privilege " of a lawyer may be enforced (under proper legislation),
by levy on the body. Stewart v. Potts, 49 Miss., 749. See Jones e. Page, 44
Ala., 657. Where the charter of a city enumerated certain classes that should
be compelled to take out a license before exercising their vocation in the city,
and then followed with these words : " and all other business, trades, avoca
tions, or professions whatever," it was held that if the profession of " law "
was not specifically enumerated in the section, that the city had no power to
lay a license tax on lawyers. The rule is, where general words follow partic
ular ones, to construe them as applicable only to persons or things of the same
general character or class. City of St. Louis e. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559.
Clergymen are sometimes subjected to an occupation tax. See Miller 9.
Kirkpatrick, 29 Penn. St., 226. So are college professors. See Union County
v. James, 21 id., 525.
»Moseley e. Tift, 4 Fla., 402; Paddleford o Savannah, 14 Geo., 438. In
Pearce v. Augusta, 37 id., 597, it was decided that a general authority to levy
taxes on taxable property would support a tax on the amount of gross sales
and on the commissions received. In Lott e. Ross, 38 Ala., 156, it was held
that a tax on " the gross amount of sales of merchandise " is not a property
tax, but an occupation or privilege tax, the amount being regulated by the
extent to which the privilege has been enjoyed. (Citing Moseley e. Tift, 4 Fla.,
402; State v. Stephens, 4 Texas, 137; State v. Bock, 9 id., 369; Dc WitU. Hays,
2 Cal., 468; Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How., 80). Such a tax would therefore not
be leviable under a power to levy a tax "not exceeding twenty cents upon
each hundred dollars of taxable property " within the county. Id.
•State v. Lee, 38 Ala., 222.
4As to what constitutes a "merchant," see State v. Whittaker, 33 Mo., 457;
State v. West, 34 id., 424. What a "dealer in tobacco," Carter v. State, 44
Ala., 29.
5Woolman v. State, 2 Swan, 353; State v. Stephens, 4 Texas, 137; State v.
Bock, 9 id., 369. As to such taxes in general, see Wilmington e. Roby, 8
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Other dealers are taxed under proper designations. But where a
municipal corporation is empowered to tax a particular occupa
tion, it cannot, by definition, bring persons within the power who
do not in fact follow the occupation.1 But a merchant, paying a
tax as such, if he adds to that occupation another though kindred
business which is separately taxed, is not by his license as a
merchant excused from paying the tax on such other occupation.8
Peddlers and transient dealers are commonly taxed a specific
sum by the year, because they are likely to escape any other.5
Manufacturers and Dealers in Liquors. This is a class of dealers
commonly selected for exceptional taxation. Their occupation is
sometimes taxed for federal, state and municipal purposes, though
their stocks are taxed as property, and whatever has been im
ported has paid a heavy duty. The right to levy these several
taxes has almost ceased to be contested.4 Regulation is gener
ally had in view in such taxes, and they will be referred to again
Ired., 250; Commissioners e. Patterson, 8 Jones' L., 182; Cousins v. Common
wealth, 19 Grat., 807; French v. Barber, 4 Sneed, 193. A statute required a
license to be obtained by every person selling goods by sample who was not
a " resident merchant." Held, that, as a man may be a resident citizen and
not a resident merchant, and the reverse, there was no discrimination in
favor of citizens of the state, and therefore the statute was constitutional.
Such a statute is not a regulation of commerce between the states. Speer v.
Commonwealth, 23 Grat., 935 ; S. C, 14 Am. Rep., 164.
1Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, N. S , 268. Case of a tax on " hucksters."
'
* Ilirsh v. Commonwealth, 21 Grat., 785. Case of a merchant taxed as j unk
dealer also.
8For definition of "peddler," see State v. Hodgdon, 41 Vt, 139. The fol
lowing are cases of such taxes: Wyne v. Wright, 1 Dev. & Bat., 19; Cowles
'9.Brittain, 2 Hawks, 204; Wilmington e. Roby, 8 Ired., 250; Whitfield v.
Longest, 6 id., 268 ; Plymouth r. Pettijohn, 4 Dev., 591 ; State e. City Council,
10 Rich., 240; State v. Pinckncy, 10 id., 474; City Council v. Ahrens, 4 Strob.,
241 ; Keller v. State, 11 Md., 525. For case of a tax on those canvassing to
buy or actually buying means of subsistence, see Sledd v. Commonwealth, 19
Grat., 813.
* See Durach's Appeal, 62 Penn. St., 491 ; Aulanier v. The Governor, 1 Texas,
653 ; Baker v. Panola County, 30 id., 86 ; Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich., 325 ;
Block e. Jacksonville, 36 11l., 301. Such taxes when laid by municipalities
are not void because of their discriminating as between different localities
therein. East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 46 11l., 392. As to tne difference between
a manufacturer and a dealer, see State v. Campbell, 33 Penn. St., 380.
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in the next chapter. Some of the cases which have considered
taxes of this nature are referred to in the note.1
Theatrical Exhibitions and Shows. These are a very proper
subject for special taxation, and are commonly charged either a
specific tax by the year or for single representations. Such taxes
call for no special remark.2
Hackmen, Draymen, etc. While these classes of persons are
usually required to take out a license for purposes of regulation,
they are also sometimes charged a substantial sum for revenue
purposes. A few cases are referred to in which the license fee
was construed to be a tax.8
Taxes on Manufactures. These are generally excise taxes.
For a time, during the civil war, nearly all manufactures were
taxed by the federal government, but only a few kinds are now
taxed, either by the nation or by the states. Any or all may be
taxed by both.4
Taxes on Offices. The United States may tax the salaries or
compensation of its officers, and the states may tax those of the
1It was once a question whether license to keep a tavern included authority
to sell liquors, and the following cases have considered it, or points bearing
upon it. Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio, N. S., 15 ; Page v. State, 11 Ala., 849 ; Commis-
sioners, etc., v. Jordan, 18 Pick., 228. Compare State v. Chamblyss, 1 Cheves,
220; Commissioners of Roads v. Dennis, id., 229. As to tavern licenses, see
further, State v. Prettyman, 3 Harr., 570; Bonner v. Welborn, 7 Geo., 296;
Hannibal v. Guyott, 18 Mo., 515; St. Louis v. Siegrist, 46 id., 593 ; Common
wealth v. Thayer, 5 Met., 246 ; Overseers of Crown Point v. Warner, 3 Hill,
150. That under the power to " tax " and also to " restrain " the liquor traffic,
a town may license it
,
see Mt. Carmel e. Wabash County, 50 11l., 69.
sSee Mabry v. Tarver, 1 Humph., 94,98; Trapp v. White, 35 Texas, 387;
Orton e. Brown, 35 Miss., 426; Germania v. State, 7 Md., 1. The business
of a traveling circus not a trade. Speak e. Powell, L. R., 9 Exch., 25. The
license fee not a tax on property. Orton v. Brown, 3upra. See Baker v. Cin-
cinati, 11 Ohio, N. S., 534.
8Bennett e.Birmingham, 31 Penn. St., 15; Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2
Cush., 562. For some special questions the following cases may be consulted :
St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo., 122; Gartside v. East St. Louis, 43 11l., 47; Sny
der v. North Lawrence, 8 Kans., 82; Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625.
4 See Commonwealth v. Byrne, 20 Grat., 165. A gas company is a " manu
facturing company." Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 12 Allen, 75.
But an aqueduct company is not. Dudley v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co., 100
Mass., 183.
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state officers, though neither can tax the compensation received
by the officers of the other.1 And the state may authorize its
subdivisions to tax state, county or tpwnship offices if it shall be
deemed proper to do so.'
Other "Privilege" Taxes. Where " privileges
"
are taxed, any
occupation which is not open to all, but can only be exercised
under license from some constituted authority, is to be re
garded as a privilege.8 And succession to an inheritance may be
taxed as a privilege, notwithstanding the property of the estate is
taxed, and taxes on property are required by the constitution of
the state to be uniform.4 Where a tax is laid on all " pursuing
any occupation, trade or profession," one keeping a billiard table
for profit is included ; though if he kept it for amusement merely
he would not be.5 It is no objection to a tax on a business that
it operates indirectly as a tax on the consumer.6 That may per
haps be the very reason why it has been deemed desirable to
levy it.
A tax on a business should be laid where the business is car
ried on ; not where the party has his residence, if it is elsewhere.7
Taxes on corporations. These are imposed in so many forms
1Collector v. Day, 11 Wall, 113; ante, p. 58. The compensation of a clerk
in a postoffice is taxable by the state. Melcher v. Boston, 9 Met., 73.
8Gilkeson e. The Frederick Justices, 13 Grat., 577.
aCaruthers, J., in French v. Baker, 4 Sneed, 193, 195.
4Eyre e. Jacob, 14 Grat., 422.
'Tarde v. Benseman, 31 Texas, 277.
•Wiley e. (Hens, 39 Ind., 429.
1Bates v. Mobile, 46 Ala., 158. See Miner v. Fredonia, 27 N. Y., 155 ; Gar-
diner, etc., Co. v. Gardiner, 5 Greenl., 133. For other cases of business or oc
cupation taxes, see Simmons v. State. 12 Mo., 268; St. Louis e. Laughlin, 49
id., 456; Carroll v. Tuscaloosa, 12 Ala., 173; Gunter e. Leckey, 30 id., 591,
Portland v. O'Niell, 1 Oregon, 218. As to meaning of profits or in«ome when
a tax is laid on results by this designation, see People v. Supervisors of Niag
ara, 4 Hill, 20; Same v. Same, 7 id., 504; New Orleans v. Hart, 14 La. An.,
803; Same v. Fassman, id., 865. As to meaning of an insurance company's
surplus, see State v. Parker, 34 N. J., 479 ; Same v. Same, 35 id., 574. A pro
vision in a city charter that its taxes should " be apportioned in the same
manner as the state tax," would preclude its discriminating against an occu
pation in a degree beyond that made against that occupation by the state.
Marshall e. Snediker, 25 Texas, 460.
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that an enumeration is difficult. The following may be men
tioned : 1. A specific tax on the franchise. 2. A tax on the
property by valuation. 3. A tax on the capital stock. 4. A
tax on the business done. 5. A tax on dividends or on profits.
Sometimes the franchise is taxed, and also the capital stock or the
property ; but to tax the capital stock and also the property in
which the capital is invested, would be imposing the same bur
den twice on the same property, and consequently unjust, if not
illegal.1
1The legislature has power to require corporations organized in the state
to pay to the treasurer of the state, a tax on the excess of the market value of
all their capital stock, over the value of their real estate and machinery other
wise taxable. Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 12 Allen, 75 ; Com
monwealth v. Hamilton Manuf. Co., id., 298. Such a tax cannot be supported
as a tax on property, because not " proportional ; " " that is, it is not laid
according to any rule of proportion whatever, but is imposed only on the
corporations designated in the act, without any reference to the amount
required to be raised by taxat ion for public purposes, or to the actual prop
erty held by such corporation subject to taxation, or to the whole amount of
property in the commonwealth liable to be assessed for the public service.
Commonwealth v. Peoples' Savings Bank, 5 Allen, 428, 431 ; Oliver v. Wash
ington Mills, 11 id., 268, 274." "P&cBigelow, Ch. J., in Commonwealth e. Ham
ilton Manuf. Co., 12 id., 298, 300. It is " in the nature of an excise or duty
on the franchise or privilege of each of the corporations designated, to be
estimated and measured by ascertaining the excess of the market value of
the capital stock or aggregate of the shares, over the value of the real estate
and machinery for which each corporation was assessed, in the town or city
in which it was established and carried on its business." Bigelow, Ch. J., in
Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 12 Allen, 75, 76. In 12 Allen, 301,
the judge shows that this is not equivalent to a tax on property, as the value
of the shares may not correspond at all to that. See also Manuf. Ins. Co. v.
Loud, 99 Mass., 146 ; Provident Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall., 611 ; Ham
ilton Co. v. Massachusetts, id.. 632; 11linois Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Peoria, 29
11l., 180; Coite v. Society for Savings, 32 Conn., 173; Society for Savings v.
Coite, 6 Wall., 594; Coite v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 36 Conn., 512. That
an excise tax may be imposed on corporations chartered in other states, but
doing business in the state imposing it
,
see Attorney General v. Bay State
Mining Co., 99 Mass., 148. The subject of taxes on foreign insurance compa
nies was much considered in People v. Thurber, 13 HI., 554, per Coton, J., and
in People v. State Treasurer, 31 Mich., 6
, per Graves, J. It was objected in
People v. Thurber, that the tax was void because not uniform ; that is
,
because
the same sum was not imposed upon each company or agent ; but it was well
replied that there was no impropriety or injustice in requiring each to con
tribute to the state revenues in proportion to the amount of business done or
money received. That a tax on the market value of the stock of corporations,
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Taxation of national banks. By the act ot congress of June
3, 1864, the shares of stock held by any person or body corpor
ate in any of the national banks,areallowed to be included in the
valuation of personal property " in the assessment of taxes im
posed by or under state authority, at the place where such bank
is not applicable to the guaranty stock of a mutual life insurance company,
rhlch is redeemable from its earnings, such stock being rather in the nature
of a debt of the corporation than stock as generally understood, see Common
wealth v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 98 Mass., 25. As to the taxation of the cap
ital of mutual life insurance companies, see Coite e. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
36 Conn., 512.
An English joint stock insurance company, clothed with the right of act
ing independently of the rules that govern an ordinary partnership, is taxable
as a " company incorporated or associated." Oliver v. Liverpool, etc., Co., 100
Mass , 531 ; Liverpool, etc., Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall., 566.
In Coite v. Society for Savings, 32 Conn., 173, 184, in which a tax on a sav
ings institution measured by the amount of its deposits, was contested on the
ground that, in effect, it was a tax on United States securities in which the
funds of the corporation had been invested, M«Curdy, J., speaking of the va
rious methods of taxation, says : " Most commonly the tax is laid upon prop
erty. But this is not always the most convenient, expedient or just mode. A
large portion of the national revenues accrues from a tax on incomes, divi
dends, licenses, legacies, stamps, etc., irrespective of property. In this state,
for many years, and until very lately, the form of taxing lawyers, physicians,
traders, tavern keepers, manufacturers and mechanics, was to assess them,
either at a fixed sum for each respective class, or at the discretion of the
' listers.' In familiar language, this was called an ' assessment on the faculty.'
The present statutes are not free from similar provisions. A capitation tax
still remains. The agent, in this state, of an insurance company existing out
of the state, is required, in consequence of being allowed to conduct business
here, to pay a certain per centage on the amount of his preminms and collec
tions. Auctioneers and express companies are assessed in a like manner. In
the case of quarry, mine and ore bed companies (joint stock or incorporated),
not only the stock itself, but the franchise is expressly made subject to assess
ment. By a law of 1862, it is enacted that, for the purposes of taxation, no
stock of any railroad company shall be estimated in the list at less than ten
per cent- of its par value, although it was then notorious that much of the
stock so to be valued was utterly worthless. These examples show that the
state has ever adopted, at its own will, different bases of taxation as applied
to different subjects, and there is no occasion for surprise that the legislature,
in the matter before us, thought proper to impose a tax directly and specific
ally on these corporations as such, without reference to their assets. There is
no reason why they should not contribute their full share to support the gov
ernment through which tUey exist and flourish."
As to the taxation of savings societies in general, see Savings Bank v. New
London, 20 Conn., 111.
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is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is as
sessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual
citizens of such state," and not exceeding "the rate imposed upon
*.he shares of any of the banks organized under the authority of
the state" where the bank is located ; and nothing in the act is to
exempt the real estate of such banks " from either state, county
or municipal taxes, to the same extent, according to its value, as
other real estate is taxed." Under this act, if no tax is imposed
by the state on shares in state banks, the shares in the national
banks are not taxed at all.1 This difficulty was met with in states
whose laws taxed the capital of banks, but not the shares thereof.*
The act of congress does not allow of taxation of the capital,8
nor will it admit of municipal taxation of national bank shares,
when the state banks are exempt therefrom.4 But the fact that
two banks, by their charter, are specially taxed, will not preclude
the taxation of the shares in the national banks by general law,5
neither are the shares to be excluded from taxation, because some
other classes of moneyed capital are exempt from taxation by
law of limited application.6 It is competent to require that the
tax on the shares shall be paid by the bank.7
Van Allen v. The Assessors, 3 Wall., 573 ; Bradley e. People, 4 Id., 459. ,
•Bradley v. People, 4 Wall., 459; Smith v. First National Bank of Tecum-
seh, 17 Mich., 479.
»Smith v. First National Bank of Tecumseh, 17 Mich., 479; Collins v. Chi
cago, 4 Biss., 472. See Smith e. Webb, 11 Minn., 500; First National Bank of
Hannibal v. Meredith, 44 Mo., 500.
4Craft e. Tuttle, 27 Ind., 332; Wright v. Stiltz, id., 338.
•Lionberger v. Rouse, 43 Mo., 67; S. C in error, 9 Wall., 468.
•Everett's Appeal, 71 Penn. St., 219. The whole subject of taxation under
this law received careful examination in Provident Institution v. Boston, 101
Mass., 575. And see Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, 19 Wall., 490, opin
ion by Waite, Ch. J.
'National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall., 353; Lionberger v. Rouse, id.,
468; First National Bank v. Douglass Co., 1 Cent. Law Jour., 584, per Dil
lon, J. As the federal decisions referred to seem now to have covered the
ground of taxation of national banks, we abstain from reference to many state
decisions.
•
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CHATTEE XIX.
TAXES UNDER THE POWER OF POLICE.
Difference between taxation and regulation. There are
some cases in which levies are made and collected under the
general designation of taxes, or under some name employed in
revenue laws, to indicate a particular class of taxes, where the
imposition of the burden may fairly be referred to some other
authority than to that branch of the sovereign power of the
state under which the public revenues are apportioned and col
lected. The reason is
,
that the imposition has not for its object
the raising of revenue, but looks rather to the regulation of rela
tive rights, privileges and duties, as between individuals, to the
conservation of order in the political society, to the encourage
ment of industry, and the discouragement of pernicious employ
ments.1 Legislation for these purposes, it would seem proper to
look upon as being made in the exercise of that authority which
is inherent in every sovereignty, to make all such rules and regu
lations as are needful to secure and preserve the public order,
and to protect each individual in the enjoyment of his own
rights and privileges by requiring the observance of rules of
order, fairness and good neighborhood, by all around him. This
manifestation of the sovereign authority is usually spoken of as
the police power.
The distinction between a demand of money, under the police
power, and one made under the power to tax, is not so much one
of form as of substance. The proceedings may be the same in
the two cases, though the purpose is essentially different The
one is made for regulation and the other for revenue. If, there
fore,' the purpose is evident in any particular instance, there can
be no difficulty in classifying the case and referring it to the
' Mr. Walker, in his Science of Wealth, adds this to Adam Smith's four car
dinal rules of taxation : " V. The heaviest taxes should be imposed on those
commodities the consumption of which is especially prejudicial to the interests
of the people."
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proper power. But in what has been said regarding the appor
tionment of taxes, it has been seen that other considerations than
those which regard the production of a revenue are admissible,
and that regulation may be kept in view when revenue is the
main and primary purpose. The right of any sovereignty to
look beyond the immediate purpose to the general effect, neither
is nor can be disputed ; the government has general authority to
raise a revenue and to choose the methods of doing so ; it has also
general authority in the regulation of relative rights, privileges
and duties ; and there is no rule of reason, policy or government
which can require the legislature, when making laws with the
one object in view, to exclude carefully from its attention the
other. Nevertheless, cases of this nature are to be regarded as
cases of taxation. Revenue is the primary purpose, and the regu
lation results from the methods of apportionment that are resorted
to in obtaining the revenue. Only those cases, where regulation
is the primary purpose, can be specially referred to the police
power.
Custom has much to do in determining whether certain classes
of exactions are to be regarded as taxes or as duties imposed for
regulation. If by the common understanding and general custom
of the country, a particular duty is regarded as being imposed
upon certain individuals, not as their proportionate share in the
burdens of government, but because of some special relation to
property peculiarly located, or to business peculiarly troublesome
or dangerous, so that a requirement that the duty shall be per
formed by such individuals is usually regarded as only in the
nature of regulation of relative obligations and duties through
the neighborhood or the municipality, there is no sufficient reason
why this may not be considered a mere police regulation, though
the proceedings assume the form of taxation, and are even desig
nated by that name. The summoning of the people once a year
to put the highways of their neighborhood in order, has some
times been looked upon as a case of this description ; to some
extent, at least, in the nature of a police regulation,1 notwith
standing that, on a failure to obey the summons, the value of the
1Bee State v. Halifax, 4 Dev. Law, 345; Sawyer v. Alton, 3 Scam., 127, 130;
Pleasant v. Kost, 290 11l., 49; Overseers of Amenia e. Stamford, 6 Johns., 92;
Draining Company Case, 11 La. An., 338, 372.
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labor is collected in money. A public purpose, such as is usu
ally accomplished by an expenditure of public moneys, is indeed
had in view in such a case ; but the custom of requiring highway
labor seems to have come down to us from a period when regular
taxes were unknown or only collected in kind, and when it was
looked upon as a neighborhood duty to keep the roads in order,
as it was to prevent riots and arrest criminals, or make compen
sation for their offenses. A like practice, based upon a similar
idea, has prevailed in other countries.
Sidewalk assessments. The cases of assessments for the con
struction of walks by the side of the streets, in cities and other
populous places, are more distinctly referable to the power of po
lice. These foot walks are not only required, as a rule, to be put
and kept in proper condition for use by the adjacent proprietors,
but it is quite customary to confer by the municipal charters full
authority upon the municipalities, to order the walks of a kind
and quality by them prescribed, to be constructed by the owners
of adjacent lots at their own expense, within a time limited by
the order for the purpose, and that in case of their failure so to
construct them, it shall be done by the public authorities, and the
cost collected from such owners, or made a lien upon their prop
erty. When this is done the duty must be looked upon as being
enjoined as a regulation of police, made because of the peculiar
interest such owners have in the walks, and because their situa
tion gives them peculiar fitness and ability for performing, with
promptness and convenience, the duty of putting them in proper
state, and of afterwards keeping them in a condition suitable for
use. Upon these grounds the authority to establish such regula
tions has frequently been supported.1
1The leading case is that of Godard, Petitioner, 16 Pick., 504, 509, in which
Shaw, Ch. J., speaking of a by-law imposing such an assessment, answers the
principal objections to it
,
and explains its nature as follows :
" Another, and perhaps the most important objection is, that the by-law if
one imposing a tax or duty upon the citizens, and it is a violation of the con
stitution in this, that it is partial, and unequal, and contravenes that funda
mental maxim of our social system, that all burdens and taxes laid on the
people for the public good shall be equal. But the court are all of the opinion
that the by-law in question is not obnoxious to this objection.
" It is not speaking strictly to characterize this city ordinance a8 a law levy
ing a tax, the direct or principal object of which is
,
the raising of revenue.
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Sewer assessments. There seems to be no legal impediment
to a requirement under the police power that lot owners in cities
It imposes a duty upon a large clat,s of persons, the performance of which
requires some labor and expense, and therefore indirectly operates as a law
creating a burden ; but we think it is rather to be regarded as a police regula
tion, requiring a duty to be performed, highly salutary and advantageous
to the citizens of a populous and closely built city, and which is imposed
upon them because they are so situated as that they can most promptly and
conveniently perform it
, and it is laid, not upon a few, but upon a numerous
class, all those who are so situated, and equally upon all who are within the
description composing the class. It is said to be unequal, because it singles
out a particular class of citizens, to wit, the owners and occupiers of real estate,
and imposes the duty exclusively upon them. If this were an arbitrary selec
tion of a class of citizens, without reference to their peculiar fitness and ability
to perform the duty, the objection would have great weight ; as for instance,
if the expense of clearing the streets of snow were imposed upon the mechan
ics, or merchants, or any other distinct class of citizens, between whose con
venience and accommodation, and the labor to be done, there is no natural
relation. But suppose there is a class of citizens who will themselves com
monly derive a benefit from the performance of some public duty, we can see
no inequality in requiring that all those who will derive such benefit, shall
by a general and equal law be required to do it. Suppose a by-law should
require every inhabitant who keeps a cart, t ruck or other team, or a coach or
other carriage, to turn out himself, or send a man, with one or more horses,
after a heavy fall of snow, to assist in leveling it. Although other citizens
would derive a benefit, yet as these derive some peculiar benefit, accompanied
with the ability, I can at present perceive no valid objection to a by-law re
quiring it, on the ground of inequality. Supposing a general regulation, that
at certain seasons of the year, every >shopkeeper should sprinkle the side
walk in front of his own shop, or sweep it
,
inasmuch as he has a peculiar
benefit, and as the duty is equal upon all who come within the description, it
seems to us to be equal, in the sense in which the law requires all such bur
dens to be equal. And it appears to us that the case before us is similar.
Although the sidewalk is part of the public street, and the public have an
easement in it, yet the adjacent occupant is often the owner of the fee, and
generally has some peculiar interest in it
,
and benefit from it
,
distinct from
that which he enjoys in common with the rest of the community. He has
this interest and benefit, often in accommodating his cellar door and steps, a
passage for fuel, and the passage to and from his own house to the street. To
some purposes, therefore, it is denominated his sidewalk. For his own ac
commodation, he would have an interest in clearing the snow from his own
door. The owners and occupiers of house lots and other real estate, therefore,
have an interest in the performance of this duty, peculiar and somewhat dis
tinct from that of the rest of the community. Besides, from their situation,
they have power and ability to perform this duty, with the promptness which
the benefit of the community requires ; and the duty is divided, distributed
and apportioned upon so large a number, that it can be done promptly and
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and villages shall be at the expense of constructing that portion
of the public sewer in front of their respective premises. It is
effectually, and without imposing a very severe burden upon any one. Sup
posing a by-law should require, what is often done, in practice, that upon an
alarm of Are in the night, all householders, on streets leading to and near the
fire, should exhibit a light. This would seem to be reasonable. Or that all
the owners or occupiers of dwelling houses, having a well and pump, should
keep them in repair at their own expense, to be used in case of fire. It would
operate partially, but it seems to us not unequal, in the sense in which we are
using that term. The city might keep persons ready in every street to light
torches and flambeaux in case of fire, and the expense to be paid from the
treasury ; still it appears to me, that as householders would derive a benefit
from the operation of this general regulation, as their local situation puts it
peculiarly within their power and ability to perform it without great expense,
and as it is equal in its terms, it would not be obnoxious to the charge of
being invalid for partiality and inequality.
" In all these cases the answer to the objection of partiality and inequality
is, that the duty required is a duty upon the person in respect to the property
which be holds, occupies and enjoys, under the protection and benefit of
the laws ; that it operates on each and all in their turns, as they become own
ers and occupiers of such estates, and it ceases to be required of them, when
they cease to be such holders and occupiers of the estate, in respect to which
the duty is required. In this respect it is like a land tax, or house tax, it does
not bear upon all citizens alike, but it is not on that account unequal or par-
tial, in the sense contemplated by the declaration of rights, requiring all
taxes and burdens to be equal and impartial." The following cases support
the same view. Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met., 180; Paxson v. Sweet, 13 N. J.,
196; Washington v. Nashville, 1 Swan, 177; Whyte e. Nashville, 2 id., 364;
Franklin v. Mayberry, 6 Humph., 368; Bonsall v. Lebanon, 19 Ohio, 418; De-
blois v. Barker, 4 R. I., 445 ; O'Leary e. Sloo, 7 La. An., 25 ; Hart v. Brooklyn,
36 Barb, 226: Buffalo City Cemetery Co., v. Buffalo, 46 N. Y., 503; Greens-
burg v. Young, 53 Penn. St., 280; Hydes v. Joyes, 4 Bush, 464. And see Hud-
ler e. Golden, 36 N. Y., 446: Woodbridge e. Detroit, 8 Mich., 274, 309, per
Christian«y, J. The case of Ottowa e. Spencer, 40 11l., 211, 217, is contra. In
New Jersey, where it is held that the assessment for an improvement on the ad
joining land owners, must not exceed the actual benefit-conferred by such im
provement, it is also held that the whole expense of a sidewalk may be
assessed upon the lot in front of which it is constructed, regardless of abso
lute benefits. Van Tassel v. Jersey City, 14 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.), 258. In
Twycross e. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 10 Gray, 293, 295, a lessee's covenant to pay
" all taxes or duties," levied or to be levied on the premises during the term,
was held not to apply to an assessment for paving the sidewalk in front; that
not being a tax or duty levied or to be levied on the premises demised. " It
is a permanent improvement of the estate, the benefit of which is to be found
in the increased value of the estate, and in the increased rent which it would
permanently command." Per Thomas, J. It is no objection to a sidewalk
tax that a street is not graded. Parker v. Challiss, 9 Kans., 155; Challiss e.
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true, that the levies for the purpose of constructing sewers and of
keeping them in repair are commonly spoken of as taxes ; 1 but,
as has been justly remarked, there is as much reason to subject
the owners of land abutting to contribution to their expenditure,
as there is to oblige them to pave the footways in front of their
grounds, or to keep the same in repair, when the city shall pave
the streets adjoining. It should be a charge on the land, just as
is the requisition on the owners of land abutting on the streets to
clear away the snow at their own expense, which has been deter
mined to be a reasonable provision. It is a charge upon real
estate thus situated, and requisite for the comfort and convenience
of all the citizens. 2 By this is not meant that the expense of
sewera may not be borne by general tax, as indeed is often done :
what is meant is only this, that the purpose to be accomplished
is of that peculiar nature that the duty to provide for it seems
intimately associated with the ownership of adjacent property,
the value of which will be increased and the use facilitated by
means thereof ; and it is therefore within the competency of the
legislature to impose upon the owners of such property the duty
to make provision for it
Levee assessments. Assessments for the construction of em
bankments or levees, to protect from overflow and destruction
Parker, 11 id., 384. Even when once graded, the grade may be changed at
the discretion of the municipal authorities, without affording any legal
ground for complaint to the parties affected. Pontiac v. Carter, Sup. Ct.
Mich. (1875) ; 2 Am. L. Times, — ; 12 Albany L. Jour., p. 88. As a matter of
construction, the following cases are important: In Williams v. Bruce, 5
Conn., 190, it was decided that the building of a railing on the inner side of a
sidewalk could not be compelled under a general authority to require the
sidewalk to be constructed. In Wright e. Briggs, 2 Hill, 77, it was held that
authority to a village council to require adjoining owners to construct side
walks in front of their premises, would not warrant imposing upon them a
tax for improving the street. A power in a municipal charter to "regulate
and improve " sidewalks, does not authorize an assessment for their construc
tion. Fairfield v. Ratcliffe, 20 Iowa, 396.
1See Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Penn.St., 401; Stroud e. Philadelphia, 61 id.,
255; Boston v. Shaw, 1 Met., 130; Hildreth e. Lowell, 11 Gray, 345; Conee.
Hartford, 28 Conn., 363 ; State v. Jersey City, 29 N. J., 441.
s Putnam, J., in Boston v. Shaw, I Mot., 130, 138. In this case it is decided
that the levy of a sewer rate by the value of estates is void, as it could not be
equal or just.
26
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large tracts of country, are commonly levied on the owners
of lands bordering on or lying near the streams or bodies of
water from which the danger is anticipated, and are generally
looked upon as a species of local tax.1 But if it should be im
posed as a duty upon residents or property owners in the neigh
borhood of such a danger, that they should turn out periodically,
or in emergencies, and give personal attention and labor to the
construction of the necessary defenses against overflow and inun
dation, it is not perceived that there could be any difficulty in
supporting such a requirement as one of police, or of resting it
upon the same grounds which sustain the regulations in cities, by
which duties are imposed on the occupants of buildings, to take
certain precautions against fires, not for their own benefit exclu
sively, but for the protection of the public.2
Drainage laws. Similar considerations apply in the case of
drainage laws, which are enacted in order to relieve swamp?,
marshes and other low lands of the excessive waters which detract
from their value for occupation and cultivation, and perhaps render
them worthless for use, and are likely at the same time to diffuse
through the neighborhood a dangerous nuisance. If these may
be drained at the expense of the owner, by special tax, there can
be no doubt of the right of the state to make it his duty to drain
them, as a matter of police regulation ; the state coming forward
to perform the duty at his expense, in case of its not being suit
ably or expeditiously performed.*
1Crowley v. Cropley, 2 La. An., 329. See Sessions v. Cronklinton, 20 Ohio,
N. S., 349; Egyptian Levee Co. e. Hardin, 27 Mo., 495; Yeatman v. Cranclall,
11 La. An., 220; Wallace v. Shelton, 14 id., 498; Bishop e. Marks, 15 id., 147;
Richardson e. Morgan, 16 id., 429; McGehec e. Mathis, 21 Ark., 40; Jones
v. Boston, 104 Mass., 461.
» It is said by Elmer, J., in State e. Newark, 27 N. J., 185, 194, that " laws for
the drainage and embanking of low grounds, and to provide for the expense
for the mere benefit of the proprietors, without reference to the public good,
are to be classed, not under the taxing, but the police power of the govern
ment; and so also the regulation of fences and party walls."
8 In State v. City Council of Charleston, 12 Rich., 702, 733, the power to re
quire sewers, drains and sidewalks to be constructed by the owners of the
property adjacent, is plainly referred to the police power. "From a very
early period sewers and pavement8 have constituted exceptional subjects in
reference to assessments. Statutes of drains and sewers were known before
CH. XIX.] TAXES UNDER THE POWER OF POLICE. 403
It is not to be doubted that other cases which may have not
yet been the subject of judicial consideration, would fall within
the same reasons ; but it might be presumptuous to attempt an
enumeration of them, especially as there can be little or no occa
sion for doing so, when the taxing power is commonly sufficient
to meet all their requirements. A safer ground will be occupied
in the consideration of those cases, so often the subject of judicial
review, in which burdens in the shape of license fees have been
imposed upon business, trades or occupations.
License fees in general. License fees may be imposed:
1. For regulation. 2. For revenue. 3. To give monopolies. 4.
For prohibition. The third purpose is inadmissible in any free
government, and has not avowedly been had in view at any time
in this country, nor in England, since the period immediately pre
ceding the revolution of 1688, so fruitful of arbitrary exactions
of every available nature.1 The fourth purpose is entirely ad
missible in the case of pursuits or indigencies which in their
general effect are believed to be more harmful than beneficial to
society, and which, consequently, the public interest requires
should be put an end to. A case of this nature is that of heavy
the time of Henry VIII, when the general statutes on the subject were enact
ed, and the mode of assessment prescribed. In like manner the act of 1764,
provided for assessments for drains or sewers and sidewalks. Various reasons
have been assigned for these exceptions. Among others, it has been plainly
urged that, as a sanitary regulation, and under the power to abate nuisances,
the corporation might require every citizen to drain his own lot, or in case of
neglect, exact a penalty; and so by the old act of 1698 (7 Stat. 12), every in
habitant of Charleston was required to mend and raise the sidewalk in front
of his house in the manner and to the dimensions therein prescribed, on pen
alty of forfeiting for each house a penalty to be collected under the warrant
of a justice of the peace. In order the better to carry into effect these objects,
and to do what each individual might be required to do for himself, the act
of 1764 authorized the commissioners of streets to construct drains and level
and pave the footways, etc., and to assess the proprietors of lands and houses
fronting on the street, etc." Dunkin, Chancellor, p. 733.
1Taxation for the benefit of individuals is compared to monopolies by
Lowrie, Ch. J., in Philadelphia Association, etc. v. Wood, 39 Peun. St., 67, 82.
The very heavy license fees exacted from pawnbrokers m Dublin are said to owe
their origin to a purpose to give a monopoly of the business to a few favored
retainers of the court. Of course the weight of such fees rests finally on the
persons whose necessities make them the pawnbroker's customers.
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fees imposed on the keeperj of implements of gaming.1 When,
however, prohibition is the object, the end may generally be
more directly accomplished by legislation which in its terms is
prohibitory, than by the circuitous method of imposing a burden
difficult or impossible to be borne ; and the direct method is con
sequently the one usually adopted. But it is often found that
the prohibition of an occupation which excites or gratifies the vices
or passions of large numbers of people, is met by a resistance so
steady and powerful as to render the law wholly ineffectual,
when a heavy tax might lessen the evils and possibly in the end
make the occupation unprofitable. A belief that this might be
the result, has influenced many persons to favor a repeal of the
prohibitory liquor laws, and the substitution therefor of laws for
the regulation and taxation of the traffic.2 But it may safely be
1 State v. Doon, R. M. Charlt., 1. The fee in this case was of $1,000, and it
was sustained, although it was manifestly imposed for the purposes of prohib
ition, and its payment would not give to the owner of the table the privilege
of making use of it
,
which was illegal under another statute. The constitu
tion of Arkansas of 1868 provided that " the general assembly shall tax all
privileges, pursuits and occupations that are of no real use to society; all
others shall be exempt." Art 10, § 17.
» The constitution of Michigan forbids the grant of licenses for the sale of
liquors, and for twenty years a statute was in force making the sale, except
for medicinal or mechanical purposes illegal, and all contracts connected with
such a sale void. The statute did not answer the expectations of those who
procured its passage, and in 1875 It was repealed, and a license tax imposed
on the dealers in liquors. The law unquestionably had both revenue and
regulation in view, but it was contested as unconstitutional. Many objections
were made, but the only one important to our present purpose was considered
in Youngblood v. Sexton, Sup. Ct. Mich., Oct. 1875, and the importance of the
principle involved seems to justify quoting at some length from the opinion:
"The objection which appears to be principally relied upon is, that a tax
on the traffic in liquors under this law is equivalent to a license of the traffic,
and therefore comes directly in conflict with that provision of the constitu
tion A-hich declares that ' the legislature shall not pass any act authorizing
the grant of license for the sale of ardent spirits, or other intoxicating
liquors.' Const. Art. IV, sec. 7. * *
" The popular understanding of the word license undoubtedly is a permis
sion to do something which, without the license, would not be allowable.
This, we are to suppose, was the sense in which it was made use of in the
constitution ; but this is also the legal meaning. The object of a license, says
Mr. Justice Manning, is to confer a right that does not exist without a license.
Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich., 43, 49. Within this definition a mere tax upon
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affirmed that prohibition is seldom the purpose of such burdens,
and that revenue or regulation — one or both — are the purposes
aimed at in the imposition of license fees.
the traffic cannot be a license of the traffic, unless the tax confers some right
to carry on the traffic which otherwise would not have existed. We do not
understand that such is the case here. The very act which imposed this tax
repealed the previous law which forbade the traffic and declared it illegal.
The trade then became lawful whether taxed or not; and this law in imposing
the tax did not declare the trade illegal in case the tax was not paid. S0 far
as we can perceive, a failure to pay the tax no more renders the trade illegal
than would a like failure of a farmer, to pay the tax on his farm, render its
cultivation illegal. The state has imposed the tax in each case, and made
such provision as ha? been deemed needful to insure its payment ; but it has
no* seen fit to make the failure to pay a forfeiture of the right to pursue the
calling. If the tax is paid the traffic is lawful, but if not paid the traffic is
equally lawful. There is consequently nothing in the case that appears to be
in the nature of a license. The state has provided for the taxation of a busi
ness which was found in existence, and the carrying on of which it no longer
prohibits; and that is all.
" But it is urged Unit by taxing the business the state recognizes its lawful
character, sanctions its existence and participates in its profits, all of which
is within the real intent of the prohibition of license. The lawfulness of the
business, if by that we understand it is no longer punishable, and is capable
of constituting the basis of contracts, was undoubtedly recognized when tho
prohibitory law was repealed ; but as the illegality of the traffic depended on
the law, so its lawfulness now depends upon its repeal. The tax has nothing
to do with it whatever. Now it is not claimed, so far as we are aware, that
the repeal of the prohibitory law was incompetent; and, if not, mere recog.
nition of the lawfulness of the traffic cannot make the tax law or any other
law invalid. It is only the recognition of an existing and a conceded fact;
and the courts could not refuse to recognize it if they would.
"The idea that the state lends its countenance to any particular traffic by
taxing it
,
seems to rest upon a very transparent fallacy. It certainly overlooks
or disregards some ideas that must always underlie taxation. Taxes are not
favors ; they are burdens. They are necessary, it is true, to the existence of
government; but they are not the less burdens, and are only submitted to be
cause of the necessity. It is deemed advisable to make careful provision to
preclude these burdens becoming needlessly oppressive; but it is conceded
by all the authorities that under some circumstances they may be carried to
an extent that will be ruinous to individuals. It would be a remarkable
proposition, under such circumstances, that a thing is sanctioned and coun
tenanced by the government, when this burden, which may prove disastrous,
is imposed upon it
,
while on the other hand it is frowned upon and con
demned when the burden is withheld. It is safe to predict that if such were
the legal doctrine, any citizen would prefer to bo visited with the untaxed
frowns of government rather than with testimonials of approval, which are
represented by the demands of the tax-gatherer.
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A license is a privilege granted by the state, usually on pay-
" It may be supposed that some idea of special protection is involved when
a business is taxed ; taxation and protection being reciprocal. If the tax upon
any particular thing was the consideration for the thing given to the owner in
respect to it
, this might be so; but the maxim of reciprocity in taxation has
no such meaning. No government ever undertakes to tax all it protects. If
a government were to levy only poll taxes, it would not be on the idea that it
was to protect only the persons of its citizens, leaving their property open to
rapine and plunder. In this state our taxes are derived mainly from real es-
tate; but it has never been suggested that real estate was entitled to special
consideration in consequence. In Great Britain, real estate pays a relatively
insignificant portion of the taxes, although in the social and political state it
is more important than any other property. As a general fact the United
States has not taxed real property, and, though during the recent rebellion it
taxed most kinds of business for war purposes, the number of subjects taxed
has been several times reduced by legislation since, and may reasonably be
expected to be further reduced hereafter. But the business taxed is no more
protected than the business not taxed; and the fisheries which are favored by
bounties are as much protected as either. All this is only an apportionment
of taxation by the selection of subjects which, under all the circumstances, it
is deemed wise and politic to subject to the burden. Whether a person in
respect to his property or his occupation falls within the category of taxables
or not, is immaterial as affecting his claim to protection from the govern
ment. It is enough for him that the government has selected for itself its
own subjects for taxation, and prescribed its own rules. It is his liability to
taxation at the will of the government that entitles him to protection, and not
the circumstance of his being actually taxed; and the taxation of a thing may
be, and often is, when police purposes are had in view, a means of expressing
disapproval instead of approbation of what is taxed. * *
" Taxes upon business are usually collected in the form of license fees; and
this may possibly have led to the idea that seems to have prevailed in some
quarters, that a tax implied a license. But there is no necessary connection
whatever between them. A business may be licensed and yet not taxed, or it
may be taxed and yet not licensed. And so far is the tax from being neces
sarily a license, that provision is frequently made by law for the taxation of a
business that is carried on under a license existing independent of the tax.
" Such is the case where cities under proper legislative authority tax occu
pations that are carried on under licenses from the state. Ould e. Richmond,
23 Grat., 464; Napier v. Hodges, 31 Texas, 287; Cuthbert v. Conley, 32 Geo.,
211; Wendover e. Lexington, 15 B. Monr., 258. The license confers the
privilege, but it is not perceived why a privilege thus conferred should
not be taxed as much as any other. The federal laws give us illustra
tion of the taxation of illegal traffic. A case in point was that of the tax
ation of the liquor traffic in the state previous to the repeal of the prohib
itory law; the federal law found a business in existence, and it taxed it
without undertaking to give it any protection whatever. McGuire v. Com
monwealth, Wall., 387; Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall, 475. What
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ment of a valuable consideration,1 though this is not essential.
To constitute a privilege the grant must confer authority to do
something which without the grant would be illegal ; for if what
is to be done under the license is open to every one without it
,
the grant would be merely idle and nugatory, conferring no privi
lege whatever.2 But the thing to be done may be something law
ful in itself, and only prohibited for the "purposes of the license ;
that is to say, prohibited in order to compel the taking out of a
license.8 This is always the case where that which is licensed
was not unlawful at the common law.
would have prevented the state from taxing the same traffic at the same
time? Is it any more restricted in the selection of subjects of taxation
than the general government isf If one may tax and at the same time refuse
to protect, may not the other do the same? The only reason suggested for a
negative reply to these questions is, that it was the state itself, not the United
States, that made the business illegal, and it would be inconsistent and absurd
to declare it illegal and at the same time tax it. But how the inconsistency
would appear in one case rather than the other, is not apparent. The illegal
ity was declared by competent authority, and yet the federal government
taxed the trade, at the same time refusing or being unable to protect it. If
protection because of the tax was due to the very thing upon which the tax
was imposed, there would bean inconsistency in taxing a prohibited trade;
but treating taxation, however and wherever it may fall, as the return for the
general benefits of government — for the protection to life, liberty, the social
and family relations, as well as to business and property — which is the only
legal and proper idea of taxation, there is no inconsistency whatever in
making a thing which is not protected one of the measures or standards
by which to determine how much the party owning or supporting it ought to
pay to the government. If one puts the government to special inconvenience
and cost by keeping up a prohibited traffic, or maintaining a nuisance, the
fact is a reason for discriminating in taxation against him; and if the tax is
imposed on the thing which is prohibited or which constitutes the nuisance,
the tax law, instead of being inconsistent with the law declaring the illegal
ity, is in entire harmony with its general purpose, and sometimes may be even
more effectual. Certainly, whatever discriminations are made in taxation
ought to be in the direction of making the heaviest burdens fall upon those
things which are obnoxious to the public interests, whenever that is practi-
cable."
1 Heise v. Columbia, 6 Rich., 404.
8 Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich., 43, 49 ; Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 50 Geo., 530.
'Requiring a cartman to take out a license under penalty is not void as be
ing in restraint of trade. " The wisdom and expediency of granting such a
power to the city were within the legislative power of the state government
to decide, and it cannot be said that the ordinance was more than a proper
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The grant of a license may be made by the state directly
or it may be made indirectly through one of the municipal cor
porations of the state. Of the indirect grant it is to be observed,
that a municipal corporation as such has no inherent power to
grant licenses or exact license fees ; it must derive all its authority
in this regard from the state, and the power must come by direct
grant and cannot be taken by implication.
Fees, when a tax. The terms in which a municipality is em
powered to grant licenses will be expected to indicate with suf
ficient precision whether the grant is conferred for the purposes of
revenue, or whether, on the other hand, it is given for regulation
merely. It is perhaps impossible to lay down any rule for the
construction of such grants, that shall be general and at the same
time safe ; but as all delegated powers to tax are to be closely
scanned and strictly construed, it would seem that when a power
to license is given, the intendment must be that regulation is the
object, unless there is something in the language of the grant, or
in the circumstances under which it is made, indicating with suf
ficient certainty that the raising of revenue by means thereof
was contemplated. If a revenue authority is what seems to be
conferred, the extent of the tax, when not limited by the grant it
self, must be understood to be left to the judgment and discretion
of the municipal government, to be determined in the usual mode
in which its legislative authority is exercised ; but the grant of
authority to impose fees for the purposes of revenue would not
warrant their being made so heavy as to be prohibitory, thereby
defeating the purpose.1
Where the grant is not made for revenue, but for regulation
merely, a much narrower construction is to be applied. A fee
for the license may still be exacted ; but it must be such a fee
only as will legitimately assist in the regulation ; and it should
not exceed the necessary or probable expense of issuing the li
cense, and of inspecting and regulating the business which it cov-
regulation of a particular branch of business, for the good order of the city,
and the protection of the persons and property of its citizens and the advance
ment of its prosperity." Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y., 591, 596, per Lott, Com.
1Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala., 432 ; Craig v. Burnett, 32 id., 728 ; Burlington v.
Insurance Co., 31 Iowa, 102 ; Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich., 325 ; Mason v.
Lancaster, 4 Bush, 406; Kniper v. Louisville, 7 id., 601.
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ers.1 If the state intends to give broader authority, it is a reason
able inference that it will do so in unequivocal terms. But the lim
itation of the license fee to the necessary expenses will still
leave a considerable field for the exercise of discretion, when the
amount of the fee is to be determined. The fee, of course, must
be prescribed in advance, and when it cannot be determined with
any accuracy what the cost of regulation is to be: it must there
fore be based upon the estimates, with more or less probability
that the result will fail to come anything near a verification of the
calculations. Moreover, in fixing upon the fee, it is proper and
reasonable to take into the account, not the expense merely of di
rect regulation, but all the incidental consequences that may be
likely to subject the public to cost in consequence of the business
licensed. In some cases the incidental consequences are much
the most important, and indeed are what are principally had in
view when the fee is decided upon. The regulation of the busi
ness of huckster, for iastance, could seldom be troublesome or
expensive, but that of the manufacture and sale of intoxicating
drinks could not be measured by anything like the same standard.
The business is one that affects the public interest in many ways,
and leads to many disorders. It has a powerful tendency to in
crease pauperism and crime. It renders a large force of peace of
ficers essential, and it adds to the expenses of the courts, and of near-
1Freeholders v. Barber, 7 N. J., 64; Kip v. Patterson, 26 N. J., 298; State v.
Hoboken, 33 id., 280; State e. Roberts, 11 Gill & J., 506; Boston v. Schaffer, 9
Pick., 415 ; Commonwealth v. Stodder, 2 Cush., 562 ; Mobile v. Miller, 3 Ala.,
137; Bennett v. Birmingham, 31 Penn. St., 15; Cincinnati v. Bryson. 15 Ohio,
625; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio, N. S., 268; Baker v. Cincinnati, 11 id., 534;
Cincinnati Gas Light Co. v. State, 18 id., 243; Chilvers e. People, 11 Mich.,
43; Ash v. People, id., 347; Collins v. Louisville, 2 B. Monr., 134; St. Louis
v. Boatmans' Ins. & Trust Co., 47 Mo., 150; State v. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123; Bur-
lington v. Insurance Co., 31 id., 102: Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall., 429; Dillon,
Mun. Corp., § 609. The fact that the license fee is payable into the treasury
of the municipality, provided the fee be a reasonable one, does not impress it
with the character of a tax. Frankford, etc. R. R. Co., v. Philadelphia,
58 Penn. St., 119; Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 id., 445; State v. Herod, 29
Iowa, 123. Upon the question when alicense fee imposed on the care of street
railways is a tax and when not, the following^cases may be consulted with
profit in connection with the Pennsylvania cases above cited : New York v.
Second Avenue R. R. Co., 32 N. Y., 261 ; Louisville City R. R. Co. v. Louis-
ville, 4 Bush, 478; S. C, 2 Withrow's Corp. Cases, 358.
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ly all branches of civil administration. It cannot be questioned,
therefore, if it is to be licensed by the public authorities, that it is
legitimate and proper to take into the account all the probable
consequences, or that the payment to be exacted should be suffi
cient to cover all the incidental expenses to which the public are
likely to be put by means of the business being carried on. And
all reasonable intendments must favor the fairness and justice of
a fee tbus fixed ; it will not be held excessive unless it is mani
festly something more than a fee for regulation.1
What may be licensed. Upon this subject it would not be
safe to venture upon laying down any rule whatever, as one of
limitation. Where revenue is the purpose, enough has been said
in other parts of the present work to show that there is practically
no limitation whatever. AVhen the license is for regulation
merely, the limitation is one of discretion and policy, and the
question presented is
,
whether the business or occupation is one
rendering special regulation important for any purpose of protec
tion to the public, or to guard individuals against frauds and im
positions. Employments the most necessary and commendable
may sometimes need regulations for one or the other of these pur
poses, and so may the most dearly prized and most essential of
fundamental rights or privileges. On this point no illustration
could be more appropriate than that of the marriage relation.
1 See Johnson e. Philadelphia, 60 Penn. St., 445; Ash v. People, 11 Mich.,
347; Burlington v. Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 102. In Burch v. Savannah, 42 Geo.,
596, 598, the following remarks are made by McKay, J. " The license fee for
retailing liquors is in no proper sense a tax. Its object is not to raise revenue.
It has for many years been thought that this business was one dangerous to
the public peace and public morals, and it has been the uniform practice of the
country to subject it to regulation, require license from some public function,
ary before it is engaged in, and to punish as a crime the pursuit of it without
a license. The license is part of the public regulations of the country, and
the fee is intended rather to prevent the indiscriminate opening of such
establishments than to raise the revenue by taxation." And see Thompson v.
State, 15 Ind., 449; Commonwealth v. Byrne, 20 Gral., 165; Straub v. Gordon,
27 Ark., 625; Falmouth v. Watson, 5 Bush, 660. An objection to a license
fee exacted of saloon keepers, etc., that it is unequal and invidious, because
the rest of the community are not required to pay similar fees, has no force.
Durach's Appeal, 62 Penn. St., 491. Neither has an objection that those taxed
are not assessed according to the business done. Youngblood e. Sexton,
Mich. Sup. Ct., Oct. 1875.
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Marriage, between persons of suitable age and discretion, and un
der proper circumstances, should be esteemed a natural right ;
but what are suitable age and discretion, and what are the circum
stances which should allow or forbid it? There are some cases
in which it is as manifestly unfit and pernicious as in others it is
proper and suitable ; and obviously legislation is essential. In
most countries the relation has always been subjected to regula
tions more or less stringent, among which has been the require
ment of a license. Such a license has commonly for its purpose
to prevent marriages between persons disqualified by immaturity
or mental infirmity, or against the will of those standing in such
relation to the parties as to render it proper and reasonable that
they should be consulted.
Public amusements may also be forbidden with entire propriety
except when licensed, inasmuch as everything of that nature has
some tendency to disorder and to increased necessity for police
supervision.1 Perhaps those private amusements in which chance
is one of the elements of interest, and which for that reason may
beget a desire for gaming, and thus lead to disorders, might also
be subjected to regulations of a like nature. The whole subject
must be one which presents questions of legislative policy, rather
than of strict law.2
Lotteries, where permitted, are usually licensed, and sometimes
the state which grants the permission and receives a fee therefor,
permits its municipalities to exact a license fee also. This it has
an undoubted right to do, unless the privilege was obtained from
the^tate on the payment of a bonus, and under legislation which,
in terms or by fair construction, would preclude any municipal
regulations or exactions.8 Games of chance or hazard of every
1See Sears e. West, 1 Murphy, 291 ; The Germania v. State, 7 Md., 1 ; Orton
v. Brown, 35 Miss., 426; Mahry e. Tarber, 1 Humph. 94; Hodgos v. Nashville,
2 id., 61 ; Eldridge v. Heneger, 5 Sneed, 257.
8In Stevens v. State, 2 Ark., 291, it was held that the keeper of a billiard
table could not be required to pay a fee as for a privilege. But this was put
on the wholly untenable ground that it was unequal, because he was taxed on
the table as property; and it was overruled by Washington v. State, 13 Ark.,
572. And see Straub e. Gordon, 27 id., 625.
*Wendover e. Lexington, 15 B. Monr., 258. Where one holds a license from
the state or county, he cannot, without legislation expressly permitting it
,
bo
compelled to take out a license in a city as a condition of doing business
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description, when made lawful at all, are usually made so under
licensed regulations.1 And though a tax is sometimes levied for
revenue upon the keepers of dogs, it is more usual to require the
keeping to be licensed ; the principal object being to have some
person responsible for every animal of the kind that is protected
by the law.s
Of the occupations upon which license fees are usually imposed,
the most conspicuous has already been mentioned ; that, namely,
of the manufacture and vending of spirituous and malt liquors.8
Few persons dispute the necessity for the regulation by law of
this business ; when the legislation has gone to the extent of the
entire prohibition, the judiciary has not deemed itself competent
to interfere.4
Illustrations of other occupations which are commonly supposed
to require special regulations, are those of hackmen, draymen,
hawkers, auctioneers, etc.5 A license fee imposed upon "all tran-
within the city limits. Robinson v. Franklin, 1 Humph., 156; Hannibal v.
Guyott, 18 Mo., 575. But where the state law permits it, or where at the time
of granting the county or state license a valid city ordinance required a city
license, it may be exacted. See Napier e. Hodges, 21 Texas, 287; Independ
ence v. Noland, 21 Mo., 394.
1 See Washington v. State, 13 Ark., 752 ; Lewellen v. Lockharts, 21 Grat., 570 ;
Tanner v. Albion, 5 Hill, 121 ; State v. Hay, 29 Me., 457 ; State e. Freeman, 38
N. H., 426 ; Commonwealth v. Colton, 8 Gray, 488.
»See Carter e. Dow, 16 Wis., 299; Tenney e. Lenz, id., 567; Blair e. Fore
hand, 100 Mass., 136; Morey v. Brown, 42 N. H., 373; Mitchell v. Williams,
27 Iud., 62.
8 In Keller v. State, 11 Md., 525, an act requiring manufacturers of beer to
take out a license for retailing, was objected to as compelling them to pay
more than their fair proportion towards the expense of the government ; but
the court say " the system of legislation to which this act belongs may be vin
dicated on the plainest grounds of public policy." As to the right in general,
see Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Geo., 586; Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind., 449; Aulainere.
Governor, 1 Texas, 653; Smith v. Adrian, 1 Mich., 495; Gardner v. People, 20
11l., 43; License Cases, 5 How., 504; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall., 472.
* It has been held in 11linois that the corporate authorities of towns, when
empowered by their charters to suppress the sale of intoxicating liquors, might
declare the unlicensed selling a nuisance. Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 11l.,
588 ; Byers e. Olney, 16 id., 35 ; Jacksonville e. Holland, 19 id., 275 ; Pekin o
Smelzil, 21 id., 464; Block «. Jacksonville, 36 id., 301. In Texas a fee of $250
required of retailers of liquors has been sustained as only a regulation of po
lice, and not a tax. Baker v. Panola County, 30 Texas, 86.
'Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625; Nightingale's Case, 11 Pick., 168;
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sient persons keeping stores
" in the town imposing it
,
has been
sustained as a police regulation, though called a tax in the legis
lation which permitted it1 The license of street railway cars has
been supported under the police power;8 and so has been thelicens
ing of insurance.8 Inspection fees are to be referred to the same
authority, and are not taxes.4
Issuing the license. This is usually done by some adminis
trative officer or board under general regulations. It has been
held in Georgia that one applying for a license is entitled to it of
right if he complies with the statutory conditions.« But this can
not be universally true. In some cases the purpose of the legisla
tion is to limit the number; and then a discretion will be allowed
to grant or refuse, just as is done in England in the case of appli
cants for license to sell liquors. In others the regulations are of
ten made exceedingly stringent In addition to the payment of
the tax a bond for good behaviour is often required, and some
times a satisfactory showing of good moral character.8
White v. Kent, 11 Ohio, N. S., 550 ; Adams e. Somerville, 2 Head, 363 ; State e.
Crawford, id., 460; Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend., 99 ; Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57
N. Y., 591.
1 Wilmington v. Roby, 8 Ired., 250. Seo Wilmington v. Patterson, 8 Jones,
Law, 182. A statute forbidding sales by sample in the city of Louisville
without a license, was sustained against an objection on constitutional grounds
in Commonwealth e. Smith, 6 Bush, 303; Morke. Commonwealth, id., 397.
s Frankford, etc., R. R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 58 Penn. St., 119 ; Johnson v.
Philadelphia, 60 id., 445; State v. Herod, 29 Iowa, 123.
8 Fire Department v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis., 136.
4Clarkston v. Rogers, 2 McCord, 495. It was decided in East St. Louis v.
Wider, 46 11l., 351, that a license fee required of merchants could not be dis
charged by a tender of evidences of indebtedness of the police commissioners,
though that indebtedness was made receivable for taxes.
On the general subject of licenses as police regulations see Dillon, Mun.
Corp., § 313 to 318, and cases cited; Cooley, Const. Lim., 695 to 697.
* State v. Justices, 15 Geo., 408 ; Hill v. Decatur, 22 id., 203.
• In Whitten v. Milledgcville, 43 Geo., 421, a requirement that the applicant
for a license to sell liquor should produce the recommendation of four of his
nearest neighbors was sustained ; a requirement not always possible to be com
plied with.
The order of a county court to its clerk to issue license to retail spirituous
liquors to an applicant, does not, of itself, authorize the applicant to retail, but
only authorizes the issuance of the license to do so after the applicant has
complied with all the prerequisites of the law. Brown v. State, 27 Texas, 335.
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Recalling licenses. Under some statutes licenses are permit
ted to be recalled or revoked for the misbehavior of those who
hold them. This in some cases is a very salutary power. They
are subject also, like all other statutory privileges, to be termina
ted by changes in the taws ; as a retailer's license, for instance,
is terminated by a law totally prohibiting sales.1
Collection of license fees. What has already been said re
garding the collection of taxes, will preclude the necessity for
any extended remarks regarding the collection of these fees. As
has been remarked, the payment is usually required in advance.
If they are not paid, and the privilege is nevertheless exercised, the
statute or ordinance imposing the fee will determine what the
consequence shall be, and what proceedings shall be taken. It
has been decided that a municipal corporation empowered to
grant licenses and to impose a fee therefor, may lawfully make the
failure to take out a license and pay the fee subject the offender to
the penalty of fine and imprisonment2
Federal licenses. The licenses issued by the federal govern
ment for revenue purposes do not supersede state regulations, and
consequently must be received subject to all such requirements
of license fees as the state may have seen fit to impose.8 The fed-
1On this subject, see Calder e. Kirby, 5 Gray, 597 ; Brimmer v. Boston, 102
Mass., 19; Commonwealth v. Brennan, 103 id., 70; Baker e. Boston, 12 Pick.,
183,194; Brick Presb. Church v. New York, 5 Cow., 538; Vanderbilt e.
Adams, 7 id., 585 ; People v. Morris, 13 Wend., 325 ; Board of Excise e. Barrie,
34 N. Y., 657; State v. Holmes, 38 N. H., 225; Hirne. State, 1 Ohio, N. S., 15;
Freleigh v. State, 8 Mo., 606; State v. Sterling, 8 id., 697; Gatzweller e. People,
14 11l., 142 ; Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How., 163 ; Baxter e. Pennsylvania, 10 id.,
416. Some courts have been inclined to hold that a license, unless for mis
conduct, cannot be revoked except on a return of the fee. See Adams e. Hack-
ett, 7 Fost., 289, 294; State v. Phalen, 3 Harr., 441 ; Boyd v. State, 46 Ala., 329:
and certainly repayment would generally be equitable.
»See Cincinnati e. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257; White v. Kent, 11 Ohio, N. S.,
550; Vandine, Petitioner, 6 Pick., 187; Nightingale, Petitioner, 11 id., 167;
Shelton v. Mobile, 3 Ala., 540; Chilvers e. People, 11 Mich., 43; Brooklyn e.
Cleves, Lalor, 231 ; Buffalo e. Webster, 10Wend., 99. Contra, Butler's Appeal,
73 Penn. St., 448.
•McGuire v. Commonwealth, 3 Wall., 387; Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 id.,
72; Commonwealth e. Thornily, 6 Allen, 445; Commonwealth.e. Holbrook,
10 id., 300; Commonwealth v. Keenan, 11 id., 262; Black v. Jeffersonville,
36 11l., 301; State v. Carney, 20 Iowa, 82; State v. Stutz, 20 id., 488.
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eral government does not issue licenses under the police power, but
may do so in some cases under the power to regulate commerce,
and in the exercise of other federal powers ; but such cases seem
to call for no special remark.
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CEAPTEE XX.
TAXATION BY SPECIAL ASSESSMENT.
One very important species of taxation is that which is exer
cised in the form of special assessments. The system under
which they are levied has been adopted in this country with the
general features of that which has prevailed for a long period in
England.
The subject of special assessments may be considered under
the following heads:
1. The principles which underlie them.
2. The cases in which it is customary to levy them.
3. The objections which are made to them in point of policy.
4. The objections which constitutional principles or provisions
are sometimes thought to oppose.
5. The principles of apportionment
6. The proceedings in levying and collecting them.
1 . The principles underlying them. Special assessments are
a peculiar species of taxation, standing apart from the general
burdens imposed for state and municipal purposes, and governed
by principles that do not apply generally. The general levy of
taxes is understood to exact contributions in return for the gen
eral benefits of government, and it promises nothing to the per
sons taxed, beyond what may be anticipated from an administra
tion of the laws for individual protection and the general public
good. Special assessments, on the other hand, are made upon the
assumption that a portion of the community is to be specially
and peculiarly benefited, in the enhancement of the value of
property peculiarly situated as regards a contemplated expendi
ture of public funds ; and, in addition to the general levy, they
demand that special contributions, in consideration of the special
benefit, shall be made by the persons receiving it. The justice of
demanding the special contribution is supposed to be evident in
the fact that the persons who are to make it
,
while they are made
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to bear the cost of a public work, are at the same time to suffer
no pecuniary loss thereby ; their property being increased in
value by the expenditure to an amount at least equal to the sum
they are required to pay. This is the idea that underlies all these
levies. As in the case of all other taxation, it may sometimes
happen that the expenditure will fail to realize the expectation
on which the levy is made ; and it may thus appear that a special
assessment has been laid when justice would have required the
levy of a general tax ; but the liability of a principle to errone
ous or defective application cannot demonstrate the unsoundness
of the principle itself; and that which supports special assess
ments is believed to be firmly based in reason and justice.1
1Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 258. " The principle upon which rests that
numerous class of statutes which charge lots of ground with the expense of
grading and paving the streets in front of them is, that the value of the lots
is enhanced by the public expenditure." Strong, J., in Schenley v. Common
wealth, 36 Penn. St., 29, 57. The principle, is that, "when certain persons are
so placed as to have a common interest amongst themselves, but in common
with the rest of the community, laws may be justly made providing that, un
der suitable and equitable regulations, those common interests shall be so
managed that those who enjoy the benefits shall equally bear the burden."
Shat«, Ch. J., in Wright v. Boston, 9 Cush., 233, 241— a drain case. " All these
municipal taxes for improvement of streets rest for their final reason upon tha
enhancement of private properties." Woodward, J., in McGonigle v. Allegha-
ny City, 44 Penn. St., 118, 121. And see, per Coulter, J., in Pray v. Northern
Liberties, 31 Penn. St., 69. The principle is " that the territory subjected
thereto would be benefited by the work and charge in question." Q-rover, J.,
in Litchfield 9. Vernon, 41 N. Y., 123, 133. " That principle of local taxation
which is undisputed, which assesses on the property benefited, or its owner, a
tax in proportion to the superadded value of the property caused by the local
improvement, of which this property has a peculiar advantage beyond that of
others not in like circumstances." Agnew, J., in the case of Washington
Avenue, 69 Penn. St., 360. See also Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20; Matter
of Opening of Streets, 20 La. An., 497; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt., 174, 187. " To
pay for the opening of a street in the ratio to the benefit or advantage derived
from it is no burthen." Green, Ch. J., in Patterson e. Society, etc., 24 N. J.,
400, quoting with approval, Matter of Mayor, etc., 11 Johns., 80. It is said
by Beck, J., in Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa, 271, 276, that " the power of
the city to perform the work does not depend upon the benefits to be derived
by property owners. [Citing Warren v. Henley, 31 Iowa, 31.] The work is
done for the benefit of the public; the assessment for its payment is levied
upon the abutting lots, not because of any special benefit their owners derive
from the improvement, but because the public good demands it
,
and the law
authorizes special taxation for such objects." In contrast with this, may be=
27
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Assessments being a peculiar species of taxation, there must
be special authority of law for imposing them. The ordinary
grant to a municipal corporation of power to levy taxes for
municipal purposes, will not justify any other than the ordinary
taxes. This would follow from the general rule which requires
a strict construction of all such grants; but the principle has
peculiar force when applied to powers in themselves exceptional.1
And it is always held, that such a power, when plainly granted,
is to be construed with strictness,2 and as strictly pursued by the
authorities who arc to levy the tax.8
2. Cases for assessments. No decision has ever undertaken
to enumerate the cases in which special assessments are admis
sible. The reserve in this regard is wise, as it is obviously
impossible to anticipate all the cases in which it might be
equitable and proper to levy them ; and it is consequently better
cited Lodi Water Co. e. Costar, 18 N. J. Eq., 519, cited with approval in Mat
ter of Drainage of Lands, 35 N. J., 497, in which it was decided that where
the cost of drainage is assessed upon lands without reference to the fact
whether they are benefited to that extent or not, this constitutes an appropria
tion of private property to public uses. The same principle underlies the de
cisions in Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend., 149, and Louisville e. Rolling
Mill Co., 3 Bush, 416. And see Van Tassel e. Jersey City, Sup. Ct. N. J., 14
Am. Law Reg., K. S., 258. In 11linois, to assess without reference to actual
benefits, is held to be unconstitutional. St. John e. East St. Louis, 50 11l., 92.
And see Lee v. Ruggles, 62 id., 427; 11l. Cent. R. R. Co. e. Bloomington, 7
Chicago Legal News, 379. In Palmer v. Stumph. 29 Ind., 329, an assessment
is spoken of as being the adjustment of the shares of a contribution to be
made by several towards a common object, according to the benefit received.
Taies, it is said, are impositions for purposes of general revenue; assessments
aic special and local impositions upon property in the immediate vicinity of
an Improvement, laid with reference to the special benefit which such prop
erty derives from the expenditure. In Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis., 599, an as
sessment, as distinguished from other kinds of taxation, is defined in similar
language. And see Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 36 Conn., 255; Al
exander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 383.
1See Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76; First Presbyterian Church v. Fort Wayne,
36 Ind., 338; Appeal of Powers, 29 Mich., 504; Hitchcock e. Galveston, U. S.
Circuit, Eastern Dist. of Texas, 2 Central Law Journal, 331.
3Reed v. Toledo, 18 Ohio, 161 ; Allentown v. Henry, 73 Penn. St., 404.
J Smith v. Davis, 30 Cal., 536 ; Taylor v. Downer, 31 id., 480. If the statute
prescribes how notice shall be given, city authorities cannot substitute one of
another character. Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal., 497.
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and safer that special cases, as they present themselves, be judged
upon their special circumstances. The following public purposes
have been held to justify special burdens in return for special
benefits :
Court House and other Public Buildings. The general rule would
require, that these be constructed by the political community
that is to own and make use of them. It has, nevertheless, been
held in several cases, that a municipality may be permitted to
contribute specially, in addition to its share in the general burden,
in consideration of the benefits it may receive from having a state
or county building located within it.1 And while, in the adjudi
cated cases, the expense has generally, if not always, been divided
between the state or county and municipality specially taxed, the
principle would seem to admit of the whole burden being
assumed by the locality peculiarly benefited if the advantages
to be reasonably anticipated were sufficient to warrant it
It is proper to remark of these cases, that they are referred
to here only because of the principle that supports them, and not
because, in other respects, they differ from the customary taxa
tion. Such an exceptional burden is not laid in the form of a
special assessment, but, on the contrary, the municipality which
contributes specially to the erection of a public building for the
state or county, will do so by voting and raising for the purpose
a sum as part of the general taxes for the year. In principle it
seems to be special, but in the method of levy and collection it
takes its place with the ordinary taxes, and is mingled with
them on the same roll.
Streets and Highways. The custom of the country, adopted
from England, is to have the ordinary highways, though made
for and belonging to the state at large, made, improved and kept
in repair by the districts in or through which they are made,
except where, for special reasons, the legislature shall otherwise
direct. But as these districts are usually the towns — or, where
there are no towns, the counties — the expense of the public high
ways is usually provided for by the general town or county levy,
except in the case of important thoroughfares, which are some
times constructed by the state at large, and except also where
1See cases cited ante, pp. 114-117.
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contributions in labor are demanded for tbe purpose. As these
contributions are usually based on a valuation of property, and
if not made, an equivalent in money is collected, the general
result, when tl.ey are called for, is the same as it would have
been had the expense been estimated and an assessment to meet
it been made as a part of the general town or county charges.
As to village or city streets, a different practice has prevailed.
No doubt, it is entirely competent to put them upon the footing
of common highways, and require them to be constructed and
kept in repair by a general levy on the city or village j1 and such
must be the course in the absence of any legislation permitting
the municipal corporation to levy street taxes on some different
basis.2 But the opening or improvement of a city or village street
almost invariably brings to the property in its immediate vicinity
an enhancement of value, in which the people of the municipality
at large can participate but slightly. It is not surprising that
the. parties who are to receive the benefit of this enhanced value,
are usually the ones who are active in pressing upon the public
authorities the importance of these improvements ; and while in
this there is nothing that is censurable, or that could justify
their being singled out for invidious discrimination, yet their
relation to the improvement, which induces this action, may very
justly be considered when the burden comes to be imposed.
That they should pay the cost, or at least some exceptional por
tion of the cost, in return for special benefits secured, is a belief
that has found very general expression in the legislation on this
subject.
Special assessments are therefore made for the cost of land re
quired to be taken in opening streets ; 8 and when this is done, it
1See People v. Whyler, 41 Cal., 351, 354, per Rhoad3, Ch. J. ; Sinton e. Ash.
bury, 41 Cal., 525.
' Sharp e. Spier, 4 Hill, 76.
•Matter of 26th Street, 12 Wend., 203; Matter of DeGraw Street, 18 id., 568.
In these cases, a basis for an assessment under peculiar circumstances was
laid down. Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen, 223 ; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn.,
189, and many others are cases of this description. In Sutton's Heirs v. Lou
isville, 5 Dana, 28, it was held not competent to open a street through the
grounds .of nonassenting parties, offset benefits against the value of land, and
render judgment against the owners for the preponderance of benefits. The
case, it will be seen, did not take the form of taxation, but of a judicial In
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is not uncommon to provide that one Commission or jury shall
estimate the value of the lands taken, and the incidental damages,
if any, and assess these, together with the costs of the proceeding,
upon the lands peculiarly benefited.1 They are also made for the
cost of grading streets,2 for paving, planking, or otherwise improv-
quisition. For the general principle, see Matter of Pittsburgh District, 2 W.
& S., B20; McMasters e. Commonwealth, 3 Watts, 292; Pittsburgh v. Scott, 1
Penn. St., 309; Alexander e. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 383; Powers' Appeal, 29
Mich., 504. In the case last named the whole subject is fully and carefully
considered by Campbell, J., who points out that, in such cases, where in the
same proceeding land is taken for the public use and the cost of the improve
ment assessed upon adjacent land, the principles which underlie the law of
eminent domain must be carefully observed, as well as those which apply to
taxation. Where the benefits to the land remaining are equal to the value of
the land taken, the owner has no ground for claiming damages. Trinity Col
lege v. Hartford, 32 Conn., 452; and where they exceed the damages, he may
be taxed for the excess. Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn., 189; Holton v. Mil
waukee, 31 Wis., 27. As to the effect of a constitutional provision in Ohio
which entitles the owners of land taken to full compensation without deduc
tion of benefits, see Cleveland v. Wick, 18 Ohio, N. S., 303. " It was decided
in McMasters v. Commonwealth, 3 Watts, 292, that in the opening of streets
in a town or city, the damage occasioned to some of the lots might be appor
tioned and assessed upon others in the neighborhood improved in value there
by. It is there assumed as a well settled principle, employing the words of
Chancellor Walworth, in Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend., 85, that when any
particular county, district or neighborhood is exclusively benefited by a pub
lic improvement, the inhabitants of that district may be taxed for the whole
expense of the improvement, and in proportion to the benefit received by
each. The conclusion seemed logically to follow ; for if a county, district or
town can be assessed for a public improvement, on the ground that they arc
particularly benefited, there can be no constitutional reason to exempt an in
dividual from assessment on the same principle. It becomes a mere question
of expediency, of which the legislature are the competent and exclusive
judges, and not of right." Bhar3wood, J., Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn.
St., 150.
1See for the general principle the important case of Litchfield e. Vernon, 41
N. Y., 123. Also Goodrich e. Turnpike Co., 26 Ind., 119; Hammett v. Phila
delphia, 65 Penn. St. 146, and Livingston e. New York, 8 Wend., 85, there
quoted. It has been held competent, where land owners dedicate a street
through their property, to order it graded and made fit for travel at their ex
pense. State v. Dean, 23 N. J., 335 ; Holmes v. Jersey City, 1 Beasl., 299.
sWray e. Pittsburgh, 46 Penn. St., 365. It is competent to change the grade
and assess the expense against adjoining owners. La Fayette •1.Fowler, 34
Ind., 140.
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ing streets,1 as well as for altering, widening and extending them.2
The power to assess the expense of repaying or replanking a street
on the adjacent proprietors, who were subjected to the expense of
the first construction, has been denied by the supreme court of
Pennsylvania;8 but the authorities in general sustain the right,4
and it has been well remarked in Louisiana that : " if the first
paving of a street is a special benefit to the front proprietor, justi
fying the imposition upon him of a portion of the expense, while
the city pays for the residue as having been incurred for a matter
of general utility, so the removal of a dilapidated or insufficient
1People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich., 560; Indi
anapolis e. Mansur, 15 Ind., 112; La Fayette v. Fowler, 34 id., 140; Cleveland
«.Wick, 18 Ohio, N. S., 303; Chambers e. Satterlee, 40 Cal., 497; People «.
Austin, 47 id., 353; State v. Christopher, 12 Wis., 627; In re Dugro, 50 If. Y.,
513; Morrison e. Hershire, 32 Iowa, 271; Gozzler e. Georgetown, 9 Wheat.,
593 ; Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall., 676. The authority to assess the expense
of paving includes all that is necessary, usual or fit in paving, including
curbing. Schenley e. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St., 29.
* Jones v. Boston. 104 Mass., 461 ; Hancock Street Extension, 18 Penn. St,
26.
8Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St., 146. In this case, Shar3wood, J'. (p.
155), says: "The original paving of a street brings the property bounding
upon it into the market as building lots. Before that, it is a road, not a street.
It is therefore a local improvement, with benefits almost exclusively peculiar
to the adjoining properties. Such a case is clearly within the principle of as
sessing the cost on the lots lying upon it. Perhaps no fairer rule can be
adopted than the proportion of feet front, although there must be some ine
qualities if the lots differ in situation and depth. Appraising their market
values, and fixing the proportion according to these, is a plan open to favorit
ism or corruption, and other objections. No system of taxation which the wit
of man ever devised has been found perfectly equal. But when a street is
once opened and paved, thus assimulated with the rest of the city and made a
part of it
,
all the particular benefits to the locality, derived from the improve
ments, have been received and enjoyed. Repairing streets is as much a part
of the ordinary duties of the municipality, for the general good, as cleaning,
watching and lighting. It would lead to monstrous injustice and inequality
should such general expenses be provided for by local assessments." The
able dissenting opinion of Read, J., contains an interesting review of Pennsyl
vania legislation on the subject of special assessments, as well as of the adju
dications in that and other states.
* Willard e. Presbury, 14 Wall., 676; McCormack v. Patchin, 53 Mo., 33 ;
Gurnee e. Chicago, 40 11l., 165; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich., 560; Municipal-
ity«. Dunn, 10 La. An., 57; Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush, 667; Brcadway Bap
tist Church v. McAtee, 8 id., 508.
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pavement, and the making of a new and sufficient one in its stead,
is a matter of special benefit to the front proprietor, as well as of
general utility. The equity is the same in both cases. * * It
seems to me that the power to pave the streets is a permanent
continuing power, to be exercised when the public good may
require it
, and that the power to levy a contribution on the
property benefited by the paving in front of it
, is equally dur
able and continuing."1 The cost of curb stones is usually pro
vided for in the same method, and often of sidewalks, though as
is shown in a preceding chapter, those conveniences are usually
ordered under the police power.2 And it may be said that,
in general, for any improvement whatsoever that tends to make
the street more suitable and convenient for the use of the general
public,8 an assessment may be laid.
Drains, Sewers, etc. The expense of constructing drains in order
to relieve swamps, marshes and other low lands of their stagnant
water, is usually provided for by special assessments. The
grounds on which this is done are not always very clearly indica
ted in the statutes. Sometimes the ground indicated is that the
drainage is important to the public health ; and in such cases the
right to levy assessments for the purpose cannot plausibly be dis
puted.4 The special benefits from the enhancement of values
1 Slidell, Ch. J., in Municipality v. Dunn, 10 La. An., 57.
» See Chapter XIX. And as to special assessments for sidewalks, see State
v. Fuller, 34 N. J., 227.
* It is held in Dean e. Carron, 26 N. J., 228, that it is not competent to defeat
an assessment for improving a street by showing irregularities in laying it
out.
4 In Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, N. S., 333, the subject is con
sidered by Brinkerhoof, J., and the right to levy an assessment affirmed, though
it does not distinctly appear that sanitary objects were had in view. In
Woodruff v. Fisher, 17 Barb., 224, an assessment made ostensibly for the pub
lic health was maintained with some hesitation. Other cases are Anderson
v. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind., 199; Sessions v. Crunklinton, 20 Ohio, N. S,
349; Draining Co. Case, 11 La. An., 338; Hagar v. Supervisors of Yolo, 47
Cal., 222 ; O'Reilcy v. Kankakee Valley Draining Co., 32 Ind., 169. The fol
lowing were draining cases, in which for the most part only questions of the
regularity of assessments were involved : Jordan Association e. Wagoner, 33
Ind., 50; Thompson v. Draining Co., id., 268; Kinyon «. Duchene, 21 Mich.,
498; Bench v. Otis, 25 id., 29; Atwood v. Zeluff, 26 id., 118; Etchinson Asso.
ciation v. Bresenback, 39 Ind., 362; Slusser e. Rawson, id., 506; Nevins, etc.,
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must accrue mainly to the owners of the lands drained, who ought,
therefore, to bear the expense. But the authority to levy assess
ments for draining lands, upon no other consideration than such
as pertain to the improvement of the land as property, must, it
would seem, be confined within limited bounds. It has been said
that " a tax cannot be levied upon any portion of the public for
the construction of a drain in which the public are not concerned.
Even the owner of the land benefited cannot be taxed to improve
it
,
unless public considerations are involved ; but he must be
left to improve it or not as he may choose." 1 But where any
considerable tract of land, owned by different persons, is in a con
dition precluding cultivation, by reason of excessive moisture
which drains would relieve, it may well be said that the public
have such an interest in the improvement, and the consequent ad
vancement of the general interest of the locality, as will justify
the levy of assessments upon the owners for drainage purposes.
Such a case would seem to stand upon the same solid ground
with assessments for levee purposes, which have for their object
to protect lands from falling into a like condition of uselessness.8
Draining Co. e. Alkire, 36 id., 189; People v. Jefferson County Court, 56 Barb.,
136; Peoplee. Haines, 49 N.Y., 587.
1 People v. Supervisors of Saginaw, 26 Mich., 22, 29. That the taking of
lands for drains is a taking under the eminent domain, see this case : also
People v. Nearing, 27 N. Y., 306.
* The power to levy assessments for the mere purpose of improving large
bodies of lands, is assumed by Chancellor Walworth, in French v. Kirkland, 1
Paige, 117, and in Philips v. Wickham, id., 560. The statutes in question seem
to have conferred upon the proprietors of lands quasi corporate powers for
the purpose. And see Draining Co. Case, 11 La. An., 338. The statute which
came under consideration in People v. Nearing, 27 N. Y , 306, appears to have
had no reference to the public health. The Massachusetts statute of 1847, for
the construction of drains in towns, is considered in Wright v. Boston, 9 Cush.,
233. It is said by Sfuiw, Ch. J., that while the public have some interest in the
draining, on the grounds of health and general convenience, it is not mainly
with these views that the statutes are framed, but with reference to the bene-
fits to estates taxed. And see Springfield v. Gay, 12 Allen, 612; Brewer v.
Springfield, 97 Mass., 152.
In Hager v. Supervisors of Yolo, 47 Cal., 222, 233, Cro«kett, J., answers the ob
jections to such assessments as follews: "It is said, however, that it is not
within the constitutional power of the legislature to compel the petitioner to
reclaim his lands at his own expense and against his consent. But we think
the power of the legislature to compel local improvements, which, in its judg-
CH. XX.] TAXATION BY SPECIAL ASSESSMENT. 425
As regards sewers and culverts in cities and villages, it is to
be remarked that while they are often provided for by special
assessments, there is no uniformity of practice in this regard, and
perhaps, considering the different offices which sewers perform,
being sometimes matters of imperative public necessity, and at
others conveniences for a few tenements only, there ought to be
ment, will promote the health of the people, and advance the public good, is
unquestionable. In the exercise of this power it may abate nuisances, con
struct and repair highways, open canals for irrigating arid districts, and per
form many other similar acts for the public good, and all at the expense of
those who are to be chiefly and more immediately benefited by the improve-
ment The constitution of the state is not a grant, but a limitation of power;
and when an act of legislation is called in question as repugnant to the con
stitution, those who assail it on this ground must specify the particular pro
vision of that instrument which is violated. The clauses of the constitution
which, or some of which, are alleged to have been violated by the act under
consideration are : 1st. That which secures to the citizen the right ' to acquire,
possess and protect property.' 2d. That whion secures to him the right of
trial by jury. 3d. That which provides that ' no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law.' 4th. That which pro.
hibits 'the taking of private property for public use without just compensa
tion.' 5th. The provision that taxation shall be equal and uniform, and that
property shall be taxed on the ad valorem principle. In my opinion the act
in question violates none of these provisions, and the authority to compel local
improvements at the expense of those to be immediately benefited, is not tax
ation, though referable to the taxmg power. It has never been held that tax
ation for general purposes, or for local improvements, is an infringement of
that clause of the constitution relating to the acquisition and enjoyment of
property; and the right of trial by jury, has no application to proceedings for
the collection of taxes. Nor does the enforcement of a valid tax, by whatever
method, constitute a taking of property without due process of law, in the
sense of the constitution ; nor is it a taking of private property for public use,
within the perview of that instrument. People v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn,
4 Comst., 419; Emery v. S. F. Gas Co., 28 Cal., 345; Sears v. Oottrell, 5 Mich.,
251 ; Murray's Lessee e. Hoboken Land Imp. Co., 18 How. (U. S.), 272. It is
equally clear that those clauses which provide that taxation shall be equal
and uniform throughout the state, and which prescribe the mode of assess
ment and the persons by whom it shall be made, and that all property shall be
taxed, have no application to assessments levied for local improvements. Bur
nett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal., 76 ; Emery v. S. P. Gas Co., supra, and cases there
cited ; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo., 495 ; Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 La.
An., 220; Wallace r. Shelton, 14 id., 498. 'But we need not rest our decision
on the narrow ground that this is strictly a local improvement. On the con
trary, the reclamation of the vast bodies of swamp and overflowed land in this
state may justly be regarded as a public improvement of great magnitude, and
of the utmost importance to the community. If left whollv to individual en-
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the diversity that now prevails. That the cost may be assessed
upon the adjacent premises under proper legislation, has been
often held.1 And in Connecticut it has been decided that this
may be done under a general power to make and maintain high
ways and streets by special assessments; the sewers which carry
off the surface water from the streets, and the filth that would
'crprise, it would probably uever be accomplished ; and in inaugurating so great
a work the legislature has pursued, substantially, the same system adopted in
other states for the reclamation of similar lands, to wit: by dividing the ter
ritory to be rccl-rimed into districts, and assessing the cost of the improvement
on the lands to be benefited. This plan has been adopted in the states of
Louisiana, Mississippi and Arkansas, to prevent the annual overflow of the
Mississippi by means of levees or embankments, constructed at the expense
of the adjacent property. The 'Black Swamp,' in Ohio, has been wholly or
partially reclaimed by the same method. A large body of land in Missouri is
protected from inundation by similar means. In Massachusetts and Connecti
cut, swamps and low lands are drained by means of assessments on the prop
erty benefited ; and in New Jersey the salt marshes have been reclaimed in
the same way. In this state, the city of Sacramento, including the ground on
which the capitol stands, has been protected from inundation by means of
levees, erected at the expense of the inhabitants, in the shape of a tax on the
property within the district benefited. In none of these states, so far as we
are aware, has the power of the legislature to cause such improvements to be
made in this method ever been denied; nor do we see any tenable ground on
which it can be questioned."
In England, the sewer assessments are laid with reference to benefits, but they
are not necessarily based on sanitary considerations. See Rookc's Case, 5
Rep., 99, b; Keighley's Case, 10 id., 139, a; Case of Isle of Ely, 10 id., 142, b;
Dore v. Gray, 2 T. R., 358; Masters v. Scroggs, 3 M. & S., 447; Netherton v.
Ward, 3 B. & Aid., 21 ; Stafford v. Hamston, 2 B. & B., 691 ; Rex v. Tower
Hamlets, 9 B. & C, 517; Soady v. Wilson, 3 Ad. & E., 247; St. Catharine
Dock Co. e. Higgs, 10 Q. B., 641; Metropolitan Board of Works v. Vauxhall
Bridge Co., 7 El. & Bl., 964; Hammersmith Bridge Co. v. Overseers of Ham
mersmith, L. R., 6 Q. B., 230. A sewer rate cannot there be laid upon a whole
town, but must be against particular estates. Emmerson v. Saltmarshe, 7 Ad.
& El., 156.
1Wright v. Boston, 9 Cush., 233 ; Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Penn. St., 401 ; Lipps
e. Philadelphia, 38 id., 503; Commonwealth v. Woods, 44 id., 113; Stroud v.
Philadelphia, 61 id., 255 ; Maucb Chunk v. Shortz, 61 id., 397 ; People e. Brook
lyn, 23 Barb., 166 ; Cone v. Hartford, 28 Conn., 363 ; St. Louis v. Oeters, 36 Mo.,
456. For rules for making the assessment, see Clapp v. Hartford, 35 Conn.,
66. That notwithstanding the whole cost is assessed on adjoining property,
the sewer may be made more capacious than present needs require, as a
provision for future extensions, see Hungerford v. Hartford, 39 Conn., 279,
285.
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otherwise accumulate, being regarded rather as improvements of
the public highway than as independent works.1
Levees. The construction of embankments to protect low lands,
bordering upon rivers, from overflow, is a public object of the
highest importance to the communities immediately concerned.
No doubt general taxation is admissible for this purpose, but the
legislation which authorizes special assessments for the construc
tion of embankments, and imposes the cost upon those who, with
out them, would be the principal sufferers, is probably in most
cases wiser and better than would be any provision for general
levies. The practice of making local assessments for this purpose
has prevailed for many years in the states bordering on the lower
Mississippi, and has been sustained against all the objections
which have been made to such assessments for other purposes.2
Water Pipes in Streets. Of these it has been said that " the
benefits are local, as the use of the water must necessarily be
mostly restricted to the benefit of the property on [the] lines, both
for domestic purposes and the extinguishment of fires. The effect
of .supplying [the] streets with water is to enhance the value of
the dwelling houses thereon. The maintenance of the pipes, and
the supplying of water are necessarily a continuing expense," and
for these reasons the assessment of the cost upon adjacent prop
erty is within the general principle of local assessments.8
1Cone v. Hartford, 28 Conn., 363.
»"Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss., 209; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 id., 652; Daily
«. Swope, 47 Id., 367; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo., 495. In Peo
ple v. Whyler, 41 Cnl., 351, a levy for such a purpose made upon part of a
county on the same basis as the ordinary taxes, was held to be a tax, not an
assessment. But the basis of apportionment ought not to be very conclusive
on this point. It is one peculiarity of assessments, that the measure of sup
posed benefits may be whatever appears to the legislature most just under the
circumstances. See Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20, where a levy made in
the same way was sustained as being an assessment, and not in the ordinary
sense a tax.
•Allentown «. Henry, 73 Penn. St., 404, 40G, per Mercur, J. And see North
ern Liberties e. Swain, 13 id., 113; Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church,
id., 104. In Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt., 174, 187, Redjidd, J., explains the princi-
pie of such assessments, and says : " It is not easy to see any distinction be.
tween an assessment for building a sewer or sidewalk and an aqueduct They
are each in degree a general benefit to the public, and a special benefit to the
local property, both in the uses and in the enhanced value of the property.
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Lighting Streets with Gas. While lighting the streets is usually
provided for by general tax, no reason is perceived why it may not
be done by special assessments. Legislation for special assess
ments exists in several of the states.1
Oilier Special Cases. No doubt the legislature has power to
provide for special assessments to meet the expenses of other im
provements ; and this power is sometimes spoken of, as if it was
practically one that was unrestricted.2 But other cases sanction
no such broad doctrine, and justify us, as we think, in saying
that, to warrant the levy of local assessments, there must not only
exist in the case the ordinary elements of taxation, but the object
must also be one productive of special local benefits, so as to
make applicable the principles upon which special assessments
have hitherto been upheld. A clear case of abuse of legislative
authority, in imposing the burden of a public improvement on
persons or property not specially benefited, would undoubtedly
be treated as an excess of power and void.«
3. Objections in point of policy and justice. If the design
of the present work embraced the discussion of legislative policy,
it would be interesting to give, with some degree of fullness, the
views which various judges have expressed regarding the justice
of assessing the cost of public improvements upon property sup
posed to be specially benefited. Some judges have spoken of
these assessments as eminently equitable and proper ; others seem
to have regarded the power to lay them as an extreme power,
The proprietor may, indeed, leave his house tenantless, and his vacant lots
unvisited, but the assessment is not for that reason void. Such assessments
are justified on the ground that the subject of the tax receives an equivalent."
1The subject was somewhat discussed in Jonas v. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio, 318,
and Creighton v. Scott, 14 Ohio, N. S., 438.
»See particularly the remarks of Grover, J., in Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N.
v., 123, 134.
5See Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St., 352, approving Hammett v. Phila
delphia, 65 id., 146. In Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt., 174, 188, Redfield, J., says : " We
have no doubt that a local assessment may so far transcend the limits of
equality and reason that its exaction would cease to be a tax, or contribution
to a common burden, and become extortion and confiscation. In that case it
would be the duty of the court to protect the citizen from robbery under color
of a better name." Remarks equally decided are made in Louisville v. Roll
ing Mill Co., 3 Bush, 416, 423.
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which generally operated oppressively, while still others have
undertaken to indicate some line of division of expense, which
should be drawn in such cases, between the public and the parties
to be specially assessed ; putting, for instance, one-half the ex
pense on the former and one-half upon the latter. But, in truth,
there is no universal rule of justice upon which such assessments
can be made. Sometimes almost the whole benefit accrues to a
few. Sometimes the benefit is distributed with something like
regularity through the community. An apportionment of the
cost that would be just in one case would be unfair and op
pressive in another. For this very reason the power to determine
when a special assessment shall be made, and on what basis it
shall be apportioned, is wisely confided to the legislature, and
could not, without the introduction of some new principle in rep
resentative government, be placed elsewhere. We dismiss this
question, therefore, with the single remark, that with the wisdom
or unwisdom of special assessments, when ordered in cases in
which they are admissible at all, the courts have no concern,
unless there is plainly and manifestly such an abuse of power a3
takes the case beyond the just limits of legislative discretion.1
4. Objections under constitutional principles and proyis-
ions. These have been made to special assessments on various
grounds.
Thai they take properly without due process of law. If these
1Expressions on the subject by judges have been very numerous, but they
have been too often general remarks called out by special and somewhat ex
ceptional cases. "We refrain from collecting them for the reason expressed in
the text; if the matter is of legislative cognizance, the courts and the profes.
sion as such have no concern with it. We may, nevertheless, copy what has
been said in one ca.se, because it probably expresses the general views which
have prevailed in legislation. " Their intrinsic justice strikes every one. If
an improvement is to be made, the benefit of which is local, it is but just that
the property benefited should bear the burthen. While the few ought not to
be taxed for the benefit of the whole, the whole ought [not] to be taxed for
the few. A single township in a county ought not to bear the whole county
expense; neither ought the whole county to be taxed for the benefit of a single
township ; and the same principle requires that taxation for a local object,
beneficial only to a portion of a town or city, should be upon that part only.
General taxation for a mere local purpose is unjust; it burdens those who are
not benefited, and benefits those who are exempt from the burden." Leonard,
3n in Lockwood v. St. Louis, 2i Mo., 20, 22.
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assessments are made in an exercise of the sovereign taxing power,
what has already been said on the subject is equally applicable
here.1 The taxing power proceeds on its own methods, and the
rules of the common law bend and conform to them. That these
assessments are an exercise of the taxing power, has over and
over again been affirmed, until the controversy must be regarded
as closed.2
That Oiey take property, i. e., money, and appropriate it to the
public use without compensation. This objection would seem to
fall with the last If special assessments are taxes, the compen
sation is conclusively presumed to be received by those who pay
them. It is only on the assumption that they are laid in the ex
ercise of the power of eminent domain that the objection could
have any force whatever. But the distinction between the two
cases is very clear. " Taxation exacts monev or services from
individuals as and for their respective shares of contribution to
any public burden. Private property taken for any public use,
by right of eminent domain, is taken, not as the owner's share of
contribution to a public burden, but as so much beyond his share.
Special compensation is therefore to be made in the latter case,
because the government is a debtor for the property so taken ; but
not in the former, because the payment of taxes is a duty, and
creates no obligation to repay otherwise than in the proper appli
cation of the tax. Taxation operates upon a community, or upon
a class of persons in a community, and by some rule of apportion
ment. The exercise of the right of eminent domain operates upon
an individual, and without reference to the amount or value ex
acted from any other individual or class of individuals." 8
1Ante, Chapter III.
8See Pennock v. Hoover, 5 Rawle, 291 ; Pennell's Appeal, 2 Penn. St., 216;
Pray «. Northern Liberties, 31 id., 69; Gault's Appeal, 33 id., 94; Common
wealth v. Woods, 44 id., 113; People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419; N. Y. Protest
ant Episcopal School, 31 id., 574 ; Howell v. Buffalo, 37 id.. 267 ; Dorgan v.
Boston, 12 Allen, 223; Baltimore v. Hughes, 1 Gill & J., 480; Baltimore v.
Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517 ; Howard v. Independent Church, 18 id., 451 ; Matter
of Dorrance St., 4 R. I.
,
230; Hoyt e. East Saginaw, 19 Mich., 39; Williams e.
Cammack, 27 Miss., 209 ; Lexington e. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513; Bradley
e. McAfee, 7 Bush, 667 ; Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. S., 126 ; Bridgeport
v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 36 Conn., 255; King e. Portland, 2 Ore., 146.
tRuggle*: J., in People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419, 424. And see Litchfield «
CH. XX.] TAXATION BY SPECIAL ASSESSMENT. 431
Attention to the distinction here pointed out will make clear the
fact that special assessments are not an exercise of the eminent
domain. It is certain that when they are levied according to
benefits received, they cannot be. The theory of the law is
,
that
full compensation is then received in every instance. It is not, it
Vernon, 41 id., 123, 133, per Grover, J. ; People v. Lawrence, 41 id., 140, per
Mason, J. ; Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. S., 126, 135, per Banney, J.; Mat
ter of Dorrance St., 4 R. I., 230, per Ames, Ch. J.; Nichols e. Bridgeport, 23
Conn., 189, 205, per ffinman, J. ; Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St., 355, 361,
per Agnew, J. The following cases are also in point : Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt.,
174, 187; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. S., 243; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co.,
8 id., 333; Malloy e. Marietta, 11 id., 636; Peoria v. Kidder, 26 11l., 351; Gar-
rett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo., 505; Uhrig v. St. Louis, 44 id., 458; Jones v. Boston,
104 Mass., 461 ; State v. Fuller, 34 N. J., 227; State «. Newark, 35 id., 168, 171 ;
Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville, 5 Dana, 28; Lexington e. McQuillan's Heirs, 0
Dana, 513; Howell t1.Bristol, 8 Bush, 493; Holton v. Milwaukee, 31 Wis., 27;
Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich., 278; Baltimore v. Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517;
GrifHn e. Dogan, 48 Miss., 11. That to tax one exempt from military service
in order to procure volunteers, and then exempt others who are liable, is not
a taking of private property for public use, see State v. Demarest, 32
N. J., 528.
The following case, in which a special assessment was held to be a taking
of private property for the public use, is believed to be of sufficient import
ance to be quoted from at some length. The case is Louisville v. Rolling
Mill Co., 3 Bush, 416, 423, in which the defendants were assessed the expense
of filling up the street in front of their property to an extent that greatly di
minished its value, and required the erection of a high wall to protect their
buildings. Williams, J., states the question to be: " Whether the city has or
can have, under our constitutional form of government, the unlimited, abso
lute, uncontrollable right to order such improvements of the streets as it may
deem necessary or beneficial, at the expense of the property holders, and in
utter disregard of their interest, and without compensation ; for it sometimes
does happen that such improvements will not only render the property owned
entirely valueless to the owner, but more — take it from him to pay for its own
improvement, besides destroying his business, and sometimes cause him to
contribute from his other means to its destruction. If cities may exercise
this unlimited, uncontrollable, omnipotent power, then the declaration in our
bill of rights, 'that absolute, arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and prop
erty of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest major
ity,' becomes meaningless if not absurd. If the filling up the plaintiffs' lot
be done so that the improvement of the street may have a sure base upon
which to rest, their machinery and building must be removed at enormous
costs, else buried under the filling; and it removed, it would not then have a
sure, sound basis in this newly filled area for the foundation of such ponder
ous erections and machinery. If a perpendicular wall be erected by which
to confine the filling of the street, then light and air are so essentially ex
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is true, a compensation made in money, but as in every other
case of taxation, the person taxed is to receive a benefit from the
expenditure of the moneys collected. The benefit which one
receives in the enhanced value of his property, from the public
eluded as to prevent its practical working for several of the warmest months
of the year; nor can this, by possibility,be remedied by culverts and aper
tures through the street, for the very potent reason that the lot on the opposite
side of the street is also required to be filled correspondingty; and even if it
were sure that the owner thereof would erect a perpendicular wall instead of
filling, yet he would be entitled to cover bis lot with buildings, which would
as effectually exclude both light aud air, and appellee's passway through
their gate would be destroyed. Besides, if all the surrounding streets were
improved so as to correspond with this contemplated improvement of
Brook, this lot and machinery would be so far below the level of the streets
as to render it wholly useless for its present purposes; and the same power
that authorizes this improvement of Brook will authorize the improvement
of the other streets, and thus, without compensation, plaintifls' business, not
in itself a nuisance, would be broken up, be compelled to remove elsewhere,
at enormous expense, lose the profits of their business in the meantime, and
then be enormously taxed to pay for the improvements which would be so
disastrous to their business. Verily, if this can be done without compensa
tion, private property and private pursuits are held by the slender tenure of
the will of others.
" The right of eminent domain — the right to take private property for the
public use — is a power almost without limit; but this essential safeguard is
thrown around the owner, that the public who wants or needs his property
must compensate him for it. Nor does this in any wise impair or conflict
with the essential right and power of local government over communities,
such as towns and cities, in ordinary cases, to have the streets improved at
the expense of the property holders thereon ; for, ordinarily, they are most
benefited, and it is only requiring them to keep their property in such condi
tion as not to obstruct or injuriously hinder the public; for, legally speaking,
each lot owner holds the legal title to one-half the street in his front, subject,
it is true, to the public easement; besides, it may ordinarily be, and generally
is, only a fair portion of the tax which may justly and legally be laid on him
to keep up the streets and public passways, which are so peculiarly beneficial
to the realty of all towns and cities ; and, moreover, each proprietor may be
presumed to have purchased in contemplation of the power in the local au
thorities, to direct him to erect such improvements as are ordinary and usual.
But when, owing to extraordinary facts, none of these presumptions and prin
ciples apply, and when, to force the owner to make these improvements is
virtually to confiscate his property, or even to permit it to be done, without
compensation, is to destroy his property, the question then is, whether it is
the constitutional exercise of legitimate legislative power or legislative spoli
ation.
" In Keasy v. Louisville, 4 Dana, 154, this court recognized the full extent
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expenditure, is as real and as substantial as that which he re
ceives in the protection afforded to his person and his estate.
The difficulty, if any, in the case, must lie back of the nature of
compensation, and must apply, rather, to the basis of assessment.
If taxation were necessarily, under all circumstances, by values,
of the constitutional and legal rights of city councils to grade and pave, or
regrade and repave streets ; but it is also guarded as to the abuses of which
such powers might be productive, or to which they might be perverted.
Iu that case the street had been graded under the old charter of 1828, a small
wooden house had been erected on the lot according to this grade, when,
shortly before the suit was brought, the city authorities had caused the grade
of the street to be raised about three feet, which necessitated a filling up of
Keasy's lot and the raising and reconstructing his house ; and for these dam
ages he sued the city. The court said : ' But the public right to regulate the
common highways of the city, is of course not arbitrary and unlimited; far
from it. Private rights must be regarded. The public, like a common person,
must so use its own as not to injure another's property. It cannot take pri
vate property for public use without paying a just equivalent, nor can it dis
turb any personal right of enjoyment. But, without touching the plaintiffs' lot,
or in any way encroaching upon it
, or interfering with any prescriptive right
to light, or to private way, the city had a clear and perfect authority to raise
its street higher or sink it lower than the level of his lot, as he would un
doubtedly have had to elevate or sink his ground, without touching or other
wise injuring or interfering with the public street.'
"And we think this well expresses the true and furthest extentof constitution
al and legal power. As the legal right to the public easement of the streets
was in the city council, to be made useful to the public, and held for the com
mon use of all the citizens, there is no doubt but so long as they confined
the improvement to the boundary of the street, and interfered with no private
right of light, air, or private passway, the incidental injury to the lot owners
would be of that class of misfortune to them for which no remedy for the
injury is afforded by law. * *
" In this case now under advisement, so far from using its own as not to in
jure the property of another, and confining the improvement wholly to the
street boundary, the general council has ordered the Rolling Mill Co. to fill
up its lot so as to support this additional embankment on the street, or to
build a perpendicular wall. We are then brought to the inquiry, whether,
under the circumstances, this is such an ordinary improvement as every lot
owner must be presumed to assent to when he purchases, or, in other words,
such as the law contemplates the proper authorities may and likely will
make ; and therefore every purchase must be presumed to be subordinate to
this public right."
(And, after examining the facts and showing that the improvements were
made with reference to the grade previously established by the city, that they
were expensive, and the proposed improvement instead of benefiting the com.
pany would cause irreparable injury, the court proceed :)
28
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it would be conceded that an apportionment by benefits must be
inadmissible. But it has already been shown that value is only
one of many standards of apportionment ; and when others are
admissible, it would seem to devolve upon those who deny the
right of assessing by benefits, to point out the element of taxa
tion, if any, which is absent when that basis is fixed upon. If
apportionment is really made in view of actual benefits in the
increased value of property, it is presumptively as fair and equal,
and therefore as well supported by the advantages the taxpayer
receives from the government, as any other. It must consequent
ly be equally admissible with any other. It cannot be said that
the taxpayer has been required to surrender for the public use
something beyond his just proportion, when the demand has been
made under a rule expressly named to reach that very proportion
and no more ; a rule, too, that in its basis is so fair that it ought,
perhaps, to be preferred to all others, if fairly and honestly ap
plied.1
" Our conclusion is
,
that this improvement is of such an extraordinary
character, and so peculiarly injurious to the proprietors of the rolling mill
that, so far from making them, at their own expense, damage their property
so greatly, it should not at all be done without compensation to them. * *
Private property is too sacred, and the individual rights of the citizen are too
well guarded, under our constitutional form of government, to be sacrificed at
the public behest, without compensation or some overruling public necessity,
in cases of emergency, such as vast conflagrations," etc.
1 The whole argument is briefly summarized in the following extract from
an opinion in the Street Case : But what objection is there to the exertion of
such a power ? It is said that it takes the property of individuals ; that is,
their money, for public use, without any compensation therefor. This is not
so, either in theory or in fact. If the assessment has been truly and justly
made, the fact must be regularly ascertained, to be what the theory of the
proceeding supposes it to be, viz: that the party whose money is taken is lo
cally aud peculiarly benefited, over and beyond the ordinary benefit which,
as one of the community, he receives in all public improvements, to the pre
cise extent of the assessment. It is no answer to this, to say that the power
may be abused; that is true of every power; and whether this particular
power is so liable to be abused, as to make it improper that it should be
vested in the city corporations, is a matter of which the legislature must be
the sole judge. The legislature saw fit to authorize the city authorities to lay
out new streets and public avenues, and instead of throwing the expense on the
whole city, to be raised by a general tax, it authorizes the expense of the several
new improvements to be assessed upon those who, ' owning or interested in
lands, or buildings in said city, will be specially benefited by such lay out, al-
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That they violate express constitutional provisions securing uniform
ity in taxation. These objections have been made under a num
ber of the state constitutions, and require examination separately.1
teration or designation, and to apportion among, and to assess to be paid, by
such person or persons respectively, the whole, or such part as they shall judge
reasonable, of the damages caused by such lay out, alteration or designation.'
Now, unless there is some inherent difficulty in ascertaining who are the per-'
sons thus specially benefited, we see no more objection to this mode of taxa
tion for a public improvement, than there is in all other modes. From the
very nature of the subject, the power of taxation is an arbitrary power, which,
when exercised by the government itself, is limited only by the discretion of
the legislature, and when exercised by subordinate bodies, is limited by the
objects for which the legislature has seen fit to authorize it to be exercised,
and by such restrictions as the legislature has seen fit to prescribe, unless, in
deed, it is further limited by some constitutional provision. But the only
provision that can be found at all, bearing upon this subject, in our constitu
tion, is the one already alluded to, that 'the property of no person shall be
taken for public use, without just compensation therefor,' and this has re
spect to property taken by the right of eminent domain, as where the land it
self is taken for a highway or other public work, or where property is di
rectly taken for the use of the government ; and has no reference to the collec
tion of taxes where money is taken as the contributive shares of individuals
to the public burdens. The rule of taxation authorized by the charter, and
which in this particular case, the authorities of Bridgeport adopted, is cer
tainly as equitable as any other. It attempts to apportion each man's tax to
the benefit which he is to receive from the improvement for which it is ex
pended. Most of our highways are laid out by the selectmen of the towns,
and the expense is borne by the town in which the highway is located,
though in regard to many of them, the inhabitants of the towns have a much
less interest than the public beyond the local limits of the town ; and in re
gard to many others, they are principally for the accommodation of some,
perhaps a small portion of the town's inhabitants. But the towns bear the
burden, because the legislature has thrown it upon them. It might, with the
same propriety, have thrown it upon the counties, or even upon the lesser terri
torial corporations; and although injustice may occasionally be done, by com-
pelling a small town to construct an expensive bridge, for the benefit princi
pally of persons outside of its limits, yet the general operation of the law is,
perhaps, as equitable as any system that could be devised. At any rate, we
have never heard it agitated, as a debatable point, that the system was so unjust
ns to be unconstitutional or illegal." Per Sinmtm, J., in Nichols v. Bridge
port, 23 Conn., 189, 203.
1There are provisions in the constitutions of the following states, requiring
taxes levied on property to be in proportion to the value: Alabama, Ark
ansas, California, Florida, Georgia, 11linois, Indiana, Louisana, Maine, Mary-
laud, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina,
Oregon, South Carolina, Tennesse, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. Min
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Alabama. In this state, under a constitutional provision that
" all taxes levied on property in this state shall be assessed in ex
act proportion to the value of such property," it has been de
cided that assessments for the improvement of a street could only
be laid according to value, and that a provision in the city char
ter, granted before the constitution was adopted, and which autho
rized such an assessment to be laid on the abutting property was
repealed by it1
Arkansas. The constitution provides that " all property shall
be taxed according to its value, the manner of ascertaining which
to be as the general assembly shall direct, making the same equal
and uniform throughout the state. No one species of property
shall be taxed higher than another species of property of equal
value. The general assembly shall have power to tax merchants,
bankers, peddlers and privileges in such manner as may be pre
scribed by law." This provision applies to the state revenue, and
not to taxes levied for local purposes,2 and does not preclude the
assessment of a levee tax on the lands specially benefited.8
California. There are provisions in the constitution that
" all
property in the state shall be tax«ed in proportion to its value,"
and that " taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the
state." The constitution also makes provision for conferring the
power of taxation and assessment on "municipal corporations."
An act o£ the legislature providing that the expense of a street im
provement shall be assessed on property fronting on the street, in
proportion to its frontage, has invariably been held not to be in
violation of the provisions regarding valuation, equality and uni
formity, but as being properly referable to the power of assess
ment, which had acquired a distinct meaning in other states before
being introduced into the constitution of this state.4
nesota and 11linois specially provide by their constitutions for the levy of as
sessments on the property benefited by or fronting on improvements.
1Mobile e. Dargan, 45 Ala., 310; Mobile v. Street Railway Co., 45 id., 322.
•Washington v. State, 13 Ark., 752.
8MoGehee e. Mathis, 21 Ark., 40.
* Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal., 76; Blanding v. Burr, 13 id., 343; Emery t.
Gas Co., 28 id., 345 ; Emery «. Bradford, 29 id., 75 ; Walsh e. Mathews, id., 123 ;
Taylor v. Palmer, 31 id., 240; Crosby v. Lyon, 37 id., 242; Chambers e. Satter-
lee, 40 id., 497. The fact that an assessment is called a tax in the statute will
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Illinois. The former constitution of this state contained this
section : " That the corporate authorities of counties, townships,
school districts, cities, towns and villages may be vested with
power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes ; such
taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property within the
jurisdiction of the body imposing the same." This, it was held,
forbade an assessment of the cost of improving a street upon the
real estate fronting thereon in proportion to frontage; the princi
ple of equality and uniformity applying to local as well as gen
eral taxes, and such a special assessment being neither equal nor
uniform withiu the meaning of the constitution. But the opinion
was at the same time expressed, that to assess to each lot the
special benefit it would derive from the improvement, charging
such benefit upon the lot, leaving the residue of the cost to be
paid by equal and uniform taxation, would be constitutional.1
But to make the improvement at the expense of lot owners, with
out regard to the actual benefit received, would not be equal and
.uniform, and consequently would be forbidden.2 And so would
be an assessment which exempted improvements from its opera
tion.8
Indiana, One section of the constitution of this state declares
that " the general assembly shall provide by law for a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe
such rules and regulations as shall secure a just valuation for
not preclude its being sustained as an assessment. People v. Austin, 47 Cal.,
353. A street was improved and city bonds issued therefor, and to pay the
same an annual levy was made on the property benefited. Held an assess-
ment. Id.
1Chicago v. Larned, 34 11l., 203. And see Ottawa v. Spencer, 40 id., 211 ;
Chicago e. Baer, 41 id., 306; Bedard e. Hall, 44 id., 91.
»St. John v. East St. Louis, 50 11l., 92. See Lee v. Ruggles, 62 id., 427.
sPrimm v. Belleville, 59 11l., 142. Since the foregoing decisions were made
the constitution of 1870 has come into operation, one section of which pro
vides that "the general assembly may vest the corporate authorities of cities,
towns and villages with power to make local improvements by special assess
ment or by special taxation of contiguous property or otherwise. For all
other corporate purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested with au
thority to assess and collect taxes, but such taxes shall be uniform in respect
to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the
same." Art IX, § 9.
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taxation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such
only for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or
charitable purposes as may be specially exempted by law."
Another forbids the passing of local or special laws " for the as
sessment and collection of taxes for state, county, township or
road purposes." These provisions do not preclude street and
other local improvements being made, and the expense borne by
means of an assessment upon property specially benefited.1
Kansas. One provision of the constitution is
,
that " the legis
lature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of assessment
and taxation," and another that "provision shall be made by gen
eral laws for the organization of cities, towns and villages, and
their power of taxation and assessment, eta, shall be so restricted
as to prevent abuse of such power." These do not deprive the
legislature of power to authorize local improvements of streets at
the cost of the adjacent property.2
Louisiana. The provision of the constitution that " taxation
shall be equal and uniform throughout the state," does not pre
clude special assessments on property benefited by local improve
ments.8
Massachusetts. The constitution gives full power and authority
to the general court, among other things, "to impose and levy
proportional and reasonable assessments, rates and taxes upon all
the inhabitants of, and persons resident and estates lying within
the said commonwealth." This is not violated by authorizing a
town, in which the state agricultural college is located, to raise
by tax and pay an exceptional portion of the expense.* Nor
1 Goodrich v. Turnpike Co., 26 Ind., 119 ; Bright e. McCullough, 27 id., 223 ;
Palmer v. Stumph, 29 id., 329. And see La Fayette v. Jenners, 10 id., 70;
Bank of the State v. New Albany, 11 id., 139; Anderson v. Draining Co., 14
id., 199; Turpi ne. Eagle Creek, etc., Co., 48 id., 46.
•Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kans., 186.
s Municipality v. Dunn, 10 La. An., 57 ; New Orleans v. Elliott, 10 id., 59 ;
Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 id., 220; Draining Co. Case, id., 388; Municipality e.
Guillotte, 14 id., 297; Wallace v. Shelton, id., 498; Bishop v. Marks, 15 id.,
147; Matter of Opening of Streets, 20 id., 497. To divide the expense of an
improvement between the city and the property specially benefited is no vio
lation of the rule of uniformity. State v. New Orleans, 15 La. An., 354.
1 Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen, 500.
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does it preclude local, street or drain assessments being laid on
the property benefited. This is so well shown by an opinion of
the supreme court of Massachusetts, and the opinion itself is of
such general application, that we consider it advisable to copy
liberally from it:
"It remains for us to consider that branch of the plaintiff's case
which involves an inquiry into the validity of the assessment or
mode of taxation prescribed by the statute, by means of which
the expenses of the proposed improvement are to be defrayed.
The broad position assumed by the plaintiff is
,
that this is a pal
pable violation of that provision of the constitution, part 2
, cb. 1
,
§1, art IV, by which the power is given to the legislature to im
pose only proportional and reasonable taxes. We have already
had occasion to consider the force and effect of these words, in
connection with other portions of the same article in the constitu
tion, as applied to the imposition of taxes for the public charges
of government As to this class of taxation, the intent seems to
be clear to put a restraint on the legislative authority, and to re
quire that taxes levied for general purposes shall belaid on prop
erty, so that, taking all estates, real and personal, within the com
monwealth, as one of the elements of proportion, each person sub
ject to taxation shall be obliged to pay only such portion of the
taxes as the property owned by him bears to the whole sum to
be raised. But this conclusion as to taxation for general purposes
is drawn mainly from the clause in the constitution which pro
vides that, in order that assessments for such purposes may be
made with equality, a valuation of estates shall be taken anew
as often, at least, as once in ten years. This requirement seems
to indicate very clearly that such taxation, in order to be propor
tional, shall be laid according to the property owned by each
person liable to assessment within the commonwealth. But this
provision is in terms limited to the public charges of government ;
that is
,
to expenditures incurred for those objects of a public na
ture for which it is the duty of the government to provide, and
the burden of which properly rests and is to be distributed among
the whole people of the commonwealth ; such, for example, as
the charges for carrying on the several departments of the gov
ernment, for the support of a system of general education, and
for the common protection and defense of the people and govern-
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ment of the state. These and other like expenditures, whether
incurred by the immediate agents and officers of the state or
through the instrumentality of counties or towns, are to be defray
ed by assessments laid with equality and in proportion to the
property held by each person liable to taxation.
" But there is another large class of expenditures for objects of
a public nature, for which it is the proper province of the govern
ment to provide, which cannot be deemed to come within the des
ignation of public charges of government, or be held to be a
proper subject of general assessment on the whole people of the
commonwealth. Take the case of money expended in effecting
an improvement of a local character, which, although it may
enure, to a certain extent, to the benefit of the public, is never
theless especially necessary for, and beneficial to, private property
in the immediate vicinity. It certainly would not be equitable
or just, or tend to an equalization of public burdens, that the
cost of such a work should be laid on the whole people, or upon
those living remote from the locality, having no property connect
ed with the improvement, and who could derive but little
or no benefit or advantage from its construction. The duty of
the government to make provision to carry into effect works of
such character is clear and unquestionable. Indeed, it is often
indispensable for police or sanitary purposes, or the convenience
and accommodation of persons living within a certain town or
municipality, or a district or section thereof, that money should
be expended for purposes of a public nature, but essentially
local in their operation and effect. Nor can there be any doubt
that ample power to procure the accomplishment of such objects
is vested in the legislature, in the exercise of their authority to
pass all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, for the good
and welfare of the commonwealth and the subjects thereof. This
great and essential attribute of sovereignty would be greatly
abridged, if it should be held that the legislature are restricted in
their authority to provide means by the levying of taxes for those
objects only which would form a proper subject of a general charge
on the whole people of the commonwealth, and have no power
to authorize assessments for objects of a local character, the execu
tion of which is required by the convenience and necessities of a
town or district or neighborhood. We see no reason for construing
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the provision in the constitution, giving to the legislature the power
of imposing proportional and reasonable assessments, rates and
taxes, as an inhibition on the levy of a tax for local purposes of a
public nature, upon those who will reap the benefit on their estates
of a proposed expenditure of money. Such is not the natural or
reasonable interpretation of the clause, standing as it does in rela
tion to this class or species of taxation, without other words to
qualify or restrict its meaning. As has been already said, it is in
regard to the public charges of government that the mode of rais
ing money by the imposition of taxes is specially pointed out,
and it is as to these only that a restriction is found on the mean
ing of the preceding clause, by which the power to levy propor
tional and reasonable taxes is given. As to all other assessments
which may be required by the enactment and execution of whole
some and reasonable laws, no limitation of authority is expressed,
and none can be implied except that which arises from the natu
ral and proper import of the words used. It certainly cannot be
said that all taxes laid for local purposes of a public nature, on
those who would be chiefly and directly benefited by the execu
tion of a proposed work, and in proportion to the degree of bene
fit or profit which each will receive therefrom, are necessarily
either unreasonable or unproportional. Nor can it be contended
that the constitution, in regard to this species of taxation, fur
nishes any fixed rules of proportion, or gives any absolute stand
ard by which to determine whether a particular tax is within the
limits of the legitimate exercise of the power granted. Undoubt
edly a very wide discretion was intended to be left to the legisla
ture as to the subjects and method of executing the authority
conferred on them, of imposing taxes for purposes other than
those of a general nature; and yet the power is not wholly with
out limit In requiring that taxes should be proportional and
reasonable, the framers of the constitution intended to erect a bar
rier against an arbitrary, unjust, unequal or oppressive exercise of
the power.1 If
,
for instance, the legislature should arbitrarily desig
nate a certain class of persons on whom to impose a tax, either for
general purposes, or for a local object of a public nature, without
any reference to any rule of proportion whatever, having no regard
to the share of public charges which each ought to pay relatively
1 Citing Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268.
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to that borne by all others, or to any supposed peculiar benefit or
profit which would accrue to those made subject to the tax which
would not enure to others, so that in effect the burden would
fall on those who had been selected only for the reason that they
might be made subject to the tax, we cannot doubt that the im
position of it would be an unlawful exercise of power not war
ranted by the constitution, against the exercise of which a person
aggrieved might sue for protection. But no such case is made by
the present bill. This part of the plaintiff's case rests on the
broad proposition, that the legislature have no power to authorize
the assessment of the cost of a work of a public nature, but the con
struction of which will be of special and peculiar benefit to adjacent
property, on the abutting estates in proportion to their value.
For the reasons already given, we are of the opinion that such a
tax is neither unreasonable, nor unproportional, and that it was
competent for the legislature to impose it in the mode prescribed
by the statute." 1
Michigan. The provision that " the legislature shall provide
a uniform rule of taxation, except on property paying specific
taxes, and taxes shall be levied on such property as shall be pre
scribed by law," and that " all assessments hereafter authorized
shall be on property at its cash value," only relates to the valua
tion, assessment and taxation of property for general purposes, and
consistent with them local assessments may be laid for local im
provements, either in proportion to benefits or in proportion to
frontage.2
Minnesota. Under a provision that " all taxes to be raised in
this state shall be as nearly equal as may be, and all property on
which taxes are to be levied shall have a cash valuation, and be
equal and uniform throughout the state," a special assessment on
lands in proportion to the benefits received from the construction
of a public road was held inadmissible.8
1Bigelou, Ch. J., in Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen, 223, 334.
•Motz e. Detroit, 18 Mich., 495; Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 id., 39: see Le
Fever v. Detroit, 2 id., 586 ; Williams v. Detroit, 2 id., 568 ; Woodbridge v. De
troit, 8 id., 274; Warner e. Grand Haven, 30 id., 24. As to what are specific
taxes, see Walcott e. People, 17 Mich., 68; Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 26 id., 325.
•Stinson e. Smith, 8 Minn., 366. Subsequently the clause in the constitu
tion was amended by the addition of the following: " Provided that the legis-
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Mississippi The constitution requires that " taxation shall be
equal and uniform throughout the state. All property shall be
taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by
law." There is nothing in this which takes from the legislature
the power to impose a tax on a special district for a local im
provement, and municipal corporations may be authorized to
assess the expense of a street improvement on the lots fronting on
the street.1 The provision has no application to taxes for local
improvements, and it is
,
therefore, competent to lay a levee tax on
lands by the acre instead of by valuation.2
Missouri. An assessment for street improvements on a basis of
benefits does not contravene the provision of the constitution that
"all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to
its value." s The same is true of assessments for levee purposes,
which need not be made on the basis of valuation.*
Ohio. The provision of the constitution that " laws shall be
passed taxing by a uniform rule, * * * all real and per
sonal property according to its true value in money," will not
preclude the levy and collection of assessments on the basis of
benefits in the cases in which they are usually laid.5
Oregon. The provision in the constitution that " all taxation
shall be equal and uniform," does not preclude an improvement
of city streets by means of assessments levied on those to whose
benefit the improvements specially inure.6
lature may, by general law or special act, authorize municipal corporations
to levy assessments for local improvements upon the property fronting upon
such improvements, or upon the property to be benefited by such improve
ments, without regard to cash valuation, and in such manner as the legislature
may prescribe."
1 Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss., 209 : see Smith e. Aberdeen, 2d id., 458 ;
Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 id., 652.
» Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss., 367.
» Garrett e. St Louis, 25 Mo., 505 ; Uhrig v. St. Louis, 44 id., 458: see Nee.
nan v. Smith, 50 id., 525.
4 Egyptian Levee Co. e. Hardin, 27 Mo., 495.
8 Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. S., 243 ; Marion v. Epler, id., 250 ; Ernst e.
Kunkle, id., 520; Reeves e. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 id., 333; Nor. Ind. R. R.
Co. v. Connelly, 10 id., 159. This provision, however, applies as much to the
local taxes, properly so called, as to the state taxes. Zanesville v. Richards, 5
Ohio, N. S., 589, 593.
• King v. Portland, 2 Ore., 146.
444 [CH. XX.LAW OF TAXATION.
Rhode Island. A constitutional provision, that " the burdens of
the state ought to be fairly distributed among its citizens," is not
inconsistent with an act which provides for the laying out of a
street, and the assessment by commissioners of one-half the ex
pense on adjoining proprietors, in proportion to benefits received ;
the assessment to any one not to exceed the benefits.1
Wisconsin. The constitution requires that " the rule of taxa
tion shall be uniform." Also, that " it shall be the duty of the
legislature, and they are hereby empowered, to provide for the
organization of cities and incorporated villages, and to restrict
their power of taxation and assessment," etc. It has been doubted
if special assessments on a basis of benefits could be upheld un
der the provision first quoted ; but it has been decided that they
may be, when properly authorized under the other.8
These are the cases in which the constitutional objections have
been most distinctly presented ; but many other cases occupy,
with more or less fullness, the same ground. The fact very
clearly appears that, while there is not such a concurrence of ju
dicial opinion as would be desirable, the overwhelming weight of
authority is in favor of the position, that all such provisions for
equality and uniformity in taxation, and for taxation by value,
have no application to these special assessments. The reasons
assigned vary in different cases, but they are no where set forth
more clearly or strongly than in the leading case in New York.
In that case, speaking of provisions made by the people in their
constitutions, it is said : " They have not ordained that taxation
shall be general, so as to embrace all persons or all taxable per
sons within the state, or within any district or territorial division
of the state ; nor that it must be in the ratio of the value of each
man's land, or of his goods, or of both combined ; nor that a tax
'must be coextensive with the district, or upon all the property
1Matter of Dorrance St., 4 R. L, 230. In the same case it is said that such an
act is not invalid by reason of allowing the local authorities a discretion to
levy the tax in the method adopted, or some other. And as to assessing by
benefits, Ames, Ch. J., gives instances of assessments for payment for houses
pulled down in populous towns to check the spread of conflagrations, and for
the expense of watchmen in compact portions of cities.
»Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 242; Lumsden v. Cross, id., 282; Bond «.
Kenosha, 17 id., 284.
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in a district which has the character of and is known to the law
as a local sovereignty.' Nor have they ordained or forbidden
that a tax shall be apportioned according to the benefit which
each tax payer is supposed to receive from the object on which
the tax is expended. In all these particulars the power of taxa
tion is unrestrained.
" The application of any one of these rules or principles of
apportionment to all cases, would be manifestly oppressive and
unjust Either may be rightfully and wisely applied to the par
ticular exigency to which it is best adapted.
" Taxation is sometimes regulated by one of these principles,
and sometimes by another ; and very often it has been appor
tioned without reference to the locality or to the tax payer's
ability to contribute, or to any proportion between the burden
and the benefit The excise laws, and taxes on carriages and
watches are among the many examples of this description of
taxation. Some taxes affect classes of inhabitants only. All
duties on imported goods are taxes on the class of consumers.
The tax on one imported article falls on a large class of consumers,
while the tax on another affects comparatively a few individuals.
The duty on one article consumed by one class of inhabitants is
twenty per cent of its value, while on another, consumed by a
different class, it is forty per cent. The duty on one foreign
commodity is laid for the purposes of revenue mainly, without
reference to the ability of its consumers to pay ; as in the case of
the duty on salt The duty on another is laid for the purpose of
encouraging domestic manufactures of the same article; thus
compelling the community to pay a higher price to one man than
he could otherwise have bought the article for from another.
These discriminations may be impolitic, and in some cases unjust ;
but if the power of taxation upon importations had not been
transferred by the people of this state to the federal government,
there could have been no pretense for declaring them unconstitu
tional in state legislation.
" A property tax for the general purposes of the government,
either of the state at large, or of a county, city or other district,
is regarded as a just and equitable tax. The reason is obvious.
It apportions the burden according to the benefit more nearly
than any other inflexible rule of general taxation. A rich man
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derives more benefit from taxation, in the protection and improve
ment of his property, than a poor man, and ought therefore to
pay more. But the amount of each man's benefit in general tax
ation cannot be ascertained and estimated with any degree of
certainty, and, for that reason a property tax is adopted instead of
an estimate of benefits. In local taxation, however, for special
purposes, the local benefits may. in many cases, be seen, traced
and estimated to a reasonable certainty. At least, this has been
supposed and assumed to be true by the legislature, whose duty
it is to prescribe the rules on which taxation is to be apportioned ;
and whose determination of this matter, being within the scope
of its lawful power, is conclusive." 1
Some of the cases assume the narrow ground, that the con
stitutional provisions refer solely to state taxation, or that, if
they go further, to the general taxation for state, county and
municipal purposes ; but the view generally expressed is
,
that
though assessments are laid under the taxing power, and are in a
certain sense taxes, yet that they are a peculiar class of taxes,
and not within the meaning of that term as it is usually employed
in our constitutions and statutes.8 Others are rested on both
reasons.
1 Ruggles, J., in People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419, 427.
* On this point see Matter of Mayor, etc. of New York, 11 Johns., 77; Sharp
v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76; Livingston v. New York, 8 Wend., 85; Matter of Furman
St., 17 Wend., 649; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn., 189; Northern Liberties e.
St. John's Church, 13 Penn. St., 107; Schenley e. Allegheny City, 25 id., 128;
Wray v. Pittsburg, 46 id., 365; Hammett e. Philadelphia, 66 id., 146;
Washington Avenue, 69 id., 353; Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana,
513; Barnes v. Atchison, 2 Eans., 454; St. Joseph v. O'Donohue, 31 Mo.,
345; St. Joseph v. Anthony, 30 id., 437: Municipality No. 2 v. White, 9 La,
An., 446; Cummings v. Police Jury, 9 id., 503; Richardson e.Morgan, 16
id., 429; Matter of Opening of Streets, 20 id., 497; S. C, in Withrow's Corp.
Cases, 375; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio St., 636; State v. Dean, 23 N, J., 335;
State e. Jersey City, 24 id., 662; Vasser v. George, 47 Miss., 713; Fairfield v.
Ratcliffe, 20 Iowa, 396 ; Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass., 461 ; Woodbridge e. De
troit, 8 Mich., 274; Alexander e. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 383, 397; Baltimore v.
Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517 ; Hale e. Kenosha, 29 Wis., 599. An agreement to
pay " all taxes and assessments," held to embrace street assessments. Oswald
e. Gilbert, 11 Johns., 443 ; Codman v. Johnson, 104 Mass., 491. One who buys
land subject to assessments which by his deed he assumes to pay may never-
theless contest them. State v. Jersey City, 35 N. J., 3S1.
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5. The methods of apportionment. Sufficient, perhaps, has
been said regarding the principles on which special assessments
are levied.1 The methods which are chosen for giving those
principles effect may now receive brief attention.
Although complaint is often made that special assessment op
erates oppressively and unjustly, and it cannot be denied that in
individual cases the complaint is perfectly just, yet on the whole
it has a decided advantage over other taxation in the fact that its
methods are so flexible, and so easily adapted to the special equity
and justice of the several classes of cases. This is shown in the
modes of apportionment which are selected under different circum-
stancea
1. The major part of the cost of a local work is sometimes
collected by general tax, while a smaller portion is levied upon
the estates specially benefited.
2. The major part is sometimes assessed on estates benefited,
while the general public is taxed a smaller portion in considera
tion of a smaller participation in the benefits.
3. The whole cost in other cases is levied on lands in the im
mediate vicinity of the work.
In a constitutional point of view either of these methods is ad-
\In Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 388, the general principle underlying
these assessments is justly said to be the same with that on which highway
taxes are laid. In Nichols v. Bridgeport, 36 Conn., 255, 262, Butler, J., in
considering the question whether a certain act subjecting railroad property to
a general tax, and exempting it from all other taxes, would exempt it from
special assessments, makes the following remarks : " It is doubtless true that
such an assessment of benefits is an exercise of the taxing power, and in a
general sense a tax. It was so regarded by this court in Nichols v. Bridge
port, 23 Conn., 207, to which we have been referred. But it is never spoken
of in the charters of cities and boroughs, or in the general law, or in popular
intercourse, as a tax. And although this strictly in a general sense is a tax,
it is one of a peculiar nature. It is a lo«al assessment imposed occasionally
as required, upon a limited class of persons interested in a local improvement,
and who are assumed to be benefited by the improvement to the extent of the
assessment; and it is [imposed and collected as an equivalent for that benefit,
and to pay for the improvement. It has consequently never been regarded as
a tax, or termed such in legislative proceedings, in our public or private
laws, or in popular intercourse. In all these it is known only and distinct
ively as " an assessment for benefits," and it cannot safely be assumed that
the legislature had such assessments in contemplation when they passed the
act of 1864."
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misible, and one may be sometimes just, and another at other
times. In other cases it may be deemed reasonable to make the
whole cost a general charge, and levy no special assessment what
ever.1 The question is legislative, and like all legislative questions
may be decided erroneously, but it is reasonable to expect that, with
such latitude of choice, the tax will be more just and equal than
it would be were the legislature required to levy it by one inflex
ible and arbitrary rule.2
Even after it has been determined how the cost shall be borne,
as between the public and the estates benefited, much liberty is
allowed in fixing upon the basis of apportionment as between in
dividuals. The two methods between which a choice is common
ly made are :
1. An assessment made by assessors or commissioners, appoint
ed for the purpose under legislative authority, and who are to
view the estates, and levy the expense in proportion to the bene
fits which in their opinion the estates respectively will receive
from the work proposed.
2. An assessment by some definite standard fixed upon by the
legislature itself, and which is applied to estates by a measure
ment of length, quantity or value.
An assessment by the first method would seem to be most
equal and just, because it would be made on actual examination
of the lands assessed. The legislature, in such cases, makes the
rule, and the proper officers give effect to it in a manner corre
sponding to the ordinary assessment for a taxation by values.
The right thus to assess by benefits has been often affirmed, and
can no longer be regarded as a controverted question.8
1As to the diverse methods, see Wallace v. Shelton, 14 La. An., 498.
»" General taxation implies a distribution of the burden upon some general
rule of equality. So a local assessment, or tax for a local benefit, should be dis.
tributed among and imposed upon all equally, standing in like relation."
Jiedfield, J., in Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt., 174, 186. The question always is, or
should be, what is equal under the circumstances.
s McMasters v. Commonwealth, 3 Watts, 292 ; Fenelon's Petition, 7 Penn.
St., 173 ; Hancock Street Extension, 18 id., 26 ; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36
id., 29; Commonwealth e. Woods, 44 id., 113: Wray v. Pittsburg, 46 id., 365;
Greensburg v. Young, 53 id., 280; Allentown e. Henry, 73 id., 404; Webere.
Reinhard, 73 id., 373; Livingston e. New York, 8 Wend., 86; Matter of Twen-
Iw-sixtb. Street, 12 id., 203; Owners of Ground e. Albany, 15 id., 374; Matter
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"When benefits are assessed after this method, the district, with
in which the tax shall be laid, may be determined in either of
two modes :
1. The legislative authority, either of the state, or, when prop
erly authorized, of the municipality, may determine over what
territory the benefits are so far diffused as to render it proper to
make all lands contribute to the cost ; or,
2. The assessors or commissioners who, under the law, are to
make the assessment, may have the whole matter submitted to
their judgment, to assess such lands as in their opinion are spe
cially benefited, and ought therefore to contribute to the cost of
the work.
When the first method is adopted, the legislature exercises di
rectly an undoubted and necessary power, which pertains to it in
all matters of taxation ; and which is inseparable from the power
of apportionment The whole subject of taxing districts belongs
to the legislature ; so much is unquestionable.1 The authority
may be exercised directly, or, in the case of local taxes, it may
be left to local boards or bodies ; * but in the latter case the deter
mination will be by a body possessing for the purpose legislative
of Furman Street, 17 id., 649 ; Matter of De Graw Street, 18 id., 568 ; People v.
Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419; Wright v. Boston, 9 Cush., 233; Dorgon v. Boston, 12
Allen, 223; Brewer v. Springfield, 97 Mass., 152; Jones v. Boston, 104 id., 461 ;
Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn., 189 ; Cone v. Hartford, 28 id., 363 ; Reid v.
Toledo, 18 Ohio, 161; Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio N. S., 126; Hill v. Hig-
don, 5 id., 243; Marion v. Epler, 5 id., 250; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill,
383; Moale v. Baltimore, 5 Md., 314; Baltimore v. Cemetery Company, 7 Md.,
517; Howard v. The Church, 18 id., 457; Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush, 667;
Howell v. Bristol, 8 id., 493 ; State e. Newark, 27 N. J., 155 ; State v. Fuller, 34
id., 227 ; Holton v. Milwaukee, 31 Wis., 27 ; Hoyt e. East Saginaw, 19 Mich.,
39 ; Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 id., 104 ; Brevoort v. Detroit, 24 id., 322 ; Mor-
rison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa, 271 ; Chicago v. Larned, 34 11l., 203 ; Ottawa «.
Spencer, 40 id., 211; Chicago v. Baer, 41 id., 306; Matter of Dorrance Street, 4
R. I., 230; Garrett e. St. Louis, 25 Mo., 505; St. Joseph v. O'Donohue, 31 id.,
345; St. Louis v. Clemens, 36 id., 467; St. Louis v. Armstrong, 38 id., 29;
Unrig v. St. Louis, 44 id., 458; Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal., 76; Emery e.
Gas Company, 28 id., 345 ; La Fayette e. Fowler, 34 Ind., 140. In State e.
Charleston, 12 Rich., 702, the right to assess by benefits is denied. The point
receives but little consideration, and the decisions to the contrary are not re
ferred to.
1 Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal., 525 ; and see ante, Chapter VII.
• Piper's Appeal, 32 Cal., 530.
29
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power, and whose action must be as conclusive as if taken by the
legislature itself. It has been repeatedly decided that the legis
lative act of assigning districts for special taxation on the basis of
benefits, cannot be attacked on the ground of error in judgment
regarding the special benefits, and defeated by satisfying a court
that no special and peculiar benefits are received. If the legisla
tion has fixed the district, and laid the tax for the reason that, in
the opinion of the legislative body, such district is peculiarly ben
efited, that is conclusive.1 The only exceptions which have been
recognized to this rule are those cases in which, under pretense of
apportionment, a work of general benefit has been treated as a
work of merely local consequence, and the cost imposed on some
local community in disregard of the general rules which control
legislation in matters of taxation.2 The authority is sometimes
exercised by making several districts for a single work, as indeed
is often done in the case of street improvements; it being equally
within the power of the legislature to prescribe one district
over which the whole cost of the improvement shall be spread,
or to make separate districts for the improvement along the
several blocks.8 It has even been held that the improvement
of several streets may be treated as one work for the purposes
of a special assessment, and the whole cost apportioned by uni
form rule throughout one district/ and this may perhaps be
equally competent with the general assessment throughout a
city of the cost of such improvements.
1Baltimore v. I1ughes, 1 Gill & J., 480, 493, per Bu«hanan, Ch. J.; Litch-
field v. Vernon, 41 N. Y., 123, 133, per Grover, J.; People e. Lawrence, 41 id.,
140; St. Louis e. Oeter8, 36 Mo., 456; Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm., 416; Philadel
phia v. Field, 58 Penn. St., 320. Compare Wright e. Boston, 0 Cush., 233.
sBaltimore e. Hughes, 1 Gill & J., 480, 492, per Buchanan, Ch. J. ; Washing-
ton Avenue, 69 Penn. St., 352.
8Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. S., 126 ; Creighton v. Scott, 14 id., 438 ;
Brevoort v. Detroit, 24 Mich., 322; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St., 29.
4See ante, p. 112. In Arnold v. Cambridge, 106 Mass., 352, the expense of
constructing sidewalks on two streets was levied by one assessment, and appor
tioned among the lots abutting on the two streets. The only authority under
which this could be done was the statute which empowered the mayor and
aldermen, whenever they should deem it expedient to construct sidewalks
" in any street," to assess the expense on the abuttors in just proportions. By
this the court thought " it was evidently intended by the legislature that the
case of each street should be considered separately, and with a view to its
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Where the legislature prescribes no limits to the taxing district,
but authorizes an assessment on such property as shall appear to
be benefited, the report of the assessors or commissioners can
alone determine what the district shall be. The subject is referred
to them as a matter depending on judgment, after actual inspec
tion ; but as they only pass upon the question of fact, the district
is to be considered as prescribed by the legislature, when the
principle is settled which is to determine it.1
Assessments by the Foot Front In many instances where streets
were to be opened or improved, sewers constructed, water pipes
laid, or other improvements entered upon, the benefits of which
might be expected to diffuse. themselves along the line of the im
provement in a degree bearing some proportion to the frontage,
the legislature has deemed it right and proper to take the line of
frontage as the most practicable and reasonable measure of prob
able benefits; and making that the standard, to apportion the
benefits accordingly. Such a measure of apportionment seems at
first blush to be perfectly arbitrary, and likely to operate in some
cases with great injustice; but it cannot be denied that in the
case of some improvements, frontage is a very reasonable measure
of benefits; much more just than value could be; and perhaps
approaching equality a3 nearly as any estimate of benefits made
by the judgment of men. However this may be, the authorities
are well united in the conclusion that frontage may lawfully be
made the basis of apportionment.2
own special circumstances ;" and that, consequently, " the power to treat two
sidewalks in two distinct streets as one for the purposes of assessment [was]
not given by the statute." In England it is held that separate lines of sewers
ought not to be included in one district, when they are on a different level,
and no one is of benefit to the district drained by the other. Rex v. Tower
Hamlets, 9 B. & C, 517.
1As to districts depending on the estimates of commissioners, see Appeal
of Powers, 29 Mich., 504; Matter of Ward, 52 N. Y., 395.
•Pennock v. Hoover, 5 Rawle, 291 ; McGonigle v. Alleghany City, 44 Penn.
St., 118; Magee e. Commonwealth, 46 id., 308; Spring Garden v. Wistar, 18
id., 195; Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61 id., 255; Covington v. Boyle, 6 Bush, 204;
State v. Elizabeth, 30 N. J., 365; Same v. Same, 31 id., 547; State r. Fuller, 34
id., 227; Ernst v. Kunkle, 5 Ohio St., 520; Upington v. Oviatt, 24 id., 232;
Barnes v. Atchison, 2 Kans., 455; Parker v. Challis, 9 id., 155; St. Joseph v.
Anthony, 20 Mo., 537 ; Fowler v. St. Joseph, 37 id., 228 ; Neenan v. Smith 50
id., 525; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal., 497; Palmer «. Stumpf, 29 Ind., 329;
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'
Occasional hardships must inevitably result from, the adoption
of such a basis, but the question is fairly a debatable one, whether
they are likely to be more serious or more frequent than those
which are to be anticipated from the selection of some other rule ;
and this question must be deemed settled by the statute.1
The principle of these statutes is the same with that which sup
ports assessments made through the intervention of assessors or
commissioners. The benefits, actually or presumptively received,
support the tax. Apportioning the cost by the frontage on the
improvement is adopted by the legislature as constituting, in the
judgment of its members, an apportionment in proportion to ben
efits as nearly as is reasonably practicable. This we understand
to be substantially the view taken by the authorities.2
Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt., 174; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich., 560; Motz v. Detroit,
18 id., 495 ; King e. Portland, 2 Ore., 146. Many of the cases cited, ante, pp.
448-9, recognize the same right.
1In Terry e. Hartford, 39 Conn., 286, the opening of the street for which a
special assessment was made left a narrow strip of land on each side belong-
ing to Terry ; so narrow as to be incapable of use, except in connection with
the adjacent lands. It was nevertheless assessed heavily for benefits. The
case showed that both this and the adjacent land would be largely benefited
if used together. The court say, " when we consider that here is land that
would be benefited to an amount of more than thirty-six hundred dollars by
the laying out of this street, should the annexation be made, and the land ad
joining would likewise be benefited to a large amount under the like circum
stances, and that no benefit would be conferred on either tract so long as they
remain the property of different proprietors, is it reasonable to suppose that
there can be any serious obstacle to prevent the one owner from selling and the
other from buying, when so great an advantage would result to both from such
sale and purchase ? A consideration of this character, no doubt, had its proper
effect in the determination of the question, whether the land was benefited or
not, and the extent of that benefit." See, also, Same v. Same, 39 Conn., 291.
The following cases are important: " Bounding or abutting" on a street
will include the soil of a private road opening into the street. Pound v.
Plumstead Board of Works, Law Rep., 7 Q. B., 183. "Adjoining " means,
touchingor contiguous, as distinguished from lying near or adjacent Mat
ter of Ward. 52 N. Y., 395, citing Rex e. Hodge, 1 M. & M., 371 ; Peverelly
e. People, 3 Park. C R., 59 ; Holmes e. Carley, 31 N. Y., 289. " In front " of
a lot construed to embrace, in case of a corner lot, not only the front, com
monly so called, but the line of the lot on the side street also. Des Moines e.
Door, 31 Iowa, 89 ; Morrison v. Hershire, 32 id., 271. A lot is not " fronting "
on a street when it is separated from it by a narrow strip. Philadelphia «.
Eastwick, 35 Penn. St., 75.
''' See State v. Fuller, 34 N. J., 227, 232, per BedU, J. ; Schenley v. Common-
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In some instances a somewhat different method has been
adopted for levying the cost of local works. Instead of establish
ing a taxing district, and apportioning the cost throughout it by
some standard of benefit, actual or presumptive, the case of each
individual lot fronting on the improvement has been taken by it
self, and that lot has been assessed with the cost of the improve
ment along its front ; or perhaps with one-half the cost, leaving
the opposite lot to be assessed for the other half. If such a regu
lation constitutes the apportionment of a tax, it must be supported
when properly ordered by or under the authority of the legisla
ture. But it has been denied on what seem the most conclusive
grounds that this is permissible. It is not legitimate taxation
because it is lacking in one of its indispensable elements. It con
siders each lot by itself, compelling each to bear the burden of
the improvement in front of it
, without reference to any contribu
tion to be made to the improvement by any other property, and
it is consequently without any apportionment. From accidental
circumstances, the major part of the cost of an important public
work may be expended in front of a single lot ; those circum
stances not at all contributing to make the improvement more
valuable to the lot thus specially burdened, perhaps even having
the opposite consequence. But whatever might be the result in
particular cases, the fatal vice in the system is that it provides for
no taxing districts whatever. It is as arbitrary in principle, and
would sometimes be as unequal in operation, as a regulation that
the town from which a state officer chanced to be chosen should
pay his salary, or that that locality in which the standing army,
or any portion of it
,
should be stationed for the time being should
be charged with its support. If one is legitimate taxation the
other would be. In sidewalk cases a regulation of the kind has
been held admissible, but it has been justified as a regulation of
police, and is not supported on the taxing power exclusively. As
has been well said, to compel individuals to contribute money or
property to the use of the public, without reference to any common
ratio, and without requiring the sum paid by one piece or kind of
property, or by one person, to bear any relation whatever to that
paid b}T another, i
s to lay a forced contribution, not a tax, within
wealth, 36 Penn. St., 29, 57, per Strong, J.; Northern Indiana R. R. Co. a
Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. 159, 165, per Peek, J.
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the sense of those terms as applied to the exercise of powers by
any enlightened or responsible government.1
Although, as has been stated, an assessment by frontage is
really based upon the idea that the estates taxed receive a bene
fit in proportion to frontage, yet when the legislature have made
benefits the rule of assessment, and provided for assessors or com
missioners to ascertain and apportion them, it is not arbitrarily
to be assumed that the benefits to any particular lot are in fact
,in proportion to its front on the improvement In such cases the
assessors or commissioners have a duty to perform, on inspection
and examination of the several estates ; and a report by them that
they have assessed the expense by the foot front, without saying
that they find the benefits in that proportion, does not affirma
tively show a performance of their duty.2
Apportionment by the Acre, as a basis for an assessment has fre
quently been adopted in levee cases. A statute in Mississippi
may be taken as an illustration. It provided for a levee tax, pre
scribed the district of assessment, and directed the tax to be laid
by the acre according to an arbitrary standard of value fixed by
the act, as follows : Unimproved lands in a part of the district, five
dollars per acre ; in the remainder of the district three dollars per
1Chri3tianey, J., in Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich., 274, 301. The case of
Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 518, is a decision that the improve
ment of a street cannot be compelled on any such basis. To the same point
is Motz v. Detroit, 18 Mich., 495. And see St. Louis v. Clemens, 49 Mo., 552;
Ncenan v. Smith, 50 id., 525, 531. The case of Warren e. Henley, 31 Iowa, 38,
is «ontra. Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 258, which also seems to be contra,
appears to be based upon a practice in that state before the constitution was
adopted. In the subsequent case of State v. Portage, 12 Wis., 562, it was held,
under a charter which permitted the expense of an improvement on the abut
ting lots, in proportion to the front or size of such lots respectively, an ordi
nance directing that each lot should be charged with the cost of the improve
ment in front of it was void. " This," says Paine, J., speaking of the provis
ion of the charter, " it is obvious is an entirely different principle of assess
ment from that which charges each lot with the entire expense of the
improvement in front of it
,
and serves to avoid much of the inequality and
injustice of the latter system." As to the reasonableness and justice of an
assessment by the foot front, compare the remarks of Carpenter, J., in Clapp
'e.Hartford, 35 Conn., 66; Read, J., in Magee v. Commonwealth, 46 Penn. St.,
358 ; Crozier, J., in Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kans., 186.
;
State v. Hudson, 27 N. J., 214; State v. Hudson, 29 id., 104, 115; State v
Bergen, id., 266; Warner v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich., 24.
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acre; improved lands in a part of the district twenty dollars per
acre, and in the remainder thirty dollars per acra The act was sus
tained,1 as was also a similar statute in Missouri.2 Street im-
1Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss., 367. See the previous cases of Smith v. Aber
deen, 25 id., 458; Williams v. Cammack, 27 id., 209; Alcorn v. Hamer,38id.,
652.
*Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo., 495. See also the Louisiana and A rkan-
sas cases. Crowley v. Copley, 2 La. An., 329 ; Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 id., 220 ;
Wallace e. Shelton, 14 id., 498; Bishop v. Marks, 15 id., 147 ; Richardson v. Mor.
gan, 16 id,, 429 ; McGehee v. Mathis, 21 Ark., 40. In Wallace v. Shelton, supra,
the lcvee tax was a specific tax by the acre. Merrick, Ch. J., says ; " In the case
of Layton v. The City of New Orleans, 12 La. An., 515, we said that nothing
prevented the legislature from adopting different principles as the bases of its
legislation. When the different municipalities were consolidated into one
city, the legislature adopted the principle, that each municipality ought to
pay its own debts; subsequently the legislature adopted the principle that it
was equal and just that the city at large should pay the very unequal debts of
the different municipalities. It was not in the power of this court to say that
the legislation was unconstitutional.
" So here the legislature has established, at different periods, different prin
ciples, in regard to the assessments made for the levee district for these parish
es, viz: 1st. That it was right, equal and just to hjvy an ad valorem assess
ment upon the lands alone ; that the property receiving the advantage should
bear the burden. 2d. That in order to protect the people from inundation, it
was just and equal that they should pay an ad valorem assessment upon all
of their taxable property in the levee district. 3d. That it costs (as in the
Draining Case) as much to protect one acre of land from inundation as it does
another ; that every acre of land in the district of land subject to overflow will
be benefited to a much greater amount than the assessment, and that, there
fore, it is just and equal that every acre should pay into the hands of the agents
charged with protecting it the same sum as every other acre ; and now, by a
statute, since this litigation arose; and fourthly, that the second and third
principles ought to be combined, and that the land ought to be subject to a
specific tax, and all other property to an ad valorem tax. It is easy to perceive,
by examination, that none of these theories can attain absolute equality, or
bring about exact justice among the different individuals composing a com
munity subject to assessment. The first and second theories operated harshly
upon those persons who occupied high tracts of land, and had already protected
themselves by sufficient levees at their own expense ; and there may be cases of
individual hardships under the third and fourth theories of legislation. But
it is not pretended but that the plaintiff is benefited to the full amount of his
assessment. The money he pays to the agents appointed to protect his property,
is restored to him in the increased value of his lands, and their security from
overflow. The argument that he may not wish to sell or cultivate his lands,
and that he may prefer that the soil be raised by the overflow each year, can
not be admitted. Salus populi suprema lex. The obstinacy of a proprietor
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provements in towns are sometimes made at the cost of abutting
lots in proportion to their area, in the belief that this is an equally
reasonable and just standard of apportionment with any other.1
Assessment by Value of Lots. This has sometimes been ordered
in levee cases, and also in the case of street improvements. In
the latter case, the buildings erected upon the lands are some
times excluded from the valuation, and very justly so, as the
improvements, while increasing largely the market value of land
as such, do not usually increase perceptibly the value of the
buildings erected upon it2
Property Subject to Assessment It has been shown in another
place, that while these local assessments are laid under a taxing
power, they are not taxes in the ordinary understanding of that
term, and that, consequently, the usual exemptions from taxation
will not preclude the property exempted being subjected to them.8
But this statement can only be applicable when the assessment
is really made on the basis of special benefits which are supposed
to be equivalent ; for, if it is laid for a work of general utility,
in the advantages of which the person assessed participates only
as one of the general* public, and not as receiving special benefits,
it must be considered a general tax, and is improperly designated
an assessment. Such has been the conclusion where an assess
ment was laid upon a railroad company which, by its charter, was
exempt from taxation, for the expense of widening a street along
in one case, or the wishes of the capitalist who holds by a speculation in another,
cannot be permitted to stand in the way of the safety of a whole community.
Courts of justice cannot look to these wishes of parties, but must judge of
their liability to assessment and taxation by reference to their property. The
argument which would relieve them from the assessment in this case, would
relieve them from taxation in every other."
1See Clapp v. Hartford, 35 Conn., 66; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kans., 186.
8See Downer v. Boston, 7 Cush., 277; Brewer v. Springfield, 97 Mass., 152;
Creighton v. Scott, 14 Ohio, N. S., 438. The levee tax sustained in Williams
e. Cammack 27 Miss., 209, was laid under an act which provided for a uni
form tax of not exceeding ten cents per acre on all lands lying on or within
ten miles of the river within a specified county, and of five cents per acre on
lands lying ten miles or more from the river. The court say, the act rests
upon the same basis with all other taxation. In some cases the assessments
have been laid on the value of lots as assessed for ordinary taxes. See People
v. Whyln, 41 Cal., 351. Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20.
*Ante, pp. 147-8.
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'which its track was laid ; the assessment upon the company-
being of such portion of the expense as the commissioners
deemed " equitable and just," and not being measured by bene
fits. " In what respect," it is asked, " does this differ in prin
ciple from an ordinary case of taxation ? The assessment is not
required to be made with any regard to the benefit the improve
ment may confer upon the company. From all that appears the
assessment may have been graduated by a regard to the ability
of the company to pay, to the value of its stock, or to the amount
of travel that passed through the street upon the railroad. It does
not appear that the improvement added any value to the road
itself, or to the stock of the company. * * In what mode
is the corporation specially benefited over any other inhabitant
of the city or traveler through its streets? If the assessment
upon the railroad company may be sustained upon the ground of
special benefits to the corporation from the increased facilities of
travel afforded by widening the street, an assessment may be
sustained upon the same ground against the owner of every
express wagon or stage coach that travels the street. The assess
ment in this case is a clear exercise of the taxing power. It is
made for a public purpose, and confers no special benefits upon
the property of the company." 1 These reasons take the levy out
of the category of assessments properly so called, and to which all
property specially benefited is liable to be subjected.
Personal property is not commonly thus assessed. The reason
is manifest in the fact that special benefits generally accrue almost
exclusively to lands. When, however, an exceptional assessment
is levied upon a municipality, for the special benefits its people
receive from a public building, or other work of the state or of
some larger subdivision of the state, the benefits are usually quite
as much to business as to real property, and the burden would
not be equally distributed if the assessment were not laid on all
property subject to ordinary taxation : this course has generally
been adopted;8 though in the case of works commonly classed
1State v. Newark, 27 N. J., 185, 191, per Green, Ch. J. In the same case, an
assessment upon houses and lots owned by the company, on the basis of bene
fits, was supported.
8 Thomas «. Leland, 24 Wend., 68; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Penn. St., 258; Mer-
rick v. Amherst, 12 Allen, 500; Marks v. Pardue University, 37 Ind., 155;
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under the head of "internal improvements," a different course has
been sometimes taken, and real estate alone been taxed.
It is no objection to an assessment for a local work that the
property assessed is used for a purpose that will not be specially-
advanced by the improvement; as for instance, that it is dedicat
ed to the purposes of sepulture,4 or is occupied by a building
erected for the purposes of public worship,1 or is devoted to school
or charitable purposes,8 or constitutes the track of a railroad,4 or
is put to any use to which the market value of the property is
unimportant There is nothing necessarily permanent in any
present use ; not sufficiently so, at least, to give it a controlling
influence in determining principles of taxation. Even public
property is often subjected to these special-assessments ; there be
ing no more reason to excuse the public from paying for such
Gordon «. Cornes, 47 N. Y., 608; People v. Whyler, 41 Cal.,351; Gilman e.
Sheboygan, 2 Black, 610.
1Baltimore v. Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517. In this case the special objection
made was, that to subject the propertyjto liability for paving would endanger
its perpetuity as a cemetery ; but the force of this, says the court, " whatever it
may be, equally applies to all the engagements and liabilities of the corpora
tion. The building of a wall, of a church, or the improvementof the grounds,
may superinduce debt and with it disastrous consequences. Although fully
sympathizing with the laudable spirit which, with pious zeal and watchful
ness, seeks to preserve the undisturbed repose of the dead, we nevertheless
feel ourselves bound to declare that we see nothing in the legislation of the
state, nor in the nature of the demand itself to exempt the appellees from
liability." See to the same effect Buffalo City Cemetery v. Buffalo, 46 N. Y.,
S06.
8Matter of Mayor, etc., of New York, 11 Johns., 80; Northern Liberties v.
St. Johns Church, 13 Penn. St., 104; Second Universalis! Society e. Providence,
6R. I., 235; Le Fever v. Detroit; 2 Mich., 586; Broadway Baptist Church v.
McAtee, 8 Bush, 508 ; Trustees of Church v. Ellis, 38 Iud., 3.
* Cincinnati College e. State, 19 Ohio, 110; Lafayette e. Orphan Asylum, 4
La. An.,1; St. Louis Public Schools e. St. Louis, 26 Mo., 468; Sheehan
Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 id., 155.
* Northern Indiana R. R.. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. S., 159 ; New Haven
e. Fair Haven, etc.. R. R. Co., 38 Conn., 422; Bridgeport v. N. Y. & H. R. R.
Co., 36 id., 235; Railroad Company v. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112. A street rail
way company has such an interest in a street where the track is laid as may
be specially assessed for benefits for widening the street. Appeal of North
Beach, etc., R. R. Co., 32 Cal., 499; Chicago v. Baer, 41 11l., 306. Compare
this with State e. Newark, 27 N. J., 185.
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benefits than there would be to excuse from payment when prop
erty is taken under the eminent domain.1
6. Proceedings in levying and collecting assessments.
These will now require some consideration.
Estimating Benefits. It has been said that, in assessing benefits,
the only safe and practicable course, and the one which will do
equal justice to all parties, is to consider what will be the influ
ence of the proposed improvement on the market value of the
property ; what the property is now fairly worth in the market,
and what will be its value when the improvement is made.2 A
test of this character should be applied by the legislature before
establishing any arbitrary rule of assessment, such for instance, as
one which measures benefits by the length of frontage. There
can be no justification for any proceeding which charges the land
with an assessment greater than the benefits ; it is a plain case of
appropriating private property to public uses without compensa
tion.8 It is conceded that the legislative judgment, that a certain
district is or will be so far specially benefited by an improvement
as to justify a special assessment, is conclusive, and that its deter
mination as to what shall be the basis of the assessment is equally
conclusive. To invoke the intervention of a court for relief
against the results of its conclusion, is to invoke the judicial au
thority to give its judgment controlling effect over that of the
legislature, in a matter of the apportionment of a tax, which by
1 See Baltimore v. Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517, 536, per Le Grand, Ch. J., St.
Louis Public Schools e. St. Louis, 26 Mo., 468. But exempting public proper
ty from the assessment does not render it illegal. People v. Austin, 47 Cal.,
353.
sBronson, J., in matter of Furman St., 17 Wend., 668, cited with approval
in State v. Newark, 35 N. J., 157, 167. It is held in Massachusetts that an
assessment for the alteration of a street will date from the order for the altera
tion. Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass., 461, citing Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick., 198 ;
Meacham v. Fitchburg, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Cush., 291 ; Whitman v. Boston, etc.,
R. R. Co., 7 Allen, 313.
•Tide Water Co. v. Costar, 18 N. J. Eq., 518; Canal Bank e. Albany, 9
Wend., 244; Matter of Canal St., 11 Wend., 155; Matter of Drainage of Lands,
35 N. J., 497; Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 La. An., 229; New Orleans e. Drain-
ing Co., id., 338. It is no objection to an assessment of benefits, that it is
made in proportion to value ; that may be a proper basis if the commissioners
think it just. Piper's Appeal, 32 Cal., 530.
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concession on all sides is purely a matter of legislation. This is
confessedly inadmissible in any case where the legislative power
has not been exceeded by an apportionment merely colorable.
An assessment so grossly and palpably unjust and oppressive, as
to give demonstration that the legislative judgment had never
determined the case on the principles of taxation, must always be
open to correction. A man's property is not to be taken from
him with impunity, and without redress, by simply calling the
appropriation an assessment, when it is not such in its elements.
When the estimate of benefits is referred to assessors, by what
ever name they may be called, the same rule of conclusiveness
must apply. The remedy of one who considers himself unfairly
assessed is to apply for redress to the statutory tribunal, if one is
provided with the power to review. In all collateral proceedings,
the benefits assessed are conclusively presumed to be received, and
the assessment is not open to revisal or review.1
1Baltimore v. Hughes, 1 Gill. & J., 480; Nor. Indiana R. R. Co. v. Connelly
10 Ohio, N. S., 159, 165; Commonwealth v. Woods, 44;Tenn. St., 113; Wray e.
Pittsburg, 46 Penn. St. 365, 369. Counterclaims of parties for damages can
not be set off against the assessment. Whitney v. Boston, 106 Mass., 89. The
English sewer cases allow great latitude to the commissioners in the assess
ment of benefits. They are largely collated in Soady v. Wilson, 3 Ad. & El.,
248, and it is said by Lord Denman, Ch. J., " from Keighley's Case, 10 Rep.,
142 4. to Rex v. Commissioners of Scwersfor the Tower Hamlets, 9 B. & C,
517, the doctrine laid down in them all is uniform and undisputed, as applies-
ble to the present question. It rests on the principle, that every one whose
property derives benefit from the works of the commissioners, may be assessed
to the rates they impose. The benefit is not required to be immediate, nor do
the cases, or the commission itself, or the statutes, say anything of the nature
or amount of the benefit. Possibly that benefit may be so extremely small,
that a jury would not have found the fact stated in the case. But on the other
hand the benefit may be of high value, as if a house were inaccessible be
cause surrounded by marshes, and the work of sewerage had made them hard
and passable. * * If the commissioners had jurisdiction, this court would
not inquire whether they had correctly exercised their judgment, in an action
of trespass for levying the rate. But as the jurisdiction results from the fact
of benefit being derived, and the case expressly states that some benefit was
derived, we think ourselves bound by the finding to say that the defendant had
authority to levy the rate, and is consequently entitled to our judgment" It
is nevertheless held competent to show, in opposition to the assessment, that
no benefit was received. This is on the ground that jurisdiction to make any
assessment against a party, depends on his premises being benefited, and the
commissioners cannot determine the question of jurisdiction in their own
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The broad latitude of legislative and administrative dis
cretion in these cases, undoubtedly opens the door to many
abuses, and it may be a reason for carefully criticising the pro
ceedings, in order to see that the law has been strictly observed ;
but it can constitute no reason for the judiciary taking upon it
self the correction of legislative mistakes and errors of judg
ment When a judicial review is given of the proceedings of
assessors, an opportunity may be afforded for laying J.own the
proper controlling principles ; but in other cases it must be as
sumed that the assessors have had the proper rules in view for
their own direction. It is clear that any assessment is wrong
which charges lands with a sum beyond the special benefits re
ceived. If the cost of any improvement exceeds the local and
peculiar benefits, the improvement should either not be made at
all, or the excess should be assumed by the public, and become a
part of the general levy. In making an assessment of actual
benefits, it may undoubtedly be proper to take into consideration
the fact of the property being devoted to a permanent use, which
for the time being at least, renders the market value of little or
no moment It has already been stated that this does not pre
clude the property being assessed for benefits. As has been just
ly remarked of some cases of this nature which have been con
sidered by the courts, when lands were devoted to church or
cemetery purposes,1 "objections to the assessment proceed on
the ground that the owner cannot apply the property to any
new or different use. When the owner has the unrestrained
power of alienation, and the property may be converted to any
new use at his pleasure, it is difficult to see how, upon any prin
ciple, an exception can be made to the rule regarding only the
market value. After the owner has escaped what would other
wise be a great burden, on the ground that he does not intend to
use the property in a way which will make the improvement
beneficial, he may change his mind, throw the property into the
favor conclusively. Masters e. Scroggs, 3 M. & S., 447 ; Stafford v. Hamston,
2 B. & B., 691. See Neave e. Weather, 3 Q. B., 984. The American doctrine
is clearly the other way. And in England, ratability once established, no
question of the amount of benefit is permitted to be raised. Rcgina v. Head,
9 Jur., N. S., 871.
1Matter of Mayor, etc., 11 Johns., 77; Matter of Albany Street, HWend., 150.
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market, and realize advantages for which others have been made
to pay." 1 And the remark is as applicable to those temporarily
appropriated to church or other special purposes as to any others.
The fact is only a circumstance to be considered by the assessors
in making up their estimate.2
The fact that a railroad company, or a plankroad or turnpike
company has an easement in a public street of a permanent nature,
and the right to occupy it for the corporate purposes, does not
preclude the street being improved at the expense of adjoining
property. It still remains a public street, and subject to the same
right of control as before, except as the right is qualified by the
easement granted to the private corporation.8
Although the assessment for a local improvement must be
limited to the cost,4 yet there is no reason in the nature of things
why it should not be made before the work is actually done,
and before the cost shall be finally and conclusively determined.
It is usually desirable that the collection of the assessment should
proceed as the work progresses, that the contractor or workmen
may be paid when it is completed. Indeed the charters of very
1 Woodhull, J., in State e. Newark, 35 N. J., 157, 167.
* The assessment in Nor. Ind. R. R. Co. e. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. S., 159, was
by frontage on the land appropriated by the railroad company for its track,
and was sustained, the court holding that the question of actual benefit was
not open for consideration. In Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 86
Conn., 255, it was denied that the easement of the railroad company in the
land occupied for its track could be assessed for benefits for laying out a
street along its side. In New Haven v. Fair Haven, etc., R. R. Co., 38 Conn.,
422, the rails, sleepers, ties and spikes of a street railway company, so laid
into and attached to the soil of the street as to become part of the realty, were
held properly assessable as real estate for paving the street. The same decis
ion was previously made in Appeal of North Beach, etc., R. R. Co., 32 Cal.,
499, where an able opinion was delivered by Sawyer, J., who reviews the case
of State v. Newark, 27 N. J., 186, and points out the difference in the benefits
likely to be received by a street railway when the street in which its track is
laid is improved, and those which a railway between distant points might be
supposed to derive from a like improvement along its track. The assessment
in Burlington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Spearman, 12 Iowa, 112, was on the depot
grounds of the company, for a sidewalk, and -seems to have been laid irre
spective of the special use.
' Bagg v. Detroit, 5 Mich., 336 ; State e. Atlantic City, 34 N. J., 99. And see
State e. New Brunswick, 34 id., 395.
4Sohenely v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St , 9.
CH. XX] TAXATION BY SPECIAL ASSESSMENT. 4G3
many cities forbid that any payments shall be made by the cor
poration, for any street or other local work, except from a fund to
be provided by a special assessment made for the purpose ; and it
is obvious that such works would only be constructed at very se
rious disadvantage, and at much greater expense, if no payment
could be made as the work progressed. It has been said, that in
assessing benefits under statutes permitting it
,
a city common
council "is the agent and instrument of the land owners in res
pect to these improvements. The work is to be conducted and
completed under its direction. It is to ascertain how much cer
tain owners are to pay and others receive; to collect the money
and see that it is applied to the purposes of the improvement
Its authority must be strictly pursued." 1 But it must also, in or
der to be enabled to perform its agency to advantage, be allowed
to make the assessment, and even the collection if it shall be
deemed proper, in advance. It has been repeatedly held that this
is admissible.8 The assessment must of course be made upon an
estimate which may be more or less incorrect, as all estimates for
public works are likely to be, but the liability to error ought not
to defeat a special any more than a general levy for future pur
poses. If it prove too large it is not fatal,8 though the excess
properly belongs to the lot owners, who would be entitled to have
it returned to them.
In assessing benefits the cost of the whole work distributed
through the whole district is to be kept in view ; the assessors
can not restrict themselves in the case of any particular lot to the
cost of the improvement in front of it.4 But at the same time
1 Brown, J., in Howell v. Buffalo, 15 N. Y., 512, citing McCullough e. Brook
lyn, 23 Wend., 458; Lake v. Williamsburgh, 4Denio,520; Sharpe. Spier, 4
Hill, 76.
* Manice v. New York, 8 N. Y., 120; Henderson v. Baltimore, 8 Md., 352;
Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. S-, 129.
8 Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. S., 126.
4 Ex parte Mayor of Albany, 23 Wend., 277. See State v. Portage, 12 Wis.,
567. When in making a street improvement, squares formed by the intersec
tion of other streets arc crossed and improved, the city may, if the object in
improving the squares, is the improvement of the street, assess the whole ex
pense npon the same property on which the other expenses of the improve
ments are assessed. Creighton v. Scott, 14 Ohio, N. S., 438. See Mote v. De
troit, 18 Mich., 495.
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they must carefully keep within the district ; this is as impera
tive as it is in ordinary taxation.1
As in the case of ordinary taxes, assessments are made either
against the land as such, or against the separate interests which
individuals have in the land, according as the statute shall pre
scribe. In either case, there should be a sufficient descriptior of
the land for the purpose of identification,2 and in the latter caoe,
it is imperative that the separate interests be taken notice of in
the assessment3
Proceedings in Assessment. These differ too much in different
states to be considered in detail. Some general principles may
nevertheless be stated. The statute authority must be strictly
pursued. This rule is fundamental and imperative. Not that it
must be literally followed, but the observance of every one of its
substantial requirements must be regarded as a condition prece
dent to the validity of any assessment.4 A common requirement
1Matter of Livingston Street, 18 Wend., 556 ; Turpin v. Eagle Creek, etc.,
Gravel Road Co., 48 Ind., 45. A statute provided for viewers to decide upon
the expediency of a proposed street extension and to " ascertain and deter
mine what lots in the vicinity of said extension, will probably be benefited by
the opening of the said street, and divide and apportion, on equitable princi
ples, the amount that each shall separately contribute to defray the damage
incurred," etc. Held, that the term "vicinity" is not a matter of eye sight
only, but for the judgment also. Roger8, J., in Extension of Hancock St., 13
Penn. St., 26, 32.
»Sharp e. Johnson, 4 Hill, 92.
*Matter of De Graw Street, 18 Wend., 568. An assessment to " owners and
occupants " for benefits is not the same thing as an assessment on the lands.
Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76. Where the assessment is to be of the benefits "be
yond that general advantage which all real property in the city may receive
therefrom," and the adjudication is that the estates have been benefited cer
tain amounts, this is presumed to have been made as the ordinance contem
plates. Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass., 461. Where, by the statute, the assess
ment is authorized upon "the enhanced value of the land," the improvement
upon the land must be excluded from consideration. People v. Austin, 47
Cal., 353.
4Nevins, etc., Draining Co. e. Alkire, 36 Ind., 189; In re Astor, 50 N. Y.,
363 ; In re Cameron, id., 502 ; Sharp e. Spier, 4 Hill, 76 ; Covington v. Casey, 3
Bush, 698; Warner v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich., 24; Henderson v. Baltimore, 8
Md., 352; Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass., 461. A contract for a local improve
ment need not include the whole work embraced in the resolution providing
for it; this is matter of discretion. Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 31 Cal.,
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is that the improvement shall be asked for or assented to by a
majority or some other proportion of those who would" be taxed.
The want of a compliance with this requirement is fatal in any
stage of the proceedings.1 And any decision or certificate of the
proper authorities that the requisite application or consent had
been made, would not be conclusive, but might be disproved.8
Collection of Assessments. These are made as the statute shall
prescribe; and what has been said regarding the collection of the
ordinary taxes is applicable here.8
240. A resolution providing that a street shall be improved "where neces
sary," is nugatory. Richardson v. Heydenfeldt, 46 Cal., 68; People v. Clark,
47 "id., 456.
1Steuart e. Baltimore, 7 Md., 500 ; Henderson v. Baltimore, 8 id., 352 ; Sharp
v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76; Howard v. First Independent Church, 17 Md., 451 ; How-
ard e. Bristol, 8 Bush, 493; Hitchcock v. Galveston, U. S. Circuit, Eastern
District of Texas, 2 Central Law Journal, 331, citing Jennings v. Moss, 4
Texas, 452; Frazier e. Todd, id., 461.
8 So held in Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76, where the village authorities had de
cided that the proper authorities had petitioned for the improvement. And
in Henderson v. Baltimore, 8 Md., 352, where the statute required the assent
in writing of a majority of proprietors of land fronting on the street, before
the paving of the street could be ordered, it was held that the assent must ap
pear in fact to have been given ; that the certificate of the commissioners that
the requisite number of proprietors had assented, was only a prima facie
warrant of authority, and those who should act under it would do so at their
peril. See also People e. Batchellor, 53 N. Y., 128, and cases referred to, ante,
p. 254. Where the statute permitted the improvement of a street and an as
sessment of expense on the owners fronting thereon, on a petition therefor in
writing, by the owners of the larger part of the ground between the points to
be improved, provided that the council, by a vote of all the members elect,
might order such improvement without such petition. Held, that an ordi
nance not passed by the vote of all, in the absence of such a petition, was in
valid. Covington v. Casey, 3 Bush, 698. Where the ordinance was required
to be passed with " the unanimous consent of the mayor and councilmen in
council," and it purported to be passed " by the mayor and board of council-
men," held that unanimous consent was to be understood, nothing to the con-
trary appearing of record. Lexington v. Headley, 5 Bush, 508. (The record
showed an affirmative vote of all the aldermen, but was silent as to the mayor,
though he signed the proceedings.) Compare Hoyte. East Saginaw, 19 Mich.,
39. On the point, what is a sufficient ordering of the work, see Wright v.
Boston, 9 Cush., 233 ; State v. New Brunswick, 30 N. J., 395. There is no
power to grade at the public expense where the right of way has not been ob
tained. Leavenworth v. Laing, 6 Kan., 274. And see ante, p. 97.
•It is no defense to an assessment for improving a street that certain city
30
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It is customary to declare by statute that the assessment shall
be a lien on the real estate assessed, and that the lien shall be
officers were interested in the contract. Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36
Penn. St., 29.
It has become a common provision in city charters that, in contracting for
city improvements, the contractor shall look solely to an assessment against
lot owners to be laid for the cost of the improvement. The following decis-
ions have been made under such provisions.
Illinoi*. Under a contract to look only to the special assessment, the con
tractor has no other remedy, providing the city is in good faith, and with
reasonable diligence, proceeding to make collections by means of such assess
ments. Chicago e. People, 48 11l., 416. But if the city has no power to make
such an assessment, and the improvement has been made without any express
contract, the city is liable, upon an implied contract, to pay in the usual way,
notwithstanding it was understood the contractor should rely on an assess
ment. Maher v. Chicago, 38 11l., 266. See, also, Chicago v. People, 56 id., 327.
Louisiana. When the contractor for a public work loses his remedy against
the land, by reason of the neglect of the authorities to give the proper notice
to the owner, or of other fault on their part, an action may be maintained
against the municipality for the contract price. Bouligny e. Dormenon, 2
Mart. La., N. S., 455 ; Newcomb v. Police Jury, 4 Rob. La., 233 ; O'Brien v.
Police Jury, 2 La. An., 355; Michel v. Police Jury, 3 id., 123; Same v. Same,
9 id., 67. If the municipality contracts with a paver that lot proprietors shall
pay a certain portion of the cost of the pavement, and they refuse or neglect
to do so, the municipality is liable. Cronan v. Municipality No. 1, 5 La. An.,
537. So, if by contract the municipality is to pay one-third the cost of a
work and the lot owners two-thirds, but, by suit, it is determined that the lot
owners can be charged one-third only, the municipality is liable for the two-
thirds. Fournier v. Municipality No. 1, 5 La. An., 298. As to suits in the
name of the corporation for the benefit of the contractor, see New Orleans e.
Wire, 20 La. An., 500.
Wis«onsin. When the contractor is to be paid by certificates, showing the
amount chargeable to each lot, which are to be collected as a tax, he cannot
maintain an action against the city, but must depend on the collection of the
certificates. Whalen v. La Crosse, 16 Wis., 271 ; Finney v. Oshkosh, 18 id.,
209 ; Fletcher v. Oshkosh, 18 id., 232.
Kentucky. When the contractor has agreed to take and collect the assess
ments as his pay, he cannot hold the city liable, unless it may be in cases
where the whole proceedings are void, or the city neglects its duty; as whero
it fails to observe the requirements of the charter necessary to make the lot
owners liable. Kearney v. Covington, 1 Met. (Ky.), 339. For a case of very
peculiar contract, see Louisville v. Henderson, 5 Bush, 515.
Maryland. Where artesian wells were ordered on a petition, the order
reciting: "the petitioners to be responsible for all expenses that may occur
in sinking said artesian wells, if a failure should take placo in the attempt to
procure water," it was held, the contractors must look to the petitioners, and
not to the city. Ruppert v. Baltimore, 23 Md., 184.
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enforced by a sale, or by means of some other remedy which the
statute prescribes.1
Kansas. When, before ordering an improvement, it was necessary that a
petition should be presented by a majority, of the resident property owners
to be affected thereby; and that there should be a stipulation in the contract
that the contractor should look to the property owners benefited for his pay,
and that the city would not be liable, a contract was let without such petition
being presented, and not containing the above stipulation ; it was held, that
the contractor, after failing to collect the amount from the property holders,
could not make the city liable for the amount. Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2
Kans., 357. But in Kansas, the city is primarily liable to a contractor for
grading, and, unless it levies a valid tax and provides some means for enforc
ing it against the lot owners, it will remain liable. Leavenworth v. Mills, 6
Kans., 288.
Indiana. Where the charter provides that the city shall be liable for the
paving of so much of the street as is occupied by streets or alley8 crossing the
same, and that the contractor must look to the owners of the bordering lands
for the remainder; held, that if the contractor failed to collect from these pro
prietors, he could not recover the amount from the city. New Albany v.
Sweeney, 13 Ind., 245. See, also, Johnson «. Indianapolis, 16 id., 227.
California. See Lucas v. San Francisco, 7 Cal„ 463, 474, for a doctrine cor
responding to that in the case cited above from Indiana.
Massa«husetts. When the contractor for a dike was to be paid from assess
ments, and after their payment the town was, by statute, liable, it was held,
there was no liability until such payment. Hendrick e. West Springfield, 107
Mass., 541.
Michigan. When by law, and by his contract, the contractor is to look only
to a special fund raised by assessment for his compensation, he cannot hold
the city liable in the absence of any negligence in levying or collecting the
assessment. See Goodrich v. Detroit, 12 Mich., 279 ; Second National Bank
v. Lansing, 25 id., 207. But the city is liable if it misappropriates the special
fund. Chaffee v. Granger, 6 Mich., 51 ; Lansing v. Van Gorder, 24 id., 456.
New York. Where, by city charter, the contractor for a city work is to be
paid from an assessment levied for the purpose, he cannot maintain a suit
against the city before the assessment is collected, in the absence of default
on the part of the officers to proceed therewith. Hunt v. Utica, 18 N. Y., 442.
See Beard v. Brooklyn, 31 Barb., 142; Swift v. Williamsburg, 24 id., 427.
Minnesota. Where the contractor binds himself to look to the property
owners for his pay, but fails to do so, the city is not liable even though it has
taken ineffectual steps to make collections from the property owners. Lovell
«. St. Paul, 10 Minn., 290.
Iowa. If a city agrees to collect the assessment, and fails to do so, it is
liable. Morgan v. Dubuque, 28 Iowa, 575.
Ohio. If the contractor takes an assignment of the assessment in payment,
he cannot look to the city to make up any deficiency in consequence of assess
ments exceeding the value of lots. Creighton v. Toledo, 18 Ohio, N. S., 447.
1In People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419, the assessment was made upon " the
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It is no defense to an assessment that the contract for the work
was not performed according to its terms. The proper authori
ties must decide upon this, and if they accept the work, the
acceptance, in the absence of frauds, is conclusive. And even
fraud, it would seem, could not be accepted as a defense to an
assessment, but should be determined in some direct proceeding
instituted for the purpose.1 On this point the following remarks
have been made in one case in which an assessment for the con
struction of a sewer was contested. " It is needless to observe
owners and occupants of all the lands benefited thereby, in proportion to the
amount of such benefit." It was made a lien on the land, but was to be col
lected of the personal property of the owner, and if none, then of the land.
As to lien, see also Walsh v. Mathews, 29 Cal., 123 ; Emery v. Bradford, id., 75 ;
McMasters «. Commonwealth, 3 Watts, 292; Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Penn.
St., 401; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 id., 29. When the assessment is on
land, irrespective of the value of buildings, the lien nevertheless affects the
buildings. Wright e. Boston, 9 Cush., 233. When an assessment for widening
a street is made a lien on the lot in the nature of mortgage, with authority in
the city to sell for its satisfaction, and a sale is made which is void, and money
refunded, the lien remains, and the Bale is no bar to further proceedings to
collect. New York v. Colgate, 12 N. Y., 149. Held, in the same case, that a
lien is not barred sooner than a mortgage would be.
1Municipality e. Guillotte, 14 La. An., 297; Dougherty e. Miller, 36 Cal., 83;
Taylor e. Palmer, 31 id., 240; Cochran v. Collins, 29 id., 129: Emery v. Brad
ford, 29 id., 75. In the case last cited, Sawyer, J., says: "In this case the
contract is admitted by the pleadings to have been performed to the satisfac
tion of the superintendent. It was a duty devolved upon that officer to deter
mine that question of fact, and he did determine it. There is no fraud charged
— nothing but an error in judgment. The law afforded the defendant a
remedy in the regular course of the proceeding itself, by which he might have
had the error reviewed, and the defect, if any, remedied. He did not avail
himself of the remedy, but declined to appeal, and now seeks to review the
determination of the superintendent collaterally. We think, by this neglect
to appeal, he has acquiesced in the approval of the work by the superintendent,
and that his determination is conclusive. The principles applicable to the
review of assessments of other taxes would apply here, and such would be the
result in respect to ordinary taxes for state, county and municipal purposes.
Conlin v. Seaman, 22 Cal., 549; Peoria v. Kidder, 26 11l., 358: Aldrich v.
Cheshire R. R. Co., 1 Foster, 361; Hughes e. Kline, 30 Penn. St., 230, 231;
Handford v. New York, 33 Barb., 150; Lowell e. Hadley, 8 Met., 194; Wil.
liams v. Holden, 4 Wend., 227, 228; Bouton e. Neilson, 3 Johns., 475, 476;
Windsor v. Field, 1 Conn., 284. It was decided in Nolan v. Reese, 32 Cal.,
484, that fraud in letting the contract was no defense to an assessment. It
might doubtless be a reason for enjoining the execution of the contract, on a
bill filed in due season.
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that no misconstruction or malconstruction of the work, arising
from the incapacity, the honest mistake, or the fraud of the con
tractor, would invalidate the assessment, or relieve the parties
assessed from the obligation to pay it In this respect the prop
erty owners, assessed under the provisions of the law for the cost
of a sewer, must stand upon the same footing with parties assessed
for taxes for the public benefit They take the hazard incident
to all public improvements, of their being faulty or useless,
through the incapacity or fraud of public servants. The pretext
that the tax payer shall avoid the payment of his assessment be
cause the funds are injudiciously applied, is the worst form of
repudiation." 1
Collection by Sale of Lands. Lands cannot be sold for such
assesments without specific legislation for the purpose. The ordi
nary authority to sell lands for taxes is not applicable to the case.
The reasons for this conclusion are well given in a New York
case, from which a quotation is given in the note.2 But any fail-
1Green, Chancellor, in State v. Jersey City, 29 N. J., 441, 449.
8 " But it is said that the power to sell lands for these assessments may he
found in the seventh section of the act which provides ' that whenever any
tax of any description on lands or tenements in the said village shall remain
unpaid,' and the collector shall make affidavit ' that the owner or owners of the
premises on whi«h the same is imposed' cannot be found, or that he has not
sufficient personal estate in the village whereon the tax can be levied, the
trustees may take order for advertising in a newspaper, for the space of three
months ' thereby requiring the owners of such lands and tenements respect
ively,' to pay the tax, and that in case of default, ' su«h lands and tenements '
will be sold, 'and if, notwithstanding such notice,' the tax shall not bo paid,
' then it shall and may be lawful for the said trustees to cause su«h lands and
tenements to be sold at auction for a term of years.' Now the first remark
upon this section is, that it only authorizes the sale of lands for the payment
of a tax ; and although it extends to a tax ' of any description,' still it in
cludes nothing but a tax of some kind. Our laws have made a plain distinc
tion between taxes which are burdens or charges imposed upon persons or
property, to raise money for public purposes, and assessments for city and vil
lage improvements, which are not regarded as burdens, but as an equivalent
or compensation for the enhanced value which the property of the person
assessed has derived from the improvement. This distinction has been made
in several statutes, long before Brooklyn was incorporated, and was fully
exemplified in the Matter of the Mayor of New York (11 Johns., 77). There,
several churches in the city of New York had been assessed for the supposed
benefit which they would derive from the enlarging of Nassau street, and
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ure to give express authority for this purpose must be exception
al and accidental; it is usually conferred with a lien and specific
directions for the enforcement Under some statutes tbe assess
ment or list when completed is handed over to the contractor for
the work, who proceeds to enforce the lien in his own favor.1
When this is done, it is generally under provisions of law which
impose upon the contractor all responsibility for the collection.
Personal Liability for Assessments. It is customary not only to
make the assessment a lien on the land, but also to make it a per
sonal charge against the owner. There is some difficulty in prin
ciple in doing this ; a difficulty which in two states has been
found insurmountable, the courts holding that in principle, at least,
it is not permissible.2
they denied the legality of the assessment, because it had been expressly en
acted that ' no church or place of public worship shall be taxed by any law
of this state.' But the objection was overruled, and the exemption claimed
by the churches denied, on the ground that the assessment could not properly
be regarded as a tax. This case apparently goes the whole length of deciding
the one now before us. The authority is to sell for a tax, and the defendant
shows nothing but an assessment for a village improvement. In Bleecker v.
Ballou, 3 Wend., 263, the question was upon an assessment for pitching and
paving a street, and Savage, Ch. J., said : ' there is no doubt that the assess
ment in question was not a tax, that being a sum imposed as, is supposed, for
some public object.' " Per Bronson, J., in Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76, 82. To
the same point are Mclnery «. Reid, 23 Iowa, 410 ; Merriam v. Moody's Exec-
tors, 25 id., 163 ; Paine v. Spratl«y, 5 Kans., 525 : Leavenworth e. Laing, 6 id.,
274. In some of the states these assessments are by statute made collectible
in the same manner as the ordinary taxes. See Morrison e. Hershire 32
Iowa, 271.
1 See Northern Indiana R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. S., 159; Taylor
v. Palmer, 31 Cal., 240 ; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 id., 497.
! The cases referred to are Taylor e. Palmer, 31 Cal., 240, 254, opinion by
Sandenon, J., and Neenan v. Smith, 50 Mo., 525, opinion by Bliss, J., after
wards approved in Carlin v. Cavender, 56 id., 286, and St. Louis v. Brester,
id., 350.
"There is abroad distinction, and one of universal recognition, between the
foundation upon which is based the right of general taxation for government
al purposes, and that which supports the right of local assessments. The
authority to impose either is referred to the taxing power; but the object of
one, as giving the authority, widely differs from that of the other. All taxa
tion is supposed to be for the benefit of the person taxed. That for raising a
general revenue is imposed primarily for his protection as a member of soci
ety, both in his person and his property in general, and hence tho amount as-
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In the case of the ordinary taxes no sufficient reason exists why
those on lands should not be made a personal charge against the
owner, if he is a resident and has the usual opportunity to be
heard. The taxes are not so much assessed in respect to the par
ticular lands, as the value of the particular lands is taken as the
measure of the owner's duty to the state. He is not taxed in con
sideration of state protection to that particular item of property,
but he is taxed for the general protection which the state affords
to his life, his liberty, his family and social relations, his property,
and the various privileges the law grants to him. If a tax meas
ured by the property should, in its enforcement, take from him
more than that property is worth, it would not follow that the
state had taken beyond the equivalent rendered. Indeed, the
contrary would be almost certainly the fact. It is different in the
case of an assessment made upon the basis of benefits. Such an
sessed is against him, to be charged upon his property, and may be collected
of him personally. But, on the other hand, local taxes for local improvements
are merely assessments upon the property benefited by such improvements, and
to pay for the benefits which they are supposed to confer ; the lots are increased
:n value, or better adapted to the uses of town lots, by the improvement. Upon
no other ground will such partial taxation for a moment stand. Other prop
erty held by the owner is affected by this improvement precisely and only as
is the property of all other members of the community, and there is no reason
why it should be made to contribute, that does not equally apply to that of all
others. The sole object, then, of a local tax being to benefit local property;
it should be a charge upon that property only, and not a general one upon the
owner. The latter, indeed, is not what is understood by local or special as
sessment, but the very term would confine it to the property in the locality;
for, if the owner be personally liable, it is not only a local assessment, but also
a general one as against the owner. The reasonableness of this restriction
will appear when we refiect that there is no call for a general execution until
the property charged is exhausted. If that is all sold to pay the assessment,
leaving a balance to be collected otherwise, we should have the legal amonaly
— the monstrous injustice — of not only wholly absorbing the property sup
posed to be benefited and rendered more valuable by the improvement, but
also of entailing upon the owner the loss of his other property. I
greatly doubt whether the legislature has the power to authorize a gen
eral charge upon the owner of local property which may be assessed for its
especial benefit, unless the owners of all taxable property within the munici
pality are equally charged. As to all property not to be so specially benefit
ed, he stands on the same footing with others; he has precisely the same in
terests, and should be subject to no greater burdens." Per Bliss, J., in Nee-
nan v. Smith, 50 Mo., 526, 528.
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assessment regards nothing but the benefit that is to be conferred
upon the particular estate. The levy is made on the supposition
that that estate, having received the benefit of a public improve
ment, ought to relieve the public from the expense of making it.
In such a case, if the owner can have his land taken from him for
a supposed benefit to the land, which, if the land is sold for the
tax, it is thus conclusively shown he has not received, and he
then be held liable for a deficiency in the assessment, the injus
tice— not to say the tyranny — is manifest But such a case is
liable to occur if assessments are made a personal charge; and
cases like it in principle, though less extreme in the injury they
inflict, are certain to occur.
The cases are not uncommon in which, on a sale of lands for the
payment of a special assessment for a drain or a levee, the whole
estate assessed is sold and lost to the owner. Such instances may
occur in the case of other improvements. If the statute allows a
sale to the highest bidder, the land may be lost to the owner, leav
ing a balance of the assessment still uncollected. The loss of his
lands is incident to a proper exercise of the power of the govern
ment, and though severe, can give him no ground for complaint
The assessors have perhaps erred in their judgment ; but this may
occur in any tax proceeding. The estate was lawfully charged
with the supposed benefit, and the charge has been enforced
But where and what are the benefits to the individual, for which
he can be called upon to pay any deficiency after a sale of the
estate ? Unless the whole legal basis of these assessments has
been misunderstood by the courts, it would seem that there are
none whatever. But the practice of making these assessments a
personal charge against resident owners, has been almost universal.
The English statutes go so far as to make them a personal charge
against " the present or any future owner of the property
"
as
sessed until paid.1 In the United States, personal assessments of
this nature have been enforced in a great number of cases.2 How
1Vestry of Bcrmondsey v. Ramsey, Law Rep., 6 C P., 247 ; Flumstead Board
of Works e. Ingoldsby, Law Rep., 8 Exch., 63 ; affirmed, id., 174.
8See New York v. Colgate, 12 N. Y., 141 ; Gilbert v. Havermeyer, 2 Sand.,
508; Manice v. New York, 8 N. Y., 120: People v. Nearing, 27 id., 308; Sharp
e. Johnson, 4 Hill, 76; Cuming v. Brooklyn, 11 Paige, 600; McCulloch tr.
Brooklyn, 23 Wend., 459; Gouverneur v. New York, 2 Paige, 437; Doughty v.
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much of this may be due to the fact that the right to make a per
sonal assessment was not contested, can only be matter of conjec
ture ; but at present it must be conceded that the overwhelming
weight of authority is in favor of the right.
Hope, 3 Denio, 253; Bennett v. Buffalo, 17 N. Y., 383; Pcop.e v. Brooklyn, 4
id., 420; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 id., 118; Bleecker v. Ballou, 3 Wend., 263;
Litchfielde. McComber, 42 Barb., 288; Baltimore v. Howard, 6 H. & J., 383;
Eschback v. Pitts, 6 Md., 71 ; Clemens e. Baltimore, 16 id., 208 ; Patterson v.
Society, etc., 24 N. J., 385; Nor. Lib. v. St. Johns Church, 13 Penn. St., 104;
New Orleans v. Wire, 20 La. An., 500; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn., 190;
Lowell v. French, 6 Cush., 223; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. S., 243; Ernst v.
Kunkle, id., 529; Creighton v. Scott, 14 id., 439; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood
Co., 8 id., 333 ; Le Fever v. Detroit, 2 Mich., 586 ; Lovell v. St. Paul, 10 Minn.,
290; Hazzard v. Heacock, 39Ind., 172.
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CHAPTER XXI.
LOCAL TAXATION UNDER LEGISLATIVE COMPULSION.
The general doctrine. In our discussions hitherto, it has been
assumed as a fundamental idea in republican »government, that the
people who are to pay the taxes must vote them, either directly
or by their proper representatives. State taxes must be levied
under laws passed by the legislature of the state, and local taxes
under the votes of the people concerned or their officers or agents
duly authorized.
It has also been assumed that all local powers must have
their origin in a grant by the state, which is the source and foun
tain of authority. The power to tax is no exception to this gen
eral rule. Every municipal corporation, and every political divis
ion of the stale which demands taxes from the people must be
able to show due authority from the state to make the demand.
The authority in some cases is conferred by the state constitution,
but if not found there, it must be given by legislative enactment.
No person is compellable to pay taxes for imposing which the
authorities are unable to show a legislative grant of power.
If local powers of taxation must come from the state, it might
seem to follow as a corollary that the state might at pleasure with
hold the grant and exercise the power itself. But in the general
framework of our republican governments, nothing is more distinct
and unquestionable than that they recognize the existence of local
self government, and contemplate its permanency. Some state
constitutions do this in express terms, others by necessary impli
cation ; and probably in no one of the states has the legislature
been entrusted with a power which would enable it to abolish the
local governments. It has usually a large authority in determin
ing the extent of local powers, and the framework of local govern
ment, but while it may shape the local institutions, it cannot
abolish them, and, without substituting others, take all authority
to itself.
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Local power to tax. Of all the customary local powers, that
of taxation is the chief and most valuable. To give local gov
ernment without this would be a mockery and a cheat. If any
state has the power to withhold it
,
the exercise of such a power
would justly be regarded as tyranny. Indeed local taxation is so
inseparable an incident to republican institutions, that to abolish
it would be nothing short of a revolution.
By local taxation here, we do not mean that which is exercised
for state purposes. So far as local officers or local boards are
made use of for the levy and collection of state taxes, they
cannot be left at liberty to exercise their own discretion in deter
mining whether they will act or abstain from acting. If the state,
instead of issuing a separate warrant for the collection of the
state taxes, shall see fit to apportion the whole tax among the sev
eral townships, leaving the township authorities to collect their
several proportions under the same warrants which are issuer! for
the collection of local taxes, there is no reason why the collection
of this proportion of the state tax should not be made compul
sory. No local community has any inherent right to decide for
itself whether it will or will not bear its share of the state bur
dens, and obviously the state could not afford to confer the right.
To do so would leave the state in the same precarious condition
that the federal union was found to occupy before the right to
tax had been conferred upon it by the constitution ; a govern
ment without the means of enforcing respect, securing obedience,
performing its obligations or perpetuating its existence.1
1 De Tocqueville, who studied American institutions with so much care, and
commented upon them with such wisdom, has the following remarks,
which bear directly upon the subject now under discussion: " In the nations
by which the sovereignty of the people is recognized, every individual has
an equal share of power, and participates equally in the government of the
state. Why, then, does he obey the government, and what are the natural
limits of this obedience? Every individual is always supposed to be as well
informed, as virtuous and as strong as any of his fellow citizens. He obeys
the government, not because he is inferior to those who conduct it
, or because
he is less capable than any other of governing himself, but because he ac
knowledges the utility of an association with his fellow men, and he knows
that no such association can exist without a regulating force. He is a subject
in all that concerns the duties of citizens to each other; he is free and respon
sible to God alone for all that concerns himself. Hence arises the maxim
that every one is the best and sole judge of his own private interest and that
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Compulsory local taxation. But aside from cases of state
taxation proper, there are some to which the same principles
apply. They are cases in which taxation is usually entrusted to
the judgment and discretion of the people to be taxed, but where
the interest is really general, and referring the cases to the local
community is merely a politic provision for the apportionment of
state burdens. Mention of one or two of these cases will suffi
ciently illustrate the principle.
One of the first and highest of all the duties devolving upon
the state is to preserve the public peace. For this purpose,
society has no right to control a man'8 actions, unless they are prejudicial to
the common weal, or unless the common weal demands his help. This doc
trine is universally admitted in the United States. I shall hereafter examine
the general influence which it exercises on the ordinary actions of life. I am-
now speaking of the municipal bodies. The township, taken as a whole and
in relation to the central government, is only an individual like any other,
to whom the theory I have just described is applicable. Municipal indepen
dence in the United States is, therefore, a natural consequence of this very
principle of the sovereignty of the people. All the American republics
recognize it more or less; but circumstances have peculiarly favored its
growth in New England.
" In this part of the union, political life had its origin in the townships, and
it may almost be said that each of them originally formed an independent
nation. When the king3 of England afterwards asserted their supremacy,
they were content to assume the central power of the state. They left the
townships where they were before, and, although they are now subject to the
state, they were not at first, or were hardly so. They did not receive their
powers from the central authority, but, on the contrary, they gave up a portion
of their independence to the state. This is an important consideration, and
one which the reader must constantly recollect. The townships are generally-
subordinate to the state only in those interests which I shall term so«ial, as
they are common to all the others. They are independent in all that concerns
themselves alone ; and amongst the inhabitants of New England, I believe
that not a man is to be found who would acknowledge that the state has any
right to interfere in their town affairs.
"The towns of New England buy and sell, prosecute, or are indicted,
augment or diminish their rates, and no administrative authority ever thinks
of offering any opposition.
"There are certain social duties, however, which they are bound to fulfill.
If the state is in need of money, a town cannot withhold the supplies; if the
state projects a road, the township cannot refuse to let it cross the territory ;
if a police regulation is made by the state, it must be enforced by the town ;
if a uniform system of public instruction is enacted, every town is bound to
establish the schools whic'.i the law ordains." Democracy, ch. v.
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peace officers are chosen, judges selected, the militia organized,
and the executive armed with very high powers to meet the con
tingencies of riot and disorder. In some cases, a state police force
has been established as assistant to, and in some degree to super
sede the ordinary officers; but in general, the belief has pre
vailed that the public peace and good order were better preserved
by apportioning the duty among the several municipal divisions,
retaining only a state supervision over all. This apportionment
is made by general laws, under which counties, towns, etc., choose
their own peace officers, and levy the necessary taxes to meet ths
expense of a local administration of police laws ; and by muni
cipal charters which confer large police powers upon the bodies
incorporated.
But if the local authorities were allowed unlimited discretion
to levy or refuse to levy the necessary taxes for the support of
the local police force, it might possibly happen, that from neglect
or refusal to do so, one part of the state might be left a prey to
disorder and violence, to the general detriment of the state at
large. Of course, no state could safely, for a single day, tolerate
such a condition of affairs. A city or township could no more
be left at liberty to decline taxation for police purposes, when the
police laws and police force, and the tax which supports them,
are made by law local, than if all were general. The police
organization of the state is really general, however it may vary
in different localities, and the obligation to support it is general,
however it may be apportioned. To this effect are the decisions.1
And within the reason of these decisions would fall all cases in
which the municipal corporations or subdivisions of the state are
called upon to tax their people for the erection and repair of court
houses and jails, by means of which the police laws are rendered
effectual. Such calls must, of course, be responded to.
1People v. Draper, 15 N. Y., 532 ; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md., 476 ; People v.
Mahaney, 13 Mich., 481 ; People e. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich., 228,
236 ; People v. Common Council of Chicago, 51 11l., 17. It was decided in Taylor
v. Board of Health, 31 Penn. St., 73, that a board of health for a city district
was a state functionary, and that a tax allowed to be levied by such a board on
immigration was " not a legitimate tax for mere local purposes, and it was
not applied to such; for the guarding of the frontiers of a state against im-
portation of pestilence is not a local purpose. The whole regulation was
general in its purposed benefits, though necessarily local in its execution."
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Elsewhere, in this work, the public highways have been spoken
of as matters of general concern to the people of the whole
state. In a certain sense they are of local concern, because the
local organizations construct and support them, but they are con
structed for the general benefit and use of all the people, and
only turned over to the localities as a matter of apportionment
This being the case, any township, city or county, that neglects
its duty in this regard, may be compelled by the interference of
the state, and on state account, to perform it.1 This doctrine
applies to the common highways ; whether it can be extended to
exceptional means of passage and transportation will be con
sidered further on.
Wherever a system of public instruction is established by law,
to be administered by local boards, who levy taxes, build school
houses, and employ teachers for the purpose, it can hardly be
questioned that the state, in establishing the system, reserves to
itself the means of giving it complete effect and full efficiency in
every township and district of the state, even though a majority
of the people of such township or district, in a want of a proper
appreciation of its advantages, should refuse to take upon them
selves the expense necessary to give them a participation in its
benefits. Possibly judicial proceedings might be available in
some such cases, where a state law for the levy of local taxes for
educational purposes had been disobeyed; but the legislature
would be at liberty to choose its own method for compelling the
performance of the local duty.2
1That the legislature, in laying out a road through several towns, has au
thority to apportion between them the expense of construction, see Harwich
v. County Commissioners, 13 Pick., 60 ; Hingham and Quincy Company v. Nor
folk County, 6 Allen, 353 ; Salem Turnpike, etc., Corporation «. Essex County,
100 Mass., 282; Commonwealth «. Newbury port, 103 id., 129; Waterville e.
Kennebeck County, 59 Me., 80; Shaw e. Dennis, 5 Gilm., 405. It has been
held that the legislature may order a reapportionment when justice requires
it. Cambridge v. Lexington, 17 Pick., 222 ; Attorney General e. Cambridge,
16 Gray, 247.
»It is noticeable that in those states in which a general system of public
instruction has longest prevailed, the municipalities have not been disposed
to find fault because they were required to maintain schools; but the com
plaint, when there has been any, has come from single individuals, who have
complained that the local powers of taxation were exercised with unreason-
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Those cases in whie h the state interferes to compel a political
corporation or body, which exists and exercises authority by its
permission, to meet its contract obligations and pay its just debts,
may be defended on two grounds : First, that it is the right and
the duty of the state to see that the powers it confers are not abused,
to the injury of those who have relied upon them. &cond, that
when a political corporation has contracted a debt or incurred an
obligation, it has already taken the initiatory step in taxation, and
has, in effect, given its consent that the subsequent steps, so far
as they may be essential to the discharge of such debt or obliga
tion, may be taken. No matter, therefore, what the purpose of
any lawful municipal contract ; the taxation to perform it must be
regarded as taxation by consent of the people who made it And
while the general law usually makes provision for such cases, by
means of suits at law and perhaps executions, circumstances
sometimes render it entirely proper that more speedy remedies
be provided ; and of these the most speedy and effectual might
possibly be a special tax upon the delinquent municipality, ordered
by the state, and perhaps levied through state agencies.1 Nor would
the power of the state in this regard be confined to obligations of a
strictly legal nature ; for the difference between a legal and moral
obligation is frequently no more than this : that the one has a
remedy provided for its enforcement, and the other has not No
question, for example, can fairly be raised of the right of the
state, after it has formed two municipal governments where one
existed before, and apportioned the debts and property of the old
organization between the two new ones, to require and compel the
payment of any balance found equitably due.2 Another case is
where the state requires one of its corporations to reimburse to
able liberality for this purpose. The cases of Cushing e. Newburyport, 10
Met., 508; Stewart e. Kalamazoo, 30 Mich., 69, and Horton v. School Commis-
sioners, 43 Ala., 598, may be referred to. The contest has been made on other
grounds in other states: see Kinney v. Zimpleman, 36 Texas, 554; Commis
sioners of Schools v. Alleghany Co., 20 Md., 439.
' See Dunovan v. Green, 57 11l., 63 ; a case of the levy of a tax by the state
upon the municipality to provide for municipal obligations.
»Harrison e. Bridgeton, 16 Mass., 16; Layton v. New Orleans, 12 La. An.,
515; People v. Alameda, 26 Cal., 641; People v. Power, 25 11l., 187; ante, p.
176, note 2
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the officers expenses they have incurred in an honest, though mis
taken effort to perform their official duty.1 Another is where a
municipal corporation is compelled, by means of taxation, to
make compensation for losses sustained within its limits at the
hands of mobs and rioters. It has been thought from very early
times that that political division of the county which failed to exert
its authority for the effectual suppression of disorder, by means
whereof innocent parties suffered from lawlessness and violence
within its boundaries, might justly be required to make good the
losses, and that its diligence in maintaining the empire of the laws
would be quickened by the requirement.2 Such legislation is
, in
effect, only a part of the state police system, under which the
municipal divisions are severally looked to for the preservation of
the public peace within their respective limits.8 And speaking
generally, it may be affirmed that in any case in which compul
sory taxation is found necessary, in order to compel a municipal
corporation or political division of the state to perform properly
and justly any of its duties as an agency in state government, or
to fulfill any obligation legally or equitably resting upon it in
consequence of any corporate action, the state has ample power to
direct and levy such compulsory taxation, and the people to be
taxed have no absolute right to a voice in determining whether
it shall be levied, except as they may be heard through their rep
resentatives in the legislature of the state.4
1 See the extreme case of Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Barb., 615 ;
S
. C in error, 13 N. Y., 143, questioned in People e. Tappan, 29 Wis., 664,
687. In Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal., 525, 530, Crockett, J., asserts in strong
terms the power of the legislature to compel a municipal corporation "to pay
a demand, when properly established, which in good conscience it ought to
pay, even though there be no legal liability to pay it."
•Darlington v. New York, 31 N. Y., 164. This case was decided under a
law passed before the mischief was done; but no reason is perceived why the
equity of such a claim might not be recognized by legislation adopted after-
wards.
sSee In re Pennsylvania Hall, 5 Penn. St., 204; People e. Chicago, 51 11I.,
17; Wider v. East St. Louis, 55 11l.. 133, 137; Fnuria v. New Orleans, 20 La.
An., 400; S. C, 2 Withrow's Corp. Cos., 374.
4 It is competent, by special statute, to compel one county to levy a tax in
order to refund to another county the fair proportion of the expenses whic h
have been incurred by the latter in trials concerning the distribution of the
CH. XXI.] LOCAL TAXATION UNDER COMPULSION. 481
Doubtful cases. Where a county is divided and property
and debts are to be apportioned, political considerations are
involved, and the legislature must directly or indirectly pass
upon them. But when demands are asserted against municipal
corporations, growing out of contracts, or upon such grounds as
might give rights of action against individuals, it is at least ques
tionable whether the legislature may pass upon the facts, adjudge
the corporation liable, and proceed to enforce payment by taxa
tion. Such action, as against a natural person, would be clearly
judicial, and therefore beyond the legislative competency ; and it
could only be sustained in the case of municipal corporations on
the doctrine that their powers and rights are wholly at the legis
lative disposal ; a doctrine dangerous in government, and, as we
think, unsound in constitutional law. The opinion has some
times been expressed that these corporations were entitled to the
constitutional benefits of an ordinary trial.1 But this is denied
in other cases, and perhaps a hearing before some court or board
of audit might be all the corporation could demand.2 But such
a hearing, if local municipal government is a matter of sub
stance, they must be entitled to. It is not believed that the lia
bility of the corporation must be. made to turn on legal ques
tions purely. On the contrary, it is more consistent with the dig
nity and honor of government that all demands against the pub
lic shall be settled on broad grounds of equity, instead of being
tested by technical rules ; and auditing boards are generally, with
the utmost propriety, empowered to govern their action by equi
table considerations. This only is maintained ; that the legisla
ture is not a proper auditing board as between the municipalities
and third persons, though it may undoubtedly prescribe the rule
of liability for all cases.
proceeds of sales of property lying in both. Lycoming v. Union, 15 Penn.
St., 166.
1See Sanborn v. Rice County, 9 Minn., 273 ; People e. Haws, 37 Barb.,
440; Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt., 283; Gage v. Graham, 57 11l., 144; State «.
Tappan, 29 Wis., 664.
* In re Pennsylvania Hall, 5 Penn. St., 204; Borough of Dunmore's Appeal,
52 id., 374; Layton e. New Orleans, 12 La. An., 515. Compare Common
wealth v. Pittsburgh, 34 Penn. St., 496. In Vasscr v. George, 47 Miss., 713,
720, Simrall, J., claims very broad authority for the legislature in adjusting
claims against municipalities.
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Nature of municipal corporations. Before considering some
other cases, it may be well to refer briefly to the general nature of
municipal corporations. Primarily these are public and their
powers governmental. They are created for convenience, expe
diency and economy in government, and, in their public capacity,
are and must be at all times subject to the control of the state
which has imparted to them life, and may at any time deprive
them of it But they have or may have another side, in respect
to which the control is in reason, at least, not so extensive. They
may be endowed with peculiar powers and capacities for the ben
efit and convenience of their own citizens, and in the exercise of
which they seem not to differ in any substantial degree from the
private corporations which the state charters. They have thus
their public or political character, in which they exercise a part of
the sovereign power of the state for governmental purposes, and
they have their private character in which, for the benefit or con
venience of their own citizens, they exercise powers not of a gov
ernmental nature, and in which the state at large has only an in
cidental concern, as it may have with the action of private corpo
rations. It may not be possible to draw the exact line between
the two, but provisions for local conveniences for the citizens, like
water, light, public grounds for recreation, and the like, are man
ifestly matters which are not provided for by municipal corpora
tions in their political or governmental capacity, but in that quasi
private capacity in which they act for the benefit of their corpo
rators exclusively.1 In their public, political capacity, they have
no discretion but to act as the state which has created them shall,
within constitutional limits, command, and the good government
1This two-fold nature of municipal corporations has often been commented
upon and been made the ground of important decisions. See Bailey v. New
York, 3 Hill, 531; Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb., 212, 213, per Edwards, P. J. ;
Lloyd v. New York, 5 N. Y., 369, 375, per Jones, J. ; Storrs e. Utica, 17 N. Y.
104 ; People «. Batchellor, 53 id., 128, per Grover, J. ; Western Savings Fund
Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Penn. St., 175; Touohard «. Touchard, 5 Cal.,306;
Holland v. San Francisco, 7 id., 361 ; San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco,
9 id., 4-53; Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio, N. S., 375, 377, per GhoUon,
J.; Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn., 1, 12; Hewison e. New Haven, 37 id., 475,
483; Detroit e. Corey, 9 Mich., 165; People v. Hurlbut, 24 id., 44; People v.
Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich., 228, 238; Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13
Wis., 37; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt., 226.
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of the state requires that the power should 'at all times be ample
to compel obedience, and that it should be capable of being
promptly and efficiently exercised. In the capacity in which they
act for the benefit of their corporators merely, there would seem
to be no sufficient reason for a power in the state to make them
move and act at its will, any more than in -the case of any private
corporation. With ample authority in the state to mould, meas
ure and limit their powers at discretion, and to prevent an^ abuse
thereof, their action within the prescribed limits, in matters of im
portance to themselves only, it would naturally be supposed,
should be left to the judgment of their citizens and of their
chosen officers.
And this has been the view on which the several state legisla
tures have in general acted. The largest liberty of action has
been permitted to municipal action in matters of local concern,
and very seldom has the disposition been evinced to interfere any
further than was deemed necessary to prevent an oppressive exer
cise of local powers, and to confine them to proper local purposes.
And in those cases in which municipal corporations have been
allowed to vote taxes for purposes not strictly local, but on the
grounds of special local benefit, the legislation has seldom gone
beyond giving permission to vote them if the electors of the
locality should elect to do so. "Whenever the legislation has gone
further than this, the courts have generally held that the legisla
tive power of control had been exceeded. In a leading case in
Vermont, the legislature provided for the appointment, by a county
commissioner, of a town agent, who should be empowered to pur
chase liquors on the credit of the town, and sell the same for such
purposes as were admissible under what was known as the pro
hibitory liquor law, accounting to the town for the proceeds. The
act was held invalid ; the court declaring that " courts that have
gone farthest in sustaining laws of state legislatures, against the
restrictive provisions of state constitutions, repudiate entirely the
idea that a person, whether natural or artificial, can be compelled
by legislative enactment to become a party to, or to be subjected
to liability upon a contract." 1 A like doctrine has been strongly
1Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt., 226, 236, per Barrett, J. In this case, Chief
Jusfce Black is quoted, who, in that opinion of his in Sharpless e. I'iiiladel.
phia, 21 Penn. ?t., 147, 165, which asserts legislative supremacy in matters of
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asserted in Massachusetts, wherein a case in which the legislature
had taken steps looking to the establishment of a pecuniary de
mand against a municipal corporation, without its consent, the
court declared— having the municipal corporation in view as the
party to be charged— that " it is not in the power of the legislature
to create a debt from one person to another, without the consent,
express or implied, of the person to be charged," and that if the
attempt were made, "it would not be within the power of any
judicial court to enforce such an act."1 A similar ruling was
made in Maine in a similar case.2 In Wisconsin, the power of the
legislature to force taxation upon the people for objects not with
in the customary grant of local powers for governmental purposes,
has been pointedly denied in cases in which the objects contem
plated were presumptively of great local importance and value ;
one case, being that of an improvement of the city harbor,8 and
another that of a state normal school, to be located in the city,
whose money, collected for local school purposes, the state directed
should be appropriated to its erection.4 In Michigan, the author-
taxation in very strong, if not extravagant language, nevertheless, inter
poses this caution: "I do not say, however, that a contract between two
individuals, or two corporations, can be made by the legislature. That would
not be legislation. Besides it would be impossible, in the nature of things;
for the essence of a contract is the agreement of the parties."
1Hampshire e. Franklin, 16 Mass., 76, 84, per Parker, Ch. J. And see Rich
land v. Lawrence, 12 11l., 1, 8.
*Brunswick e. Litchfield, 2 Greenl., 28, 32 ; Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6
id., 112.
* Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis., 37. In this case, Dixon, Ch. J., speak-
ing of the power of the legislature to make a contract for amunicipal corpor
ation against its will, says: " It is certainly unnecessary at this day to enter
into an argument or to cite authorities to show that, under a constitutional
government like ours, the legislature has no such power." This decision is
defended in an able opinion by the same learned judge, in Mills v. Charlton,
29 Wis., 413. See also Knapp v. Grant, 27 id., 147 ; State v. Tappan, 29 id.,
664.
* State v. Haben, 22 Wis., 660, per Dixon, Ch. J. " Was it competent " ft was
mquired in this case, " for the legislature, without the assent of the city or its
inhabitants, thus to divert the funds raised and in the hands of the treasurer
for the purpose of erecting a suitable high school building, and to declare
that they should be appropriated, not for that purpose, but for the purpose of
purchasing a site for a state normal school in the city? We are clearly of
the opinion that it was not It is well settled as to all matters pertaining tc
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ity of the state to appoint agents who, without the consent of a
city, might issue obligations binding upon it for the purchase and
embellishment of a public park for its citizens, was denied on like
grounds.1 In Kansas, where county officers had issued to a cred
itor of the county the county bonds, bearing a rate of interest
higher than was permitted by the law under which the debt was
contracted, it was decided that the legislature had no power to
validate the bonds ; this being in effect the making of a new con
tract to which the county had not assented.8 In Illinois, similar
decisions have been based upon a narrower ground. The consti
tution of the state provides that " the corporate authorities of
counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns and villages,
may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate
purposes;" and this, it is held, by implication precludes the levy
vested rights of property, whether real or personal, and to the obligation of
contracts, that municipal corporations aro as much within the protection of
the federal constitution as private individuals are. The legislature cannot di
vest a municipal corporation of its property without the consent of its inhab
itants, nor impair the obligation of a contract entered into with or in behalf
of such corporation."
1People e. Common Council of Detroit, 28 Mich., 228. And see People e.
flurlbut, 24 id., 44. In this last case, in answer to an objection that there was
no express saving of municipal rights in the state constitution, the following
remarks are made (p. 107) :
" Some things are too plain to be written. If this
charter of state government which we call a constitution were all there was
of constitutional command; if the usages, the customs, the maxims, that have
sprung from the habits of life, modes of thought, methods of trying facts by
the neighborhood, and mutual responsibility in neighborhood interests, the
precepts which have come from the revolutions which overturned tyrannies,
the sentiments of manly independence and self control which impelled our
ancestors to summon the local community to redress local evils, instead of re
lying upon king or legislature at a distance to do so; if a recognition of all
these were to be stricken from the body of our constitutional law, a lifeless
skeleton might remain, but the living spirit, that which gives it force and at
traction, which makes it valuable and draws to it the affections of the people,
that which distinguishes it from the numberless constitutions, so called,
which in Europe have been set up and thrown down within the last hundred
years, many of which, in their expression, have seemed equally fair and to
possess equal promise with ours, and have only been wanting in the support
and vitality which these alone can give; this living and breathing spirit,
which supplies the interpretation of the words of the written charter, would
be utterly lost and gone."
* Shawnee County v. Carter, 2 Kans., 115.
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of local taxes, or the contracting of local debts, by agencies created
by the legislature, and not being the corporate authorities of the
locality to be taxed, or to be bound by the debts.1 While as has
been said, the ground chosen in those cases is narrow, the decis
ions are nevertheless of very general application, for the terms in
which authority over the municipal corporations is conferred by
other constitutions, though not the same, will generally be found
open to similar implications. A similar decision has been made
in Tennessee.2
In one or two states an inclination has been manifested to ac
cept, in its broadest signification, the language in which an unre
stricted authority in the legislature over the whole subject of tax
ation is usually spoken of when there is no occasion for pointing
the limitations. It has already been shown by the citation of a
large number of cases that no such unrestricted power exists, and
it may safely be asserted that it ought not to exist It is not dif
ficult to give the most reckless robbery for private purposes the
forms of constitutional action, and it is as easy to call it a tax as
it was in former periods to call those exactions which were en
forced by prisons and physical suffering and the quartering of
a ruthless soldiery upon the people by the gentle name of benev
olences. Taxation is a fearful power, but, like other legislative
powers in representative government, it has its checks and bal
ances. It is certainly limited as to purposes, and, as has been
1People v. Chicago, 51 11I., 17; People v. Salomon, id., 37; Harward e.
Drainage Co., id., 130; Lovingston «. Wider, 53 id., 302; People v. Canty, 55
id., 33; Wider v. East St Louis, id., 133; Sleight v. People, Sup. Ct. 11l., 1875,
7 Chicago Legal News, 292.
* Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heisk., 682, in which an able opinion is delivered by
Freeman, J. See also, State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo., 458 ; People e. Hastings,
29 Cal., 449. The case in Heiskell involved the validity of an act of the legis
lature appointing a state board for the levy of county taxes in a few counties
named. The court held the act invalid, as being inconsistent with the right
of local taxation which by implication was considered retained and intended
to be perpetuated by the constitution. And after commenting upon the max
im that taxation and representation go together, the court query concerning
the board in question: " Can it be believed for a moment that the power was
ever intended to be delegated by the people to the legislature to authorize such
a body, so appointed and constituted, to perform the functions assigned to
them in this act? We think no reasonable man can come to such a conclu
sion."
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generally believed, by local rights immemorially existing and
universally recognized.
A recent case in Alabama is of importance as bearing upon
this question just mentioned. An act of the legislature of that
state constituted a board, consisting of the president of the court
of county commissioners of revenue of Mobile county, the mayor
of Mobile, the president of the bank of Mobile, the president of
the Mobile chamber of commerce and one citizen of the county
of Mobile to be appointed by the governor, who, and their suc
cessors, were to be commissioners for the purpose of improving
the river, harbor and bay of Mobile. The county commissioners
of revenue were directed to issue to said board bonds to the
amount of $1,000,000, binding upon the county, to be made
payable as they should determine, and " to levy such tax as may
be deemed proper to pay such bonds." The constitution pro
vides that " No power to levy taxes shall be delegated to indi
viduals or private corporations:" but the act was nevertheless
sustained in an opinion that does little more than to allude to the
very important question arising under the state constitution, and
avoids the discussion of general principles.1
A case which was more considered was decided a few years
since in New York. An act of the legislature had named com
missioners, authorized them to lay out and construct roads in two
townships named, at a cost per mile not exceeding $20,000, exclu
sive of bridges. The sum necessary to be raised to meet the ex
pense was to be obtained by a sale of town bonds, to be issued
by the town officers on the requisition of the commissioners, and
by the latter sold. The roads, it will be seen, were local roads, to
be constructed by state agents at the cost of the towns ; neither
1President and Commissioners, etc., v. State, 45 Ala., 399. The case in which
the question arose was a proceeding in mandamus against the county commis
sioners of revenue, to compel them to issue bonds under the act to the harbor
improvement board. In answer to the objection that here was a case of dele
gation of the power to tax, which by the constitution was forbidden, Safford,
J., delivering the opinion of the court, says: "even if it be a delegation of
the taxing power to individuals or private corporations, that portion of the act
only need be vitiated." We should understand from this that the court did
not regard the conferring upon this board the power of making the improve
ment, and of demanding and making use of bonds binding upon the county,
for the purpose, as being equivalent to a delegation of the power to tax.
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the people of the towns nor the local officers being consulted or
allowed any authority whatever in the premises, or even the privi
lege of being heard. The work was exceptionally if not extrava
gantly expensive, and it is difficult to conceive of any justifiable
ground for forcing upon an unwilling people an expense of this
description, when no corresponding burdens were imposed on other
localities. The court of appeals, however, felt constrained to up
hold this legislation, basing their decision upon the ground of a
general power in the legislature over the subject of taxation, which
in this particular was not restricted by any express provision of
the state constitution.1
Conceding this to be sound doctrine, it must nevertheless be
called hard doctrine. Such legislation stands wholly apart and
distinct from all the ordinary provisions for the construction and
support of highways. The customary regulations are made on
some rule of apportionment, and this case had no rule but the
special legislative determination.2 And it may well have been
regarded by the people concerned as specially objectionable, be
cause depriving them of one of the privileges intended to be se
cured to them by the state constitution. That instrument had
provided that local officers should be chosen by the voters of the
locality,8 and it doubtless intended that they should be left to
exercise the usual local powers. While this appointment of com
missioners for roads in the two towns avoided a violation of the
words of the constitution, the violation of its spirit, unless the roads
were in importance something more than ordinary town highways,
would seem to be undoubted. It is a well known principle, how
ever, that a legislative violation of the spirit of the constitution
does not ordinarily permit of judicial correction.
A case in Pennsylvania in which the legislature provided for
the construction of an exceptionally expensive road at the cost of
1People «. Flagg, 46 N. Y., 401.
* In Goodrich v. Turnpike Co., 26 Ind., 119, an act " to allow county com
missioners to organize turnpike companies," which permitted the cost of con
structing the turnpike to be assessed upon the real estate within three-fourths
of a mile of the proposed road, was sustained. This was an exceptional
method, but not unknown to the law, and it was neither oppressive nor was
the whole matter taken out of the hands of the local authorities.
• Const, of N. Y., art. X, § 2.
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the people living on and near the same without their consent, and
not, as the court found, for the local but for the general benefit,
must be regarded as opposed to the one in New York. The court
held that, on the general principles governing taxation, the legis
lature had no such power.1 And this decision finds, as we think,
strong support in a recent decision of the court of appeals of
Kentucky ; a court whose decisions in matters of taxation are al
ways able and strong. The case there was one of a city assess
ment. It was denied that the legislature possessed the power to
require a certain portion of one street in a city to be improved in
a manner exceptionally expensive, at the cost of abutting owners
and without their consent, when by the law as - to all the other
streets, the owners of the larger proportion of the frontage must
petition for such an improvement before it could be ordered.8 The
case was one of an invidious assessment, as were those in Penn
sylvania and New York. " A law," it is said by the court, "im
posing taxation on the general public, the evident intent and le
gitimate results of which are to equalize the burden so far as prac
ticable, will not be held as violative of the fundamental law,
merely because that desirable end may not be attained. But when,
as in this case, the most probable if not the necessary consequence
of the law is to produce the most oppressive inequality, and to
compel a small minority of tax payers to provide, at their sole
expense, an improvement of general utility and public interest,
the construction of which costs more than double as much as the
character of such improvements in general use, and from which,
when constructed, the general public derives almost as much ad
vantage as themselves, it assumes the character of an attempted
exercise of arbitrary power over the property of this minority ; it
becomes in a constitutional sense a taking and appropriation of
their private property to the public use without compensation, and
it cannot be sustained, so long as the safeguards placed around
the citizen by our fundamental law are respected and upheld. No
such power over the property of the citizen can be constitution
ally exercised by any department of our state government ; and
whenever it is attempted, it is the imperative duty of the judi-
1Matter of Washington Avenue, 69 Penn. St., 352.
* Howell e. Bristol, 8 Bush, 493, per Lindsay, J.
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ciary to interpose in behalf of those whose constitutional rights
are being thereby prejudicially affected." "Whatever may be
thought of the relative soundness of these decisions in matters of
law, those which deny the power to levy such invidious burdens
are most likely to conduce to equality and fairness in matters of
local taxation, and with just purposes and purity in legislation.
It is difficult to conceive of a more corrupting power than that of
voting taxes by those who are not to feel them, especially when
the expenditure may be confided to those who have no interest,
personally or as corporators, and who will presumably be con
cerned only to the extent that they can make a personal profit of
the taxes which others are to pay.
In another recent case in New York, it is decided that the legis
lature may require a village to levy a speciul tax to be expended
in the construction of a state educational institution at that lo
cality.1 This decision is based upon the sovereign power of the
state to tax and apportion the public burdens; a power which,
unless it is subject to implied limitations, would enable the legis
lature of a state to require its capital town to construct the state
house, another town to construct the state prison, and so on, to the
entire relief of the state at large. It has been seen that a decision
in Wisconsin is opposed to the one just cited, and that derives
strong support in more recent cases in Illinois.2
The New York cases which have been mentioned find abundant
justification in an earlier case in the same state, and could not well
have been decided otherwise without rejecting that as an authority.
The facts in that case were the following :
Certain citizens of Utica, in order to secure the connection of
the Chenango with the Brie at their place, entered into a bond,
conditioned to pay to the state some $38,000, the estimated in
creased expense in bringing the canal to that point, instead of to
another which had been proposed. Having thereby secured the
location, the legislature then interfered for their relief, and re
quired the amount of the obligation to be assessed as a tax upon
1Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y., 608.
»Livingston County v. Welder, 64 11l., 427, is specially referred to. This case
is commented on and explained in Burr v, Carbondale, Sup. Ct. 11l., 1874, 6
Chicago Legal News, 350, in which it was held competent to permit a locality
to vote special aid to a state building.
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the real estate of the city of Utica. "Was this a constitutional
tax? The supreme court of the state held that it was. "The
general purpose of raising the money by tax was to construct a
canal, a public highway, which the legislature believed would be
a benefit to the city of Utica as such ; and independently of the
bond, the case is the ordinary one of local taxation to make or
improve a highway." 1
How far the principle of this case can be carried beyond the
exast state of facts upon which it was decided, is a question of
the highest interest. Would it
,
for instance, have been within
the power of the legislature to compel the city of New York to
bear the whole cost of the Erie canal ? or to construct at its own
cost the Erie railroad ? Or might the whole cost of the Hoosac
tunnel be thrown upon Boston ? Or might Chicago or St. Louis
be compelled to construct a system of railways through the state,
on the ground, that in the opinion of the legislature the railways
would specially benefit the city which was made a terminus? If
a power to require such expenditures can rest in the hands of any
legislature, restrained only by a sense of the responsibility of its
1 Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend., 65, 67, per Cowen, J. Under the principles
of this decision, it might, perhaps, be held that the legislature had the power
to require the refunding by the munipalities of commutation moneys, or
moneys paid to procure substitutes, where the effect was to relieve the muni
cipality from a draft. The purpose of the payment, so far as it went to aid
the government by money or men, was public; and yet as such payments are
made by parties for their own advantage, a law levying taxation to refund
them is judicially declared to resemble " an imperial rescript," rather than
constitutional taxation. Thompson, J., in Tyson e. School Directors, 51 Penn.
St., 9
,
22. In Perkins v. Milford, 59 Me., 315, 318, Appleton, Ch. J., in denying
the authority to authorize the refunding of commutation moneys by towns,
says : " The money was voluntarily paid, and without expectation of repay
ment. It was a gift — so understood, so intended by all the parties subscrib
ing. It was no advance or loan to the town, with the expectation of repay
ment. Whether the gift was to the soldiers enlisting, or to the town, makes
no difference. The naked question recurs, Can the town raise money to give
to individuals? This is not a gift to any public purpose. It is a gift as a
recompense for past generosity. If a town can give to A., it can give to B.
If it can give little, it can give much. If it can give, then every man holds
his estate subject to the will of the majority, who can give away as much or
little as they please. Taxation is for public purposes, and for those the right
of the government to impose taxes is unlimited. Taxation is imposed by the
state to meet its exigencies. But taxes to meet the plaintiffs claims would
be taxes for a private purpose, for a gift to an indivi li:al."
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members to their constituents, there is always a possibility that
the members may at some time discover that a majority of the
constituencies would be pleased to see the power exercised.1
Another recent case in New York seemed to interpose a check
to the unlimited power of the legislature over the taxation of
municipal corporations. The point of the decision was, that
towns could not be compelled to give aid to railroad corporations
by subscribing to their stock. The decision was an able one, and
made by the court of last resort.2 But this decision, so far as in
the nature of things it would be possible, was shortly afterwards
qualified, and, as it would seem, overruled by the assistant court,
called the commission of appeals. The case decided by this
court asserts a power in the legislature broader and more abso
lute than has ever been applied in this country, by any court of
corresponding dignity, whose decisions have fallen under our no
tice. The point of the decision was, that where the legislature
had once empowered a commissioner, appointed for a town, but
not by it or by any town officer or authority, to subscribe for the
town to the stock of a railroad corporation, on the condition pre
cedent of obtaining the assent of a majority of the resident tax
payers, the legislature had full power afterwards to remove the
condition and empower the commissioner to bind the town by a
subscription without it " As it is obvious," say the court, " that
all the property of a town, as an artificial being, is public prop
erty, and must usually have proceeded from the exercise of the
power of taxation, and as the private rights of individuals re
siding in the town can only be affected through the exercise of
the power of taxation, it follows that the substantial power of the
1In Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 580, Bigelaw, Ch. J., speaking of the
right of the state to apportion among the municipalities the expense of high
ways, etc., says: " Perfect equality in the allotment of public burdens is unat
tainable. If they are distributed on just principles, applicable alike to all on
whom they are imposed; if no undue discrimination is made among those
on whom a charge or duty is laid; if no tax is assessed which is dispropor
tionate, or ' without the assent of the people or their representatives,' substan
tial equality will be attained, and no legal or constitutional right or privil
ege will be violated or evaded." This seems to us an admirable statement of
the principles governing the imposition by the state of burdens upon the
municipalities.
* People v. Batchellor, 53 N. Y., 12?, opinion by Grover, J.
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legislature, through the power of taxation, is broad enough to
sustain the requirement to a town to aid in the construction of a
railroad, in the construction of which, in the judgment of the
legislature, it has a public interest And if it may do this di
rectly by the imposition of a tax, and the direct and immediate
employment of the money raised, it is not perceived how the
issuing of bonds, with the only contingency of taxation to follow,
can be beyond the legislative power ; nor how the more remote
possibility of becoming chargeable by reason of holding stock,
can alter the case." 1
As the commissioner who made the subscription was not a
town officer, nor a town agent with the town's consent, it is mani
fest that he was able to accomplish what was said by the eminent
Pennsylvania judge, whose views have been quoted, to be " im
possible in the nature of things
"— a contract without the consent
of the parties.2
It must, we should suppose, be conceded that the doctrine that
the legislature may do anything to which it gives the form of
taxation, and which is not expressly forbidden by the constitu
tion, is necessarily corrupting in practice. It constitutes a stand
ing invitation to corrupt classes of the state to flock to the state
capital with schemes for enriching themselves at the expense of
localities ; and it would be remarkable if they were not often suc
cessful. Perhaps, if the state were owner of important public
works, a more tempting attraction might thereby be presented,
and the municipalities be left unmolested. But even this might
prove otherwise, for the evils of vicious legislation are likely to
increase and multiply in every direction, when once it is ad
mitted that they are subject to no legal restraints, and that the
central authority may legislate on local matters which concern
only the locality, and, concerning which, the members acting will
know nothing, except as interested parties may undertake to in
form or misinform them.
1Johnton. Com., in Duanesburgh v. Jenkins, 57 N. Y., 177, 187. The decis
ion in the case reversed the decision in supreme court made by Judges James,
Sockes, Rosecram and Potter.
*Black, Ch. J., in Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Penn. St., 147,165. See
also what is said by Mellen, Ch. J., in Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Greenl.,
112, 114.
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All the property of a municipal coporation may be assumed to
come from taxation. If any of it comes from gift or grant, it is
not believed that the nature of its ownership is any different on
that account, unless the gift or grant was charged with a trust.
It is public property, but public for the purposes of the munici
pality, and not for the purposes of the state. If any of it has
been raised for special purposes, under state authority, the state
may compel its proper application. The state must have a power
of direction, also, in cases where municipal powers are so modified
as to preclude the contemplated purpose being followed ; but it is
believed to be an unsound doctrine that the legislature of the state
may, for that reason or any other, apply it to state uses, or even to
local uses, against the consent of the people concerned. Mr. Justice
Story early expressed the view that the legislature, changing, mod
ifying, enlarging or restraining the local powers, must secure the
property for the uses of those for whom, and at whose expense, it
was originally purchased.1 There can be little doubt that this is
the view that has been generally acted upon, and that any other
is
,
to say the least, less safe, either to the general interests of the
state or of the municipalities. It is very true, as has often been
said, the fact that a power is liable to abuse, is no argument
against its existence ; it would only constitute a reason which
should influence the people to expressly withhold the grant of
power when framing their constitution. But when it is consid
ered that the states in general have not been accustomed to exer
cise such a power, and that its existence is inconsistent with any
substantial constitutional protection to local self-government —
that feature of the American representative system which has
1 Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, 52. " It may also be admitted," he says,
in Dartmouth College e. Woodward, 4 Wheat, 518, 594, " that corporations for
mere public government, such as towns, cities and counties, may, in many
respects, be subject to legislative control. But it will hardly be contended
that, even in respect to such corporations, the legislative power is so transcen
dent, that it may, at its will, take away the private property of the corpora
tion, or change the uses of its private funds acquired under the public faith.
Can the legislature confiscate to its own use the private funds which a muni
cipal corporation holds under its charter, without any default or consent of
the corporators?" And again, on p. 698, he says of the state: "It cannot
recall its own endowments granted to any hospital, or college, or city, or
town."
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usually been looked upon as the corner stone of all, and must leave
the municipalities at the mercy of legislative majorities, it may
justly be questioned whether the recognition of the power is not
an innovation. It is not to be forgotten that the power in ques
tion is "a power to destroy" — an expression which loses none
of its force when applied to municipal corporations — and that
it is capable of being exercised in legitimate modes to the
destruction of private fortunes. And the subject seems to invite
the remark, as bearing upon the question whether the early New
York decision, which has been referred to, was not a departure
from sound principle, that if the legislature of the state may vote
the local taxes, or take the moneys which have been raised by
taxation for local purposes, and appropriate them to other pur
poses in their discretion, on any assumption that, as they have
now become public funds, they must be at the state's disposal ;
then the maxim that taxation and representation go together,
would seem to be merely a glittering generality, promising much,
but assuring nothing. For any reliance upon responsibility to
constituents, as a check upon extravagant' taxation and reckless
misappropriation, becomes useless, and indeed worse than useless,
because deceptive, if the constituency in general, instead of bear
ing the burden of evil legislation, may actually, in some cases,
have the general burden diminished by the selection of particular
communities for exceptional and invidious taxation. And any
principle in representative government may well be considered
obsolete when, as applied, it only removes the substantial respon
sibility and restraining power from the constituency concerned to
a distant central authority.1
1On this general subject, reference is made to the case of Sleight v. People,
Sup. Ct 11l. (1875), 7 Chicago Legal News, 292. The facts were, that a rail
way was built through four townships — Oxford, Clover, Weller and Galva —
of Henry county. Two of these townships —Weller and Galva — subscribed
for capital stock and issued their bonds in payment of the subscription. The
charter of the railroad company provided that " the tares to be collected from
said railroad company for county and township purposes, by the several
counties and townships through which said railroad runs, shall be paid to
and set apart by the county treasurer as a sinking fund to redeem the princi
pal of the bonds issued by any township or townships in said county." On
behalf of the railroad company, the claim was made that the entire tax col
lected from the railroad company, for county and township purposes, in the
several townships through which the railroad runs, should be paid to and set
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CHAPTER XXIL
THE REMEDIES OF THE STATE AGAINST COLLECTORS OF
TAXES.
Remedies in general. It has been seen that the law sometimes
provides for very summary proceedings for the enforcement of
the duty to pay taxes, and that the legislative competency to do
so has been very fully sustained. With much greater reason may
the law provide summary remedies against those who, having
collected taxes, neglect or refuse to pay them over to the proper au
thority. Whatever hardships there may be in forcing summary pay
ment by the person who is simply negligent in paying his dues,
there can be none in requiring speedy accounting and settlement
by one who has, by his office, become custodian of the public
apart by the treasurer of the county as a sinking fund, to be applied pro rata,
in redeeming the principal of the bonds issued by the towns of Weller and
Calva.
In the opinion of the court, by Schqfleld, J., it is said : " A tax cannot be
levied for county or township purposes on property which is not subject to
the jurisdiction of the authority levying the tax; and the property of the rail
way compan}' in the county and in each township must be subject to the
same taxation as other taxable property there situated, for county and town
ship purposes ; and no property can be held for the payment of a county or
township tax which is not levied for a corporate purpose.
" Without undertaking to define what is a corporate purpose, it is very cer
tain that a tax imposed for the payment of a debt not incurred by the au
thority imposing the tax, and for the payment of which it is in no wise re
sponsible, is not for a corporate purpose.
" Neither Henry county, nor the towns of Oxford or Clover, made any sub
scription to the capital stock of this railway company, or incurred any in
debtedness by issuing bonds or otherwise on account thereof. Nor are they
either indebted to the towns of Weller or Galva.
" Neither Henry county, nor the towns of Oxford or Clover, could therefore
levy and collect a tax in excess of the amount needed for their tespective
corporate purposes, and equal to the amount claimed for this sinking fund,
because such a tax would not oe for a corporate purpose.
" But the claim here made is for the taxes actually levied and collected for
county and township purposes, from the railway company, in the towns of
Oxford and Clover. If this amount shall be taken, then there must necessa
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funds ; and whatever evils may be anticipated in the case of in- .
dividual neglects are likely to be multiplied many fold, if one
who has collected from numerous persons may then neglect or re
fuse to pay over his collections until it shall suit his convenience
to do so.
The remedies which are at the service of the public authorities,
and one or more of which are usually made use of, are the follow
ing:
Suit at the Common Law. The state, or any of its municipalities,
for whom moneys have actually been collected, may pursue its
delinquent collector by suit at the common law, if under the cir
cumstances that remedy shall be deemed adequate and suitable.1
Where expedition is not important and the party is responsible,
this may be all that is essential. Such a suit the collector can
defend only on such grounds as would constitute a defense to a
like suit as between other parties who stand in the relation of
principal and agent It would be for money received by the
collector for the use of the public ; and he would not be permit-
rily be a deficiency to that extent in the county and township revenues, which
will have to be supplied by additional taxation. The property liable to taxa
tion in one municipality will thus be compelled to bear a burden of taxation
imposed by the corporate authority of a different municipality, and this, too,
without its consent, and in the absence of any presumptive corresponding
benefits. The principle upon which alone this can be sustained is, that the
legislature may, in its pleasure, impose debts upon counties and townships,
and require their payment without regard to the wishes of the inhabitants and
tax payers of such counties and townships; for it is evident that the practical
result is precisely the same, whether it is said the taxes levied for county and
township purposes on the property of the railway company in the towns of
Oxford and Clover shall be set apart for the payment of the bonds issued by
the towns of Weller and Galva, or that the county and these townships shall
pay a sum equal to the amount out of their revenues for the same purpose.
In either event, it is taking so much of the revenues of the county and of
the towns of Oxford and Clover to pay the debts of the towns of Weller and
Galva. But it has been repeatedly held by this court, that the legislature is
powerless to impose a debt upon a municipaliy against its consent; and
those cases must be deemed conclusive on the questions involved here. The
Peoplee. The Mayor, etc., 51 111., 18; People v. Salomon, id., 38; People v.
Chicago, id., 580 ; Madison Co. e. People, 58 id., 463 ; Hessler v. The Drainage
Commissioners, 53 id., 105; Lovingston v. Wider, id., 302."
1Adams v. Farnsworth, 15 Gray, 423; Helvey a. Huntington Co., 6 Blackf.,
317; Wentworth v. Gove, 45 N. H., 160; Spencer v. Perry, 18 Mich., 394.
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'
ted to rely on technical objections which might be made to the
right of the public to the money. If he receives the money to
the use of the public, he should account for it ; and it is immate
rial that those who have paid it might successfully have resisted
th e collection from them. It has been elsewhere shown 1 that a
collector de facto, or even an intruder, will not be permitted to re
sist the demand of the state upon him for taxes collected, by
showing that he collected them without due authority. And it
has been held that although a bond to perform the duties of an
office would be void if there were, by law, no such office in ex
istence, yet an irregular appointment of a person to an office
which is established by law is valid as a contract to perform the
duties of the office, and entitles the public to demand the fulfill
ment of the engagement.2 The principles here stated are appli
cable not merely to the case of a defect in the official authority,
but to the case also in which defects, either technical or substan
tial, might have been urged to the tax the officer has enforced.«
The substantial fact is that he has received money for the state,
and having done so, it is not his privilege to pause and question
the right of the state to receive it ; but he should pay it over, and
leave those from whom it was received to present a claim to the
state for the refunding, if they deny its right to retain it.4 Even
an unconstitutional tax, once collected, the collector has no right
to retain, but should account a3 in other cases.5 The action in
1Ante, pp. 191, 192. Sec in addition to the cases there cited, Ford v. Clough,
8 Grceul., 334; Jolmsoc v. Goodridgc, 15 Me., 29; Orono v. Wedgcwood, 44
Me., 49; Trcscott v. Moan, 50 Me., 347; State v. Woodside, 8 Ired., 104; Lyn
don v. Miller, 36 Vt., 329.
» United States e. Maurice, 2 Brock., 98.
8Williams v. Holdcn, 4Wend., 223 ; Moore e. Alleghany City, 18 Penn. St, 55.
4Commonwealth v. Philadelphia, 27 Penn. St., 497.
5 In Waters v. State, 1 Gill, 302, and Smyth v. Titcomb, 31 Me., 272, it was
decided not to be a good defense to a suit to recover taxes collected, that the
tax itself was unconstitutional. In O'Neal v. School Commissioners, 27 Md.,
221, there was a like ruling as to a tax claimed to have been unlawfully levied.
In State v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 34 Md., 344, this doctrine was ap
plied to a railroad company which, being required to pay to the state one-flfth
of the fares on a certain branch, collected the fares, but declined to pay, al
leging the unconstitutionality of the tax. See also State v. Cunningham, 8
Blackf., 339. ,
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these cases is for the money had and received to the use of the
public. The like action will not lie for a mere neglect to per
form the official duty to collect ; but an action on the case would
be the appropriate remedy.1
Collector's Bond. It is a customary precaution to require of
any collector of public moneys that he shall give bond to secure
a proper accounting. The form, or at least the requisites, of such
a bond, are commonly prescribed by statute, and statute reme
dies cannot be had upon it unless it is a good bond under the
statute. But it is always lawful for one who has a duty to per
form to a third person or the public, to give sureties for the per
formance thereof ; and a bond by a public collector, which is not
in the statutory form, may nevertheless be a good bond at the
common law, upon which the usual common law remedies will be
available.2 On this ground suits have been sustained upon bonds
which were given to one body or official board, when the statute
required them to be given to another,8 and also upon those which
were so defective in any of their requisites as not to constitute a
sufficient statutory bond. Of course if the bond is given to an
obligee different from that named in the statute, suit upon it
must be brought in the name which appears in the obligation.4
What has been said of the liability of the collector, to account for
moneys received, is as applicable in a suit on any such bond, as
in a suit for money had and received ; he cannot defend by show
ing that those who voluntarily have paid to him could not legally
have been compelled to do so.5
1Charleston v. Stacey, 10 Vt, 562.
s Claasen v. Shaw, 5 Watts, 468 ; Freeman v. Davis, 7 Mass., 200 ; Morse v.
Hodsden, 5 id., S17 ; Burroughs v. Lowder, 8 id., 372 ; Sweetsei v. Hay, 2 Gray,
49 ; Horn v. Whittier, 6 N. H., 88 ; Treasurer v. Bates, 2 Bailey, 362, 375 ; Gov-
ernor «. Allen, 8 Humph., 176; Walker v. Chapman, 22 Ala., 116.
8Van Hook v. Barnett, 4 Dev., 268 ; Justices of Chrisflan v. Smith, 2 J. J.
Marsh., 472. And ace Supervisors of St. Joseph e. Coffinhury, 1 Mich., 355 ;
People v. Johr, 22 Mich., 461, 462 ; Mallory v. Miller, 2 Yerg., 113. The rulings
in the federal courts are that a hond taken from a collector of taxes is good as
a common law hond, though not required hy law, or though not in statutory
form when a bond is required. Dixon v. IT. S., 1 Brock., 177; Poitmas-
ter General v. Rice, Gilpin, 554; United States v. Howell, 4 Wash., C C, 620;
United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet, 115.
4 Stevens v. Hay, 6 Cush., 229. See Walker e. Chapman, 22 Ala., 116.
* See cases cited, ante, p. 498. Also Kelly v. Savage, 20 Me., 199.
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The liability on the bond must, however, be governed by its
condition. It has been held that when sureties undertake for the
collection of all rates for which the collector shall have " sufficient
warrant under the hands of the assessors," a recovery cannot be
had upon the bond for taxes collected without such warrant ; the
cases not being within the terms of the undertaking.1 But where
the sureties undertake that the collector shall " faithfully perform
his duty, and pay over the moneys collected," they are liable
for the moneys collected by him, whether with warrant or with
out2
It is not the business of the collector to question the fairness or
propriety of any tax which has been committed to him for collec
tion. If the assessment is excessive, the party assessed must
make the objection, and not the assessor. His duty is to collect
the list committed to him, and he cannot excuse himself for any
failure to exhaust his authority in collecting, on the pretense that
the person taxed should not have been assessed at all, or should
have been assessed otherwise than as he was.8 Nor is it a sufficient
answer to a suit for neglect of duty, that the party taxed being
poor, any proceedings by distress would not have been available.*
His duty in such a case is to exhaust his power in an effort to
collect ; and the legal evidence of the inability of the person taxed
to pay the amount will then be furnished by his return.
A collector may always refuse to proceed in the collection of a
tax for the collection of which his authority is insufficient While
he is bound to account for all sums voluntarily paid to him by
persons taxed, he is under no obligation to commit trespass in the
attempted exercise of a void authority ; and it is always a defense
to him and his sureties, that the process committed to him would
not have protected him in its execution.5 Undoubtedly, also, the
1Foxcroft v. Nevens, 4 Greenl., 72.
8 Johnson e. Goodridge, 15 Me., 29 ; State v. Woodside, 8 Ired., 104. And
see Ford v. -dough, 8 Greenl., 334; Orono e. Wedgewood, 44 Me., 49; Trescott
v. Moan, 50 Me., 347; Williamstown v. Willis, 15 Gray, 427.
8See Williams v. Holden, 4 Wend., 223 ; Moore e. Allegheny City, 18 Penn.
St., 55.
*Gorham v. Hall, 57 Me., 58, 62, citing Colerain v. Bell, 9 Met, 499, 503.
The same doctrine is laid down in Treasurers v. Hilliard, 8 Rich., 412.
•Reynolds v. Lofton, 18 Geo., 47; Barlow v. The Ordinary, 47 id., 639;
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collector may decline to proceed in the collection of a tax illegally
levied ; as any person may refuse to recognize any illegal authori
ty, or to obey an unconstitutional law. But he takes upon him
self a great responsibility when he assumes to question the validity
of a statute, or of the acts of his superiors. In any case he ought
to be the last person to raise the question, and then only when
necessary to his own protection. So long as the persons taxed
voluntarily make payment of the tax, it is his duty to proceed
with the collection.
The collector should receive for the taxes money only, unless
the statute permits him to receive something different. Money
is always understood in tax laws when nothing else is mentioned.1
The collector is not at liberty to use his office as a means of spec
ulation, and therefore cannot buy up demands against the public
and turn them in when he comes to account' Even if such de
mands are by law made receivable for taxes, they are not availa
ble to him in his settlement, unless he actually received them in
payment8 And what the collector receives he must, at his peril,
safely keep and account for. It is no defense, when he is sued
for a failure to account, that the moneys have been stolen from
him, or otherwise lost, without fault or negligence on his part*
This seems a very harsh rule, but it is
,
without question, a very
necessary one.
When the time arrives for the collector to account and pay
over his collections, no demand is necessary in order to fix upon
him and his sureties a liability for failure to do so ; but they may
be sued at once, as soon as a default has occurred.*
Liability o
f Sureties. In general the liabilities of sureties on
Cheshire v. Howland, 13 Gray, 321 ; Adams v. Farnsworth, 15 id., 483 ; Wei-
mer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich., 201.
1 See Johnson e. United States, 5 Mason, 425; United States v. Morgan, 11
How., 154; Miltenberger v. Cooke, 18 'Wall., 421.
» Frier e. State, 11 Fla., 300: and see Cheshire e. Howland, 13 Gray, 321.
• Commonwealth e. Rodes, 5 T. B. Monr., 319. The collector has no right to
receive in payment of taxes the draft of his creditor upon himself. Elliott v.
Miller, 8 Mich., 132.
4 United States v. Prescott, 3 How., 578; United States «. Morgan, 11 id.,
154; Morbeck v. State, 28 Ind., 86; Muzzy v. Shattuck, 1 Denio, 233.
•State e. Mcintosh, 9 Ired., 307; State v. Woodsides,9 id., 496.
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these official bonds are the same as those on other undertakings
for third persons. The undertaking of a surety is always looked
upon as slriciissimi juris, and cannot be extended beyond the ex
act terms of his undertaking. His position is essentially different
from that of the officer himself. The latter, in accepting his posi
tion, has the obligation imposed upon him by law to perform its
duties ; but the former has only entered into a contract, and con
sented to be bound by the terms of that, but by nothing else.
The law creates no obligation for him whatever.1 A very im
portant consequence resulting from this fact is
,
that if any altera
tion is made in the contract of the surety without his consent, it
discharges him, because it is no longer his contract.2 And this
would be the case even though the alteration tended to diminish
the surety's responsibility, instead of to increase it ; on the plain
principle that the law cannot, where a party has made one con
tract, charge him with another, upon any such untenable ground
as that it would have been for his interest to have made the sub
stituted contract instead of the other.8
In one particular, however, it is possible there may be an
important difference between this undertaking and the ordinary
contract of suretyship : in general an extension of time granted
to the principal for the performance of his obligation will dis
charge the surety ; but the rule, we should say, did not apply to
the sureties of a collector of taxes, at least, so far as the extension
of time to make collections is concerned ; such an extension being
supposed beneficial to them, rather than the contrary. But whether
beneficial or not, such an undertaking ought to be regarded as
1 Miller «. Stewart, 9 Wheat., 681, 702; United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet., 187;
Leggett v. Humphreys, 21 How., 66; Swanson v. Ball, Hempst, 39; Walsh e.
Bailie, 10 Johns., 180.
* Gass e. Stinson, 2 Sunm., 453 ; Smith v. United States, 2 Wall., 219.
8 '. The alteration of the bond, after it was executed by the defendants, and
without their consent, discharged them from all liability under it. It does
not now truly represent the obligation into which they entered. That obliga
tion was that Jonathan Eldridge should act faithfully as collector of a tax of
$2,572.82, which had been already assessed; by the alteration of the bond, the
obligation which it purported to impose on the defendants was, that the said
Eldridge should act faithfully as collector of a tax of $2,490.01, which was
assessed after the bond was executed. This obligation they never consented
to incur." Metealf, J., in Doane e. Eldridge, 16 Gray, 254.
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made subject to any provisions of law that might influence the
obligation or the duties of the officer for which the sureties have
undertaken.1 But on this point there is some conflict of opinion.2
The repeal of the law under which the bond was given does
not affect the responsibility of the sureties, whose contract remains
in full force as before.8
In many cases it is made the duty of some auditing board or
other authority to examine the collector's accounts periodically,
and come to a settlement with him for previous collections. Un
doubtedly all such boards or authorities should perform their duty,
and give the sureties such benefit as might accrue to them there
from; but the legal view of provisions of law imposing such
1The point was made in State v. Carlton, 1 Gill, 249, 257. Stephen, J. : "The
condition of the bond is, that the principal shall 'well and truly account for
and pay over to the treasurer the several sums of money which he shall re
ceive, or be answerable for by law, ' at such times as the law shall direct.' The
extension of the time of payment, therefore, by the legislature was no change
or alteration of the terms of the contract, but was warranted and authorized
by the express language of the condition of the bond upon which the suit-
was instituted. The principle, therefore, that time given to the principal
debtor by the creditor, without the consent of the sureties, will operate their
discharge, cannot be applied in this case. The terms of the condition of the
bond reserved to the state a right to grant the indulgence by law, if she thought
tit to do so, without affecting in any manner the liability of the sureties.
But it is not necessary to rely upon the condition of the bond alone, for the
ieversal of the judgment of the court below. A similar question was brought
before the court of appeals for the eastern shore from Worcester county, several
years ago, and the court then decided that the granting of indulgence by law
to the principal collector did not operate to discharge his sureties. The law
was not considered as binding or obligatory upon the state, but alterable bv
the legislature at their pleasure, whenever the interest or the convenience of
the state might require it."
8In a recent decision the supreme court of Tennessee has decided that sure-
ties are discharged under such circumstances. Johnson v. Harker, 2 Central
Law Journal, 625. The court of appeals of West Virginia had previously de
cided the other way. Bennett e. The Auditor, 2 W. Va., 441, per Brown, Prest.
8Tucker v. Stokes, 3 S. &. M., 124. That a collector's bond is for the security
of the public only, and private citizens have no remedy upon it
,
see Brown
e. Phipps, 6 id., 51. A collector gave a general official bond conditioned to
pay over all tax moneys collected by him. A statute afterwards provided for a
special tax, and authorized the county board to require of the collector a fur
ther bond, which they failed to do. Held, that the sureties on the general bond
were liable for the special tax. State e. Hathorn, 36 Miss., 491. See also
Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 Mich., 44.
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duties is
,
that they are made, not for the protection of sureties, but
of the public. The sureties undertake for the conduct of the prin
cipal, and cannot require the state to protect them against his
misconduct or neglect If, therefore, they suffer from neglects
which are not only his neglects, but also those of some other pub
lic officer or board, the loss must be borne by themselves. If
periodical settlements would tend to their advantage, they will be
expected to look after them in their own interest.1
Summary remedies. So far, we have spoken of obligations
and remedies, in providing for which no serious question of legis
lative power could well arise. But in the case of collectors of
the public revenue, it has sometimes been thought important to
compel them to place themselves under obligations and subject
themselves to liabilities not demanded in other cases. Provisions
of the following import are often met with :
1
. That the statement of accounts by the state auditor or other
public accountant shall, as between the state and its collector, be
conclusive.
2
. That, when the collector is in default, process in the nature
of an execution may be issued against him by his superior officer,
without any judicial finding, or any hearing, and this process
shall be collected of the property of the collector and his sure
ties.
3
. That, on application to some specified court, summary judg-
men t may be taken against the collector on motion, without other
process than short notice to show cause.
Upon this is to be remarked, that the justification of such
remedies must be found in the contract relations established be
tween the state and the collector, by the acceptance of office by
the latter while such provisions are in force, and between the
1 United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; United States e. Van Zandt,
11 id., 184; United States v. Nicholl, 12 id., 605; Dox e. Postmaster General, 1
Pet., 318; State e. Atherton, 40 Mo., 209; Christian, Ex parte, 23 Ark., 641;
Christian «. Ashley County, 24 id., 142 ; State v. Bates, 36 Vt, 387, 398 ; Detroit
v. Weber, 26 Mich., 284. As to the liability of sureties in different bonds
where the collector was his own successor for several terms, and the sureties
in the several bonds were not the same, and defaults existed in each term, see
United States v. Eckford, 17 Pet, 251 ; S. C, 1 How., 250 ; Detroit e. W eber, 20
Mich., 24.
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state and the obligors in the official bond, by their giving the
bond under the statute which provides this summary remedy.
The bond, in such a case, is to be read as if the provisions of the
statute were set forth at large in it
,
and had thereby received the
express assent of the parties.1 And this removes the difficulty
that would otherwise exist were the rights of a party to be con
cluded without giving him the opportunity of a judicial hearing.
It has been affirmed in Kentucky, that it is competent to make
the auditor's statement of the amount of taxes evidence against
the sheriff who acted as collector of taxes, in a proceeding
against him for an accounting, and also in favor of the sheriff
and against his deputy, who received the list to collect ; and to
give a summary remedy against both.8 And, in another case, it
was more distinctly decided that the auditor's statement must be
conclusive where the statute so declares. " We acknowledge," it
is said, " that this * * does curtail the privilege of defense to
be made by a collector, and places him on a footing different
from that of other defendants in our courts, and we have no
doubt that it is necessary to do so for the security of the revenue,
and that, without it
,
not only great confusion would be produced
in the finances of the state, but many frauds would be practiced
on the treasury. If this defense of tender and refusal, or dis
count, or whatever it may be called, is allowed, what will soon
be the consequence? The collectors need never settle their ac
counts with the proper department; for, if they do, it will only
acquit them of costs. [And, after suggesting the probable evil re
sults, it is added] : To prevent this, the state has selected its own
auditor, and required every claim to pass through his hands before
any can be allowed, or any debtor be released. This rigor with
regard to officers of the revenue is not new in the science of
government"8
1 Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How., 272; People e. Van Eps, 4 Wend.,
387, 390; Lewis v. Garrett's Adm'r, 6 Miss., 434 ; Chaffee v. Thomas, 5 Mich.,
63; Pratt v. Donovan, 10 Wis., 378; Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 52 Penn.
St., 451 ; Whitehurst e. Coleen, 53 11l., 247.
»Johnson «. Thompson, 4 Bibb, 294. The point arose only incidentally in
this case.
'ifHis, J., in Commonwealth v. Rodes, 5 T. B. Monr., 318, 324, citing, in
support of his views, the action of the federal government in making tran-
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In other cases, similar statutes have been enforced without any
question being made of the competency to adopt them.1
A summary distress warrant against the collector and his sure
ties can only be awarded where the bond is in accordance with
the statute, and where all the statutory conditions exist The
process being extraordinary and in derogation of the common
law, the steps leading to it must all have been taken ; and if it is
issued under any other circumstances than those under which the
statute gives it
,
the officer issuing it will be a trespasser.8 The
liability is striclissimi juris, and cannot be extended a single step
beyond the statutory permission. The same remark may be
made of the case of application for judgment on motion. The
statute must be strictly pursued, as the ordinary legal intend
ments do not apply in aid of the proceedings in such a case.8
But where the statute has been strictly pursued, the summary
remedies have been sustained by the courts without hesitation.
" The federal government," it is said by an able jurist of Geor
gia, "may summarily enforce the collection of its revenue out of
defaulting receivers or other duly appointed agents. Upon like
scripts from the books of the treasury evidence of delinquencies. For simi
lar expressions, see Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick., 323; Smyth v. Titcomb, 31 Me.,
272. It was held, in Board of Justices e. Fennimore, Cox, 242, that a com
mittee of the county commissioners did not conclude the collector by their
settlement with him, but he might show errors on being sued for the balance.
In Texas, the controller's statement of accounts is not evidence in a suit
against the collector. Albright v. The Governor, 25 Texas, 687. This would
be the rule anywhere in the absence of an express statute making it evidence.
1See Prather e. Johnson, 3 H. & J., 487; Billingsley e. State, 14 Md., 369.
» Weimer «. Bunbury, 30 Mich., 201 ; S
. C, 2 Am. Law Times, 37.
» Nabors v. The Governor, 3 Stew. & Port., 15. And see Walker v. Chap
man, 22 Ala., 116; Graham v. Reynolds, 45 id., 578. As to the recitals in the
record, see Hardaway e. The County Court, 5 Humph., 557. Where the stat
ute authorizes summary judgment against the collector and his sureties, the
collector is a necessary party, and if he be dead, the summary remedy is
gone. Governor v. Powell, 23 Ala., 579. If the bond is taken to the county
trustee when it should have been to the governor, the summary remedy can
not be had. Mallory v. Miller, 2 Yerg., 113. And see Broughton v. State, 7
Humph., 193. So a bond dated fourteen months after the collection is prima
fa«ie not the statutory bond, and motion for judgment on i
t should be denied.
De Soto County v. Dixon, 34 Miss., 150. But the fact that the penalty of the
bond is smaller than the statute requires is no objection to it Mabry v. Tar.
ver, 1 Humph., 94.
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principles the state may collect taxes immediately out of the
defaulting citizen ; for that purpose the tax collector is author
ized to issue execution. These powers of the government are
founded in an imperious necessity. They are necessary to the
preservation of the government, to the administration of the law,
indeed to a maintenance of all the rights of the people. If the
government were forced to submit the case of every defaulting
tax payer and tax gatherer and financial agent to a jury, with the
delays and uncertainties attending a judicial investigation, it could
not command its revenue, it could not be administered." 1
The necessity for a strict compliance with the statute in the
issue of such process is seen in the further fact that the officer
who issues it is usually a mere ministerial officer, without judi
cial power. As has been said in a case from which quotation
has already been made, and in which by statute an inferior court
issued the process, " The inferior courts have judicial powers, but
I apprehend that this is not one. They act as mere agents of the
state. They are instructed by the act to issue execution for the
amount which appears to be due. There is no issue to try ; there
is no judgment to be pronounced. As auditors, it is their busi
ness to ascertain the amount due, and then to issue execution.
So the state treasurer is the mere agent of the state. His busi
ness is to state the collector's account, and if he is in arrear, to
issue execution." 8
Precisely the same reasons sustain those acts of the legislature
which forbid the courts interfering with the process which is is
sued in revenue cases. If it is important that the party in default
should be precluded from a resort to dilatory proceedings of one
kind, it is equally important that the power to interpose others
1Lumpkin, J., in Tift v. Griffin, 5 Geo., 185, 191. The learned judge com
ments in this case upon the claim that the tax collector was entitled to a trial
by jury, and declares that the case is, and always has been, and must be an
exception to the right of jury trial. And see Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick., 323 ;
Smyth e.Titcomb, 31 Me., 272; Bassette.The Governor, 11 Geo., 207; Harper
v. Commissioners, 23 id., 566; Daggett v. Everett, 19 Me., 373; Fremont v.
School District, 33 id., 482 ; Cruikshanks v. Charleston, 1 McCord, 360 ; Prather
v. Johnson, 3 H. & J., 487; Billingsley v. State, 14 Md., 369; Hobson v. Com
monwealth, 1 Duv., 172; Wcimer e. Bunbury, 30 Mich., 201.
»Tift v. Griffin, 5 Geo., 185, 193. It is added that if the duty were judicial, it
would make no difference, because it is exceptional.
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should not be allowed to them.1 Here again is a rule which
seems severe, but the statutes which prescribe it do not go be
yond those which have been sustained by the courts, in which
is taken away the right to maintain replevin for property taken
for taxes, or to take any other proceedings calculated to embar
rass the collector's action. The legal view of such statutes is,
that while they take away a specific remedy, they nevertheless
leave to the party other remedies which are adequate to do him
eventually full justice.2
Even as regards the summary proceedings, however, there are
some principles which will constitute protection to the collector
and his sureties. One of these must be, that they can only be
proceeded against on notice with a hearing on the question of de
linquency. We say nothing here of the evidence which may be
1Eve v. State, 21 Geo., 50 ; Scofield v. Perkerson, 46 id., 350, 360. In this last
case, Warner, Ch. J., after considering the legislative act in question, proceeds
to say: "But it is said if there is not judicial interference, the complainants
-will be remediless. The 7th section of the act before cited points out the
remedy, which negatives the idea that it was to be by judicial interference.
The principle is
,
that the state must collect her revenue for the support of
government through the action of the executive department thereof, whether
derived from taxes or from her other sources of revenue, without any judi
cial interference therewith. The courts will not presume that the state, in
the exercise of her sovereign prerogative in the collection of her revenue,
will do injustice to any of her citizens for her own benefit. The complain
ants, at the time they signed the official bonds of their principal, must be
presumed to have done so with a full knowledge of the law applicable to
their liability thereon, and as to the manner of its enforcement against them
for the default of their principal. The issuing the executions by the comp
troller general in this case, being the act of the executive department of the
government having the exclusive jurisdiction over that subject matter, the
courts have no legal right, judicially, to interfere with the exercise of that
jurisdiction, for the reasons alleged, either in the original bills of the com
plainants or in their amended bills, but on the contrary, are expressly prohib
ited from doing so."
»It has been decided in Georgia that the governor may be authorized to
vacate the commission of a defaulting tax collector and fill the vacancy.
"The running of the state machinery is so intimately connected with its
treasury, and may be said to be so dependent upon it
,
and it is of such trans
cendent importance to its citizens and the public, that it cannot be subjected
to the ordinary rules governing in other cases." Trippe, J., in State «. Fra-
zier, 48 Geo., 137. But the remedy by summary judgment for taxes collected
cannot be had against one who has been ousted on quo warranto as a usurper.
Hartley «. State, 3 Kelley, 233, 237.
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received on the hearing ; of its quality or its conclusiveness ; but
the principle, that one is not to be condemned unheard, should
be considered inviolable. The hearing will of course be sum
mary, and a substituted notice might be sufficient where, in proper
cases, the law so provides. Another is
,
that there shall be some
official showing of the delinquency; something of an authoritative
character, and based upon documents, returns or records, which
show the facts. It has been decided in one case that an officer
who could have no better evidence of a collector's default than
the legal presumption that another officer, whose business it was
to deliver to the collector the proper tax rolls and warrant, had
performed that duty, could not be empowered to issue execution
on such a presumption, since the like presumption would be
equally strong in favor of the collector, and should consequently
protect him.1 It was also decided in the same case that any such
summary process — at least where the statute had prescribed no
form — should show on its face the existence of all the facts
necessary to give jurisdiction to issue it'
1 Weimer e. Bunbury, 30 Mich., 201 ; S. C, 2 Am. Law Times, 37. In
this case the supreme court of Michigan fully sustained the power to provide
for this summary process, but held that a county treasurer, in whose office
there was no evidence that the collector had ever had the tax warrant, and no
evidence of delinquency, except the mere fact that the time for making return
of taxes collected and delinquent had expired, could not he authorized to
issue execution against the collector. Compare Commonwealth e. Wilson,
Myers (Ky.), 127.
* Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich., 201. In this case, speaking of the statutory
provisions, the court say : "It was necessary in this case that the state and
county taxes should be properly apportioned to the city of Niles, and that the
city treasurer should have executed to the county treasurer the proper bond.
The supervisors must subsequently have delivered to the city treasurer, tax
rolls, with state, county, city, school, and other taxes extended thereon, with
warrants annexed giving him proper legal authority to collect the same, and
directions as to what disposition he was to make of the several taxes he
should collect. All these were necessary prerequisites, without which the
city treasurer could notibe subjected to this summary process. Treating the
city treasurer's official bond to the county treasurer as an agreement that a
summary execution may issue when a default occurs, its terms cannot he ex
tended so as to subject the city treasurer and his sureties to this extraordinary
process, when the default is on the part of another officer. The city treasurer
is not in default if he never receives the tax roll ; and though he may be liable
in a proper form of action for any tax moneys actually received by him, it is
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The conclusion to be drawn from the authorities appears to be,
that the officer, by accepting the public trust, submits himself to
the laws which provide remedies for the enforcement of his duties,
with this restriction, that final process is not to be issued against
him unless the officer issuing it has evidence that a default has
clear that he does not agree, by his bond or otherwise, to become responsible
for all the moneys called for by the tax roll, if no warrant accompanies it em
powering him to enforce payment. In other words, he must have in his
hands the statutory means for collection before he can be in default for not
collecting. And when summary process of this nature is issued against him,
it must show on its face all the facts which are necessary to constitute a de
fault; for nothing can be taken by intendment in favor of a proceeding like
this, which is in derogation of common law principles, and therefore must
depend for its validity upon a strict conformity to the statute. As in the case
of the process of all other inferior and special tribunals not proceeding ac
cording to the course of the common law, the county treasurer's warrant
must show the facts which presumptively would make out a case in which he
had jurisdiction to issue it. Nichols v. Walker, Cro. Car., 394; Rex e. Man
ning, 1 Burr., 377; Rex v. Mayor, etc., of Liverpool, id., 2244; Frary v. Dakin,
7 Johns., 75 ; Mills v. Martin, 19 id., 733 ; People e. Koeber, 7 Hill, 39 ; Dakin
v. Hudson, 6 Cow., 221 ; Bridge v. Ford, 4 Mass., 642; Barrett e. Crane, 16 Vt.,
246; Brewster v. Hyde, 7 N. H.. 211; Chandler e. Nash, 5 Mich., 409; Piatt v.
Stewart, 10 id., 260; Hart v. Newsom, 14 id., 233. In this case the county
treasurer has no record back of the warrant which shows the default, and
consequently any question which might be made regarding the support of
the warrant by such a record is not in the case.
" What does the county treasurer's precept show in this case* It begins
with a recital that the city treasurer is in default ' in the payment to the county
treasurer of the taxes apportioned to said city of Niles for the year 1872.'
Here is the statement of a legal conclusion without the recital of a single fact
to support it It is a judgment without preliminary accusation or finding.
It is difficult to conceive of a proceeding more defective in the statement of
jurisdictional facts. Nothing is said of any tax rolls, nothing of any tax
warrants ; but upon the naked fact that taxes have been apportioned to the
city of Niles, which have not been paid over to the county treasurer, the
sheriff is to proceed to levy and collect the same of the property of the city
treasurer and his sureties. Nor do the subsequent recitals in the precept sup
port this preliminary declaration of the city treasurer's default The subse
quent recitals show two facts only; that certain persons became sureties on
the bond of the city treasurer to the county treasurer, and that ' there remains
now due and unaccounted for from the said Thomas A. Bunbury, as such city
treasurer as aforesaid, the sum of four thousand eight hundred and seventy-
two dollars and sixty-two cents.' Now the city treasurer might be in default
for this amount without being liable to (his process, for, the taxes unpaid
might be city, school, highway, or special taxes, with which the county treas
urer has no concern. It may be doubtful, therefore, if this statement would
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occurred. And so far as the officer himself is concerned, as his
obligation does not spring from contract, but come3 from the law
itself, he may perhaps be subjected to such change of remedies,
or provision for new remedies, as may be made by changes in the
statute after his appointment or election. But summary remedies
cannot be given against sureties except as they have assented to
them, either expressly by their bond, or by implication in giving
the bond under a statute which provides for them. And changes
in the statute law which, if applied to their contract, would sub
ject them to further responsibility, or to other remedies unknown
to the common law, could not be applied at all.
The same principle seems to apply here as to the remedy by
suit against the collector : while he cannot be compelled to make
an illegal collection, or be rendered liable for neglect to do so, yet
if he actually collects a tax, he cannot defeat the summary pro
ceeding by showing that the tax was unauthorized.1
show a default, even if it were recited that tax rolls and warrants were duly
delivered ; but it is clear it could be of no service in the absence of such a
recital. It follows that the county treasurer's precept was not fair on its face;
that is to say, it did not contain recitals sufficient to show that it was lawfully
issued."
1Palmer v. Craddock, Myers (Ky.), 182. An act authorizing the treasurer
to issue execution against persons making default in listing their property for
taxation was considered in State v. Allen, 2 McCord, 55. But this seems to be
going a great way.
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CHAPTER XXIII.
ENFORCING OFFICIAL DUTY UNDER THE TAX LAWS.
Under any system of taxation, most careful provisions are es
sential to ensure obedience to the law on the part of those who
are entrusted with its administration. The serious consequences
that ensue when any important provision of law is overlooked or
disregarded are sufficient to render such regulations prudent, and
the perpetual temptations which invite officers to disobedience or
evasion of the law must admonish the government of their ne
cessity. It is to be borne in mind abo that tax laws, however
necessary, do not enlist the affections of the people, and that the
public sympathy does not accompany the officers in the perform
ance of their duties. On the contrary, the people submit to tax
ation as a hard necessity ; and as every individual is likely to be
impressed with a conviction that the laws seldom or never operate
with equality or justice, he is also likely to be entirely willing to
make his case one that shall escape the heavy burdens. The tax
official is therefore expected to enforce the law against a commu
nity, the members of which excuse to themselves an evasion of
its provisions on the ground that even then they perform their
duties as nearly as do the others upon whom the like duty rests ;
and will feel, if compulsory steps are taken against them, some
thing like a sense of personal wrong. The difficulty is compli
cated by the fact that the officers who make the assessments are
chosen by the people assessed, and as the local assessments are
usually made the basis for state taxation, their people will expect
them to make the valuations sufficiently low to protect them
against unfair assessments elsewhere. The sense of official duty
must be strong and the firmness considerable that can resist
under such circumstances the pressure for some departure
from the strict rule of law ; and the conclusive evidence that it is
not always resisted is found in the notorious fact, that men who
take solemn oath to perform to the best of their ability the duty
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of assessing property at its fair cash value are accustomed to as
sess it at from one-fourth to two-fifths only, justifying their diso
bedience of the law on the general disobedience of others. The
provision for a state equalization as a correction of this evil does
not appear to cure this demoralizing disregard of law and official
oaths, nor does any legal process seem adequate to the case.
Of the securities relied upon for the performance of duty by
tax officials, besides those which may be found in the character of
the officials themselves, or that may rest in the power of removal,
the following may be mentioned.
1. The Official Oath. Upon this much less reliance is placed
than formerly, for the reason, perhaps, that the community has
come to tolerate — it may almost be said to demand — a disre
gard or evasion of its provisions, when the apparent interest of
the district seems to require it Moreover, as has been shown in
another place, an official oath is not absolutely essential, and if
neglected, the proceedings may still be valid. The oath is conse
quently of little or no importance, and probably might be abol
ished without detriment to the public service ; certainly without
detriment to the public morals.1
2. An Official Bond, This is usually required of collectors
only. The value of this depends on the law, on its terms and on
the sureties, and there is no occasion to add here to what has been
said in another place.
3. Penalties for Neglect of Duty. Of these great use is made.
They are either penalties to be recovered in a civil action, or they
are imposed as criminal punishments. For the cases of various
officers connected with the public revenue system, particular!/
collectors, appraisers and other officers or agents in the internal
revenue and customs service of the United States, it has been
found necessary to go further, and to make some criminal miscon
duct and delinquencies punishable as felonies.
4. Common Law Remedies. These lie back of those given bv
1Sufficient evidence of this is furnished too often by the further fact that
men appointed from the ranks of respectability to perform duties under the
internal revenue and other tax laws are found in very many cases to pay not
the least regard to official obligations or official oaths, and use the position as
one of vantage for the purposes of public plunder.
33
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statute. The most useful and efficient of them all is that which
is afforded by the writ of mandamus.
Mandamus: its nature. The writ of mandamus is a sum
mary writ, issuing from the proper court, which commonly is the
highest court of common law jurisdiction of the state, command
ing the officer or body to whom it is addressed to perform some
specific duty, which the party applying for the writ is entitled of
right to have performed.1 The award of the writ rests in the
discretion of the court, which will allow or deny it according as
in its opinion justice requires,2 and it is in general a sufficient
reason for denying it that another adequate remedy exists. Thus,
it has been refused when applied for to compel the board of su
pervisors to audit and allow to one wrongfully assessed the tax
he had paid ; he having, in that case, an adequate remedy by
suit against the assessors who had assessed him without jurisdic
tion.' ' The writ is not awarded to control the exercise of a dis
cretionary authority, and it is therefore usually said that a judi
cial duty cannot be enforced by means of it Such a statement
is not accurate; a judicial duty is as susceptible of being en
forced by the process as any other when the right is clear, and
when the judicial officer, if he obey the law, has no option, but
must do some specific thing which the law requires of him. The
more accurate statement would be, that a judicial officer, or one
exercising a judicial or discretionary authority, cannot be coerced
in his judgment or compelled to exercise his discretion in a par
ticular manner by means of this writ But when a judge or other
officer has no discretion as regards the particular act to be done,
and a refusal to do some specific thing would be a wrongful de
nial of a right or a remedy, mandamus is a proper and suitable
process to compel him to perform his duty.4
13 Bl. Com., 110; Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, 34 Penn. St., 496, 509, per
Strong, J. ; Marathon v. Oregon, 8 Mich., 372, 378, per Campbell, J. ; Ex parte
Nelson, 1 Cow., 417, 423, per Savage, Ch. J.; High on Extraordinary Reme
dies, ch. I.
*Weber e. Zimmerman, 23 Md., 45 ; Stickney Ex parte, 40 Ala., 160 ; People
e. Judge of Wayne Circuit, 19 Mich., 296.
5Peoplee. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N. Y., 563.
* See Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall., 364 ; Stafford e. Union Bank, 17 How., 275 ;
Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat., 529 ; Ex parte Bradstreet, 7 Pet., 634. A singular
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It will not only lie, therefore, to compel an auditing board to
proceed to the consideration of an account, and to pass upon it in
some manner, but if the charges are legal, and it is the clear duty
case of overlooking this distinction is seen in Ex parte Ostrander, 1 Denio,
679 ; the more singular from the fact that it in effect overruled several pre
vious cases in the same state. The case was one in which the court of com
mon pleas had wrongfully dismissed an appeal ; and the supreme court held
the reinstatement could not be compelled by mandamus, even though the party
wronged had no other remedy, because the common pleas had cognizance of
the matter. And this, too, though the court found the dismissal to have been
"in manifest violation of the provisions of the statute on that subject," and
" an exercise of a power which the court did not possess." The previous
cases of Ex parte Caykendoll, 6 Cow., 52; People v. Superior Court, 5 Wend.,
114, and People v. N. Y. Common Pleas, 19 Wend., 118, which are plainly op
posed to this, are not noticed in the opinion ; but the case has often since been
cited as authority, probably because the general principle which it lays down
but misapplies — that a judicial discretion will not be controlled by this writ —
is manifestly sound. We say misapplied, because, as the supreme court found,
the common pleas had no discretion in the premises, and were clearly guilty
of abuse. Recent New York cases place the doctrine on safer ground. In
Howland v. Eldredge, 43 N. Y., 457, 461, Grover, J., says of judicial tribunals :
" They may, by mandamus, be compelled to proceed and determine the matter,
but they cannot be compelled to decide in any particular way. If they could,
it would no longer be their judgment or discretion, but that of the court award
ing the writ." Applying this rule to auditing boards, the court often compels
them to allow claims which are legal demands, after they have once decided
they will not do so. See People v. Supervisors of Delaware, 45 N. Y., 196, 200,
per Folger, J., who cites Hull v. Supervisors of Oneida, 19 Johns., 259; Wil
son v. Supervisors of Albany, 12 id., 416. In the still later case of People v.
Supervisors of Otsego, 51 N. Y., 401, 407, Earl, Com., explains the rule more
fully, and shows how little foundation there is for the doctrine of Ex parte
Ostrander, that a judicial body cannot be compelled to undo wrongful action
by. means of this writ. An extract from the decision in this case will be given
further on.
Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall., 364, is in striking contrast to Ostrander's case.
An attorney, as the court found, had been unlawfully disbarred by an inferior
court. "We agree," says Mr. Justice Nelson, "that this writ does not lie to
control the judicial discretion of the judge or court, and hence where the ac
tion complained of rested in the exercise of this discretion, the remedy fails.
But this discretion is not unlimited, for if it be exercised with manifest injus
tice, the Court of King's Bench will command its due exercise. Tapping on
Mandamus, 13, 14. It must be a sound discretion and according to law. As
said by Chief Justice Taney, in Ex parte Secomb, 19 How., 13 : ' The power,
however, is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure
of the court, or from passion, prejudice or personal hostility.* And by Chief
Justice Marshall, in Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat., 530: 'The court is not inclined
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of the board uuder the statute to make the allowance, that duty
the members may be compelled to perform by means of this
writ.1
to interpose unless it were in a case where the conduct of the circuit or dis
trict court was irregular or was flagrantly improper.' " The judge who dis
sents in the case does so on other grounds. The following cases may be re
ferred to as supporting like views: Ex parte Conway, 4 Ark., 302; Wright v.
Johnson, 5 id., 687; Ex parte Pile, 9 id., 336; Day u. Justices of Fleming, 3
B. Monr., 198; Applegate v. Applegate, 4 Met. (Ky.), 236; Castello e.St. Louis
County Court, 28 Mo., 259; Roberts e. Holsworth, 5 Halst., 57; Merced Min
ing Co. v. Fremont, 7 Cal., 130; Ortman v. Dixon, 9 id., 23; People v. Bacon,
18 Mich., 247 ; People e. Judge of Wayne Circuit Court, 22 id., 493 ; People v.
Pearson, 1 Scam., 458; 11linois Central R. R. Co. v. Ruckcr, 14 11l., 353; Ste
phenson v. Mausony, 4 Ala., 317 ; Hudson e. Daily, 13 id., 722 ; Ex parte Lowe,
20 id., 330; Shadden e. Sterling, 23 id., 518; Ex parte Thornton, 46 id., 384.
Other Alabama cases make a more liberal use of this writ than would be sanc
tioned in other states. The whole doctrine may be thus summarized: If a
body having judicial powers shall refuse to proceed to do what the law re
quires, it may be compelled to do it by this writ. If it has done an act which
the law does not authorize, its duty is to undo it on request, and this duty may
be compelled by this writ. But if it has acted in a matter which by the law
was committed to its judgment or discretion, mandamus will not lie to correct
its errors, for judgment and discretion are not to be controlled or coerced by
this process.
1Bright e. Supervisors of Chenango, 18 Johns., 242; Hull e. Supervisors of
Oneida, 19 id., 259 ; People «. Supervisors of New York, 32 N. Y., 473 ; People
e. Supervisors of Otsego, 51 id., 401; People e. Supervisors of Macomb, 3
Mich., 475 ; Gunn's Adm'r v. Pulaski County, 3 Ark., 427. Where the county
court is to order a surveyor's report to be recorded " unless it see some objec
tion to the report," the duty may be compelled by mandamus. Delancy e.
'
Goddin, 12 Grat., 266; Randolphs Stalnoker, 13 id., 523. In People «. Su
pervisors of Otsego, tupra, Earl, Com., considers the question somewhat
fully, and answers the objections usually made to the employment of the
writ in cases where the supervisors are to audit and allow accounts. The fol
lowing is an extract from the opinion, p. 407:
" But it is claimed on the part of the appellant, that it has done all it can
be compelled to do by mandamus; that it has heard the relator's claim, and
determined it adversely to him. It is true that boards of supervisors have a
certain judicial discretion to exercise in reference to claims presented to them,
which cannot be controlled by mandamus. They are to investigate and deter
mine the facts as to any disputed claim, and if it is unliquidated, they are to
determine the amount to be paid. But the law is supposed to be plain, and
they are presumed to understand it
,
and they have no right to reject a claim
as illegal, which the law plainly requires them to allow. If they do, they can
be compelled to the allowance by mandamus. (People «. Supervisors of New
York, 11 Abb. Pr., 114; People e. Board of Supervisors of New York, 32 N.
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In the application of these principles to the case of assessors it
will be manifest that they cannot be controlled in their judgment,
as to the amount they shall assess against a person or his proper
ty, The doctrine is shortly stated by the supreme court of Mas
sachusetts, in a case in which county commissioners had declined
to abate a tax on behalf of one who claimed to have been over-
Y., 473 ; People v. Board of Supervisors of New York, 21 How. Pr., 322 ; Peo-
pie v. Supervisors of St. Lawrence, 30 id., 178; Hill v. The Supervisors
of Oneida, 19 Johns., 259 ; People v. Supervisors of Now York, 1 Hill, 362.)
Where supervisors refuse to audit and allow a legal claim, on the ground that
it is illegal, they do not exercise the discretion which the law vests in them;
and hence, in such case, they can be compelled by mandamus to exercise their
discretion upon the facts and the amount to be allowed.
" Now, let us see what was done in this case. The relator, in the affidavits
upon which the order to show cause was based, showed clearly and particu
larly that it owned the United States stocks; that it was assessed upon them
and paid the taxes claimed. These facts showed that it had a claim which,
under the special act of 1867, the board of supervisors was bound to deter
mine; and if it found the facts to be true, then it had no discretion left, and
was bound to cause the money paid to be refunded. These facts were not dis
puted. When the claim was presented, it was referred to a committee. It
does not appear that the committee or the board of supervisors made my inves
tigation whatever of the facts pertaining to the claim, although the statutes
furnish ample power to make such investigation (Laws of 1845, ch. 180;
Liws of 1858, ch. 190). The committee, in their report, speak of the taxes
as ' collected and paid,' and then state that the county and towns ' cannot, in
justice, refund said taxes,' thus substantially admitting that the taxes had
been paid as claimed. They do not report that they have examined and
inquired into the facts, or that any of the statements contained in the affidavit
of complainant were untrue. They simply report that they have examined
the claims, and that it would be unjust for the county and towns to refund the
taxes. Then the board of supervisors adopted a resolution reported by the
committee, that the claim was invalid, and that the same be disallowed. There
was no determination by the board of supervisors that the relator was not as
sessed just as alleged, and that it did not pay the taxes just as claimed by it.
The claim was evidently rejected simply because it was unjust and illegal.
The legislature had determined that the claim for taxes illegally exacted, as
mentioned in the act, was both just and legal ; and the only questions to be
determined by the board of supervisors, in reference to which it had any dis
cretion, were, whether the complainant had such claims, and the amount of
them. This case is, therefore, brought within the rule laid down in Hill v.
Supervisors of OneMa (supra) : ' Where the supervisors of a county refuse to
allow a claim for services as a county charge, this court, if it be a legal charge,
may instruct and guide the supervisors in the execution of their duty by a writ
of mandamus, and compel them to admit the claim as a county charge.'"
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rated. " If the commissioners," it is said, "had refused to hear
and determine upon the complaint, this court would have issued
a mandamus requiring them to do it But the question whether
the petitioner's taxes should be abated or not, was a judicial
question. And although it is within the province of this court to
require the commissioners to decide the question, yet we have
no power to decide it for them, or to determine what decision
they shall make. No judicial officer, in determining a matter le
gally submitted to his discretion, can ever be required to be gov
erned by the dictates of any judgment but his own. We are
clearly of opinion that in refusing to abate the petitioner's taxes,
the commissioners acted judicially, upon a subject of which they
had final jurisdiction, and in which the exercise of their discretion
cannot be revised by any other tribunal." 1 A like view has been
expressed in Pennsylvania, in a case in which an inferior court
had issued the writ to compel school directors to exonerate a per
son taxed. " This," it is said, " was an unprecedented application
of the writ of mandamus. It is not the ordinary official duty of
school directors to exonerate taxes, but rather to levy and collect
them. If they were backward in the exercise of this official func
tion, mandamus might be used to stir them up. But when
they have set themselves in motion, and are proceeding to dis
charge the duty imposed by law, they are no longer subject to
mandamus. Exoneration is a discretionary power incidental to
their office, and in this instance would seem to have been exer
cised by a refusal to grant the relief asked for. We have no
power to control a discretion vested in them, and no appeal lies
from them to judicial tribunals." * This rule undoubtedly applies
to all classes of assessments, and to all other actions of assessors
which they are to perform according to the dictates of their own
judgment In New York, where a statute made it the duty of
town assessors when a majority of tax payers, owning more than
one-half the taxable property of the town had signed a certain
paper, to make affidavit of the fact for a certain purpose important
1Gibbs v. County Commissioners of Hampden, 19 Pick., 288, citing Chase
e. Blackstone Canal Co., 10 id., 244; United States v. Lawrence, 3 Dallas, 42
» Woodward, J., in School Directors of Bedford e. Anderson, 45 Penn. St ,
.388. 390.
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to the town, a mandamus to compel them to perform the duty was
held unauthorized. " The affidavit of the assessors must be in
accordance with what they believe to be the fact, otherwise they
incur the moral guilt of perjury, irrespective of any determination
the court may have made thereon. By the seventeenth section
of the act, false swearing by the assessors is made perjury, and,
should it turn out that they are right and the court wrong in their
views, the only ground upon which they could escape convic
tion would be that the affidavit was not their voluntary act, but
the result of coercion, which they had no power to resist. If this
appeared upon the face of the affidavit, it is entirely clear that in
no legal sense would it be their affidavit at all, but a mere nullity.
It follows that there is no remedy provided by the act for the cor
rection of errors into which the assessors may fall, in respect to the
matter referred to their determination. The statute having de
clared it to be their duty to make the affidavit when the fact exists,
the court have power, by mandamus, to compel them to proceed
and examine the evidence and determine the fact, and if
,
from
their determination, it appears that the requisite consent has been
given, to make an affidavit in accordance therewith. This is the
universal rule in respect to all subordinate courts and tribunals
clothed with the exercise of judgment or discretion. They may
by mandamus be compelled to proceed and determine the matter,
but cannot be compelled to decide in any particular way. If
they could it would no longer be their judgment or discretion, but
that of the court awarding the writ Their determination is con
clusive, unless some mode of review is provided." 1
For like reasons, operating with still greater force, the writ can
not be employed to compel the performance of duties of a politi
cal nature. Such would be the duty of determining what taxes
should be levied by a municipal corporation for the current needs
of the year, in respect to which no previous imperative duty was
fixed upon the municipality, in consequence of previous indebted
ness or otherwise. If this writ were to be employed for such pur
poses, the courts and not the people, would in effect exercise the
local political powers.2
1 Howland v. Eldredge, 43 N. Y., 457.
' See Union County Court e. Robinson, 27 Ark., 116, where the endeavor w.as
made to compel school district authorities to increase the school levy which
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On the other hand, the writ will lie to compel assessors to strike
from the assessment roll nontaxable property which they have
included in it Here is a clear case of excess of jurisdiction ;
nothing is submitted to their discretion, because by the law the
subject matter of the controversy is put beyond their authority,
and they can lawfully neither list it
,
nor value it.1 And the writ
will lie to compel the refunding of taxes charged upon exempt
property, where by statute the officers are directed to refund it
,
even though the exemption depends upon matters of fact which
they are to inquire into and pass upon. The refunding in such a
case is a mere ministerial duty ; the officers are supposed to know
the law, and it is their duty to apply it to the facts as they find
them.2 A similar ruling has been made in the case of a state
officer who had the power by law to reject illegal taxes which
had been returned to him ; and he was required by this writ to
reject taxes on lands which were exempt from the levy, though
there was no specific statute commanding it.8 And if assessors
omit from the roll property which is taxable, they may be com
pelled to insert it on the roll on the application of the proper law
officer of the state.4 The relief in all such cases is based on the
the people had voted for the year, on a showing that it was insufficient for the
support of proper schools.
1 People v. Assessors of Barton, 44 Barb., 148; People v. Olmsted, 45 id.,
644. Compare Miltenberger v. St. Louis County Court, 50 Mo., 172, which
possibly would appear contra if all the facts were given, but the statement of
the case is somewhat imperfect. The case cites Dunklin County v. District
Court, 23 Mo., 449, and State e. La Fayette County Court, 41 id.. 221, which
arc cases of a different nature.
•People v. Supervisors of Otsego, 51 N. Y., 401. The case was one of taxa
tion of national securities, which, under the law and the decisions of the
courts, were not within the jurisdiction of the assessors. It was made the duty
of the supervisors to refund the tax, which they could only do on a showing
of facts. The board adopted a resolution that the claim was invalid, and that
it be disallowed, but this was a manifest evasion of duty.
»People v. Auditor General, 9 Mich., 134. The duty of the auditor general
to reject taxes in this case, depended upon the date when the patents for the
lands issued; a fact only to be brought to his knowledge by evidence, but
which made the duty clear when it was proved. In that regard the case
resembled People v. Supervisors of Otsego, 51 N. Y., 401.
4 People e. Shearer, 30 Cal., 645. The case was one in which possessory
rights in the public lands were held to be taxable, and ordered to be placed
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clear legal right of the public or of a private party to have per-
lormed a certain act which the officer refuses to perform; and it
is immaterial what is the nature of the duty, if in the particular
case the officer has no discretion. Such cases are in pointed con
trast to those in which the attempt is made to control the judg
ment or discretion of assessors, or of the appellate board of review,
after an appeal has been taken to it1 But the assessor, when he
has a mere ministerial duty to perform, like that of the delivery
to the officer of a correct copy of the assessment roll in a case
where he has assumed to make unauthorized changes, may be
compelled on this writ to perform it2
A suitable case. for the employment of the writ is where it is
found necessary to compel county commissioners to proceed to
the hearing of an appeal from an assessment, where the hearing
is of right under the statute.8 It will lie to compel the proper
officer to issue a distress warrant against a defaulting collector ;
though it is said that if it is manifest from an inspection of the
proceedings that the collector has no authority to collect the tax,
by reason of its illegality, or that the persons assessed, on being
compelled to pay it
,
would have a remedy back for restitution,
the court will not grant a process, to enforce a collection that
would be fruitless and oppressive.4 So the remedy by this writ
upon the roll. Possibly a private individual might have been relator in this
case. See People e. Halsey, 53 Barb., 547 ; S. C, on appeal, 37 N. Y., 344.
1 Gibbs v. County Commissioners, 19 Pick., 298. See Miltenberger v. St.
Louis County Court, 50 Mo., 172.
» People v. Ashbury, 44 Cal., 616.
8This seems to be recognized in James e. Bucks County, 13 Penn. St., 72,
'where, however, the party had deprived himself of the right to be heard.
And see Virginia, etc., Company v. County Commissioners, 5 Nev., 341.
4 Smyth v. Titcomb, 31 Me., 272, 281, per Howard, J. See, also, Waldron v.
Lee, 5 Pick., 323, which covers all the same ground. A ruling like this in
principle was made in People v. Halsey, 53 Barb., 547 ; S. C, on appeal, 37
N.Y., 344. The case was one in which a county treasurer had assumed to
question an assessment, as being unjust, and had refused to issue his warrant
for the collection of the tax. The court held that he had no discretion in the
premises, and ordered a mandamus to issue. It was also decided in the same
case that a private individual, having a common interest with the rest of the
community in the collection of the tax, might be relator in the proceeding.
On this last point Fullerton, J., in 37 N. Y., 344, 348, says: " Inasmuch as the
people themselves are the plaintiffs in a proceeding by mandamus, it is not of
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may be had to compel a board of supervisors to assess upon the
county the amount due to it from the state, after it has been ad
justed and settled by the competent authority ; 1 or to compel a
county trustee to levy a tax to pay the damages awarded in a
proceeding for the construction of a county road ; it being his
duty under the law to do so.2
The purchaser at a tax sale may have mandamus to compel
the delivery to him of the proper certificate as evidence of his
purchase,8 or of a proper deed, if the one delivered to him is
defective.4 And the owner, whose title has been cut off by a
tax sale, may have mandamus to compel the payment to him of
any surplus moneys received on the sale.5 But mandamus never
lies to coerce the performance of legislative duties, either by the
legislature of the state or by any inferior and subordinate body ;
not only because legislation is foreign to judicial duties, but also
because, in its nature, legislative action is discretionary. But
where ministerial action is required of a body, which also exer
cises legislative functions, its performance may be compelled by
vital importance who the relator should be, so long as he does not officiously
Intermeddle in a matter with which he has no concern. The office which a
relator performs is merely the instituting a proceeding in the name of the
people, and for the general benefit. The rule, therefore, as it is sometimes
stated, that a relator in a writ of mandamus must show an individual right to
the thing asked must be taken to apply to cases where an individual interest
alone is involved, and not to cases where the interest is common to the
whole community. This is the rule adopted in many of the states. Hamil
ton v. The State, 3 Ind., 452; State v. County Judge, 7 Iowa, 186; State «. Bai
ley, id., 390; County of Pike e. State, 11 11l., 202. The rule is different in
other states. Heffner «. The Commonwealth, 28 Penn. St., 108 ; The People e.
The Regents of the University, 4 Mich., 98; The People «. The Inspectors of
State Prison, id., 187; Arberry v. Beavers and others, 6 Texas, 457; Zebulon
Sanger v. Commissioners of Kennebec, 25 Me., 291. But the practice which
has so long prevailed here, though never, so far as I can discover, passed
upon directly by the court of last resort, where the objection was raised,
seems to be a reasonable and convenient one, and ought now to be considered
as settled."
1People v. Supervisors of Jackson, 24 Mich., 237.
sHuntington e. Smith, 25 Ind., 486.
8State e. Magill, 4 Kans., 415. See State v. Bowker, id., 114.
* Clippinger e. Fuller, 10 Kans., 377.
'People v. Hammond, 1 Doug. (Mich.), 276.
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this writ as well as if the act were to be performed by an indi
vidual. But the writ will not be awarded to the executive of the
nation or state ; such officer being an independent department of
the state, as much so as the judiciary itself.1
These references sufficiently indicate the general nature of the
cases in which the writ of mandamus may afford the proper
remedy. It will be seen, that it is awarded as well on behalf of
the public authorities, to compel performance of the successive
official duties, under the revenue laws, as on behalf of private
parties, whose rights have not been regarded in taxation or in
any of the proceedings which are to result in taxation. On
behalf of the state, the writ may issue against officers of corpora
tions where a duty is imposed upon them under the tax laws ;
such, for instance, as that of furnishing a list of the stockholders
for assessment,8 or of paying over a tax on dividends which have
been declared by the corporation.8 But it will never be issued
until the duty has become fixed ; and, therefore, it will not lie to
compel the levy of a tax for a balance of accounts which still
remains to be adjusted by the proper statutory authority.4 The
writ cannot confer an authority to do an act which could not vol
untarily have been done; and, therefore, cannot require an official
act by one after he has gone out of office,5 nor by one who,
though elected, has never qualified and entered upon the per
formance of his duties.6 Nor will the writ issue in advance of
1There are conflicting cases on this point which are collected in High on
Extraordinary Remedies, §§ 118-124; and in Dillon on Mun. Corp., § 671 and
note. Also in the recent Michigan and Texas cases. People e. Governor, 29
Mich., 320; Bledsoe v. International R. R. Co., 40 Texas, 537; Keuchler e
Wright, 40 id., 600.
* Insurance Co. v. Baltimore, 23 Md., 296, 309.
8State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 487. See Person e. Warren R. R. Co., 32 N. J.,
441, which was one of mandamus to the lessee of a road to compel the pay.
ment of a tax upon it.
•State e. Rice, 35 Wis., 178.
5State v. Perrine, 34 N. J., 254. That where proceedings have been begun
against a board, they may be continued against their successors, see Bassett
v. Barbin, 11 La. An., 672. But the levy of a tax cannot be compelled after
the time fixed by law, for the levy has expired. Ellicott v. Levy Court, I
Har. & J., 359.
•State v. Bcloit, 21 Wis., 280.
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the time for the performance of a duty, on any assumption that
it will not be performed in due season.1
One of the most common cases in which the writ of mandamus
is employed in tax matters is
,
where it has become the clear duty
of the authorities to levy a tax for general purposes, or for the
payment of some demand, and they refuse to do so.2 In such
cases the remedy may be had on behalf of the state or the munci-
pality concerned, or by any individual whose demand the tax
should pay. Thus, if one has recovered a judgment against a
muncipality which can only be paid by means of taxation, the
levy of a tax to pay it may in proper cases be compelled.8 It is
customary to make express provision by statute for such cases,
and when the statute requires the levy of a tax, the case is clear.
When the statute does not expressly require it
,
the duty may
perhaps be equally plain if the muncipality has been clothed with
the requisite power ; but it cannot be compelled to levy a tax in
excess of the restrictions which are imposed upon it by charter or
by the general law.4 But it may not be essential that a judg-
1 Commissioners of Schools v. County Commissioners, 20 Md., 449; State e.
Burbank, 22 La. An., 298. A mandamus will not be issued to compel the spread
ing of a tax.on the roll in advance of the time when it is to be done. On the
contrary, it will be assumed that the officer will perform his duty when the
time coincs. Zanesville «. Richards, 5 Ohio, N. S., 589, 583.
»See Manor e. McCall, 5 Geo., 522; Beaman e. Board of Police, 42 Miss.,
237; Commissioners of Schools v. County Commissioners, 20 Md., 449; Ex
parte Common Council of Albany, 3 Cow., 358; Whiteley e. Lansing, 27
Mich., 131; Morgan v. Commonwealth, 55 Penn. St., 456; Robinson «. Super
visors of Buite County, 43 Cal., 353.
sKnox County v. Aspinwall, 24 How., 376; Supervisors e. United States, 4
Wall., 435 ; Von, Hoffman e. Quincy, 4 id., 535 ; Galena e. Amy, 5 id., 705 ;
Walkley v. Muscatine, 6 id., 481; Riggs e. Johnson County, id., 166; Weber
«. Lee Couiity, id., 210; United States v. Keokuk, id., 514; Benbow v. Iowa
City, 7 id., 313; Mayor, etc., e. Lord, 9 id., 409; Supervisors?>. Durant. id.,
415; Statee. Madison, 15 Wis., 33; State v. Beloit, 20 id., 79 ; State e.Milwau
kee, id., 87; Watertown v. Cady, id., 501; State v. Racine, 22 id., 258; Has-
brouck v. Milwaukee, 25 id., 122; Whiteley e. Lansing, 27 Mich., 131; Coy e.
Lyons City, 17 Iowa, 1
;
Boynton e. Newton, 34 id., 510; Huntington e. Smith,
25 Ind., 486 ; Olney v. Harvey, 50 11l., 453 ; Lutterloh v. Commissioners, 65
N. C, 403; Gooch v. Gregory, id., 142; Gorgas e. Blackburn, 14 Ohio, 252;
Frank v. San Francisco Co., 21 Cal., 668; Flagg Palmyra, 33 Mo., 440;
State v. Hug, 44 id , 116 ; Commonwealth v. Allegheny Co., 37 Penn. St., 277, 29a
4United States e. Burlington, 2 Am. Law. Reg, N. S., 394, per Miller, J. of
the Federal Supreme Court. And see note to same case by Judge Dillon.
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ment should have been recovered, in order that the duty to levy
a tax may he imperative. If the amount of the demand is abso
lutely fixed and determined as it would be by judgment, and the
law makes it the duty of the proper officers to levy a tax for its
payment as a settled demand, this is sufficient, and mandamus
may issue if performance of the duty is neglected or refused.1
Indeed it has been held in the case of bounty bonds, which by the
law under which they were issued were " a valid and lawful claim
against the township," to " be paid in the same manner as the
ordinary township expenses
"
are paid, that is to say, by the levy
of a tax by the township officers, an action upon the bonds would
not lie; mandamus being the appropriate and also the adequate
remedy.8
The federal courts have no general power to issue the writ of
mandamus to compel the performance of duties under the state
tax laws. That belongs to the province of the state courts. It
has nevertheless been held in many cases, that they might issue
the writ in order to compel municipalities to levy taxes for the
satisfaction of judgments which had been rendered in such
courts, and which the local authorities neglected or refused to
provide for by taxation, though clothed by law with full author -
1Schoolbred v. Charleston, 2 Bay, 63 ; "Wilkinson v. Cheatham, 43 Geo., S58 ;
Clark Co. Court v. Turnpike Co., 11B. Monr., 143 ; Rodman v. Justices of Larue,
3 Bush, 144; People v. Supervisors of Columbia, 10 Wend., 363; People e.
Bennett, 54 Barb., 480 ; People v. Supervisors of Otsego, 51 N. Y., 401 ; Robin
son e. Supervisors of Butte, 43 Cal., 353 ; Tarver v. Commissioners, 17 Ala.,
527; Pegrame. Commissioners, 64 N. C, 557; State v. Smith, 11 Wis., 65;
State v. Clinton County, 6 Ohio, N. S., 280; Cass v. Dillon, 16 id., 38; State
v. Harris, 17 id., 608 ; Columbia County v. King, 13 Fla., 451 ; Commonwealth
v. Pittsburgh, 34 Penn. St., 496; United States v. Sterling, 2 Bissell, 408.
8 Campbell, J. in Dayton e. Rounds, 27 Mich., 82, citing People v. Township
Board of La Grange, 2 Mich., 187; Marathon c Oregon, 8 id., 372; People v.
Auditors ofWayne, 5 id., 223; People v. Porter, 18 id., 101. See also Robin-
son e. Butte County, 43 Cal., 353. In this case it is said if the officers order a
levy which is not sufficient to pay what is due on such a demand, a relevy
may be compelled by mandamus. When the proper tax has been levied, so
that it has become the duty of the treasurer to make payment on presentation
of the obligations, it is not necessary for the holder to have an order from the
county commissioners for the purpose, and consequently they will not be
compelled to issue one. State v. McCrillis, 4 Kans., 250.
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ity to do so.1 The extent of the federal jurisdiction in state tax
cases is pointed out in recent decisions of the federal supreme
court, and it is shown to be purely exceptional.2 In some cases,
under state laws, these courts have appointed commissioners to
levy a tax when the local officers have refused to provide for it*
But for this purpose the proper statutory authority must exist*
1See Knox County v. Aspinwall, 24 How., 376, and other cases cited in note
3, p. 524. And see High on Extraordinary Remedies, § 392.
* Rees e. Watertown, 19 Wall., 107, opinion by Sunt, J. ; Heine e. Levoe
Commissioners, id., 655, opinion by Miller, J. The opinion of Mr. Justice
Bradley, in the case last named, is reported in 1 Woods' Reports, 246.
* Supervisors «. Rogers, 7 Wall., 175, cited and explained in Rees v. Water-
town, IP ,d., 107, 117.
* Rees e. Watertown, 19 Wall., 107.
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CHAPTER XXIV.
THE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE AND ILLEGAL TAXATION.
Reference has already been made by us to the principle which
in this country has been adopted from the Great Charter, that no
person shall be deprived of his property except by the law of the
land, or, as it is sometimes expressed, by due process of law ; and
it has been stated that this principle is as much applicable in the
case of taxation as in any other case. It has also been said that
however summary and apparently arbitrary are the methods and
processes in tax cases, they cannot deprive the citizen, when his
property is taken in the course of their enforcement, of a trial of
the right to take it
,
before some impartial judicial tribunal to
which the public authorities must justify their proceedings.
What the tribunal shall be, and what the proper remedy to seek
in it
,
may depend on the tax law itself, and on the stage which
the proceedings have reached before a remedy is sought
Abatement of taxes. There are always methods in which one
who is wrongfully assessed for taxation, or unequally taxed, may
have abatement of the assessment or tax without resort to the
customary legal remedies. While the assessor still has the list or
roll in his hands uncompleted, he may abate any assessment on
his own motion, or on application, when satisfied that it is either
wholly or in part illegal or unjust No statute could be neces
sary for this. But when the assessment has passed from his
hands, the right to an abatement must in general depend upon
the statute. No doubt the legislature might abate taxes, and
probably the proper legislative authority of a municipality might
do the same as regards a municipal tax, where no legislative or
constitutional provision was in the way ; but taxing officers or
boards must have special authority to warrant their doing so. In
the absence of special authority, they are to accept the assessment
as legal and just, and levy and collect the taxes accordingly.
The remedy usually given is by
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Reviews and appeals. The reviews may perhaps be directed
to be had by the assessors themselves ; the appeals will of course
be to some court or appellate board. The abatement may be
total, where one is unlawfully taxed, or taxed, for exempt prop
erty or property he does not own,1 or it may be partial, where
the complaint is only that the valuation is excessive.8 In either
case, one applying for an abatement must comply strictly with the
provisions of the statute which confers the right.8
When the tax is illegal, one is not obliged to apply for an
abatement, unless the statute makes that the sole remedy ; but
he may contest the tax when attempt is made to collect it But
for a merely excessive or unequal assessment, where no principle
of law is violated in making it
,
and the complaint is of an error
of judgment only, the sole remedy is an application for an abate
ment, either to the assessors or to such statutory board as has
been provided for hearing it If fraud is charged, equity may
interfere, but equity has no jurisdiction under its general powers
to correct a merely unequal or unjust assessment when there is a
statutory board that may do so.4 And this principle is applicable
1 State e. Ormsby County, 7 Nev., 392. Authority to abate taxes for over
valuation will not embrace a case where one complains that he is assessed for
property he does not own. Walker v. Cochran, 8 N. H., 166.
• State v. Powers, 24 N. J., 406; Phillips e. Stevens Point, 25 Wis., 594.
• State v. Parker, 34 N. J., 49 ; State v. Bishop, id., 45 ; Otis Co. v. Ware, 8
Gray, 509.
4 Stafford v. Albany, 6 Johns., 1 ; S. C, 7 id., 541 ; Matter of Beekman
St., 20 id , 269; Matter of Canal St., 11 Wend., 154; Matter of Mount Mor
ris Square, 2 Hill, 14; Matter of Canal and Walker Sts., 12 N. Y., 406; Peti
tion of Eager, 46 id., 100; Western R. R. Co.v. Nolan, 48 id., 513; Kimber «.
Schuylkill Co., 20 Penn. St., 366; Hughes v. Kline, 30 id., 227; Wharton v.
Birmingham, 37 id., 371; Clinton School District's Appeal, 56 id., 315;
Stewart e. Maple, 70 id., 221 ; Everitt's Appeal, 71 id., 216 ; County Court v.
Marr, 8 Humph., 634; Holton v. Bangor, 23 Maine, 264; Stickney v. Bangor,
30 id., 404; Gilpatrick v. Saco, 57 id., 277; Gravel Road Co. e. Black, 32 IxuL,
468; Richardson v. Scott, 47 Miss., 236. See Brook v. Shelton, 47 id., 243;
Weaver v. State, 39 Ala., 535 ; Andrews v. Rumsay, Sup. Ct. 11l. (1875), 7
Chicago Legal News, 321, citing Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. e. Frary, 23
11l., 34; Munson v.Minor, 22 id., 594; Cook County e. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co.,
35 id., 460; Du Page County v. Jenks, 65 id., 278. When a person is liable
to taxation in personal or real estate in a particular district, his sole remedy
for excessive valuation, or for including in the assessment property of which
he is not the owner, or for which he is not liable tr taxation, is by application
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to the determination of boards of equalization. If they are prop
erly constituted, there is no appeal from their determination in mat
ters of judgment, where the statute gives none.1 For a merely irreg
ular assessment the statutory remedy is also the exclusive remedy.
It is supposed to be adequate to all the requirements of justice,
and it is the party's own folly if he fails to avail himself of it2
And if he appeals to the statutory tribunal and is dissatisfied
with its judgment, he is nevertheless concluded by it8
An assessment made without jurisdiction is of course illegal,
and may be disregarded on that ground.4 And the action of an
appellate board is held not to be binding where the board itself
has disobeyed the law, to the prejudice of parties. If, by law, it
is to meet at one time, but meets at another, when parties have
to the assessors for an abatement. Bourne v. Boston, 2 Gray, 494, 496, citing
Howe v. Boston, 7 Cush., 273; Lincoln v. Worcester, 8 id., 55: compare Lee
e. Templeton, 6 Gray, 579. This doctrine applied to one properly taxed for
real estate in a town, but improperly taxed for other real estate not in the town.
Salmond v. Hanover, 13 Allen, 119. But compare Bailly v. Buell, 59 Barb.,
158.
1Rhodes v. Cushman, 45 Ind., 85. No fraud was charged, but error only.
»Windsor v. Field,l Conn., 279; Hughes v. Kline, 30 Penn. St., 230; Aldrich
v. Railroad Co., 21 N. H., 359 ; Conlin e. Seaman, 22 Cal., 546 ; Chambers e.
Satterlee, 40 id., 497, 519 ; Emery v. Bradford, 29 id., 75 ; Nolan v. Reese, 32
id., 484; Peoria v. Kidder, 26 11l., 351; Deane v. Todd, 22 Mo., 90. In Mary
land, it is said if the party fails to avail himself of the remedy given by stat
ute, he cannot come into equity unless he makes out a very clear case; by
which is meant, doubtless, a case within the ordinary jurisdiction of equity.
Church e.Baltimore, 6 Gill, 391 ; O'Neal v. Bridge Co., 18 Md., 1.
8Weaver v. State, 39 Ala., 535. Suit will not lie at law for the levy of an
irregular or excessive assessment which might be corrected on review or ap
peal. Wright v. Boston, 9 Cush., 233; Bourne v. Boston, 2 Gray, 494; Com
monwealth v. Cary, etc., Co., 98 Mass., 19. When special appeal to a subordi
nate court is given there can be no appeal thence to the supreme court unless
expressly given, but certiorari will lie to review regularity. Kimber v.
Schuylkill Co., 20 Penn. St., 366. Where the right is given to any person to
appeal from a special assessment, the city against whom an assessment is
made may appeal. Matter of Opening of Streets, 20 La. An., 497.
4See Commonwealth «. Cary, etc., Co., 98 Mass., 19; Weller v. St. Paul, 5
Minn., 95. An act that proceedings on the sale of land for local improve
ments shall not be questioned collaterally, but may, at any time, be reviewed
by certiorari, or other proper proceeding, in the supreme or circuit court, sus-
tained. State v. Jersey City, 35 N. J., 381. And see Smith e. Cleveland, 17
Wis., 556.
34
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neither actual nor constructive notice to appear, its action is in
valid ; and so it will be if the statute requires notice to be given
of its meetings, and the notice does not appear by the record of
the board to have been given.1
Refunding taxes. This is only an abatement, made after the
tax has been paid or enforced. A general right exists in the
state to refund any tax collected for its purposes, and a corres
ponding right probably exists in the common council, or other
proper boards, of cities, villages, towns, etc., to refund to individ
uals any sums paid by them as corporate taxes, which are found
to have been wrongfully exacted, or are believed to be for any
reason inequitable. But no executive or ministerial officer could
have any such authority, unless expressly given by law.
Remedy by certiorari. At the common law the writ of cer
tiorari lies to remove into the supreme court of judicature the
proceedings of inferior tribunals, in order that their errors may
be corrected when it is alleged that they have exceeded their
jurisdiction. In some of the states, considerable use has been
made of this writ in tax cases, sometimes with, and sometimes
without, statutory regulations. When the writ is by statute, a
broader scope may be, and usually is
,
given to it than it has at
the common law.2 The common law writ is not one of right, but
is granted on the special facts ; and the court has a discretion to
refuse to grant it in any case, when great mischiefs might be likely
to follow the setting aside the proceedings complained of.8 It may
even dismiss the writ after it has been granted, without a consid
eration of the merits, if, in the opinion of the court, it was granted
1 Nixon v. Ruple, 30 N. J., 58. In Kelly e. Corson, 12 Wis., 610, the effect of
errors in the action of a hoard of equalization was considered by Cole, J., and
the conclusion reached, that errors committed hy the board when acting in
good faith will not invalidate their action, or give a right of action to one
who cannot show that he was injured thereby.
»When the relief sought by the applicants would affect all other tax payers
and residents of a town equally with themselves, in arresting the collection
of an alleged illegal tax, it has been held that it should be denied unless ap
plied for by all. Libby v. West St. Paul, 14 Minn., 248.
8 In Fractional School District v. The Joint Board, 27 Mich., 3, the writ waj
refused when applied for to review the proceedings in establishing a school
district, fifteen months after the action had been taken; the district in the
meantime having organized and taken upon itself corporate functions.
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improvidently.1 The writ must be applied for in due season, and
before the proceeding, which it is desired to review, has passed
beyond the control of the tribunal in which it was taken. If
,
therefore, the writ is issued to review the action of assessors,
after the assessment roll has passed from their hands into the
hands of the supervisor, it will be dismissed for that reason.2 The
writ is not awarded to review political action, and, therefore, the
action of a town or any other municipality, or of any of the local
boards, in determining upon the purposes for which taxes shall
be levied, or the time and manner of levying them, when that is
committed to their judgment, or of causing the sums to be levied,
or the objects of expenditure, or anything of a like nature, is not
subject to review by means of it.8 The writ will be refused where
an appeal is given which affords an adequate remedy, or, in other
words, which is not so restricted in its scope as to preclude the
party from a review of the errors of which he complains.4 It will
1Magee v. Cutler, 43 Barb., 239; People v. Supervisors of Allegany, 15
Wend., 198; Susquehanna Bank v. Supervisors of Broome, 25 N. Y., 312;
Matter of Lantis, 9 Mich., 324. The writ should not be allowed where the
purpose is merely to enable a party to recover back taxes paid, by procuring
a reversal of the proceedings. People v. Commissioners of Taxes, 43 Barb.,
494; People v. Reddy, id., 539.
•People «. Delaney, 49 N. Y., 655. See People e. Supervisors of Queens,
1 Hill, 195, 199.
8People v. Supervisors of Allegany, 15 Wend., 198 ; Benton v. Taylor, 46
Ala., 388. See Dwight e. Springfield, 4 Gray, 107 ; Dillon, Mun. Corp., §§
739-743.
* The New York decisions on the subject of the remedy of certiorari are
very numerous, and in People e. Betts, 55 N. Y., 600, 602, they are reviewed
by Folger, J., in the following language: " The office of a common law eer-
tiorari is, in strictness, merely to bring up the record of the proceedings of
an inferior court or tribunal, to enable the court of review to determine
whether the former has proceeded within its jurisdiction ; and not to correct
mere errors in its proceedings. People e. Commissioners of Highways, etc , 30
N. Y., 72. True, it has been sometimes intimated, and sometimes held, that in
the absence of any other remedy, and to prevent a failure of justice, the party
will be suffered by it to bring up, not only the naked question of jurisdiction,
but the evidence, as wetl as the ground or principles on which the inferior
body acted, and the questions of law on which the relator relies. Susquehan
na Bank v. Supervisors, etc., 25 N. Y., 312; Baldwin e. Buffalo, 35 id., 380;
Swift v. Poughkeepsie, 37 id., 511. Many cases are cited in the People v. As
sessors, 39 N. Y., 81, and it is there held that the office of the writ extends to
the review of all questions of jurisdiction, power and authority of inferioJ
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not lie to review any merely discretionary action of any tribunal ; 1
nor is it within the proper scope of the writ to review the decis
ions of inferior tribunals on the merits. The court awarding it
,
therefore, will not look into the evidence on which the inferior
tribunal may have acted, except so far as may be necessary to
the determination of any jurisdictional question that may depend
upon it.2 The proper office of the writ is to ascertain whether
tribunals to do the acts complained of, and to all questions of regularity of
their proceedings. In People e. Assessors, 40 N. Y., 154, it is held thai the
writ may bring up for review, the decision that a given state of facts is not
legally sufficient to compel a board of assessors to the conclusion that certain
property was not liable to assessment: in other words, a decision of law. Sec
also People v. Board, etc., 39 N. Y., 506; Freeman «. Ogden, 40 id., 105; Peo
ple e. Hamilton, 39 id., 107; Western R. R. Co. e. Nolan, 48 id., 513. In Peo
ple e. Delaney, 49 N. Y., 655, inclining the other way, it was held that a de
parture by assessors from the statutory standard for estimating the value of
property on the assessment roll cannot be corrected on certiorari. In People
v. Supervisors, etc., 51 N. Y., 442, it was held that it was the office of a «ertio
rari to review the determinations of inferior boards where a claim was re
jected, as not just or legal. And in People «. Allen, 52 N. Y., 538, a «ertiorari
brought up for review the decision of the defendants upon a question of law.
It is thus seen that the office of a common law writ of certiorari has been
somewhat enlarged since the decision in 30 N. Y., supra. But it will also
be seen that it is in cases where the relator has no other available remedy, and
where injustice -would be done if the writ was not permitted to do its work.
The rule still remains unimpaired, at least in principle, that where there is a
remedy by appeal, the writ will be confined to its original and more appro
priate office. Storm v. Odell, 2Wend., 287. See also In re Mt. Morris Square,
2 Hill, 14, 27." To the foregoing may be added People v. Nearing, 27 N. Y.,
306. That certiorari does not lie where there is an adequate remedy by ap
peal, see Withowski v. Skalowski, 46 Geo., 41 ; Peacock v. Leonard, 8 Nev.,
84, 157, 247; State v. Apgar, 31 N. J., 358; Macklot «. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 379;
State v. Bentley, 23 N. J., 532. When in assessing upon abutting lots the ex
pense of a local improvement, a jury is allowed on their demand to parties
dissatisfied with the assessment, the demand for a jury is the proper remedy
for an excessive assessment and not certiorari. Jones e. Boston, 104 Mass.,
461, citing North Reading v. County Commissioners, 7 Gray, 109: and see
Whiting v. Boston, 106 Mass., 89.
1 The action of the auditor general in charging back certain taxes to a
county in his settlement with it
,
being within his official discretion, cannot be
reviewed on certiorari. Supervisors of Midland v. Auditor General, 27 Mich.,
165.
* Matter of Mount Morris Square, 2 Hill, 14, 27, per Cowen, J., citing Rex «.
Moreley, 2 Burr., 1040, 1042 ; Philadelphia and Trenton R. R. Co., 6 Whart., 25,
41. And see Jackson v. People, 9 Mich., Ill ; Low «. Galena, etc., R. R Co.,
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the inferior tribunal has acted in a case of which it had jurisdic
tion, and has lawfully exercised its jurisdiction in what it has as
sumed to do: to keep the inferior tribunal within the limits of
the law, and not to make its judgments conform to the opinion of
the superior tribunal on the facts.
The following conclusions are deduced by the authorities from
these general principles : That the writ does not lie to the collec
tor of taxes or any other mere ministerial officer to review either
his action, or any of the prior action on which his own was based ; 1
that assessments cannot be revised and set aside on this writ on
the ground merely that they are excessive or unequal ; 8 or that
the assessors have erred in any matter of judgment, or have been
guilty of irregularities in the exercise of their authority, not being
of a nature to deprive them of jurisdiction or to take from the
party complaining any substantial right8 The discretionary ac-
18 11l., 324; Commissioners v. Supervisors of Carthage, 27 11l., 140; Central
Pacific R. R. Co. v. Placer Co., 43 Cal., 365; Swift e. Poughkeepsie, 37 N. Y.,
511 ; People v. Assessors of Brooklyn, 39 id., 81. See the general subject con
sidered: Carson v. Martin, 26 N. J., 594; Gaertner v. Fond du Lac, 34 Wis.,
497 ; People v. Assessors of Brooklyn, 39 N. Y., 81, 88 ; People v. Assessors of
Albany, 40 N. Y., 154. While valuations are not subject to review on certio
rari, if the assessors enter on the roll property not subject to taxation, and re-
fuse on application to strike it out, the action, it is held, may be reviewed in
this mode. People e. Ogdensburg, 48 N. Y., 390. Mandamus would seem,
however, to be a more appropriate remedy. The writ will lie in the case of a
warrant issued by a justice of the peace to collect militia penalties. State e.
Kirby, 6 N. J., 143.
1People v. Supervisors of Queens, 1 Hill, 195. This was a case in which
counsel moved for a certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, " or some other writ,
instrument, process, order or proceeding," to review the action of town audi
tors in allowing a large sum against the town, for the expense of certain suits
which it was claimed were not a proper charge against it. The errors com
plained of all originated in this allowance. The tax roll was at the time in
the collector's hands, and the court held that no relief could be given in any
of the modes proposed.
8Owners of Ground v. Albany, 15 Wend., 374 ; People v. Ogdensburgh, 48
N. Y., 390; Jones e. Boston, 104 Mass., 461 ; Randle v. Williams, 18 Ark., 380;
State v. Kingsland 23 N. J., 85 ; State e. Ross, id., 517 ; State v. Danser, id.,
552; State v. Powers, 24 id., 400; State v. Manchester, 25 id., 531.
» Jones v. Boston, 104 Mass., 461 ; People v. Fredricks, 48 Barb., 173 ; New
ark ads. State, 32 N. J., 453; State e. Newark, id., 491; Matter of Mount
Morris Square, 2 Hill, 14. If a corporation, in opening a street and assess
ing the expense, act within the scope of the authority conferred upon it
,
and
LAW OF TAXATION. [cn. xxiV.
tion of a county board in equalizing the assessments of the county,
like the assessments themselves, is not subject to review on this
process.1 In the following cases action may be set aside on cer
tiorari: Where the assessment is erroneous in point of law, either
because the assessors have adopted some inadmissible basis in
making it
,
or because they have disregarded any of the mandatory
provisions of statute on which parties assessed have a right to
rely for their protection ; 2 where errors of a like character are com
mitted by any appellate jurisdiction which is empowered by stat
ute to review, revise or equalize the assessments ; 8 and where muni-
comply with the forms prescribed by the statute, the proceedings will not be
reversed on certiorari, though its own by-laws may have been disregarded.
Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend., 276. But where there are ques
tions of jurisdiction in the appointment of commissioners to make the as
sessment, certiorari will lie. Patchin v. Brooklyn, 13 Wend., 664. An assess
ment will not be set aside because of its including property not taxable with
that which is, if the whole valuation is not excessive for that which is taxa
ble. State v. Haight, 35 N. J., 178.
1 Smith v. Supervisors of Jones Co., 30 Iowa, 531; People e. Supervisors of
Allegany, 15Wend., 198 ; People v. Supervisors of Queens, 1 Hill, 195.
» See Newburyporte. County Commissioners, 12 Met., 211 (where the question
was whether the commissioners were not legally bound to assess at the valua
tion which the tax payer had given in the list which he had furnished as re
quired by law); Hey wood v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y., 534; Genesee, etc., Bank e. Liv
ingston Co., 53 Barb., 223 ; Hatch v. Buffalo, 38 N. Y., 276 ; People v. Ogdens-
burgh, 48 id., 390; State v. Clothier, 30 N. J., 351 (where it is held that «er
tiorari may be brought though the tax has been collected by distress and sale:
But see, as to this, National Bank of Chemung v. Blmira, 53 N. Y., 49) ; Ohio,
etc., R. R.Co.v. Lawrence Co., 27 11l., 50; State «. McClurg 27 N. J., 253
(where it is decided that if an excessive tax is assessed it will be set aside for
the excess only); State v. Quaife, 23 N. J., 89 (where a similar ruling was
had); State «. Newark, 27 id., 185 (where, on certiorari, an assessment was
set aside which assumed to be made by benefits, where from the nature of
the case there could be no benefits) ; California, etc., R. R. Co., e. Supervisors
of Butte, 18 Cal., 671 ; Swann v. Cumberland, 8 Gill, 150; Buckner Ex parte, 4
Eng. (Ark.) 73; Carroll e. Mayor, 12 Ala., 173.
8 In New York, where street assessments were to be submitted to the com
mon council for confirmation, and that body was empowered to alter the
same in such manner as, in its opinion, justice might require, the act of con
firmation was held to be an exercise of judicial authority, and subject to be re-
moved into the supreme court by certiorari. Leroy v. New York, 20 Johns.,
430; Starr v. Rochester, 6 Wend., 564; Matter of Mount Morris Square, 2 Hill,
14; People v. New York, 5 Barb., 43; People e. Brooklyn, 9 id., 535. So in
Massachusetts, the proceedings of county commissioners in reviewing assess
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cipal bodies in levying assessments for local improvements exceed
their authority, or lay down erroneous principles to govern the
action of the assessors or commissioners who are to make them.1
In reviewing a case on certiorari the court is confined to the
rerord of the tribunal reviewed. Extrinsic evidence cannot be
received to contradict or control it.2 If the tax is rendered ille
gal by facts not appearing of record, some other remedy must be
sought.8 On certiorari the court will not set aside the whole of a
tax proceeding if justice can be done to the party without doing
so,4 unless, perhaps, where by law, in case it is vacated, there can
be a new assessment ; in which case, vacating the whole may
be most likely to accomplish the general purposes of the law for
making the levy.5
ments on appeal were held reviewable in this mode. See Parks «. Boston, 8
Pick., 218; Gibbs e. County Commissioners, 19 id., 298; Newburyport «.
County Commissioners, 12 Met., 211; Lincoln e. Worcester, 8 Cush., 55, 61.
A similar ruling in New Jersey: State v. Falkinburge, 15 N. J., 320; State «
Parker, 34 id., 49. And in Missouri : State v. St. Louis County Court, 47 Mo.,
'
594; State v. Dowling, 50 id., 134. And see Floyd v. Gilbreath, 27 Ark., 675.
1In New Jersey, it is said that the action of municipal bodies in levying as
sessments for local improvements must be kept strictly within the limits as
signed to them by the statute, and if the assessments appear not to be within
those limits, they shall not only be liable to reversal on certiorari, but also be
held void and insufficient to support a title professing to be founded on them.
State v. Jersey City, 35 N. J., 381 ; State «. Hudson City, 29 id., 104, 475.
* Charlcstown v. County Commissioners, 109 Mass., 270. See Hatch v. Buf
falo, 38 N. Y., 276.
•Floyd v. Gilbreath, 27 Ark., 675 ; Hatch v. Buffalo, 38 N. Y, 276.
4State v. Kingsland, 23 N. J., 83, 88. In this case, Carpenter, J., says : " But
though this vote was illegal, we do not think we are bound to proceed under
this writ, and set the vote and proceedings aside. The money has been col.
lected and disbursed under that vote without objection, so far as it appears,
except on the part of the prosecutor, Cornelins Van Vorst. Mueh inconven-
ience might result from such judgment to the township, while, on the other
hand, it is not necessary for the protection of Mr. Van Vorst, whose grievance
will be redressed under another writ. The power of the court to restrain
such proceedings, and which was exerted in the case of The State v. Albright,
is indisputable. But there are cases when the courts/will not interfere with
the assessment of taxes, from regard to the public inconvenience, and particu
larly when not necessary for the protection of any individal who may com
plain. The writ will, in tho discretion of the court, under such circum
stances, be refused or dismissed. King v. King, 2 T. R., 235; Lawton e. Com-
missioners of Highways, 2 Caines, 182 ; Ryerson, J., 3 Green, 323."
' State v. Bergen, 34 N. J., 438. But whether on certiorari the court will sel
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Enjoining collection. To entitle a party to relief in equity
against an illegal tax, he must by his bill bring his case under
some acknowledged head of equity jurisdiction. The illegality
of the tax alone, or the threat to sell property for its satisfaction,
can not, of themselves, furnish any ground for equitable interpo
sition.1 In ordinary cases a party must find his remedy in the
courts of law, and it is not to be supposed he will fail to find one
adequate to his proper relief. Cases of fraud, accident or mis
take, cases of cloud upon the title to one's property, and cases
where one is threatened with irremediable mischief, may demand
other remedies than those the common law can give, and these in
proper cases may be afforded in the courts of equity.
The available remedy in equity, when any is admissible, is com
monly that by injunction. It is probable that this remedy has
many times been awarded in equity with too little regard to any
other consequences than those which concerned the individual ap
plying for it. But the personal consequences are not the only ones
which must be kept in view in these cases. When the illegalities
complained of affect only the person complaining, an injunction
which restrains the collection as to him may cause no considera
ble mischief, and may very properly be awarded if a sufficient
case is made out; but when they affect the whole tax levy, as
they often do, a court should be extremely cautious in awarding,
on the complaint of one person, or even of several, a process which
may reach the cases of others not complaining, and which may
seriously embarrass all the operations of the government depend
ing on the source of revenue which by means of it would be
aside an assessment after an act of the legislature to confirm it
,
even though
that act be invalid, see State v. Apgar, 31 id., 358.
1 Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall, 108; Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 id., 547;
Savings and Loan Society v. Austin, 46 Cal., 415, 488; Floyd e. Gilbreath, 27
Ark., 675; Mooers v. Smedley, 6 Johns. Ch., 27; Messeck v. Supervisors of
Columbia, 50 Barb., 190; Hanlon v. West Chester County, 57 id., 383; Hcy-
wood v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y., 534; Susquehanna Bank v. Broome County, 25 id.,
312; McDonald e. Murphrce, 45 Miss., 705; Sayre v. Tompkins, 23 Mo., 443;
First National Bank of Hannibal v. Meredith, 44 id., 500; Barrow v. Davis, 46
id., 394; McPike e.Pew, 48 id., 525; U. P. R. R. Co. v. Lincoln County, 2 Dill.,
297; Weaver v. State, 39 Ala., 535; Cook County v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 35
11l., 460. But see Williams v. Pinney, 25 Iowa, 436; Jeffersonville v. Patter
son, 32 Ind., 140; Burnes v. Leavenworth, 2 Kans., 454; Warden v. Supervi-
sors, 14 Wis., 618.
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stopped.
" How," it has been justly remarked, "could a govern
ment calculate with any certainty upon the revenues, if the col
lection of the taxes was subject to be arrested in every instance
in which a tax payer or tax collector could make out prima facie
a technical case for arresting such collection? Far better is it
* * to let the individual pay to the government what it de
mands of him, at the time of the demand, as he will be certain of
getting it back with interest, after more or less delay, if it was not
due." 1 So serious have been the embarrassments by an improvi
dent employment of the writ of injunction and other obstructive
process, that the legislature has in some cases deemed it necessary
to interpose and forbid the issue of injunction, replevin or other
specified writs, the tendency of which would be to embarrass col
lections.2 The courts also have sometimes imposed conditions to
equitable remedies in cases where they deemed the public interest
to demand it. Thus where an injunction has been applied for to
restrain the collection of a tax, partly legal and partly not, the
court has made the payment of the legal a condition precedent,8
1Benning, J., in Eve v. State, 21 Geo., 50. This approved in Cody e. Lennard,
45 id., 85, where it was held that the act providing that "no replevin shall
lie, or any judicial interference be had in any levy or distress for taxes under
this law, but the party injured shall be left to his proper remedy in any court
of law," was valid. The party must pay the tax, even though illegal, and
pursue his remedy against the collector. See also Scofield v. Perkerson, 46
Geo., 350.
8That restraining collection of taxes may be prohibited, see Pullan v. Kin-
singer, 2 Abb. U. S., 94 ; 9 Am. L. Reg., N. 3., 557.
•Conway v. Waverley, 15 Mich., 257; Palmer v. Napoleon, 16 id., 176;
Hersey v. Milwaukee County, 16Wis., 185; Bond e. Kenosha, 17 id., 284; Myrick
v. La Crosse, 17 id., 442; Mills v. Johnson, 17 id., 598; Mills v. Charleston,
29 id., 400 ; Dean v. Borchsenins, 30 id., 236 ; O'Kane v. Treat, 25 11l., 557 ;
Taylor e. Thompson, 42 id., 9 ; Briscoe v. Allison, 43 id., 291 ; Reed v. Tyler,
56 id., 288; Barnett e. Cline, 60 id., 205; Harrison v. Haas, 25 Ind., 281; Rose-
berry t>.Huff, 27 id., 12 ; Board of Commissioners v. Elston, 32 id., 27 ; Ad
ams v. Castle, 30 Conn., 404; Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa, 271; Corbin v.
Woodbine, 33 id., 297; Shelton v. Dunn, 6 Kans., 128; Lawrence v. Killam, 11
id., 499; Twombly v. Kimbrough, 24 Ark., 459; Frazer v. Siebern, 16 Ohio,
N. S., 614. If the tax is excessive by reason of the list not including some
lots which should have been embraced, the collection will not be enjoined un
til the amount really chargeable to complainant has been paid. Ottowa v.
Barnes, 10 Kans., 270. If the bill shows precisely the amount of the excess
of the taxes which are claimed to be illegal, and only asks to have the collec
tion of the illegal taxes restrained, the bill will not be dismissed for want of
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and it has been strongly intimated, in a case where it was alleged
that by fraud the assessment had been made too high, that the
payment of what the party conceded would be his just proportion,
ought to be required before injunction should issue, in order that
the proceeding may be as little as possible injurious to the public
interest.1
Personal Taxes. When a tax is assessed as a personal charge
against the party taxed, or against his personal property, it is difficult
to suggest any ground of equitable jurisdiction. Presumptively the
remedy at law is adequate. If the tax is illegal and the party makes
payment, he is entitled to recover back the amount The case does
not differ in this regard from any other case in which a party is com
pelled to pay an illegal demand ; the illegality alone affords no
ground for equitable interference, and the proceedings to enforce the
tax by distress and sale can give none, as these only constitute an or
dinary trespass. To this point the decisions are numerous.2 The
exceptions to this rule, if any, must be of cases which are to be
a formal offer to pay the legal taxes. Clement v. Everest, 29 Mich., 19. Com
pare Board of Commissioners v. Elston, 32 Ind., 27. If the legal and illegal
taxes are so blended that they cannot be distinguished, a prohibition may go
for the whole. State v. Hodges, 14 Rich., 2/i6.
1Merrill e. Humphrey, 24 Mich., 170; Frazer e. Siebern, 16 Ohio, N. S., 614.
Where a bill is filed praying that the levy of state, county and township taxes
be restrained, alleging them all to be invalid, if complainant fails to show any
illegality in the state and county taxes, the bill will be dismissed. Pillsbury
e. Auditor General, 26 Mich., 245.
»Brewer e. Springfield, 97 Mass., 152; Durant e. Eaton, 98 id., 469; Loud e.
Charlestown, 99 id., 208 ; Whiting e. Boston, 106 id., 89 ; Hunuewell v. Charles-
town, 106 id., 350; Rockingham Savings Bank v. Portsmouth, 62 N. H.,17; Rit-
terv. Patch, 12 Cal., 298; Berri v. Patch, 12 id., 299; Worth v. Fayetteville,
Winst. Eq. (N. C), 70; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich., 560; Conley v. Chedic, 6
Nev., 222; Van Cott v. Supervisors of Milwaukee, 18 Wis., 247; Greene v.
Mumford, 5 R. I.,4»2; McCoy v. Chillicothe, 3 Ohio, 370; Dodd v. Hartford,
25 Conn., 232; Sayre v. Tompkins, 23 Mo., 443; Barrow v. Davis, 46 id., 394;
McPike v. Peru, 48 id., 525; Hopkins v. Lovell, 47 id., 102; Leslie e. St. Louis,
47 id., 474; Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 id., 20; Fowler v. St. Joseph, 37 id., 228;
Deane v. Todd, 22 id., 90. The doctrine of these cases is very succinctly
stated by Bigelow, Ch. J., in Brewer v. Springfield, 97 Mass., 152, 154. " Until
the plaintiffs have been compelled to pay the tax which they allege to have
been illegally assessed upon them, they have suffered no wrong. When they
have paid it they can recover it back by an action at law, which would furnish
them an adequate and complete remedy." Sec also Brooklyn v. Messerole, 26
Weud., 132.
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classed under the head of irreparable injury ; as when the enforce
ment of a tax might destroy a valuable franchise or when prop
erty is levied upon which possesses a peculiar value to the owner
beyond any possible market value it can have ;8 and other like
cases where the recovery of damages would be inadequate redress.
It must be conceded, however, that the cases in some states go
further, and sustain the remedy by injunction in all cases of illegal
taxation ; proceeding in doing so upon the ground that " when
officers or individuals have no legal authority to lay a tax, and
they assume the right ; or when persons are vested with the legal
authority to lay a tax for a specified purpose, but instead of exer
cising that power they proceed to impose a tax which the law has
not authorized, or lay it for fraudulent or unauthorized purposes;
then a court of equity will interpose to afford preventive relief,
by restraining the exercise of powers perverted to fraudulent or
oppressive purposes." s B ut in the large majority of cases in which
taxes are illegal, there is no fraud, actual or intended, and the
illegality consists in an erroneous construction of powers, or in the
unintentional omission of some necessary proceeding, or in other
defect not inconsistent with good faith on the part of officers ; and
it seems a great stretch of equitable principles to treat such a case
as one of legal fraud, and to be remedied on that ground. The equi
table jurisdiction in these cases has grown up somewhat impercepti
bly, and perhaps owes its origin as much to an idea that municipal
officers, in the authority which affects the property of the people, are
exercising a trust over which equity may properly assume a supervi
sion, as to any supposed fraud, actual or constructive, which may be
involved in their illegal action.4 In view of ihe conflict in the de-
1Osborne e. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat., 738, where an officer was en
joined from enforcing a heavy state tax unlawfully laid on a branch of the
Bank of the United States, on the ground that to enforce it would drive the
bank from the state and work irreparable mischief. See Poote v. Linck, 5
McLean, 616.
sSee Henry v. Gregory, 29 Mich., 68, 70.
•Drake v. Phillips, 40 11ls., 388, 393, per Walker, Ch. J. See also Foote v.
Milwaukee, 18 Wis., 270; Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. La Fayette, 22 Ind., 262;
Commissioners of Clay Co. v. Markle, 46 id., 96; Knight v. Flatrock, etc., Co.,
45 id., 134; Shoemaker v. Grant Co., 36 id., 175 ; Riley v. Western Union Tele
graph Co., 47 id., 511 ; Spencer v. Wheaton, 14 Iowa, 38 ; St. Clair Board's Ap
peal, 74 Penn. St., 252.
*Mr. High, in his valuable Treatise on the Law of Injunctions, says : "It wiH
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cisions regarding the basis of equitable jurisdiction, it seems advis
able to classify somewhat the cases which have been decided,
indicating, wherever necessary, the points of divergence.
Preliminary Action. The action of the proper authorities in
voting a tax cannot be restrained on the ground that they are
voting more than is necessary for the purpose ; 1 nor on an allega
tion that there is an intent to appropriate some portion of the sum
voted to a purpose not authorized by law ; 2 no* because com
plainant is injured by unreasonable delay in doing the work for
which the tax is laid,8 nor can the making of an assessment be
enjoined, the act being judicial.4
Excessive Assessments. For excessive assessments, when fraud
is not charged, there can be no relief in equity. The remedy
must be such as the statute has given.'
Irregular Taxation. A tax will not be restrained on the ground
merely that it is irregular or erroneous. Errors in the assessment
do not render the tax void, nor, as a general rule, do they consti
tute any reason whatever against its being strictly enforced. But
however that may be in any particular case, the law has provided
be found on examination that courts of equity have been inclined, in the case
of assessments by municipal corporations, to relax somewhat the stringency of
the rule of noninterference as applied to the collection of state taxes. Though
it is difficult to perceive any sufficient reason for such distinction, yet the
distinction itself remains." § 369.
1Wharton v. School Directors, 42 Penn. St., 358. The levy of a tax within
the limits of legislative authority is an act of sound discretion, and cannot
render the board ordering it liable to the parties whose property is taken for
its satisfaction. Moore,e. School Directors, 59 Penn. St, 232.
♦Truesdell's Appeal, 58 Penn. St., 148. The principle was involved in Mor-
gan v. Graham, 1 Woods, 124, in which it was attempted to restrain state
officers from issuing bonds under what was alleged to be an unconstitutional
law.
•Whiting v. Boston, 106 Mass., 89.
4Western R. R. Co. v. Nolan, 48 N. Y., 513.
•Kimber v. Schuylkill, 20 Penn. St., 366; Hughes v. Kline, 30 id., 227; Ever-
ett's Appeal, 71 id., 216; Hutchinson v. Pittsburgh, 72 id., 320. An injunc
tion would seem to be the appropriate remedy where a town makes discrim
inations in the discounts on taxes, this not rendering the tax illegal. Toby v.
Wareham, 2 Allen, 594. Equity can not relieve on the ground of the tax hav
ing become burdensome by depreciation of property. White Sulphur Springs
Co. v. Robinson, 3 W. Va., 542.
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remedies for all such mere irregularities and errors as do not go
to the foundation of the tax, and parties complaining must be
confined to these. In this the authorities are agreed.1 But it is
not a mere irregularity when one is denied his legal right to work
out a road tax, and the amount is demanded in money,2 nor when
a tax once paid is demanded a second time ; 8 nor when property
is unlawfully exempted from taxation, thereby increasing the
burden upon complainant;4 nor when property which is exempt
from taxation by law is assessed ; 5 nor when one's assessment
has been increased without giving him the notice to which by law
he is entitled. In all these cases the party taxed is denied a sub
stantial right, or his tax is unlawfully increased beyond his due
proportion, and his right to an adequate remedy is unquestiona
ble. If, however, the tax is a personal tax only, it will appear
from the references to decisions, which have already been made,
that in a majority of the states the remedy by injunction would
not be given, and the party would be turned over to his suit at law.7
1Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall., 108; Hughes v. Kline, 30 Penn. St., 227; Clin-
ton, etc., Appeal, 56 id., 315; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. e. Frary, 22 111.,34; State
e. Bremond, 38 Texas, 116; Jones v. Summer, 27 Ind., 510; Center, etc., Co.
«. Black, 32 id., 468 ; Ottowa v. Walker, 21 11l., 605 ; Metz v. Anderson, 23 id.,
463; O'Neal e. Virginia, etc., Co., 18 Md., 1; Mills v. Gleason, 11 "Wis., 470;
Mills v. Johnson, 17 id., 598; Brooklyn v. Messerole, 26 Wend., 132; Marklot
v. Davenport 17 Iowa, 379; West « Whittaker, 37 id., 598; Dodd v. Hart
ford, 25 Conn., 232; Greene v. Mumford, 5 R. L, 472; Lawrence e. Killam, 11
Kans., 499 ; Smith e. Leavenworth, 9 id., 296 ; Kansas Pacific R. R Co. v. Rus-
sel, 8 id., 558; Merrill e. Gorham, 6 Cal., 41. If equity should give relief on
the ground of a mere irregularity, it would require payment of the tax as a
condition. Savings and Loan Society v. Ordway, 38 Cal., 679. Equity will
not relieve on the ground of a very slight excess in the levy. Smith v. Leav
enworth, 9 Kans., 296. Nor on the ground of an illegal tax collected of com
plainant in former years. Fremont v. Mariposa County, 11 Cal., 361.
»Miller v. Gorman, 38 Penn. St., 309.
8Commonwealth v. Supervisors of Colby, 29 Penn. St., 121. To entitle one
to relief from double taxation, it must appear that he has paid once. Savings
and Loan Society v. Austin, 46 Cal., 415.
411linois Central B. R. Co. v. McLean County, 17 11l., 291 ; Mott v. Pennsyl
vania R. R. Co., 30 Penn. St., 9. See what is said on this subject, ante, Chap
ter VI.
*Morris, etc., Co. v. Jersey City, 1 Beas. Ch., 227.
•Darling v. Gunn, 50 11l., 424; Cleghorn v. Postlewaite, 43 id., 428.
1To the point that equity will give no relief in tax cases where the remedy
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Tax upon Lands. When a tax is assessed against the owner of
lands, and is a personal charge upon him, and not a lien upon the
land, there can be no grounds for equitable interference which
would not exist in the case of a tax assessed upon personalty.1
In those states in which a personal tax would be restrained if illegal,
a tax upon land constituting a personal charge would be restrained
also. In other states it would not be, unless some special ground
of equity jurisdiction was shown.
Chud upon Tide. If the tax is a lien upon lands, it may then
constitute a cloud upon the title ; and one branch of equity juris
diction is the removal of apparent clouds upon the title, which
may diminish the market value of the land, and possibly threaten
a loss of it to the owner. A cloud upon one's title is something
which constitutes an apparent incumbrance upon it
,
or an apparent
defect in it ; something that shows primafacie some right of a third
party, either to the whole or some interest in it. An illegal tax
may or may not constitute such a cloud. If the alleged tax has
no semblance of legality; if
,
upon the face of the proceedings, it
is wholly unwarranted by law, or for any reason totally void, so
that any person inspecting the record and comparing it with the
law is at once apprised of the illegality, the tax, it would seem,
could neither constitute an incumbrance, nor an apparent defect
of title ; and, therefore, in law, could constitute no cloud. If this
be so, the jurisdiction which is exercised by courts of equity, to
relieve parties by removing clouds upon their titles, could not
attach in such a case. And so it has been held in many cases.2
at law is adequate, the following additional cases maybe referred to. Weaver
e. State, 39 Ala., 535; Dodd e. Hartford, 25 Conn., 232; Magee e. Denton,
5 Blatch., 130; Missouri River, etc., R. R. Co. e. Wheaton, 7 Kans., 232.
1See Williams e. Detroit, 2 Mich., 560; Brewer v. Springfield, 97 Mass.,
152; Greene e. Mumford, 5 R. I.
,
474; Hunnewell v. Charlestown, 10(5 Mass.,
350; Henry e. Gregory, 29 Mich., 68.
•Messerolee. Brooklyn, 8 Paige, 198; Wiggin e. N.Y.,9 id., 16; Van Doren
v. N. Y., id., 388; Livingston e. Hollenbeck, 4 Barb., 9, 16; Van Rensselaer
v. Kidd, 4 id., 17; Bouton v. Brooklyn, 15 id., 375; Cox e. Clift, 2 N. Y., 118;
Scott v. Onderdonk, 14 id., 9 ; Hatch e. Buffalo, 38 id., 276 ; Newell v. Wheeler,
48 id., 486; Dean e. Madison, 9 Wis., 402; Head v. James, 13 id., 641; Shep-
ardson v. Supervisors of Milwaukee, 28 id., 593 ; Milwaukee Iron Co. e. Hub
bard, 29 id., 51 ; Floyd v. Gilbreath, 27 Ark., 675 ; Mobile, etc., R. K. Co. «.
Peebles, 47 Ala., 317; Robinson v. Gaar, 6 Oal., 273; Bucknall e. Story, 36 id.,
67; Ewing v. St. Louis, 5 Wall., 413; Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 id., 547.
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When, however, the illegality or fatal defect does not appear on
the face of the record, but must be shown by evidence aliunde, so
that the record would make out a prima facie right in one who
should become purchaser, and the evidence to rebut this case may
possibly be lost, or be unavailable from death of witnesses or other
cause, or when the deed given on a sale of the lands for the tax
would by statute be presumptive evidence of a good title in the
purchaser, so that the purchaser might rely upon that for a recov
ery of the lands until the illegalities were shown, the courts of
equity regard the case as coming within their ordinary jurisdic
tion, and have extended relief on the ground that a cloud on the
title existed or. was imminent The cases on this point are numer
ous, and in considerable variety, as would be anticipated in view
of the different tax systems under which they have been made.1
1Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 Wall., 547; Dows e. City of Chicago, 11
id., 108; Dean e. Madison, 9 Wis., 402; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 id., 242; Jen
kins v. Rock County, 15 id., 11; Mitchell v. Milwaukee, 18 id., 92; Crane v.
Janesville, 20 id., 305; Grimmer e. Sumner, 21 id., 179; Hamilton v. Fond du
Lac, 25 id., 490; Siegel v. Outagamie County, 26 id., 70; Judd e. Fox Lake, 28
id., 583 ; Shepardson v. Milwaukee, 28 id., 593 ; Wals v. Grosvenor, 31 id., 681 ;
Conway e. Waverley, 15 Mich., 257; Palmer v. Rich, 12 id., 414; Scofield v.
Lansing, 17 id., 437; Kenyon e. Duchene, 21 id., 498; Shell v. Martin, 19 Ark.,
139; Chaplin v. Holmes, 27 id., 414; Polk v. Rose, 25 Md., 153; Weller v. St.
Paul, 5 Minn., 95; Gage v. Rohrbach, 56 11l., 262; Gage v. Billings, 56 id.,
268 ; Reed v. Tyler, 56 id., 288 ; Gage v. Chapman, 56 id., 311 ; Burnett v. Cline,
60 id., 205; Reed v. Reber, 62 id., 240; Lee v. Ruggles, 62 id., 427; Moers v.
Smedley, 6 Johns. Ch. 28; Pettit e. Shepherd, 5 Paige, 493 ; Oakley v. Trustees
of Williamsburg, 6 id., 262; Hanlon v. Supervisors of Westchester, 57 Barb.,
383; Van Doren v. New York, 9 Paige, 388; Scott v. Onderdonk, 14 N. Y.,
9; Ward v. Dewey, 16 id., 519; Hatch v. Buifalo, 38 id., 276; Allen e. Buffalo,
39 id., 386; Overing e. Foote, 43 id., 290; Crooke «. Andrews, 40 id., 547;
Newell v. Wheeler, 48 id., 486 ; Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 id., 534 ; Lapp e. Mor-
rill, 8 Kans., 678; Harmer v. Boling, 8 Cal., 384; Cohen v. Sharp, 44 id., 29;
Ward v. Ward, 2 Hayw., 226 ; Leigh « Everheart's Executors, 4 T. B. Monr.,
379; Harrison v. Haas, 25 Ind., 281 ; Morris Canal, etc., Co. v. Jersey City, 1
Beas. Ch. 227; Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20; Fowler v. St. Joseph, 37 id.,
228; Morrison v. St. Paul, 9 Minn , 108; Weber e. San Francisco, 1 Cal., 455;
Robinson e. Gaar, 6 id., 273 ; Hardenburg v. Kidd, 10 id., 403 ; Bern e. Patch,
12 id., 299 ; Pixley v. Huggins, 15 id., 127 ; Burr e. Hunt, 18 id., 303 ; Bucknall
e. Story, 36 id., 67 ; Houghton v. Austin, 47 id., 646 ; Arrington v. Liscom, 34
id., 365; Coulson v. Portland, Deady, 481 ; Huntington v. Central Pacific R.
R. Co., 2 Sawyer, 503. It is no answer to the bill in such a case that the tax
might have been collected from personal property. Scofield e. Lansing, 17
Mich., 437. The cloud upon the title is presumptively removed when personal
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There are many cases, however, which ignore the distinction be
tween proceedings void on their face for illegality, and proceed
ings which, though illegal in fact, are on their face presumptively
valid. Such cases, if they do not give relief on the ground of ille
gality alone, will give it on the ground that any sale of the land
under proceedings which assume to be by authority of law, and
are conducted by public officers empowered to make such sales, is
such a cloud upon the title of the owner as he ought, in equity,
to be relieved against, if the officers are proceeding unlawfully,
and have no authority in fact.1
Quieting Title after a Sale. If land has been actually sold and
conveyed for a tax, the original owner remaining in possession
may have the validity of the sale tested by a bill in equity, filed
for the purpose of quieting his title. This is the general rule.
Courts of law cannot give him relief in such a case, as he can not
bring ejectment, being himself in possession ; and no other form
of action is given by the common law for such a case. And
where the case has proceeded to sale and conveyance, even though
the defects in the title are apparent of record, and the deed is not
prima facie evidence of title, it may perhaps be possible to dis
tinguish the case from one in which the void proceedings are only
impending. While they are in progress, it may be assumed that
the officers will pause in their illegal action before any sale is
reached ; but when the proceedings have reached that point, and
a conveyance has been given, which, though void, may affect the
market value of the land, there would seem to be no very conclu
sive reason why equity should not interfere and decree a cancel-
ment of the void claim.2 If the tax purchaser has enteied into
property sufficient to satisfy the tax is levied upon. Henry e. Gregory, 29
Mich., 68.
1See Burnett v. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio, 73 ; Culbertson v. Cincinnati, 16 id., 574 ;
Ottowa v. Walker, 21 11l., 605, and cases cited ; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Frary,
22 id., 34; Barnard v. Hoyt, 63 id., 341; Holland «. Baltimore, 11 Md., 186;
Baltimore v. Porter, 18 id., 284; Litchfield e. Polk Co., 18 Iowa, 70; Leslie v.
St. Louis, 47 Mo., 474. And see Blackwell cn Tax Titles, 483; High on In
junctions, ch. VII., where the cases are collected with the author's usual
industry and care. The occupant of lands, though he be not the owner, may
file a bill to remove the cloud cast by an illegal tax. Barnard v. Hoyt, 63
11l., 341.
*See Yancey e. Hopkins, 1 Mumf., 419; Holland v. Baltimore, 11 Md., 186;
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possession of the land, the original owner has an adequate remedy
by suit at law in ejectment ; and to this he must resort1 When
neither party has actual possession, if the statute has authorized
the action of ejectment to be brought on the constructive posses
sion, which either may claim by virtue of the conveyances which
he holds, the suit at law would appear to be the adequate remedy
in such a case also.8
Joint Complaint by Several Persons Taxed. When the supposed
illegality in a tax affects a single person only, or affects him in a
peculiar manner, distinguishing his case from that of others, he
can not unite with others in a suit to restrain its collection. A
joint bill by two or more parties, setting out distinct grounds on
which each sought relief, would be dismissed as multifarious.«
But where the illegality extends to the whole assessment, or
where it affects, in the same manner, a number of persons, so that
the question involved can be presented without confusion by one
bill filed by all or any number of those thus affected, there seems
to be no sufficient reason why a joint bill should not be permitted.
The reasons favoring it are, that it avoids the necessity of a mul
tiplicity of suits, and the attendant trouble and expense; and the
objection that the interests of complainant are several is suffi-
Polk e. Rose, 25 id., 153; Almony v. Hicks, 3 Head, 39; Head v. Fordyce, 17
Cal., 149; Hartford v. Chipman, 21 Conn., 488; Fonda v. Sage, 48 N. Y., 173.
If complainant by his bill makes out a case for relief, it is not necessary for
him to aver that he has paid the tax^s. Polk v. Rose, 25 Md., 153.
1The court of chancery is not the proper tribunal for settling titles to land
generally. Munson v. Munson, 28 Conn., 582; Thayer v. Smith, 9 Met., 47C ;
Sunderton e. Thompson, 2 Dev. Ch., 539; Devaux e. Detroit, Har. Ch., 98 ;
Blackwood e. Van Vleet, 11 Mich., 252.
8Parish v. Eager, 15 Wis., 532 ; Bonncll v. Roane, 20 Ark., 114 ; Scott i\
Watkins, 22 id., 556. It is not competent to give relief in equity against
the party in actual possession; he having a constitutional right to a trial by
jury. Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich., 322. See Springer e. Rosette, 47 11l., 223. As
to bill by tax purchaser, and what he must aver, see Belcher e. Mhoon, 47
Miss., 613.
8Kerr v. Lansing, 17 Mich., 34; Hudson v. Atchison County, 12 Kans., 140;
compare Cutting v. Gilbert, 5 Blatch., 259. One person cannot file a bill to
restrain the collection of a tax from another. Missouri River, etc., R. R. Co.
e. Wheaton, 7 Kans., 232. To a bill filed by a stockholder to restrain illegal
taxation of the corporation, the corporation must be made a party. Daven
port v. Dows, 18 Wall., 626.
35
546 LAW OF TAXATION. [CH. XXIV.
cientlj met by the fact that complete justice may be done to all
in one suit on the single issue ; whereas, if the parties did not
join, the same issue must be passed upon in separate suits brought
by the several complainants. Although there has been some
hesitation in sanctioning such bills, the weight of authority is
decidedly in favor of supporting them, and this method of redress
is now most commonly resorted to where the case is appropriate
for it.1
But the mere saving of the expense of several suits at law,
where each of the complainants has an adequate remedy, is no
ground for sustaining a joint suit in equity where no other ground
of equitable relief is apparent This is well explained by the
supreme court of Connecticut, in a case in which a joint petition
was filed to restrain the collection from several complainants of
sewer assessments made upon their lands severally, and which
were claimed to be illegal. "The multiplicity of suits, which the
petition seeks to avoid, does not injuriously affect any one of the
petitioners. No one of them has occasion to expect any such mul
tiplicity affecting himself. One suit is all that any one of them has
to fear, and the object of this bill would seem to be to relieve these
parties severally from that one suit, and to consolidate the appre
hended litigation. In other words, to enforce a consolidation rule
by means of the extraordinary powers of the court of chancery. If
the assessment were against one person only, it is not claimed
that he could transfer from a court of law to a court of equity the
question of his liability. But how is the condition of any one
1Bull v. Read, 13 Grat., 78; Johnson e. Drummond, 20 id., 419; Floyd v
Gilbreath, 27 Ark., 675; Stevens v. Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 29 Vt., 545;
Holmes e. Baker, 16 Gray, 259; Mott v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 30 Penn. St.,
39; Page v. Allen, 58 id., 338; Manly v. Raleigh, 4 Jones Eq., 370; Galloway
e. Jenkins, 63 N. C, 147; Kerr v. Landing, 17 Mich., 34; Scofield «. Lansing,
17 id., 437 ; Motz v. Detroit, 18 id., 495 ; Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn., 131 ;
Terret v. Sharon, 34 id., 105 ; Sherman e. Carr, 8 R. I.
,
431 ; Upington v. Oviatt,
24 Ohio, X S., 232; Vanover v. The Justices, 27 Geo., 354; Baltimore v. Porter,
18 Md., 284; La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind., 38; Baltimore e. Bill, 31 Md., 375;
Nill e. Jenkinson, 15 Ind., 425; Oliver e. Keightley, 24 id., 514; Harward e.
St. Clair, etc., Company, 51 11l., 130; Hooper v. Ely, 46 Mo., 505; Steiner r.
Franklin County, 48 Mo., 167; Barr e. Deniston, 19 X. H., 170; McMillan v.
Lee County, 3 Iowa, 311; Mandeville v. Riggs, 2 Pet., 482; King v. Wilson,
1 Dillon, 555 ; Coulson v. Portland, Deady, 481. For a case under the Kansas
statute, see Wyandotte, etc., Bridge Co. v. Wyandotte County, l0Kans., 326.
CH. XXIV.] REMEDIES FOR ILLEGAL TAXATION. 547
of these petitioners the worse because others are assessed for the
same improvement? It would undoubtedly be convenient to try
the questions relating to these warrants in one comprehensive
law suit But it does not seem to the court that the case presented
by the bill is one of such irreparable injury, or of inadequate relief
at law, as to warrant us in taking it away from the legal tribunals." 1
Fraud. A tax founded on an assessment which, from corrupt
and malicious motives, is made excessive, may be enjoined.2 So
may any other tax which is rendered unequal and unfair by fraud
ulent practices of the officers, or in which the party is deprived by
like practices of important rights which the law intends to secure
to him ; such, for instance, as the right of appeal from an assess
ment, or to be heard by the board of review before his assessment
should be raised.8
Bills of Interpleader. It is possible for cases to arise in which
the same sum of money is demanded as a tax under conflicting
claims by different officers — or, in city cases under peculiar ordi
nances, by a contractor and an officer. Conflicting claims may
also arise where one is taxed as representing another, in the ca
pacity of agent, trustee or otherwise, or as officer of a corporation
representing the shareholders, and where the person beneficially
interested contests the tax. Such cases may possibly justify a bill
of interpleader, as the most ready method of determining to whom
the custodian of the fund is under obligation to make payment4
1Seymour, J., in Dodd v. Hartford, 25 Conn., 232, 238. And see Sheldon v.
School District, id., 224. Compare Savings and Loan Association v. Austin,
46 Cal., 415; Houghton v. Austin, 47 id., 646; Central Pacific R. R. Co. e. Cor
coran, 48 id., 65.
2Albany, etc., R. R. Co. e. Canaan, 16 Barb., 244; Leffertsi>. Calumet, 21Wis.,
688; Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Hubbard, 29 id., 51; Merrill v. Humphrey, 24
Mich., 170; Republic Life Ins. Co. e. Pollak, Sup. Ct. Illinois, 7 Chicago Legal
News, 357.
» See Cleghorn v. Postlewaite, 43 11l., 428 ; Darling e.Gunn, 50 id., 424. Each
of these was a case in which an assessment was increased without notice to
the person assessed, and the collection was enjoined. The case is not distinctly
put on the ground of fraud, it being sufficient under the 11linois decisions that
the party had been illegally deprived of his right to be heard before his
assessment should be increased.
* See Thomson v. Ebbets, Hopk. Ch., 272; Mohawk and H. R. R. Co.e.
Clute, 4 Paige, 384.
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Illegal Corporate Action. The cases are hopelessly divided on
the question, whether individual tax payers may file a bill on
their own behalf to restrain unlawful municipal action, when it
constitutes the preliminary step leading to taxation. Such, for
instance, as tne contracting of a debt ultra vires, the allowance of
an illegal claim, the consent to a collusive judgment, or the mis
appropriation of the public moneys. On the one hand it is in
sisted that, until a tax is actually laid, the grievance, if any, is
purely a public grievance, and public grievances must be redressed
on the application of the proper public authorities ; that individ
uals can proceed in equity only when their interests are separate
and individual ; and such interests are only affected by the un
lawful action when a tax is laid and has become an individual
charge against the several persons taxed.1 On the other hand, it
is said that the case is to be distinguished from the cases of public
wrongs, in whicb the general public are alike concerned ; that the
tax payers constitute a class specially damaged by the unlawful
act, in the increase of the burden of taxation upon their property.
They have, therefore, a special interest in the subject matter of the
suit distinct from that of the general public2 The decided pre
ponderance of authority is in support of the right of the tax pay
ers to file bills on their own behalf in such a case. The jurisdic
tion of equity may be sustained on the ground that the injury
which would be done by the unlawful municipal action would be
irreparable ; and this would meet any objection on the ground
that the parties would have a remedy at law when the tax came
to be levied. In most cases the injury would be irreparable, and
it might become so in all ; as misappropriation of corporate funds
cannot render a subsequent tax illegal, even though levied for the
very purpose of meeting the deficiency thereby caused ; 8 and con
sequently, all remedy may be lost if the misappropriation is not
enjoined. It may be lost also in any case in which a corporate
1Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome, 18 N. Y., 155; Roosevelt v. Draper, 23
id., 318; Miller e. Grandy, 13 Mich., 540; Conkline. Commissioners, 13Minn.,
454; Morgan v. Graham, 1 Woods, 124. In Massachusetts, a remedy is given
by statute. Cooley v. Granville, 10 Cush., 56, and many subsequent cases were
brought xtnder statutes conferring jurisdiction.
'Bartol, Ch. J., in Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md., 375, 394.
• Bee Wright v. Dunham, 13 Mich., 414.
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debt is evidenced by some negotiable instrument given under an
authority to contract in that form, and is put into circulation. The
effective remedy must usually in such cases be preliminary to the
threatened illegal action ; and though the state may interfere in
such cases through its proper law officer, to restrain an abuse of
the limited powers it has granted,1 its right to do so is commonly
held not to preclude redress on the application of individual tax
payers.2
Delay in Proceedings. It has been held in Massachusetts that
persons taxed for school purposes, when the district has been il
legally constituted, may unite in a bill to restrain the collection
of the tax, notwithstanding a delay of thirteen months since
the illegal action to establish the district, and notwithstanding in
the meantime a tax has been levied and collected, and other im
portant action has been had by the district8 In Michigan, after
several years had elapsed, the court refused to permit the regu
larity of the organization to be attacked in equity, and the cases
referred to in the opinion tend strongly in the direction of holding
that, on grounds of public policy, it should not be suffered, even
after a short delay, if the district, in the mean time, had become
peaceably organized, and was in the exercise of authority as such.4
Actions at Law against Assessors. When questions are re-
1See Attorney General v. Detroit, 26 Mich., 263, and cases cited.
•See Mandeville v. Riggs, 2 Pet., 482; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How., 331;
Sharpless «. Philadelphia, 21 Penn. St., 147; Mercer Countye. Pittsburgh, etc.,
R. R. Co., 27 id., 339; Page v. Allen, 58 id., 338; New London v. Brainard, 22
Conn., 552; Webster v. Harwinton, 32 id., 131 ; La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind., 38;
Oliver v. Kcightley, 24 id., 514; Tcrrett v. Sharon, 34 Conn., 105; Barr v. Den-
iston, 19 N. H., 170; Merrill e. Plainfield, 45 id., 126; Colton v. Hanchctt, 13
11l., 615; Drake e. Phillips, 40 id., 388; Rice v. Smith, 9 Iowa, 570; McMillan
v. Lee County, 3 id., 311; Grant v. Davenport, 36 id., 396; Fleming v. Mershon,
id., 413; Wade «. Richmond, 18 Grat., 583; Douglass v. Placerville, 18 Cal.,
643; Stevens e. Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 29 Vt., 546; Gifford v. New Jersey R.
R. Co., 10 N. J. Eq., 171; Baltimore v. GUI, 31 Md., 375; Hooper v. Ely, 46
Mo., 505 ; Steines e. Franklin County, 48 id., 167 : see also Gray v. Chapin, 2
Sim. & Stu., 267; Bromley v. Smith, 1 Sim., 8.
*Holmes v. Baker, 16 Gray, 259. The opinion barely refers to the delay,
saying that " The plaintiffs have been guilty of no delay or negligence which
should deprive them of a remedy by injunction against the future illegal pro
ceedings of the defendant."
4Stewart v. Kalamazoo, 30 Mich., 69, citing People e. Maynard, 15 id., 463 ,
Fractional School District v. The Joint Board, 27 id., 3.
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ferred to the decision of an officer selected for the purpose
of deciding them, and who, in making the decision, must act
upon his own judgment, it is of the highest importance, that
in their consideration, he shall be entirely unembarrassed by
any possible consequences to himself, and left free to the ex
ercise of an unbiased judgment IIe must, consequent!}", be
wholly exempt from responsibility to private parties who may
be dissatisfied with his conclusions, and who might be disposed,
if the law permitted it, to cause them to be reviewed in a collate
ral proceeding, instituted before some other tribunal for the re
covery of compensation for damages sustained in consequence of
an erroneous judgment This principle is so plain and reasonable
that it meets with universal assent, and is applied in all cases
where functions of a judicial nature are exercised. " They who
are entrusted to judge ought to be free from vexation, that they
may determine without fear ; the law requires courage in a judge,
and therefore provides security for the support of that courage.'-1
" Judges have not been invested with this privilege for their own
protection merely ; it is calculated for the protection of the people
by insuring to them a calm, steady and impartial administration
of justice."2 And this principle of protection is not limited in its
application to the judges of courts, but extends to all officers
who have duties to perform which in their nature are judicial,
and which are to be performed according to the dictates of their
judgment Instances of this nature are the decisions of highway
officers, that a person claiming exemption from a road assess
ment is not exempt in fact,8 or that one assessed is in default
1 Barnardiston v. Soane, 6 How. St. Tr., 1096, per Nvrth, Ch. J.
• Taaffe v. Downes, 3 Moore, P. C, 36, n. See Floyd v. Barker, 12 Rep., 23 ;
Mostyn e. Fabrigas, Cowper, 161 ; Garnett e. Farrand, 6 B. & C, 611 ; Mills e.
Collett, 6 Bing., 85 ; Holroyd v. Bean, 2 B. & Aid., 473 ; Pike «. Carter, 3 Biug.,
78 ; Dicas v. Lord Brougham, 6 C & P., 249 ; Lowther v. Earl of Radnor, 8
East, 113; Basten «. Carew, 3 B. & C, 652; Yates e. Lansing, 5 Johns., 282,
291; S
. C 9 id., 395; Stewart v. Hawley, 21 Wend., 552; Weaver e. Deven-
dorf, 3 Denio, 117; Vail e. Owen, 19 Barb., 22; Hill v. Sellick, 21 id., 207;
Wilkes e.Dinsman, 7 How., 89; Hoggctt v. Bigley, 6 Humph., 236; Walker v,
Hallock, 32 Md., 239; Gordon e. Farrar, 2 Doug., Mich., 411; Wall e. Trum-
bull, 16 Mich., 228; Gregory e. Brooks, 37 Conn., 365; Bradleye. Fisher, 13
Wall., 335 ; Fuller e. Gould, 20 Vt, 644; Wilson v. Marsh, 34 id., 352.
8 Harrington v. Commissioners, etc., 2 McCord, 400.
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for not working out the assessment,1 or that a road should or
should not be laid out on a prescribed line;2 to the appraise
ment of damages when property is taken under the eminent do
main ; 8 to action of inspectors of elections who are to decide ques
tions of fact which determine the qualifications of voters;4 of
school directors in deciding upon the removal of a teacher ;
5 of
corporate authorities in passing upon questions of suspension of
members; 6 of members of a township board in deciding upon the
allowance of claims ; 7 and the like. In many of these cases it will
be perceived that the officer who is held exempt is one who, in
the main, performs ministerial functions only ; but this is unim-
porant, if in the particular case complained of he was exercising
a discretionary authority, or one which, by law, was confided to
his deliberate judgment.8
No question can be made that these principles apply to
the case of assessors.9 The proper remedy for erroneous de
cisions on their part is not by suit at law to hold them to per
sonal responsibility. " In the imperfection of human nature," it
has been said by an eminent judge, " it is better that an individ-
1Freeman v. Cornwall, 10 Johns., 470.
' Sage v. Laurain, 19 Mich., 137.
8Van Steenburgh v. Bigelow, 3 Wend., 42.
4Gordon v. Farrar, 2 Doug. (Mich.), 511 ; Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns., 121 ;
Miller v. Rucker, 1 Bush, 135; Cartere. Harrison, 5 Blackf., 138; Rail v
Potts, 8 Humph., 225; Peavy e.Robbins,3 Jones L., 339; Caulfield v. Bullock,
18 B. Monr., 494; Elbin v. Wilson, 33 Md., 135; Friend v. Hamill, 34 id., 298;
Geotchens v. Mathewson, 5 Lans.. 214.
•Burton v. Fulton, 49 Penn. St., 151.
•Harman v. Tappenden, 1 East, 555.
'Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich., 228.
»Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns., 121; Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117;
Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich., 228.
»Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass., 547; Easton v. Calendar, 11 Wend., 90;
Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117; Vail v. Owen, 19 Barb., 22; Brown v.
Smith, 24 id., 419; People v. Reddy, 43 id., 539; Vose e. Willard, 47 id., 320;
Bell v. Pearce, 48 id., 51 ; Barhyte e. Shepherd, 35 N. Y., 238 ; Western R. R.
Co. e. Kolan, 4S id., 513; Pentland v. Stewart, 4 Dev. & Bat., 386; Steam Nav-
igation Co. v. Wasco County, 2 Oregon, 209 ; Macklot v. Davenport, 17 Iowa,
379 ; Muscatine Western R. R. Co. v. Horton, 38 id., 33 ; Walker v. Hallock,
32Ind., 239; Lilienthal v. Campbell, 22 La. An., 600; Wall «. Trumbull, 16
Mi<*. 238.
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ual should occasionally suffer a wrong, than that the course of
justice should be impeded and fettered by constant and per
petual restraints and apprehensions on the part of those who are
to administer it"1 And the remark is as true of assessors as it is
of the judges of courts ; it is of the highest importance that they
should be protected in the honest exercise of their judgment.2
Assessors are therefore not liable for an excessive assessment,
even though it may be made such by erroneously including in
the estimate property not belonging to the party assessed, or not
within the district.8 Nor are they liable for erroneously listing
for taxation persons or property which, though within their juris
diction, are not taxable,4 or for an error of judgment, influenced
1Lord, Tenterden, Ch. J., in Garnett e. Ferrand, 6 B. & C, 611.
* That while the assessors are protected, the collector who collects the tax
is protected also, as well as the town, county, etc., to which the money is paid
over, see Holton«. Bangor, 23 Me., 264; Gilpatrick e. Saco, 57 id., 277; Whar
ton v. Birmingham, 37 Penn. St., 371; Ontario Bank v. Bunnell, 10 Wend.,
186 ; Little v. Greenleaf, 7 Mass.. 236 ; Oshorne v. Dan vers, 6 Pick., 98 ; Bates
v. Boston, 5 Cash., 93; Howe v. Boston 7 id., 274; Lincoln i\ Worcester, 8 id.,
57; Greenee. Mumford, 4 R. I.
,
313; People v. Arguello, 37 Cal.,524; Glascow
v. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479.
8 Stickney v. Bangor, 30 Me., 404; Hemingway v. Machias, 33 id., 445;
Brown e. Smith, 24 Barh., 419; Dow e. Backer, 61 id., 597.
4 Huggins v. Hinson, 1 Phil. N. C, 126; Vail v. Owen. 19 Barb., 22; Easton
«. Calendar, 11 Wend., 90; Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117; Brown r.
Smith, 24 Barb., 419; Bell v. Pierce, 48 id., 51; Barhyte v. Shepherd, 35 N.
Y., 238, 255. Compare National Bank of Chemung v. Elmira, 53 id., 49. A
contrary decision was made in Gridley «. Clark, 2 Pick., 402, but the point
was not discussed. Afterwards statutes were passed in that state to protect
assessors in some cases. As, where through mere error and while acting with
integrity and fidelity, they assessed a person not taxable. Sec Baker v. Allen,
21 Pick., 382 ; Durant v. Eaton, 98 Mass., 469. So the statute of 1823 provided
that assessors shall not be responsible for the assessment of any tax upon the
inhabitants of any city, town, district, parish or religious society of which
they are assessors, when thereto required by the constituted authorities there
of, but the liability, if any, shall rest solely with such city, etc. Held, under
this, that assessors were not liable for errors of law committed without fraud
or intentional wrong. Ingraham v. Doggett, 5 Pick., 451; Devinnels v. Par
sons, 98 Mass., 470. But where the regular assessment has been made for the
year, and without authority of law they make another, they are liable. Inglee
v. Bosworth, 5 Pick., 498. And see further, Gage v. Currier, 4 id., 399 ; Free
man e. Kenney, 15 id., 44; Suydam v. Keys, 13 Johns., 444; People v. Super
visors of Chenango, 11 N. Y., 573; Lyman v. Fiske, 17 Pick., 231; Baker v.
Allen, 21 id., 382 ; Griffin v. Rising, 11 Met., 345. The above statute held not
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by -which they omit from their roll persons or property which
ought to be taxed, thereby increasing the tax upon others,1 And
the rule is general, applying to all errors of law and mistakes of
fact in the exercise of their lawful authority.2
But to bring one within this rule of protection, he must be
careful not to assume a jurisdiction which the law does not confer
upon him. If persons assume to be assessors when they are not,
they may justly be held responsible as trespassers ;8 and the law
ful assessor, if he assumes an authority to decide upon the rights
of others in cases which the law has not confided to his judgment,
is in general responsible to the same extent as if he possessed
no official character whatever. The office protects him only when
he keeps within the limits which have been prescribed for his
official action ; when he exceeds those he lays aside his official
character, and must rely for his protection on the same principles
behind which citizens in private life must defend themselves.
A case in illustration is that of the assessment of a personal tax
upon persons who are not resident within the district, and conse
quently not subject to the jurisdiction of the assessors.4 Others are
to apply to school districts. Little e. Merrill, 10 Pick., 543 ; Taft e. Wood,
14 id., 362. An act exempting assessors from responsibility except " only for
the want of integrity and fidelity on their own part," held not to protect them for
assessing a school tax for a district having no legal existence. Bassett v. Por
ter, 4 Cush., 487; S. C, 10 id., 418; Dickinson v. Billings, 4 Gray, 42. But in
such a suit it does not devolve on the assessors to prove a legal organization.
The organization in fact, and action as a district, are sufficient prima facie.
Stevens v. Newcomb, 4 Denio, 437.
1Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass., 559. Where taxes were irregularly assessed
and paid over to the county and town, and the assessors, to avoid suit, refunded
it to the taxpayers, and the town voted to refund to them, this was held a good
promise as to the town tax, but not as to the others. Nelson e. Milford, 7
Pick., 18. As to the liability of assessors for refusing to assess the plaintiff,
whereby he lost his right to vote, see Griffin v. Rising, 11 Met., 339.
* Assessors held not liable to a parish for negligence in not levying a tax
equal to the amount voted by the parish, where they acted under an honest be
lief that they were carrying out the views of the parish. First Parish in
Sherburne v. Fiske, 8 Cush., 264. Nor for neglect to take the oath of office. Id.
8Allen v. Archer, 49 Me., 346. A tax levied without an assessment is of
course void. Shewalter v. Brown, 35 Miss., 423.
4Mygatt v. Washburn, 15 N. Y., 316 ; Wade e. Matterson, 4 Lans., 159 ; Hen-
nan v. Stevens, 43 Me., 437; Martin v. Mansfield, 3 Mass., 419; Ware e. Perci
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'where they spread upon the roll a sum never lawfully voted,1 or
a sum in excess of that which by law is to be levied for the year,
or in excess of that which has been lawfully voted ;s or a sum
which has been voted for an unlawful purpose.8
Possibly, the assessors should be held liable also if
,
by neglect
of duty, they deprive the taxpayer of the opportunity of being
heard before the board of review.4 The distinction which runs
val, 61 Me., 391 ; S. C, 14 Am. Rep., 565; Agry e. Young, 11 Mass., 220; Gage
e. Currier, 4 Pick., 399; Sumner v. Dorchester, 4 id., 361; Inglee v. Bosworth,
5 id., 498; Freeman v. Keuney, 15 id., 44; Lyman e. Fiske, 17 id., 231 ; Henry
v. Edson, 2 Vt., 499; Fairbanks v. Kittridge, 24 id., 9
;
Bailey v. Bucll, 59
Barb., 158; Beunet e. Buffalo, 17 N. Y., 383; Clark v. Norton, 49 id., 243;
Westfall v. Preston, 49 Barb., 349; Dorwin e. Strickland, 57 N. Y-, 492. But
where one is assessed in the wrong town by his own request, he cannot main
tain an action against the assessors for so assessing him. Pease v. Whitney,
8 Mass., 93.
'As where a school tax is levied which was voted at a meeting not legally
called: Bussey v. Leavitt, 12 Me., 378; Baldwin e. McClinch, 1 id., 102; Colby
v. Russell, 3 id., 227; Mussy e. White, 3 id., 290; Gardiner v. Gardiner, 5 id.,
133 ; Paine v. Ross, 5 id., 400 ; Johnson v. Goodrich, 15 id., 29 ; Barnard «. Ar-
gyle,20 id., 296; Kcllar v. Savage, 20 id., 199; Withrington e. Eveleth, 7 Pick ,
106; Little v. Merrill, 10 id., 543. A tax list made out before a tax is voted is
void. Mead v. Gale, 4 Hill, 109 ; S. C, 2 Dtnio, 232. This was a case in which
a tax had been voted and the vote afterwards repealed, and at a later meeting
the repealing vote itself repealed. Held, that the tax was to be regarded as
voted at the date of the last meeting. But assessors are not bound to go be
hind the records to see that a meeting was properly called. Saxton v. Nimms"
14 Mass., 315; Libby v. Burnham, 15 id., 144.
• Libby e. Burnham, 15 Mass., 144 ; Joyner e. School District, 3 Cush., 567 ;
Drew e. Davis, 10 Vt., 506 ; Grafton Bank e. Kimball, 20 N. H., 107.
8 Stetson e. Kempton, 13 Mass., 271 ; Drew v. Davis, 10 Vt., 506. The liabili
ty in such cases, however, would probably depend upon the position the asses
sor occupies under the statutes of his state relatively to the vote. If the asses
sor is himself to take from the township records the sums voted, and spread
them upon the roll, or if they are certified to him in detail, so that he is neces
sarily informed before he is required to act officially what sums are legal
and what illegal, it seems clear that he cannot fall back upon the vote for his
protection. But if
,
on the other hand, some other officer is required to certify
to him in gross the sums voted, and he is then to spread the amount on the roll,
this certificate, if in due form, like process fair on its face, should constitute
his sufficient protection, and he cannot be held bound to inquire for illegalities
behind it. See Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich., 228; Parish v. Golden, 35 N. Y.,
462.
4 See Thames Manufacturing Co. v. Lathrop, 7 Conn., 550. In this case, it
appeared that the law required the assessment list to be filed for inspection
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through the cases is between an unlawful assumption of authority
which has not been conferred, and a mistaken, erroneous or
irregular exercise of authority actually possessed ; the former
will render any officer liable irrespective of the good faith of his
action ; for the latter he is
,
in general, not liable at all.1 The law
which -governs the whole subject is summed up in few words
in a leading case decided in Massachusetts: "When judicial
officers, deriving their authority from the law, mistake or err in
the execution of their authority, in a case clearly within their
jurisdiction, which they have not exceeded, we know of no law
declaring them trespassers vi et armis. If the law were otherwise
respecting assessors, who, when chosen, are compellable to serve
or pay a fine, hard indeed would be their case. But the same
law must apply to them as to inferior judicial officers. If, there
by the first of December. It was not filed until the twentieth of that month,
but this was ten days before the meeting of the board of relief. Held, that
the selectmen who took out a tax warrant on this list, by virtue of which the
property of a person taxed was seized, were liable in trespass. See note on
this case in 25 Vt., 27. In New York, where by statute, the "last assessment
roll of the township was to govern in levying a school tax, except as changes
were made, of which notice was to be given to the parties affected before the
assessment was completed, it was held, that the omission of this notice did
not render the assessors liable as trespassers. Randall v. Smith, 1 Denio, 214,
citing with approval Eaton v. Callendar, 11 Wend., 90, where trustees of a
school district were held not liable, though they had erroneously added col-
lection fees to the amount to be raised, and omitted to assess three individuals;
the court holding, that the apportionment of the tax was to a certain extent a
judicial act, and that, " though the trustees may err in point of law or in
judgment, they should not be either civilly or criminally answerable, if their
motives are pure." The court distinguish Alexander v. Hoyt, 7 Wend., 39, in
which the school assessment was made from a town assessment not finished
and afterwards changed, and where the trustees were held to be trespassers.
1In many cases, jurisdiction depends on questions of fact; as where, for
instance, the question is one of residence. But these questions the assessor
must decide correctly at his peril; he cannot, by his own error, obtain a juris
diction which the law has not conferred. Dorwin v. Strickland, 57 N. Y., 492.
Where the assessor increased the valuation of a person's property, after the
list had passed beyond his control, he was held liable. Bristol Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Gridley, 28 Conn., 201. That an irregular assessment affords no
cause of action against assessors, see Sanford e. Dick, 15 Conn., 447 ; Sprague
v. Bailey, 19 Pick., 436. National banks, not being taxable as such by the
states, are not within the jurisdiction of assessors, who are liable if they
assess them. National Bank of Chemung v. Elmira, 53 N. Y., 49, citing many
cases.
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fore, the persons acting as assessors have been duly chosen and
qualified to execute that office, if the sum assessed has been
legally ordered to be assessed, if the assessment be made and the
warrant of collection be issued by them or a major part of them,
in due form of law, if the poll and estate of the party com
plaining of the assessment be legally taxable, he cannot, in our
opinion, maintain an action against them a3 trespassers vi ei armis
for any error or mistake of theirs in the exercise of their dis
cretion."1
It has been made a question whether these principles should
apply to a case where these officers are accused of having been
actuated by malice, and where the impelling motive has been to
inflict injury upon the parties assessed. It has already been seen
that assessments, purposely made excessive through evil motive,
may be reached and corrected in equity. But to subject every
tax officer to the necessity of being compelled to justify his mo
tives to the satisfaction of others, under a penalty of personal re
sponsibility, is perhaps to go beyond what is necessary to the pro
tection of tax payers; and in matters depending on judgment of
values, would be so dangerous to the officers that it is doubtful if
sound policy could sanction it In a leading case in New York it
is declared that the question of motive is not to be raised in a
suit against assessors who have kept within their jurisdiction.
" The assessors," it is said, " were judges acting clearly within the
scope and limit of their authority. They were not volunteers,
but the duty was imperative and compulsory ; and acting, as they
did, in the performance of a public duty, in its nature judicial,
they were not liable to an action, however erroneous or wrongful
their determination may have been. This case might be disposed
of on narrow ground, for there was no evidence to justify the
conclusion that the defendants acted maliciously in fixing the
value of the property of the plaintiff, or of any one else ; and
surely it will not be pretended they were liable for a mere error
of judgment. But 1 prefer to place the decision on the broad
ground, that no public officer is responsible, in a civil suit, for a
judicial determination, however erroneous it may be, and however
malicious the motive which produced it Such acts, when cor
rupt, may be punished criminally, but the law will not allow
1Panoiis, Ch. J., in Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass., 559.
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malice and corruption to be charged in a civil suit against such
an officer, for what he does in the performance of a judicial duty.
The rule extends to judges from the highest to the lowest ; to
jurors, and to all public officers, whatever name they may bear,
in the exercise of judicial power. It of course applies only where
the judge or officer had jurisdiction of the particular case, and
was authorized to determine it. If he transcends the limits
of his authority, he necessarily ceases, in the particular case, to
act as a judge, and is responsible for all consequences. But with
these limitations, the principle of irresponsibility, so far as respects
a civil remedy, is as old as the common law itself."1
Action against supervisors. The supervisors of townships in
some states act in several capacities. They are members of the
township board, and as such pass upon claims against the town
ship ; they meet in convention and constitute the county board
which audits the county claims and votes the county taxes, and
perhaps they act as assessors also, and issue process for the col
lection of the taxes after they have been properly spread upon
the roll. Thus their action in each of these capacities may affect
the tax payer ; but the cases must be rare in which the party
aggrieved could go back of the supervisor's action as assessor, if
that was not in itself illegal, and maintain an action against him
as supervisor for something done in another capacity. Thus, it
has been held in New York that supervisors who issue a tax
warrant, having jurisdiction to do so, are not liable in trespass for
having included in the levy a sum improperly allowed by them
to a county officer.8 The like decision has been made in Michi
gan, where a supervisor was sued for placing upon the roll allow
ances unlawfully made by the township board of which he was a
member.8 But in Michigan, the supervisor who undertakes to
justify the issuing of a tax warrant, does not make out his justi
fication by proving his official character merely ; he must show
1Beardtley, J., in Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio, 117, 120. Compare Baker
v. State, 27 Ind., 485; Walker v. Hallock, 32 id., 239; Gregory 0. Brooks, 37
Conn., 365; Burton v. Fulton, 49 Penn. St., 151; Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo., 491,
497 ; Auditor v. Atchison, etc., R. R. Co., 6 Kans., 500.
»Parish v. Golden, 35 N. Y., 462.
8Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich., 228. See Smith e. Crittenden, id., 152; Cun
ningham v. Mitchell, 67 Penn. St., 78.
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that the sums to be levied have been certified to him by the com
petent authorities, and that the assessment roll has come to him
from the board of supervisors as provided by law. These are
prerequisites to his jurisdiction to issue any tax warrant1 And
if a tax is assessed on lands as a personal charge against a resi
dent, the description on the roll must be sufficient to identify the
land ; and if not, that particular assessment will be void and its
enforcement will render him liable.2 In Iowa, township trustees
are held not liable for a refusal to issue a certificate of compliance
with the conditions upon which a tax has been voted in aid of a
corporation, unless they act willfully and corruptly.8
»
Resisting collection. It is stated on a preceding page that
if a tax is unlawful, the person taxed may resist the exaction in
stead of submitting to it and bringing suit afterwards. This is
only a statement of a general principle of the common law, which
recognizes the individual liberty of every person to that extent
Where, however, the tax warrant on its face discloses no illegality, it
has been held that resistance to the officer is not permitted, notwith
standing illegalities lie back of it; and it can seldom be advisable
or even safe to do otherwise than submit to the process and seek
the proper remedy afterwards. But where lands are sold, the peace
ful and quiet remedy which consists in retaining possession, and
leaving the purchaser to resort to his suit at law, is usually all
that is necessary, and under the statutes of limitation will, after a
time, become completely effectual, unless the purchaser resorts to
the courts for a remedy on his own behalf.*
1Clark v. Axford, 5 Mich., 182.
»Atwell v. Zeluff, 26 Mich., 118.
' Muscatine Western R. R. Co. v. Horton, 38 Iowa, 33.
4We have referred, on a preceding page, to the decisions in Wisconsin, that
the holder of a tax deed of lands is to be considered constructively in posses
sion, where the land is unoccupied. The rule was laid down in Sydnor e.
Palmer, 29 Wis., 226, that, under statutes of limitations, " evidence of adverse
possession is always to be strictly construed, and every presumption is to be
made in favor of the true owner." In Wilson e. Henry, 35 Wis., 241, 245, this
rule is explained as applying to the holder of the tax title when he claims
by constructive possession, and the " true owner " is in such case to be re
garded as the original owner, notwithstanding any technical defects that may
be found in his claim of title. This just and reasonable rule was applied to
the facts of the particular case in the following language : " The plaintiff seeks
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Liability of collector. In general, any mere ministerial offi
cer to whom process is issued, which proceeds from an officer,
board or other body having authority to issue process of that na
ture, which process is legal in form and contains nothing on its
to cut off the remedy and destroy the right af the true owner, and to show an
indefeasible title in himself, by virtue of an adverse constructive possession
of the land for three years next after the recording of his tax deed. Within
the rule, the evidence of such adverse constructive possession must be strictly
construed, and the defendant may avoid the bar and defeat the right asserted
by the plaintiff on this ground, by showing any actual occupation and use of
the premises under his title for any portion of the three years so required to
perfect the title of the plaintiff, or to debar the remedy of the defendant. This
principle has already been settled by this court in the case of Lewis v. Dishcr,
32 Wis., 504, and it is needless to add to the discussion which will there be
found. The court there say: ' In order that the claimant by tax deed may
assert or acquire title to unoccupied land in that way, or by lapse of time
under the statute, it must appear that the land remained and was continuously
unoccupied for the whole period during which the statute was running. Any
intervention and actual occupancy during the time by the former owner, or
any person for him, disengages the bar of the statute, and relieves the former
owner from the conclusive effect which would otherwise be given to the tax
deed.' But, as will be seen from the same decision, and others by this court,
with whicl} counsel are familiar, the effect of an actual possession taken and
held by the former owner, during the whole or any considerable portion of
the three years, is not only to disengage the bar of the statute, when resorted
to in favor of the grantee by tax deed, but also to create a bar against him,
and in favor of the title of such former owner. It operates in favor of the
true or former owner thus entering and holding, to cut off the remedy of the
grantee by tax deed, and to annul his title, whatever it may have been. In view
of these well settled principles, this court is of opinion that it was error for
the court below to reject the offer of proofs made by the defendants on the
trial." The offer is recited, and consisted in substance of a proposal to siiow
that persons mined for lead on the land in controversy during what was called
the mining season, in the winter, recognizing the defendant's right, and paying
rent to him ; also that a custom exists where this land is situate, making it
obligatory upon the land owner to hold mineral diggings for the miner oper
ating them during the summer season, though the miner does not work during
such summer season upon such diggings. And it is then added : " The time
included in the foregoing offer embraced the whole period of the three years
from and after the recording of the plaintiff's tax deed ; and the facts, if estab
lished, would divest the plaintiff of all constructive possession during the
same period. They would not only disprove and destroy his constructive
possession, but they would turn the statute of limitation against him by show
ing the actual possession and occupancy of the former owner, thus cutting off
any title acquired under the tax deed, unless the plaintiff saw fit to bring his
action to recover the possession within the three years. The offer, if proved
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face to notify or fairly apprise him that it is issued without au
thority, will be protected in serving it
,
even though, in fact, it
was issued without authority of law. This is a rule, not only es
sential to the protection of such officers, but absolutely required
also for the due dispatch of public business.1 It would seem to
be impolitic in a very high degree to compel such an officer to
ascertain, at his peril, the illegalities that might lie back of a pro
as made, would have shown that the plaintiff was thus under the necessity of
bringing his action, and that, not having done so, he had lost his title, if any,
acquired by the tax deed, and could not maintain this action, which was not
instituted until after the expiration of the three years. It would have sus
tained the plea or answer of the statute of limitations made by the defendants,
so as to protect them and the title under which they claim against the present
action, and the right now set up by the plaintiff."
1Ford e. Clough, 8 Me., 334; Kellar v. Savage, 20 id., 199; Tremont v.
Clark, 33 id., 4S2; State v. McNally, 34 id., 210; Caldwell v. Hawkins, 40 id.,
526; Bethel e. Mason, 55 id., 501; Judkins v. Reed, 48 id., 386; Nowell u.
Tripp, 61 id., 426 ; Savacoul v. Boughton, 5 Wend., 171 ; McGuinty v. Herrick,
id., 240, 243: Wilcox v. Smith, id., 231 ; Alexander v. Hoyt, 7 id., 89; Beach e.
Fuiman, 9 Johns., 228; Warner v. Shed, 10 id., 138; Reynolds v. Moore, 9
Wend., 35, 36; Coon v. Congden, 12 id., 496, 499; Bennett v. Burch, 1 Denio,
141; Patchin v. Ritter, 27 Barb., 34; Webber v. Gray, 24 Wend., 485; Abbott
e. Yost, 2 Denio, 86; Dunlap v. Hunting, id., 643; Cornell v. Barnes, 7 Hill,
35 ; People v. Warren, 5 id., 440 ; Sheldon e. Van Buskirk, 2 N. Y., 473 ; Che-
garay v. Jenkins, 5 N. Y., 376 ; Turner v. Franklin, 29 Mo., 285 ; Glascow v.
Rouse, 43 id., 479 ; St. Louis Building, etc., Ass'n e. Lightner, 47 id., 393 ;
State v. Dulle, 48 id., 282; Walden v. Dudley, 49 id., 419; Holden e. Eaton, 8
Pick., 436 ; Colman v. Anderson, 10 Mass., 105 ; Sprague v. Bailey, 19 Pick.,
436; Upton v. Holden, 5 Met., 360; Lincoln v. Worcester, 8 Cush., 55; AJd-
rich v. Aldrich, 8 Met., 102 ; Hays v. Drake, 6 Gray, 387 ; Howard v. Proctor,
7 id., 128; Williamstown v. Willis, 15 id., 427; Cheever v. Merritt, 5 Allen,
56S; Underwood v. Robinson, 106 Mass., 296; Brainerd v. Head, 15 La. An.,
489; Blanchard v. Goss, 2 N. H., 491; Henry v. Sargent, 13 id., 321; State v.
Weed, 21 id., 262; Rice v. Wadsworth, 27 id., 104; Kenniston v. Little, 30
id., 318; Kelley v. Jsoye?, 43 id., 209; Moore «. Alleghany City, 18 Penn. St.,
55; Billings v. Russell, 23 id., 189; Dennis e. Shaw, 5 Gilm., 405; Hill «. Fig.
ley 25 11l., 156; Allen v. Scott, 13 id., 80; State v. Jervey, 4 Strobh., 304; Cun
ningham v. Mitchell, 67 Penn. St., 78; Loomis v. Spencer, 1 Ohio, N. S., 153;
Thames Manufg Co. e. Lathrop, 7 Conn., 550; Watson v. Watson, 9 id., 140;
Neth v. Crofut, 30 id., 580; Grumon v. Raymond, 1 id., 40; Prince e. Thomas,
11 id., 472; Burton v. Fulton, 49 Penn. St., 151; McLean v. Cook, 23 Wis.,
364; Noland •:. Busby, 28 Ind., 154; Le Roy v. East Saginaw City Railway
Co., 18 Mich., 233 ; Lott v. Hubbard, 44 Ala., 593 ; State v. Lutz, 65 N. C, 503 ;
Gore v. Martin, 66 id., 371; Bird v. Perkins, Sup. Ct. Mich., Oct Term, 1875;
Erekine v. Hohnbach, 14 Wall., 613.
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cess apparently legal, and it might be justly expected to force
prudent men to decline the office altogether, or to proceed with
such hesitation and circumspection as sometimes to render the
process of little or no avail.1 The general rule is
,
that such an
officer is legally protected against any illegalities, except those
committed by himself, and it is not illegal for him to execute
process which comes to him as a ministerial officer, from other
officers whose action he has no authority to revise or review.8 He
is consequently not liable to one who is unlawfully taxed, by
reason of not residing within the district for which the tax is
levied ; 8 nor does the fact that sums are included in the warrant,
which were never lawfully voted, render him liable.4 And he is
protected in executing his warrant by arrest, notwithstanding the
person taxed has been discharged in bankruptcy.5
1 In Vermont the ruling is different, and a treasurer sued in trespass, for
taking goods on a warrant of distress, for taxes, cannot rely on a valid war
rant, but must show that all the previous proceedings were legal. " It has
never been considered in this state that the tax bill and warrant were of them
selves any sufficient justification to the officer. Neither the vote of the town,
nor the assessment of the tax by the selectmen, is in the nature of the proceed
ings of a court, either of general or special jurisdiction. The legality of all
the proceedings must be shown by the collector." Jledfield, J., in Collamer e.
Drury, 16 Vt., 574, 578. To the same point are Downing e. Roberts, 21 Vt.,
441; Hathaway e.Goodrich, 5 id., 65; Spear v. Tilson, 24 id., 420; tihaw v.
Peckett, 25 id., 423. See also Downer v. Woodbury, 19 id., 329 ; Wheelock v.
Archer, 26 id., 380. But the rule seems to be the reverse of this in that state,
when suit is brought for taxes, for then it is held the burden is upon the de
fendant to impeach the regularity and validity of the list Macomber e. Cen
ter, 44 Vt., 235, citing Willson v. Seavey, 38 id., 221.
» Erskine v. Hohnbach, 14 Wall., 613 : Nowell v. Tripp, 61 Me., 426 ; S. C., 14
Am. Rep., 572 ; Moore v. Alleghany City, 18 Penn. St., 55.
« Savacool v. Boughton, 5 Wend., 171 ; Nowell e. Tripp, 61 Me., 426 ; S. C, 14
Am. Rep., 572; Holden e. Eaton, 8 Pick., 436.
*Lincoln v. Worcester, 8 Cush., 55; Abbott e. Yost, 2 Denio, 86.
•Aldrich e. Aldrich, 8 Met., 102; Wilmarth e. Burt, 7 id., 257. The col
lector having a warrant from an authority of competent jurisdiction to issue
it
,
cannot inquire into the precedent steps. Cunningham v. Mitchell, 67 Penn.
St., 78. He may even officially receive voluntary payments where his au
thority is defective. State v. Woodside, 8 Ired., 104; Same v. Same, 9 id., 496;
Johnson e. Goodridge, 15 Me., 29 ; Orono e. Wedgewood, 44 id., 49 : Trescott
e. Moan, 50 id., 347 ; Sandwich v. Fish, 2 Gray, 298 ; Cheshire «. Howland, 13
id., 321 ; Williamstown v. Willis, 15 id., 427. Compare Waters v. State, 1
Gill, 302 ; O'Neal v. School Commissioners, 27 Md., 227 ; Commonwealth v.
30
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It is not easy to lay down any general rule as to -what will
constitute a defect in the process which should put the collector
on his guard. Where the law required the assessment roll to be
attached to the warrant, and the certificate attached thereto was
not in accordance with the law, it was held, that the warrant
could not be said to be fair on its face, and the collector was
liable for executing it1 The same ruling was made where the
warrant showed on its face that a certain tax included in it could
not lawfully have been placed in the list for that year.2 And so
where the affidavit which was required to be attached to the roll
after the time for reviewing the assessments had expired, appeared
to be made prematurely.8 So where the warrant was issued by a
justice of the peace, where, by law, it should have been issued by
the supervisors.* But mere clerical errors may be overlooked in
any case.5
Philadelphia, 27 Penn. St., 497; Moore v. Alleghany City, 18 id., 55. If the
collector's warrant was sufficient when property is seized under it
,
a subse
quent alteration, by the magistrate who signed it
, for the purpose of making
it a warrant for another tax, will not invalidate the collector's action. Good
win e. Perkins, 39 Vt., 598.
1 Van Rensselaer v. Witbeck, 7 N. Y., 517-
»Eames v. Johnson, 4 Allen, 382. So the collector was held liable in col
lecting a personal tax from a bank which, by law, was taxable on its realty
only. American Bank v. Mumford, 4 R. I., 478. Compare National Bank of
'Chemung v. Elmira, 53 N. Y., 49, and cases cited. That, however, was a suit
against the town after the money had been paid over.
8Westfall «. Preston, 49 N. Y., 349. See, also, National Bank of Chemung
e. Elmira, 53 id., 49; Gale v. Mead, 4 Hill, 109.
4 Chalker v. Ives, 55 Penn. St., 81. And see Hilbish v. Hower, 58 id., 93.
» Process issued to one as " constable and collector " will be sufficient, if in
fact he was authorized to act as collector when it was issued to him. Hays e.
Drake, 6 Gray, 387. And a collector is not a trespasser in seizing property
by virtue of two warrants, if either of them is sufficient. Id. A warrant at
tached to a tax list, and signed by the supervisors, was held to be fair on its
face, though they failed to add the official title to their names. Sheldon e.
"Van Buskirk, 2 N. Y., 473. A warrant issued in pursuance of law for the
collection of a tax from one who has removed from the township, is sufficient,
though it fails to recite the fact of removal. Cheever v. Merritt, 5 Allen, 563.
And see Sherman v. Torrey, 99 Mass., 472 ; Hubbard e. Garfield, 102 id., 72.
So it will protect the officer where the only defect is a failure to insert the
direction to sell distrained goods within seven days, according to law. King
v. Whitcomb, 1 Met., 328. And for other cases, where questions of validity
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But though a valid process will protect an officer against per
sonal responsibility, it will not enable him to build up a title to
property seized by virtue of it
,
either general or special. While,
therefore, he might hava a perfect defense to a suit brought
against him in trespass, for seizing property, he might not success
fully defend an action of replevin, or any other action in which
the legal title to the property, or the legal right to possession, was
the question at issue. In any such action it would not be suffi
cient for him that the process under which he acted appeared to
be valid on its face, but it should be valid in fact1 This is an
important distinction, which is sometimes overlooked.
It has been decided that if taxes are collected by color of law, and
actually paid over by the collector according to the command of
his warrant, that officer is not liable for the amount at the suit of
the tax payer, though it turn out that the authority under which
he acted was void for unconstitutionality or other reason.2 This
seems but reasonable, since the tax payer still has his remedy, as
will be seen further on.
If the collector levies distress for a tax and afterwards abuses
his authority, the warrant becomes no protection to him, and he
is held to be a trespasser ab initio. This rule has been applied in
one case where the collector sold the property at half its value
within two hours after seizure, and without giving public notice
of the time and place of sale.8 It has been applied also where
the collector, after a sale on which he had received a surplus, failed
to render to the owner an account in writing of the sale and
charges, as required by the statute under which the sale was made.*
of process have been raised, see Mussey v. White, 3 Me., 290; Bachelder e.
Thompson, 41 Me., 639; Stephens e. Wilkins, 6 Penn. St., 260; Bank of Che
nango e. Brown, 26 N. Y., 467 ; Barnard v. Graves, 13 Met., 85. And see
ante, pp 304, 305.
1Earl v. Camp, 16 Wend., 562; Beach v. Botsford, 2 Doug. (Mich.), 199; Lc
Roy v. East Saginaw, 18 Mich., 233.
» Dickens v. Jones, 6 Yerg., 483 ; Crutchfield v. Wood, 16 Ala., 702 ; Lewis
County v. Tate, 10 Mo., 650. In Wood v. Stirman, 37 Texas, 584, however, it
was decided that where a county treasurer collects taxes without authority of
law, he alone is liable, and not his sureties or the county, though the money
may have been actually paid in to the county treasury, and disbursed as
other county funds.
8 Blake e. Johnson, 1 ST. H., 91.
* Blanchard v. Dow, 32 Me., 557.
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And the collector is liable as a trespasser ab initio, if he keeps the
distress until after the time limited by law for making sale,
and then sells it ; 1 or if
,
having sold enough to satisfy the tax, he
proceeds to sell more.2
The rules which have been given apply to collectors under the
internal revenue laws of the United States, who are protected in
like manner in the collection of taxes committed to them by lists
fair on their face.8 The case of the collector of customs duties is
1 Pierce e. Benjamin, 14 Pick., 356, 360, citing Purrington v. Loring, 7 Mass.,
388; Nelson v. Merriam, 4 Pick., 249. See to the same effect Brackett e. Vin-
ing, 49 Me., 356; contra, Ordway v. Ferrin, 3 N. H., 69. Where a collector of
taxes, after seizing property as a distress and advertising it for sale, neglected
to sell it at the time appointed, but afterwards again advertised it the requisite
period, and sold it upon such new advertisement: Held, that neither the neg
lect to sell at the appointed time, nor the subsequent sale, could make him a
trespasser ab initio. Souhegan Nail, etc., Factory e. McConike, 7 N. H.,
309.
* Williamson v. Dow, 32 Me., 559. But in such a case he is trespasser only
as to the excess. Leckins v. Goodale, 61 Me., 400; S. C, 14 Am. Rep., 568.
Compare Polk v. Rose, 25 Md., 153. If an officer under two rate bills, one
valid and the other invalid, seizes no more property than he is authorized to
by virtue of the valid process, and sells the same for more than enough to sat
isfy the valid process, and then appropriates the excess to satisfy the invalid
process, such misapplication does not render the officer a trespasser ab initio.
To make him a trespasser ab initio, the wrongful act must be done to the
property taken, not to the fund realized from a legal sale. Wilson v. Seavey,
38 Vt., 221, 230. For the law as to what will render one a trespasser ab initio,
see the Six Carpenters' Case, 8 Coke, 290; S. C, 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 162
and notes ; Van Brundt e. Schenck, 11 Johns., 377 ; S. C, 13 Johns., 413. If one
whose proporty is unlawfully seized and sold by the collector causes it to be
bid in for himself and appropriates it to his own use, he can recover in an
action against the collector only what he paid for the property on the sale;
as that was the extent of his injury. Hurlburt «. Green, 41 Vt., 490.
» Erskine e. Hohnbach, 14 Wall., 613, 616. In this case Mr. Justi«e Field
states the rule of protection very clearly and concisely as follows: " Whatever
may have been the conflict at one time in the adjudged cases, as to the extent
of protection afforded to ministerial officers, acting in obedience to process
or orders issued to them by tribunals or officers invested by law with authority
to pass upon and determine particular facts, and render judgment thereon,
it is well settled now that if the officer or tribunal possess jurisdiction over
the subject matter upon which judgment is passed, with power to issue an
order or process for the enforcement of such judgment, and the order issued
thereon to the ministerial officer is regular on its face, showing no de
parture from the law, or defect of jurisdiction over the person or property
affected, then, and in such case, the order or process will give full and entire
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different. He has no tax warrant or other process to protect
him, and he proceeds at his peril in demanding and receiving
what he claims to be demandable as duties. If he collects ille
gal or excessive duties, and they are paid under protest, he is
liable to the party paying for the amount ; 1 but he is excused if
he pays over the moneys before protest is made.'
Liability of town, county, etc. The town, village, city or
county for which a tax has been levied and collected, may also,
under some circumstances, be liable to an action at the suit of
parties from whom the tax has been exacted. The authorities
warrant us in specifying the following as the conditions on which
any such action may be maintained :
1. The tax must have been illegal and void, and not merely
irregular.
2. It must have been paid under compulsion or the legal equiv
alent
3. It must have been paid over by the collecting officer, and
have been received to the use of the municipality. '
And to these should perhaps be added :
4. The party must not have elected to proceed in any remedy
he may have had against the assessor or collector.8
For a merely irregular assessment, it has already been stated in
several places, the remedy of the party is that which the statute
may give him. Irregularities do not make a tax void, nor com
monly do they attach to it any circumstance of inequality or injus-
protection to the ministerial officer in its regular enforcement against any
prosecution which the party aggrieved thereby may institute against him,
although serious errors may have been committed by the officer or tribunal
in reaching the conclusion or judgment upon which the order or process is
issued: " citing Savacool v. Boughton, 5 Wend., 170; Earl v. Camp, 16 Wend.,
563 ; Chegaray v. Jenkins, 5 N. Y., 376 ; Sprague v. Burchard, 1Wis., 457. To
the same effect is Haffin v. Mason, 15 Wall., 671. And see Cutting v. Gilbert,
5 Blatch., 259; Nelson v. Carman, id., 511; Braun v. Sauerwein, 10 Wall.,
218; The Collector e. Hubbard, 12 id., 1; Coblens e. Abel, 1 Woolw., 293.
1Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet., 137; Maxwell v. Griswold, 10 How., 242.
»Elliott «. Swartwout, 10 Pet., 137.
» In Ware v. Percival, 61 Me., 391, the person illegally assessed sued the town
and recovered satisfaction. Afterwards he sued the assessors, but his first
revovery and satisfaction were held conclusive. See same case, 14 Am.
Rep., 565.
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tice. When a municipal corporation is sued for money collected
and paid over to it as a tax, the idea on which the suit is predi
cated is
,
that the corporation has received that which, in justice,
it ought not to retain. But the merely irregular action of the
officers in their proceedings in assessing and levying the tax do
not show injustice ; there must be something further in the case
which either exempts the party from the tax altogether, or which,
because of illegality or inequality, deprived the officers of juris
diction. Municipalities do not guaranty to their people correct
action on the part of their officers, and if they did, no one would
be entitled to rely upon the guaranty until he was injured. Ir
regular action does not necessarily injure the parties concerned;
and where it does, the remedies given by review or appeal are
supposed to afford full redress. Any further remedy must pro
ceed upon the idea that the tax is void ; a mere nullity.1 That a
tax voluntarily paid cannot be recovered back, has been held by
the authorities with very few exceptions.8 It is immaterial in
such a case that the tax has been illegally laid, or even that the
law under which it was laid was unconstitutional.8
1 Wright e. Boston, 9 Cush., 233, 241, per Shaw, Ch. J., citing Preston v. Bos
ton, 12 Pick., 7 ; Boston, etc., Glass Co. v. Boston, 4 Met., 181 ; Howe e. Boston,
7 Cush., 273 ; Lincoln v. Worcester, 8 id., 55 ; approved in Rogers e. Green-
bush, 58 Me., 390. If an illegal state tax is collected and paid over, the state
becomes trustee of the moneys for the persons paying it
,
and their remedy is
to ask the law-making power to make the proper appropriation. Shoemaker
v. Grant County, 36 Ind., 175. If the state has any auditing board competent
to allow such claims, their power might be adequate to the case. When the
town collector collects a state, county and town tax levied on property not
taxable, if the town is sued, the recovery will be limited to what was paid over
to it for its own use, and will not embrace the state and county taxes. Ver
mont Central R. R. Co. e. Burlington, 28 Vt., 193. See, also, Spear v. Brain-
tree, 24 id., 414; Slack v. Norwich, 32 id., 818; Matheson «. Mazomanie, 20
Wis., 191.
» Smith e. R«adfield, 27 Me., 145 ; New York, etc., R. R. Co. v. Marsh, 12 N.
Y., 308 ; Walker v. St. Louis, 15 Mo., 563 ; Christy's Administrators e. St.
Louis, 20 id., 143 ; Hospital v. Philadelphia County, 24 Penn. St., 229 ; Phillips
v. Jefferson County, 5 Kans., 412; Wabaunsee County e. Walker, 8 id., 431 ;
Corkle e. Maxwell, 3 Blatch., 413 ; Elliott «. Swartwout, 10 Pet., 137.
• Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Penn. St., 73 ; Barrett e. Cambridge, 10 Allen,
48. And see Forbes e. Appleton, 5 Cush., 115. Money paid to secure a license,
issued on the petition of the party, is voluntarily paid, and cannot be recovered
back, even though no power existed to require it Mays «. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio,
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The principle is an ancient one in the common law, and is of
general application. Every man is supposed to know the law ;
and if he voluntarily makes a payment which the law would not
compel him to make, he cannot afterwards assign his ignorance
of the law as the reason why the state should furnish him with
legal remedies to recover it back. Especially is this the case
when the officer receiving the money, who is chargeable with no
more knowledge of the law than the party making payment, is
not put on his guard by any warning or protest, and the money
is paid over to the use of the public in apparent acquiescence in
the justice of the exaction. Mistake of fact there cannot well be
in such a case ; as the illegalities which render such a demand a
nullity must appear from the records, and the taxpayer is just as
much bound to inform himself what the records show or do not
show, as are the public authorities. The rule of law is a rule of
public policy also ; it is a rule of quiet as well as of good faith,
and precludes the courts being occupied in undoing the arrange
ments of parties which they have voluntarily made, and into
which they have not been drawn by fraud or accident, or by any
excusable ignorance of their legal rights and liabilities.1
N. S., 268, citing Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt., 143; Elliott e. Swartwout, 10
Pet., 150; Clarke. Dutcher, 9 Cow., 674; Robinson v. Charleston, 4 Rich., 317;
Smith v. Readfield, 27 Me., 145. To the same effect is Ligonier v. Ackerman,
46 Ind., 552. In California it is held that a tax imposed by city ordinance,
without authority of law, may be recovered back, even though paid without
protest. Galveston e. Snyder, 39 Texas. 236, citing Marshall v. Snediker, 25
id., 460; Baker v. Panola County, 30 id., 86.
1Parties who have acquiesced in a tax for eleven years, held to have yielded
forever their right to question the law which imposed it. Commonwealth v.
Philadelphia, 27 Penn. St., 497. In Kentucky it has been held that where a
party pays taxes illegally assessed without knowledge of the illegality, he
may recover back, though he made no protest. Underwood v. Brockman, 4
Dana, 309 ; Ray v. Bank of Kentucky, 3 B. Monr., 510; Louisville v. Zanone,
1 Met. (Ky.), 151 ; Covington v. Powell, 2 id., 226. But in Iowa it has been
held that a tax, paid under ignorance that the law under which it was levied
was invalid, could not on that ground be recovered back. Kraft v. Keokuk,
14 Iowa, 86; Espy v. Fort Madison, id., 226. And sec Lester e. Baltimore, 29
Md., 415. A competent authority, having jurisdiction, assessed the plaintiffs
for personal property. They complained, and appealed to the courts. Be
fore the court of appeals rendered a final decision, the officer having charge
of the collection of taxes gave notice to the plaintiffs, requiring payment, and
stating that if the tax was not paid, a warrant would issue to collect the same.
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All payments of taxes are supposed to be voluntary -which are
not made under protest or under the apparent compulsion of legal
process.1 When a protest is relied upon, nothing very formal is
requisite ; " taxes illegally assessed may always be recovered
back, if the collector understands from the payer that the tax
is regarded as illegal, and that suit will be instituted to compel
the refunding." 3
A payment made to release goods from seizure is a payment
on compulsion,8 and so is pa}'ment after threat of distress of
Thereupon the plaintiffs paid the tax. There being no warrant, seizure, or
threatened seizure, payment of money to free the property from the posses
sion of another, or ignorance of facts, it was held, that it was a purely volun
tary payment, and no action would lie to recover back the same. Union Bank
v. New York, 51 Barb., 159.
1Where a town offers a discount to those who make payment promptly, a
payment made to obtain this discount has been held to be voluntary, though
made under protest. Lee v. Templeton, 13 Gray, 476. In Connecticut it has
been decided that if one's land is sold for a Ux after protest, and he buys it
in, this purchase must be regarded as a voluntary payment, and will give him
no right of action. Sheldon v. School District, 24 Conn., 88. In Taylor v.
Board of Health, 31 Penn. St., 73, taxes levied under an unconstitutional law
had been demanded and paid for a series of years, and the law being then
held void, suit was brought to recover back. The taxes were in the shape of
head money on immigrants, and were collected of consignees of ships, with
out process. Lowrie, J. : " If the matter complained of here was a wrong, then
the state did it in the only way a state can do a wrong — by its public func
tionaries. The suit is not against the state, and could not be ; but it is against
the executive officer of the state; for in this matter the board of health waa
nothing else. A state imposes certain taxes, and orders a certain officer to
collect them and apply them in a certain way, and if he does so, how can the
state compel him to refund them to the taxpayer? Will it be said that in this
case the order was void, and therefore the officer acted on his own authority
and at his own risk ? The plaintiff cannot well say that, seeing that he paid
voluntarily, and without attempting to deny the duty or to warn the officer
that he must proceed at his own risk. Had he given such warning, the va
lidity of the t:ix would have been tested by the superior officers of the col
lector. He paid without dispute, and thus assented to the collection of the
tax for public purposes, and of course, to the application of it; and he has
no shadow of equity against the collecting functionary." In Busby v. No-
land, 39 Ind., 234, it is said that one who pays without protest is estopped
from disputing the legality of the tax.
8Cha»e, Ch. J., in Erskine e. Van Arsdale, 15 Wall., 75, 77.
8Briggs v. Lewiston, 29 Me., 472. But it was held in this case that the costs
laid were not recoverable back. And see Dow e. Sudbury, 5 Met., 73; Shaw
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goods ; 1 and much more would be the satisfaction of the demand by
actual sale of goods distrained ; 2 and it seems that if the officer calls
upon the person taxed, and " demands a sum of money under a war
rant directing him to enforce it. the party of whom he demands it
may fairly assume that if he seeks to act under the warrant at all,
he will make it effectual. The demand itself is equivalent to a
service of the writ on the person. Any payment is to be regard
ed as involuntary, which is made under a claim involving the use
of force as an alternative ; as the party of whom it is demanded
cannot be compelled or expected to await actual force, and can
not be held to expect that an officer will desist after making a de
mand. The exhibition of a warrant directing forcible proceed
ings, and the receipt of money thereon, will be in such case equiv
alent to actual compulsion."8
The proper action against a corporation, in these cases, is as
sumpsit for money had and received ; the liability not attaching
e. Becket, 7 Cush., 442; though if the suit were brought against the officers in
a proper case, it would be otherwise. Shaw v. Becket, supra.
1Grim v. School District, 57 Penn. St., 433, citing Henry e. Horstick, 9
Watts, 414; Caldwell v. Moore, 11 Penn. St., 60; Allentown «. Saeger, 20 id.,
421. And see Guy v. Washburn, 23 Cal., 111. A payment is not voluntary
where the payer lays down money, but forbids the collector to take it. Bel
linger e. Gray, 51 N. Y., 610. And see Greenabaum v. King, 4 Kans., 332.
»Hurley v. Texas, 20 Wis., 634.
• Campbell, J., in Atwell e. Zeluff, 26 Mich., 118, citing Boston, etc., Glass Co.
v. Boston, 4 Met., 181. And see Amesbury, etc., ManuPg Co. v. Amcsbury, 17
Mass., 461 ; Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick., 7 ; George v. School District, 6 Met.,
497; Joyner v. School District, 3 Cush., 567; Lincoln v. Worcester, 8 id., 55.
Upon the right to maintain this action in general, see Henry v. Chester, 15
Vt., 460; Allen v. Burlington, 45 id., 202; Richards v. Stogsdell, 21 Ind., 74;
Hubbard v. Brainard, 35 Conn., 563; Goddard v. Seymour, 30 Conn., 394; Cal
laway v. Milledgeville, 48 Geo., 309; Wilkey v. Pekin, 19 11l., 160; Allentown
v. Saeger 20 Penn. St., 421. The question what constitutes a voluntary pay
ment was quite fully discussed, and the English authorities cited in Baker e.
Cinncinnati, 11 Ohio,N. S., 534, and Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Penn. St., 73.
The latter case quotes particularly Fullan «. Down, 6 Esp., 26 ; Valpy e. Man-
ly, 1 C B., 5U4; Parker v. G. W. Railway Co., 7 M. & G., 253; Morgan e. Pal.
mer, 2 B. & C, 729. In Carleton v. Ashburnham, 102 Mass., 348, the maxim
that where two acts are done at the same time, the one shall take effect first
which ought in strictness to have been done first, in order to give it effect
(Claflin «. Thayer, 13 Gray, 459), was applied to a simultaneous payment of tax
and delivery of a protest against its exaction.
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until the money is paid over, and being then based upon tbe re
ceipt of the money, and not upon the illegalities which preceded
it1 The recovery will of course be limited to the money received ;
while in an action of trespass against the assessors, or trespass or
trover against the collector, the party might recover such actual
damages as he could show he had sustained.2 It is possible that
in the case of municipal corporations existing under special char
ters, the rule may be different If such corporations, in the exer
cise of their legislative power, order the collection of an illegal
tax, and process is issued to their officers for ite collection, such
officers may well be regarded as the agents of the corporation in
the execution of the process, and the corporation held liable in
1A town is not liable for any mistake or misfeasance of the assessors or col
lector by means whereof one has been compelled to pay a tax wrongfully lev
ied, the money not having been paid into the treasury of the town. These of
ficers are not, in a legal sense, the agents of the town in its corporate capacity,
in performing duties under the tlx laws. Lorillard of Monroe, 12 Barb., 161,
and 11 K. Y., 372. And see People e. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N. Y., 563 ;
Preston v. Boston, 12 Pick., 7; Chapman v. Brooklyn, 40 N. Y., 372; Newman
v. Supervisors of Livingston, 45 N. Y., 676. When one is illegally assessed a
tax afterwards abated, and is arrested by the collector, the payment by the
town to the collector of the cost of the arrest is not such a ratification of the
act as to render the town liable. Perley v. Georgetown, 7 Gray, 464. In a
suit against a town to recover back an illegal tax, the town cannot defend by
showing that the assessors were not legally elected. Sudbury v. Heard, 103
Mass., 543. On the other hand, it is no ground for recovering back a tax, that
it was collected by one who was not collector de jure where he was such de
facto. Williams v. School District, 21 Pick., 75. Where a tax has been col
lected and paid over to a city, and is afterwards set aside, suit will lie against
the city to recover it back, even though the assessors were not appointed or
controlled by the corporation. Bank of Commonweiilth v. New York, 43 N.
Y., 184. See also Chapman v. Brooklyn, 40 id., 372; Newman v. Supervisors
of Livingston, 45 id., 676: compare Swift v. Poughkeepsie, 37 id., 511. If the
tax is charged to the collector in a general settlement with him, this is equiv
alent to a payment into the treasury. County Commissioners v. Parker, 7
Minn., 267; Slack v. Norwich, 32 Vt, 819; Babcock v. Granville, 44 id., 325.
•Dow v. Sudbury, 5 Met., 73 ; Shaw e. Becket, 7 Cush., 442. And see Inglee
v. Bosworth, 5 Pick., 498, per Morton, J. ; Ware e. Percival, 61 Me., 391, per
Appleton, Ch. J. If the proceedings in the collection of a tax are wholly void,
and the person taxed neither has been nor can be disturbed in his possession,
there is no ground for an action against the town, as the plaintiff has lost
nothing. Such would be the case of a void sale of shares in a corporation.
Noyes v. Haverhill, 11 Cush., 338.
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tort if the officer resorts to compulsory measures for its enforce
ment.1
A demand is not necessary before bringing suit to recover back
illegal taxes.2 Interest is recoverable from the date of demand,
but not before.8 If only a part of the tax was illegal, the recov
ery will be limited to that part, if capable of being distinguished.4
1Howell v. Buffalo, 15 N. Y., 512. See Conrad e. Ithaca, 16 id., 158; West v.
Brockport, id., 116, note ; Bennett v. Buffalo, 17 id., 383 ; Sheldon e. Kalamazoo
24 Mich., 383.
»Look e. Industry, 51 Me.,.375. See Pierce v. Benjamin, 14 Pick., 356.
' Boston, etc., Glass Co. v. Boston, 4 Met., 181. See Atwell v. Zeluff, 26
Mich., 118, 120.
* Torrey v. Millbury, 21 Pick., 64. See this case commented on in Lincoln e.
Worcester, 8 Cush., 55. Whether cost of the proceedings to collect the tax
can be recovered from the town, see Briggs e. Lewiston, 29 Me., 472 ; Dow v.
Sudbury, 5 Met., 73 ; Shaw v. Becket, 7 Cush., 442. The following illustra-
tions of illegal taxes recovered back may be cited: One who pays a person-
al and poll tax in a town of which he is not a resident may recover it back,
if paid under the threat of a warrant, notwithstanding he was properly taxed
for real estate in that town. This would not be regarded as a case of exces
sive taxation from which the party should appeal; the tax on the personalty
and poll being wholly unauthorized. Preston e. Boston, 12 Pick., 7. Fur
ther, as to the recovery of a town, etc., by nonresidents unlawfully taxed with
in it
,
see Hathaway v. Addison, 48 Me., 440; Sumner v. Dorchester, 4 Pick.,
361; Inglee v. Bosworth, 5 id., 498; Dow v. Sudbury, 5 Met., 73; Lee «. Bos
ton, 2 Gray, 484; Dickinson v. Billings, 4 id., 42; People e. Supervisors of
Chenango, 11 N. Y., 563. It has been held that if school taxes are levied un-
lawfully in a district by vote of the town, they may be recovered back of the
town. Powers v. Sanford, 39 Me., 183. If a nonresident is taxed on person
alty in a town where he does not reside, his right to recover it back cannot
be affected by the fact of his having real estate in the town which was omit
ted from the list Hathaway e. Addison, 48 Me., 440. Where an inhabitant
is wrongfully taxed on property held in trust for him abroad, and has no
property taxable to him, he may recover back of the town a tax assessed to
and paid by him in respect of the property so held in trust. Dorr v. Boston,
6 Gray, 131, relying upon Preston e. Boston, 12 Pick., 7. When by law the
personal estate of corporations is assessed in the shares of the company, but
the assessors tax to the corporation both their personal and real estate, and
they pay the taxes, they may recover back the tax on the personalty. Dunnel
Manuf. Co. v. Pawtucket, 7 Gray, 277. For further cases, see Perry v. Dover,
12 Pick., 206; Joyner v. School District, 3 Cush., 567; Huckins v. Boston, 4
Cush., 543; Bacon e. School District, 97 Mass., 421 ; Mathewson v. Mazomanie,
20 Wis., 191; Hurley v. Texas, id., 634; James v. New Orleans, 19 La. An.,
109 ; Hill v. Supervisors of Livingston, 12 N. Y., 52 ; Atwater e. Woodbridge,
6 Conn., 226; Adam «. Litchfield, 10 id., 127; Gillette v. Hartford, 31 id., 351;
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A municipal corporation or body, for whose benefit taxes are en
forced, does not warrant to the purchaser the title to property
sold for their satisfaction, or the legality of. the proceedings on
which the sale was based. The purchaser in such a case buys at
his own risk, and at his peril investigates the proceedings. This
is a general rule in tax sales.1
A misapplication by a corporation, actual or threatened, of
moneys collected by taxation, will give no right of action to an
individual to recover his proportion of the tax. The money,
when collected and paid to the corporation, belongs to it
,
and not
to those from whom it has been collected. For misapplication
there may be remedies on behalf of the public, and perhaps indi
vidual taxpayers may enjoin it ; but a suit to recover the moneys
must be based upon an individual right to it
,
which could not
exist in the case.8
Remedy by replevin. In some cases, one whose goods have
been seized for the satisfaction of a tax may recover them by
writ of replevin. But to justify this process the tax must be ab
solutely void, and not merely unjust, excessive or irregular. The
case must consequently be brought within the rules already laid
down, regarding the invalidity of tax levies, or the suit in replev
in must fail. The liability of this process to vexatious use is
so considerable, that it has been deemed proper in some of the
states, on grounds of public policy, to provide that replevin shall
not lie for property distrained for taxes. Taking away this
remedy would still leave to the party all the other remedies which
are applicable to the case ; and he may therefore still contest the
Nicodemus v. East Saginaw, 25 Mich., 456; Supervisors of Stephenson e.
Manny, 56 11l., 160; Lauman e. Des Moines County, 29 Iowa, 310; Allen r.
Burlington, 45 Vt, 202 ; Judd v. Fox Lake, 28 Wis., 583 ; First Ecclesiastical
Society v. Hartford, 38 Conn., 274; Foster v. County Commissioners, 7 Minn.,
140.
1 Lynde v. Melrose, 10 Allen, 49 ; Packard v. New Limerick, 34 Me., 266.
In Vermont, it is otherwise by statute. See Saulters v. Victory, 35 Vt., 351.
1 Withrington v. Harvard, 8 Cush., 66 ; Moore v. School Directors, 59 Penn.
St., 232; Wright v. Dunham, 13 Mich., 414. A tax on corporate dividends
cannot be disputed by creditors of the corporation on the ground of its hav
ing been declared when the corporation was insolvent. Pennsylvania Bank
Assignees' Account, 39 Penn. St., 103.
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validity of the tax in a suit to recover the money after it has been
paid, or in an action to recover the value of his goods, if the tax
was collected by distress and sale.1 And it has been held that a
statute taking away the remedy by replevin is not to be held ap
plicable to a third person whose goods are seized for a tax for
which he is no way liable ; * nor to one who was not liable to be
assessed for taxation.8
Where replevin is allowed, it cannot be maintained by the
party taxed unless the whole tax is illegal ; as it must assume
that the seizure of the goods is without warrant of law.4
Estoppel. Under some circumstances, a party who is illegally
assessed may be held to have waived all right to a remedy by a
course of conduct which renders it unjust and inequitable to oth
ers that he should be allowed to complain of the illegality. Such
a case would exist if one should ask for and encourage the levy
of the tax of which he subsequently complains ; and some of the
cases referred to in the note go far in the direction of holding, that
a mere failure to give notice of objections to one who, with the
knowledge of the person taxed, as contractor or otherwise,
is expending money in reliance upon payment from the
taxes, may have the same effect.5 But the duty to speak
1Dudley v. Ross, 27 Wis., 679; Macklot v. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 379.
»Traverse e. Inslee, 19 Mich., 98. Compare Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co., v.
Cleino, 2 Dillon, 175 ; Cardinel v. Smith, Deady, 197.
»Stockwell v. Vietch, 15 Ab. Pr., 412. See Ross v. East Saginaw, 18 Mich.,
233. As to such statutes in general, see O'Reiley v. Good, 42 Barb., 521; Mc-
Claughry v, Cratzenburgh, 39 11l., 117 ; Mt. Carbon, etc., R. R. Co., v. Andrews,
53 id., 176; Yancey v. New Manchester, etc., Manuf. Co., 33 Geo., 622; Cady
v. Lennard, 45 id., 85. Where mere irregularities are complained of, replevin
will not be the appropriate remedy. Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282; Bilbo e.
Henderson, 21 id., 56, and cases cited.
*Brackett e. Whidden, 3 N. H., 17; Emerick v. Sloan, 18 Iowa, 139.
8Weber e. San Francisco, 1 Cal., 455; Kellogg «. Ely, 15 Ohio, N. S., 64;
Tash v. Adams, 10 Cnsh., 252 ; Motz v. Detroit, 18 Mich., 495 ;Warner «. Grand
Haven, 30 id., 24; Peoria v. Kidder, 26 11l., 351 ; Sleeper e. Bullen, 6 Kans.,
300; Pease v. Whitney, 8 Mass., 93; La Fayette v. Fowler, 34 Ind., 140. In In
diana it is held that one who has seen a public improvement go on without
objection, until it is accepted 'as completed by the city, cannot afterwards en
join the collection of the assessment on the ground that the work was not
done according to contract. Evansville v. Pflsterer, 34 Ind., 36. Or that the
whole proceeding was invalid. La Fayette v. Fowler, 34 Ind., 140, citing Hcl
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ought to be very imperative to make mere silence operate as an
estoppel.1
Remedy by mandamus. A summary remedy by the writ of
mandamus may be had by parties illegally assessed in a few cases,
which are more particularly referred to in another chapter.2 They
embrace cases in which the property or subject taxed is not taxa
ble by law, and the remedy is given by compelling the proper
officer to strike off the assessment or to discharge the tax.8 But
an excessive assessment is not to be corrected by means of the
writ, it not lying to correct mere errors of judgment in the exer
cise of judicial or discretionary powers.4
Remedy by prohibition. The common law writ of prohibi
tion lies to keep inferior courts within their jurisdiction, and is
inapplicable to tax cases, except, perhaps, under very peculiar
statutes. A statutory remedy has been given in some states
under this name.5
Quo warranto. ^This is the process by means of which usur
pations of corporate franchises may be inquired into. It may
doubtless be made available on behalf of the state in some cases
where powers of taxation are unlawfully claimed, but is not
adapted to the redress of individual wrongs under the revenue
lenkamp v. La Fayette, 30 id., 192; Palmer e. Strumph, 29 id., 329. And see
Sleeper e. Bullen, 6 Kans., 300. One contesting a drainage proceeding, but ad
mitting before the supervisors that the land is swamp and overflowed is es
topped from disputing that fact on certiorari. Hagar v. Supervisors of Yolo,
47 Cal., 222.
1Where city property is assessed by city officers and sold as individual
property, this does not estop the city from setting up its title. St Louis v.
Gorman, 29 Mo., 593. Taxing lots as private property whose boundaries in
clude part of what is actually used as a street does not estop the city from
claiming it as a street. Ellsworth v. Grand Rapids, 27 Mich., 250.
»Chapter XXIII.
8See People c Barton, 44 Barb., 148; People v. Olmstead, 45 id., 644; Peo-
pie v. Supervisors of Otsego, 51 N. Y., 401 ; People v. Auditor General, 9
Mich., 134.
4Howland v. Eldridge, 43 N. Y., 457 ; School Directors v. Anderson, 45 Penn.
St., 388; Gibbs v. Hampden Co. Commissioners, 19 Pick., 298; Miltenberger
e. St. Louis County Court, 50 Mo., 172.
5See People v. Supervisors of Queens, 1 Hill, 195; Talbot Dent, 9 B.
Monr.,526; State v. Gary, 33 Wis., 93.
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laws. It has been held not to be the proper process to correct
corporate action, where a city, instead of establishing remunerative
water rates to pay the interest and part of the principal of the
water loan — which it was claimed was its duty to do annually —
established nominal rates only, and levied a tax on the city at
large to pay the debt and interest.1
Conclusion. It will be apparent from what has appeared in
this chapter, that many serious errors may be committed and
many wrongs done in the exercise of the power to tax, which the
parties wronged must submit to, because the law can afford them
no redress whatever. All injuries which result from an exercise
of political or legislative authority are to be included in this cat
egory ; and these are often the most serious which, in matters of
taxation, the people are visited with. In all such cases, the au
thority of the judiciary is confined to an inquiry into the jurisdic
tional question, and if it appears that the political or legislative
body has kept within the limits of its authority, the judiciary must
pause there, and admit its incompetency to inquire into wrongs
which, within those limits, may have been committed. The wrongs
which spring from errors on the part of assessors are, in a large
proportion of all the cases, as little susceptible of correction, unless
the legislature shall have provided a remedy by statute. Courts
of equity have but a limited jurisdiction, extending to few cases
besides those in which the impelling motive on the part of the
assessors has been to do injustice and inflict injury. The chief
protection of the citizen must at last be sought in the intelligence
and integrity of public officers, and where these fail, as too often
they do, the injury must frequently prove irreparable.
1Attorney General e. Salem, 103 Mass., 138. Neither is a bill in equity the
proper remedy for such a case. Carlton e. Salem, 103 Mass., 141.
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APPEAL — «ontinued.
party failing to avail himself of, is concluded, 528.
right to, does not exist unless given by statute, 528.
is not essential if tax is void, 528.
by a city, from an assessment, 529.
where given, certiorari will not be allowed, 531.
APPELLATE BOARD —
may be compelled by mandamus to proceed to hearing, 521.
action by, is in general conclusive, 529.
when action may be reviewed on certiorari, 534.
APPOINTMENT —
without authority, officer de facto in case of, 185, 186.
(See De Facto Offices.)
of township meetings, etc.,
(See Notice.)
APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES —
must be districts for, 103-123.
equality the purpose of, 124-164.
involves the right to make exemptions, 145.
what it consists in, 175.
methods of 175.
specific taxes, 175.
ad valorem taxes, 175.
taxes with reference to special benefits, 175, 176.
general principles of, 177, 178.
by legislature is presumptively just, 179.
is imperative, 180.
burdens levied without, are arbitrary, 180.
diversity in methods of, may be just, 181.
failure to do justice in, does not render levy void, 181.
nor failure in strict enforcement of, 181, 182.
must be confined to the district, 182.
does not admit of invidious exemptions, 182, 183.
in case of highways passing through or into two towns, etc., 106-110,
419, 478.
APPORTIONMENT OF DEBTS —
on division of municipality, may be made by legislature, 176, 177, 479, 481.
APPORTIONMENT OF ASSESSMENTS —
general principles, 447-156.
by benefits, 449.
by foot front, 451-454.
by the acre, 454, 453.
by value of lots, 456.
districts for, 449, 450.
(See Assessments, Local.)
UNHEX. 5S3
APPRAISAL— ,
(See Valuation.)
APPRAISERS —
(See Assessors.)
APPROPRIATION —
under eminent domain, how it differs from taxation, 175.
(See Eminent Domain.)
unlawful,
(See Misappropriation.)
ARBITRARY EXACTIONS —
how they difier from taxes, 2, 260.
levies without apportionment are, 180.
ARBITRARY POWER —
to tax does not exist, 68.
See Limitations on the Taxing Power.)
ARBITRARY RULES —
of apportionment, 180, 453, 454.
(See Apportionment.)
ARKANSAS —
exemptions in, 132.
constitutional provisions to secure equality of taxation in, 436.
ARMY —
taxation for, 73.
(See Bounties.)
ARREST—
after discharge in bankruptcy, 561.
for nonpayment of taxes, 301, 389.
ASSENT —
of owners sometimes required before special assessment can be laid,"'455.
of people to the imposition of taxes, 44-48, 178.
in case of local taxation, 474-495.
of municipal corporations to contracts, cannot be dispensed with by
legislature, 483-494.
to payment of illegal taxes,
(See Voluntary Payment.)
to illegal taxation,
(See Estoppel.)
ASSESSMENT —
invidious or fraudulent may be set aside. 157-547.
cannot be confirmed, 228.
necessity for, 258, 259.
what it is, 258.
from what time it dates, 260.
to be made periodically, 260, 261.
by several assessors, 194.
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ASSESSMENT — continued.
lists for, 261-264.
right to notice of, 265-268, 547.
meetings for review of, 267.
chaDge of without notice, 268.
personal, how made, 269-272.
only on residents, 269.
and at place of residence, 14, 270.
to trustees, 270, 271.
of partnership property, 271.
principles of, 271, 272.
of corporations, 273.
of railroad property, 274.
what included in "taxable property," 272.
of " certificates of deposit," "debt," " income " and " machinery," 272.
of stock, 272, 274.
of real property, 275.
seated and unseated lands, 275-277.
what are seated, 276, 277.
how assessed, 27S.
tracts to be separately valued, 279, 280, 289. /
when owner or occupant to be named, 278, 279.
what are separate parcel«, 281.
what a sufficient description, 282-286.
valuation, necessity for, 287.
is a judicial act, 288.
legislature cannot make, 288.
how authenticated, 289, 290.
of distinct interests separately, 288, 289.
equalization of, 290.
evidences of in special cases, 332.
review of on certiorari,
(See Certiorari.)
for the purposes of special levies, 447-452.
by benefits, 448-451.
by other standards, 451, 452.
duplicate,
(See
Duplicate Taxation.)
fraud in,
(See Fraud.)
relief against,
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
action in making is judicial, 550-552.
ASSESSMENTS, LOCAL —
exemptions from taxation do not apply to, 146-151.
are not taxes in the ordinary sense of that term, 146, 456.
general subject considered, 416-473.
' principles which underlie them, 416.
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ASSESSMENTS, LOCAL— «ontinued.
arc based upon supposed benefits, 416, 417.
must be special authority of law for, 418.
cases for, 418-428.
court houses and other public buildings, 4M>.
streets and highways, 419, 420.
laud for opening streets, 420.
grading streets, 421.
paving, planking and improving streets, 421, 422.
altering, widening and extending streets, 422.
repaving or repairing streets, 422.
drains, sewers, etc., 423-427.
culverts, etc., in cities, 425-427.
levees and embankments, 427.
water pipes in streets, 427.
lighting streets with gas, 428.
other special cases, 428.
objections to, in point of policy and justice, 428, 429.
objections under constitutional principles and provisions, 429-446.
1. that they take property without due process of law, 429, 430.
2. that they take property for public use without compensation, 430-4.
3. that they violate express constitutional provisions, 435-444.
in Alabama, Arkansas and California, 436.
in 11linois and Indiana, 4;!7.
in Kansas, Louisiana and Massachusetts, 438.
in Michigan and Minnesota, 442.
in Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio and Oregon, 443.
in Rhode Island and Wisconsin, 444.
objections not sustained by the authorities, 444-446.
general principles of apportionment, 414 446.
methods of apportionment, 447-449.
1. by an estimate of benefits, 448.
2. by a standard fixed by the legislature, 448.
fixing the district for assessment, 449-451.
one district for several improvements, 445.
assessments by frontage, 451-454.
is really an assessment by benefits, 454.
assessment by the acre, 454-456.
assessment by value of lots, 456.
property subject to assessment, 456.
case of railroad property, 456, 457.
case of personal property, 457, 458.
case of property devoted to special use, 458.
case of public property, 458, 459.
proceedings in levying and collecting, 459.
district is conclusively fixed by legislative authority, 459.
assessment is conclusive upon benefits, 460.
courts powerless to relieve against hardships, 461, 462.
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ASSESSMENTS, LOCAL — continued.
proceedings in case of street occupied by plankroad, etc., 462.
assessment must be limited to cost of work, 462.
may be made before work done, 462, 463.
excess in estimate will not defeat, 463.
must be distributed through the district, 463.
must not go outside the district, 464.
may be against the land or against separate interests, 464.
statute must be strictly followed in making, 464.
conditions precedent must be complied with, 464, 465.
collection of assessments, 465.
> may be as the statute shall prescribe, 465.
by contractor, 466, 467.
by enforcing lien against land, 466, 467.
no defense that work not done according to contract, 468, 469.
sale of lands for, 469, 470.
personal liability for assessments, 470-473.
enjoining, when illegal, 540.
(See Injunction.)
review of on certiorari, 535.
(See Certiorari.)
ASSESSORS —
election of, 259.
enforcing official duties by, 512-526.
cannot be coerced in the exercise of their judgment, 517, 518.
may be compelled by mandamus to deliver correct copy of roll, 520.
and to put on roll omitted property, 520.
and to perform any ministerial duty, 521.
act judicially in making assessment, 550-552.
joint action by, 194.
not liable for excessive assessment, 552.
even though it was made so by including property not taxable, 552.
nor for errors of judgment, 552, 553.
are liable for exceeding their jurisdiction, 553-555.
as where personal tax is assessed upon nonresident, 553.
or where tax was levied which was never voted, 554.
or an excessive tax, 554.
or one voted for an illegal purpose, 554.
or for neglect of duty in some cases, 554.
whether liable for fraud or malice, 556, 557.
liability of supervisor as, 557, 558.
form of action against, 570.
ASSUMPSIT —
action of, for taxes, 300.
against collector to recover illegal taxes paid, 559-565.
against town, county, etc., 56*.
against collector of internal revenue, 564.
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ASSUMPSIT — continued.
actions against collector of customs, 564, 565.
(See Action at Law; Remedies for Excessive and Illegal
Taxation.)
ASSUMPTION OP POWERS—
(See De Facto Officers; Jurisdiction.)
ATTORNEY GENERAL —
(See Law Officer of the State.)
ATTORNEYS —
(See Lawyers.)
AUCTION —
lands to be sold at, 344.
AUCTIONEERS—
taxation of, 389.
AUDITING BOARDS —
mandamus to compel action by, 515.
may be compelled to bear, and also allow legal demands, 515-517.
reviewing action of, on certiorari, 533.
AUDITING CLAIMS —
is a judicial function, 481.
by legislature against municipalities, 481.
against collectors of taxes, 504, 507.
(See Collector of Taxes.)
AUTHENTICATION —
of assessment, 289, 290.
of tax warrant, 293, 294.
of notices of tax sales, 336.
AUDITOR GENERAL —
may be required to reject illegal taxes, 520.
discretionary action, not reviewable on certiorari, 532.
action of, does not estop the state, 233.
AUTHORITY —
to tax, strict execution of, 257.
(See
Taxing Powers.)
to sell must be express, 324.
must be strictly followed, 323-325.
whether special is necessary, 333.
is terminated by payment or tender, 322, 323.
for assessments, must be express, 418.
and be strictly pursued, 418.
to tax, exhausting, 256.
to collect tax, exhausting, 295.
of boards of review, what does not exhaust, 291.
of collector, defect in, no excuse for not paying over, 498.
abuse of, by collector, may make him treasurer ab initio, 304, 305.
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B.
BANK CHECKS —
taxation of, 22.
BANK OF UNITED STATES —
not taxable by the states, 58.
restraining tax upon, 539.
BANKERS —
taxation of in general, 388, 392, 393.
BANKRUPTCY —
arrest after discharge in, 561.
BANKS —
when tax on shares presumed to exclude tax on bank, 167.
when tax on capital excludes tax on shares, 167.
when tax on stock excludes tax on business, 167.
paying specific tax not taxable on collaterals, 167.
restraints on taxation in charters of, 55.
savings, taxation of, 169. 392, 393.
taxation of, in general, 273, 274, 388, 392, 393.
shares in, are taxable property, 210.
duplicate taxation in cases of, 165-171.
(See CORPORATIONS.)
national,
(See National Banks.)
BANKS, NATIONAL —
may be taxed by states, 61.
rules for the taxation of, 394, 395.
BENEFITS —
always flow from taxation, 3.
of taxation, what are, 16, 17, 406, 416.
of local assessments, what are, 416.
failure of in particular case cannot defeat tax, 3.
apportionment by, 176.
special assessments must be based upon, 417, 418.
not otherwise valid, 417, 418.
set off of, against damages for land taken, 420.
how estimated, 459-464.
must be governed by market value, 459.
what to be taken into account, 461, 462.
must be limited to the cost, 462, 463.
BENEVOLENCES —
distinguished from taxes, 2.
BEQUESTS —
(Sec Successions.)
INDEX. 589
BETTERMENTS —
recovery of value of, where title proves defective, 371, 372.
cannot be exempted from taxation without authority of law, 154.
BEVERAGES —
taxation on manufacture and sale of, 390.
taxation in regulation and restraint of sale of, 404-407, 412.
BIDDER —
who entitled to be at tax sales, 341, 345.
not the officer who makes sale, 341.
not one whose duty it was to pay taxes, 345-351.
whether adverse claimant may be, 348-351.
BIDDER, HIGHEST —
tax sale must be made to, 344.
tax deed must run to, 344.
BILL IN EQUITY —
(See Equity.)
BILL OF RIGHTS—
(See Constitutional Principles.)
BILLS OF EXCHANGE —
taxes on, 22.
BLOCKS —
of lots, assessment of, 281, 282.
BOARDS OF EQUALIZATION -
powers and duties of, 290, 291.
act judicially, 291.
how composed, 291.
are assessors, 291.
election of members of, 291.
action of, not reviewable on certiorari, 534.
correction of errors of description by, 285.
BOARDS, LOCAL —
decision of, as to amount, etc., of tax levy, not reviewable on certiorari, 531.
BOARDS OF RELIEF—.
(See Boards of Review.)
BOARDS OF REVIEW —
compelling hearing by, 52.
conclusiveness of action of, 534.
BOARDS OF SUPERVISORS —
may be compelled by mandamus to proceed to hear claims, 615-517.
and to allow the legal claims, 515-517.
and to assess state taxes, 522.
BOATS AND VESSELS —
taxation of, 270.
(See
Tonnage Duties.)
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BONA FIDE PURCHASERS —
not to be affected by amendments, 239.
purchasers at tax sales are not, 329, 375.
BONDS —
owned out of state not taxable within it
,
15, 16, 169.
taxable in general, 65.
to be taxed where owner resides, 66, 270.
tax on the interest upon, 169.
irreparable injury in the issue of, 549.
BONDS, OFFICIAL —
required to secure performance of public duty, 500.
of collector, not according to statute, may be good at common law, 499.
remedies upon, 500, 504.
BOUNDARIES —
(See Description.)
BOUNTIES, MILITARY —
taxation for, 74, 99-101.
BOUNTY BONDS —
mandamus to compel taxation for, 525.
BRIDGES —
taxation for, 94.
(See Highways.)
BROKERS —
taxation of, 169, 388.
BUILDINGS —
sometimes excluded in taxing lands, 181.
recovery of value of as betterments, 371, 372.
assessment of, as personalty, 275.
exemption of,
(See Churches.)
BURYING GROUNDS —
exemption of, from taxation, 130.
may be subjected to assessments, 144, 456-458.
BUSINESS —
taxation of, in general, 20, 129.
of nonresidents, taxable where carried on, 44.
admissible, though property required to be taxed by value, 133, 138
141, 144.
duplicate taxation of, 169.
not admissible to build up monopolies, 173.
general right to tax, 384, 394.
taxation by United States, 484.
methods of, 384, 385.
of privileges, 385, 386, 392.
kinds usually taxed, 387, 392.
construction of powers to tax, 387.
INDEX.
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES —
taxation not admissible in aid of, 76-80, 89, 90.
BUYERS AT TAX SALES —
who may be, 345-351.
(See Sales of Lands for Taxes.)
BY LAW —
effect of failure of corporation to observe, 534.
illegal taxation by, 567.
c.
CALIFORNIA —
exemptions in, 132.
constitutional provisions to secure equality of taxation in, 436.
do not preclude special assessments, 436.
liability to contractor in, 467.
CALAMITIES —
protection against, 101, 102.
(And see Levees.)
CANALS —
taxation of, 151.
taxation for, 94, 96.
special levy for special benefits from, 490, 491.
CAPITATION TAXES—
levy of, 18, 73.
can only be assessed on residents, 269.
CARRIAGE OP PROPERTY—
taxes on, 21, 61-63.
when a tax on, is a tax on commerce, 62, 63.
CARRIERS, COMMON —
taxation of, 21, 388.
CARS—
taxation of, 388.
when a tax on, is a tax on commerce, 63.
CAVEAT EMPTOR —
rule of, applied to tax purchasers, 329, 375.
CELEBRATIONS —
taxation for, by government, 93.
towns no general authority to tax for, 93.
CEMETERIES —
exemption of, from taxation, 130.
(See Exemptions.)
592 LAW OF TAXATION.
CEMETERIES — «ontinued.
liable for special assessments, 147, 458.
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT—
what are, 272.
CERTIFICATE OF SALE —
what it is. 352.
is evidence of sale, but not conclusive, 352.
does not convey title, 352, 353.
recording, to cut off redemption, 366.
compelling delivery to purchaser, 522.
CERTIFICATES, OFFICIAL —
conclusiveness of, 195.
liability of officers for false, 196.
to assessment, 289, 290, 562.
protect ion of officer by, 554, 557.
CERTIORARI —
may be made the exclusive remedy for illegal or irregular taxation, 530.
forbidding other remedies, 234.
general nature of the writ, 530
is not of right,
will not be allowed where likely to do serious mischief, 531.
will be dismissed if improvidently issued, 531.
dismissing where defect has been cured, 232.
political action not reviewable on, 532.
not usually awarded where an appeal is given, 532.
discretionary action not reviewable on, 533.
proper office of, to inquire into jurisdiction, 533.
will not be issued to collector, 533.
nor in case of merely unequal assessments, 533.
nor for mere errors or irregularities, 533.
assessments erroneous in point of law reviewable on, 533.
and cases where mandatory statutes are disregarded, 533.
and cases of erroneous action by municipalities in laying assessments, 534.
only the record can be reviewed on, 534.
CHANCERY —
(See Equity ; Injunction ; Remedies for Excessive and Illegal
Taxation.)
CHATTELS —
of nonresident, not taxable in state, 14, 42.
unless having an actual situs within it
,
15.
taxed to owner at his place of domicile, 269.
property in, accompanies owner wherever he goes, 270.
held by trustee, where taxed, 271.
of partnership, where taxed, 271.
taxation of in bulk, and by separate articles, 272.
IKDEX 593
CHATTELS — «ontinued.
distraining for taxes, 301-304.
objections to this process, 302.
taking property of another upon it, 302, 303.
municipal corporation cannot authorize, without special authority,
302.
enjoining illegal taxes upon,
(See Injunction.)
levy upon, presumptive satisfaction of tax, 543, 544.
CHARITABLE SOCIETIES—
exemption of, from taxation, 150.
are subject to special assessments, 458.
CHARITY —
taxation in aid of, 88, 89, 93.
CHARTERS —
are contracts between the state and the corporators, 55.
stipulation in, for exemption from taxation binding on state, 52, 55, 56.
presumption against exemption, 54, 273.
stipulation subject to legislative action where right to amend or repeal is
reserved, 55, 56.
strict construction of exemptions from taxation by, 150-152, 273.
grant of, may be subject to conditions as to taxation, 44.
CHARTERS, MUNICIPAL —
are not contracts, 56.
(See Municipal Corporations.)
CHURCH PROPERTY—
exemption of, from taxation, 130, 142, 143.
liable for special assessments, 147, 458.
CITIES AND VILLAGES —
(See Municipal Corporations.)
CITIZENS —
privileges of, not to be abridged in taxation, 64.
unequal taxation does abridge, 64.
doctrine applied to nonresident traders, 64
different methods of procedure admissible in case of nonresidents, 64.
(See Nonresident.)
corporations are not, 64, 65.
CITY ORDINANCE —
(See By Law.)
CIVIL WAR—
pendency of, does not enlarge right to redeem, 364.
CLAIM OF TITLE—
what is, 382, 383.
(See Adverse Possession.)
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CLAIMS —
against municipalities, auditing of, 479, 481.
compelling recognition of, 91.
allowance of, by mandamus,
(See Mandamus.)
certiorari in cases of allowance, 532.
CLASSIFICATION —
of taxes, 5.
of lands as seated and unseated, 275-277.
of lands in case of levee assessments, 454-457.
CLERGYMEN —
taxation of, 389.
CLERICAL ERRORS —
may be disregarded, 234, 562.
(See Amendments.)
CLOUtf UPON TITLE —
what constitutes, in taxes, 542.
whether a void tax is, 542, 543.
relief in equity in case of, 543.
illegality alone no ground of relief, 544.
(See Equity.)
COERCION —
(See
Voluntary Payment.)
COLLECTION OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS —
must be made as statute provides, 465.
by enforcing a lien, 466, 467.
by the contractor, 466, 467.
from special fund, 466, 467.
defenses to, 468, 469.
by sale of lands, 469, 470.
by proceedings against the owner, 470-473.
COLLECTION OF TAXES —
summary process for, 38, 39, 298.
by intruders, estoppel in case of, 191, 192, 498.
warrant for, 292.
must comply with statute, 292.
must be properly directed, 293.
effect of errors in, 293,294.
different for different taxes, 294.
delivery of, 295.
exhausting authority under, 295.
excess in, makes void, 296, 297.
direct and indirect methods of, 298, 299.
by suit, 300.
by arrest of person taxed, 301.
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COLLECTION OF TAXES- «ontinued.
by distress of goods, 301-304.
by detention of goods, etc., 305.
by sale of lands, 305-309.
return of no goods, etc., as a condition 307.
by imposition of penalties, 309-315.
by forfeiture of property taxed, 315-319.
(See Forfeitures.)
by conditions to the exercise of a right, 319, 320.
through municipalities, 321.
by stamps, 320.
in license fees, 385, 386, 414.
of special assessments, 465-473.
by state from the collector, 433-511.
enjoining, not in general admissible, 536.
may be if irreparable injury threatened, 539.
(See Injunction.)
resisting, when proper, 558.
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS —
liability of, for exacting illegal duties, 564, 565.
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE —
liability of, for illegal collections, 564.
COLLECTOR OF TAXES—
warrant of, for collection, 292.
a trespasser if he acts without, 292.
direction of, 293.
should follow statutory form, 293.
what defects in, do not vitiate, 293, 294.
delivery of, 295.
exhausting authority in issuing, 295.
effect of blending taxes in, 295.
demand by, before levying distress, 304.
notice by of, distress and sale, 304.
when may become trespasser ab initio, 304, 305, 563, 564.
return by, of tax uncollected, 307, 308, 359.
remedies of state against, 496.
suit at the common law, 497.
defect of authority no defense to, 497, 498.
suit in case, for neglect of duty, 499.
bond of, valid though not in statutory form, 499.
liability upon, 499, 500.
liable on, though tax illegal, 500.
may refuse to collect illegal tax, 500, 501.
must receive money only, 501.
must not speculate in his office, 501.
liable for failure to keep moneys safely, 501.
must account without demand, 501.
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COLLECTOR OF TAXES— «ontinued.
sureties of, only liable on their bond, 301, 502.
Alteration in bond discbarges, 502.
whether extension of time to principal does, 502, 503.
not released by repeal of law under which the bond was given, 503.
concluding, by auditor's statement of account, 504-506.
summary remedies against, 504.
judgment on notice, 504, 505.
distress warrant, 506.
statute for, must be strictly complied with, 507.
principles governing, 507, 508, 510, 511.
right to a hearing on, 508, 509.
must be proper evidence of right to, 509.
not entitled to jury trial of delinquency, 507.
summary removal of, 508.
compelling issue of distress warrant against, 521.
is protected by his process if fair on its face, 559.
but not against his own illegalities, 561.
what is process fair on its face, 562.
not where tax appears to be illegal, 562.
nor where process issued by wrong officer, 562..
the protection does not give him title, 563.
not liable where taxes actually paid over, 563.
proper form of action against, 563.
COLLECTOR'S BOND —
is for security of the public only, 503.
(See Collector of Taxes.)
COLLECTOR'S WARRANT —
(See Collector of Taxes.)
COLOR OF LAW —
taxes collected by and paid over, cannot b« recovered back from col
lector, 563.
COLOR OF TITLE —
what is, 382-3.
(See Adverse Possession.)
COLORABLE TAXATION —
is void, 38, 34, 486.
COMBINATIONS—
of bidders at tax sales, are fraudulent, 239, 240.
COMMERCE, TAXES ON —
on exports, 24.
on imports, 24.
by states, what forbidden, 61.
on imports and exports, 61.
on tonnage, 61.
on trade with Indian tribes, 62.
INDEX.
COMMERCE, TAXES ON — continued.
by states, on importers as such, 62, 63.
on freight passing from state to state, 63.
on masters of vessels, 64.
what not a tax upon, 63, 64.
duties on for protection, 10, 74.
COMMISSION DEALERS —
taxation of, 389.
COMMISSIONERS —
for making special assessments, 448-451.
certiorari to, 535.
COMMON BURDENS—
should be sustained by common contributions, 153.
(See Apportionment.)
COMMON CARRIERS —
taxes on business of, 21, 383.
'when they become taxes on commerce, 61-63.
COMMON COUNCIL —
certiorari to, 534.
(See Municipal Corporations.)
COMMON LAW—
protection of in tax cases, 36-40.
(See Constitutional Principles.)
COMMUTING —
for taxes, admissible, 173.
cases of, 137, 172.
COMPENSATION —
for taxation, what is, 2, 14, 16, 406, 416.
for special assessments are benefits received, 416-418.
in case of exercise of eminent domain, 430-434.
for loss by riots.
(See Riots.)
COMMON LAW REMEDIES —
of state against collector of taxes, 497.
(See Collector of Taxes.)
to compel performance of official duty under tax laws, 513-526.
(See Mandamus.)
general right to, in tax cases, 36-40, 528.
COMPETITION —
at tax sale must be allowed, 239, 240.
COMPLAINTS —
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
COMPULSION —
what payments are deemed to be made under.
(See Voluntary Payments.)
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COMPULSORY TAXATION —
(See Mandamus.)
COMPULSORY LOCAL TAXATION —
general right of people to vote taxes they are to pay, 474.
but state must grant powers to tax, 474, 475.
and may modify them at will, 474.
local power to tax, value of, 475..
meaning and extent of, 475.
is not inherent, 475.
is not discretionary in matters of state concern, 475.
what are matters of state concern, 476.
preservation of order, 476.
support of courts, erection of court houses, etc., 477.
construction and repair of highways, 478.
maintenance of schools, etc., 478.
payment of corporate debts, 479.
apportionment of debts, etc., when municipality is divided, 479, 481
making compensation for destruction by rioters, 480.
indemnifying officers, 480.
whether the legislature may audit claims against municipalities, 481.
municipal corporations, two fold nature of, 482.
subjection of, to state in their political capacity, 482.
corporate rights in their private capacity, 482, 483.
judicial decisions thereon, 483-486, 489, 494.
judicial decisions questioning, 480-493.
conclusion, 493-495.
CONCLUSIVENESS—
ot assessment on parties taxed in case of special assessments, 449, 450.
(See Judgment.)
CONDEMNING LANDS—
(See Eminent Domain.)
CONDITIONS—
imposed on power to tax must be observed, 254, 255.
imposed to compe! payment of taxes, 319, 320.
to render tax chargeable, must be observed, 215.
to redemption, must be complied with, 364, 365.
cannot be added to by officer or purchaser, 369.
imposed on recovery of land sold for taxes, 371-375.
imposed on the privilege of doing business, 385, 386.
to special assessments, must be observed, 464.
CONFIRMATION —
of defective proceedings,
(See Curative Laws.)
of tax sale, who may oppose, 360.
CONFLICTING CLAIMS—
bills of interpleader in cases of, 547.
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CONGRESS -
taxation by,
(See Federal Taxation.)
CONSENT —
cannot give jurisdiction to tax, 271.
cannot pass title to land, 337.
(See Estoppel.)
CONSIDERATION —
for taxation, what is, 16, 17, 406, 416.
for special assessments, 417, 418, 456, 471-473.
state may relinquish right to tax for a, 52-56.
gifts to public purposes may support taxation, 101.
but not gifts to private purposes, 491.
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES —
provisions in, regarding introduction of revenue bills, 33.
may restrain legislative powers of taxation, 244, 251.
municipal taxation subject to, 251.
protection of minorities by, 251, 252.
admit of summary remedies to collect taxes, 298, 303.
of recovery of betterments, 371, 372.
of summary remedies against collectors of taxes, 504-511.
provisions in to secure equality in taxation, 132-144.
right to levy special assessments how affected by, 136-146.
provisions in, affecting local assessments, 436-446.
are framed in contemplation of existence of local powers, 474.
provisions in for taking land for private ways, 76.
provisions for the taxation of legal process in certain, 23.
laws which violate spirit of, not necessarily void, 488.
assume the existence of fundamental principles, 41.
CONSTITUTION OF UNITED STATES —
forbids states passing laws which impair obligations of contracts, 53.
instances of such laws, 52-56, 65.
stipulations by states not to tax, sometimes contracts, 52-56.
charters of private corporations are contracts under, 55.
forbids state imposts, or duties on imports and exports, 61,
what are exports under this provision, 61.
forbids duty of tonnage by states without consent of congress, 61.
what are duties of tonnage, 61, 62.
state taxes on foreign and interstate commerce are in violation of, 62.
but not taxes on property as such, 62.
taxes on importers are, 62, 63.
taxes on freight, when are, 63.
taxes on cars and vessels, when are, 63.
taxes on immigrants, are, 63.
illustrations of what are not, 63, 64.
is violated by taxes which abridge the privilege and immunities of citi
zens, 64, 05.
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CONSTITUTION OF UNITED STATES — continued.
does not admit of federal taxation of the state, or its agencies, 58.
or of state taxation of the agencies of the federal govei nment, 57.
illustrations of what are government agencies, 57-61.
when a tax on passengers out of the state is in violation of, 59.
requires duties, imports and excises to be uniform throughout the United
States, 73.
provision in, regarding direct taxes, 73.
forbids duties on exports, 73.
limitations in, are applicable to local taxation, 250, 251.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES —
that taxation and protection are reciprocal, 14.
meaning of, 16, 406.
that taxation and representation go together, 44.
original meaning of the maxim, 44.
meaning of in America, 44 48.
can only be understood in territorial sense, 46.
does not entitle all persons taxed to suffrage, 46.
application of to territories and District of Columbia, 47, 48.
that life, liberty and property are protected by the law of the land, 36-39.
this not a guaranty of judicial proceedings, 37.
is not violated by healing statutes, 223-232.
exceptions, 227-229.
admits of distress for taxes, 302, 303.
whether legislative forfeitures violate, 316-319.
whether it admits of imposition of penalties without judicial hear
ing, 313-315.
not violated by enforcing any valid tax, 425.
protection of municipal property, 494.
monopolies not admissible under, 173, 403.
special assessments on basis of benefits not obnoxious to, 429-431.
summary process against collectors and their sureties, admissible under,
504-511.
influence of custom in understanding of, 39.
giving jury trial, not applicable in tax cases, 36-40, 507.
(See Jury Trial.)
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT —
hearing is matter of, 229, 265-268.
local government a matter of, 474-495.
CONSTRUCTION —
of contracts not to tax must be strict, 53.
of exemptions must be strict, 54, 146.
effect of this in case of special assessments on real property, 147.
instances of construction of exemptions, 148, 149.
application in case of corporations, 149-151.
of township powers to tax, will admit of indemnifying officers, 91.
not of celebrations, 93, 94.
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CONSTRUCTION — continued.
of township powers to tax, general observations upon, 98, 99.
of local powers to tax generally, 209-211, 217.
reasons why this should be strict, 209.
the rule applied in case of assessments, 418.
rule where apparently modified or atfected by general statutes, 210,
221, 222, 255, 256.
of constitutional provisions regarding equality and uniformity in taxa
tion, 132-144.
in Arkansas and California, 132.
in Georgia and 11linois, 133-137.
in Indiana, 137.
in Iowa and Louisiana, 138.
in Maryland, 139.
in Massachusetts and Michigan, 140.
in Minnesota and Missouri, 141.
in Ohio, 142, 143.
in Tennessee, 143.
in Virginia and Wisconsin, 144.
rules of, in construing statutes, 197.
of revenue laws, 199-208.
whether to be strict or not, 200.
views of Mr. Dwarris, 200, 208.
'
citations from English reports, 201.
from American reports, 202-207.
penal provisions in. 208, 262.
what provisions to be held mandatory, 212-219.
what to be considered only directory, 219, 220.
'
of remedial laws, 204, 205.
of laws permitting redemption, to be liberal, 363.
of provisions apparently retrospective. 221, 222.
of powers to tax business, 387.
of power to levy license fees, 396-398.
where it warrants the levy of fees for revenue, 408.
influence of custom upon, in case of powers to tax, 396, 397.
in case of town votes, 347.
(See Custom.)
CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD —
whether illegal taxation is, 539.
in tax purchases,
(See Comrinations; Bidder.)
CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION —
(See Possession.)
CONSUMPTION —
indirect taxes on,
(See Indirect Taxes.)
of luxuries, taxation of, 23.
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CONTRACTOR —
collection of assessments by, 466, 467.
fraud of, will not defeat assessment where work is accepted, 468, 460.
CONTRACT —
not to tax, states may make, 52-56.
charters of private incorporation are, 55.
but not municipal charters, 56.
exemptions from taxation from motives of state policy are not, 54.
(See Exemptions.!
obligation of, not to be violated in taxation, 65.
by corporations ultra vires,
(See Ultra Vires.)
tax laws are not, and state may repeal, 252, 253.
tax purchases are, 370.
power of legislature over redemption from, 369, 370.
state cannot make, for municipalities, 483-494.
taxation of money contracts,
(See Bonds, Credits.)
in fraud of revenue laws, are illegal, 299.
CORPORATIONS —
charters of are contracts, 55.
restrictions on taxation in, arc binding, 55, 65.
property of, is represented by stock, 164.
exemptions of, from taxation, 55, 150-152.
instances of special or partial exemptions, 148, 151, 152.
duplicate taxation in case of, 166-171, 571.
whether to be classed as " persons," etc., 273.
taxation of in general, 15, 16, 25, 58, 60. .
questions of equality in, 129.
valuation of the franchise, 135-137.
effect of consolidation on, 151.
capital and shares may both be taxed, 164, 274.
effect upon this of the presumption against duplicate taxation, 166, 171.
methods of, are in legislative discretion, 273.
may be on franchise, capital, shares, or taxable property, 273.
other methods admissible, 273, 274.
case of railroad property, 273, 274.
meaning of " stock " in tax law, 274.
shares should be taxed at owner's domicile, 44.
general methods of taxing, 392, 393.
on the franchise, 393.
on the property by valuation, 393, 571.
on the capital stock, 393.
on the business done, 273, 274, 393.
on dividends, profits or receipts, 137, 138, 221,393.
specific tax cannot be levied on, under a power to tax. " taxable prop
erty," 210.
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CORPORATIONS — continued.
general notice of taxation of, 267.
recovery by for excessive taxes, 571.
(See Charters; Franchises; National Banks.)
CORPORATION OFFICERS —
may be compelled by mandamus to perform duties under tax laws, 523.
(See Charter; Franchises; National Banks.)
CORRECTIONS —
by judicial action, 233, 234.
(See Amendments; Curative Laws; Reassessments.)
COSTS —
recovery of, in suits for illegal taxes paid, 568, 570, 571.
COUNTIES —
apportionment of debts, etc., on division of, 176.
may be made debtors for state taxes, 321.
bids by, at tax sales, 351.
liability of, for illegal taxes, 565.
(See Remedies for Illegal and Unjust Taxation.)
COUNTY BUILDINGS —
local taxation for, 115, 419, 477.
COUNTY BOARDS —
(See Boards of Equalization ; Boards of Review.)
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS —
(See Boards of Review.)
COUNTY TREASURER—
default of, county to respond for, 321.
may be compelled to issue distress warrant against collector, 521.
cannot question an assessment as unjust, 521.
COUNTY TRUSTEE—
compelling levy of tax by, 522.
COURT HOUSE—
special tax on county town for, 115, 419.
municipalities may be compelled to tax for, 477.
COURTS —
support of, municipalities may be compelled to tax for, 477.
(See Judiciary.)
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES —
have limited jurisdiction in matters of state taxation, 525, 526.
mandamus by, to compel payment of their judgments, 525.
taxation by commissioners appointed by, 526.
CREDIT—
not to be given at tax sales, 344.
CREDITS—
are property, 159.
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CREDITS — continued.
taxation of, 15, 65, 134, 270.
taxation of, in hands of agent, 270.
(See Bosds.)
when secured by mortgage,
(See Mortgage.)
CULVERTS —
special assessments for, 425-427.
CUMULATIVE TAXES —
(See Duplicate Taxation.)
CURATIVE LAWS —
healing defects in tax proceedings by, 223-232.
cannot establish conclusive rules of evidence, 223.
must not take the form of legislative mandates, 224.
may be special acts, 225.
limitation upon the right to pass such, 225-226.
'what defects cannot be cured by, 227-229.
may be prospective, 230.
may be made applicable to pending suits, 231.
but not to cases passed into judgment, 231.
may provide for reassessment, 232.
(See Judicial Corrections.)
CURB STONES— x
assessment for, 423.
(See Assessments, Local.)
CURTESY —
tenant in, may redeem, 366.
CUSTODIAN —
(See Interpeader.)
CUSTOM —
effect on construction of power to tax, 397.
effect in determining what are public purposes, 80.
influence of, in construction of public powers, 39.
to be considered in construing town votes, 347.
CUSTOMS DUTIES —
what are, 3.
levied by the United States, 24, 384.
liability of collector of, 564, 565.
D.
DAMAGES—
by local improvements, cannot be set off against assessment, 420.
by rioters, towns, etc., may be compelled to pay, 480.
to which one is entitled, not taxable as a debt until definitely fixed, 272.
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DAMAGES — continued.
assessment of, is a judicial act, 551.
party making, not personally liable for error in, 551.
recovery of, in actions against collector, etc., 570.
towns, etc., not liable for, in case of illegal action by officers, 570.
whether this rule applies under special charters, 570, 571.
DAMS —
for water power, taking land for, under right of eminent domain, 77.
DEBT, PUBLIC —
taxation for payment of, 102.
unlawful engagement does not create, 102.
of municipalities, state may compel payment of, 479.
including moral obligations, 479, 480.
not to be audited by the state, 481.
not to be created by the state, 483-495.
action in creating unlawfully, not a private wrong, 548.
enjoining, on application of taxpayers, 548.
failure to provide for, cannot be remedied by means of the writ of
quo warranto, 575.
of the United States, not taxable, 50.
DEBTS —
taxes are not, 13.
allowance for in assessment, 136, 142.
of municipalities, compulsory taxation for,
(See Dert, Purlic.)
taxation of,
(See Credits; Mortgage.)
DECEASED PERSONS—
estates of, where taxable. 270.
assessment of to widow and heirs, 278.
assessment to, is no debt against administrator, 301.
DECISIONS —
(See
Discretionary Action ; Judgments.)
DEDICATION —
of streets, authorizes opening at expense of owners, 421.
DEED —
(See
Alienation; Tax Deed.)
DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS —
may levy taxes, 4,
DE FACTO OFFICERS —
who are, 185.
action of, how far binding, 187-191.
protection of, 188, 189.
questioning title of, 187-189.
that taxes are collected by, is no ground for recovering them back, 570.
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DE FACTO OFFICERS — continued.
collector, cannot defend against an accounting by showing defect i n his
title, 191, 192, 498.
(See Officers.}
DEFAULT —
determination that one is in, is judicial action, 550.
(See Forfeitures.)
must be, before distress levied. 304.
or before land can be sold, 322, 323.
in payment of municipal debts,
(See Dert, Purlic.)
DEFAULTING COLLECTOR —
suits against, at common law, 497-499.
suits on bond of, 499-504.
summary remedies against, 504-511.
(See Collector of Taxes.)
DEFECTS —
in title of de facto officer, effect of, 187-191, 498.
(See Officers.)
in tax proceedings which render them void on their face, prevent their
being a cloud on the title, 542-544.
in process, what will prevent it being fair on its face, 562.
(See Fair on its Face.)
DEFENSE —
of collector under his process,
(See Process.)
to illegal taxes,
(Sec Remedies of Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
DEFICIENCY —
occasioned by misappropriation, may be provided for by tax, 548.
no private right of action for such wrong, 572.
DEFINITION —
of taxes, 1.
of tax legislation, 1.
of taxable property, 130, 272.
of capital, 150, 151.
of duplicate taxation, 164.
of "actual value" of capital stock, 165.
ot office, 184.
of officer, 184.
of officer defa«to, 185.
of officer dejure, 185.
of revenue laws, 199.
of directory statutes, 212-215.
of mandatory statutes, 212-215.
of assessment, 258.
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DEFINITION — continued.
of certificate of deposit, 272.
of income, 272.
of "seated, " resident " and " occupied " lands, 276.
of levy, 298.
of coior of title, 382.
of claim of title, 382, 383.
of license, 406,407.
of "bounding or abutting," 452.
of " adjoining," 452.
of " in front," 452.
of cloud on title, 542.
of direct taxes, 5.
of law of the land, 37-38.
DE JURE OFFICERS —
who are, 185.
distinguished from officers de facto, 185.
(See Officers.)
DELAY —
in taking objections promptly, reason for denying a certiorari, 530, 531.
in case of irregular organization of school district, may preclude objec
tions, 530, 549.
in doing the work for which tax is levied, no defense to the tax, 540.
of collector in selling goods distrained, effect of, 564.
(See Estoppel.)
DELEGATION —
of power to tax cannot be made to the judiciary, 33, 34.
nor to any subordinate authority, 48-51.
questions affecting amount of taxes may be referred, 49, 50.
power to decide upon licences may be granted, 49, 413.
to municipal corporations, of power to tax, admissible, 51-53.
(See Assessments, Local ; Compclsory Local Taxation.)
DELINQUENCY —
must exist to authorize sale of goods for taxes, 304.
and before the power to sell land attaches, 322, 323.
in case of highway labor, determination of, 550.
DELINQUENT TAXES —
distress and sale for, 301-304.
(See Distress.)
sale of lands for, 305-309.
(See Sales of Lands for Taxes.)
forfeiture of property for,
(See Forfeittjre.)
DEMAND —
for taxes, before suit, 301.
before distress, 304.
before sale, 353.
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DEMAND— continued.
for jury, the proper remedy where party entitled to it
,
532.
for tax, when it amounts to compulsion, 571.
when necessary to entitle party to interest, 571.
DEMANDS —
(See Bonds ; Credits ; Derts.)
DE MINIMIS LEX NON CURAT —
maxim, application of, to excessive taxes, 296, 297.
DEPOSIT —
what is certificate of, 272.
taxation in respect of, 394.
what tax on, is held invalid, 165.
DEPRECIATION OF PROPERTY —
is no defense to a tax, 540.
DESCRIPTIONS OF LAND —
separate, must be separately assessed, 279-282, 287.
if grouped, the assessment void, 279.
what are separate, 281, 282.
must be separately sold, 341, 342.
in assessment, what is sufficient, 282.
correction of by county board, 285.
must identify land, 282.
must not be calculated to mislead owner, 282, 283.
not enough that it would not mislead in party's own conveyance, 283,
284.
result of the cases, 285, 286.
instances of defective, 286, 287.
must not be divided in making sale, 282.
in notice of sale, what sufficient, 336, 337.
if defective in tax roll, tax is void, 558.
DESTITUTION —
taxation for relief of,
(See Charity.)
DESTRUCTION —
taxation may be carried to extent of, 57.
taxation for the purposes of, 10, 403.
of franchise by taxation may be enjoined, 539.
DIFFICULTIES —
in enforcement of tax laws, 512.
DILATORY PROCEEDINGS —
statutes to prevent in tax cases, 507, 508, 572, 573.
DIRECT TAXES —
what the term means, 5
.
meaning of, as used in the federal constitution, 5
.
how laid by the United States, 73, 142.
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DIRECTORY STATUTES —
what are, 212-215.
mstances of, 219, 220,
(See Construction.)
DISABILITY —
redemption in case of, 364, 365,
DISASTERS —
(See Calamities.)
DISCHARGE —
in bankruptcy of person taxed, does not render officer liable for arrestmg
him, 561.
of lands illegally taxed, 520, 574.
(See Aratement ; Mandamus.)
of tax by payment,
(See Payment.)
of lien by tender,
(See Tender.)
of sureties by change in their obligation,
(See Sureties.)
of tax by levy on goods, 543, 544.
of lands from tax sales by redemption,
(See Redemption.)
of municipal obligations by compulsory taxation,
(See Compulsory Local Taxation ; Mandamus.)
DISCOUNTS —
discriminations in making, may be enjoined, 540.
payments made to obtain, are deemed voluntary, 568.
DISCOURAGEMENT —
of trades or occupations in taxation,
(See Police Power.)
DISCRETIONART ACTION —
cannot be reviewed on certiorari, 532.
instances of 532.
cannot be enjoined, 540.
will not render the officer personally liable, 550.
(See Judicial Officer.)
will not be controlled on mandamus,
(See Mandamus.)
DISCRETIONARY POWERS —
not to be interfered with, 157, 514-525.
(See Mandamus.)
effect of fraud upon exercise of, 157.
liability to abuse, no argument against, 212.
are vested in assessors, 550-552.
DISCRETIONARY WRITS —
(See Certiorari ; Mandamus.)
39
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DISCRIMINATIONS —
in duties, sometimes made for purposes of protection, 10, 24, 25.
against articles of luxury, 23, 25.
unavoidable in taxation, 128, 130.
taxes not void for, 129.
in taxation of business, 138, 139.
what inadmissible, 153, 179.
between real and personal property in special assessments, 456.
against undesirable occupations, 396.
(See Police Power.)
unlawful, may be enjoined, 540.
between residents and nonresidents, not allowed in taxation, 64, 65, 158.
in retrospective taxation, 226.
DISMISSAL OF WRIT —
(See Certiorari.)
DISTRESS —
taxation for relief of,
(See Charity.)
DISTRESS OF GOODS —
legal warrant for, 301, 302.
is a summary remedy, 302.
founded on long practice, 302.
leaves party his common law remedy, 302.
common law remedies sometimes taken away in case of, 302.
levy of on goods of another, 302, 303.
demand before, 304.
statutes regarding notice to be strictly complied with, 304.
when action in, renders officer trespasser ab iniio, 304, 305 563, 564.
«ertiorari may be brought though tax has been collected by, 534.
what defects in process render collector liable, 562.
cannot generally be enjoined, 538.
(See Injunction.)
when threat of, amounts to compulsion. 568, 569.
replevin in case of, 302, 572.
DISTRESS WARRANT—
against collector of taxes,
(See Collector of Taxes.)
compelling issue of by mandamus, 521.
DISTRIBUTIONS —
(See Successions.)
DISTRICTS —
necessity for in case of taxation, 104, 176.
object of the tax must sometimes determine, 104.
for road taxes, 108, 109.
for local taxes generally, 109.
in case of special improvements, 110.
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DISTRICTS — «ontinued.
must be established by legislative authority, 110, 111.
judicial tribunals cannot control establishment of, 111, 119.
legislative methods of establishing, 112, 113.
diversity in, 113, 114.
overlying, for public buildings, 114-117.
for improvement of streets, 117, 118.
in case of general city taxes, 118, 119.
taxation must be for purposes of, 104-108.
taxation beyond limits of, not admissible, 121-123, 169.
exemptions of property in, 132, 135.
(See Exemptions.)
apportionment must be uniform within, 180.
different, may be differently taxed, 172.
different methods of collection in, 181.
for levee taxes, 427.
for local improvements generally,
(See Assessments, Local.)
DISTRICTS FOR SCHOOLS—
(See School Districts.)
DIVERSITY —
of taxes,
(See Taxes.)
of taxation in districts, 172.
in methods of collection, 181.
in case of residents and nonresidents,
(See Nonresidents.)
DIVIDENDS—
taxes on, 22, 170, 210, 272.
as a measure for taxation, 171.
how evidence of, may be required, 523.
tax on, cannot be disputed by creditors on the ground that they should
not have been declared, 572.
DIVISION —
of parcels of land in tax sales, 282.
of municipalities, apportionment of debts and property on, 479, 481.
of powers of government, 32.
DOGS-
taxation of, for revenue, 21.
for regulation, 412.
DOLLAR MARK —
omission of in assessment, effect of, 289.
omission of in judgment is fatal, 289.
DOMAIN—
(See Eminent Domain.)
public,
(See Purlic Lands.)
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DOMICILE —
right to tax when dependent upon, 42-44.
residents must be taxed at place of, 269-272.
exceptions in case of tangible property, 14.
and of located business, 270, 271.
of trustee, determines place of taxation of the trust, 271.
what constitutes, 269.
(See Nonresidents.)
DOUBLE TAXATION —
one complaining of, must show that he has paid once, 541.
(See Duplicate Taxation.)
DOWRESS —
right of, to redeem, 366.
DRAINS —
taxation for, to protect the public health, 101.
special assessments for, 423, 424.
(See Assessments, Local.)
whether health a necessary consideration in case of, 424.
special benefits from, may be made the basis of assessment, 423, 424.
for purpose of reclaiming large tracts of land, 402, 424.
assessments for, under the police power, 402.
cannot be made by taxation for private benefit solely, 424.
instances of special assessments for, 423.
assessors must meet to make, 195.
illegal, cannot be enforced, 225.
estoppel against disputing benefit of, 574.
DRAINAGE —
(See Drains.)
DRAYMEN —
taxation of, 391.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW —
(See Law of the Land.)
DUPLICATE —
(See Collector's Warrant.)
DUPLICATE TAXATION —
results from taxation of personalty, 28.
*
impossibility of avoiding in some cases, 158, 161.
indirect taxation results in, 159.
taxation of corporation and its stockholders sometimes is, 159.
taxation of property and the debt owed for it
,
159.
taxation of mortgage and the property it covers, 159.
injustice of, is not a legal question, 160.
not necessarily invalid, 160.
tax on sales which reaches property twice, 160.
decisions upon the validity of such taxation, 161-163.
is invalid if the same burden reaches twice the same subject, 164.
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DISTRICT TAXATION — continued.
taxation of a corporation and its franchise is not, 165, 170.
revenue statutes are to be construed so as to prevent, 165.
instances in which this rule has been applied, 166-168.
instances which have been held not within it, 168-170.
instances of special corporation taxes, 171.
tax on merchant's stock and his business is not, 389.
DUTIES —
meaning of the term, 3
.
upon imports, 24.
upon exports, 24.
for what purposes levied, 24, 25.
are required to be uniform, 73.
frauds in the collection of, 309-313.
contracts in fraud of, 299.
illegal collection of,
(See Collector of Customs.)
DUTY —
to pay taxes, the correlative to protection, 16, 17, 406, 416.
how this should be apportioned, 6
.
(See Apportionment.)
of the government in laying and collecting taxes, 6
,
7
.
official, how performance of compelled, 512-526.
(See Mandamus.)
of collector, how performance of secured,
(See Collector of Taxes.)
of assessor to give notice, whether neglect of will render him liable, 554,
of municipality to pay judgments, etc., may be compelled by mandamu3.
624-526.
or by compulsory taxation by state,
(See Compulsory Local Taxation.)
of municipality to levy water rates, cannot be coerced on quo warranto,
575.
E.
EDUCATION —
religious, not a proper purpose for taxation, 83, 84.
secular, taxation for, 84-88.
extent of, a question for the legislature, 85.
may be provided for by public schools^ 85.
or by assisting private schools, 86.
local taxation to erect state buildings for, 87, 88.
municipalities may be compelled to provide for, 478.
exemption of property used for purposes of, 130, 145.
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EJECTMENT —
for lands sold for taxes, 371.
condition to recovery that improvements shall be paid for, 371, 372
condition that taxes shall be paid, 373-375.
short statutes of limitations for, 376.
how affected by constructive possession, 378-382.
(See Adverse Possession.)
cannot be brought by one in possession, 544.
in case of vacant tenements, 378-382, 545.
(See Laud Titles.)
ELECTION—
of remedy where one has paid an illegal tax, 565.
ELECTION OFFICERS —
not liable for errors in the exercise of their judgment, 551.
ELECTIVE FRANCHISE —
payment of taxes may be made condition to, 319, 320.
action for depriving one of, by not taxing him, 320.
EMBANKMENTS —
to prevent inundations, special assessments for, 427.
(See Levees.)
EMINENT DOMAIN —
principles governing its exercise, 76-83, 430.
meaning of public purposes in the law of, 76-83.
may be employed to obtain water power, 77.
distinction between exercise of, and taxation, 175, 178.
special compensation to be made in case of, 76-83, 430.
' special assessments not an exercise of the, 431-434.
assessments for land taken for, 420, 421.
appraisal of damages under, is judicial, 551.
EMPLOYMENTS —
taxes on privilege of following, 385, 386, 392.
what usually taxed, 392.
taxation of, for regulation, 396-415.
(See Business.)
ENCOURAGEMENT —
to proceed with improvements, may operate as an estoppel, 573
(See Estoppel.)
of business, discriminations for purposes of,
(See Protection.)
ENFORCING OFFICAL DUTY —
(See Mandamus.)
ENFORCING PAYMENT —
by collector,
(See Collector of Taxes.)
by municipalities,
(See Mandamus ; Compulsory Local Taxation.)
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ENFORCING TAXES —
(See Collection of Taxes.)
ENGLAND —
taxation in, 26, 27, 31.
sewer assessments in, 426, 460, 472.
land taxes in, 18-20.
monopolies in, 173, 423.
the maxim in, that taxation and representation go together 44.
EQUALITY —
taxation must aim at, 2, 103.
impossibility of attaining, 124-128, 183.
may exist, though but few articles taxed, 128
but not, if exemptions made from the classes taxed, 128, 129.
exemptions admissible, 130.
(See Exemptions.)
invidious assessments inadmissible, 157.
duplicate taxation not necessarily void, 158-165.
when may be, 164.
presumption against, 165-171.
(See Duplicate Taxation.)
commuting taxes does not produce inequality, 172.
nor diversity in rules, etc., 172.
monopolies, inadmissible, 173, 423.
permanence in legislation essential to, 174.
discriminating assessments cannot be cured, 228.
(See Curatite Laws.)
assessment by benefits is supposed to be, 416-445.
apportionment essential to, 175-183.
want of, in a tax does not render it void,
(Sec Excessive Assessments.)
remedies where it is wanting,
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
EQUALIZATION —
boards for, 290.
conclusive nature of, 291.
limited authority of boards of, 291.
judgment on, is final if no appeal given, 528, 529.
errors in, do not invalidate, 530*
decisions on, not subject to review on certiorari, 534.
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL—
(See Estoppel.)
EQUITY—
of any particular exaction, cannot support it
,
unless it has the elements
of taxation, 3.
of demands against the public, legislature may require recognition of,
479, 481.
of special assessments, 428, 429.
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EQUITY, COURT OF—
relief in, against fraudulent assessments, 157, 158, 547.
cannot enjoin political action, 34.
cannot abate taxes, 528.
cannot give remedy to one who has neglected that given by statute,
529.
enjoining collection in, 636.
not allowed, unless the case comes under some head of equity juris
diction, 536.
mischiefs flowing from, 536.
remedy refused where mischief serious, 536, 537.
conditions on, 537, 538.
not generally allowed in case of personal taxes, 538.
allowed where injury irreparable, 539.
will not enjoin preliminary action, 540.
nor merely excessive assessments, 540.
nor merely irregular taxation, 540.
what are not mere irregularities, 540, 541.
may enjoin when discriminations are made, 540.
will not enjoin a double tax unless once paid, 541.
whether personal tax in respect to lands can be enjoined, 542.
may relieve from cloud upon title, 542-544.
what is such, 542.
whether it is cloud where the proceedings are void on their face,
542.
may quiet title after sale, 544.
not the proper tribunal for trial of land titles generally, 544.
relief by, in respect to possession, 545.
joint suit by several persons taxed, 545.
question must be same as to all, 545.
and be capable of being presented without confusion, 545.
cannot quiet title as against party in possession, 545.
saving of expense not a reason for complainants' joining where there is
no other ground of equitable relief, £46, 547.
may enjoin malicious or corrupt assessment, 547, 556.
bills of interpleader in, 547.
taxpayers' bills in, to enjoin iltegal corporate action, 547, 548.
action ultra vires usually a public wrong, 547, 548.
relief on ground of irreparable mjury, 547,548.
delay in proceedings may bar right in, 549, 573.
cannot compel the levy of taxes, 34, 35.
will not enjoin an assessment where a party seeing the work go on has
made no objectiens, 573.
redemption cannot be had in, 364.
EQUIVALENT—
benefits are, for special assessments, 416, 417.
for taxes, what is the, 13-17.
when the eminent domain is employed, 76.
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ERRORS —
'
in description of land, effect of, 282-286.
what may be rejected, 283.
in assessment and in private conveyance, effect of, 284-286.
in records, etc., amendment of,
(See Amendments.)
in valuations, not to be corrected by the courts,
(See Judiciary.)
correction of, by statute,
(See Curative Laws.)
in tax proceedings, must usually be corrected by the statutory tribunal,
528,532.
cannot usually be corrected in equity, 536, 540.
(See Equity, Court of ; Injunction.)
of assessors, do not render them personally liable, 550-553.
(See Assessors.)
deprivation of a legal right not a mere error, 554.
distinction between, and want of jurisdiction,
(See Jurisdiction.)
resisting collection in case of, 558.
what, on the part of the collector, will render him liable, 563, 564.
what, in collector's warrant, renders it not fair on its face, 562.
clerical, may be overlooked in any case, 234, 562.
in tax deed, correction of in equity, 353.
waiver of, by action of the party,
(See Estoppel.)
effect of, in general,
(See Irregularities.)
ERRORS OF JUDGMENT —
not to be corrected by mandamus,
(See Mandamus.)
in assessments, cannot be reviewed by the courts, 528.
cannot be reviewed on certiorari,
(See Certiorari.)
do not render an officer personally liable,
(See Judicial Officer.)
ia legislative action, not subject to judicial correction,
(See
Legislative Action.)
ERRORS OF LAW —
what may be corrected by mandamus,
(See Mandamus.)
extending to jurisdiction, may be reviewed on certiorari,
(See Certiorari.)
what will render proceedings void,
(See Jurisdiction ; Nullity.)
ERRORS IN POLITICAL ACTION —
cannot be corrected on certiorari, 5H1.
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ERRORS IN POLITICAL ACTION — continued.
cannot be corrected on mandamus, 518, 519.
nor on bill in equity, 34, 35.
(See Voting the Tax.)
ESTATE —
the whole, in lands, may be sold for taxes, ML
and for special assessments, 469.
in common, taxation of,
(See Tenants in Common.)
redemption of separate, 365.
in dower, redemption of, 366.
set apart as a homestead, 366.
(See Homestead.)
wife's separate, taxation of, 278.
ESTATES —
recovery of, at law,
(See Ejectment.)
quieting title to,
(See Quikting Title.)
removal of cloud upon title to,
(See Cloud upon Title.)
adverse possession, in case of,
(See Adverse Possession.)
ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS —
taxation of 270, 278, 301.
ESTIMATE —
for purposes of general taxation,
(See Valuation.)
for the raising of taxes,
(See Political Action.)
for local improvements, effect of excess in, 463.
departure by assessors from statutory method of, 53.
ESTOPPEL—
against intruders who have collected taxes, 191.
against collectors de facto, 498.
against one who has collected a void tax, 498.
against the state in case of illegal organization of municipal corpora
tions, 549.
in case of ta payer neglecting to bring in list, 264.
of tax payer b . giving in list of property not taxable, 264
state may be bound by, in case of officer de facto, 187-189.
of tax payer by encouraging levy of a tax, 573.
by failure to give notice of objections, 573.
by failure to take objections on hearing, 574.
city uot bound by, in consequeuce of taxing land covered by a street, 574.
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EVIDENCE —
legislative control over rules of, 223.
does not authorize rules which preclude a party from showing his
rights, 223, 824.
tax deed cannot be made conclusive, 356.
must be put in by tax purchaser to show regularity of tax proceedings,
326, 328.
strictness required in these cases, 327.
how he may be aided by presumptions, 329-332.
how far presumptions may depend on delays, 330, 331.
how they may be affected by possession, 330, 331.
presumption cannot supply want of record, 332.
cannot presume existence of record where none is found, 332.
secondary, where record is lost, 248, 332.
of tax votes, must be of record, 247.
can only be shown by record, 248.
of tax sale, by certificate, 352, 353.
record is better evidence, 352.
by tax deed, of the proceedings to a sale, 353-357.
deed is not evidence of the previous steps, 353, 354.
statutes changing this rule, 354, 355.
some statutes make it evidence of regularity of sale, 355.
necessity in such case to prove prior proceedings, 355.
other statutes make the deed evidence of title, 355, 356.
cannot make deed conclusive. 356.
do not apply to deeds on sales for assessments, 356, 357.
against the collector, by the accounting of the auditor, 505, 506.
of giving notice of meetings of towns, etc., 248.
on certiorari, is only gone into to determine jurisdiction, 532.
not to review case on the merits, 532.
extrinsic, cannot be received on, 535.
necessity for, to show defect in tax title, will render deed a cloud upon
title, 543.
for the purposes of amendments,
(See Amendments.)
action by one as officer, evidence of official character,
(See Officers De Facto.)
official returns as, 195, 196.
are generally conclusive, 195.
except in action against the officer, 196.
EXACTIONS —
equity of, will not support them as taxes, 3.
EXCESSIVE ASSESSMENTS—
abatement :1ftaxes in cases of, 527.
(See Aratement.)
reviews and appeals in cases of, 528-530.
remedy must generally be the statutory remedy, 528.
refunding tax in cases of, 530.
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EXCESSIVE ASSESSMENTS — continued,
cannot be corrected on «ertiorari, 533.
assessors not personally liable for, 552, 556.
collector not liable in cases of, 552.
equity cannot correct in general, 540.
may correct in cases of fraud, 547.
conditions may be imposed in such cases, 537, 538.
EXCESSIVE DUTIES —
tend to defeat the purpose of their levy, 24.
illegal, may be recovered back of collector, 564, 565.
EXCESSIVE MOISTURE —
taxation for drawing off,
(See Drains.)
EXCESSIVE SALE —
sale for taxes must be of only what is necessary, 343.
sale for more, is void, 343, 345.
power to sell, is exhausted when tax is paid, 344.
illegal addition of percentage, or costs, may render sale excessive, 344.
EXCESSIVE TAXES —
tax in excess of authority, spread upon the roll, renders it void, 296, 297.
one excessive tax does not defeat others which are severable, 296.
what will render tax excessive, 296.
excessive in individual cases does not avoid roll generally, 296.
the maxim de minimis, etc., in such cases, 296, 297.
made so by fraudulent assessment, 157, 158, 547.
will only be enjoined on payment of what is legal, 538.
in suit for, only what was illegal can be recovered back, 571.
one excessive tax does not avoid levy if aggregate not too large, 220.
EXCISE TAXES—
what are, 3.
on business, 384-392.
(See Bcsiness.)
on corporations, 392, 393.
(See Corporations ; Franchises.)
EXECUTION —
tax warrant is in the nature o",
(See Collector's Warrant.)
process agains; collec:or in nature of,
(See Collector of Taxes.)
EXECUTION OF POWER —
must be strict in tax cases, 257.
of collector, must be strict, 304, 308.
to sell, must be exact, 323-327.
EXECUTIVE, THE —
cannot levy taxes, 32.
not subject to mandamus, 523.
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EXECUTIVE AND MINISTERIAL OFFICERS —
must keep within limits of their authority, 33.
cannot refund taxes, 530.
compelling performance of duty by,
(See Mandamus.)
protection of by process, 559-562.
protection of by certificate on which they must act, 557.
EXECUTOR—
taxation of for estate property, 270, 271, 278.
suit against for tax on estate, 301.
EXEMPT PROPERTY —
inserted on roll, assessors may be compelled to strike off, 520, 574
taxes collected from, may be required to be refunded, 520.
taxes on auditor general may be required to reject, 520.
abatement of taxes upon, 528.
refunding taxes upon, 530.
including in assessment, will not render assessor personally liable, 552.
taxation of, not a mere irregularity, 541.
(See Exemption.)
EXEMPTION —
of agencies of federal government from state taxation, 56-61.
of agencies of state government from federal taxation, 58-61.
of property, by contract, 52-54.
from taxation, generally subject to be recalled, 54, 145.
by charters of incorporation, 55, 56.
implied, in case of all public property, 130-132.
of persons in a class taxed, produces inequality, 128, 129.
customary, of household furniture, tools of trade, etc., 130, 145.
from motives of charity, 130, 145.
of church property, school property, etc., 130, 145.
constitutional provisions bearing on right to make, 132.
of Arkansas, 132.
of California, 132, 133.
of 11linois, 133, 134.
of Indiana, 137, 138,
' of Iowa, 136.
of Ohio, 142, 143.
general right of the state to make, 144, 145.
is involved in the power to apportion, 145.
exists whenever it is not forbidden, 145.
general right of the state to recall, 145.
intent to make must be clear, 146.
must be strictly construed, 146.
from taxes, will not apply to special assessments, 147.
instances of special cases, 148-152.
of corporation, which employs its means for other purposes than thoso
for which its powers are given, 149-151.
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EXEMPTION — continued.
principles which should support, 152-154.
invidious, not admissible, 129, 130, 153.
not to be made without legislative authority, 153.
motives cannot support, when not lawfully made, 153.
power to make, is a discretionary power, 146.
construction of certain exemptions, 151-154.
unlawful, may render roll void, 153, 541.
unintentional, will not avoid the levy, 154-156.
decision upon right to, a judicial act, 550.
party entitled to, may replevy property seized, 573.
state may make, without regard to municipal power to tax, 253.
(See Exempt Property.)
EXEMPTION FROM RESPONSIBILITY—
officers performing judicial functions have, 550.
(See Judicial Officer.)
of assessors under statutes, ,552, 553.
EXHAUSTING AUTHORITY —
to tax, sometimes by single exercise, 256.
abortive attempt is not, 256.
influence of custom in such cases, 256.
in case of license taxes, 256.
to collect taxes, by issue of one process, 295.
by boards of review, whftt is not, 291.
EXHIBITIONS AND SHOWS —
taxation of, 391.
(See Amusements.)
EXONERATION —
from taxation, cannot be compelled by mandamus, 518.
(See Aratement.)
EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS —
tax sales are, 324, 325.
necessity for strict compliance with law in such cases, 323-326.
EXPENSE —
saving of, by joint suit in equity, 545, 546.
not of itself a reason for equitable jurisdiction, 546, 547.
of local works, assessment of on parties benefited, 416-473.
(See Assessments, Local.)
EXPENSES OF GOVERNMENT —
general, taxation for, 73-75.
(Sec
Purposes of Taxation.)
EXPORTS—
taxation of, by the states, limited to inspection fees, 24, 61.
not to be taxed by the United States, 73.
EXTENSION OF TIME —
to collector, whether discharges sureties, 502, 503.
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EXTRA TERRITORIAL TAXATION -
state has no power to levy, 121.
case of contracts made in state and owned abroad, 65.
case of bonds on a road lying in two states, 169.
in case of municipal corporations, 48.
whether they can be authorized to tax persons or property beyond
their limits, 121-123.
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE —
cannot be received on certiorari, 535.
F.
FACT, ERRORS OF —
how corrected in records, ect.,
(See Amendments.)
not corrected on certiorari,
(See Certiorari.)
personal liability for,
(See Judicial Officer.)
FACULTY—
assessment on the, 394.
(See Privileges.)
FAILURE OF BENEFITS —
will not defeat local assessment, 417.
FAIR ON ITS FACE —
certificate that is, protects oflicer who is to act upon it
,
554, 557.
process that is, will protect ministerial officer, 559, 560.
when a process is not, 562, 563.
FAITH, PUBLIC —
municipal bodies may be compelled to tax for purposes of keeping, 479.
(See Mandamus.)
FALSE DESCRIPTION —
of land in assessment, whether may be rejected, 282, 283.
(See Descrdttion.)
FALSE RETURNS—
liability of officer for, 196.
FARES ON RAILROADS —
(See Gross Receipts ; Tolls.)
FARMING THE REVENUE —
what is, 300.
not admissible in this country, 300.
FAVORITISM—
m exemptions, 153.
(See Invidious Exemption.)
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FEDERAL COURTS —
(See Courts of the United States.)
FEDERAL LICENSES —
grant and force of, 414, 415.
do not displace state regulations, 406, 415.
FEDERAL TAXATION —
(See United States.)
FEE SIMPLE —
is usually valued, instead of separate estates, 288.
separate payments on separate interests, 289.
is usually sold in selling lands for taxes, 351.
FEES —
for licenses,
(See License Fees.)
for inspection,
(See Inspection.)
FEMALES —
taxability of, 45.
(See Dowress; Married Woman.)
FERRY BOATS —
taxation of, 270.
FICTIONS OF LAW—
are not to work injustice, 381.
the doctrine applied to case of adverse possession, 381.
application of, where two acts done at same time, 569.
FIGURES IN VALUATION—
without dollar mark,
(See Dollar Mark.)
FILING OF ASSESSMENT—
requirement of, must be complied with, 267.
FINALITY —
of judgment as to facts covered by it
,
(See Judgment.)
of assessment as to value of property,
(Sec Assessment.)
of legislative action as to purposes of taxation,
(See Purlic Purposes.)
FINES AND PENALTIES —
(See Penalties.)
FIRE, PREVENTION OF —
taxation for, 102.
FIRE ENGINE —
taxation by town for, 98.
FISCAL AGENT—
of United States, not taxable by states, 58.
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FLORIDA —
taxation ot property in, must be by value, 435.
FORCE—
taxes collected by coercion, may be recovered back if illegal, 569
what constitutes, 569.
(See Voluntary Payments.)
FORCED CONTRIBUTIONS —
distinguished from taxes, 2.
taxes levied without apportionment are, 180.
tax levies where the statutory provisions are disregarded are, 260.
FORECLOSURE OF REDEMPTION—
statutes for, must be strictly performed, 365.
notice required for, must be given, 365, 366.
right to, cannot be waived by any but the party himself, 365, 366.
must be given officially, 366.
should be in writing, 366.
judicial proceedings for a, 364.
must be strictly pursued, 364.
do not apply to sales for municipal taxes, unless so expressly pro
vided, 364.
FOREIGN BONDHOLDER—
not taxable in the state on his bonds, 15, 16.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS —
doing business in state must submit to its conditions of taxation, 44.
are not citizens, 65.
owning a road in two states, taxation of, 168.
FOREIGN RESIDENTS—
(See Nonresidents.)
FORFEITURES—
(See Penalties.)
FORFEITURES OF PROPERTY—
provisions by law for, in case of delinquent taxes, 315, 316.
question of legislative competency to make, 316.
decisions thereon in several states, 316.
Intent to create a forfeiture must be clear, 317.
meaning of the term, 317, 318.
sale, no more than a forfeiture, gives a judicial hearing, 318.
if forfeiture admissible, questions of compliance with the law would
be open afterwards, 319.
proof of regularity of proceedings in case of, 319.
statutes for, construed strictly, 317.
delay in returning list, when will defeat, 317.
FORMAL DEFECTS —
(See Amendments.)
FORMS—
pi escribed by statute, necessity for following, 337.
in case of collector's return, 307, 308.
40
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FORMS — continued.
in the authentication of the assessment, 289, 290.
in the warrant for collection,
(See Collector's 'Warrant.)
in case of tax deeds, 353, 362.
when intended for henefit of taxpayers, 216.
FORTIFYING TITLE —
right of, by buying at tax sale, 347-349.
FRANCHISES —
may be taxed as well as persons, 15.
in what cases taxation is just and in what not, 25.
granted by congress for federal purposes, not taxable by states, 58.
what granted by congress are taxable by states, 60, 61.
provisions in charters regarding taxation of, 55.
valuation of, for taxation, 135-137.
may be taxed though the property is taxed also, 165, 168, 170.
application in case of, of the presumption against duplicate taxation,
166-168.
when exemption of, from taxation will exempt property also, 171.
may be taxed though capital invested in government securities, 58.
exemptions of, from taxation, how they affect special assessments, 148-152.
consolidation of, effect on taxation, 151.
exemptions of, does not exempt property, 171.
taxation that would annihilate, may be enjoined in equity, 539.
(See Banks ; National Banks ; Railroad Companies.)
FRANCHISE, ELECTIVE —
(See Elective Franchise.)
FRAUDS—
in assessment, may justify an injunction, 157, 528.
on the federal revenue, enumeration of, 309-313.
in tax sales will avoid them, 339-340.
in redemption, may be relieved against, 367.
of contractor, no defense to assessment, 468, 469.
conditions may be imposed when tax is enjoined for, 536-539.
do not necessarily exist where tax is illegal, 539.
relief against, where they deprive parties of substantial rights, 547.
FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE —
in tax sales, renders them void, 341.
instances, of purchase by the officer himself, 341.
of purchase by tenant who should have paid the tax, 345.
of purchase by the mortgagor, 345.
by tenant in common, 346.
by one whose land was grouped with that of another, 346, 347.
by agent buying the principal's land, 347.
by any one whose duty it was to pay, 347.
case of the mortgagee, 347.
case of an adverse claimant, 348-351.
INDEX.
FRAUDULENT COMBINATIONS —
at tax sales, render them void, 339.
one not aware of them, not affected thereby, 340.
FRAUDULENT CONTRACTS —
those in fraud of the revenue are, 299.
FREE BRIDGE—
taxation to establish, 94, 210.
FREE SCHOOLS—
taxation, 84-88.
(See Education.)
FREEDOM, PRINCIPLES OF—
(See Constitutional Principles.)
FREIGHT—
taxes on, 61-63.
on the carriers of, 388.
FRONTAGE —
assessment by the, for local improvements, 451-464.
(See Assessments, Local.)
FUND, SPECIAL —
payment for local improvement from, 463, 463.
FUNDAMENTAL LAW—
(See Constitutional Principles.)
G.
GAMES -
(See Amusements.)
GAMING IMPLEMENTS—
taxation of, for the purpose of prohibition, 10.
impositions on keepers of, under police power, 403, 404.
GAS LIGHT—
special assessments to provide, 428.
GAS PIPES—
laid in streets, are taxable as machinery, 272.
GAS WORKS—
taxation for, 99.
GENERAL EXEMPTIONS —
from taxation, do not apply to local assessments, 146-148.
right to recall, 146.
(See Exemptions.)
GENERAL LAW —
for municipal taxation, 210.
modifying local powers by, 255.
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GENERAL POWERS —
to tax, are strictly construed as against municipalities, 209-21 1.
what they cover in case of towns, 211.
will not authorize special assessments, 418.
to sell lands, construed strictly, 469
to levy fees under police power, will not justify taxes for revenue, 396,
397, 408, 409.
construction of, in general,
(See Construction of Tax Laws.)
'
GENEROSITY —
not legally demandable of tax payer, 153.
GEORGIA —
provisions for uniform taxation in, 133.
are not violated by taxes on business, 133.
provisions for ad valorem taxation, 133, 435.
GIFTS —
taxes cannot be laid for making, 78, 86, 90.
the rule applied to manufacturing corporations, 78.
as pensions, may be made,
(See Pensions.)
as bounties for military service,
(See Bounties.)
GOLD —
states may collect taxes in, 12.
GOOD FAITH —
action in, by members of board of equalization, gives no right of action,
530.
absence of, in assessors, does not render them personally liable, 556, 557.
GOODS —
taxation of,
(See Personal Property.)
levy of distress upon, for satisfaction of taxes, 301.
must be the proper warrant for, 301-2.
not liable to constitutional objections, 302.
case of levy on property of one not taxed, 302, 303.
replevin in such case, 573.
demand to be first made, 304.
personal notification to party concerned, 304.
notice of sale, etc., 304.
authority in making, must be strictly pursued, 304.
what will render officer trespasser ab initio, 304, 563, 564.
municipal corporations cannot authorize without statutory authority
304.
'
sale of, not usually enjoined, 538-540.
levy on, is presumptive sati sfaction of tax, 539.
when collector liable for, 559-564.
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GOODS — continued.
payment to relieve from seizure, is payment under duress, 568.
so is payment after threat of seizure, 569.
exhibition of process is such threat, 569.
sale of, for illegal tax, gives right of action, 569.
GOVERNMENT —
taxes, tho property of, 1.
taxing power essential to, 3, 4.
maxims which should govern in taxing, 7, 8.
other purposes than revenue in taxing, 10, 11.
may collect taxes in kind, 12.
is to give protection for taxation, 14-17.
customary taxes by, 18-31.
general right of to tax, 30.
division of powers of, 32.
checks and balances of, 33.
representative responsibility in, 178.
(See Representatives.)
agencies of, are exempt from taxation, 56.
property of, not within the intent of tax laws, 130, 131.
public domain, not taxable, 59, 60.
general purposes for which it may lay taxes, 67-103.
(See Purlic Purposes.)
United States, taxation by,
(See United States.)
municipal, taxation by,
(See Municipal Corporations.)
can only exercise its powers through officers, 184.
contracts by, for exemptions,
(See Contracts; Exemptions.)
principles which should govern its taxation,
(See Principles of Taxation.
can only act through officers, 184.
construction of revenue acts of, 197-222.
may tax all kinds of business, 384.
may regulate rights and occupations, 306-415.
has general control of its municipalities, 474.
powers of, are liable to abuse, 212.
any, is better than none, 212.
political remedies for wrongs in, 575.
privilege of choosing representatives in, is insignificant in value as com
pared with other rights, 45.
powers of, are held in trust, 539.
GOVERNMENT OF THE STATES —
(See Legislative Power ; States.)
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES —
(See United States.)
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GOVERNMENT STOCKS —
(See Purlic Securities.)
GOVERNOR OF STATE —
whether subject to mandamus, 523.
GRADE OF STREETS —
assessments for, 421.
right to change, 401.
(See Assessments, Local.)
GRADUATING LICENSE FEES —
in reference to the size of town, 179.
as between classes of lawyers, 179.
in case of liquor dealers, 180.
general methods of, 384, 385.
right to make when no restrictions are imposed, 387.
in case of merchant's sales, 160.
GRANT —
of lands for taxes,
(See Tax Deed.)
of the power to tax,
(See Power to Tax.)
of franchises,
(See Franchises.)
of taxes by the people's representatives,
(See Representatives.)
of taxes by the people,
(See Voting the Tax.)
of exemptions,
(See Exemptions.)
of power of local taxation, 51, 209-211.
of power to lay local assessments, must be special, 418.
of privileges,
(See Privileges.)
of the power to tax business, 387.
of power to make exemptions, is not compulsory, 146.
GREAT BRITAIN —
early taxation in, 26, 27.
excise fees in, 31.
land tax of, 18, 19.
hearth and window taxes in, 19, 20.
GRIEVANCE, PRIVATE —
remedies for, at the common law,
(See Common Law Remedies.)
remedies for, in general,
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
joinder of complaints for,
(See Joint Complaints.)
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GRIEVANCE, PRIVATE — continued.
must exist to authorize private party to apply for mandamus, 522.
does not exist unless one is injured, 154.
GRIEVANCE, PUBLIC —
what may be remedied by mandamus, 523.
in case of threatened illegal corporate action, 548.
where municipal bodies do not meet their obligations, 479, 480, 524.
GROSS RECEIPTS —
taxation of, 64, 137, 138.
GROUPING OF LANDS—
not admissible, where statute requires them to be separately assessed, 279.
is not a mere irregularity, 279.
reasons for not allowing, 280.
statute against, is mandatory, 280.
what to be considered separate parcels, 281.
in valuation, not admissible, 287.
what amounts to a, 287.
in making sale, renders sale void, 341.
reasons for the rule, 342, 343.
when several lots may be treated as one parcel, 342.
GUARANTY —
none by municipalities, of correct action on the part of their officers, 566.
(See Caveat Emptor.)
GUARANTIES, CONSTITUTIONAL—
(See Constitutional Principles.)
GUARDIAN —
tax on, for the minor's estate, 271.
H.
HACKMEN —
taxation of, 391.
HARBORS —
taxation for, 96.
special taxation of municipalities for, 484, 487.
HEAD MONEY —
imposed in respect to immigrants, 568.
HEALIJSG ACTS
what admissible, 225-202.
liability of to abuse, 226.
retroactive, forbidden in some states, 226.
may be special, 226.
must not be invidious, 226, 227.
cannot cure want of jurisdiction, 227.
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HEALING ACTS — «ontinued.
may heal irregularities, 227.
cannot make good what could not originally have been authorized, 227.
instances of defects not cured by, 227, 228.
unlawful discriminations cannot be made good, 228, 229.
sale of wrong land cannot be validated, 228.
general principle as to what may be made good, 229.
may be prospective, 230-232.
instances of prospective curative laws, 231, 232.
may apply to pending suits, 231, 232.
not to cases which have passed into judgment, 232.
HEALTH —
taxation for protection of, 101.
draining lands for, 402, 423, 424.
whether health must be a purpose of drainage assessments, 423, 424.
board of, Is a state functionary, 477.
HEARING —
right to, not to be taken away retrospectively, 229.
is of right in tax cases, 265, 266.
provisions of law for, are mandatory, 266, 267.
alterations in assessments without opportunity for, are illegal, 268, 541.
notice of, must be given as statute provides,
(See Notice.)
in review of assessment, parties dissatisfied may have, 528.
if not applied for, all remedy is usually lost, 529.
decision upon, is final, 529.
on certiorari, only extends to jurisdiction, 532.
(See Certiorari.)
when may be had in equity,
(See Equity.)
general right to,
(See Law of the Land.)
HEARTHS —
taxation of houses by, 20.
HEIRS—
assessment of estate to, 270, 278.
(See Estates of Deceased Persons.)
HIGH SCHOOLS —
taxation for,
(See Education.)
exemption of buildings for,
(See Exemptions.)
HIGH WATERS —
protection against,
(See Levees.)
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HIGHWAYS—
duty of government to provide for, 94.
different varieties of, 94.
chartering corporations to make, 94.
principles applicable to, whether they apply to railroads, 95-97.
cannot tax to make, unless the land has been appropriated, 97, 98.
methods of providing for construction of, 106.
taxing districts for, 106.
exceptional burdens for construction of, 107.
special assessments for, 108.
are state works, 106, 109, 110, 428.
are constructed by localities, 109, 110,419.
labor contributions for, 12.
requirement of, in the nature of a police regulation, 420.
states may compel municipalities to construct, 478.
whether this principle can apply to a road exceptionally expensive,
487-489.
apportionment of cost of, between counties, etc., 478.
special districts for, 112, 114.
(See Bridges ; Free Bridge ; Plankroads ; Streets ; Turnpikes.)
HIGHWAY LABOR—
requirement of, 12.
is in nature of police regulation, 420.
right to perform, not to be taken away by officer, 541.
decision on exemption from, is a judicial act, 550.
officers not liable for error in, 550.
commutation for, 172.
HOMESTEAD —
exemption of, from taxation, 145.
redemption of, from sales, 366.
HORSES—
taxation in respect of, 21.
HOUSES —
taxes on, measured by rents, 19.
by hearths, 20.
by windows, 20.
(See Betterments ; Improvements.)
HUSBAND AND WIFE —
(See Homestead; Married Woman.)
I.
IGNORANCE —
of one's rights, in paying an illegal tax, no ground for recovery back,
667, 668.
different ruling in Kentucky, 667.
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IDENTIFICATION —
of land in tax proceedings,
(See Description.)
ILLEGAL ACTION —
of officers, presumption that it will not be persevered in, 544.
remedies for,
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
ILLEGAL CONTRACTS —
those in fraud of the revenue are, 209.
will not be enforced, 299.
whether the rule applies to contracts in fraud of foreign revenue laws,
299.
ILLEGAL OCCUPATIONS —
taxation of, uuder internal revenue law, 406, 414.
may be taxed by the state, 403, 404, 406.
ILLEGAL TAXES —
collector may refuse to collect, 500.
whether he should raise question of illegality, 500, 501.
if collected, must be paid over, 498.
cannot be validated retrospectively by the legislature, 375.
those laid for private purposes are, 42.
(See Purposes op Taxation.)
those are, which violate contracts with the state, 52-56.
or impair the obligation of contracts, 65.
(See Contracts.)
or which are laid in disregard of constitutional provisions, 66.
or which the states lay on foreign or inter-state commerce, 61-64,
(See Commerce.)
or which are laid without apportionment, 175.
or otherwise than by official action, 184.
or by local boards, etc., without legislative authority, 209.
or in disregard of mandatory provisions of statute, 212-219.
or which are in excess of statutory authority, 295-297.
may be abated, 528.
may be contested without applying for abatement, 528.
cases of errors which constitute, 534, 541.
enjoining collection of, 536.
not usually permitted on grounds of illegality alone, 536, 538.
combined with legal, will only be enjoined on the legal being paid,
537, 538.
will be enjoined when they constitute cloud on title, 542.
(See Equity.)
protection of collector in enforcing, 559-562.
liability of collector of the customs for enforcing, 564, 565.
are not necessarily or usually fraudulent, 539.
error in the assessment will not of itself make, 540.
INDEX.
ILLEGAL TAXES — continued.
liability of town, etc., for, after it has been paid over, 565.
only exists when the tax is a nullity, 566.
does not exist if tax voluntarily paid, 566, 567.
what are voluntary payments, 568, 569.
form of action upon, 569, 570.
recovery on, is limited to money paid, 570.
recovery where tax only in part illegal, 571.
liability of assessors for levying, 570.
of collector for enforcing, 570.
remedy by replevin in case of, 572, 573.
estoppel of party taxed, by his conduct in some cases, 573.
remedy by mandamus, 574.
the political remedy sometimes the only one, 575.
ILLEGALITIES —
correction of, by certiorari, 630, 533.
(See Certiorari.)
in municipal organization, may be cured by delay, 530, 549.
enjoining collection in case of, 536, 538, 540.
(See Injunction.)
protection in case of, where officer is to act upon certificate, 554, 557.
or upon process which is fair on its face, 559-562.
ILLINOIS —
constitutional provisions for equal taxation in, 133-136.
taxation of property must be by value, 435.
constitutional provisions affecting special assessments, 437.
special fund for assessments in, 466.
IMMIGRANTS—
tax in respect of, is a tax on commerce, 63.
assessment of head money in respect of, 568.
IMMUNITIES —
of citizens of the several states, not to be abridged in taxation, 64, 65.
IMPAIRING CONTRACTS— '
(See Contracts.)
IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL —
right of every party to a hearing before, 527.
(See
Hearing ; Law of the Land.)
IMPLICATIONS —
are against contract not to tnx, 52, 53.
against duplicate taxation, 165-171.
(See
Duplicate Taxation.)
against exemptions from taxation, 145-147.
(See Exemptions.)
in favor of correctness of legislative apportionment, 179.
in favor of legislative action as to purposes of taxation, 69.
636 LAW OF TAXATION.
IMPLIED EXEMPTIONS —
from taxation, what are, 130, 131.
IMPOLITIC TAXES—
imposition of, 387.
IMPORTED PACKAGES—
(See Importers.)
IMPORTERS—
tax on, is a tax on commerce, 62, 63.
tax by states on goods imported, when admissible, 62, 63.
IMPORTS —
taxation of, a customary resource of government, 21.
not to be taxed by the states, 61.
what is a tax upon, 62, 63.
IMPOSITIONS—
special exemptions from, construed, 148.
exemption from " civil imposition," construed, 149.
IMPOSTS —
what arc, 3, 24.
discrimination in, 74.
unlawful, may be recovered back, 564, 565.
unless paid without protest, 567, 568.
exemption from " tax or impost," 144.
IMPRISONMENT —
for taxes may be authorized, 14.
this not imprisonment for debt, 14.
not now generally allowed, 301.
may be provided for in case of license fees, 301.
IMPROVEMENT—
of wet lands, special assessments for, 423-425.
must have reference to the public interest, 423, 424.
the public health not the sole consideration, 423, 424.
(See Drains.)
IMPROVEMENTS —
(See Betterments.)
discrimination in favor of, 134.
INADEQUACY OF PRICE —
will not defeat tax sale, 345.
is usually found to exist, 323-325.
INADEQUATE RELIEF —
legal remedies afford, in some cases, 541, 542 .
remedy in equity in such cases, 541, 542.
in case of cloud upon title, 542.
in case of one in possession whose land another claims, 544.
in case of threatened irreparable injury, 538, 539.
(See Equity.)
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INCIDENTAL BENEFITS —
will not support taxation, 90.
(See Manufacturing Enterprises.)
will not support special assessments, 457.
(See Benefits.)
to those not taxed, will constitute no objection to a tax, 127, 128.
INCIDENTAL INJURIES —
from exercise of lawful powers cannot entitle a citizen to compensation, 91.
compensation sometimes made in case of, 91.
INCOME —
taxes on, 20, 168, 170.
meaning of, 160, 272, 392.
difficulty in adequate enforcement of tax on, 20.
reasons which render it unequal, 20.
taxes should be in proportion to, 16.
exemption of, from taxation, how construed, 168.
of a corporation may be taxed, though its dividends are exempt, 170.
tax upon, In lieu of tax upon property, 172.
INCONVENIENCES —
to result from setting aside a tax levy, may be reason for refusing a certi
orari, 530.
must be considered in deciding upon injunction, 536.
from delays in collection, may justify summary remedies,
(See Summary Remedies.)
or the taking away of common law remedies,
(See Replevin.)
INCORPORATIONS —
(See Corporations.)
INCREASE —
in assessment without notice, 268.
this not a mere irregularity, 541.
INCUMBRANCE —
when an illegal tax may constitute an apparent, 542.
removal of, in equity, 542-544.
(See Cloud upon Title.)
taxation of,
(See Mortgage.)
INDEBTEDNESS—
public, taxation for, 102.
incurred for illegal object is void, 102.
private, may be taxed,
(See Bonds ; Credits.)
of municipalities, mandamus to compel payment of, 524-526.
compulsory taxation by state to meet, 479.
payment of taxes on, as a condition to recovering, 320.
municipal, as a tender for taxes, 413.
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INDEMNIFICATION —
of municipal officers acting in good faith, 91, 92.
legislature sometimes compels, 91, 480.
of purchaser at tax sale, municipalities not bound to, 566.
of losers by riots, 480.
of losers by exercise of taxing power, 91, 92.
INDIAN LANDS —
taxation of, after Indian title extinguished, 275.
INDIAN TRIBES —
trade with, not taxable by states, 62.
INDIANA —
constitutional provisions for equal taxation in, 137, 138.
requiring property to be taxed by value, 435.
affecting special taxation, 437, 438.
special fund for assessments in, 467.
INDIRECT TAXES —
what are, 5.
not illegal, 392.
may be equally just with any other, 6.
what may be unjust, 6.
on luxuries, policy of, 6.
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS —
protection of, by constitutions,
(See Constitutional Princtples.)
INELIGIBILITY —
to office, effect of, if the party acts, 186.
(See Officers De Facto.)
INEQUALITY —
is meant to be avoided in taxation, 2, 124.
apportionment to secure against, 126, 127.
(See Apportionment.)
cannot always be prevented, 124, 126, 128, 160.
may exist in case of single tax, 124.
why a tax on luxuries not subject to objection for, 125.
does not render a tax illegal, 125, 128.
in the case of school taxes on nonresidents, 127.
does not necessarily exist where tax is restricted to few subjects, 128
discriminations which produce, not necessarily unlawful, 128.
are unlawful when special and invidious, 128, 129, 130, 152-154, 158.
taxing one kind of corporations and not others, may not cause, 129.
constitutional provisions designed to guard against, 132, 144.
produced by exemptions,
(See Exemptions.)
accidental omissions of property, do not invalidate the levy, 154, 156.
fraudulent assessments, relief against, 157, 158, 547.
INDEX. 639
INEQUALITY — continued.
caused by duplicate taxation, 158, 163.
(See Duplicate Taxation.)
taxing land and the mortgage upon it, 159.
taxing income and the property it is invested in, 160.
presumption against intent to cause, in tax laws, 165-171.
produced by granting monopolies,
(See Monopolies.)
must result from frequent changes in legislation, 174.
in the case of license fees, 412.
purposely caused in case of prejudicial employments, 396, 404.
abatement of taxes in cases of, 527.
(See Aratement.)
caused by unequal assessments, cannot be corrected by certiorari, 533.
or in equity, when fraud is not charged, 540.
no remedy against assessors for, 550-557.
unless they deprive the tax payer of some legal right, 554.
does not necessarily result from illegalities, 566.
political redress the principal security against, 575.
INFANTS —
are taxable, though they have no voice in representation, 45, 46.
the exceptional benefits received from government by, 16, 17.
can only redeem from tax sales on the statutory conditions, 364, 365.
taxation of property of, to guardian, 271.
INFERIOR JURISDICTIONS —
corrections of errors of, by certiorari, 530.
(See Certiorari.)
the remedy by prohibition in case of, 574.
errors of judgment in, cannot be corrected by mandamus, 514.
may be compelled by mandamus to perform ministerial action, 522, 523.
conditions to appeals from, 374.
INFORMALITIES —
(See Errors ; Irregularities.)
INHABITANTS —
(See Residence.)
INHERITANCES —
taxes on,
(See Successions.)
INJUNCTION —
the available remedy in equity in case of illegal tax, 536. ,
not awarded unless the case comes under some recognized head of equit
able jurisdiction, 536.
mischiefs that may flow from awarding, in tax cases, 536, 537.
equitable conditions sometimes imposed, 537, 538, 541.
not usually awarded in case of personal taxes, 538.
awarded in cases of irreparable injury, 539, 548
640 LAW OF TAXATION.
INJUNCTION - «ontinued.
by some courts in any case of illegal municipal taxation, 538-540.
not awarded against political action, 540.
nor in case of merely excessive assessments, 540.
nor of merely irregular taxation. 540, 541.
not generally awarded in case of personal tax in respect of lands, 542.
joint bills for, 545-547.
not awarded where the remedy at law is adequate, 538, 542, 546, 548.
to restrain fraudulent assessments, 547.
to restrain illegal corporate action, 548.
whether taxpayers can file bill for, 548, 572.
irreparable injury in such cases, 548, 549.
effect of delay in applying for remedy, 549.
what will estop one from applying for, 573.
INJURIES WITHOUT REMEDY —
must be cases of, under tax laws, 575.
(See Inequality.)
INJURY—
from riots, municipalities may be compelled to indemnify, 480.
from an exercise of the taxing power, may be indemnified, 91, 92.
INJUSTICE —
of taxation cannot render it void, 3.
of legislative action, judiciary cannot take cognizance of, 35.
except in case of wanton perversion of power, 71.
impossibility of avoiding, in taxation, 124-129.
intentional, may render tax illegal,
(See Invidious Assessments ; Invidious Exemptions.)
resulting from accidental omissions,
(See Omissions.)
by the state, will not be presumed, 508.
of tax, no excuse for county treasurer for not proceeding with, 521.
what will render tax void,
(See
Illegal Taxes.)
what cannot be validated by legislation,
(See Curative Laws.)
abatement of tax in cases of, 527.
reviews for the correction of, 528, 529.
certiorari not a remedy for,
(See Certiorari.)
remedy in equity in case of intentional, 547.
of state in enforcing local taxation for local purposes, 493-495.
INQUEST OF OFFICE —
whether essential in forfeitures for delinquency, 316-319.
(See Forfeitures.)
INQUISITORIAL PROCEEDINGS —
necessary in case of tax on income, 20.
objections to, 20, 26, 27.
INDEX. 641
INQUISITORIAL PROCEEDINGS — continued.
cannot be effectual, 20.
in case of hearth taxes, 20.
in case of taxes on personalty, 26, 27.
INSPECTION LAWS —
of states, fees under, 61.
(See Head Mosey.)
INSPECTORS OF ELECTION—
not liable for erroneous exercise of judicial functions, 551.
(See Judicial Officers.)
INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING—
exemption of, from taxation,
(See Exemptions.)
INSURANCE COMPANIES —
whether inequality is produced in singling out for taxation, 129.
capital of mutual, what is, 273, 394.
surplus of, what is, 392.
taxes on foreign, 393.
guaranty stock of mutual, 393, 394.
English joint stock, taxation of, 394.
(See Corporations.)
specific tax on, 210.
INTEGRITY—
statutes to protect officers acting with, 552, 553.
whether want of, will render assessors liable, 556, 557.
of officers, the chief protection in tax matters, 575.
INTELLIGENCE —
taxes upon,
(See Newspapers.)
of public officers, reliance upon in taxation, 575.
INTENT—
must govern in construction of statutes, 198.
if plain, rules of interpretation are unimportant, 199.
aids in arriving at,
(See Construction.)
to defraud,
(See Fraud.)
of party in describing lands, may be aided, 282, 283.
whether this principle applicable to descriptions in assessment roll, 282-
286.
malicious, whether it will render assessors liable, 556, 557.
INTEREST —
taxes on, 22.
what recoverable in suit for illegal taxes paid, 571.
imposed as a penalty for delay in paying taxes, 313-315.
requiring county to pay, on debt apportioned to it
,
92.
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INTERESTS, SEPARATE —
in lands, sometimes separately assessed, 289.
assessed together, separate payments on, 289,
liens, etc., in case of, 306.
purchases by one joint owner, 346, 347.
redemption incases of, 365, 367.
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS —
taxation for, 94-97.
grounds on which it must be supported, 96, 97.
compulsory, not admissible,
(See Compulsory Local Taxation.)
INTERNAL REVENUE —
penalties for frauds upon, 309-313.
construction of statutes for,
(See Construction of Tax Laws.) ,
liability of collector of, 564.
(See Collector of Taxes.)
taxes laid for,
(See Excise Taxes ; Taxes.)
INTERPLEADER —
bills of, may sometimes be necessary, 542.
INTERPRETATION —
of revenue statutes, should aim at the intent in passing them, 198.
aids to, where intent is not apparent, 199.
rules for reaching, 197.
(See Construction.)
INTOXICATING DRINKS —
taxation of, as luxuries, 23.
frauds and evasions when taxes heavy, 24.
taxation of manufacturers and dealers in, 390.
license to keep tavern, whether it includes license to deal in, 391.
laws prohibiting dealing in, 404.
may be taxed, though the sale unlawful, 404-406.
taxation of, under the police power, 412.
federal licenses to dealers in, 404, 414.
1N'TRUDERS
into office, who are, 186, 187.
distinguished from officers de fa«to, 186, 187.
acts of, are void, 186, 187.
are estopped from disputing their authority when called upon to account
for moneys collected, 191.
INVIDIOUS ASSESSMENTS —
illustrations of, 129.
relief in equity from,
(See Injunction.)
INDEX.
INVIDIOUS CURATIVE LAWS —
are not admissible, 225-227.
illustrations of, 226, 227.
INVIDIOUS EXEMPTIONS —
are not admissible, 152.
grounds on which exemptions should be supported, 152, 153.
selecting particular individuals, are void, 153.
selecting particular parcels of property, 153, 154.
will not make one's tax void if it is not thereby increased, 154.
in case of manufacturing enterprises, 129, 130.
illustrations of, 129.
INVOLUNTARY PAYMENTS —
of illegal taxes, recovery back in cases of, 565.
those made under protest are deemed to be, 567.
or under threat of distress, 569.
or on presentation of legal process, 569.
(See Voluntary Payments.)
collection of interest in case of, 571.
IOWA—
constitutional provisions for equal taxation in, 138.
do not admit of exemptions of corporate property, 138.
special fund for assessments in, 467.
IRREGULAR ASSESSMENTS —
are not to be corrected on certiorari,
(See Certiorari.)
will not be enjoined,
(See Injunction.)
do not render assessors trespassers, 565.
(See Assessors.)
towns are not liable for, 565.
(See Irregularities.)
IRREGULAR TAXES —
are not void for that reason alone, 540.
(See
Illegal Taxes.)
IRREGULARITIES —
methods of curing in tax cases, 223-243.
cannot be cured by conclusive rules of evidence, 223, 224.
or by legislative mandates, 224.
may be cured by special curative laws, 225-229.
or by prospective laws, 230.
(See Curative Laws.)
or by reassessing the tax, 232, 233.
or on a judicial hearing, 233, 234.
curing by amendment, 234-243.
(See Amendments.)
in the execution of directory statutes, may be overlooked, 219, 220.
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IRREGULARITIES — eontintted.
clerical, may be disregarded, 234, 562.
conditions sometimes imposed, to the taking advantage of, 372, 373.
in cases of judgments for taxes, do not render the proceedings invalid, 362
but may authorize a reversal, 362.
what not mere irregularities, 360, 361, 539.
not corrected on certiorari,
(See Certiorari.)
not a ground for relief in equity,
(See Equity; Injunction.)
IRREPARABLE INJURY —
a tax which will cause, may be restrained, 538, 539.
instances of a tax which mi?ht destroy a franchise, 539.
distress of goods is not supposed to cause, 538, 539.
exceptional cases, 539.
IRREPEALABLE EXEMPTIONS —
states may grant, 52-56.
necessity of consideration for, 54.
by corporate charters, 55.
do not exist where right to repeal is reserved, 56.
implication against intent to grant,
(See Exemptions.)
ISSUING LICENSES —
proceedings on, 413.
conditions imposed, 413.
whether they are of right when the conditions are complied with, 413.
J.
JOINT BOARDS —
must meet and consider subject referred to them, 193.
separate action of members is invalid, 193.
custom cannot change this rule, 193, 194.
if only two of three members are chosen, they cannot act, 193.
majority may act if all cannot agree, 194.
presumption in favor of action of, 194.
are subject to the writ of mandamus, 522, 523.
(See Boards of Equalization; Boards of Review; Supee visors,
Board of.)
JOINT COMPLAINTS —
where an illegal tax affects all tax payers alike, 530.
where two or more are alike affected, 545.
cannot be entertained where the grounds of complaint are distinct, 545.
reasons favoring them, 545, 546.
cannot be entertained on sole ground of saving expense, 546, 547.
by tax payers to restrain political action, 548.
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'JOINT OWNERS —
assessment of property of, 279.
when interest to be separately assessed, 288, 289.
separate payment of taxes by, 289.
redemptions by, 367.
separate judgments against for taxes, 362.
separate purchases by,
(See Tenant in Common.)
JUDGMENT —
compelling payment of, by mandamus, 524, 525.
by federal courts, 525, 526.
of board of review, is final, 529.
cannot be set aside by statute, 232.
JUDGMENT, ERRORS OF —
do not render taxes illegal, 468.
do not render an officer liable,
(See Judicial Officer.)
JUDGMENT FOR TAXES —
provisions for in some states, 357.
preliminary review of proceedings, 357, 358.
court must have jurisdiction, 358.
jurisdiction must appear by the record, 358, 359.
report to the court as a basis for its action, 359.
notice of application for judgment, 359, 360.
defects which avoid the proceedings, 360, 361.
who may appear and defend, 360.
irregular action will not avoid, 362.
judgment in case of joint owners, 362.
is void if no jurisdiction, 362.
proceedings subsequent to, 362.
recitals in record, 362.
JUDGMENT OF ONE'S PEERS —
the guaranty of, in magna charta, 36-40.
(See Constitutional Principles; Jury Trial; Law of the Land.)
JUDICIAL ACTION —
assessors exercise, in valuing property, 550-552.
is had by boards of equalization, 291.
by boards of review, 291.
by highway officers in some cases, 550, 551.
by appraisers of damages, 551.
by inspectors of election, 551.
by school directors, 551.
by township boards, 551.
is void if it is usurped, 554-556.
ministerial officers do not exercise, in enforcing taxes. 40, 41.
(See Judicial Officers.)
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JUDICIAL CORRECTIONS —
of tax pioceedings, sometimes provided for, 233, 234.
on certiorari,
(See Certiorari.)
by allowing amendments,
(See Amendments.)
JUDICIAL DUTY —
discretion in exercise of, cannot be controlled by mandamus, 514-516.
performance of, when^may be compelled, 414.
liability in performance of,
(See Judicial Officers.)
JUDICIAL OFFICERS —
are not liable for errors of judgment, 550.
reasons for the exemption, 550.
the principle extends to all who exercise judicial functions, 550.
instances of such officers, 550, 551.
the principle applies to assessors, 551, 552.
what it protects them against, 552, 553.
are liable for exceeding their jurisdiction, 553.
instance, of personal tax on nonresident, 553.
or of assessing a tax never voted, 554.
or an excessive tax, 554. ....
or a sum voted for an illegal purpose, 554.
are liable for depriving a party of a substantial right, 554.
distinction between error of judgment and excess of jurisdiction, 555, 556
whether malice will render liable, 556, 557.
JUDICIAL POWER —
what it consists in, 40, 41.
not to be exercised by the legislature, 224, 225.
(See Judiciary.)
JUDICIAL PROCESS —
(See Certiorari; Judiciary; Mandamus.)
JUDICIAL SALES —
sometimes provided for in tax cases, 357.
proceedings to, are in. rem,
(See Judgment for Taxes )
JUDICIARY —
can afford no redress against oppressive taxation, 4.
the levy of taxes does not belong to, 33-35.
cannot question the policy of tax laws, 34, 74.
can only restrain excess of jurisdiction, 35, 71, 104-10S.
as where tax legislation is merely colorable, 36.
or has private purposes in view, 67-69.
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
is sometimes vested with statutory power of review, 36.
must presume in favor of legislation, 69, 70.
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JUDICIARY— continued.
'
is not to judge of legislative motives in taxing, 75.
is sometimes authorized to correct irregularities, 233, 234.
power of, to permit amendments in tax cases, 235-242.
cannot control discretionary local powers of taxation, 249, 250.
Bitting to revise tax proceedings, must observe statutory regulations, 266
whether forfeitures must be declared by, 316-319.
(See Forfeitures.)
cannot redress wrongs in special assessments, 461.
cannot limit the acknowledged powers of the legislature, 4.
right to a hearing by,
(See Law of the Land.)
officers of the, not personally liable for errors,
(See Judicial Officers.)
judgments by, for taxes,
(See Judgments for Taxes.)
power to compel performance of official duty,
(See Mandamus.)
JURISDICTION —
to tax, what gives, 14. . .
extends to all the subjects of taxation, 4.
exists where protection is due, 15.
may exist in behalf of government de facto, 4, 5.
is confined to territorial limits, 42.
does not exist in the case of nonresidents, 43.
of personalty depends on residence of owner, 43, 269-272.
cannot reach corporate shares of nonresident corporators, 43.
of states, does not embrace agencies of government, 56-61.
must be limited to the district taxed, 104-106.
excess of, in taxation may be restrained, 34.
(See Judiciary.)
want of, cannot be cured retrospectively, 227-229.
(See Curative Laws.)
consent cannot give, in tax cases, 271.
necessity for, when judgments are to be taken for taxes, 358, 359.
(See Judgment for Taxes.)
to levy special assessments depends upon property being benefited, 460,
461.
(See Assessments, Local.)
in summary proceedings, must appear by the recitals, 509, 510.
'
limitations upon, in the nature of taxation,
(See Limitations upon the Taxing Power.)
limitations specially imposed by constitutions, 66.
limitations imposed by the federal constitution,
(See Constitution of the United States.)
of the United States to tax,
(See United States.)
an assessment made without, is void, 529.
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JURISDICTION — continued.
certiorari to review questions of,
(See Certiorari.)
municipal bodies must keep strictly within, 535.
want of, in judicial officers will render them personally liable, 553, 555
what constitutes a want of, in assessors, 553, 554.
of supervisor, what necessary to, 557, 558.
tax laid without, may be resisted, 558,
keeping inferior tribunals within, by prohibition, 574.
JURISDICTION, INFERIOR —
(See Inferior Jurisdiction.)
JURJ" TRIAL —
guaranty of, in Magna Charta,
(See Law of the Land.)
not of right under tax laws, 36-40, 302.
reasons why it could not be allowed, 37.
right of, is not violated by special assessments, 425.
summary remedies in tax cases an exception to, 302.
not of right on question of collector's delinquency, 507.
is of right when land is demanded of one in possession, 545.
where one is entitled to, on demand, that is his remedy for an excessive
assessment, 532.
JUSTICE —
of special assessments, 428, 429.
is determined by the law providing therefor, 428.
of taxation cannot be determined by the courts,
(See Judiciary.)
claims founded in, will support taxation, 88.
municipalities may be compelled to provide for, 480.
right of trial of, 481.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE—
certiorari to, in case of militia penalties, 533.
JUSTIFICATION —
of officer by his warrant,
(See Process.)
of officer by certificate on which he is to act,
(See Supervisor.)
of local assessments by the special benefits conferred, 416-418.
of taxation by the protection afforded by government, 2, 14.
E.
KANSAS—
special fund for ass s-ments in, 466.
liability of city in such case, 436.
INDEX.
KENTUCKY—
liability of city for special assessments, 467.
special fund for, 467.
KIN, NEXT OF —
(See Successions.)
L.
LA.BOR —
taxes sometimes made payable in, 12.
discrimination in privilege to pay in, 172.
on highways, 419, 420.
deprival of rights to pay in, 541.
LACHES—
in applying for certiorari, 531.
in objecting to irregular organization of municipal corporations, 549.
in bringing suit to recover lands,
(See Limitation, Statutes of.)
when one will be estopped by,
(See Estoppel.)
LAND —
taxes on, in England, 18.
taxes upon, by value, 26-30.
assessment of, for taxation, 275-282.
classification of, as seated and unseated, 275.
meaning of these terms, 276, 277.
classification of, is imperative, 277.
changing from one list to other, 277
resident lands, assessment of, 278, 279.
separate tracts to be separately assessed, 279-282.
what are separate tracts, 281, 282.
description, what requisite, 282-286.
valuation, must be of parcels separately, 287.
is a judicial act, 288.
cannot be made by legislature, 288.
of separate interests, 288, 289.
equalization of, 290.
lying in two townships, how assessed, 121, 282.
single parcels not to be divided in, 282.
forfeiture of, for taxes, 315-319.
(See Forfeiture.)
sale of, for taxes, 305-308, 321-361.
requires legislative authority, 305.
.
lien of the tax, 305.
not prevented by change in ownership, 306.
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LAND— «ontinued.
sale of, of separate interests, 306.
municipalities cannot order, without legislative authority, 307.
conditions precedent, 307.
evidence that tax is unpaid, 307, 308.
special authority for, 308 333.
payment discharges right to make, 322.
or tender, 323.
proceedings on, must be regular, 323.
is made exclusively under statutory power, 324.
insignificant consideration received on, 324, 325.
purchaser must show proceedings correct, 326-329.
presumptions of regularity in, 329-332.
notice of, must comply strictly with statute, 334.
(See Notice.)
time and place of, 338.
competition must be allowed at, 339, 340.
officer selling, must not be buyer, 341.
separate parcels must be sold separately, 341-343.
surplus bond on, 343.
excessive, is void, 343, 344.
must be made to highest bidder, 344.
must be for cash, 344.
certain persons may not buy at, 345-351.
to state or county, 351, 352.
different sales at same time, 352.
certificate of, 352.
deed on, and recitals in, 353.
the deed as evidence of regularity of, 353-357.
(See Tax Deed.)
judicial proceedings for, 357-362.
(See Judgment ron Taxes.)
redemption from, 363-370.
favored by the law, 363.
is a statutory right only, 364.
conditions to cut off, must be complied with, 365.
foreclosure of, 364, 365.
who may make, 366, 367.
relief against mistakes and frauds, 367.
waiving conditions in, 368.
gives no new title, 368.
conditions cannot be added to by officer or purchaser, 369.
power of legislature over, 369, 370.
recovery of, after conveyance, 371-383.
statutory conditions upon, 371.
requirement that betterments be paid for, 371, 372.
and that taxes be paid, 372-3 76.
diaining under the police power, 402.
INDEX.
LAND— continued.
draining by means of special assessments, 423, 424.
whether this may be done for improvement merely, 423-425.
special assessments upon,
(See Assessments, Local.)
sale of, for municipal taxes requires special authority, 469-471.
personal liability for taxes upon, 278.
where lands have been sold, 306, 307.
for special assessments upon, 470-473.
can only be taxed within the district,
(See Extra Territorial Taxation.)
discriminations in taxing, within the district,
(See Overlying Districts.)
remedies for excessive or illegal taxation of, 527.
by abatement, where it is excessive, 527, 528.
against assessor when land not taxable, 541.
when land is assessed to owner, 542.
in case of cloud upon title, 542.
(See Cloud upon Title.)
quieting title to, 544.
joint suits by several owners, 545-547.
relief in cases of fraudulent assessments, 547.
(See Fraud.)
resisting collection of tax upon, 568-570.
adverse possession of,
(See Adverse Possession.)
mandamus to relieve from taxes on, 574.
LAND CONTRACT —
assessment of, to agent, 270.
LAND TITLES —
change in ownership will not affect lien for taxes, 306.
personal liability for taxes on, 278, 306, 307.
recovery of, when sold for taxes, 371-383.
loss of, by adverse possession,
(See Adverse Possession.)
cloud upon, how relieved against,
(See Cloud upon Title.)
quieting,
(See Quieting Title.)
equity not the proper tribunal for trying, 545,
LANDLORD —
title of, cannot be cut off by purchase by tenant, 345, 3*i
assessments of lands of, to occupant, 278, 279.
LAW, ERRORS OF—
correction of, by certiorari,
(See Certiorari.)
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LAW, ERRORS OF — continued.
extending to jurisdiction, render officers liable,
(See Jurisdiction.)
in judicial officers, create no personal liability,
(See Judicial Officers.)
LAW OFFICER OF THE STATE —
interference by, in case of illegal corporate action, 548, 549.
mandamus on application of, to compel assessment of property, 520.
to compel county to assess state tax, 522.
to compel corporate officers to furnish list of stockholders, 523.
to compel levy of tax to pay demands, 524.
LAW OF THE LAND —
the guaranty of, 36.
does not necessarily imply judicial proceedings, 37.
what is, 36-40.
what curative laws are, 223-232.
(See Curative Laws.)
admits of distress for taxes, 302, 303.
whether it will sanction imposition of penalties by ministerial officers,
313-315.
or of legislative forfeitures, 316-319.
(See Forfeitures.)
not violated by enforcement of any valid tax, 425.
not violated by special assessments, 429.
nor by summary process against collectors and their sureties,
(See Collector of Taxes.)
right to an effectual remedy by,
(See Constitutional Principles.)
LAWS—
impairing obligation of contracts forbidden, 52-56, 65.
by states, imposing certain duties, forbidden, 61, 62.
curative, may heal defects in tax proceedings, 223-232.
what cannot be cured by, 227-229.
may be made applicable to pending suits, 231.
construction of, in general, 197-222.
(See Construction.)
limitation, application of, in tax cases, 376-383.
(See Limitation, Statutes of.)
retrospective, may cure want of power to tax, 100, 101.
presumption against, 221, 222.
revenue, what are, 1, 199.
must have revenue for their purpose, 9.
directory, what are, 212-216, 219, 220.
mandatory, what are, 216-219.
allowing redemption, are favorably construed, 363.
violative of spirit of constitution, not necessarily yoid, 488.
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LAWS — «ontinued.
establishing rules of evidence, 223, 224.
(See Evidence.)
LAWYERS —
taxation of, 388, 394.
apportionment of taxes on, 179, 388, 389.
LEGACIES—
taxation of,
(See Successions.)
LEGAL PROCESS —
taxation of, 23.
LEGALITY—
in tax proceedings, is not warranted by municipal corporations, 572.
(See Caveat Emptor.)
how to be shown in cases of tax titles,
(See Evidence.)
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY—
is necessary for any tax, 244, 274.
must be had for assessments, 418.
may change local institutions at will, 474, 475.
but cannot take all power to itself, 474.
in what cases it may compel local taxation, 475-480.
matters of police, courts, etc., 476, 477.
construction of highways, support of schools, 478.
payment of debts, indemnification of officers, 479, 480.
compensation for losses by riots, 480.
no compulsory power in matters concerning only the corporators, 482-493.
may abate state taxes, 571.
cannot make assessments, 288.
canuot set aside judgments by curative laws, 232.
LEGISLATIVE DUTIES—
performance cannot be compelled by mandamus, 522.
(See Political Action.)
LEGISLATIVE INTENT —
(See Construction.)
LEGISLATIVE POWER—
taxing power is a, 32-40.
must grant taxes, 32.
must decide upon the purposes of taxation, 67.
and upon questions of policy involved, 34.
decision not absolutely conclusive, 67.
presumption in its favor, 68, 69.
must apportion taxes, 75, 125, 175.
discretion of, not subject to judicial control, 111.
must prescribe districts for taxation, 111, 112.
may determine for itself the methods of establishing districts, 112.
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LEGISLATIVE POWER— continued.
may make exemptions from taxation,
(See Exemptions.)
limitations upon, by federal constitution,
(See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.)
limitations upon by state constitutions, as regards exemptions, 132-144.
limitations upon, as regards local assessments,
(See Assessments, Local.)
presumption in favor of correctness of apportionment, 179.
may delegate local powers of taxation,
(See Local Power to Tax.)
may levy retrospective taxes, 221, 222.
power of, to cure defects in tax proceedings, 223-232.
(See Curative Laws.)
power to declare forfeitures, 316-319.
(See Forfeitures.)
whether it may extend or shorten time to redeem, 369, 370.
may prescribe districts for special assessments, 449, 450.
may determine the principles of apportioning such assessments, 449-456.
whether it may audit claims against municipalities, 481.
cannot at pleasure impose debts upon municipalities, 483, 484, 493, 497.
cannot grant monopolies,
(See Monopolies.)
cannot confer power to tax upon the judiciary, 34.
territorial limitations on power of,
(See Extra Territorial Legislation.)
exercised by local bodies,
(See Political Action.)
LEGISLATION —
importance of permanence in, 174.
lobby services to procure, 99.
restraints upon, by constitutional principles,
(See Constitutional Principles.)
colorable taxation by, is void, 35, 36.
(See Statutes.)
LESSEE —
cannot buy lessor's title at tax sale, 347.
LEVEES—
construction of, may be ordered under power of police, 401, 402.
special assessments for, 427.
districts for, 454.
apportionment of expense, 454.
different standards of apportionment in different cases, 456.
general taxation for, 427.
equality in such taxation, 162.
LEVY OF DISTRESS —
cannot in general be enjoined, 538.
INDEX. 655
LEVY OF DISTRESS— continued.
ability to make collection by, no defense to a bill to remove cloud, 543.
collection of illegal tax by, 568, 569.
(Sec Distress.)
LEVY OF TAXES —
mandamus lies to compel, by supervisors, 522.
and by county trustee, 522.
compelling, to pay judgments, 524-526.
or other settled demands, 524, 525.
by the state for municipal demands,
(See Compulsory Local Taxation.)
LEVY ON THE PERSON —
(See Arrest.)
LIABILITY —
(See Assessors ; Judicial Officers; Officers; Personal Liability;
Towns; Usubpers.)
LIBERTY—
has come from contests over taxation, 45, 46.
principles of,
(See Constitutional Principles.)
LICENSES—
granted to give privileges, 385.
granted for purposes of regulation, 403-415.
granted to give monopolies, 403.
(See Monopolies.)
what they are, 406, 407.
granted by the federal government, 414, 415.
by the state, cannot be nullified by town or county, 411, 412.
may be taxed, 21, 386.
regulations for issuing, 413.
right to, when conditions complied with, 413.
power to recall, 414.
LICENSE FEES—
payment of, a condition to doing business, 403, 404.
imposed for purposes of regulation, 403, 412, 413.
imposed for revenue, are taxes, 403, 408, 409.
imposed for monopolies, 173, 403.
imposed for prohibition, 403, 404.
may be imposed on any employments, 410, 412.
on marriages, 410, 411.
on amusements, 411.
on lotteries, 411.
on games of chance, etc., 411, 412.
collection of, 414.
whether to be returned when license revoked, 414.
money paid for, when voluntarily paid, 566.
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LICENSED TRADERS —
among the Indians, not taxable by states, 02.
LIEN OP LOCAL ASSESSMENTS —
sometimes established by statute, 466-463
attaches to the buildings, 468.
remains, though a void sale has been made, 468.
LIEN OF TAXES —
only exists by legislation, 305.
'
municipal authorities cannot create, 307.
not affected by change in ownership, 306.
who liable for tax in such case, 306, 307.
enforcing by sale,
(See Sale of Land for Taxes.)
relief in cases of.
(See Cloud upon Title.)
LIGHTING STREETS —
special assessments for, 428.
LIQUORS —
taxation of manufacturers and dealers in, 390.
fees imposed on, under police power, 404-407, 412.
policy in these impositions, 396.
may be imposed though the business is illegal, 404-406.
taxation, of as articles of luxury, 23, 125.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTES OF —
general power of the legislature to establish, 376.
short statutes of, for tax cases, 376.
questions of right and policy involved in, 376-378. '
application of to case of vacant tenements, 377-382.
who to be deemed the true owner, 558, 559.
nature of the claim which is affected by, 382, 383.
general principles governing, 381.
LIMITATIONS ON THE TAXING POWER —
general doctrine, 41.
must be for the public good, 42.
for public purposes, 42.
territorial, 42.
(See Extra Territorial Taxation.)
must be voted by people or their representatives, 44-48.
power must not be delegated, 48-51.
except to municipalities, 51.
power how affected by contracts, 52-56.
government agencies, officers, etc., not to be taxed, 56-61.
states not to tax the public domain, 59, 60.
nor to lay taxes on commerce, 61-64.
nor tonnage duties, 61, 62.
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LIMITATION ON THE TAXING POWER— continued.
elates not to tax in abridgment of privileges and immunities of citizens,
64,65.
nor those which impair obligation of contracts, 65.
express, imposed by state constitutions, 66.
in case of special assessments, 428.
cannot be exceeded under orders of courts, 524.
LISTING— ,
by assessors, what is, 258.
by taxpayers, for assessment,
(See Tax Payers' Lists.)
LISTS—
of members, corporate officers may be required to furnish, 528.
furnishing by taxpayers, 27, 29, 262.
penalties for not bringing in, 262-264.
effect of including property not taxable, 264.
LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS —
special exemptions of from taxation, 149, 150.
taxation in aid of, 86, 87.
LOANS —
government, not taxable by states, 58.
by corporations, taxation of, 168, 169.
by individuals, may be taxed, 162.
(See Credits.)
secured by mortgage, may be taxed though the land is taxed also, 159, 162.
to corporations by nonresidents, not taxable within the state, 65.
LOBBY SERVICES —
taxation for, not admissible, 99.
LOCAL ASSESSMENTS —
(See Assessments, Local.)
LOCAL COMPULSORY TAXATION —
by legislature, not generally admissible, 474, 475.
admissible in case of objects of state conoern, 475.
such as, preservation of the peace, 476.
support of courts, court houses, etc., 477.
construction and repair of highways, 478.
support of public education, 478.
payment of corporate debts, 479.
making compensation for destruction by rioters, 480.
indemnifying officers, 480.
whether legislature may audit claims against towns, etc., 481.
duplicate nature of municipal corporations, 482.
decisions regarding right to compel taxation in matters concerning
only themselves, 483-493.
42
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LOCAL POWERS TO TAX—
constitutional authority to confer, 51.
in case of lands partly in different municipalities, 111.
for highway purposes, etc., 108-110.
are to be strictly construed, 98, 209-211.
instances of action in excess of, 98, 99.
not to be exercised to influence legislation, 99.
for military bounties, must be special, 100.
may be conferred retrospectively, 100.
cannot be exercised for private purposes, 100.
exercise of, must be confined to the district, 121-123.
exemptions from exercise of, 153.
general, must be confined to ordinary purposes, 210.
liability to abuse, no argument against, 212.
exercise of, 244-257.
meetings to vote taxes, 245.
must be regularly called, 246.
must be limited in action to purposes specified in call, 24C, 247.
warning of, 246.
notice of, 246-249.
action of, to be favorably construed, 247.
votes must appear of record, 247-249.
informalities in action, to be overlooked, 249.
legislative control over, 249.
judiciary cannot control, 249, 250, 531.
(See Political Action.)
restrictions on exercise of, 250-254.
those imposed by federal constitution, 250, 251.
those imposed by state constitution, 251.
other restrictions, 251.
restraints on, to protect minorities, 251, 252.
conditions precedent must be observed, 254.
what is the evidence of observance, 254, 255.
confining exercise of to tax pavers, 255.
are always subject to repeal, 255, 256.
and to modification, 221,222.
exhausting authority under, 256.
must be strictly executed, 259.
are compulsory, when state has an interest in their exercise, 475-481.
compelling exercise of, to pay debts, 524-526.
for the purposes of local improvements,
(See Assessments, Local.)
conferred under the police power,
(See Licenses; License Fees; Police Power.)
taxes on business under,
(See Business; Privileges.)
attempted illegal exercise of, how restrained, 548
contracting debts an incipient step to exercise of, 479.
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LOCAL WORKS —
payment for, out of special fund, 462, 463.
city the agent ot parties assessed, 463.
collection of cost by contractor, 466, 467.
acceptance of, conclusive on persons taxed, 468, 469.
(See Assessments, Local.)
LOCALITY OF PROPERTY —
gives jurisdiction to tax, 14-16.
(See Jurisdiction ; Nonresidents ; Personalty.)
LOCOMOTIVES —
tax upon as property, 6
what taxes upon are not admissible,
(See Railroad Companies.)
LOSSES —
by riots, indemnity for, 480.
by officers acting in good faith, indemnity for, 91, 92, 480.
(See Damages.)
LOTTERIES —
fees for regulation of, 411.
tax upon, adjudged to be a penalty, 264, 265.
LOUISIANA—
constitutional provisions for equal taxation in, 138.
do not preclude special assessments, 438.
special fund for assessments in, 466.
liability of public in such cases, 466.
property in, must be taxed by value, 435.
LOWER HOUSE—
origin of revenue laws in, 33.
LOW LANDS —
taxation for draining, 101.
draining under the police power, 402.
(See Drains.)
LUXURIES —
instances of taxes upon, 21, 23, 30.
effect when excessive, 24.
justice of special taxation of, 125.
M.
MACADAMIZED ROADS —
taxation for, 94.
MACHINE SHOPS —
of railroad company, whether exempted in general exemption from taxa
tion, 151.
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MACHINERY—
the term held to include gas pipe, etc., 272.
MAGNA CHARTA—
protection by principles of, 36-40.
(See Constitutional Principles.)
MAINE —
property in, must be taxed by value, 435.
MAJORITY —
of joint boards, when may act, 193, 194.
(See Joint Boards.)
of voters, cannot vote away property of minority, 78, 79.
MAKING ASSESSMENT —
is a judicial act, 551, 552.
assessors not liable for errors in,
(See Assessors.)
MALICE —
whether assessors liable in case of, 566.
MALT LIQUORS —
duties on, under police power,
(See Police Power.)
taxation of, for revenue,
(See Liquors.)
MANDAMUS -
general nature of the writ, 514, 520, 521.
award of, rests in discretion, 514.
right to redeem may be enforced by, 365.
is denied when another adequate remedy exists, 514, 520.
will not lie to enforce a discretionary authority, 514.
or to enforce performance of political duties, 518, 519.
to assessors, cannot control them in their judgments,
517, 520.
this rule applies to all assessments, 518.
and to other discretionary duties, 518, 519.
not to mere ministerial duties, 520, 521.
may compel them to insert taxable property
on roll, 520.
to school directors, will not lie to compel them to exonerate a person
taxed, 518.
to judicial officers, when may be issued, and what its scope, 514-516.
to boards of review, may compel them to proceed
to a hearing, 521.
to county treasurer, to compel issue of distress warrant against
collector,
521.
to supervisors, to compel them to levy state tax, 522.
to county trustee, to compel tax to pay damages
awarded, 522.
to compel issue of certificate of tax sale, 522.
to compel payment of surplus moneys at tax sale, 522.
will not lie to coerce legislative duties, 522.
INDEX
MADAMUS — continued.
will lie to enforce ministerial duties, 520, 521.
even by a board having legislative functions, 522, 523.
will not lie to the executive, 523.
will lie to compel corporate duties in tax cases, 523.
levy of tax to pay judgments may be compelled by, 523, 524.
and sometimes to pay other settled demands, 524, 525.
but not an unadjusted demand, 523.
will not lie to compel an official act by one not an officer, 523.
nor an act that could not voluntarily have been done, 523.
nor in advance of the time for doing the act, 523, 524.
jurisdiction of federal courts to issue, 525, 526.
MANDATORY STATUTES —
what is understood by, 212-215.
instances of, 216-219, 304.
necessity of obedience to, 212-215.
failure to observe, is not a mere irregularity, 534.
(See Statutes.)
MANUFACTURE —
right to remove property from the state for purposes of, 61.
MANUFACTURES —
taxation of, 391.
AN UFACTURERS —
business taxes upon, 390.
of liquors, taxation of,
(See Liquors.)
what corporations are held to be, 391.
MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES —
taxation not admissible in aid of, 78-80.
exercise of the eminent domain for, 77-83.
exemptions in favor of, 129, 145.
discriminations in duties, in aid of,
(See Protection.)
MARRIAGES—
are sometimes taxed, 30.
license fees imposed upon for regulation, 410, 411.
MARRIED WOMEN —
taxation of land of. to husband, 278.
redemption of homestead interest by, 366.
must redeem under the statutory conditions, 364.
special provisions for redemption by, 364.
no implied exemption in favor of, 146.
MARSHES —
taxation for the purpose of draining, 402.
special assessments for draining, 423, 424.
(See Drains.)
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MARYLAND —
property in, must be by value, 435.
liability for special assessments in, 466.
MASSACHUSETTS —
constitutional provisions for equal taxation in, 140.
application of, to special assessments, 438-442.
special fund for assessments in, 467.
MAXIMS —
of policy in taxation, 6-8.
that taxation is for revenue, 9.
qualifying this for purposes of protection, 10, 396.
or to discourage certain occupations, 11.
that taxation and protection are reciprocal, 14-17, 42-44.
that every man has a remedy in the law, 36-40.
that taxation is only for public purposes, 42, 67.
that taxation and representation go together, 44-48. !
that sovereign powers are not to be delegated, 48-51.
qualification of this in case of local taxation, 51.
that one sovereignty cannot be taxed by another, 56-61.
(See Principles of Taxation.)
that he who seeks equity must do equity, 537, 538.
MEANING OF WORDS —
(See Construction ; Definitions.)
MEETING HOUSES —
(See CHCRCHE8.)
MEETINGS —
of aggregate bodies, are essential to valid action, 193, 195.
presumption that meeting has taken place, 194.
action by majority in case of, 194.
of towns, etc., to vote taxes, 245-250.
are only legal as they comply with the law, 245.
how appointed, 245.
notification of, by statute, 246.
limiting subjects, to be considered at, 246.
must be regularly called, 246.
notification must be regular, 246.
proof of notice of,
(See Notice.)
what sufficient warning of, 246, 247.
action of, to be favorably construed, 247.
votes must appear of record, 247 , 248.
must be strictly confined to purposes of the call, 247.
courts cannot control, 249, 250.
power of legislature over action of, 249.
of boards of review,
(See Boards of Review.)
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MERCHANTS —
taxation of business of, 389.
meaning of, 389.
discriminations against those not residents, 390.
may be taxed on stock and also on occupation, 389.
MERITS —
of assessment will not be reviewed on certiorari, 532.
(See Certiorari.)
METHODS —
of taxation,
(See Taxation.)
of apportionment,
(See Apportionment.)
of collection,
(See Collection of Taxes.)
of obtaining relief in tax cases,
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
of enforcing official duty,
(See Mandamus.)
of enforcing the responsibility of collectors,
(See Collector of the Customs; Collector of Taxes.)
MICHIGAN —
uniformity of taxation in, 140.
taxation of property by value in, 435.
constitutional provisions affecting special assessments, 442.
special fund for assessments in, 467.
MILITARY BOUNTIES —
taxation for by municipal corporations,
(See Bounties.)
MILITARY COMPANY —
furnishing uniform for, not a proper town charge, 100.
MILITARY PENALTIES —
certiorari in case of, 533.
MILITARY SERVICE -
taxation of property of one engaged in, 146.
one exempt from, may be taxed to pay bounties for volunteers, 431.
MILL DAMS —
condemning lands for, 77-83.
MINISTERIAL DUTIES —
performance of may be compelled by mandamus, 520-525.
the principle applicable to bodies having discretionary powers, 514-516.
(See Mandamus.).
MINISTERIAL OFFICERS —
confined strictly to their statutory authority, 33.
cannot refund taxes unless specially empowered, 530.
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MINISTERIAL OFFICERS— continued.
certiorari does not lie to, 533.
protection of by process, 569.
(See Process.)
compulsory process against, 512-526.
(See Mandamus.)
MINNESOTA —
equality and uniformity of taxation in, 141.
taxation of property by value in, 435.
constitutional provisions affecting special assessments, 441.
MINORITIES —
property of, cannot be voted away by majority, 78, 79.
constitutions framed for protection of, 251, 252.
MINORS —
taxation of, 45.
redemption by, must be made under the statutory conditions, 364.
special provisions for redemption by, 364.
may sell their rights subject to redemption, 364.
guardian may be personally taxed for property of, 271.
MISAPPROPRIATION —
levy will not be enjoined, on allegation of intent to make, 540.
may be restrained as a public wrong, 548.
restraining on bill filed by private parties, 548, 549.
no individual action at law for, 572.
does not render a tax levy illegal, 572.
MISCHIEFS —
of improvident use of certiorari, 531, 532.
of enjoining taxes, 536.
of the remedy by replevin, 572, 573.
in tax cases, mostly corrected only by political remedies, 575.
MISCONDUCT—
(See Collector of Taxes ; False Return ; Malice.)
MISFEASANCE —
of officer, does not render town, etc., liable, 570.
of collector, when it will render him trespasser ab initio,
(See Collector of Taxes.)
of officers in making false returns,
(See Officers.)
of assessors, etc., damages for, 570.
MISSISSIPPI —
constitutional provisions in, bearing upon special assessments, 443.
taxation of property by value in, 435.
MISSOURI —
constitutional provisions in, bearing upon special assessments, 443.
uniformity of taxation in, 141.
INDEX.
MISTAKE —
in description of land, effect of, 282-286.
(See Description.)
in naming the party liable to assessment, 231, 278, 279.
in redemption, not relieved against, 368.
except where it is mistake of officer or purchaser, 367.
in assessments, correction of by abatement, 528, 529.
in listing property for taxation, 264.
may give jurisdiction to equity, 536.
of party in paying an illegal tax, 567.
of officers, towns are not liable for, 570.
in omitting property from assessment will not render levy void,
(See Omissions.)
correction of by amendments,
(See Amendments.)
correction of by statute,
'
(See Curative Laws.)
MISTAKE OF LAW—
in assessors, does not render assessment void, 155, 156.
does not render judicial officers liable,
(See Judicial Officer.)
MODIFICATION —
of local powers to tax, right of, 210, 255, 256.
construction in cases of, 221, 222.
MONEY—
taxes on the interest of, 22.
taxes are presumptively payable in, 501,
collector limited to receiving, 501.
collector must safely keep at his peril, 501.
demands against the public not receivable instead of, 501.
coin may be demanded by states, 12.
MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED —
action of, by state against collector, 497, 498.
defense to, must be on substantial grounds, 497.
insufficiency of collector's authority, no defense, 498.
or defect in his official title, 498.
or the illegality of the tax, 498.
action on collector's bond for, 499-504.
action against town, etc., for, 565-570.
will only lie when tax is void, 565.
and where it has been paid under compulsion, 565.
and where it has been paid over by the officer, 565.
and where no other remedy has been elected, 565.
will not lie for an irregular assessment, 565, 566.
what to be deemed a voluutary payment, 567.
(See Voluntary Payment.)
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MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED— «ontinued.
action against town, demand not necessary before bringing, 571.
interest recoverable in, 571.
refunding, in case of illegal collections, 530.
MONOPOLIES —
taxation capable of being employed to build up, 173.
spirit of the constitution forbids, 173.
instances of, in England, 173, 403.
case of patented pavements, 173.
license fees for purposes of, 403.
taxation for private purposes, compared to, 403.
MONUMENTS —
power of municipal corporations to erect, 811.
MORAL OBLIGATIONS —
will support taxation, 91.
municipalities may be required to recognize, 479, 481.
MORTGAGEE —
purchase by, at tax sale, 347, 348.
whether mortgagor's title may be cut off thereby, 347.
title of, cannot be cut off by mortgagor's purchase, 345.
MORTGAGES —
to be taxed to owner where he resides, 43.
given by railroad company, docs not make bonds held by nonresidents
taxable in state, 65.
must be taxed, where taxation is required to be in proportion to property,
134.
may be taxed, though the property mortgaged is taxed also, 134, 159.
whether this constitutes duplicate taxation, 159.
not in existence at date of assessment, cannot be taxed, 261.
MORTGAGOR —
cannot cut off mortgage by tax purchase, 345-351
whether title may be cut off by mortgagee's purchase, 347-351.
MOTIVES —
(See Judicial Officer ; Malice.)
MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS —
joinder of complaints in equity in order to avoid, 545.
mere saving of expense not a reason for, 546, 547.
necessity that there should be some ground of equity jurisdiction,
546, 547.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS —
may be empowered to tax, 51.
powers may be changed at the discretion of the legislature, 474.
charters of, not contracts, 56.
have no inherent power to tax, 475.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— continued.
may tax business, 387.
but must be specially empowered, 387.
construction of powers to tax, 98, 209-211, 387.
grant of licenses by, 408.
enforcing licenses by imprisonment, 301.
cannot nullify state licenses, 411, 412.
(See Licenses.)
special assessments for streets in, 419-422.
for sewers, drains, etc., in, 423-427.
for water pipes in streets, 427.
for lighting streets of, 428.
constitutional objections to, 429-446.
apportionment of, 444-456.
may be left to discretion of municipality, 444.
property subject to, 456-459.
proceedings in levying and collecting, 459-470.
personal liability for, 470-473.
acceptance of work, conclusive on persons assessed, 468, 469.
act as agents for tax payers in levying and collecting assessments, 463.
not taxable by United States, 58.
taxation of, under legislative compulsion, 473-495.
in what cases allowable, 475-480.
cases of preservation of the peace, support of courts, etc., 476, 477
construction of highways and support of schools, 478.
payment of corporate debts, 479.
compensation for injuries by rioters, 480.
indemnification of officers, 480.
in 'what cases not allowable, 482-493.
local improvements, 484.
state buildings, 484, 485.
city parks, 485, 486.
cases which recognize the supreme authority of the legislature, 487-493.
apportioning cost of roads between, 478.
and cost of suits, 480.
and debts and property on division of, 177, 178, 479, 481.
state cannot make contracts for, 483, 484, 493, 497.
right of, to trial on question of indebtedness, 481.
power of, to erect monuments, etc., 211.
ownership of property of, on division, 176.
collection of taxes on division, 176.
abatement of taxes by authorities of, 527.
appeal by, from assessments, 529.
refunding taxes by, 530.
review of proceedings of, 530-535.
(See Certiorari.)
action preliminary to taxation cannot be enjoined, 540.
(See Political Action.)
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — continued.
failure to observe by-laws does not avoid action, 534.
whether merely illegal taxation by, may be enjoined, 539.
exercise powers in trust for corporators, 539.
remedies against, for misappropriation, 540.
(See Misappropriation.)
restraining action ultra vires. 548.
illegal organization of, must be complained of promptly, 530, 549.
action against, for moneys illegally collected, 565, 566.
(See Money Had and Received.)
liability of, for acts of officers, 570, 571.
do not warrant title to property sold for taxes, 572.
remedy for usurpation by, 574.
(See County; Town.)
compelling taxation by, to pay judgments, 524.
or other settled demands, 524, 525.
taxation by, under orders of federal courts, 525, 526.
cannot be compelled to tax beyond statutory powers, 524.
action of, cannot be questioned on ground of members of the council
having been improperly seated, 188.
MUNICIPAL REVENUES —
are presumptively derived from taxation, 494.
state control of,
(See Local Compulsory Taxation.)
N.
NAME—
error in, in assessment, 231, 278.
NATION —
(See United States.)
NATIONAL BANKS —
may be taxed by states, 61.
statutory provisions concerning, 394, 395.
only to be taxed as state banks, 394, 395.
may be required to pay taxes on shares, 395.
action against ascssors for illegal taxation, 555.
NATIONAL DEBT —
(See National Securities ; Purlic Dert.)
NATIONAL SECURITIES —
not taxable by the state, 5S.
mandamus in case of illegal taxation of, 520.
excise tax on corporations whose moneys are invested in, 394.
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NATURE OF THE TAXING POWER —
what it is, 32-40.
(See
Taxing Power.)
NAVIGATION —
(See Ships.)
NEBRASKA —
taxes on legal process in, 23.
NECESSITY—
for a government, is imperative, 212.
the foundation of the right of eminent domain, 76-83.
and of taxation, 1, 4, 512.
private convenience must yield to, in collection
of taxes, 298, 404, 536, 572.
NEGATIVE PROVISIONS—
may render statute mandatory, 214.
,
NEGLECT OF DUTY—
of collector, action for, 499. t
by assessor, liability for, 554.
correction of, by mandamus,
(See Mandamus.)
by municipal corporations in not paying
debts,
(See Compulsory Local Taxation.)
NEGLIGENCE —
of assessors in not levying tax, liability
for, 553.
in not taking official oath, 553.
NEGOTIABLE PAPER—
ofmunicipalities, issue of, may cause irremediable
mischief, 549.
taxation of, 22.
NET INCOME—
not same thing as dividends, 170.
(See Income.)
NEVADA—
taxc8 on legal process in, 23.
taxation of property to be by
value, 435.
NEW ASSESSMENT—
(See Reassessment.)
NEW STATES —
may not tax the public domain
in, 59, 69.
may tax possessory interests, 60.
when lands in, are so disposed
of as to be taxable, 60.
NEW TERRITORIES
—
(See Territories.)
NEW YORK—
special fund for local assessments
in, 467.
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NEWSPAPERS—
taxes nn, 23.
NEXT OF KIN —
taxation of distributions to, 270.
(See Successors.)
NONAGE—
(See Minors.)
NONRESIDENT LANDS-
assessed separate from resident, 275.
this requirement imperative, 276.
must be correctly described, 286.
(See Description.)
a railroad track is not, 274.
(See Unseated Lands.)
assessment fixes character of, for tax purposes, 334, 369.
assessment of, as resident, 277
NONRESIDENTS—
personal tax cannot be assessed against, 14, 42.
right to collect a debt in the state, not taxable, 14-16.
personalty of, actually in the state may be taxed, 15, 43.
owning shares in a corporation, cannot be taxed through the copora
tion, 43.
cannot be taxed on personalty being carried through the state. 43.
may be taxed on their business within the state, 64.
must not be discriminated against, 64.
different methods of procedure in case of, 64.
incidental benefits to, from taxation, 127.
discriminations between those living within or without a city, 130,
158.
bonds held by, not taxable within the state, 14-16, 169.
not chargeable with constructive notice of action of assessors, 266, 267.
are taxable on their lands, 64.
assessment of lands of,
(See Nonresident Lands.)
notice of tax sale in case of, 334.
personal assessment upon, is a nullity, 571.
recovery by, of personal tax paid, 571.
NORMAL SCHOOL —
local taxation for, 114, 115.
NORTH CAROLINA —
taxation of property in, to be by value, 435.
NOTARY PUBLIC —
authority to tax " trades, occupations and professions," does not include.
INDEX. 671
NOTICE —
of town meetings, the statute itself may be, 245, 246.
omission of public notice in such cases not fatal, 246.
of special town meetings, must be given, 246.
business of special town meeting must be confined to objects men
tioned in, 246.
effect of neglect to give, or of giving misleading notice, 248.
how proof of shoutd be made, 248.
of assessments, right of parties to, 265, 26S.
statutes for, must be strictly observed, 265.
nonresidents not personally bound by constructive, 266, 267.
upon corporation, failure to give, is not fatal when subsequent notice
provided for, 267.
of adverse proceedings, in general, is matter of right, 266.
of road taxes, necessity for, 304.
of tax, to be given before distress levied, 304.
of tax sales, must comply with statute, 334.
if not described in statute, must be in writing, 334.
may be given by publication, 334.
required to be given to occupant, how complied with, 334.
is a prerequisite to any authority to sell, 335.
is void if it omits statement of taxes where statute requires it, 335.
or gives incorrect statement, 336.
or is not for full time, 335.
or does not appear to be official, 336.
or varies from the assessment, 336.
or gives an imperfect description, 336, 337.
or is in the wrong paper, 336.
instances of other defects in, 336, 337.
how proof of, to be made, 337, 338.
if form is given, sufficient to follow it, 337.
publication of, must be in regular issues of the paper, 337.
after tax sale, when required to be given, 353.
of application for judgment for taxes, 359.
to foreclose redemption, 365, 366.
of meeting of board to review assessments, 530.
record thereof, 530.
of increase of assessment, right to, 541, 547.
of change in assessment, 555.
of objections to a public work, duty of party to give, 573.
curing defect in retrospectively, 231.
limitation upon the right, 229.
(See Hearing.)
constructive, from records,
(See Records.)
NUDUM PACTUM—
obligations contracted without authority of law are, 103.
contracts in violation of revenue laws are, 299.
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NUGATORY PROCEEDINGS —
(See Nullity.)
NUISANCE —
taxation in order to abate,
(See Drains.)
right to declare liquor selling to be, 412.
NULLITY—
colorable taxation is a, 33^0.
delegation of power to tax is a, 33.
what burdens are a,
(See Limitations on the Taxing Power.)
tax which is a, may be resisted, 528.
and collector may refuse to collect, 501.
excess of municipal powers is a, 535.
an excessive tax is a,
(See Excessive Taxes.)
tax sale after payment or tender is a, 322, 323.
tax without apportionment is a,
(See Apportionment.)
any tax without jurisdiction is a,
(See Jurisdiction.)
a merely irregular assessment is not a, 540.
(See Irregularities.)
a levy which is a, if paid without objection cannot be recovered back, 663.
(See Voluntary Payment.)
sale for two taxes, one of which is a, 564.
liability of town, etc., where tax is a, 566.
town not liable for a void sale never enforce a, 570.
legislature cannot validate a,
(See Curative Laws.)
when a local assessment is a, 465.
o.
OATH —
to tax payer's list, failure to make, 263.
(See Affidavit.)
OATH, OFFICIAL —
(See Official Oath.)
OBJECTION —
failure to take in season, may work an estoppel,
(See Estoppel.)
payment of illegal tax without, no recovery in case of,
(See Voluntary Payment.)
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OBJECTS OF TAXATION —
(See Purposes of Taxation.)
OBLIGATION —
(See Bond; Moral Orligation; Nudum Pactum.)
OBLIGATION OP CONTRACTS —
must not be impaired in taxation, 52-56.
this precludes state setting aside its own contracts, 52, 53.
(See Contracts; Exemptions.)
states cannot tax debts owing in the states to nonresidents, 65.
taxing residents on debts owing them does not impair, 65.
OCCUPANT—
purchaser at sheriffs sale of right of, may redeem, 366.
of land, personal tax upon, 277, 278.
must be assessed for land, if statute so provides, 278.
assessment of lands of several to one as agent, 278.
whether he may acquire title at tax sale, 347-351.
cases holding he may not, 348, 349.
cases holding the contrary, 350 , 351.
claiming land but losing it
,
may be compensated for betterments, 371, 372.
cannot waive for the owner the right to a notice, 365.
possessory right of on public lands, may be taxed, 60.
OCCUPATION —
what is sufficient to entitle one to notice, 334.
what constitutes, 276.
(See Seated Lands.)
of part of a parcel of land, fixes character of all as occupied, 276.
OCCUPATIONS —
taxation of,
(See Business; Professions.)
what to be deemed privileges under tax laws, 385, 392.
licenses for permission to follow, 385.
whether business unlawful if license not taken out, 386.
privileges liable to taxation, 386.
licensed by state, municipality cannot preclude being carried on, 386.
may be licensed by state and also by county or town, 386.
construction of municipal powers to tax, 387.
what included in " occupation, trade or profession," 392.
may be licensed for purposes of regulation, 396-415.
(See Police Power.)
but not for purposes of monopolies,
(See Monopolies.)
illegal, may still be taxed, 405, 406.
OFFENSES —
taxation for punishment of, 476, 477.
against the revenue laws, 299, 309-315.
43
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OFFICE FOUND —
whether necessary to a forfeiture, 817-319.
(See Forfeitures.)
OFFICERS —
taxation may be imposed to indemnify, 91, 92.
municipalities may be required to indemnify, 480.
taxation can only be had by means of, 184.
definition of, 184.
kinds of, legislative, executive and judicial, 184.
inferior ministerial, 184.
defa«to, what are, 184-186.
ousting by-judicial proceedings, 185.
, distinguished from usurpers, 186, 187.\ acts of, not to be assailed collaterally, 187-190.
cannot by his action build up rights in his own favor, 188.
Jhese rules apply in tax cases, 190, 191.
intruders, when estopped from denying official character, 191, 192.
joint action by, 193, 194.
must be meeting for, 193.
, custom cannot change this rule, 193, 194.
invalid if requisite number not chosen, 193.
majority may act, 194.
presumptions which support action , 194.
returns and certificates of, are evidence, 195.
generally held conclusive, 195, 196.
liability for false, 196.
amendment of records, rolls, etc., by, 234-243.
(See Amendments.)
curing irregularities of by statute,
(See Curative Laws.)
correcting irregularities judicially,
(See Judicial Corrections.)
mistakes of, when parties are making redemption, may be relieved against,
367.
may be compelled by mandamus to permit redemption, 365.
refusal of, to give certificate for purposes of redemption, 368.
cannot add to the conditions of redemption, 369.
requirement of official oath, 513.
(See Oath, Official.)
r.quirement of official bond, 513.
(See Collector of Taxes; Sureties.)
penalties against, for nonperformance of duty,
513.
compelling performance of duty by, 512-526.
(See Mandamus.)
excess of jurisdiction by,
(See Jurisdiction.)
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OFFICERS — continued.
judicial, not liable for errors, 550-657.
whether this principle applies in case of malicious action, 556, 557.
(See Judicial Officer.)
protection of, by process,
(See .Process.)
presumption that they will pause in illegal action, 544.
of highways, judicial action by, 550.
what is not, 541.
protection of by certificate, 558.
municipalities not liable for conduct of, 566.
collecting moneys, are not liable after they are paid over, 568.
(See Collector of Taxes.)
action for damages against, 570.
proceedings by quo warranto against, 574.
political remedies in case of, 575.
of municipalities, action by, ultra vires,
(See Ultra Vires.)
cannot refund taxes unless specially empowered, 527.
taxation of salaries of,
(See Salaries.)
OFFICERS, CORPORATE —
may be compelled by mandamu* to perform duty under tax laws, 523.
OFFICES—
federal, may be taxed by United States, 391.
state, may be taxed by states, 391, 392.
state, may be taxed by county, etc., under proper authority, 392.
of one government, cannot be taxed by the other, 58, 392.
taxation of county, 144.
OFFICIAL ACTION —
necessity for, in tax cases, 184.
(See Offices.)
by persons irregularly claiming office, 184-191.
cannot be required of those no longer officers, 523.
liability for,
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
by usurpers,
(See Usurpers.)
OFFCIAL AUTHORITY—
protection by,
(See Process.)
excess of,
(See Jurisdiction.)
LAW OF TAXATION.
OFFICIAL BOND —
of collector may be valid though not in compliance with statute, 499.
or not required by statute, 499.
liability of sureties upon, 500-504.
(See Collector of Taxes.)
OFFICIAL OATH —
neglect to take, does not create personal liability, 553.
does not preclude one being officer de facto, 186.
reliance upon for protection of the public, 513.
OFFICIAL RETURNS —
conclusiveness of, 195.
liability for false, 196.
of failure to collect tax, 307, 359.
what should be shown by, 308.
disproving, 359.
OFFSET—
of damages against special assessment, 420.
of rents and profits against redemption moneys, 365.
(See Set Off.)
OHIO —
exemptions of property from taxation in, 142.
constitutional provisions bearing upon special assessments, 443.
payment of special assessments in, 467.
OMISSIONS —
of property from tax roll, when may be corrected by mandamus, 520.
accidental, will not vitiate the whole tax, 155.
caused by error of law, 156.
unlawful, if purposely made, vitiate tax, 153.
are not mere irregularities, 553.
ONUS OF PROOF —
purchaser must take, when tax title is in question, 326-329, 353-355.
change of this rule by statute, 355-357.
(See Presumption ; Tax Deed.;
OPENING STREETS —
special assessments for, 420, 421.
offsetting benefits against damages in case of, 420.
principles governing proceedings in, 421.
(See Assessments, Local.)
OPINIONS —
(See Judicial Officers.)
OPPRESSIVE TAXES—
(See Political Remedies.)
IKDEX.
ORDER —
preservation of, is a state duty, 476.
municipalities may be compelled to tax for, 476, 477.
and to make compensation for losses by riots, 480.
ORDERING SALE FOR TAXES—
(See JUDGMENT FOR TAXES.)
ORDERING TAX LEVY —
(See Judgment ; Compulsory Local Taxation.)
ORDERLY PROCEEDINGS—
are essential in taxation, 2.
ORDINANCES—
for special assessments, instances of, 464, 465.
(See Municipal Corporations.)
OREGON —
constitutional provisions in, bearing upon special assessments, 443.
taxation of property in, must be by value, 435.
ORES —
assessment of, for taxation, 859.
ORGANIZATION —
of school districts, delay in questioning, 530. "
estoppel in case of, 549.
defective, unlawful tax in case of, 553.
OVERFLOW —
of streams, assessments for prevention of, 437.
(See Levees.)
OVERLYING DISTRICTS —
for the purposes of state buildings, 114-117.
in street cases, 117.
(See Assessments, Local.)
in the case of general city taxation, 118-120.
(See Rural Lands.)
OWNER —
when land to be assessed to, 276-279.
assessments of lands when unknown, 277, 278.
effect of consent to assessment in wrong list, 277.
former, assessment to, 278.
transferring title after assessment, 278.
when wife is, lands not to be assessed to husband, 278.
assessment to one of several, 278.
mistake Ln not assessing to, 278.
assessments to persons unknown, 279.
when must petition for local assessment, 464.
personal liability of, for assessments, 470-473.
(See Assessments, Local.)
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OWNER — continued.
recovering lands may be required to pay for betterments, 371, 372.
losing title by adverse possession,
(See Limitation, Statutes of.)
who is, for purposes of redemption, 366.
P.
PACKAGES—
imported, when they become taxable by states, 62.
PAPERS AND BOOKS —
(See Amendments ; Records.)
PARCELS OF LAND —
separate, must be separately assessed, 279, 280.
failure, renders assessment void, 279.
reason for this, 280.
whether grouping is a mere irregularity, 279, 280.
what are, 281, 282.
case of lots occupied together, 282.
water rights not to be assessed separate from the land, 282.
must be separately valued, 287.
and separately sold, 341-343.
must not be divided in assessment, 282.
dividing for sale when tax on part is paid, 341.
(See Tenant in Common.)
erroneous descriptions of, avoid tax, 558.
(See Description.)
PARKS —
taxation for, 93.
(See Compulsory Local Taxation.)
PAROL EVIDENCE —
to show vote of a school tax, 248.
to provo lost records, 248, 249.
(See Evidence.)
PART LEGAL —
(See Tax Part Legal.)
PARTIALITY —
in tax laws, 128.
in customs duties,
(See Protection.)
in assessments,
(See Invidious Assessments.)
in exemptions,
(See Exemptions.)
INDEX. 679
PARTIES —
(See Joint Complaint; Relator.)
PARTNERSHIP -
taxation of members severally, 271.
assessment of lands of, 282.
PASSAGE—
from one state to another, right of, 59,
PASSENGERS —
taxation on carriage of, when in violation of federal constitution, 59, 63.
taxation of carriers of, 388.
PATENT—
description of land by, in assessment, 282, 287.
PATENTED PAVEMENT —
taxation for, 173.
PAUPERISM —
taxation in relief of, 88, 89.
PAVING STREETS—
assessments for the purpose of, 421.
for repaying, 422.
(See Assessments, Local.)
PAYMENT OF MUNICIPAL DEBTS —
compelling tax for, by mandamus, 524-526.
levy of tax for, under state compulsion, 479.
PAYMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT—
taxation for, 102.
PAYMENT OF TAX—
demand of, before levy of distress, 304.
extinguishes authority to sell, 322.
by one part owner, 341.
whether it can be shown to defeat judgment, 362.
requirement of, as condition to recovery of land, 372.
in what cases this is not admissible, 374, 375.
requirement of, as condition to maintaining suit, 319, 320.
in license cases, as condition of doing business, 385, 386.
in labor, is of right when the law permits it
,
541.
if tax illegal, the law affords adequate remedy, 538, 542, 545.
if voluntary, no remedy against town, etc., though tax is illegal, 565.
what is voluntary payment, 567.
all not made under protest or apparent compulsion of process, 568.
what is involuntary payment, 569.
(See Voluntary Payment.)
recovering back, where tax is only part illegal, 571.
PAYMENT, OVER —
by collector, before town can be liable, 565.
whether collector afterwards liable. 563.
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PAYMENT, OVER — «ontinued.
compulsory proceedings against collector to enforce,
(See Collector of Taxes.)
PEACE. BILLS OF —
(See Quieting Title.)
PEACE, PRESERVATION OF —
is a state duty, 476, 477.
PEACEFUL REMEDY —
by not yielding to illegal demands, 558.
PEDDLERS —
taxation of, 390.
PENALTIES —
for delinquency in payment of taxes, 309-315.
for frauds, evasions, etc., 309.
under federal revenue laws, 309.
now imposed, 310.
forfeiting right to appeal, etc., 311-313.
whether they may be imposed without judicial investigation, 313-315.
imposed on redemption, 314, 315.
for nonperformance of official duty, 513.
for failure to list property for taxation, 141, 261-263.
(See Tax Payers' Lists.)
construction of laws which impose, 208, 262, 263.
PENSIONS —
taxation for, 74.
PEOPLE —
voting taxes by,
(See Voting the Tax.)
assent of, to taxes, 44-48, 178, 474-495.
PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES —
(See Representation.)
PERMANENCE IN LEGISLATION —
importance of, to equal taxation, 174.
PERMANENT IMPROVEMENTS —
(See Betterments.)
PERNICIOUS EMPLOYMENTS—
propriety of discriminating against, 396.
taxation in regulation and restraint of, 304-307.
(See Police Power.)
PERSON —
corporation considered as being, for purposes of an appeal, 529.
application of the word to corporations generally, 273.
PERSONAL ALLEGIANCE —
has no necessary connection with right to tax, 15.
(See Nonresident.)
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PERSONAL LIABILITY—
of residents for taxes, 269-272, 277.
depends upon domicile, 269.
in case of trusts, 271.
in case of partnerships, 271.
in case of private banker, 271.
in cases of discretionary authority,
(See Discretionary Action.)
of purchasers of land for taxes previously assessed, 303.
of owners of land for special assessments, 470-473.
of officers for false return, 196.
of officers for neglect of duty, 513.
of assessors, 549-557.
(See Assessors.)
of judicial officers generally, 549-551, 556, 557.
(See Judicial Officers.)
of supervisors, 557.
(See Supervisor.)
of collector, 559-565.
(See Collector of Taxes.)
of collector of the customs,
(See Collector of the Customs.)
PERSONAL PROPERTY—
within the state may be taxed, though the owner is a nonresident, 15, 64,
270.
bonds, etc., held abroad, not taxable in state, 15, 16.
taxation of, by value, 26-30.
inquisitorial proceedings necessary to, 26.
temptations held out to fraud, 28.
injustice of, in many cases, 28.
leads to duplicate taxation, 28.
large official force required for, 28, 29.
reaches but small part of property, 29.
is to be taxed where the owner resides, 269-271.
held in trust, where taxable, 271, 539, 571.
belonging to estate of deceased person, where taxable, 270.
distress and sale of, for taxes, 301.
must be proper legal process for, 301, 302.
may be constitutionally authorized, 302.
taking away dilatory remedies in case of, 302, 308.
demand of tax to be first made, 304.
notice of sale, etc., 304.
necessity for strict compliance with statute, 304.
liability of officer in case of abuse, 304, 563.
(See Trespasser ah initio.).
to be exhausted before lands are sold, 307.
official evidence of that fact, 307, 308.
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PERSONAL PROPERTY — continued.
levy upou for tax, is prima facie satisfaction, 543, 544.
not generally assessed for local works, 457, 458.
cannot be excused from taxation without authority of law, 154.
taxes upon, will not generally be restrained, 538.
except in cases of fraud, 538, 539.
the legal remedy generally adequate, 538, 539.
the rule applies to a personal tax assessed in respect of lands, 512.
illegal tax on, may be recovered back, 571.
unlawfully taken, may be recovered by replevin, 572, 573.
case of bouse owned by one on land of another, 275.
assessment of railroad properly as, 150.
of corporations should be assessed at the place of the business office, 273.
PETITION —
for local improvement, sometimes required, 465.
to state for refunding of illegal tax, 566.
for license, will preclude recovery back of license fees, 566.
PHYSICIANS—
taxation of, 388, 389, 394.
PLANKING —
of streets, special assessments for, 421.
(See Assessments, Local.)
PLANKROADS —
existence of, in city streets, will not preclude special assessments for Im
proving, 462.
POLICE —
compulsory local taxation for, 576, 577.
regulation of, is a state duty, 576, 577.
POLICE POWER —
levying burdens under, to discourage certain trades, etc., 11.
this proper in case of pernicious employments, 396.
taxation for regulation and restraint under the, 396-415.
this distinguished from taxation generally, 396.
case of highway labor, 396.
case of sidewalk assessments, 398-401.
case of levee assessments, 401, 402.
case of drain taxes, 402.
other cases, 403.
license fees under, 403, 404.
sometimes have restriction in view, 404, 405.
what a license is, 404, 405.
grant of, 408.
fees, when a tax, 408-410.
what may be licensed under, 410.
employments generally, 410.
marriages, 411.
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POLICE POWER— continued.
what may be licensed under — continued.
amusements, 411.
lotteries, 411.
games of hazard, etc., 411.
keeping of dogs, 412.
what occupations usually licensed, 412, 413.
discriminations in, not unlawful, 412.
case of inspection fees, 413.
issuing the license, 413.
right of applicant to license if he complies with conditions, 413.
recalling license, 414.
whether fee must be returned on, 414.
collection of license fees, 414.
state regulations not interfered with by federal licenses, 414, 415.
POLICY—
must govern in determining suffrage, 45.
must always be had in view in taxation, 9.
discriminations in taxation from considerations of, 396-398.
(See Protection.)
of special assessments, 428, 429.
maxims of, in taxation, 6-8.
1. that each ought to be taxed in proportion to his revenue, 6.
2. that the tax, as to time, manner and sum, ought to be certain and
not arbitrary, 6.
3. that the tax ought to be levied in the time and manner most con
venient to the contributor, 6.
4. that it ought to take and keep from the people as little as possible
beyond what it brings to the public treasury, 7.
5. that the heaviest taxes should be imposed on prejudicial commodi
ties, 396.
(See Purlic Policy.)
POLITICAL ACTION —
when it exhausts the power to tax, 256.
cannot be controlled by the comts, 247-249.
not to be reviewed on certiorari, 531.
cannot be enjoined, 540.
POLITICAL DUTIES—
performance of, cannot be enforced by mandamus, 519.
POLITICAL ECONOMY —
rules of, which should govern in taxation, 6-8, 396.
(See Policy.)
POLITICAL REMEDIES —
in case of abuse of legislative power, 4, 71.
redress of wrongs in taxation by, 155.
these often the only redress, 575.
reasons why they are of little value in some cases, 485, 512, 513.
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POLLS, TAXES BY —
not a common resort, 18.
not often just or politic, 18.
in labor, 12, 397.
can only be levied on residents, 269.
POOR —
taxes in aid of,
(See Charity.)
POOR HOUSES —
presumptively exempt from taxation,
(See Purlic Property.)
POPULAR ASSEMBLAGES—
voting taxes by, 245-250.
(See Voting the Tax.)
POPULARITY —
not to be expected for tax laws, 612, 513.
POSSESSION —
presumptions arising from, as affecting titles, 329, 332.
may support a title under which possession has been held, 329, 330.
cannot support a title where no possession has been held, 330-332.
limitation of time to bring suits in case of, 376-382.
(See Limitation, Statutes of.)
constructive, in case of vacant tenement, 379-381.
who to be considered the true owner, 558, 559.
betterments made during, recovery of value of, 271, 272.
removing cloud on title in case of, 542-544.
(See Cloud upon Title.)
quieting title in case of, 544, 545.
(See Quieting Title.)
of personalty, trying right to,
(See Replevin.)
rights by, may be taxed, 60.
POSSESSORY RIGHT —
on the public lands, may be taxed, 60, 275.
purchaser of, at sheriff's sale may redeem, 366.
(See Occupant.)
POSTAL SERVICE—
charges for, not considered taxes, 30.
POSTPONEMENT—
of tax sale, 338.
of time for collecting taxes, 502, 503.
POWER —
abuse of, derives no sanction from time, 94.
' liability of to abuse, is no argument against existence of, 212.
to sell for taxes, is terminated by payment, 822.
or by tender, 323.
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POWER— continued.
to sell, must be express, 324.
must be strictly executed, 323-326.
compliance with must be affirmatively shown, 326-329.
to tax, exists in every sovereignty, 3.
extent of, 11, 41, 56.
nature of, 32-40.
exhausting, 256.
limitations upon, 41-66.
for local purposes, must be strictly construed, 209-211.
for special assessments, must be express, 418.
and be strictly executed, 418.
to tax business, construction of, 387.
to levy police taxes, 396-398, 408.
to divest one of his estate, must be strictly pursued, 217.
to license, when permissory, 412,
weight of custom in construction of, 39, 397.
(See Taxing Power.)
arbitrary, in taxation, does not exist, 68.
POWER OF POLICE —
(See Police ; Police Power.)
PRACTICE —
(See Custom.)
PRACTITIONERS—
of law and medicine, taxation of, 388, 389.
PREFERENCE —
of occupations in taxation, 10, 25, 74, 396.
PRELIMINARY ACTION —
in laying taxes, cannot be enjoined, 548.
leading to tax sales, necessity that it shall comply with statute, 323, 324.
PREMATURE SALE —
by collector, liability in case of, 563.
PRESUMPTION —
against duplicate taxation, 165.
force of this, in construction of statutes, 165-171.
that apportionment is just, 179.
in support of tax titles, 329.
can aid in case of possession under the title, 330.
cannot aid where possession is held against the title, 330-332.
cannot supply the want of a record, 332.
in favor of the purposes for which taxes are laid, 69.
in favor of joint official action, 194.
in favor of action of persons assuming to be officers, 189.
that assessment is properly made to person unknown, 279.
that process fair on its face is lawful, 561.
(See Process.)
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PRICE —
at tax sale must be paid down, 344.
inadequacy of, will not defeat sale, 345.
valuing, for the purposes of taxation, 287-289.
PRIMA FACIE RIGHT —
to lands, will constitute cloud upon title, 543.
(See Cloud upon Title.)
PRIMARY SCHOOLS —
(See Education ; School Districts.)
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT —
(See Agent.)
PRINCIPLES —
of apportioning taxes, 16, 17.
of constitutional protection,
(See Constitutional Principles.)
underlying special assessments, 416, 417.
(See Assessments, Local.)
liability of to erroneous application, does not invalidate, 417.
of representative government, protect the right of local taxation, 493-405.
of equity,
(See Maxims.)
PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION —
that taxes must be regular and orderly, 2.
apportioned by some uniform ratio of equality, 2, 104.
each person contributing in proportion to his revenue, 6.
the tax as to time, sum and manner of payment to be certain, 6.
to be levied at the time and in the manner most convenient for pay
ment, 6.
to take from the people as little as possible over what is brought to
the treasury, 7.
that taxes should bear some proportion to what government protects, 14.
should be laid by the people's representatives, 32, 44, 244.
who must select the subjects of taxation, 130, 144.
and ought to select for the heaviest taxes prejudicial commodities,
396.
that taxes must be laid according to the law of the land, 36.
only to provide for public necessities, 41.
and for the public good, 42.
and for public purposes, 42, 89.
which the legislature must declare, 67.
and only within the jurisdiction of the government laying them, 42.
that the sovereignty is not to delegate its power, 48.
nor bargain it away, 52, 53.
and can only act through officers, 184.
that one sovereignty is not to tax another, 56.
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PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION— continued.
that revenue laws are not to be strained by construction, 199-208.
that in collection private convenience must yield to public necessity, 298
404, 536, 572.
but leaving every man a remedy in the law, 265, 527.
that the law favors the efforts of the citizen to preserve his estate from
forfeiture, 363.
that it allows moral obligations to be recognized in taxation, 91.
and justifies special burdens in return for special benefits, 416.
and leaves local communities to regulate concerns that are exclusive
ly their own, 474, 483, 493.
,'RIVATE CORPORATIONS —
protection of charters of,
(See Charter ; Corporations ; Franchise.)
organized for charity, etc., may be aided by the government, 86.
PRIVATE ENTERPRISES —
taxes cannot be laid in aid of, 78-80.
the rule applied to manufacturing corporations, 78-80.
employment of the eminent domain in aid of, 78-82.
PRIVATE PURPOSES —
taxation must not be for, 67-69.
but pensions, bounties, etc., may be paid, 74.
(See Purposes of Taxation.)
discrimations for protection,
(See Protection.)
PRIVATE RIGHTS—
(See Constitutional Principles.)
PRIVATE SCHOOLS —
taxation in aid of, 86, 87. ,
PRIVATE WAYS —
taking land for, 76.
taxation for, is inadmissible, 77.
effect of existence of, in case of local assessment, 452.
PRIVATE WRONGS —
misuse of corporate powers may constitute, 548, 549.
injunction in such case, 549.
redress of, in tax cases,
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxatiow.)
PRIVILEGES —
taxes on, 385, 386.
usually confined to employments which are exceptional, 385.
are usually collected in the form of license fees, 385.
when failure to pay tax may render the business illegal, 385.
taxing successions as, 392.
keeping billiard tables, may be, 392.
of citizens of other states must not be abridged in taxation, 64.
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PRIVILEGES — continued.
taxation of property or business in the state does not abridge, 64.
unless it discriminates against them, 64.
different modes of procedure in taxation do not abridge, 64.
nor requiring foreign corporations to submit to special conditions, 65.
PROCEEDINGS —
in assessing lands for taxation,
(See Assessment.)
in the levy of special assessments,
(See Assessments, Local.)
irregular, correction of by amendment,
(See Amendments.)
correction of, by statute,
(See Ccrative Laws.)
correction of, by judicial action,
(See Judicial Corrections.)
correction of, by reassessments,
(See Reassessments.)
to compel performance of official duty,
(See Mandamus.)
dilatory, in tax cases, statutes to prevent, 507, 508, 536, 572.
PROCESS —
if on its face apparently valid, will protect officer executing it
,
559-561.
importance of this rule, 560.
does not protect officer against corsequencesof hisown illegalities, 551.
protects collector, though a party is unlawfully taxed, 561.
or though the tax was not lawfully voted, 561.
or though the party arrested had been discharged in bankruptcy,
561.
rule in Vermont, 561.
what is not fair on its face, 562.
tax roll is not, if certificate atttached is not valid, 562.
or if the warrant shows that an illegal tax is included, 562.
or if an affidavit attached appears to have been made prematurely, 562.
or if the warrant does not emanate from the proper officer, 562.
defects which do not vitiate, 562.
building up title upon, 563.
abuse of authority under, 304, 563.
(See
Trespasser Ar Initio.)
Tor collection of tax from personalty,
(See Distress of Goods.)
to compel performance of official duty,
(See Mandamus.)
in the c:ise of illegal taxation,
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxattow.)
summary, against collectors, 504-511.
(See Collector of Taxes.)
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PRODUCTION —
taxation of land by, 18.
PROFESSIONS —
taxation of, 388, 389, 394.
PROFITS —
apportionment of taxes by, 384, 385.
taxes on, 392. ,
meaning of, 160.
(See Income.)
PROHIBITION —
of importation, by excessive duties, 10.
of occupations not licensed, 385.
the licensed occupations are privileges, 385, 386, 392.
of occupations under the police power, 403, 404.
taxes should not go to extent of, 10, 408.
PROHIBITION OF REMEDIES —
(See Injunction ; Replevin.)
PROHIBITIONS ON THE STATES —
not to impair the obligation of contracts in taxing, 52-55, 65.
not to tax the agencies of government, 56-61.
or commerce regulated by congress, 61-64.
not to tax imports or exports without consent of congress, 61.
not to levy duties of tonnage, 61.
not to abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens, 64, 65.
(See Constitutional Principles; Limitations on the Taxing
Power.)
PROHIBITORY LIQUOR LAW—
does not preclude taxation of liquors, 406.
PROMISE—
town vote to refund illegal taxes, when it amounts to a, 553.
(See Nudum Pactum.)
PROOF —
of giving notices, should recite the manner in which they were given, 248.
general averment of legality not sufficient, 248.
sufficient if it complies with statutory form, 337.
strictness required in making, 338.
of tax proceedings must be made by the record, 247.
(See Record.)
of right to redeem, need not be presented, 367.
onus of, in case of tax sale,
(See Sale of Lands for Taxes.)
of legal existence of a school district, 554.
of tax proceedings, in order to justify the collector, 561.
44
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PROPERTY —
is a creature of the law, 17.
constitutional protection to,
(See Law of the Land.)
taxation of, by value, 26-30, 61, 175.
difficultes of this, in case of personalty, 26-30.
generally regarded equitable and just, 445.
local levies upon, 416.
principles supporting these levies, 417.
public, not to be taxed, 56-59.
(See Purlic Property.)
taxable, what is understood by, 130, 210, 272.
of private corporations may be taxed, though the franchise is taxed, 170.
(See Corporations.)
impossibility of avoiding duplicate burdens on, 158-163.
(See
Duplicate Taxation.)
of municipal corporations, constitutional protection to, 493-405.
assessment of, for taxation, 253-291.
(See Assessment.)
distress and sale of, for taxes, 301-304.
(See Distress of Goods —
collection of tax by detention of, 305.
sale of real, for taxes, 305, 322-361.
(See Sale of Lands for Taxes.)
redemption of, from tax sales, 363-370.
(See Redemption.)
taxation of, does not preclude taxation of business, 389.
levies upou, for purposes of regulation, 396-415.
(See Police Power.)
recovery of, after sale for taxes, 371-383.
destroyed by rioters, compensation for, 480.
apportionment of, on division of municipality, 479, 481.
PROPRIETORS —
of wet lands, assessments upon for draining, 402, 423.
(See Adjacent Proprietors; Owners.)
PROTECTION —
and taxation, are reciprocal, 2,14.
right of the people to, entitles government to tax, 14, 406.
value of, to life and liberty, cannot be estimated, 16.
attempts to apportion tsxes by value of, 16, 17.
against calamities, taxation for, 102, 401, 427.
of property, by constitutional principles,
(See Law of the Land.)
ugainst oppressive taxation,
(See Political Remedies; Principles of Taxation.)
against pernicious occupations, etc., by discriminating fees, etc., 396.
(See Police Power.)
INDEX.
PROSPECTIVE ACTION —
statutes are to have, unless the contrary intent appears, 221, 222.
the principle applied to tax laws, 222.
PROTECTIVE DUTIES—
are levied in some cases, 10, 25, 74.
PROTECTIVE HEALING ACTS —
right of the state to pass, 232.
instances of, 232-234.
(See Curative Laws.)
PROTEST —
when neglect to make, will preclude complaining of a tax, 573.
illegal tax, paid without, cannot be recovered back, 567, 568.
PUBLIC BUILDINGS—
special taxation for, 115, 419.
compulsory local taxation for, 477, 484, 490.
(See Compulsory Local Taxation.)
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS —
(See Municipal Corporations.)
PUBLIC DEBT—
taxation for payment of, 102.
of municipalities, compulsory taxation for, 479.
mandamus to compel levies for, 524, 526.
(See Dert, Purlic.)
PUBLIC DOMAIN —
not taxable by the states, 59, 60.
possessory rights on, may be taxed, 60.
(See Reservation.)
PUBLIC GOOD —
taxes must be laid for the, 42.
questions of, must be determined by the legislature, 42.
(See Policy.)
PUBLIC GROUNDS —
are presumptively exempt from taxation, 130, 131.
may be assessed for local improvements, 458, 459.
PUBLIC HEALTH —
(See Health.)
PUBLIC INSTRUCTION —
(See Education; Schools.)
PUBLIC LANDS—
(See Purlic Domain.)
PUBLIC MONEYS—
treasurer liable for safe keeping of, 501.
impolicy in accumulations of, 8, 9.
misappropriation of, 572.
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PUBLIC NECESSITY—
(See Necessity.)
PUBLIC POLICY —
forbids officer who sells being purchaser, 341.
favors redemption, 363.
maxims of, in the levy of taxes, 6-8, 396.
(See Policy.)
exemptions based on considerations of,
(See Exemptions.)
PUBLIC PROPERTY —
of the United States, not taxable, 59, 60.
of the stste and its municipalities, is presumptively excepted from tax
laws, 130-132.
may be assessed for local improvements, 468, 459.
assessed and sold by mistake, 574.
PUBLIC PURPOSES —
taxes must be laid for, 42, 67.
what are, 67-103.
general meaning of the term, 76.
must pertain to the district taxed, 104-123.
(See Purposes of Taxation.)
PUBLIC SCHOOLS —
taxation for, 85-87.
(See Education.)
PUBLIC SECURITIES —
are not taxable by the states, 58.
of the states and their municipalites. taxation of, 66.
investing capital of corporation in, does not preclude taxation of fran
chise, 58.
PUBLIC SQUARE —
taxation for, 93.
PUBLIC USES —
taking property for, 75-80, 420, 421.
(See Eminent Domain.)
what will justify taxation, 67-103.
(See Purposes of Taxation.)
PUBLIC VENDUE —
tax sale at, 344.
PUBLIC WORSHIP—
taxes cannot be levied for purposes of, 83, 84.
houses of,
(See Churches.)
PUBLIC WRONGS —
in the case of illegal corporate action, 548.
INDEX.
PUBLIC WRONGS— continued.
in the misapplication of public moneys, 572.
correction of, by political action,
(See Political Remedies.)
correction of, bymandamus,
(See Mandamus.)
PUBLICATION —
(See Notice.)
PUNISHMENT —
(See Forfeitures ; Penalties.)
PURCHASER —
by executory contract, may redeem, 367.
subject to assessments, may contest them, 446.
may be made personally liable for tax on lands bought, 303.
must take title subject to right to reassess taxes, 233.
(See Bona Fide Purchaser.)
at tax sale,
(See Sale of Lands for Taxes.) '
PURCHASER AT TAX SALE —
who may not be, 341, 345-351.
the officer who sells, 341.
a tenant bound to pay taxes, 345.
mortgagor in possession, 345.
any one whose duty it was to pay taxes, 346.
or to pay any part thereof, 346, 347.
the agent of the owner, 347.
whether the mortgagee may, 347, 348.
or an adverse claimant, 348-351.
must take the risk of the title,
(See Caveat Emptor.)
may have mandamus to compel issue of certificate, 522.
or of deed, 522.
may be compelled to assign on redemption, 367.
right of, to redeem from prior sales, 364.
notice by, to owner of land purchased, 365, 366.
cannot be compelled to accept redemption of undivided interest, 367.
frauds of, in redemption may be relieved against, 367.
right of, cannot be acquired by stranger, 367.
may accept redemption without strict compliance with the statute, 3(
cannot add to conditions of redemption, 369.
time to redeem from, cannot be enlarged, 369, 370.
PURPOSES OF TAXATION —
what are admissible, 67-103.
legislature must decide upon, 67.
decision not absolutely conclusive, 67, 68.
must determine extent of taxation, 69.
limits of judicial authority in deciding upon, 67-69.
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PURPOSES OF TAXATION— continued.
how affected by the grade of government, 71, 72.
general expenses of government, 73.
purposes in general, 76.
will not embrace private business enterprises, 76-79, 90.
—
general enumeration of, 81-83.
religious instruction, 83, 84.
secular instruction, 84-88.
public charity, 89, 90.
moral obligations, 91.
amusements and celebrations, 92, 93.
highways and roads, 94-96.
canals, railroads, etc., 97.
municipal purposes, 98, 99.
military bounties, 99-101.
the public health, 101, 423-427.
protection against calamities, 102, 427.
payment of the public debt, 102.
interest need not be exclusively public, 102, 103.
% for what the municipalities may be compelled to tax, 476-480.
for what they cannot be, 482-495.
must pertain to the districts taxed, 104-123.
Q.
QUALIFYING -
by officer, proof by parol of, 192.
effect of failure in, 185, 186.
QUESTIONING OFFICAL TITLE —
in case of usurpers, 186, 187.
in oase of officer defacto, 187-189, 574.
QUIETING TITLE—
bill may be filed for, by claimant of lands in possession, 544.
whether this maybe done in case of procedings void on their face, 544,545
cannot be done by one not in possession against one who is, 545.
'
QUO WARRANTO —
against officers de facto, 187-189.
for usurpation of corporate powers, 574.
by state to restrain unlawful taxation, 574.
not adapted to the redress of individual wrongs, 574.
R.
RAILROAD COMPANIES —
may be taxed, though made use of by government, 60.
exception of the Union Pacific, 60, 61.
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RAILROAD COMPANIES— continued.
caanot be taxed on freight carried from state to state, 63.
nor on the use of locomotives and cars run from state to state, 63.
may be taxed on locomotives as property, 63.
cannot be taxed on their bonds held by nonresidents, 65.
valuation of franchises of, for taxation, 135-137.
specific tax on, precludes taxation of property, 150.
but not of branch road for gravel, 150.
construction of exemption from taxation in charters, 150, 151, 152, 171, 172.
general exemption from taxation, whether applicable, to municipal taxa
tion, 149, 151.
effect of consolidation of, upon taxation, 151.
exemption from taxation of property " necessarily used," etc., 151, 152.
whether general exemption will apply to machine shops, etc., 152.
specific tax on, held to exclude tax on shares, 166.
value of property in, is included in tax on shares, 167.
tax on interest paid by, is a tax on the creditor, 169.
may be taxed on franchise, and also on property, 170.
exemption of property from taxation, held to exempt franchise also, 171.
tax on capital stock, held to exempt the franchise, 171.
may stipulate in the charter to pay the state a proportion of earnings, 172.
shares in, owned by resident, whether to be regarded as personal prop
erty, " within " a city, 210.
rolling stock of, where to be assessed, 273.
whether to be treated as real or personal, 273, 274.
property of, may be taxed as personal, if statute so provides, 274.
districts for taxation of, 274.
personalty of, should be assessed at the place of the business office, 273.
track of, cannot be assessed as nonresident lands, 274.
property of, is subject to special assessments, 456.
but only with reference to special benefits, 456, 457.
easement of, in a street, does not preclude special assessments, 462.
assessment of property as personal, 150.
(See Corporations.)
RAILROADS—
state may tax for constructing, 65.
taxation in aid of construction, 65-67.
(See Railroad Companies.)
RAILWAYS, STREET —
(See Street Railways.)
RATES —
exemption from, how construed, 148.
for construction of sewers, 426.
(See Water Rates.)
RATIFICATION —
by town of illegal action by the collector, 570.
by statute, of previous action taken by towns, etc., 100, 101.
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REAL ESTATE—
taxing by the production, 18.
impolicy of this, 18.
taxation by rents, 18.
taxation by value, 18, 19, 26-30.
why this is preferable to taxation of personalty, 26-30.
assessment of, for taxation, 275-286.
discrimination between seated and unseated, 276-279.
how to be described in assessment, 281-286.
valuation of, for taxation, 287-289.
sale of, for taxes, 305-309, 322-362.
(See Sale of Lands for Taxes.)
forfeiture of, for taxes, 315-321.
(See Forfeitures.)
redemption of, from tax sales, 363-370.
(See Redemption.)
recovery of, by tax purchaser, 371-383.
(See Recovery of Lands Sold for Taxes.)
special assessments upon,
(See Assessments, Local.)
outside a taxing district, whether may be taxed within it
,
(See Extra Territorial Taxation.)
what taxation of, out of the district, is irregular merely, 528, 529.
tax upon, when it may be enjoined, 542.
(See Injunction.)
cloud upon title may be removed in equity, 542.
(See Cloud upon Title.)
quieting title to, 544.
(See Quieting Title.)
joinder of complaints in case of illegal taxation of, 545-547.
(See Joint Complaints.)
equity not the proper tribunal for trying titles to, 545.
right of claimant in possession, to jury trial of his claim, 545.
improvements upon,
(See Betterments ; Improvements.)
personal liability for taxes and assessments upon,
(See Personal Liarility.)
acquiring right to, by adverse possession,
(See Adverse Possession ; Limitation, Statutes of.)
judicial sales for taxes, 357-362.
REAPPORTIONMENT —
of cost of road in several I owns, 478.
of debts among municipalities, 455.
REASSESSMENTS —
curing defects in taxation by, 232.
may be authorized by general or special law, 232.
cases of hardship after change in title, 233, 234.
may be authorized where tax was laid without authority of law, 233.
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REASSESSMENTS — continued.
may be ordered to correct neglect of apportionment, etc., 233.
judgment against a tax does not preclude a reassessment, 233.
may be had in case of local taxes, 233.
authority to make, may be reason for setting aside irregular levies, 535.
REBELLION —
collection of internal revenue during the, 181.
collection of direct land tax during the, 181*
(See Civil War.)
RECALLING LICENSES—
power of, 414.
whether fees must be returned on, 414.
RECEIPT—
for taxes, is evidence of payment, 323.
RECIPROCITY—
of duty as between the tax payer and the state, 14.
RECLAMATION OF LANDS —
(See Drains.)
RECITALS—
in process, how they may affect its validity as a protection, 562.
in tax deeds, 344, 353, 362.
corrections in, by amendment, 334-343.
(See Amendments.)
what necessary to show jurisdiction of court, 358, 359.
in judgments for taxes, 362.
in case of summary proceedings against collectors, 509, 510.
RECORDS—
amendment of defects in, 234-243.
(See Amendments.)
purchaser of lands is supposed to examine, 232, 233.
tax purchaser must take notice of, 572.
(See Caveat Emptor.)
levy of taxes must appear by, 247, 248.
assessors may rely upon votes appearing by, 248.
secondary evidence of, when lost, 248.
want of, cannot be supplied by presumption, 332.
of tax judgment, 361, 362.
reviewing defects in, on certiorari, 830.
(See Certiorari.)
fatal defects on face of, will preclude tax being cloud on the title, 548.
protection of assessors by, 554.
tax payer must take notice of defects in, 567.
of sale, are better evidence than the certificates, 352.
RECOVERY OF LANDS SOLD FOR TAXES —
general remedy by ejectment, 371.
special rules sometimes provided, 371.
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RECOVERY OF LANDS SOLD FOR TAXES — continued.
payment for betterments as a condition, 371, 372.
payment of taxes, whether may be required, H72-375.
may be if tax is legal, 374.
not if it were illegal, 375.
short limitation acts for, 376.
construction of that of Pennsylvania, 377.
of that of Wisconsin, 378.
adverse possession under, 378-382.
" color " or " claim " of title, 382, 383.
" true owner " iu case of, 558, 559.
equity not the proper tribunal for, 545.
right to jury trial when suit is brought for, 545.
RECOVERY FOR TAXES ILLEGALLY COLLECTED —
cannot be had if tax merely irregular, 531, 565.
may be had against assessors who have acted without jurisdiction, 553.
or against collector whose process is void, 562.
or if he makes himself trespasser ab initio, 564.
but not after moneys paid over by him, 563.
may be had against collector of customs, 564, 565.
may be had against town, county, etc., 565.
what are the conditions to such recovery, 565.
the suit must be for money actually paid over, 566.
it can only be for void taxes, 565, 566.
and only for what the municipality has received for its own use, 566.
cannot be had for taxes voluntarily paid, 565, 566.
even though the levy was unconstitutional, 566.
immaterial that the party did not know his legal rights, 567.
what are voluntary payments, 568.
not those made under protest, 568.
or to relieve goods from seizure, 568.
or under compulsion of process, 569.
will be limited to money received, 570.
demand not necessary before suit, 571.
what interest recoverable on, 571.
from the state, must be obtained by legislation, 566.
(See Refunding.)
REDEMPTION —
is favored by the policy of the law, 363.,
statutes for, are liberally construed, 363.
is a statutory light, 364.
courts cannot give where the statutes do not, 364.
pendency of civil war does not enlarge time for, 364.
cases of minors, etc., sometimes specially provided for, 364.
statutory provisions for foreclosing, 364, 365.
necessity that these be strictly observed, 364, 365.
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REDEMPTION — «ontinued.
who entitled to make, 365-367.
purchaser by executory contract, 367.
tenant in common, 365, 367.
original owner, though there is a tax title, 366.
wife, having a homestead right, 366.
lien creditor, 366.
purchaser at sheriffs sale, 366.
dowress, 366.
husband, of the wife's lands, 366.
mortgagee or his assignee, 366, 367.
not a mere stranger, 367.
relief in cases of accident or fraud, 367, 368.
can be none against the party's own mistakes, 364, 367, 368.
purchaser may accept, waiving conditions, 368.
purchaser or officer cannot impose conditions on, 369.
legislature cannot enlarge time for, after sale, 369, 370.
whether it may shorten time, 370.
no new title acquired by making, 368.
right of one who makes to compel assignment to himself, 367.
REFUNDING—
by the state, of illegal taxes, 498, 530, 566.
by municipalities, of taxes collected for their use, 530.
officers have no general authority for, 530, 568.
when may be compelled by mandamus, 520.
REFUSAL —
to assess a person, who loses right to vote in consequence, 553.
of auditing boards to allow claims, may be corrected by mandamus, 515-
517.
to perform official duty, how corrected,
(Sec Mandamus.)
to levy tax to pay judgment, etc., 524-526.
of municipalities to perform state duties, 476-481.
to perform political duties,
(See Political Duties.)
REGRADING—
of streets, taxation for, 422, 423.
REGULARITY—
of tax sales must be shown by purchaser, 326-329.
(See Sale of Land for Taxes.)
want of, when may be corrected by statute,
(See Curative Laws.)
correcting, record to show,
(See Amendments.)
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REGULATION —
taxation for, 11, 12.
burdens imposed under the police power for, 396-415.
(See Police Power.)
REJECTING TAXES —
when may be compelled by mandamus, 520, 674.
requiring, on certiorari, 533.
RELATION —
of protest, to a time preceding payment, 569.
of tax deed to time of purchase, 353.
RELATOR—
in tax cases, when private parties may be, 522-524.
when law officer of the state should be,
(Sec Law Officer of the State.)
RELEASE OF GOODS—
payments made to obtain, are not voluntary, 568.
RELEASE FROM TAXATION —
(See Contracts ; Exemptions.)
RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION —
taxes not to be levied for, 83, 84.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES—
what protection from government they are entitled to, 84.
exemption of property of, from taxation, 130.
reasons for this, 145.
must be strictly construed, 146, 147.
do not preclude special assessments, 147, 458.
exemption ceases when property is sold, 151.
REMAINDER —
(See Surplus Moneys.)
REMEDIAL STATUTES —
what are, 204, 205.
may be presumed to reach back, for purposes of justice, 222.
the proper province of, 374.
laws for imposing revenue are not, 204, 205.
PEMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE AND ILLEGAL TAXATION —
are always afforded by the law, 527.
by abatement, 527.
assessors m iy make, while they retain roll, 527.
legislative authority may make, 527.
taxing office rs must luive authority for, 527.
by reviews and appeals, 52S.
these by assessors or by appellate board, 528.
need not apply for, if tax is void, 528, 529.
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REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE AND ILLEGAL TAXATION— con.
by reviews and appeals — continued.
the proper remedy for excessive or unequal assessment, 528.
decision by reviewing authority final, 529.
for irregular assessment, statutory remedy is exclusive, 529.
right of city to appeal, 529.
by refunding, 530.
officers cannot refund without express authority, 530
by certiorari, 530.
the remedy at common law, 530.
the writ not of right, 530.
promptness required in applying for, 531.
the writ only brings up the record, 535.
discretionary action not reviewed on, 532-535.
only reaches jurisdictional questions, 532.
what will be set aside upon, 535.
by injunction, 536.
mischievous use of this writ, 536, 537.
conditions imposed on issuing, 537, 538.
not generally awarded in case of personal taxes, 538.
except to prevent irremediable mischief, 539.
not awarded to restrain political action, 540.
nor for merely excessive assessments, 540.
nor for merely irregular assessments, 540.
what are not merely irregular, 541.
case of personal taxes in respect of land, 542.
joint complaint by several persons, when allowable, 545-547.
allowed in cases of fraud, 547.
in case of illegal corporate action, 548, 549.
effect of delay on proceedings, 549.
by removing cloud from title, 542.
what constitutes a cloud, 543, 544.
by having title quieted, 544.
for this, complainant must have possession, 545.
by action against assessors, 549.
this will not lie for mere errors, 549-553.
will lie in case of excess of jurisdiction, 553.
and where by neglect a party is deprived of his rights, 554.
bad motive in the assessor will give no right of action, 555-557.
by action against supervisor, 557.
what necessary to his justification, 557, 558.
by resisting collection, 558.
by action against colUctor, 559.
his protection by his process, 561, 562.
fatal defects in process, 562.
process does not protect against his own illegalities, 563, 564.
these r.ules apply to federal collectors, 564, 565.
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REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE AND ILLEGAL TAXATION— con.
by action against town, etc., 565.
this only lies when tax was void, 565.
and when payment was compulsory, 565.
and after money is paid over by collector, 565.
and where party has not elected to proceed against the officers, 565
all payments are presumed to be voluntary, 567.
what are not, 568, 569.
recovery limited to amount received, 570.
demand in case of, 571.
recovery of interest, 571.
case of misapplication by corporation, 572.
by replevin of goods, 572.
this sometimes taken away, 572, 573.
by prohibition, 574.
by quo warranto, 574.
by mandamus, to strike illegal assessment from the roll, 520, 574.
to compel allowance for illegal taxes paid, 520.
estoppel against resorting to, 573.
political redress,
(See Political Remedies.)
REMEDY —
for false official return, 196.
by suit for recovery of taxes, 300.
(See Collection of Taxes.)
by suit against collector of taxes, 497.
on collector's bond, 499-504.
summary against collectors, 504.
(See Collector of Taxes.)
for neglect of official duty,
(See Mandamus.)
to recover lands sold for taxes,
(See Recovery of Lands Sold for Taxes.)
against corporations for neglect of officers, 570.
limitation of time to apply for,
(See Limitation, Statutes of.)
political,
(See Political Remedies.)
REMISSION —
(See Aratement.)
REMOVAL —
summary of collector, 508.
of persons taxed, from the district, 562.
REMOVAL OF CLOUD UPON TITLE —
(See Cloud Upon Title.)
INDEX. 703
RENTS —
taxation of, 18, 19. •
offset of, against redemption moneys, 365.
REPAIRING WAYS—
special assessments for, 422, 423.
(See Assessments, Local; Highways.)
REPAVING STREETS—
right to levy special assessments for, 422, 423.
REPEAL —
by implication from general luws, not favored, 210, 255, 256.
construction of acts of, 221, 222.
of exemptions, general right of, 54, 145.
exceptions to this, 52-55.
of local powers to tax, 14, 474.
of law under which collector's bond was given, 503.
REPLEVIN —
for property seized for tax, 572.
liability of the process to abuse, 572.
the remedy sometimes taken away, 303, 572.
this does not take away right of third person, 573.
nor of one not liable to taxation, 573.
collector cannot defend action of, unless tax was legal, 563.
REPORTS, OFFICIAL —
(See Returns, Official.)
REPRESENTATION —
and taxation go together, 44-48, 178.
origin of this maxim, 44.
meaning of, in America, 44-48.
application of, to local taxation, 474, 483-494,
precludes levy of taxes by the executive, 44.
does not ensure low taxes, 46.
is only fully true when applied to the state at large, 46.
does not preclude taxes on those who cannot vote, 47.
application of maxim to federal government, 48.
(See Compulsory Local Taxation.)
REPRESENTATIVES —
of the people must grant taxes, 32, 42-47.
responsibility of, to the people, the security against oppressive taxation,
4, 71, 178, 575.
(See Political Remedies.)
who to have a voice in choosing, 45.
REPUBLIC —
arbitrary power does not exist in, 431.
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REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT—
'
principles of,
(See Constitutional Principles.)
REPUTED AUTHORITY—
of one assuming to be an officer, 189, 190.
(See Officers )
REQUEST—
for jury trial when the right is given, 554.
RESERVATIONS —
persons living on, not taxable by the state, 269.
(See Petition.)
RESIDENCE—
personal assessments to be made at place of, 269.
what constitutes, 269.
(See Domicile.)
RESIDENT—
out of state not personally taxable within it
,
(See Nonresidents.)
out of district, may be taxed on property in it
,
46.
RESIDENT LANDS—
taxation of, separate from nonresidents, 275, 288.
(See Real Estate.)
personal liability for taxes on,
(See Personal Liarility.)
RESIDUE —
(See Surplus Moneys.)
RESPONSIBILITY —
of representatives to their constituents, the security against oppressive
taxation, 4, 71.
(See Representatives.)
RESPONSIBILITY, PERSONAL—
(See Personal Liarility.)
RESTRAINING COLLECTION —
(See Injunction.)
RESTRAINTS —
on the power to tax,
(See Limitations on the Taxing Power.)
taxation for purposes of,
(See Police Power.)
RESTRICTIONS —
on the power of the states to tax,
(See Constitution of the .United States.)
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RESTRICTION S — continued.
on the power of the United States to tax,
(See Constitution of the United States ; Constitutional Princi
ples.)
on municipal powers to tax, what is, 262.
are sometimes the purpose in taxation, 11, 896.
(See Police Power.)
RETAILERS—
of liquors, taxation of, 396, 404.
(See Spirituous Liquors.)
RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION—
may cure want of power to tax, 100, 101.
presumption against intent to adopt, 221, 222.
for curing defects in tax proceedings, 223-229.
(See Curative Laws.)
RETROSPECTIVE TAXATION —
may be imposed, 169.
presumed intent not to impose, 221, 222.
RETURNS, OFFICIAL—
in general are conclusive, 195.
officer liable for false, 196.
liability for failure to make, 563.
of failure to collect tax, 307, 359.
void if made prematurely, 307.
void if defective in its recitals, 307, 308.
what it should show, 308.
is evidence in favor of the officer, 308.
disproving, 359.
REVENUE —
taxation must be for purposes of, 9.
other incidental purposes,
(See Policy.)
not the purpose of police taxation, 396-398.
(See Police Power.)
license fees, when are for, 408-410.
farming out the, 300.
contracts in fraud of, are void, 299.
frauds on the federal, 309-313.
collection of the, 298-321.
(See Taxation ; Taxes.)
REVENUE LAWS —
what are, 1, 199.
general purpose of, 9.
in some states originate with the popular house, 32.
construction of, in general, 199-208.
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REVENUE LAWS — continued.
for local taxation, construction of, 209-211.
directory and mandatory provisions in, 212-220.
presumption against retrospective action of, 221, 222.
(See Construction.)
REVENUE STAMPS —
collection of taxes by, 22, 23, 320.
not taxable by the states, 58.
REVIEW—
right of parties to notice of meeting of boards of, 206-268.
remedy by, in case of excessive taxation, 528.
decision of board of, when final, 529.
failure to apply for, effect of, 529, 531.
errors in decision on, do not invalidate action, 530.
certiorari in cases of, 534.
increasing assessments upon, 547.
REVISION -
of revenue laws, effect of, 222.
(See Repeal.)
RHODE ISLAND —
constitutional provisions of, bearing upon special assessments, 444.
RIGHT—
constitutional,
(See Constitutional Principles.)
RIGHT TO A HEARING —
(See Hearing.)
RIOTS —
taxation to indemnify losers by, 480.
RIVERS —
protection against overflow of,
(See Levees.)
ROADS —
taxation for, 94.
(See Highways.)
taxation for, under legislative compulsion, 478.
(See Compulsory Local Taxation.)
labor, taxes in,
(See Laror.)
officers of, not liable for error in their decisions, 550.
ROBBERY —
under the forms of law in tax cases, 428.
of collector, 501.
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RULES —
fixed, taxation must be based upon, 2, 3.
(See Principles of Taxation )
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION —
of statutes in general, 197.
of revenue laws, 199.
of local powers to tax, 211.
See Construction.)
RULES OF EVIDENCE —
right of the legislature to establish and change, 223.
must not preclude parties from showing their rights, 223, 224.
application of, to tax sales, 333-357.
(See Evidence ; Presumptions.)
RURAL LANDS —
in cities, sometimes taxed at different rates from other city property, 118.
brought into city without sufficient reason, taxation of, 119, 120.
s.
SACRIFICE —
in taxation, equality of, 127.
in sale of land for taxes, 345.
SAFE KEEPING —
of public moneys, officer is liable for, 501.
SALARIES —
of federal officers, states cannot tax, 58.
of state officers, United States cannot tax, 58.
state and United States may tax those of their own officers, 391, 392.
collection of taxes on, 298, 299.
BALE —
of chattels for taxes, 301-303.
must be warranted by statute, 302.
ordinary defensive remedies sometimes taken away, 302, 803.
(See Replevin.)
demand of the tax should be first made, 304.
misconduct of officer may render him trespasser, 304, 563, 564.
will not preclude proceedings being set aside on certiorari, 534.
'
payment of tax to prevent, is payment under compulsion, 568, 569.
title obtained by, is not warranted, 572.
(See Caveat Emptor.)
70S LAW OF TAXATION.
SALE OF LANDS FOR TAXES —
collection by, 305-309.
conditions precedent must be observed, 307-309.
return of no goods, etc., 307.
payment discbarges right to make, 322.
land must be liable, 322.
proceedings must be regular, 323-326.
regularity of, to be shown by purchaser, 326-329.
rule of caveat emptor applies, 329.
how far presumptions may support, 329-332.
special authority for, 333.
notice of, 334-337.
description of land in notice, 336, 337.
must be made at time and place appointed, 338.
adjournment of, 338.
competition must be allowed at, 339, 340.
officer cannot buy at, 341.
must be of separate parcels separately, 341-343.
undivided interests may be sold, 341.
surplus bond required In some states, 343.
excessive, is void, 343, 344.
must be to highest bidder, 344.
must be for cash, 344.
must not be for more than is due, 345.
may be of complete title, 345.
inadequacy of price will not defeat, 345.
what persons may not buy at, 345-351.
case of tenant and mortgagor, 345, 347, 351.
case of tenant in common, 346.
case of an agent, 347.
case of party in possession, 348-351.
bids by state or county, 351.
for different taxes at the same time, 352.
certificate to purchaser, 352.
how issue of, compelled, 522.
deed and its requisites, 353.
force of, as evidence, 353-357.
how execution of, compelled, 522.
judicial proceedings for, 357.
court must have jurisdiction, 358, 362.
report of inability to collect, 359, 361.
notice to parties, 359.
proceedings are in rem, 360.
what defects invalidate, 360, 361.
confirmation of, who may oppose, 360.
questions of regularity concluded by judgment, 362.
redemption from, 362-870,
(See Redemption.)
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SALE OF LANDS FOR TAXES— continued.
recovery of lands sold, 371-383.
(See Recovery of Lands Sold for Taxes.)
surplus moneys, compelling payment of, 522.
SALE OF LANDS FOR ASSESSMENTS—
"
must be special authority for, 469, 470.
power usually conferred, 470,
(See Assessments, Local.)
SALES OF MERCHANDISE —
taxation of, 22.
by sample, license for may be required, 413.
taxation of business of selling,
(See Trades.)
taxation of property also, 389.
SALOON KEEPERS —
(See Spirituous Liquors.)
SANITARY PURPOSES —
taxation for, 101.
special assessments for, 423, 424.
levies for, under the police power, 402.
SATISFACTION —
of municipal debts, compelling taxation for, 479, 524-626.
of tax on lands by levy on goods, 307, 543, 544.
of illegal tax voluntarily, precludes action to recover back, 565.
(See Voluntary Payment.)
SAYING OF EXPENSE —
not a sufficient reason for uniting suits in equity, 546.
(See Joint Complaints.)
SAVINGS BANKS AND SOCIETIES—
tax on deposits in, not a tax on property, 168.
excise taxes upon, 393, 394.
tax on deposits invested in nontaxable securities, 165.
SCHOOL DIRECTORS —
cannot be compelled by mandamus to abate taxes, 518.
permissory authority of, to make exemptions, 146.
SCHOOL DISTRICTS —
may be authorized to support free schools, 85, 253.
meetings in, to vote taxes, 245.
notice of, 245-248.
mus> be regularly called. 246, 554.
proceedings must appear of record, 247, 248.
warning of, 247.
construction of particular votes, 211, 247,248.
p- if not legally called, action is void, 247.
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SCHOOL DISTRICTS — continued.
meetings in, protection by record of, 248.
acquiescence in, when invalid, 248.
informalities to be overlooked, 249.
joint meetings of, for taxation, 212.
cannot build school house on site not legally established, 254.
conditions precedent to taxes, must be observed, 254.
informal organization of, 530, 549.
protection of officers of, in discretionary action, 552, 553.
votes of taxes cannot be controlled by mandamus, 519.
SCHOOL PROPERTY —
exemption of, from taxation, 130, 149, 150.
liability of, to special assessments, 458.
instances of special exemptions and their construction, 149, 150.
SCHOOLS —
taxation for, 84-88, 245-248, 253, 254.
(See School District.)
municipalities may be required to tax for, 478.
taxes for, unlawfully levied by town, may be recovered back, 571.
taxes for, levied at a meeting not lawfully called, may be recovered b3«k
554.
special taxation for, in different counties, 139.
construction of power to tax for, 210-212.
private, aid of the state to, 86, 87.
exemption of from taxation, 149, 150.
voting taxes for,
CSee Voting: the Taxes.)
SEATED LANDS —
meaning of the term, 276.
are required to be taxed separate from unseated, 275.
what an abandonment of, 276.
taxes on, are a personal charge, 277.
transfer of, to unseated list, 277.
(See Unseated Lands.)
SECULAR INSTRUCTION —
taxation for, 84-88.
(See Schools.)
SECURITY —
for business taxes, may be required, 321.
for performance of collector's duties,
(See Collector of Taxes.)
SECURITIES —
taxation of,
(See Bonds; Credits; Mortgages; Purlic Securities.)
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3EIZURE -
of the person for taxes, 301, 389.
of property for taxes,
(See Distress.)
payment of tax to relieve from,
(See Voluntary Payment.)
replevin in case of unlawful, 573, 573.
SEMINARIES—
exemption of, from taxation, 149, 150.
SEPARATE INTERESTS —
may be separately valued if statute so provides, 288, 289.
and separately sold, 341, 342.
redemption in case of, 364, 365.
SEPARATE PARCELS—
separate assessments of, 279 , 280.
(See Grouping.)
what are, 281, 282.
separate sale of, 341, 342.
must not be divided in assessment, 282.
SERVANTS —
taxation in respect of, 21.
SERVICES —
in procuring legislation, payment for, 99.
military, one exempt from, may be taxed to procure volunteers, 431
SETOFF—
of demands against taxes, not allowed, 13.
of benefits against value of land taken for streets, 420.
of demands receivable for taxes, against taxes collected, 501.
(See Offset.)
SEWERS—
construction of, may be ordered under police power, 399-101.
special assessments for, 423-427, 469.
(See Assessments, Local.)
assessments for, in England, 426.
illegal exemption from tax for, 154.
SHARES IN CORPORATIONS—
(See Stock in Corporations.)
SHERIFF —
(See Collector of Taxes.)
SHIPS —
tonnage duties on, cannot be laid by states, 61.
are taxable as property by states, 61.
but not as vehicles of commerce, 62.
tax on masters of, 63.
where to be taxed, 270.
taxes on consignees of, 568.
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SHORT STATUTES OF LIMITATION—
(See Limitation, Statutes of.)
SHORTENING TIME TO REDEEM—
question of right of, 369, 370.
SHOWS —
taxation of, 391.
(See Amusements.)
SIDEWALKS—
construction of, under police power, 398.
special assessments for, 450, 451.
SIGNING —
of assessment roll, necessity for, 289.
signing certificate attached, not equivalent to, 290.
of tax roll by supervisors, 293, 294.
SILENCE —
when may work an estoppel, 573.
SOLDIERS —
bounties for,
(See Bounties.)
exemption of property from taxation, 149.
taxation while in service, 146.
SOUTH CAROLINA—
assessments of property in, must be by value, 485.
SOVEREIGN POWERS —
apportionment of, in government, 32.
general nature of the division, 32-40.
SOVEREIGNTY —
the taxing power an incident of, 3.
taxation an act of, 146.
of state or nation, not to be invaded by the other, 56-60.
(See Extra Territorial Taxation.)
SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS—
(See Assessments, Local.)
SPECIAL BENEFITS —
levying assessments with reference to, 416-473.
(See Assessments, Local.)
SPECIAL JURISDICTION—
of courts to review proceedings in taxation, 233, 234.
of courts to render judgments for taxes,
(See
Judgment for Taxes.)
to review assessments.
(See Boards of Equalization ; Boards of Review.)
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SPECIAL LAWS —
implied repeal or modification of, by general laws, 255, 256.
imposing new burdens, should be prospective, 221.
to be construed to harmonize with the general law, 210.
for curing defects in tax proceedings,
(See Curative Laws.)
SPECIFIC TAXES —
what are, 175.
SPECULATION —
lands held for, may properly be taxed, though producing no income, 20.
and be subjected to special asssessments for draining, 456.
collector not to make use of his office for, 501.
SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION—
statutes which violate are not necessarily void, 488.
(See Constitutional Principles.)
SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS —
why especially selected for taxation, 396.
policy in indirect taxation of, 6.
heavy taxation of, sometimes defeats the purpose, 24.
manufacturers and dealers in, are taxed on their business, 300.
stock taxed as property at same time, 390.
discriminations in taxing dealers, 390.
whether one licensed as a tavern keeper may sell, 391.
taxation of, where regulation is the purpose, 404, 412.
may be taxed though the business is illegal, 406.
tax law not invalid for discriminating against, 412.
power to declare the unlicensed selling a nuisance, 412.
license fee for regulating sale of, is not a tax, 410.
issuing licenses to sell, 413.
conditions to a license of the business, 413.
revoking licenses to sell, 414.
SPORTS —
1taxation of, 30.
(See Amusements.)
SQUARES —
at street crossings, assessments for, 463.
public, taxation for, 93.
STAMPS —
revenue, are not taxable by the states, 5?.
collection of taxes in, 320.
economy of such collection, 22, 23.
STATE -
bids by, at tax sales, 351.
power of, to coerce local taxation, 474-495.
(8ee Compulsory Local Taxation.)
LAW OF TAXATIOH".
STATE — «ontinued.
remedies of, against its collectors, 496-511.
(See Collector of Taxes.)
abatement of taxes by, 527.
refunding of illegal taxes by, 530, 566, 568.
license by, cannot be nullified by county or town, 411, 412.
determination of tax levy for, 244.
(See Legislative Actios ; Legislative Power.
STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION —
review of assessments by, 392.
STATE BUILDINGS —
(See Purlic Buildings.)
STATE CONSTITUTIONS —
(See Constitutions of the States.)
STATE PAPER —
publication of notice in, 335.
STATE PURPOSES —
taxation for, must be apportioned through the state, 104-108.
cases of state buildings, 114-120.
taxation by municipalities for, 475-480.
what are, 475-480.
(See Purposes of Taxation.)
STATE TREASURY —
refunding illegal taxes received at, 566, 568.
STATES —
may require taxes to be paid in gold, 12.
may make contracts not to tax, 53, 54.
power of to tax, how limited by the federal constitution, 52-65.
(See Constitution of the United States.)
constitutions of, are not grants of power, 425.
general right of, to tax and select the subjects, 406, 407.
STATIONS —
railroad, exemption of from taxation, 151.
STATUTES —
revenue, what are, 1,
-
199.
must have revenue for their purpose, 9, 200.
impairing obligation of contracts forbidden, 52-56, 65.
(See Contracts.)
construction of in general, 197-222.
must be governed by the intent, 198.
must find intent in the words employed, 198.
extrinsic aid to, in cases of doubt, 198, 199
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STATUTES — continued.
construction of revenue laws, 199.
main purpose of such laws is revenue, 200.
incidental purpose to protect against extortion, 200.
Mr. Dwarris' views, 200, 208.
opinions of English judges, 201, 202.
opinions of American judges, 202-207.
leaning should not be to liberal construction, 208.
penal provisions should be strictly construed, 208.
conferring local powers to tax, should be strictly construed, 209, 211.
directory and mandatory, 212.
what should be held mandatory, 216-219.
instances of directory provisions, 219, 220.
may lay taxes retrospectively, 221, 222.
presumption against retrospective effect, 221.
curative, the various classes of, 223.
establishing conclusive rules of evidence, 223.
legislative mandates, 224.
for special cases, 225.
what is within their compass, 227-229.
prospective, 230-232.
for reassessments, 23.
may give summary remedies for collection of taxes, 298, 303.
allowing redemption, are to be favorably construed, 363.
whether redemption can be shortened by, after sale made, 369, 370.
or lengthened, 369, 370.
what conditions may be imposed by, in suits to recover lands sold for
taxes, 371-375.
(See Recovery of Lands Sold for Taxes.)
remedial, what are, and how construed, 203-205, 222, 374.
of limitation, application of in tax cases, 376-383.
(See Limitation, Statutes of.)
retrospective, may cure defect in power to tax, 100, 101.
may abate taxes, 527.
may protect officers acting in good faith, 552, 553.
taking away common law remedies, 572, 573.
or remedies in equity, 537.
bTATUTORY POWER —
divesting one of his estate, must be strictly construed, 217.
and strictly executed, 217.
STATUTORY REMEDY—
for abatement of taxes, 528-530.
STAYING COLLECTION —
(See Injunction.)
STEALING FROM COLLECTOR—
(See Theft.)
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STEAMBOAT —
made use of for railroad purposes, question of exemption in case of, 152.
STOCK, PUBLIC —
of the United States, not taxable by the states, 58.
of states and their municipalities, taxation of, 66.
investing capital of corporation in, does not preclude taxation of fran-
chise, 58.
STOCK IN CORPORATIONS —
to be taxed where owner has his domicile, 16, 274.
subject to conditions imposed by state in granting permission to transact
business, 65.
when taxation of will preclude taxation of corporate property, 166, 167.
property of corporation is represented by, 167.
when exempt from taxation where corporation is exempt, 167, 168.
tax on, is a different thing from a tax on the corporation, 169.
sometimes corporation made collector of taxes upon, 274.
sale of, by process fair on its face passes title, 303.
held by nonresidents, cannot be taxed to corporation, 43.
may be taxed as the charter shall provide, 44.
what words in a tax law held not to embrace, 210.
meaning of the word " stock " in a certain tax law, 274.
(See Banks; Corporations ; Railroad Companies.)
STOCK IN TRADE —
may be taxed though the business is taxed, 389, 390.
STOCKHOLDERS—
obtaining lists of, by mandamus, 523.
taxation of,
(See Stock in Corporations.)
STRANGER—
to title, cannot redeem from tax sale, 367.
payment of tax by, 322, 323.
STREAMS —
special assessment for preventing inundations by, 427.
(See Levees.)
STREET RAILWAYS —
taxation of, 167, 409.
assessment of track of, for widening the street, 458, 462.
STREETS —
general taxation for, 420.
special assessments for land taken for, 420.
for cost of grading, 421.
for paving or otherwise improving, 421.
for altering, widening or extending, 422.
for repaving, replanking, etc., 422.
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STREETS — continued.
special assessments, for cost of curbstones, etc., 423,
for sewers for, 423-427.
for water pipes in, 427.
for lighting, 428.
constitutional objections to, 429-444.
apportionment of cost, 447-456.
property subject to, 456-459.
proceedings in levying and collecting, 459-470.
payment of, from special fund, 470, 471.
personal liability for, 420, 470-473.
estoppel of parties assessed, by failure to make objections in due sea
son, 573, 574.
dedication of land for, will authorize opening at expense of owners,
421.
STRICT CONSTRUCTION—
of power to tax,
(See Power.)
of power to divest one of his estate,
(See Statutory Power.)
STRICT EXECUTION—
of authority to tax, 457.
of authority to sell for taxes, 323-325.
of authority to lay special assessments, 418, 464.
STRIKING FROM THE ROLL—
of property not taxable, may be compelled by mandamus, 520, 574.
compelled by certiorari, 533.
SUBSIDIES -
distinguished from taxes, 2.
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS—
action for depriving one of, 554.
irregularities which do not take away, will not render tax void, 533.
SUCCESSIONS—
to estates, may be taxed as a privilege, 392.
taxation of, in general, 22.
of an alien, may be taxed, 64.
taxation of personalty received from an estate abroad, 270.
taxation of bequests to colleges, etc., 150.
SUFFRAGE —
right of, sometimes dependent on payment of taxes, 553.
SUITS —
pending, application of curative laws to, 231.
(See Actions ; Equity ; Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxa
tion.)
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SUMMARY REMEDIES —
for collection of taxes, necessity for, 298, 496.
are not unconstitutional, 302, 303.
against collectors of taxes, 496, 497, 504.
(See Collector or Taxes.)
SUPERVISOR—
action against, 557.
protection of, by certificate, 557, 558.
SUPERVISORS, BOARD OF—
mandamus will not be issued to, where party has another remedy, 514
may be compelled by mandamus to proceed to consider an account, 515.
may be compelled to allow legal accounts, 516-517.
and to refund moneys illegally collected, 520.
and to assess state taxes, 522.
and to levy a tax to pay judgments, etc., 524-526.
issue of tax warrant by, 293, 294.
SUPPLEMENTARY LIST —
when signing of, a good verification of the original, 290.
SUPPOSED BENEFITS —
levy of assessments by, 427.
(See Assessments, Local.)
SURETIES—
in collector's bond, liability of, 501.
obligation of, is »tricti*»imi juris, 502.
are only bound by the terms of their bond, 502.
alteration in the obligation discharges, 502.
whether extension of time for collection will discharge, 502, 603.
summary remedy against, 504, 510, 511.
effect of change of law upon liability of, 511.
whether liable for an illegal tax collected, 563.
SURPLUS —
of insurance company, taxation of, 392.
SURPLUS BOND —
provision for, 343.
consequence of failure to give, 372, 373.
SURPLUS MONEYS—
on tax sale, disposition of, 343.
payment of, to party entitled, how compelled, 523.
SWAMPS —
taxation for draining, 101.
special assessments for draining,
(See Drains.)
draining under the police power, 402.
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T.
TAKING AWAY REMEDY—
cases of, 537, 572.
(See Constitutional Principles.)
TAKING OF PROPERTY—
for puplic use,
(See Eminent Domain.)
for taxes,
(See Distress.)
-
TARIFF —
revenue, 25.
protective, 25.
prohibitory, 10, 74.
(See Duties, Exports, Imports.)
TAVERNS—
taxation of keepers of, 391.
extent of license to keep, 391.
TAX COLLECTOR—
(See Collector of Taxes.)
TAX DEED—
right of highest bidder to, 344.
recital in, as to the quantity of land sold, 344
recital in, as to authority to sell, 353, 362.
other recitals in, 353.
does not prove a valid sale, 353.
except as statutes so provide, 354-357.
errors of form may not avoid, 353.
error in, may be corrected in equity, 243.
recording of, as a period from which actions may be limited, 378, 379.
constructive possession by virtue of, 379-381, 558.
when it does not give color of title, 382, 383.
setting aside as a cloud on title,
(See Cloud upon Title.)
mandamus to compel delivery of, 522.
TAX DUPLICATE—
issue of, 292.
(See Collector's Warrant.)
TAX LAWS —
'what are, 1, 199.
(See Revenue Laws.)
repeal of, terminates proceedings under them, 14.
construction of, 199-222.
(See Construction.)
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TAX LAWS — continued.
for curing defects in proceedings, 223-232.
(See Curative Laws.)
enforcing official duty under,
(See Mandamus.)
limitations on the power to pass,
(See Limitations on the Taxing Power.)
should aim at equality in the burden imposed, 124.
may make exemptions, 130, 144.
can only have effect through official action, 1S4.
summary remedies under,
(See Summary Remedies.)
contracts in fraud of, are void, 299.
TAX LEGAL IN PART—
will be enjoined only when the legal part is paid, 537.
recovery of town in case of, 571.
replevin in case of, 573.
TAX LEVY—
authority for, 244-257.
(See Voting the Tax.)
is void if excessive,
(See Excessive Taxes.)
enjoining, 536.
(See Injunction.)
whole will not be enjoined to redress individual wrongs, 636.
setting aside on certiorari,
(Sec Certiorari.)
compelling by mandamus,
(See Mandamus.)
TAX PAYERS' LISTS—
objections to, 27, 29.
requirement of, 261.
penalties for failure to hand in, 262.
construction of penal provisions respecting, 262, 263.
taking away appeal, for refusal to hand in, 263.
failure to make oath to, 263, 264.
mistake in, will not create estoppel, 264.
effect, where it misleads the assessors, 264.
disregarding, by the assessors, 534.
TAX PROCEEDINGS—
curing defects in, by statute, 223-232.
by reassessments, 232, 233.
by the action of courts, 233, 234.
by amendments, 234-243.
what departures from the statutes will not defeat, 219, 220.
(See Irregularities.)
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TAX ROLL —
premature issue of, 292.
striking property from,
(See Striking from the Roll.)
warrant to,
(See Collector's Warrant.)
compelling assessor to put omitted property on, 520.
and to deliver correct copy of, 520.
TAX SALES —
(See Sales of Lands for Taxes.)
TAX WARRANT —
(See Collector's Warrant.)
TAXABLE PROPERTY —
meaning of, IS0, 210, 212, 272.
TAXATION —
definition of, 1.
and protection, are reciprocal, 2, 14, 16.
differs from forced contributions, etc., 2,260.
must have equality for its basis, 2.
unlimited nature of, 4.
is submitted to as a hard necessity, 512.
direct and indirect, 5.
maxims of, 6-8.
1. that it should be in proportion to revenue enjoyed, 6.
2. that it ought to be certain, and not arbitrary, 6.
3. that it ought to be levied at the time and in the manner most con
venient for payment, 6.
4. that it ought to take and keep out of the pockets of the people as
little as possible, 6, 7.
5. that the heaviest taxation should be on commodities the consump
tion of which is prejudicial, 396.
must be laid for revenue, 9.
regulation may be a purpose in, 11.
discriminating in, for protection, 10.
jurisdiction for, 14-16.
should be in proportion to benefits, 16, 17.
English, 26, 31.
heavy, dates from the time power of the commons was established, 46.
power of, is a legislative power, 32-40.
colorable, may be treated as void, 33, 34.
in the District of Columbia, 47.
in the territories, 47, 48.
power of, not to be delegated, 48-51.
except to the municipalities, 51.
abridgment of power of, by contracts, 62-55.
general purposes of, 67-103.
(See Purposes of Taxation.)
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TAXATION — continual.
districts for, 103-123.
(See Apportionment.)
extra territorial, 121-123.
equality and uniformity in, 124-174, 448.
duplicate, sometimes unavoidable, 28, 158-171.
presumption against intent to lay duplicate, 165-171.
exemptions from, 130, 144.
(See Exemptions.)
accidental omissions from, 154-156.
diversity of, in different districts, 172, 173.
distinguished from legislative appropriation of private property, 175,
178, 430-434.
and representation go together, 44-48, 178.
curing defects in, 223-243.
(See Tax Proceedings.)
restrictions upon municipal, 250-253.
conditions precedent to, 254, 255.
repeal or modification of power for, 255.
exhausting authority for, 256.
official action in, 184-196.
(See Officers.)
assessments of property for, 258-291.
(See Assessment.)
of business and privileges, 384-392.
general right of, 384.
methods of, 384, 385.
by federal government, 384.
what to be deemed privileges, 385, 386.
construction of powers for, 387.
kinds usually taxed, 387-392.
of corporations, 392, 393,
(See Corporations.)
of national banks, 394, 395.
imposed for purposes of regulation, 396-415.
(See Police Power.)
by special assessment, 416-473.
in England, 460, 472.
(See Assessments, Local.)
compulsory local, 474-495.
admissible in matters of state concern, 475-480.
not for matters of mere local concern, 481-495.
to indemnify for losses by riots, 480.
to pay corporate debts, 479.
general, for a mere local purpose, is unjust, 429.
enforcing official duty in regard to, 512-526.
(See Mandamus.)
INDEX.
TAXATION— continued.
remedies for excessive and illegal, 527-575.
by abatement, 527.
by review and appeals, 528.
by certiorari, 529-534.
by injunction, 536-542.
in equity to remove cloud on title, 542-544.
in equity to quiet title, 544, 545.
by several jointly, 545-547.
in cases of fraud, 547.
by suit against assessors, 550-657.
by suit against supervisor, 557, 558.
by resisting collection, 558.
by suit against collector, 559-564.
by action against collector of customs, 664, 566.
by suit against town, etc., 564-572.
by action of replevin, 572.
by mandamus, 574.
by prohibition, 574.
TAXES —
definition of, 1.
classification of, 4, 5.
direct, 5.
indirect, 5.
payable in kind, 12.
capitation, 18.
on credits, 13.
(See Bonds; Credits; Mortgages.)
on lands, 18.
on houses, 19.
on income, 20.
on employments, 21.
on carriage of property, 21.
on wages, 21.
on servants, etc., 21.
on interest, 22.
on dividends, 22.
(See Dividends.)
on successions, 22.
(See Successions.)
on sales, bills, etc., 22.
on newspapers, 23.
on legal process, 23, 373.
on consumable luxuries, 23.
on exports, 24.
on imports, 24.
on corporate franchises, 25, 60, 64, 392.
(See Corporations.)
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TAXES — continued.
on property by value, 26, 61, 176.
on marriages, 30.
on amusements, 30. .
on public securities, 58.
(See Purlic Securities.)
specific, 175.
on licensed traders, 62.
(See Traders.)
on business, 384-392.
(See Business.)
on privileges, 385, 392.
on offices, 391.
(See Offices.)
on national banks, 394, 395.
apportionment of, 2, 103-123, 175-183.
(See Apportionment.)
maxims governing levy of, 6-8.
(See Principles of Taxation.)
apportioning by benefit received, 14-17.
are pecuniary contributions when not otherwise explained, 13.
arc not debts, 13.
are granted by the people's representatives, 32.
to be levied for the public good, 42.
to be for public purposes, 42.
not to be extra territorial, 42.
right to representation in levying, 11 18.
in violation of contracts are void, 51-54.
impairing obligation of contracts are void, 65.
on agencies of federal government by the states, 56-61.
on agencies of state government by United States, 56-61.
on revenue stamps, etc., 58.
on salaries of federal and state officers, 58.
on travel, 59.
on the public domain, 60.
on railroads, 60.
(See Railroad Companies.)
on commerce by the states, 61-64.
(See Commerce.)
which abridge rights of citizens, 64.
(See
Privileges of Citizens.)
purposes for which they may be laid, 67-103.
(See Purposes of Taxation.)
how direct are laid by the United States, 73.
should be equal, 124.
invidious discriminations in laying, 128, 129.
exemptions from, 130-149.
(See Exemptions.)
INDEX.
TAXES — continued.
invidious exemptions from, 154-156.
duplicate levies of, 156-171.
(See Duplicate Taxation.)
commuting for, 172.
official action in levying, 184-196.
(See Officers.)
construction of laws for, 197-222.
(See Construction.)
Curing defects in proceedings to obtain, 223-243.
(See Curative Laws.)
voting of, 244-257.
must be legislative authority for, 32, 244.
(See Voting the Tax.)
assessment of property for. 258-291.
(See Assessment.)
collector's warrant for, 292-297.
(See Collector's Warrant.)
collection of, 298.
by suit at law, 300.
by arrest of person taxed, 301.
by distress of goods and chattels, 301-304.
(See Distress.)
by detention of goods and chattels, 305.
by sale of lands, 305-307.
by imposition of penalties, 309-315.
by forfeiture of property taxed, 315-319.
(See Forfeitures.)
by conditions to the exercise of a right, 319-321.
See Conditions.)
lien of, on lands, 305-307.
collection by the state of its municipalities, 321.
sale of lands for, 322-357.
(See Sale of Lands for Taxes.)
judicial sales for, 357-362.
(See Judgment for Taxes.)
redemption from sales for, 363-370.
(See Redemption.)
pioceedings to recover lands sold for, 371-383.
(See Recovery of Lands Sold for Taxes.)
under the police power, 396.
how they differ from other taxes, 396, 397.
case of sidewalks, 398.
case of sewers, 399-401.
case of levees, 401-2.
case of drains, 402,
other cases, 403, 409-413.
license fees, when are, 403-405, 408-410.
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TAXES — continued,
license fees, collection of, 414.
must not be prohibitory, 408.
special assessments not classed as, 146, 456.
(See Assessments, Local.)
enforcing duties in levy and collection of, 512-526.
(See Mandamus.)
decision of proper authority as to amount of levy, cannot be controlled
by mandamus, 519.
rejection of, when illegal, 520.
(See Striking from the Roll.)
illegal, collector may refuse to collect, 521.
injustice of, cannot defeat them, 3, 35, 124-129.
or excuse officer for not proceeding with, 521.
compelling levy of to pay judgments, etc., 524-526.
levy of, by municipalities under state compulsion, 574-594.
(See Compulsory Local Taxation.)
remedies by the state for, against collectors, 496-511.
(See Collector of Taxes.)
remedies where they are excessive or illegal, 527-574.
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
TAXING DISTRICTS —
taxes levied must pertain to the, 104-106.
instances of violation of this rule, 106-108.
general rule as to, 108-110.
legislature must establish, 110-113.
different for different purposes, 113, 114.
overlying, 114-120.
(See Districts.)
taxation beyond limits of, 121-123.
(See Extra Territorial Taxation.)
in cases of special assessments, 449-451.
TAXING POWER —
is an incident of sovereignty, 3.
is granted for the benefit of all, 4.
proper exercise of, affords no ground of complaint, 4.
extent of, 11, 41, 56.
is not an executive power. 32.
is not a judicial power, 33.
is legislative in its nature, 32-40.
is not to be delegated, 48-51.
except to the municipalities, 49.
may be restrained by contracts, 52-56.
limitations upon, by constituional principles,
(See Constitutional Principles.)
limitations upon, by the federal constitution.
See Constitution of the United States.)
INDEX
TAXING POWER— continued.
state restrictions upon, 66.
construction of, in general,
(See Construction.)
local, construction of, 209-211.
in case of business taxes, 387.
in case of levies for regulation, 396-398, 408.
liability of, to abuse, 212.
principles on which it should be employed,
(See Principles of Taxation.)
TENANT—
may not buy his landlord's title at tax sale, 345.
(See Occupant.)
TENANT BY THE CURTESY —
right of, to redeem, 366.
TENANT IN COMMON —
interests of, may be separately assessed, 288, 289.
and separately sold, 341, 342.
cannot buy interest of the others at tax sale, 346, 347.
one may redeem for all, 367.
redemption of separate interest by, 323, 365.
TENANT IN DOWER—
right of, to redeem, 366.
TENDER—
extinguishes lien for taxes, 308.
will prevent a sale, 323.
must be of the full amount due, 323.
for purposes of redemption, 368.
of certificates of public indebtedness, for license fees, 413.
in settlement with collector, 501.
TENNESSEE —
constitutional provisions for equal taxation in, 143, 144.
assessments of property in, must be by value, 435.
TERRITORIAL LIMITATION —
on power of states to tax, 42.
on power of municipalities to tax, 121-123.
(See Nonresidents.)
in case of municipal license tax, 47.
the maxim that taxation and representation go together, 42-48.
TERRITORIES —
taxation in, 47, 48.
TESTAMENTARY GIFrS —
taxes on, 22.
(See Successions.)
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TESTIMONY —
(See Evidence.)
TEXAS —
property in, must be assessed by value, 435.
THEATRICAL EXHIBITIONS —
taxation of, 391,
what is equality in case of, 138.
THEFT —
from collector, does not discharge him, 501.
THREAT—
of illegal enforcement of taxes, 536.
of illegal distress, is compulsion, 569.
(See Voluntary Payment.)
TIME —
taxes must be voted at the proper, 217.
taxpayer must have notice of that fixed for appeal, 217.
allowed for notices, must be given, 218, 230, 335.
proceedings fatally defective if statute regarding, is not observed, 218.
sate prematurely made cannot be validated, 229.
computing, in case of notices, 33?.
to redeem, cannot be enlarged, 369, 370.
to redeem, shortening the, 369, 370.
of advertising, to cut off redemption, 365.
TITLE —
at tax sale is not warranted, 572.
(See Caveat Emptor.)
trial of, 371-383.
(See Recovery of Lands Sold for Taxes.)
extinguishing by adverse possession,
(See Limitation, Statutes of.)
removing cloud upon, 542.
(See Clood upon Title.)
quieting, in equity, 544.
(Sec Quieting Title.)
collector cannot build up, if tax is void, 563.
tax deed as evidence of,
(See Tax Deed.)
purchaser must take, subject to right to reassess a tax, 232, 233.
power to divest, must be strictly construed and strictly pursued, 217, 324.
TITLE, OFFICIAL—
not to be questioned collaterally, 187-189.
questioning on quo warranto, 188.
questioning in suit by or against officer de facto, 188, 189.
TOLL-
meaning of the term, 3.
INDEX
TOLL BRIDGE—
duplicate taxation in case of, 163.
TOLL HOUSE —
when exempt from taxation, 151.
TONNAGE —
taxes of, not to be laid by the states, 61,
what are, 61, 62.
TOWN AUDITORS —
action of, in allowing accounts not to be reviewed in the courts, 533.
unlawful allowances by, 557.
TOWN BOARD —
members of, not liable for errors in their judicial action, 551.
(See Judicial Officer.)
TOWN BONDS —
mandamus to compel payment of, 525.
compulsory levies for payment of, 429.
TOWN MEETINGS—
(See Towns.)
TOWN PLATS—
assessment of lots and blocks upon,
(See Separate Parcels.)
TOWN PURPOSES —
repair of fire engine, 99.
compensation for use of building, 99.
procuring legislation, 99.
purchase of a public square, 93.
paying bounties for military services, 100, 101.
general enumeration of, 211.
TOWN TREASURER —
(See Collector of Taxes.)
TOWN TRUSTEES —
liability of, for refusing certificate, 558.
TOWN VOTE —
meetings for, 245-249.
(See Voting the Tax.)
control of, by the courts,
(See Political Action.)
protection of officers by, 561.
what will constitute a promise, 553.
TOWNS —
general power to tax usually conferred upon, 98, 475, 476.
purposes of taxation by,
(See Town Purposes.)
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TOWNS — continued.
apportionment of debts and property on division of, 176.
must have legislative power to tax, 244.
voting taxes by, 244-257.
meetings for the purpose, 245.
how appointed, 245, 246,
notice of, 246.
must confine themselves to the purpose of the call, 246-248.
warrant for, 247.
action of, to be favorably construed, 247.
must be record of, 247, 24S.
proof of record of, when lost, 249.
courts cannot control political action of, 249, 250.
restrictions on powers to tax, 250-253.
conditions imposed on power of to tax must be observed, 255, 256.
legislative control over taxation by, 253, 255, 256.
exhausting power to tax, 256.
strict execution of power by, 257.
taxation under legislative compulsion, 474-495.
refunding taxes by, 530.
liability of, for illegal taxes collected, 565.
only attaches where the tax was void, 565.
and was paid under compulsion, 565.
and has been paid over by the officer, 565.
what is a compulsory payment, 567-569.
do not guaranty correct action by their officers,- 566.
proper action against, for money collected, 569.
extent of recovery in, 570.
not liable for mistakes, etc., of officers where money is not received, 570.
cannot defend suit for illegal taxes by showing assessors not legally
elected, 670.
no action against, where the proceedings are wholly void, 570.
demand not necessary before suit, 571,
recovery of interest in suit against, 571.
do not warrant title to property sold for taxes, 572.
(See Municipal Corporations.)
allowance of moneys to collector is equivalent to payment to, 570.
indemnifying collector not a ratification of his illegal act, 570.
suit against on promises, 553.
TOWNSHIPS—
(See Towns.)
TRACK —
of railroad company, assessment of, for paving the street, 462.
is not nonresident land, 274.
(See Railroad Companies.)
TRACTS, SEPARATE—
(See Separate Parcels.)
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TRADE —
what taxation of, is forbidden,
(See Commerce.)
taxation of. in general,
(See Traders.)
TRADERS—
licensed to trade with Indians, not taxable by states, 62.
importing goods, not taxable by states as importers, 62, 63.
exchange and money brokers, taxes on, 63, 64.
dealing in articles not the growth of the state, whether specially taxable
on their business, 64.
taxes on business of, as a privilege, 385, 392.
licensed by the state, cannot have the license nullified by city, etc., 386.
may be taxed by state and municipality under proper legislation, 386.
licence of, may be taxed, 386.
power to tax, construed strictly, 387.
graduating licenses of, 387, 390.
what kinds of, generally taxed, 387-389.
taxes on auctioneers and commission dealers, 389.
on merchants, 389.
on peddlers and transient dealers, 390.
on dealers in liquors, 390.
for regulation,
(See Police Power.)
TRANSIENT DEALERS —
taxation of, 390.
fees for regulating business of, 412, 413.
TRAVEL—
unlawful taxation of, 59.
(See Commerce.)
TREASURER—
protection of, by process,
(See Collector of Taxes.)
liability for stolen moneys, 501. '
(See County Treasurer.)
TRESPASS —
against assessors, recovery in, 570.
when it will lie,
(See Judicial Officer.)
against the collector, recovery in, 570.
when it will lie,
(See Collector of Taxbs.)
against supervisor, 557, 658.
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TRESPASSER AB INITIO —
collector is, if he sells distress before the time fixed by law, 304.
or if he keeps it beyond the time fixed by law, 304.
or if he sells and fails to render account of surplus moneys, 568.
or if he sells more than is necessary, 564.
what abuse of official authority will render the officer a, 304, 563.
(See Collector of Taxes.)
TRIAL -
right of every party to,
(See Law of the Land.)
by jury, not always of right, 425.
(See Jury Trial.) '
of question of corporate indebtedness, 481.
TRIBUNAL—
right of every one to an impartial, 527.
(See Hearing; Law of the Land.)
what is open, in case of illegal taxation,
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
TRIBUTE —
distinguished from taxes, 2.
TROVER—
action of, in case of illegal levies, 570.
TRUE OWNER —
who deemed to be, when title in contest, 558.
TRUST —
municipal officers hold their powers in 539.
TRUSTEE —
cannot buy property for himself at tax sale, 348.
(See Trusts.)
TRUSTS —
property belonging to, may be assessed to trustees where they reside, 271.
assessment in case of two trustees, 271.
investment of moneys in another state, 271.
abroad, cannot be taxed by state, 571.
TURNPIKE —
taxation for, 488.
(See Highways.)
TURNPIKE COMPANY —
easement of, in street, will not preclude special assessment to improve it,
462.
appropriation of road of, under the eminent domain, 176.
(See Corporations.)
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TYRANNY—
right of the people to vote the taxes, chief check upon, in some coun
tries, 46.
of enforced local taxation, 475, 483.
u.
ULTRA VIRES—
taxation which is
,
is void,
(See Nullity.)
contracting debts which are, may work irreparable injury, 548, 549.
restraining threatened action, 548, 549.
interference of_the state for the purpose, 549.
UNANIMOUS VOTE—
what is evidence of, 465.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAX—
collector may refuse to collect, 500.
collected, must be accounted for by collector, 498.
voluntarily paid, and paid over by collector, he is not liable for, to tax
payer, 563, 566.
duplicate taxes not necessarily unconstitutional, 158-160.
UNDIVIDED INTERESTS —
may be separately assessed, 288, 289.
and separatety sold, 341, 342.
but not without statutory authority, 341.
and separately redeemed, 323, 364, 365.
redemption by one owner for all, 367.
UNEQUAL TAXATION —
impossibility of avoiding, 124-128.
the purpose of government to avoid, 124.
what does not create, in a legal sense, 128.
special exemptions produce, 128, 129.
invidious exemptions not allowable, 152, 153.
caused by accidental omissions, 154-156.
caused by fraudulent assessments, 157.
caused by duplicate taxation, 158-171.
not caused by permitting commutations, 172.
caused by want of permanence in legislation, 174.
not supposed to flow from assessment by benefits, 416, 417.
does not necessarily result trom sslecting few subjects for taxation, 184,
125, 387, 388, 411, 412.
legislature must determine questions of, 126.
abatement in cases of, 527.
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
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UNIFORMITY—
must be aimed at in taxation, 124-174.
constitutional provisions intended to secure, 132-144, 430-444.
apportionment with a view of securing, 175-183.
required in federal duties, imposts and excises, 73.
general consideration of questions of, 124-174.
(See Equality.)
application of rules of, to special assessments, 416, 417, 428, 429.
(See Assessments, Local.)
UNITED STATES —
may levy direct taxes, 5, 73.
taxation of liquors by, 24.
of exports, 24.
of imports, 24.
general right of, to lay taxes, 5, 32, 56, 71.
tax bills to originate in lower house, 33.
taxation in territories by, 47.
in District of Columbia, 47.
cannot tax the states or their agencies, 58.
or salaries of state officers, 58.
or municipal corporations, 58.
public domain of, not taxable by states, 59, 60.
constitutional limitations on power to tax, 73, 74.
may tax for bounties, 99.
collection of tuxes by penalties, 309.
taxation of business by, 384.
licenses by, 414, 415.
do not give rights as against state laws, 415.
not granted under police power, 415.
interest of, in railroad, precludes taxation of, 60, 81.
salaries of officers of, cannot be taxed by states, 58.
contracts to defraud revenue of, are void, 299.
customary frauds upon, 309, 312.
special regulations for collection of internal revenue, 181.
direct land tax, collection of, 181.
UNITED STATES COLLECTORS —
of the customs,
(See Collector of the Customs.)
of internal revenue,
(See Collector of Internal Revenue.)
UNITED STATES LANDS —
(See Purlic Domain.)
UNITED STATES PROPERTY—
(See Public Property.)
UNITED STATES RESERVATIONS —
personal assessments of people living upon, 269.
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UNITED STATES SECURITIES—
not taxable by the states, 58.
corporations taxable on their franchises, though moneys invested in, 58.
UNIVERSITIES —
exemption of, from taxation, 149.
UNJUST TAXATION —
is frequently laid, 387.
(See Unequal Taxation.)
remedies for,
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
UNKNOWN OWNERS —
assessment of lands of, 278, 279.
what is presumptive evidence that owners are unknown, 279.
UNLAWFUL CONTRACTS —
those in fraud of the revenue are, 299.
those in excess of power are, 553.
(See Ultra Vires.)
UNRESTRICTED POWER—
to tax, does not exist, 6, 68, 431.
(See Limitations on the Taxing Power.)
in case of municipal taxation, 486.
(See Compulsory Local Taxation.)
UNSEATED LANDS—
separate taxation of, 275.
meaning of the term, 276.
what will constitute land once occupied unseated, 276.
lien of tax upon, 277.
description of, 282-286.
proceedings in selling must follow assessment, 334, 359.
notice of sale in case of, 334.
surplus bond in case of, 343.
UNWARRANTED ASSESSMENTS —
what are, 428, 431-434.
USAGE—
cannot change the law, 194.
influence of, in construction of town powers, 93, 94.
(See Custom.)
USURERS —
impolicy of robbery of, 6.
USURPATION —
of powers not conferred,
(See Jurisdiction ; Nullity ; Ultra Vires.)
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USURPERS —
distinguished from officers de facto, 186, 187.
inquiry into authority of, 574.
must pay over public moneys collected, 191, 192, 498.
V.
VACANT TENEMENTS —
limitation of actions in case of, 377.
whether it may be done when ejectment cannot be brought, 377.
decisions that holder of tax title has constructive possession, 378-381.
possession in case of, is purely matter of fiction, 381.
VACATING ASSESSMENTS —
proceedings for, on certiorari,
(See Certiorari.)
by striking property from the roll,
(See
Striking from the Boll.)
VALUATION—
necessity for, in assessment, 287.
separate parcels, separately, 287.
is a judicial act, 288.
cannot be made by legislature, 288.
effect of omitting dollar mark in, 289.
assessors not liable for errors in, 549.
(See Judicial Officers.)
remedies for excessive and illegal,
(See Remedies for Excessive and Illegal Taxation.)
VALUE —
taxation of property by, 26-30.
objections to this in case of personalty, 26-30.
constitutional provisions for taxation by, 132-144, 435.
imposition of duties by, 176.
assessments by,
(See Assessment.)
certificate to assessment, showing how value estimated, 290.
how provisions for taxation by, affect special assessments, 432-446.
special assessments by, 456, 459.
(See Assessments, Local.)
VERIFICATION —
of tax list, 216, 293, 294.
of assessment, 290, 562.
of notices of tax sales, 336.
VESSELS —
taxes on, 61, 64,270.
(See Ships.)
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VESTED RIGHTS—
under contracts,
(See Contracts.)
of municipal corporations in their property, 494, 495.
cannot be taken away by arbitrary rules of evidence, 223, 224.
nor by legislative mandates, 224.
nor by statutes which undertake to heal fatal defects, 227
(See Law of the Land.)
VICINITY—
meaning of, 464.
VILLAGES —
(See Municipal Corporations.)
VIRGINIA—
provisions for equal taxation in, 144.
property in, must be assessed by value, 435.
VOID ON ITS FACE —
tax record that is, creates no cloud on title, 542-544. ,
process that is, may be resisted, 558.
process that is, no protection to collector, 561.
what will render process invalid, 562.
mere clerical errors will not, 562.
protection where one of two tax warrants is not, 562.
VOID SALE —
does not divest the lien for the tax, 468.
(See Nullity ; Sale op Lands for Taxes.)
VOLUNTARY- PAYMENT—
town, etc., not liable for illegal tax in case of, 565.
party making, is supposed to know his rights, 567.
payment made without warning or protest is, 567.
unless there was fraud or mistake, 567.
protest need not be formal, 568.
payment to release goods from seizure is not, 568.
nor payment after threat of distress, 568, 569.
nor one made on exhibition of process, 569.
payment made for a license petitioned for is, 566.
recovery when the payment was not, 568, 569, 570.
VOLUNTEERS—
taxation of property of, 146.
taxation to pay bounties to,
(See Bounties.)
one may be taxed to raise bounties for, though exempt from military ser
vice, 431.
VOTE —
on ordering special improvement, 465.
(See Town Vote.)
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VOTING THE TAX —
must be legislative authority for, 244.
special regulations for determining amount of state taxes, 244.
determination of local taxes, 244.
1. by the legislature, 244.
2. by local boards acting in legislative capacity, 244, 245.
3. by the vote of popular meetings, 245.
meetings to vote taxes, 245.
must be lawfully convened, 245, 246, 554.
statutes fixing time are notice of, 245, 246.
failure to give additional notice not fatal, 246.
limiting subjects to be considered at, 246.
limiting the amount to be voted at, 246.
special, must be regularly called, 246.
methods of notifying, 246.
action of, is political, 247.
is to be favorably construed, 247.
is not to be overruled by judiciary, 247.
proceedings of, must appear of record, 247, 248, 249.
construction of particular warrants for, 247.
and of particular votes taken at, 247-250.
notice of, if fraudulent or misleading, is void, 248.
proof of, how made, 248.
secondary proof of records of, 248, 249.
assessors may rely upon records of votes at, 248.
action of, not to be assailed as unwise, 249, 250.
statutory appeal from, 249, 250.
levy in excess of that voted, is void,
(Sec Excehsive Taxes.)
action in, not reviewable on «ertiorari, 531.
nor subject to be enjoined as being more than is necessaay, 540.
or on ground of intended misappropriation, 540.
or because of unreasonable delay, 540.
w.
WAGES —
taxation of, 20.
WAGONS —
tax on, in proportion to animals drawing them, 139.
WAIVER —
by purchaser, of conditions to redemption, 368..
by tax payer, of objections to illegal tax,
(See
Voluntary Payment.)
of right to notice, cannot be made by occupant for owner, 365.
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WAIVER — «ontinued.
of right to «ertiorari by delay, 531.
of objections to a public work by silence, 573.
(See Estoppel.)
WAREHOUSE —
belonging to railroad company, taxation of, 151.
WARNING —
payment of illegal tax without, will preclude recovering, back, 567, 568.
(See Voluntary Payment.)
of town meeting, etc., 246.
will limit business to be done at meeting, 246.
necessity that it be legal, 246.
what is a sufficient, 246.
construction of special warnings, 247.
WARRANT —
for town meeting, etc., 246, 247.
return upon, 247.
must be duly signed, 247.
for collection of taxes,
(See Collector's Warrant.)
against collector of taxes,
(See Collector of Taxes.)
protection by,
(See Process.)
WARRANTY—
none in tax sales,
(See Caveat Emptor.)
municipalities give none, as to action of their officers, 572.
WATER —
privilege of supplying a city with, is taxable, 282.
power, is not taxable separate from the land to which it is attached, 282.
special assessments to lay pipe for, 427.
levees to protect against,
(See Levees.)
assessments for drains and sewers to carry off,
(See Dralns; Sewers.)
WATER POWER—
appropriating land for,
(See Emwent Domain.)
WATER RATES —
action establishing insufficient, cannot be corrected by quo warranto, 575.
WATER WORKS —
taxation for, 98.
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WAYS —
private,
(See Private Ways.)
public,
(See Bridges ; Can am ; High'ways ; Turnpikes ; Streets.)
WEEKS—
required in notices, must be full weeks, 335.
WEST VIRGINIA—
provisions for equal taxation in, 141.
taxation of property in, must be by value, 435.
WHARF BOAT—
taxation of, 152.
WHARFAGE FEES —
right to, not included in the term " property," 272.
WIDENING STREETS —
assessments for, 422, 468.
(See Assessments, Local.)
WIDOW—
right of, to redeem from tax sale, 366.
WIDOW AND HEIRS ^
assessment of estate to, 278.
WILL—
taxation of gifts by,
(See Successions.)
taxation of estate under,
(See Executor.)
WINDOW TAX —
formerly levied, now abolished, 20.
WISCONSIN —
equality of taxation in, 144.
constitutional provisions bearing upon special asseasmaata, 444.
special fund for payment of city contracts in, 466.
WOMEN —
are taxable, 45.
(See Married Women ; Widow.)
WORDS —
(Sec Definitions.)
WORK —
right to pay taxes in, not to be taken away by officers, 541.
(See Laror.)
INDEX.
WORSHIP —
taxation for, not allowed, 83, 84.
houses of, generally exempt from taxation, 145.
exemptions may be recalled, 145.
must be strictly construed, 146.
will not preclude special assessments, 147.
estimate of benefits in such cases, 462.
WRIT OF CERTIORARI —
(See Certiorari.)
WRIT OF INJUNCTION —
(See Injunction.)
WRIT OF MANDAMUS —
(See Mandamus.)
WRIT OF PROHIBITION —
(See Prohirition.)
WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO —
(See Quo Warranto.)
WRIT OF REPLEVIN —
(See Replevin.)
WRONG —
committed by the state in the iety of illegal tax, 568.
(See State.)
WRONGFUL ACT —
(See Trespasser ar Initio.)
WRONGS, REMEDY FOR—
(See Remedy; Remedies for Excessive and 'Illegal Taxation.)
Y.
YEARLY LEVIES —
one, exhausts the power for the year, 256.







